Talk:Operation Barbarossa

An event mentioned in this article is a June 22 selected anniversary.

This article could use more beef in terms of Barbarossa's failures. I think the ever worsening relationships between Hitler and the general staff, the difficulty of communication and the differences between political and military goals were something that had a profound impact on how the war went. I think Alan Clark's Barbarossa (ISBN: 0304358649) is the best account i've read of the friction in the top echelons of german command.

Why have you returned the note about the cartoon to this page. It has very little to do with Operation Barbarossa and everything to do with the Molotov-Ribbetrop Pact, where it is also noted. It could also be attached to the Nazi - Soviet invasion of Poland or the Soviet invasion of the Baltic states, but I see no reason for it to be in this article. - SimonP 01:00, August 2, 2005 (UTC)

Should all of the last half of this article be here. It's always been my impression that Barbarossa was merely the opening campaign against the USSR, and not the entire war up until Stalingrad. I think the last four or five paragraphs should be moved to the article on the eastern front in WWII. - SimonP

Before Barbarossa, the Germans and the Russians were allies, having signed an unexpected treaty shortly before the German invasion of Poland.

This wasn't anyting like "unexpected" and it wasn't German but German and Soviet invasion. --Taw

I do think the Molotov-Ribbentrop pact can be described as unexpected. The Soviets only began thinking of allying themselves with the Germans after Munich, and the treaty took the English and French completely by suprise as they had long counted on a Soviet alliance against Hitler. - SimonP

Right at the beginning of the article it needs to be stated, that Germany was aware of Soviet Union's plan to attack Germany. When Hitler found that out, he right away took the offensive and cought the Soviet Army in offensive position, therefore surprised them. Soviet Union had appr 30,000 tanks , Germany 6 or 9,000?, something like that.

Viktor Suworow , (book Ice-Breaker) and book "Der Tag M" (M=Mobilizing Day) proved that the Soviet Army under Stalin was ready to attack. Suworow recently inspected many documents. He was trained in Soviet Army at Suworow Officer School in Kaliningrad and at Officer College Kiev.

Further down in the article it needs to be stated , that the main reason, for bogging down the German army, was weather, the rains and early winter . user:H.J.

... or poor strategic planning of overfamed German military celebrities for which Russian climate and geography were surprise even after the same lesson of Napoleon? Mikkalai 21:55, 14 Apr 2004 (UTC)

...and of Charles XII of Sweden. --Ruhrjung 22:02, 14 Apr 2004 (UTC)

The vast majority of historians still believe the USSR was taken by suprise by Barbarossa. There is no evidence Hitler's attack as a preemptive strike to prevent an impending war. With the opeing of archives after the fall of the Soviet Union it has only become more clear that Stalin was shocked by the attack and the Russian armies unprepared, even if many in the NKVD were fairly certain an attack was imminent. - SimonP

There are only two possible explanations why Hitler attacked Russia. (a) He feared that they will attack him, and decided to do it first, or (b) he was total idiot. I think in reality it was a mixture of two :)

Which resembles the situation with regard to recent events in Iraq. Preemtive strikes they were (believed to be) never-the-less.

--Ruhrjung 22:04, 14 Apr 2004 (UTC)

The reason for Stalin's shock could be quite different as pointed out by Viktor Suvorov. I believe the Icebreaker does deserve a note Gene s 11:11, 3 Jun 2004 (UTC)

I think it needs to be pointed out that the Germans were bogged down by the weather at Moscow mainly because they first took a detour southward earlier in the campaign. Hitler ordered Army Group Center southward to conquer the Ukraine in a pincer operation instead of taking Moscow earlier in the campaign. I believe that several of Hitler's generals, including Guderian, argued against this. By the time they returned towards the push to Moscow, the muds and then the snows had stopped the advance. -- Egern

The detour, as well as (Causasus campain) was a correct decision: to gain resources (and cut Russia off resources). Taking the capital means nothing in modern war. Mikkalai 19:22, 7 Jan 2005 (UTC)

...except in a psychological sense. But I agree with Mikkalai. The Wehrmacht would have been bogged down by the Russian weather anywhere when that time came. The reason for the failure was an overestimation of own strength and an underestimation of the enemy's preparedness to fight, which can also be argued with regard to Britain (...and more recently in Ira^H^H^H ...oooops ;->). But as there exists a plethora of different theories, I think we as far as possible would strive to attribute different explanations of why the operation failed to the respective advocates of these explanations. --Ruhrjung 20:33, Jan 7, 2005 (UTC)

