Talk:Battle of Midway/Archive 2

Archive 1

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Department of corrections

I added "(because the Japanese had carried out an identical mission in March)" and "(thanks in part to Yamamoto's haste)". I question the accuracy of "This information was in the hands of both Nagumo and Yamamoto prior". Willmott's Barrier and the Javelin suggests Nagumo had not picked up the signals from Tokyo, & Yamamoto would not re-radiate it for fear of giving away the position of his Covering Force. Trekphiler 19:50, 19 November 2006 (UTC)

Actually, if you read the Japanese carrier air group reports, it's clear that Nagumo *did* have this information in his hands *before* the battle. Akagi's summary report makes that very clear. See Shattered Sword pp. 99-104 for a discussion of this topic. The bottom line is that the Japanese communications network was disseminating current intel information to *all* the Japanese formations (including Nagumo's), and that that information was in Nagumo's hands. The issue, then, is more one of interpretation on Nagumo's part--it seems clear he chose not to alter his scouting dispositions in response to current intel.

-jon parshall- —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jparshall (talk • contribs) 18:15, 18 January 2009 (UTC)

After "California Here I Come", I'm inclined to add "(probably a deception, in case Japan still had active spies on Oahu.)" It's speculation, tho.

I deleted "By any analysis, a loss of that magnitude would have prolonged the war in the Pacific." This is by no means certain. It might have forced Nimitz to change focus, increasing emphasis on submarines, thus compelling a cure to the problems with the Mark XIV torpedo (historically not cured until September 1943), which would have increased damage to Japanese trade and thus shortened the war. This would almost certainly have put paid to "guerrilla submarine" missions. In addition, it's likely to have undercut MacArthur's operations in the South West Pacific Area and his mania for return to the Philippines. (Unfortunately, this falls into "original research"...) The whole "impact" section smells of speculation; I'm inclined to delete.

Also, "Halsey himself was stricken with psoriasis". Was he? I've read it was shingles, & the sources I've seen can't seem to agree.

Finally, I added, "At least part of this was a product of fatigue; Japanese carriers had been constantly on operations since 7 December 1941, including pinprick raids on Darwin and Colombo." This is based on Willmott's B&J. Trekphiler 15:59, 6 December 2006 (UTC)

The sites:

http://www.psoriasis.org/about/psoriasis/

and

http://www.ninds.nih.gov/disorders/shingles/shingles.htm

point out that the first is chronic and itchy and some palliative anti-malarials were available at the time, the second is episodic, painfull (think 50 to 100 recurring cigarette burns) and untreatable at that time since there were no anti-viral meds. It is unlikely that Adm. Halsey would have been incapacitated by the first, but quite likely by the second.

68.100.243.51 16:28, 14 April 2007 (UTC) Uveges 12:25, 14 April 2007 (DST)

I have a suspicion the psoriasis idea comes from the film, where Mitchum is itching like crazy. Just goes to show, you can't trust Hollywood... Trekphiler 20:05, 29 September 2007 (UTC)

I just noticed that the sidebar on this page states that the Japanese had 264 Carrier aircraft and 16 float planes at the battle. It also states that 332 of their carrier aircraft were destroyed in the course of the battle. I know that Midway was a stunning victory, but that is 68 more planes than they supposedly had! I understand that sources may differ on such detalis but logic dictates that either or the other can be correct, but not both. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 72.54.62.114 (talk) 00:39, 22 July 2008 (UTC)

I'm sorry, I'm a novice at Wikipedia. I would like for someone to add this to the "initial attacks" section: Although most sources say 108 aircraft attacked Midway, the Japanese after-action report says 107. The HIRYU only put up 17 (not 18) attack planes. [See ref: The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway] The Japanese attack on Midway resulted in the loss of 9 aircraft, 5 due to fighter action, and 4 due to anti-aircraft fire. Two Zeros may have been scrapped upon return to the HIRYU. [See ref: The Japanese Story of the Battle of Midway] —Preceding unsigned comment added by 71.161.61.35 (talk) 16:44, 1 March 2009 (UTC)

Factcheck.com

"the second wave's torpedo bombers mistook her for an intact carrier." It's fact-tagged, but I've read it somewhere, too.

"Even more important was the irredeemable loss of four of Japan's fleet carriers." It's sourced, but I call that POV; carriers without aircrews are expensive toys, not fighting units. Trekphiler (talk) 17:23, 6 February 2008 (UTC)

Yeah, but as I explain in Shattered Sword, the aircraft the Japanese lost at Midway could be replaced in a matter of weeks, even at the relatively anemic aircraft production rates the Japanese were putting out in 1942. The carriers, on the other hand, could not be replaced for *years*. There's no question that had the Japanese carriers survived Midway, their airgroups could have been reconstituted. The carriers were, therefore, by *far* the most precious assets the Japanese lost that day.

-jon parshall- —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jparshall (talk • contribs) 19:52, 18 January 2009 (UTC)

It was the pilots. By the time of The battle of Coral Sea the IJN had carriers and planes but no qualified pilots. You are right - they were just expensive decoys.

