Buddhist crisis
The Buddhist crisis was a period of political and religious tension in South Vietnam from May 1963 to November 1963. The crisis was precipitated by the shootings of nine unarmed civilians on May 8 in the central city of Huế who were protesting a ban of the Buddhist flag. The crisis ended with a coup in November 1963 by the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, and the arrest and assassination of Ngô Đình Diệm on November 2, 1963.
Background
In South Vietnam, a country where the Buddhist majority was estimated to comprise between 70 and 90 percent of the population in 1963,[1][2][3][4][5] President Ngo Dinh Diem's pro-Catholic policies antagonized many Buddhists. A member of the Catholic minority, his government was biased towards Catholics in public service and military promotions, as well as in the allocation of land, business favors and tax concessions.[6] Diem once told a high-ranking officer, forgetting that he was a Buddhist, "Put your Catholic officers in sensitive places. They can be trusted."[7] Many officers in the ARVN converted to Catholicism in the belief that their career prospects depended on it, and many were refused promotion if they did not do so.[7] Additionally, the distribution of firearms to village self-defense militias intended to repel Vietcong guerrillas was done so that weapons were only given to Catholics.[8] Some Catholic priests ran private armies,[9] and in some areas forced conversions, looting, shelling and demolition of pagodas occurred.[10] Some Buddhist villages converted en masse to receive aid or avoid being forcibly resettled by Diem's regime.[11]
The Catholic Church was the largest landowner in the country, and the "private" status that was imposed on Buddhism by the French, which required official permission to conduct public activities, was not repealed by Diem.[12] The land owned by the church was exempt from land reform,[13] and Catholics were also de facto exempt from the corvée labor that the government obliged all other citizens to perform; public spending was disproportionately distributed to Catholic majority villages. Under Diem, the Catholic Church enjoyed special exemptions in property acquisition, and in 1959, he dedicated the country to the Virgin Mary.[14] The Vatican flag was regularly flown at major public events in South Vietnam.[15]
Events
May 1963
A rarely enforced 1958 law—known as Decree Number 10—was invoked in May 1963 to prohibit the display of religious flags. This disallowed the flying of the Buddhist flag on Vesak, the birthday of Gautama Buddha. The application of the law caused indignation among Buddhists on the eve of the most important religious festival of the year, as a week earlier Catholics had been encouraged to display Vatican flags at a government-sponsored celebration for Diem's brother, Archbishop Ngo Dinh Thuc, the most senior Catholic cleric in the country.[16][17] On May 8, in Huế, a crowd of Buddhists protested against the ban on the Buddhist flag. The police and army broke up the demonstration by firing guns at and throwing grenades into the gathering, leaving eight dead.[18][19]
Diệm denied governmental responsibility for the incident. Instead, the president blamed the Vietcong for the event. Diệm’s Secretary of State Nguyen Dinh Thuan accused the Vietcong of exploiting Buddhist unrest and declared that Diệm could not make concessions without fueling further demands. The Vietnam Press, a pro-Diệm newspaper, published a government declaration confirming the existence of religious freedom and emphasizing the supremacy of the country’s flag. Diệm’s National Assembly affirmed this statement, but this did not placate the Buddhists.
On May 30, more than 500 monks demonstrated in front of the National Assembly in Saigon. The Buddhists had evaded a ban on public assembly by hiring four buses and filling up and pulling the blinds down. They drove around the city before the convoy stopped at the designated time and the monks disembarked. This was the first time that an open protest had been held in Saigon against Diem in his eight years of rule.[20] They unfurled banners and sat down for four hours before disbanding and returning to the pagodas to begin a nationwide 48-hour hunger strike organised by the Buddhist patriarch, Thich Tinh Khiet.[21][22]
June 1963
On June 1, Diệm's authorities announced the dismissal of the three major officials involved in the Huế incident: the province chief and his deputy, and the government delegate for the Central Region of Vietnam. The stated reason was that they had failed to maintain order. By this time, the situation appeared to be beyond reconciliation.[23]
On June 3, Vietnamese police and troops of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam poured chemicals on the heads of praying Buddhist protestors in the South Vietnamese city of Huế. 67 people were hospitalised and the United States privately threatened to withdraw aid.