I cannot disagree with you (especially about Ir^H^H), but don't you think that this kind of argument has no place in a serious text? Thinking about it, for every battle lost by an attacker it is 100% safe to say that the loser underestimated the winner and/or overestimated himself (unless it is known that the attack was desperate (knowing bad odds) or thoughtless (hoping for odds)). What are other general-purpose explanations? Mikkalai 21:53, 7 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Well... for different reasons, people are often preoccupied by the question "Why did X win and not Y" at Jena, at Waterloo, etc, etc. Since people really do discuss different alternative explanations, I think Wikipedia can't avoid it. The matter is not "if" but "how" to discuss it. (I don't wish to discuss it in this article, I just don't see how it can be avoided, given the nature of Wikipedia. I've not proposed any changes to the text, only tried to argue against Wikipedia taking the stance to agree Guderian et consortes, as proposed by by User:Egern.) As it stands, I think the current version of the first paragraphs is reasonably good. --Ruhrjung 22:29, Jan 7, 2005 (UTC)

BBC article you gave (http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/war/wwtwo/countdown/countdown_1.shtml) contains at least one important mistake - in April 1939 Inagresion Pact between Germany and Poland was cancelled by Germans, so no way could Hitler be "bound by an agreement he signed with Poland in January 1934". --Taw

official German announcement

On my computer, in mp3 audio format, I possess the official German announcement of the attack on the Soviet Union. The announcement is made by Josef Goebbels, who reads an address from Adolf Hitler. If I can find a website to host this file, would a link to this file be considered relevant enough to add to the "Links" section? Yours sincerely and respectfully, --Cormac Canales 08:58, 21 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Certainly, it would be quite appropiate here. — Monedula 09:29, 21 Aug 2004 (UTC)

That sounds important enough to upload directly to the Wikipedia I'd say. Oberiko 12:47, 21 Aug 2004 (UTC)

Of course, this mp3 belongs to the article! May this mp3 be GFDL-licensed? If yes, it definitely would be better to upload it to Wikipedia! Dr Bug (Volodymyr V. Medeiko) 12:58, 21 Aug 2004 (UTC)

I am not an expert on the international copyright law, but it seems safe to assume that this recording don't have a copyright, i.e. it's public domain (not GFDL) in the same way as laws don't have copyrights. Goebbels might have held the copyright because it was his performance, but even that's unlikely since he was acting as a public official. Encoding the speech to a new medium is not covered by copyright laws. Gene s 11:54, 23 Aug 2004 (UTC)

The speach itself is not copyrighted, but this specific .mp3 can be. It's like the Encyclopaedia Britannica 1913 is not copyrighted, but its modern reprints are. Dr Bug (Volodymyr V. Medeiko) 12:02, 23 Aug 2004 (UTC)

The copyright law protects only creative works. Simple copying is not creative, so it does not create copyright. Therefore, converting a record to mp3 does not change its legal status. Monedula 12:11, 23 Aug 2004 (UTC)

I am not sure you are correct on copyright status of modern reprints of EB1913. Can you provide any links? I am quite certain the copyright does not cover the exact reprint. It may cover something else, added to the modern reprint. It's impossible to extend the copyright by simply republishing a copy. Gene s 12:26, 23 Aug 2004 (UTC)

I am uncertain where we stand in regards to the legality of this file. In any case, here is a link to where it can be downloaded: http://home.ripway.com/2004-1/57781/JosephGoebbels-FeldzugInRussland(22.Juni1941).mp3 [The file size is 630828 bytes (630kb)]. If a message appears that the download is not working, I assure you nothing is wrong with the link. My host only allows a certain amount of downloads for a free account during a 24-hour block. If I surpass this amount, all downloads are frozen for 24 hours. Simply re-try the link after one day. I can also produce the text of this radio announcement in it's original German and translated into English, if the need arises. Stay in contact. --Cormac Canales 01:38, 14 Sep 2004 (UTC)

Entry contradicts itself?