In Isom's "Midway Inquest" the facts seem less certain than this article. Should the article identify disputes? —Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.152.242.65 (talk) 02:25, 21 April 2009 (UTC)

Gene McPhail Sirgorpster (talk) 02:09, 21 April 2009 (UTC)

"Speculation" About Impact of Battle?

I see that one Trekphiler has deleted my couple of sentences about the consequence of a Japanese victory at Midway for the "Germany First" strategy, despite their being sourced to a speech by former SecNav Schlesinger.

Exactly how does one evaluate the "impact" of a battle -- Marathon? Waterloo? Stalingrad? -- without considering the results had it gone the other way? That is not "fiction."

I don't see why a narrow notion of history's permissible scope should be an excuse for deleting valid analysis of why a battle was important. --Andersonblog (talk) 17:40, 6 July 2008 (UTC)

Simple. Historiography traditionally deals with fact, not speculation. If you're going to talk about the effect on FDR, I want to see the impact on the subwar, how Nimitz might've been inclined (if not compelled) to pull subs from Oz to Hawaii, which would shorten the PW. I want to see how Winston would have lobbied hard for more effort in ETO & the prospect for him agreeing to abandon plans for TORCH. I want an analysis of FDR's inclination to keep promises or stand firm in the face of outcry. I want an acknowledgment of how there was already more manpower going to PTO than ETO. And maybe most of all, I want to see how Nagumo achieves it short of a miracle. Put it in the source notes for the interested (&, BTW, I'd look for those sources myself), but leave aside the speculation. This isn't the place for it, & "impact" sections have been taken out before without undue protest. TREKphiler 18:23, 6 July 2008 (UTC)

Thanks for keeping the article factual, Trekphiler. Binksternet (talk) 02:35, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

De nada. I confess a COI on it; I want to see the sources left in... TREKphiler 03:20, 7 July 2008 (UTC)

The "Impact" section states that the loss of four carriers was a heavier blow than the loss of experienced pilots at Midway. I am not sure it is objectively possible to say that one of these had greater impact than the other. My own feeling is that the loss of pilots was the greater blow to the Japanese than the loss of carriers. In 1942, the Japanese still had capability to build carriers and also convert other ships to carriers. Building (i.e. training) an experienced pilot is something else; this takes time. As Saburo Sakai showed, the Zero in experienced hands was still a very formidable weapon in 1942. But in inexperienced hands, the Zero's lack of armor and self-sealing fuel tanks were much more exposed. Pilots like Sakai were good enough to evade being shot, thus making the Zero's weak defense a minor point. At Midway, the Japanese lost many irreplacable Sakai's. --Westwind273 (talk) 09:21, 1 August 2008 (UTC)

I think it's a "6 of 1, half doz the other". IJN did still have experienced aviators, & training new ones (if not of equal caliber) could be done with reasonable facility; building a new CV (or converting a tanker) would take years, time & yard space Japan could not spare. She was barely keeping pace with repairs on damaged merchantmen as it was, a situation that would not improve as the PacFleet Sub Force became more effective. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 13:41, 1 August 2008 (UTC)

Good points; you may be right. What sticks in my mind is later events like the Battle of the Philippine Sea (i.e The Marianas Turkey Shoot). At that battle, the Japanese seemed to have enough carriers. But the inexperience of the pilots led them to make an amateurish attack, which resulted in hundreds of planes shot down. Had those planes been manned by the experienced pilots of Midway (and men like Sakai), I somehow think they would have fared better. Although Japanese planes were inferior by 1944, the few remaining expert pilots were still able to score victories in Zeros and Raidens. --Westwind273 (talk) 08:21, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

I agree that the loss of the carriers was equal to the loss of the airmen; neither was "a heavier blow." However, the aviator losses could have been easily augmented with a training program if it had been started early enough to make a difference by mid-1942. Japan had the human resources. What they truly lacked was the raw materials to make more aircraft carriers and aircraft. Their economy at its peak was one-tenth the strength of the USA's and their imports were now choked off by submarine attacks. Japan also lacked the vision to see how their military code of honor was going to continue taking good aviators to their deaths for very little reason. A number of pilots could have been saved with parachutes and rescue operations. The green "Turkey Shoot" pilots could have been better used on a handful of lesser missions that would have built them up as veteran pilots before the big showdown. Finally, theirs was a war effort run entirely by military men, not civilian technology experts and politicians. The Japanese Army and Navy both cared little for advancements like radar and radio, two technologies that could have saved a few more men if implemented as widely as within US forces. The Japanese never had much hope for success in an extended war, as long as Americans wanted to roll up their sleeves and fight — a situation that surprised the Japanese military planners who thought of their enemy as a nation of shopkeepers. At any rate, the great impact of the battle of Midway was a combination of factors all culminating in making Midway the defining turning point where Japan was now unable to win. Binksternet (talk) 16:08, 3 August 2008 (UTC)

While I don't disagree training could have been ramped up sooner to make up losses, that presupposes better planning, which wasn't in place in fact. Absent that, the only adequate response is a ramp-up after the Midway losses; shipbuilding couldn't cope, but training had the chance to. That said, loss of carriers was de facto the heavier.

As to "cared little for advancements", if Peattie & Evans describe the situation correctly, it's more like incompetence in technical matters. Technical training was virtually nonexistent, & technical competence wasn't valued or understood as desirable, let alone necessary.

