Hannibal

Hannibal (from Punic, literally "Baal is merciful to me", 247 BC – 183 BC) (sometimes referred to as Hannibal Barca) was a politician and statesman who is considered one of the finest military commanders in history and the greatest enemy of the Roman Republic. Hailing from Carthage, Hannibal was best known for his achievements in the Second Punic War in marching an army from Hispania over the Pyrenees and the Alps into northern Italy and defeating the Romans at the Battles of the river Trebia (218 BC), Lake Trasimene (217 BC) and Cannae (216 BC). After Cannae, the Romans refused to fight him in pitched battles, instead aiming to defeat him by sheer attrition (the Romans had obvious and huge advantages of supply and manpower). After years of occupying Roman territory in a series of fits and starts, a counterinvasion of North Africa by the Romans under Scipio Africanus in 204 BC forced Hannibal to return to Carthage, where Scipio defeated him at Zama (202 BC).

As the son of Hamilcar Barca, he is often called Hannibal Barca. In fact Barca was a nickname, meaning lightning, and not a surname. However for convenience Hamilcar's family are called by historians the Barcid family, and calling him Hannibal Barca does avoid confusion with other minor Carthaginians who shared his name but not his fame.

Following the end of the war, Hannibal led Carthage for several years, aiding its recovery from the devastation of the war, until the Romans forced him into exile in 195 BC. He went to live at the court of Antiochus III of the Seleucid Kingdom. In 190 BC the Romans, having defeated Antiochus and imposed the Peace of Apamea (188 BC), demanded that he turn Hannibal over to them and the general fled again, this time to the court of King Prusias I of Bithynia. When the Romans demanded that Prusias surrender him in 182 BC, Hannibal left but soon committed suicide rather than submit. He died in 183 BC

Hannibal is universally ranked as one of the greatest military commanders and tacticians in history, alongside Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Scipio, Genghis Khan, Subutai, Shaka Zulu, Napoleon I of France, and only a few others. Military historian, Theodore Ayrault Dodge, once famously christened Hannibal as the "father of strategy".

Background and early career

Hannibal Barca ("mercy of Baal"), son of Hamilcar Barca, was born in 247 BC. After Carthage's defeat in the First Punic War, Hamilcar set about the task of improving Carthage's fortunes. To do this, Hamilcar began the subjugation of the tribes of Spain. Carthage at the time was in such a poor state that its navy was unable to ferry his army to Iberia (Hispania); instead, he had to march it to the Pillars of Hercules and cross there. According to a story he later told at the court of Antiochus, Hannibal came upon his father while he was making a sacrifice to the gods before leaving for Hispania. Hannibal, then quite young, begged to go with him. Hamilcar agreed and allegedly made Hannibal swear that as long as he lived he would never be a friend of Rome. Hannibal is reported to have told his father, "I swear so soon as age will permit...I will use fire and steel to arrest the destiny of Rome."

Hannibal's father went about the conquest of Hispania with all the skills given to military men. When he was killed in a battle, Hannibal's brother-in-law Hasdrubal succeeded to his command of the army. Hasdrubal pursued a policy of consolidation of Carthage's Iberian interests, even signing a treaty with Rome whereby Carthage would not expand past the Ebro River, so long as Rome did not expand south of it.

Upon the death of his brother-in-law (221 BC) Hannibal was acclaimed commander-in-chief by the army and confirmed in his appointment by the Carthaginian government. Titus Livy, a Roman scholar, gives a depiction of the young Carthaginian: “No sooner had he [Hannibal] arrived...the old soldiers fancied they saw Hamilcar in his youth given back to them; the same bright look; the same fire in his eye, the same trick of countenance and features. Never was one and the same spirit more skillful to meet opposition, to obey, or to command...”. After he assumed command, he spent two years consolidating his holdings and completing the conquest of Hispania south of the Ebro. After this was accomplished, he set out to fulfill what he felt to be his life task: the conquest and humiliation of Rome. Accordingly, in 219 BC he used a pretext for attacking the town of Saguntum, which stood under the special protection of Rome. Disregarding the protests of Roman envoys, he stormed it after an eight-month siege. As the Carthaginian government, in view of Hannibal's great popularity, did not venture to repudiate this action, the war he sought was declared at the end of the year. Hannibal was now determined to carry the war into the heart of Italy by a rapid march through Hispania and southern Gaul

Second Punic War in Italy (218—203 B.C.)

Overland Journey to Italy

Hannibal's army in Iberia reportedly totaled 90,000 infantry and 12,000 cavalry, although those figures most probably included Hasdrubal's forces as well as his own. The expeditionary force would still number as many as 75,000 foot soldiers and 9,000 horsemen. Hannibal departed New Carthage in late spring of 218 B.C. He fought his way through the northern tribes to the Pyrenees, which by clever mountain tactics and stubborn fighting, he succeeded in subduing. After marching 290 miles through hostile territory to arrive at the Ebro by late June, Hannibal selected the most trustworthy and devoted contingents of the large army of Libyan and Iberian mercenaries that he had at his disposal, to continue onward with his voyage. He left a detachment of 11,000 troops to garrison the newly conquered region. At the Pyrenees, he released another 11,000 Iberian troops who displayed reluctance to leave their homeland. Hannibal reportedly entered Gaul with 50,000 foot soldiers and 9,000 horsemen.