On June 11, Buddhist monk Thích Quảng Ðức burned himself to death at a busy Saigon road intersection in protest against Diem's policies.
In the meantime, Xa Loi Pagoda in Saigon had become a centre of Buddhist unrest. There the monks produced and mimeographed pamphlets attacking Diem's policies for dissemination, organised mass meetings, demonstrations and hunger strikes. They compiled daily news items to motivate followers and campaigned among relatives in the civilian public sector and the armed forces.[24] The Hue shootings were kept on the agenda by a memorial service at the An Quang Pagoda in the Chinese district of Cholon which was addressed by prominent members of the sangha (monks and nuns). Hundreds of ordained Buddhist monks and nuns then formed a procession to take the memorial tablets back into Xa Loi in the city centre.
July 1963
On July 7, 1963, the secret police of Ngo Dinh Nhu—the brother of President Ngo Dinh Diem—attacked a group of journalists from the United States who were covering Buddhist protests on the ninth anniversary of Diem's rise to power. Peter Arnett of the Associated Press (AP) was punched in the nose, but the quarrel quickly ended after David Halberstam of The New York Times, being much taller than Nhu's men, counterattacked and caused the secret police to retreat. Arnett and Browne were later accosted by police at their office and taken away for questioning on suspicion of attacking police officers.[25][26][27]
August 1963
On Sunday, August 18, the Buddhists staged a mass protest at Xa Loi Pagoda, Saigon's largest, attracting around 15,000 people, undeterred by rain.[28][29] The attendance was approximately three times higher than that at the previous Sunday's rally.[30][31] The event lasted for several hours, as speeches by the monks interspersed religious ceremonies.[29] A Vietnamese journalist said that it was the only emotional public gathering in South Vietnam since Diem's rise to power almost a decade earlier.[28] David Halberstam of The New York Times speculated that by not exploiting the large crowd by staging a protest march towards Gia Long Palace or other government buildings, the Buddhists were saving their biggest demonstration for the scheduled arrival of new US ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. in the following week. As a government attack on Xa Loi was anticipated, Halberstam concluded that the Buddhists were playing "a fast and dangerous game".[32] He wrote that "the Buddhists themselves appeared to be at least as much aware of all the developments, and their protest seemed to have a mounting intensity".[28]
On the evening of August 18, ten senior generals of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam met to discuss the situation and decided that martial law would need to be imposed. On August 20, Nhu summoned seven of the generals to Gia Long Palace for consultation. They presented their request to impose martial law and discussed dispersion of the monks. Nhu sent the generals to see Diệm. The president listened to the group of seven, led by General Tran Van Don. Don claimed that Communists had infiltrated the monks at Xa Loi Pagoda and warned that ARVN morale was deteriorating because of the civil unrest. He claimed that it was possible that the Buddhists could assemble a crowd to march on Gia Long Palace. Hearing this, Diem agreed to declare martial law effective on the next day, without consulting his cabinet. Troops were ordered into Saigon to occupy strategic points. Don was appointed at the acting Chief of the Armed Forces in the place of General Le Van Ty, who was abroad having medical treatment. Don noted that Diem was apparently concerned with the welfare of the monks, telling the generals that he did not want any of them hurt. The martial law orders were authorized with the signature of Don, who had no idea that military action was to occur in the early hours of August 21 without his knowledge.[33][34]
Shortly after midnight on August 21, on the instructions of Nhu, troops of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam Special Forces under Colonel Lê Quang Tùng executed a series of synchronised attacks on the Buddhist pagodas in South Vietnam. Over 1400 Buddhists were arrested. The number killed or "disappeared" is estimated to be in the hundreds. The most prominent of the pagodas raided was that of Xa Loi, which had become the rallying point for Buddhists from the countryside. The troops vandalized the main altar and managed to confiscate the intact charred heart of Thich Quang Duc, the monk who had self-immolated in protest against the policies of the regime. The Buddhists managed to escape with a receptacle with the remainder of his ashes. Two monks jumped the back wall of the pagoda into the grounds of the adjoining US Aid Mission, where they were given asylum. Thich Tinh Khiet, the 80 year old Buddhist patriarch, was seized and taken to a military hospital on the outskirts of Saigon.[35] The commander of the III Corps of the ARVN, Ton That Dinh soon announced military control over Saigon, canceling all commercial flights into the city and instituting press censorship.[36]