"Pilots like Sakai were good enough to evade being shot" True, but he was a rare case. Moreover, Japanese engineering capacity was incapable of producing superior aircraft able to protect the inferior Japanese aviators while providing performance equal to the F4F, let alone the F4U or P-38. (I count the F6F somewhat less dominating in performance.) When the cream of IJN were lost at Midway, it was only a matter of time.

This was only exacerbated by (frankly) stupid strategic decisions in SWPA, & technical incompetence. Given these didn't happen, American forethought in accelerating training, & vastly superior engineering capacity (to even create the likes of the F4U, never mind build thousands of F6Fs & P-38s), meant the outcome was never in doubt. And the airedales should give the Sub Force their due; if Nimitz hadn't bungled his dispositions & force placements so badly (his one real mistake), & if BuOrd & Customs hadn't f*cked up so badly prewar, it would've been over before the end of '43. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 04:54, 4 August 2008 (UTC)

Speculation about the consequences of alternate outcomes to the battle should only be included if they are quotes from published historians, with appropriate citations and references. Speculation by Wikipedians is original research and has no place in Wikipedia articles. - Aprogressivist (talk) 13:16, 20 February 2009 (UTC)

"War and Remembrance": the TV mini-series

The TV mini-series "War and Remembrance", which starred Robert Mitchum and MANY other famous actors and actresses is not included in the "in film" credits for this historical battle. The 'Battle of Midway' episode in that series is FAR more historically accurate than the movie: "Battle of Midway" which starred Charlto Heston (and many others), so I think it should at least be mentioned under the "in film" category. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 96.13.254.157 (talk) 17:46, 2 January 2009 (UTC)

Aircraft strength and losses

The Japanese losses exceed their initial strength. How can this be? Dapi89 (talk) 00:17, 17 January 2009 (UTC)

Naming conventions

I'm wondering whether some thought should be given to following Japanese convention - Family name followed by given name(s) when listing Japanese names in these articles eg; Yamamoto Isoroku instead of Isoroku Yamamoto. Surely this would be more accurate and more encyclopaedic than using Western convention? Minorhistorian (talk) 22:35, 22 January 2009 (UTC)

We are writing in English; we therefore call Admiral Yamamoto what English sources call him. This is more accurate than adopting Japanese conventions; doing so would leave anglophones speaking of Admiral Isoroku. Septentrionalis PMAnderson 18:02, 23 April 2009 (UTC)

Impeachment of Featured article

Hi! I don't have a time to check all statements in this article but just in infobox I have found 2 statements without citations. I added one (but I'm not sure if it's true because I have seen other numbers too) but the 2nd is evidently wrong. Do you realy thing that article without citations and unverified (and wrong) statesments IS FEATURED article? Even in the "featured" article the statement about losses wasn't supported by citation. --Sceadugenga (talk) 14:31, 21 April 2009 (UTC)

This article would not now make FA. Its references are a bit messed up in format, and some are lacking page numbers. It requires a little work to regain FA quality. Binksternet (talk) 16:45, 25 May 2009 (UTC)

June 4 or 4 June?

It's a minor point, but is there really consensus to have the date of the battle 4 June 1942? This has been swapped within the past year, and will be mildly disconcerting to many of the readers about this battle, who will be Americans, not British or Australians. Septentrionalis PMAnderson 18:05, 23 April 2009 (UTC)

"4 June 1942" is fine, since that's how the US military writes dates and this article covers a major US military event. Battleax86 (talk) 22:55, 24 April 2009 (UTC)

It's confusing..Ive never noticed them writing it like that.. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.179.163.66 (talk) 01:24, 17 May 2009 (UTC)

Bustin' a CAP

I think this has been raised before, but I see it's not changed, so let me reiterate. I'm troubled by use of the USN (modern?) term to refer to IJN deployment. I can't think of a better term, tho... TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 12:33, 16 October 2009 (UTC)

We can just use more words to describe the action and the goal; we don't have to use a term from a different time. Binksternet (talk) 16:02, 17 October 2009 (UTC)

I'm open to suggestions. "Top cover"? TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 18:19, 17 October 2009 (UTC)

CVs inacurate

The number of CVs ( carriers) are inaccurate for Japan. They had 6 CVs present at the battle of Midway, the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, Soryu, Zuiho, Hosho. The carriers Ryujo and Junyo ( battle group North) attacked the Northern islands of Aleutian as a diversion.

Currently, the article says Japan only had 4 carriers at the battle, I'm going to change it to 6, and ask if it should be changed to 8 to account for the Ryujo and Junyo. —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.179.163.66 (talk) 01:32, 17 May 2009 (UTC)

That's an interesting question. Should support groups be included, even if they didn't actually participate in the battle? They are included in Midway order of battle after all. It should never be 8 though - the Aleutians were a separate battle. Clarityfiend (talk) 03:05, 18 May 2009 (UTC)