First section (German preparations) has this paragraph:

"Stalin's own bloodthirsty reputation made the Soviet Union a tempting target for the Nazis. During the late 1930s, Stalin had killed millions of people during the Great Purge, including large numbers of competent and experienced military officers and strategists, effectively leaving the Red Army weakened and leaderless. The Nazis often emphasized the brutality of the Soviet regime when targeting the "inferior" Slavs in their propaganda."

While at the end (causes for the Soviet defeat) we have:

"However, all this caused a shift in Soviet propaganda attitudes. Whereas in prewar years it stated that Soviet army was very strong, already in the fall of 1941 it began to tell people that Soviet army had been weak, that there had not been enough time to prepare for war, that the German attack had come as a surprise etc. All this continues to be preached in Russia's schools today (with the extra embellishment that Stalin's purges of 1930s have destroyed the best officers). At the same time, almost everything concerning the Soviet army in 1939–1941 remain secret even today, many years after the war is over."

So did Stalin's actions during the Great Purge leave the Soviet army without good officers or not?

jagripino

Opinions differ. Some say that indeed the Great Purge has killed the best officers. Others think that, quite contrary, the Great Purge has eliminated the unloyal and the incompetent. See Viktor Suvorov's book "Очищение" ("The Cleansing"). — Monedula 15:23, 2 Oct 2004 (UTC)

What Jagripino here sees as a problem is in my view one of the compelling strengths of a Wikipedia, that tries to present attributed opinions rather than a selected version of many alternative truths. The wordings can of course be improved, but there is absolutely no reason for us (Wikipedia) to make a choise in the text of which theory to believe in. --Johan Magnus 16:21, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)

Still, it does seem a bit confusing. Perhaps it'd be best to leave discussion of the effects within the article Great Purge and only make a passing reference to it here. (With the amount of officers taken out though, it does seem pretty difficult to believe that it wouldn't have caused some mass confusion though). Oberiko 16:47, 4 Oct 2004 (UTC)

I have no problems with the contradicting views on the effects of the Great Purge on Operation Barbarossa. If both theories are supporter/disputed, pointing both POVs should be done on the article alongside with a link to the Great Purge entry. Jagripino 16:09, 5 Oct 2004 (UTC)

terrible loss of life, and miserable conditions for Russians and Germans alike. <---POV Lirath Q. Pynnor

Really permafrost?

A comment: In the article it says: "Drilling into the solid permafrost was impossible, and tents couldn’t even be staked into the ground." I am afraid the permafrost is not found anywhere along the front line. A sole exception could be the very north, next to Finland and Norway. I guess the writer meant an ordinary frozen ground which thaws completele in spring, as opposed to the "real" permafrost.

Thank you for the comment, the article has been corrected. Wikipedia is an open encyclopaedia which anybody can edit. If you spot more inaccuracies, we will be grateful if you correct them by clicking the "edit this page" at the top of the window. Just leaving a comment, like you did, is appreciated, too :) Zocky 10:39, 10 Jan 2005 (UTC)

I am wondering how I could have missed this "drilling impossible". This is total nonsense. Of course, it is impossible to do it with bare hands. But I happen to be a ski tourist in my youth. I can assure you, there is no big deal to put up a tent. Once we were camping at -40 deg. Celsius.

And again, Russians had to dig into the very same ground, didn't they? Mikkalai 20:01, 10 Jan 2005 (UTC)

"Scorched earth" was actually German's approach, to debase the guerillas, not Russians'. Mikkalai 20:10, 10 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Next; this is sooo naive:

Thick scrub dotted the landscape, and Russian troops, usually on cavalry, used this to sneak up on Germans and open fire, unnoticed.

ROTFLMAO. Sneaky bastards these Russians.

I am removing the whole this silly paragraph. The only possible way it can be in a serious article is as an exact quotation from some German general looking for each and every excuse to drive the blame off his ass. Mikkalai 20:06, 10 Jan 2005 (UTC)

Where's the beef?

This article seems to lack any description of what actually happened. It goes from preparations to tangential matters (Siege of Leningrad, the Continuation War) to analysis with only a couple of paragraphs about the greatest military engagement in history! No order of battle. No names of commanders. No mention of the encirclements at Bialystok and Minsk. Nothing about the Baltic states. Nothing about the Soviet counter-offensives at Gomel and Korosten. What about the reinforcement of the Smolensk pocket? The battle of West Ukraine and the encirclement at Uman? The siege of Odessa? Gdr 10:22, 2005 Mar 22 (UTC)

Some people have got too much of that kind of history already. You, who obviously have not, are free to fix the shortcoming! :-) /Tuomas 10:43, 22 Mar 2005 (UTC)

I don't see why we need the book "Stalin's War of Extermination" listed in "further reading". For one thing, the book is in German; for another, it's essentially recommending to the reader a blatantly fascist source. Everyking 09:56, 12 Jun 2005 (UTC)

Hand grenades

The statement about hand-grenades being the only operational weapons in the winter, is ambiguous with reference to being able to "pull the pin".