Once the US government realized the truth about who was behind the raids, they reacted with disapproval towards the Diem regime. The Americans had pursued a policy of quietly and privately advising the Ngos to reconcile with the Buddhists while publicly supporting the alliance, but following the attacks, this route was regarded as untenable. Furthermore, the attacks were carried out by American-trained Special Forces personnel funded by the CIA, and presented incoming Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. with a fait accompli.[37][38] The State Department issued a statement declaring that the raids were a "direct violation" of the promise to pursue "a policy of reconciliation".[39][35]
On August 24, the Kennedy administration sent Cable 243 to Lodge at the embassy in Saigon, marking a change in American policy. The message advised Lodge to seek the removal of the Nhus from power, and to look for alternative leadership options if Diem refused to heed American pressure for reform. As the probability of Diem sidelining Nhu and his wife was seen as virtually nil, the message effectively meant the fomenting of a coup.[40][41][42] The Voice of America also broadcast a statement blaming Nhu for the raids and absolving the army of responsibility.[43]
September 1963
After the events of August, Diem's regime became a major preoccupation for the Kennedy administration and a fact-finding mission was launched with the stated purpose of the expedition was to investigate the progress of the war by South Vietnam and their American military advisers against the Viet Cong insurgency. The mission was led by Victor Krulak and Joseph Mendenhall. Krulak was a Major General in the United States Marine Corps, while Mendenhall was a senior Foreign Service Officer experienced in dealing with Vietnamese affairs. The trip lasted four days.[44]
In their submissions to the NSC, Krulak presented an extremely optimistic report on the progress of the war, while Mendenhall presented a very bleak picture of military failure and public discontent. Krulak disregarded the effects of popular discontent in combating the Viet Cong. The general felt that the Vietnamese soldiers' efforts in the field would not be affected by the public's unease with Diem's policies. Mendenhall focused on gauging the sentiment of urban-based Vietnamese and concluded that Diem's policies increased the possibility of religious civil war. Mendenhall said that Diem's policies were causing the South Vietnamese to believe that life under the Viet Cong would improve the quality of their lives.[44]
The divergent reports led US President John F. Kennedy to famously ask his two advisers:
The two of you did visit the same country, didn't you?[45]
The inconclusive report was the subject of bitter and personal debate among Kennedy's senior advisers. Various courses of action towards Vietnam were discussed, such as fostering a regime change or taking a series of selective measures designed to cripple the influence of the Nhus, who were seen as the major causes of the political problems in South Vietnam.[44]
The inconclusive result of Krulak and Mendenhall's expedition resulted in a follow-up mission.
November 1963
On November 1, 1963, after six months of tension and growing opposition to the regime, generals from the Army of the Republic of Vietnam conducted a coup, which led to the fall of the Diem government and the arrest and assassination of the president.
References
- ^ Moyar, pp. 215–216.
- ^ "The Religious Crisis". Time. 1963-06-14. Retrieved 2007-08-21.
{{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in:|publisher=(help) - ^ Tucker, pp. 49, 291, 293.
- ^ Maclear, p. 63.
- ^ "The Situation In South Vietnam – SNIE 53-2-63". The Pentagon Papers, Gravel Edition, Volume 2. 1963-07-10. pp. 729–733. Retrieved 2007-08-21.
{{cite web}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in:|publisher=(help) - ^ Tucker, p. 291.
- ^ a b Gettleman, pp. 280–282.
- ^ "South Vietnam: Whose funeral pyre?". The New Republic. 1963-06-29. p. 9.