The invasion of the Aleutians was not a diversion; as spelled out quite clearly by Parshall and Tully Operation AL was intended to be run concurrently with Midway. Had it been intended as a mere "diversion" it would have started some days earlier than Midway to allow time for it to be detected and for the Americans to react by sending their forces to the north, well away from Midway. Zuiho and Hosho were over 300 miles away from the combat zone, their contingent of aircraft was very weak and mostly second line material; again, Parshall and Tully make it quite clear that for all intents and purposes the ships that counted during the battle were those that were in the main attack forces - the Japanese support groups have been listed seperately from the main battle group of four carriers, two BBs and 15 cruisers and destroyers (see also http://combinedfleet.com/battles/Battle_of_Midway). Operation Al is described in a seperate article and Ryujo and Junyo are listed there. Minorhistorian (talk) 09:58, 18 May 2009 (UTC)

It's my understanding the extra two carriers Ryujo and Junyo were considered "light carriers", not in the same class as the fleet carriers Hiryu, Soryu, Akagi and the Kaga. Malvenue (talk) 05:34, 27 November 2009 (UTC)

Correct. They were too small & too slow to operate with Nagumo's fleet CVs, & they weren't part of his task force in any event, as Willmott's Barrier & the Javelin very clearly points out. (I haven't read Parshall & Tully yet. :( ) The conventional treatment, 4 fleet CVs, is the correct one. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 07:27, 27 November 2009 (UTC)

Strengths of each side.

I find the strengths the JIN to be incomplete, and wrong.

The Japanese deployed 7 BBs during the battle ( 9 if you count escorts) , 16 SS, 6 heavy cruisers, and a number of DDs.

http://www.2worldwar2.com/battle-of-midway.htm —Preceding unsigned comment added by 75.179.163.66 (talk) 01:55, 17 May 2009 (UTC)

Morison Writing of Criticism of Spruance

A new editor added a bit about Samuel E. Morison theorizing about how Spruance could have shortened the war by going after the Japanese surface fleet. This bit has now been countered by Blair's analysis that Spruance would have been slaughtered in a night battle with Yamato and company. I went to the new editor to ask for a page number in the Morison book, but he says no, and asks about Herman Wouk instead. Can somebody else find this material in Morison? Is a fiction work by Wouk good enough? (ri-i-ight.) If Morison doesn't work, and Wouk doesn't fly, we should delete both the conjecture and Blair's rebuttal. Binksternet (talk) 16:43, 25 May 2009 (UTC)

Adding another author's pure conjecture leaves lots of scope for another editor to come in with a rebuttal based on Parshall and Tully's book, where it is very clearly set out that the US fleet was in no shape to go chasing Yamamoto's battle fleet.Minorhistorian (talk) 22:43, 25 May 2009 (UTC)

So, the way forward is to have no conjecture and rebuttal, or to have conjecture and additional rebuttal? Binksternet (talk) 13:51, 27 May 2009 (UTC)

FWIW, I recall it being raised in Wouk, & I think it's a legit take from SEM. It's still conjecture, tho, & as Morison wrote, I'm not completely sure he was aware Yamato had been present. Also, there was a fashion to criticize Spruance for awhile there... (My $0.02: Blair's right, which is why I added it.) TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 12:33, 16 October 2009 (UTC)

The criticism of Spruance came from Nimitz’s staff, perhaps Nimitz himself, who were following the battle from Pearl Harbor. Perhaps this is the reason why Nimitz never heaped glory on Spruance, and why Spruance’s name is hardly known by the American people.Cgersten (talk) 13:31, 16 October 2009 (UTC)

Can't speak to that. I do know postwar he took some heat. On Midway, tho, I can't image it came from Nimitz, given Nimitz had effectively ordered him not to do anything stupid. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 15:28, 16 October 2009 (UTC)

Many knowledgeable people believe it was stupid of Spruance not to follow up his victory and destroy the remaining Japanese fleet.Cgersten (talk) 18:42, 16 October 2009 (UTC)

And other knowledgable people believe that had Spruance gone after the main Japanese battlefleet his fleet would have been wiped our. By the end of the battle Spruance had the equivalent of one full air group available to him - not enough to do much damage to battleships. Conjecture from chair-borne experts is all well and good, but it should be based on facts not on a bunch of suppositions. Minorhistorian (talk) 20:22, 16 October 2009 (UTC)

The battleships were several hundred miles behind the Japanese carrier striking force, Spruance could have sunk many if not most of the remaining cruisers and destroyers of the now carrilerless carrier striking force.Cgersten (talk) 23:43, 16 October 2009 (UTC)

Morison wrote that Spruance was criticized for not following up his victory at Midway, however Morison does defend Spruance. The old section title implies that Morison did not agree with Spruance, I believe my section heading more accurately reflects Morison’s position.Cgersten (talk) 17:22, 17 October 2009 (UTC)

"The battleships were several hundred miles behind the Japanese carrier striking force" They wouldn't have been by the time Fletcher came in contact. And he had no chance of winning a night battle against Yamamoto, even with a full airwing. IJN was the best night-fighting force in the world in '42, & Yamamoto's heavies would have mopped the floor with Fletcher's CAs. Recall, he'd pulled back in reaction to Murphy, & Yamamoto was still coming. (For clarification: I slip into the common error of crediting Ray; it was Frank Fletcher who was SOPA, & Spruance, correctly, credits him with the win. So should we.) TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 18:15, 17 October 2009 (UTC)