German hand-grenades ("potato-mashers") did not have pins, rather, the soldier unscrewed the bottom and pulled a string that ran through the wooden handle and was attached to a fuse that triggered the grenade after a few seconds delay.

L. Fernandes, Jun. 21, 2005

Incorrect Mention of Stalingrad as objective

I removed the mention of Stalingrad as an objective of Barbarossa, as it was not decided by the Germans that they should attempt to take it until much later (by Hitler at a conference, on 23 of June 1942). Sources are from Antony Beevor's Stalingrad:

"During the conference [that is, the conference on June 1 1942 for Heeresgruppe Sud’s summer offensive], Hitler hardly mentioned Stalingrad. As far as his generals were concerned, it was little more than a name on the map. His obsession was with the oilfields of the Caucasus. ‘If we don’t take Maikop and Grozny, I must put an end to the war’."

Later, on 23rd of June:

"Hitler, having ignored the strategic rationale on which the whole plan had been based, now increased its objectives at a stroke. Sixth army would now take and occupy Stalingrad. He was no longer content with the original idea of just advancing to the Volga and destroying the arms factories."

I ask, how could Stalingrad possibly be considered an objective of Barbarossa if it wasn't even initially an objective of Operation Blau (Army Group South's 1942 Summer Offensive)?

Good point! :o) Indeed the goals of Operation Barbarossa were very optimistic: it was intended to reach the line Archangelsk - Gorki - Stalingrad (or "the Volga") in the autumn of 1941. Of course these bold aspirations were based on the assumption that most organised resistance would have collapsed by then. I fear Hitler was not only suffering from delusions of grandeur but also deluded himself with a presumed Russian inferiority. But then he simply didn't have good intelligence about the strength of the Red Army. In 1942 planning was much more realistic and the scope of the offensive was limited to the severely diminished fighting power of the German army — though still not taking into account the possibility of an enormous growth of Soviet tank production despite the destruction of one of the major tank production centres: Stalingrad.

However, if you think Stalingrad is too far: Baku is even farther! (and yes: the aim was to secure the whole of the Caucasus :o)

--MWAK 10:16, 6 August 2005 (UTC)[reply]

-I'm afraid that simply isn't true, Stalingrad was not considered as a target prior to 23 June 1942 and certainly not explicitedly stated as so. I have already provided evidence to support this contention, now if you want me to believe otherwise you will have to provide some too.

Fuhrer Directive No.21, which states the ultimate objective as "to establish a defence line against Asiatic Russia from a line running from the Volga River to Archangel', and to which you seem to refer, does not constitute in any way evidence that Stalingrad was considered a target.

I find this a very puzzling statement. Of course, it's difficult to prove a negative fact: indeed from the evidence you gave it doesn't follow your claim is true — it isn't even an indication of such unless you make the (understandable) mistake to assume that the goals of 1941 couldn't possibly be more ambitious than those of 1942. As you say, the Fuehrerweisung indicates the Volga as the consolidation line. It should be emphazised that this line was to be reached before November 1941. As Stalingrad is west of that line it was thus intended to occupy that city during the execution of Operation Barbarossa. And this implies it was an operational target. The logic seems impeccable! However it might be that you simply want to make clear that conquering Stalingrad was in 1941 not, so to say, a target in itself, a strategic wair aim and a motive for reaching so far east. I have to agree it was at best a minor one. But then the text in the article didn't say it was. It simply used the city as a geographical indicator.

--MWAK 16:28, 10 August 2005 (UTC)[reply]

American Lend Lease?

I'm not suggesting that Russia's victory should be credited to the United States, but even Zhukov credits the American Lend Lease policies as helping the Soviets overcome their logistical problems.