{{cite news}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in:|publisher=(help) - ^ Warner, p. 210.
- ^ Fall, p. 199.
- ^ Buttinger, p. 993.
- ^ Karnow, p. 294.
- ^ Buttinger, p. 933.
- ^ Jacobs p. 91.
- ^ "Diệm's other crusade". The New Republic. 1963-06-22. pp. 5–6.
{{cite news}}: Italic or bold markup not allowed in:|publisher=(help) - ^ Hammer, pp. 103–105.
- ^ Jacobs, p. 142.
- ^ Jacobs, p. 143.
- ^ Hammer, pp. 113–114.
- ^ Gettleman 1966, p. 279.
- ^ Hammer 1987, p. 118.
- ^ Hammer 1987, p. 259.
- ^ Jones 2003, pp. 259–260.
- ^ Jones 2003, p. 254.
- ^ Prochnau, pp. 328–330.
- ^ Langguth, p. 219.
- ^ Hammer, p. 157.
- ^ a b c Halberstam, p. 140.
- ^ a b Sheehan, p. 354.
- ^ Hammer, p. 164.
- ^ Dommen, p. 524.
- ^ Halberstam, p. 141.
- ^ Hammer 1987, p. 166.
- ^ Jones 2003, p. 300.
- ^ a b Hammer 1987, p. 168.
- ^ Jones 2003, p. 298.
- ^ Halberstam, p. 147.
- ^ Halberstam, p. 151.
- ^ Jacobs, p. 153.
- ^ Jacobs, pp. 162–163.
- ^ Karnow, pp. 303–304.
- ^ Halberstam, pp. 157–158.
- ^ Halberstam, p. 152.
- ^ a b c Jones, pp. 256–260.
- ^ Jones, p. 357.
References
- Buttinger, Joseph (1967). Vietnam: A Dragon Embattled. New York City, New York: Praeger Publishers.
- Dommen, Arthur J. (2001). The Indochinese Experience of the French and the Americans: Nationalism and Communism in Cambodia, Laos, and Vietnam. Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press. ISBN 0253338549.
- Fall, Bernard B. (1963). The Two Viet-Nams. London: Praeger Publishers.
- Gettleman, Marvin E. (1966). Vietnam: History, documents and opinions on a major world crisis. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books.
- Halberstam, David (2008). The Making of a Quagmire: America and Vietnam during the Kennedy Era. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield. ISBN 0-7425-6007-4.
{{cite book}}: Unknown parameter|coauthor=ignored (|author=suggested) (help) - Hammer, Ellen J. (1987). A Death in November. New York City, New York: E. P. Dutton. ISBN 0-525-24210-4.
- Jacobs, Seth (2006). Cold War Mandarin: Ngo Dinh Diem and the Origins of America's War in Vietnam, 1950–1963. Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. ISBN 0-7425-4447-8.
- Jones, Howard (2003). Death of a Generation. New York City, New York: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-505286-2.
- Karnow, Stanley (1997). Vietnam: A history. New York City, New York: Penguin Books. ISBN 0-670-84218-4.
- Langguth, A. J. (2000). Our Vietnam. New York City, New York: Simon and Schuster. ISBN 0-684-81202-9.
- Maclear, Michael (1981). Vietnam:The Ten Thousand Day War. New York City, New York: Methuen Publishing. ISBN 0-423-00580-4.
- Moyar, Mark (2006). Triumph Forsaken: The Vietnam War, 1954–1965. New York City, New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521869110.
- Prochnau, William (1995). Once Upon a Distant War. New York City, New York: Times Books. ISBN 0-812-92633-1.
- Sheehan, Neil (1988). A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam. New York City, New York: Random House. ISBN 0-67972414-1.
- Tucker, Spencer C. (2000). Encyclopedia of the Vietnam War. Santa Barbara, California: ABC-CLIO. ISBN 1-57607-040-0.
{{cite book}}: Check|isbn=value: checksum (help) - Warner, Denis (1963). The Last Confucian. New York City, New York: Macmillan.
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