Had Spruance not retreated the first night of the battle, he would have caught the remnants (all carriers sunk) of the Japanese carrier fleet, and been able to have been a position to sink most of the Japanese destroyers and cruisers in the carrier fleet. Yamamoto’s battleships were hundreds of miles away and would not have been in the battle.Cgersten (talk) 20:14, 17 October 2009 (UTC)

Wrong on both counts; on June 5 Yamamoto's main battle fleet was still advancing towards Midway while the remainder of Yagumo's Japanese carrier strike force had begun retreating towards Yamamoto; had Fletcher attempted to push ahead he would have encontered the MAIN Japanese fleet - not the remmnants of the carrier fleet. As Trek has described, the Solomon's Campaign showed how capable the Japanese were at night combat, and even a bunch of cruisers and destroyers were capable of delivering devestating torpedo attacks from outside the range of Spruance's battleship gun range. The Japanese were licking their chops in expectation. Minorhistorian (talk) 22:31, 17 October 2009 (UTC)

Spruance had no battleships. What I am talking about is Spruance’s lost opportunity to attack the remnants of the carrier strike force with dive bombers and torpedoe attack aircraft. Also the Japanese torpedoes would not be effective if the American fleet was over a hundred miles away in the open sea.Cgersten (talk) 23:47, 17 October 2009 (UTC)

"Spruance had no battleships." Exactly. Even presuming Fletcher ignores Murphy's (wrong) contact report, he's got to close about 400nm just to get in striking range. Granted, Yamamoto's going to take a beating, but recall, it took (*looks it up*) 100 a/c to put down Yamato in '45, after much more combat experience & with better torpedoes, & she was more/less alone. Fletcher had about, what, 60 effectives at dusk? And exhausted aircrews. And facing a task force loaded for bear, including a CVE able to offer (some) air cover (which Yamato scarcely had in '45), with better a/c than the F4F (not the rough parity of '45) & much better aircrews (not the vast U.S. edge of '45). Given Fletcher gets the first shot in, he'll recover at around 150nm, putting Yamamoto in contact after dark in pursuit...& Fletcher looks like a bigger idiot than Halsey. Without reading the page again, I'd say Fletcher doesn't even get the first shot, 'cause they meet a couple of hrs before morning twilight, & Fletcher gets his ass handed to him. By Nimitz, for creating such a FUBAR, after being told not to, because they don't have CVs growing on trees. (Which they do in '45, BTW.) On the bright side, Murphy doesn't get unjustly turfed out, but that's pretty small change, against losing 3 CVs, a couple of CAs, & 10000 men.

Of course, this could end up actually shortening the war, 'cause now, Nimitz will have to rely on his subs, & maybe (**Pet Peeve Alert**) he'll light a fire under English to get the lousy damn MkXIV fixed before September '43, & maybe look at concentrating on the Luzon Strait, or even consider mining... TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 00:13, 18 October 2009 (UTC)

This debate is about Spruance going after the remnants of the carrier strike force, not Yamamoto's battleship task force.Cgersten (talk) 00:31, 18 October 2009 (UTC)

No, it's not. If Fletcher (SOPA, recall) pursues, he falls into the hands of Yamamoto. He then must cope with the Main Body heavies. And Yamamoto wins. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 01:04, 18 October 2009 (UTC)

Spruance was in no position to go after the remnants of Nagumo's force! His air groups were depleted and, as Trek says, the aircrew were exhausted. One: There were few torpedo toting Devestators left and, as the battle proved, the damned torpedoes were of no use anyway! (I agree with Treks pet peeve - American torpedoes were the pits - aerial and submarine - the lack of impetus to iron out the designs before the war was nothing short of criminal). Second: Spruance had no idea of where Yamamoto's force was, nor did he know which way it was headed. So, he presses on regardless? Can any armchair admiral guarentee that the next morning he wouldn't have blundered right into the middle of Yamamoto's battlewagons instead of being suitably positioned 100 miles away? Spruances main priority was to preserve the USN's chief assets, namely the carriers - something the Japanese didn't do. Spruance had enough courage to know when he had done enough and preserved his carriers. Instead of all this 20/20 hindsight criticism he deserves to be given accolades for a job well done. Minorhistorian (talk) 01:49, 18 October 2009 (UTC)

You wrote: Spruance had enough courage to know when he had done enough and preserved his carriers. Instead of all this 20/20 hindsight criticism he deserves to be given accolades for a job well done. If you were to ask 100 randomly selected Americans who Spruance was, you would be lucky to get one accurate response. Spruance failure for not following up his victory at Midway lost him his place in history.Cgersten (talk) 02:01, 18 October 2009 (UTC)

It is more accurate to say Spruance's careful husbanding of unreplaceable resources is what lost him his place in history. America likes gamblers and grandstanding heroics, and that was not Spruance. Binksternet (talk) 02:36, 18 October 2009 (UTC)