Hannibal recognized that he had the Pyrenees and the Alps to cross, in addition to many mighty rivers. Moreover, in addition to natural obstacles, he would have to contend with opposition from the Gauls, through whose land he must pass upon his way. Starting in the spring of 218 BC, he easily fought his way through the northern tribes to the Pyrenees and, by conciliating the Gaulish chiefs on his passage, contrived to reach the Rhone before the Romans could take any measures to bar his advance. Arriving at the Rhône in September, Hannibal's army numbered 38,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and thirty-seven war elephants.

After outmaneuvering the natives, who endeavored to prevent his crossing, Hannibal evaded a Roman force sent to operate against him in Gaul; aproceeded up the valley of one of the tributaries of the river Rhone (probably the Isere) and by autumn arrived at the foot of the Alps. His passage over the mountain chain (probably in the vicinity of the Col de Mont Cenis) was one of the most memorable achievements of any military force of ancient times. By this time, Hannibal had successfully crossed the Alps; having surmounted the difficulties of climate and terrain, the guerrilla tactics of the native tribes, and the challenge of commanding a army diverse in race and language under harsh conditions. After completing his overland journey, Hannibal descended from the foothills into northern Italy. He had arrived, however, with only half the forces with which he is said to have set out, and only a few elephants. In total, Hannibal had lost as many as 20,000 out of 46,000 men. Hannibal from the first, seems to have calculated that he would have to operate without aid from Hispania. On the other hand, the figures for the amount of troops he had when he left Hispania are less reliable. Nonetheless, Adrian Goldsworthy thinks that due to the opposition of the natives and the difficulties of landslides and cold altitudes, the costs of Hannibal's march were considerable.

Battle of Trebia

Hannibal's perilous march brought him into Roman territory and frustrated the attempts of the enemy to fight out the main issue on foreign ground. His sudden appearance among the Gauls of the Po valley, moreover, enabled him to detach those tribes from their new allegiance to the Romans before the latter could take steps to check the rebellion.

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Battle of Trebbia

Publius Cornelius Scipio, the consul who commanded the Roman force sent to intercept Hannibal, had by no means expected Hannibal to make an attempt to traverse the Alps, since the Romans were prepared to fight the war in Spain. With a small detachment still positioned in Gaul, Scipio made an attempt to intercept Hannibal. Through prompt decision and speedy movement, he succeeded in transporting his army to Italy by sea, in time to meet Hannibal. After allowing his soldiers a brief rest to recover from their exertions, Hannibal first secured his rear by subduing the hostile tribe of the Taurini (modern Turin). While Moving down the Po valley, the opposing forces were engaged in a small confrontation at Ticinus. Here, Hannibal forced the Romans, by virtue of his superior cavalry, to evacuate the plain of Lombardy. This victory, though essentially a minor engagement, did much to weaken Roman control over the Gauls. As a result, of the Rome’s defeat at Ticinus, the Gauls were encouraged to join the Carthaginian cause. Soon the entirety of northern Italy was unofficially allied, both Gallic and Ligurian troops soon bolstering his army back to 40,000 men. Hannibal’s army, significantly supplemented, now stood poised to invade Italy. Scipio, severely injured in the battle, retreated across the River Trebia with his army still intact, and encamped at the town of Placentia to await reinforcements.

The other Roman consular army was rushed to the Po Valley. Even before news of the defeat at Ticinus had reached Rome, the senate had ordered the consul Sempronius Longus to bring his army back from Sicily to meet Scipio and face Hannibal. Fortunately, Hannibal, by skillful maneuvers, was in position to head him off, for he lay on the direct road between Placentia and Arminum, by which Sempronius would have to march in order to reinforce Scipio. He then captured Clastidium, from which he drew large amounts of rations for his men. But this gain was not without its loss, as Sempronius avoided Hannibal watchfulness, slipped around his flank, and joined his colleague in his camp near the Trebbia River near Placentia. There, in December of the same year, Hannibal had an opportunity to show his superior military skill at Trebia; after wearing down the excellent Roman infantry he cut it to pieces by a surprise attack from an ambush in the flank.

Battle of Lake Trasimene

Having secured his position in northern Italy by this victory, Hannibal quartered his troops for the winter with the Gauls, whose zeal in his cause thereupon began to abate. Accordingly, in spring 217 BC Hannibal decided to find a more trustworthy base of operations farther south. On the other hand, the Romans, greatly alarmed and dismayed by Sempronius’s defeat at Trebia, immediately made plans to counter the new threat from the north. The Roman senate resolved to elect new consuls the following year in 217 B.C. The two new consuls elected were Cnaeus Servilius and Gaius Flaminius. As both anticipated Hannibal’s continued advance, the new consuls took their armies—one under Servilius to Arminum on the Adriatic, the other, under Flaminius, to Arretium situated near the Apennine mountain passes—thereby commanding the eastern and western routes by which Hannibal could advance towards Rome.