"Operation Barbarossa" only refers to the events of 1941.--MWAK 08:27, 12 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

reasons of SU defeats in summer'41

You're overestimating purges' effect. As recently (late 80s) opened archives show, only ~30000 officers were permanently purged, out of ~205000 available in 1937. Of course there were not enough officers, but Red Army size was doubled during 1937-1941. Highest officer's average education has greatly increased after the cleansing, and some poor commanders removed (Blucher, Yakir, Tukhachevsky, Uborevich, etc.).

Page with tables and references (in russian) http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/Parliament/7231/army.htm

Yes, but the higher the rank, the worse the ratio gets. Weeding out the older officers decreased common sense and experience. Would that be fully compensated by the nominal length of formal education? And "permanently" means they were never readmitted? So that those still in disgrace on 22 June are not among the 30,000 you mention? Stalin often valued and rewarded the courage of those who dared to contradict him, but the general atmosphere after the purges was one of fear and docility.--MWAK 12:24, 19 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]

"Causes of initial Soviet defeats" section is an utter nonsense. "Soviet armed forces, in contrast, lacked leadership, training, and readiness." - excuse me? Didn't they just fought Winter War in very, very difficult climate?

Yes, and the consensus view of the Red Army's performance in that campaign reinforces the view that the Army lacked readiness, that the standard of training in many units was poor, and that leadership, at least in many units, was poor. By the way, the Wehrmacht drew this conclusion. The US Army also drew this conclusion, estimating at the time of the German invasion that the Red Army would collapse within six weeks. Study of the Winter War, at least the first phase when the Soviets were attacking on a broad front, tends to lead anyone to that conclusion.

Reds attacked in polar winter, sometimes at more than -40 degrees celsius, in near-polar-night conditions, against heavily fortified Mannerheim line - and they broke through it! If this is not combat readiness, I don't know what is. I doubt that _any_ other army of that time could perform similarly.

Sorry to burst the bubble, but during the initial assault against Mannerheim line there was only average -1 - -6 Celsius with 0 -5 cm snow cover at Karelian Isthmus from November 30 to December 24, when temperature started to drop fast. And again at February 11, when the successful breakthrough against the Mannerheim line was started, the temperature was -20 Celsius, and varied from -10 to -24 during the next week after which it rose to zero for the rest of the month. So Soviets didn't attack during the most intense cold of late December and January, but Finns did at Suomussalmi and Ladoga Karelia. And that "heavily fortified" Mannerheim line consisted less concrete than modern concert hall. (f.ex. Helsinki Opera House) :-) --Whiskey 22:25, 27 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

At the very same time Germans were planning to attack France (Poland was defeated by the end of September 1939), but generals convinced Hitler that their army cannot attack in autumn, and then, winter. Even March (a March in France, not Finland!) was too cold. Germans attacked France thru Denmark and Norway in _April_. Which army was more able, German or Red Army?

The other thing to keep in mind here is that leadership, training, and readiness are comparative. The Wehrmacht was the most highly trained, ready, and probably best-led force in the world in June 1941. They had just finished off a series of very successful campaigns, particularly against the French. Any Army facing them had to take this into account. It was not like the US Civil War, when, as Lincoln said "You are all green alike". One side was very green; the other wasn't. DMorpheus 17:08, 21 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Germans had severe problems waging war in _Moscow_ winter, which is warm and well-illuminated in comparison to Finnish one. Who, again, was more trained, ready, and best-led force? Germans with their pitiful three thousand of all-gasoline light tanks against 24000 enemy tanks (~950 of which were heavy tanks with diesel engines (KV-1)), with lack of winter clothing, with generals who do not even know that there are hundreds of kilomenters of bad roads and also that there are cold winters in Russia? This does not make sense.

"Much of their planning assumed that no war would take place before 1942" - yes, this is why paratroopers were at the very border, and what paratrooper are good for, except for an offensive? "Also, a significant part of the Soviet Army was concentrated at the Western Soviet border" - and excuse me, what it was doing there at the border, if not preparing for attacking Germans?!

May I point out that both the Polish and French Armies were poised at their respective borders prior to the German invasions, but neither contemplated any offensive action. Therefore, having a large force at the border cannot be taken as evidence of offensive intent. Review of their procurement and reorganization plans show clearly that the USSR was preparing for war, but certainly not in 1941. DMorpheus 17:08, 21 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Paratroopers were at the border, with their parachutes in border forests, and which were evacuated as a valuable assets under enemy machine gun fire in the first hours of war. Parachutes cannot wait in such conditions for 1942 to come, they will simply rot from wetness. And another thing. No commander in USSR could give order to deploy paratroopers to the border by his own will (well, unless he wants to be court-martialed and shot by NKVD). Since this was happening not in one spot, but was typical, then orders to prepare for invasion in summer of 1941 must be given from the very top.