Cgersten, are you actually reading anything into my comments other than those which support your pet theory? You have simply taken my comment out of context to support your "case" - Spruance had the guts and the courage as the commander who was on the spot (and not sitting back at Pearl Harbor or Washington) to know when to quit - had he followed on and attempted to advance, without knowing the position of the main Japanese battle fleet, and with a depleted and exhausted air group, we who were not there may well be discussing why Midway was a disaster for the USN - this article could read something like "The Japanese lost four carriers but Spruance needlessly lost his remaining carrier strength to torpedoes and battleship guns by blundering directly into Yamamoto's path. The Yamato proved particularly devastating against the Enterprise..." That Spruance is now hardly recognised does not support your case - all it demonstrates is that there were people in the USN and in Washington who were gunning for him no matter how well he accomplished his primary tasks (those same powers that be did nothing to solve the torpedo crisis which plagued submariners for the next 18 months or so). What is YOUR evidence that Spruance would have seriously depleted or destroyed the remnants of Nagumo's force before Yamamoto arrived? Minorhistorian (talk) 09:08, 18 October 2009 (UTC)

You wrote: What is YOUR evidence that Spruance would have seriously depleted or destroyed the remnants of Nagumo's force before Yamamoto arrived? The following day when Spruance changed his main and decided to chase the Japanese fleet, his aircraft caught up with two Japanese cruisers, sinking one and seriously damaging the other.Cgersten (talk) 13:42, 18 October 2009 (UTC)

<--"his aircraft caught up with two Japanese cruisers, sinking one and seriously damaging the other." In daylight. Conceded, notice. Even if the SBDs had been numerous, a) the Mk13 was a joke (Blair says "It had all the defects of the Mk14, plus others." [!!]) & b) many, many weaps had been depleted from CV stocks, which weren't replenished. How many would it take? 30 for no hits, if experience of VT-6 & VT-8 is any indication. Did Fletcher even have the weaps to do the job? Also, Mogami & Mikuma were all by their lonesome (spotted by Murphy & mistaken for the Main Body), which Yamamoto wouldn't be: & he had air cover. Not a lot, but Fletcher was on a comparative shoestring, so it's not going to be a turkey shoot, which the CAs were. And it risks both Fletcher's CVs (something he can't afford to do) & his aircrews (which, as IJN would learn after Midway, are even harder to replace). Never mind all that, tho. What you are ignoring is, it isn't daylight ops that are the issue. It's what happens after Fletcher (not Spruance) claims a couple of cruisers of Main Body: namely, Yamamoto mops the floor with Fletcher's CAs & sinks 2 CVs, & Midway is a disaster, not a victory. Recall, also, Fletcher had to account for the possibility of invasion (which is why Spruance moved back 100nm on Murphy's mistaken report). And don't forget, even Nimitz (with complete info) wasn't entirely sure where all the disparate IJN TFs were, nor was Fletcher, so he risked the very blundering into Yamato, in the dark, Minor mentions. The fact Spruance is unknown proves exactly nothing. (Well, it proves he doesn't have Patton's press agent. Or MacArthur's press corps.) It may say more to who Spruance was than how big a gaffe not pursuing was; notice, Spruance gave away credit for the victory to Fletcher, who was SOPA, as a matter of personal honor. I have a sense Spruance didn't care if he was famous. The people who counted knew who he was & what he'd done. And the historiographers know, which I think would suit him fine. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 17:06, 18 October 2009 (UTC)

I'm not forgetting Mogami and Mikuma; as Cgersten should well know Mogami had had her bows practically ripped off and bent after colliding with Mikuma. Their maximum speed at the time they were most fortuitously spotted was 14-20 knots - the only reason they were spotted and attacked was because of their low speed, otherwise they would have been well out of range of American aircraft. That they were attacked and Mikuma sunk and Mogami and the destroyer damaged shows that American dive bomber crews were quite capable of dishing out some punishment. However dive bombers alone would have been incapable of sinking the Japanese battlewagons - Yamato alone absorbed 9-13 torpedoes and six bombs before sinking. No torpedo aircraft were involved in the attacks on the two cruisers because their were so few left. The most Spruance and Fletcher could have hoped for, had they blundered into the main Japanese battlefleet, was to seriously damage maybe one or (at a stretch) two battleships; certainly not a good reason for sacrificing his two remaining carriers. Minorhistorian (talk) 22:55, 18 October 2009 (UTC)

I don’t understand. I keep stating that Spruance aircraft could have annihilated the remnants of the Japanese carrier strike fleet, and you all change the discussion to a surface attack on Yamamoto's main battle fleet which was hundreds of miles from the battle.Cgersten (talk) 00:51, 19 October 2009 (UTC)

No, you don't understand. As repeatedly pointed out, pursuit threatened to put Fletcher at risk of coming in contact with Yamamoto's heavies under conditions Fletcher was completely incapable of defending against them, which would result in disaster. You seem to have a misconception Yamamoto's force was a static item, like an island, that can be marked & ignored. Wrong.

Minor, I wasn't suggesting you'd forgotten M&M at all. I guess I should've been clearer. I meant it to point out, damage or no, they weren't defended. (I was getting a bit lazy & not looking it up to say for sure they'd collided after spotting Murphy.) As for whether Yamato could've survived what Fletcher could throw, I have no doubt of it. In fact, I'm of the firm opinion Yamamoto would've been better advised to put his gunships in the van & shell the blazes out of Midway, with Nagumo acting as cover/scout, 'cause the MC aviators there were incompletely trained, & B-17s were lucky to hit ocean from altitude, so Yamamoto'd have been little in harm's way. This would also've solved Nagumo's probs with lack of recce assets (they were with the CCs, which were in company with Yamamoto...). If this isn't bad command decision by Yamamoto, I don't know what is. (I credit Wilmott's Barrier & the Javelin with pointing this out.) Except, as I understand it, shelling land bases was contrary to IJN practise (or doctrine, I'm not entirely clear which): preference for attack & ship-ship action....

Folk, next time somebody tells you Yamamoto was a genius, recall Midway. And straighten out the misconception. It's overdue for correction. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 01:42, 19 October 2009 (UTC) (P.S. I was too tired to notice what a boob connecting SBDs & the Mk13 was. 8o :( )

Yamamoto pushed the idea that attacking the United States was an essential part of the Japanese expansion into Southeast Asia. Others argued (unsuccessfully) that expansion could be had at the expense of Britain, France and the Netherlands but without poking a stick in America's eye. Some very smart modern historians including Mark R. Peattie weigh in against Yamamoto to say that America would not have entered WWII if Japan kept to the narrower path of taking Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam, Korea, etc, and refrained from bloodying America's nose. Binksternet (talk) 02:02, 19 October 2009 (UTC)

I wouldn't lay that one on Yamamoto. I think he tried his best to dissuade IJA from provoking the U.S., & they didn't listen. His advocacy of the HI attack is based on IJN belief (to the point of certitude) the U.S. would inevitably come to Britain's aid when Japan attacked, so it was necessary to attack the PacFlt to avoid USN interference. Looking at a chart of W Pac, it's easy to see why.

Was this a genuine belief? I'm not sure. I have a hunch (no more) IJN didn't want to lose even more of the defence budget to IJA. And maybe Yamamoto was secretly hoping IJA would realize how stupid the idea was; since few IJA SOs knew anything about the U.S., it was a vain hope. And IMO he lacked the morale courage to commit seppuku to protest, which every Japanese would understand; here, I may be thinking he owed greater loyalty to Japan, where he may have felt he owed it to the Throne. TREKphiler ^{hit me ♠} 03:36, 19 October 2009 (UTC)

Waldron's mimeographed message

Reargun tried to put in a quote by Jack Waldron but it was spelled wrong, it was incomplete and it broke the flow of the paragraph. Here is what the torpedo squadron leader wrote out and mimeographed to hand to each of his men before they were all knocked out of the sky:

Just a word to let you know I feel we are all ready. We have had a very short time to train and we have worked under the most severe difficulties. But we have truly done the best humanly possible. I actually believe that under these conditions we are the best in the world. My greatest hope is that we encounter a favorable tactical situation, but if we don't, and the worst comes to worst, I want each of us to do his utmost to destroy our enemies. If there is only one plane left to make a final run-in, I want that man to go in and get a hit. May God be with us all. Good luck, happy landings, and give 'em hell. – Jack Waldron as quoted in Mitscher's biography. Again, in Life magazine.

Anybody think some or all of this is worthy of being worked into the article? Binksternet (talk) 16:45, 2 December 2009 (UTC)

In a word, no. This strikes me a standard pre-battle exhortation, nothing special, & would attract no attention whatever had VT8 not been wiped out. And if it's going to encourage the likes of Reargun to claim this makes VT8 "the first kamikaze", that's as good an argument as I can think of to leave it out, because that is preposterous. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 18:27, 2 December 2009 (UTC)

Not exactly Blood, toil, tears, and sweat. I wouldn't even put this in John C. Waldron. Clarityfiend (talk) 03:37, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

Agreed with Trek. The Devastator was an antiquated aircraft that didn't have much of a chance against the Japanese Zero, but their missions weren't necessarily suicide runs, especially if they didn't have to fight through many Zeroes. The Japanese's anti-aircraft weapons were probably comparable to the other Axis ships, and the British Swordfish—certainly worse than even the Devastator—managed to torp the Italians at Taranto and Bismarck on her way home. In this situation, it was expected that the Zeroes would have a distraction from the Wildcats escorting the dive bombers, but it didn't work out that way. —Ed (talk • majestic titan) 05:18, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

Yeh, it got pretty bungled, but that's a product of inexperience with carrier combat, not like they set out to get killed. Or that Fletcher intended them to, which kamikaze suggests. And yeh, Clarity, not exactly one for the history books, tho considering they got killed, leaving off Waldron would be a bit like leaving off Cardigan from Balaclava (despite no Tennyson). TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 08:12, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

The torpedoes were lousy. Someone has to take credit for that in the US military. The Devastator flying without air support and do no having enough fuel continues its mission and they continue. Now what sort of mission is that!!!