The difference from French is that Red Army wasn't just "at the border". It was at the very border, literally within 10-30 kilometers of it, in final stages of preparation for invasion.

The overwhelming consensus of professional historians is opposed to this point. I believe you used the word "nonsense" above; it applies here. DMorpheus 22:32, 22 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

21 jun 1941: 22nd army is arriving from the Ural to the Belorus. Significant part of it consists of conscripted 'zeks' (Gulag inmates). Just think for how long it makes sense for armed criminals to be kept outside of labor camps? Until 1942?! 22 jun: 22nd army ordered to prepare for defense and counterattacks. Commander of 186th infantry division of 62nd corpus of 22nd army general-lieutenant N.I.Birukov has 13000 soldiers, 144 field guns, 154 mortars, 16 forging tanks, 558 machine guns, etc. He has everything needed for war, except maps of Belorus. Why? The only one map he somehow manages to obtain is taken from him by commander of his corpus, general-major I.P.Karmanov. Why? Because Karmanov had no map either. Because Karmanov, and many other generals, were supplied with everything needed to wage war NOT in Belorus, but in Poland, Romania, Germany.

Ok, maybe Soviets were so stupid that they had guns, but no maps? No so. According to General-lieutenant Kudryavtsev, retreating Soviets destroyed ~200 railroad cars of topographic maps. With ~1 million maps per car, it amounts to 200 million maps. General-lieuthenant Losev gives other figures: around 100 million maps lost or destroyed. But exact number is not that important. The question is - why they were destroyed instead of being used? Because maps of Germany are totally useless in defence of Moscow.

Son of Stalin, Jakob Dzhugashvili, was in the army, under Moscow, in 7th mechanized corpus under command of general-mayor V.I.Vinogradov. Corpus was fully armed and staffed. 25 jun 1941 corpus was in Western Belorus. I guess everybody will agree with me that it is physically impossible to load 1031 tanks, 358 field guns and mortars, 266 armored cars and 36080 soldiers in rail cars, move them from under Moscow to western Belorus, and unload there, all in three days. It must have started moving there well before 22 jun. Why? To wait there for 1942?

Soviets had 5 corps of paratroopers (I don't know exact English term), each consisted of 3 brigades, had separate tank battalion (50 tanks), artillery division, and more than 10 000 men. _All five_ corps, more than 50 000 of paratroopers, were close to the Western border at the end of May:

1st: general-major M.A.Usenko, Keiv military district

2nd: general-major F.M.Kharitonov, Kharkov military district

3rd: general-major V.A.Glazunov, Odessa

4th: general-major A.S.Zhadov, Pukhovichi

5th: general-major I.S.Bezugliy, Daugavpils

General-colonel A.I.Rodimtsev was in command of 5th brigade (3th corp). According to him, these units were fully equipped and manned. They were moved even closer to the border in the last month. For example, on 22 jun 1941 general-major Zhadov ordered his subordinates to organize emergency evacuation of precious equipment (thousands of parachutes for his 4th corp) which were kept on that day in the forest just _one kilometer_ to the east of the Berezina river (an USSR border)! Equipment was evacuated under German fire. Do you have a plausible theory what Zhadov's troops were doing there?

Troop movements could temporarily leave guns in one train and their ammunition in another, unit commanders could be separated from their units while they are being moved by the railroad etc. Stalin correctly estimated that Hitler cannot win the war, and _incorrectly_ assumed that Hitler will not start the war he cannot win. Germans struck Red Army amassed at the very border, crowded in railroad cars, with planes in hundreds and their fuel stockpiled on border airstrips... Everyone knows what followed.

"The decision not to dig in the infantry divisions proved disastrous" - now, the question is, in which case army would NOT dig in? If it is going to attack!

Because the Red Army's pre-war doctrine so stressed offensive operations that defensive operations were not extensively taught or trained. That was a very good reason why it was a cause of the initial defeats. DMorpheus 17:08, 21 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

And why offensive operations were stressed? Because army (and the whole nation which was effectively at war footing already) was trained and equipped exactly for this - for the conquest of Europe. Even after horrendous 1941 and tens of millions of soldiers lost, remains of Red Army did conquer half of Europe.

"aviation units had their aircraft parked in closely-bunched neat rows, rather than dispersed as they would have been under normal wartime procedure, thereby making easy targets for German ground-attack aircraft in the first days of the conflict." - a 'normal procedure' of packing hundreds of aircraft on border airfields? Isn't it CRYING of imminent invasion? (I infer they were on border because otherwise Germans would have some difficulty reaching, say, Moscow or Kiew airfields, no?)

No, parked aircraft are generally dispersed in wartime unless your air superiority is so complete there is no fear of enemy attack. It is not a sign of imminent offensive action; it's a sign of peacetime readiness levels. See Pearl Harbor for a similar situation. Or compare it to the Battle of Britain - both sides were engaged in very high-intensity air combat, both sides dispersed parked aircraft.

Where were German aircraft 21 jun 1941? Were they "dispersed"? I highly doubt so. I will risk guessing that they were _crowded on the border airstrips with USSR_, with tons of ammunition and fuel nearby. Do you see the similarity? Both armies were readied for surprise attack. Germans struck first.

A small aside - in English it is spelled "Kiev" DMorpheus 17:08, 21 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

"Initially the Red Army was fooled by a complete overestimation of its own capabilties" - sure,

This is a major leadership failure, is it not? DMorpheus 17:08, 21 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

My "sure" was a sarcastic one. I meant that it is simply untrue. It was not "fooled by a complete overestimation", because it did not "overestimate" it's strength. Reds had 7 tanks to every German one, the article also says "the number of artillery pieces and aircraft was also heavily in the Soviets' favor", human resources was also on the Russia side, Germany was critically dependent on Romanian oil and Norwegian ore, while USSR had plenty of both on it's own territory, etc, etc, etc... Simply put, Germany was not superior to USSR in anything and Stalin rightly concluded that it cannot possibly win.

but "Red Army ... could field about 24,000 tanks against the German 3,350", more than 7 to 1 ratio, and Red's tanks were better than German's... "A lack of spare parts and trucks ensured a logistical collapse" - interesting, how did those tanks moved around just before the war?

It is well established that the state of maintenance in Red Army tank units at the time of the German invasion was very poor. See Zaloga, Milsom, or Glantz. It is also well-established that many units lost all combat effectiveness due to logisitcal collapse. Tanks without fuel or ammo are useless. Artillery that cannot be moved to firing positions, cannot be supplied with ammo, and cannot communicate with the troops being supported is useless. See especially Glantz's "Stumbling Colossus" for an excellent description of the sad state of the Red Army on June 22, 1941. DMorpheus 17:08, 21 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I agree here. This was the result of army being in the last weeks of mobilization, army whose commander was 100.00% sure that Germans would not attack, because that would be a suicide (and it _was_ a suicide, as we all know now).

I think you're both right. Structurally the state of readiness of the Red Army was low and training, logistics and leadership ranged from poor to mediocre.

After the 1941, this is what Stalin wanted everyone, including both Soviet and Allied nations, to think. He didn't want to be perceived as would-be aggressor. Reading your comments, I see that apparently he succeeded...

Nevertheless by its size alone it was a very powerful force. Its potential was to be used for an offensive and indeed the disposition of the forces at the western border reflected the intention to take over the initiative almost immediately after a German attack. If this attack took the Soviets by surprise it was by the operational tempo and the ability to keep the exact date a secret until just before the offensive was launched, not by the fact that it happened at all. The Soviet strategy was based on the premise there would be ample warning to mobilise the second echelon early enough for a coordinated campaign together with the first echelon. On 22 June the second echelon was just beginning to move. For a pre-emptive attack? Or just to be sure? We simply don't know. It is fun to speculate though, as the literature shows :o).

On the subject of tank maintenance: the point is that an army in retreat gradually loses most of its tanks. No doubt almost every single German tank also broke down at some point during the campaign. But it could be salvaged.

--MWAK 20:30, 21 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

POV about Suvorov

I think that this is a rather POVish statement:

An alternative explanation is given by Viktor Suvorov in his book Icebreaker, where Suvorov depicts the war as being intentionally facilitated by Stalin. This claim is strongly disputed and is generally considered to be without any factual basis. Many quotes in Suvorov's books proved to have been falsified.