Please read this book

http://www.amazon.com/Battle-Midway-Destruction-American-Squadrons/dp/0300122640/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1259838149&sr=8-1

much of which is available here and make your own mind up.

http://books.google.com.au/books?id=vQ5jd3yD6YYC&pg=PA32&lpg=PA32&dq=The+Devastator+compared+Swordfish&source=bl&ots=TnSNUKV_rd&sig=_mCUsz7kiF1-sZWlK63ylzR4HgU&hl=en&ei=TJoXS57xMoHo7APdy5TNDw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8&ved=0CCEQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=&f=false

I will respect what you guys decide Reargun (talk) 11:15, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

I'm not sure what you are trying to say there. Obviously the Devastator was not a good plane to be in without fighter cover, but the same could be said for B-17s, B-24s, Dauntless', etc... —Ed (talk • majestic titan) 14:45, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

<==Looks like a consensus exists for not quoting Waldron. Binksternet (talk) 22:31, 3 December 2009 (UTC)

Yeh. FWIW, from what Reargun's said on my talk, it seems he's not drawing a clear distinction between a bad bungle & a deliberate intention. (And yeh, the Mk13s were horrible, don't get me started on that... ;D) TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 02:16, 4 December 2009 (UTC)

I accept that decision, what I decided to do is create a page for Jack Waldron which quite surprised me when I found out he did not have one considering his importance to the battle. 122.107.221.110 (talk) 11:55, 5 December 2009 (UTC) 122.107.221.110 (talk)

Did you not see my link to John C. Waldron? Clarityfiend (talk) 20:46, 5 December 2009 (UTC)

Give that back!

"seizing the strategic initiative"? I'll accept Japan lost it; my impression is, it wasn't until Watchtower was launched the U.S. actually "seized" anything. (I could be persuaded, tho.) Also, I changed to "perceived", since the sub threat was very under-appreciated by IJN (& most historiographers since! :/) TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 15:23 & 15:25, 7 December 2009 (UTC)

The Ironside file

While I don't disagree with "crippling" entirely, it went beyond merely severe (which that suggests) into something Japan was simply incapable of replacing, even absent any other losses for the duration. "Shattering losses"? TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 04:48, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

Anything but "irreparable damage". It makes it sound like the ships that managed to limp back to port had to be scrapped because they couldn't be fixed! How about "catastrophic losses"? Clarityfiend (talk) 19:38, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

I find "catastrophic" a bit strong, suggesting the war should've ended immediately. (Of course, had Japan's leadership any sense, maybe...) I'm looking for some sense of decimation beyond recovery, but not "cry Uncle" effects. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura} 19:45, 20 February 2010 (UTC)

new info about Air Group 8

Robert J. Mrazek's book "A Dawn Like Thunder" brings to light some interesting evidence by Bowen Weisheit. Weisheit interviewed surviving members of Air Group Eight and discovered that they were sent on an incorrect heading. According to several eyewitnesses, the Air Group Commander, Stanhope C. Ring, told Mitscher that he would head out on a 263 heading, even though the contact report put the Japanese fleet at a heading of 240. Waldron (commander, Torpedo Eight) was present at the time and argued for a 240 heading, adjusted for the enemy's course and speed. Mitscher supported Ring rather than Waldron, and as a result, the balance of Hornet 's air group went the wrong way. There is considerable navigational evidence (from mementos and saved paperwork) to support this.

The new evidence is interesting because it not only explains how Waldron managed to find the Japanese fleet (he had the correct contact report) but it also opens up a few cans of worms concerning Ring and Mitscher, i. e. that they deliberately sent the Air Group in the wrong direction (Mrazek speculates that Mitscher suspected the Japanese force was more dispersed than it was and he sent them off to try and find a trailing group) and that they falsified their After Action reports in order to cover their mistake (both give a different heading than 263, making it appear that Ring's group barely missed the Japanese fleet). It's surprising just how much more information comes to light after so long.Dallan007 (talk) 07:24, 27 February 2010 (UTC)

With respect to all authors and contributors, the Order of Battle section of this article unclear on an important point.

"Nagumo was now in a quandary. Rear Admiral Yamaguchi Tamon, leading Carrier Division 2 (Hiryū and Sōryū), recommended Nagumo strike immediately with the forces at hand: 18 Aichi D3A2 dive bombers each on Sōryū and Hiryū, and half the ready cover patrol aircraft.[56]"

It is not at all clear from this excerpt or anything that precedes or follows it what target(s) Admiral Tamon was recommending an immediate attack against and under what conditions. Was he recommending an immediate second attack against Midway Island or an attack against the American fleet? Well, we can find out if we read elsewhere that Tamon recommended an immediate air strike against the American fleet without taking time to rearm the aircraft for anti-ship operations. According to the article, none of this would have made any difference as Admiral Fletcher had already launched the aircraft that were to be victorious against the Japanese, but it is a bit confusing to read. Why even mention Tamon and his recommendation without specifying exactly what the recommendation was and what apparent advantages and disadvantages it might have for the Japanese? In other words, why did this recommendation put Nagumo in a quandary? 74.177.135.142 (talk) 05:56, 27 March 2010 (UTC)

The quandary is simple & evident: Fuchida is saying Midway needs another strike. VS-4 is saying there's a U.S. carrier, which is a serious threat to Nagumo's task force. Nagumo can't recover his inbound strike birds without a delay that might cost him a shot at the carrier, which Yamaguchi is saying he should hit, losses to the inbound birds be damned. QED. BTW, it made no difference, because Fletcher's birds would hammer him even if he launched immediately, as Yamaguchi advocated. TREKphiler ^{any time you're ready, Uhura}

Useful resource

Website with contributions by Battle of Midway veterans and others: The Battle of Midway Roundtable. Jmrasor (talk) 02:36, 31 March 2010 (UTC)