No question it is disputed, because it depicts Soviet Union to be almost as bad as Germans. Communists and Russian chauvinists are outraged by this alternative view and will do whatever they can to discredit it, possibly including doing falsified counter-research (not an unusual thing to do for Communists, I'd say). Can we allow Wikipedia reader to draw his/her own conclusions instead of feeding him/her with generally considered POV?

Not only "Communists and Russian chauvinists" are outraged, but every truth-loving and Hitler-hating person is. Suvorov's "research" is really falsified (not an unusual thing to do for "anti-Communists", I'd say). If you search the Internet for it, you can easily find a lot of contradictions between Suvorov's fantasies and real documents, newspapers and books he "quoted". Suvorov exploits USSR's wrong image and its defeat in propaganda war in order to earn money by lies (not an unusual thing to do for "anti-Communists", I'd say). --Achp ru 12:23, 27 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

This is your POV. I do not propose deticting Suvorov's ideas as ultimate truth, I merely suggest removing any POV (either pro-Suvorov or anti-Suvorov) from the article, letting reader to draw his own conclusions. As for "wrong image of USSR", well... I'm not surprized about that, I see that "ru" in your user name.

I would suggest all the Suvorov-related content be deleted from the article. The leading historians of the conflict consider it nonsense and we waste an enormous amount of time with it. Much like the evolution vs creationism debate in US schools, there is no "controversy" and putting it in the article may lead a non-specialist reader to believe there is. It would be equally productive to debate whether the earth is flat. DMorpheus 17:14, 27 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I suggest we leave it, as a reference to possible offensive planning (in this case Suvorov- the most widely known) by Stalin isnt impossible. Ksenon 18:22, 27 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Gasoline freezing?

I am not sure this new edit is valid. In the winter of 1941-42 a majority of Soviet tanks still has gasoline engines also. Only the latest versions (the T-34s and KVs basically) had diesels. So this cannot be a reason the Germans had difficulties.DMorpheus 21:04, 13 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

The Germans were dependent on truck transport, the Red Army could use rail transport. The severe cold had very asymmetrical effects.--MWAK 20:30, 21 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry, not quite correct. The Germans grabbed a HUGE amount of Soviet trains. mikka (t) 22:46, 21 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

I think its more complex than that. Both sides had trucks, horses, and trains for transport.

Both sides' trucks were largely gasoline-powered. The Soviet trucks (in this era, no modern US lend-lease trucks were available) were elderly but simple designs. The German trucks were a mix of German, Italian, French, and other types, creating a maintenance nightmare. It's ridiculous how many different truck types they had. Hard to say which side was worse off since neither Army had really good cross-country trucks such as the US had. I think it's fair to say both Armies were roadbound with their wheeled supply vehicles.

The 600,000 German horses were not well-suited to the climate and died in large numbers. Offsetting this, they captured large numbers of the smaller Russian horses. I am not sure how many horses each side had by Dec 1941.

Trains - both sides were heavily dependent on trains. One big difference was that the Germans were hampered by the gauge change at the old (1939) Polish-Soviet border. But by autumn they had double-tracked a lot of the right of way. The Soviets did not have this problem, but they did have a shortage of locomotives. IIRC they only made a dozen or so locos in the entire war period, and the US supply of them hadn't started yet in 1941.

"They made a dozen locos" in four years? I find it hard to believe.

Hard to believe, but documented. That's why the US supply of somehting like 1800 locos in Lend-Lease is so important. DMorpheus 18:17, 23 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Not dozen, a little bit more. Steam engine numbers are: 914 in 1940, 708 in 1941, only 9 in 1942, 43 in 1943, 32 in 1944, and only 8 in 1945. No electric or diesel engines were produced during the wartime. --Achp ru 11:35, 27 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

Why do you think the gauge change was at the old Polish-Soviet border? After annexation of Western parts of Byelorussia and Ukraine, the gauge was changed very quickly, for there was no reason to preserve Stephenson gauge there. --Achp ru 11:48, 27 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]

There's no question the weather had a highly asymmetric effect, but not for all the reasons stated in the article. I suggest this whole gasoline issue be omitted since it contributes more confusion than clarity. DMorpheus 20:04, 22 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]