The only alternate route to central Italy laid at the mouth of the Arno. This route was practically one huge marsh, and happened to be during this particular season, more overflowed than usual; a state of which would subject his men to the same suffering as they had endured on the Alps. Hannibal knew that this route was full of difficulties, but it remained the surest and certainly the quickest route to Central Italy. As Polybius claims “he [Hannibal] ascertained that the other roads leading into Etruria were long and well know to the enemy, but that one which led through the marshes was short, and would bring them upon Flaminius by surprise. This was what suited his peculiar genius, and he therefore decided to take this route.” For four days and three nights, Hannibal’s men marched “through a route which was under water” suffering terribly from fatigue and enforced want of sleep. He crossed the Apennines and the seemingly impassable Arno without opposition, but in the marshy lowlands of the Arno he lost a large part of his force, including, it would seem, his remaining elephants, through disease and himself became blind in one eye.

Arriving in Eturua in the spring of 217 BC, Hannibal decided to lure the main Roman army under Flaminius into a pitched battle, by devastating under his very own eyes the area he had been sent to protect. As Polybius tells us, “he [Hannibal] calculated that, if he passed the camp and made a descent into the district beyond, Flaminius (partly for fear of popular reproach and partly of personal irritation) would be unable to endure watching passively the devastation of the country but would spontaneously follow him . . . and give him opportunities for attack.” ^[1]. At the same time, he tried to sever the allegiance of Rome’s allies, by proving that she was powerless to protect them. Despite of this, Hannibal found Flaminius still passively encamped at Arretium. Unable to draw Flaminius into battle by mere devastation, Hannibal marched boldly around his opponent’s left flank and effectively cut Flaminius off from Rome (thus executing the first conscious turning movement in military history). Advancing through the uplands of Etruria, Hannibal provoked Flaminius to a hasty pursuit and, catching him in a defile on the shore of Lake Trasimenus, destroyed his army in the waters or on the adjoining slopes while killing Flaminius as well (see Battle of Lake Trasimene). He had now disposed of the only field force which could check his advance upon Rome, but, realizing that without siege engines he could not hope to take the capital, he preferred to exploit his victory by passing into central and southern Italy and exciting a general revolt against the sovereign power.

Fabius Cunctactor

Rome, reeling from her disastrous defeat at Lake Trasmimene, was put into an immense state of panic. According to Polybius “On the news of the defeat reaching Rome, the chiefs of the state were unable to conceal or soften down the facts, owing to the magnitude of the calamity, and were obliged to summon a meeting of the commons and announce it. When the Praetor [the head of the Roman Senate] . . .said, ‘We have been defeated in a great battle”, it produced such consternation that to those who were present on both occasions, the disaster seemed much greater now than during the actual battle.” ^[2] In times of such crisis, there was but one thing to do; and that was to appoint a dictator. Dictatorial power permitted a single man to develop his own strategies, make appointments in the civil government, and prepare armies without the usual political wrangling; a post that give him near total authority for a period of approximately six months. “Abandoning” says Polybius “the system of government by magistrates elected annually, they [the Romans] decide to deal with the present situation more radically, thinking that the state of affairs and the impending peril demand the appointment of a single general with full powers” ^[3]. The man they appointed as sole commander, or “dictator”, was a man named Quintus Fabius Maximus, intelligent and prudent general coined as the "Cunctator" (akin to the English noun cunctation), or the "Delayer" in Latin

Departing fron Roman military traditions, Fabius adopted the Fabian strategy of refusing open battle with his opponent while placing several Roman armies in Hannibal’s vicinity limit his movement. While seeking to avoid battle, Fabius instead, sent out small detachments against Hannibal’s foraging parties, and always maneuvered the Roman army in hilly terrain, so as to nullify Hannibal’s decisive superiority in cavalry. Residents of small northern villages were encourage to post lookouts, so that they could gather their livestock and processions and take refuge into fortified towns. This, Fabius knew, would wear down the invaders’ endurance and discourage Rome’s allies from going over to the enemy, without having to challenge the Carthaginians to battle.

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Hannibal - Silver double shekel, c. 230 BC, The British Museum

Having ravaged Apulia without provoking Fabius to battle, Hannibal decided to march through Samnium to Campania, one of the richest and most fertile provinces of Italy, hoping that the devastation would draw Fabius into battle. Livy tells us that “He [Hannibal] began to provoke and try his temper, by frequently shifting his camp and laying waste the territory of the allies before his eyes; and one while he withdrew out of quick sight and halted suddenly, and concealed himself in some winding of the road, if possible, to entrap [ambush] him on his descending into the plain” ^[4]. The dictator closely followed Hannibal’s path of destruction, yet still refused to let himself be drawn into battle, and thus remained on the defensive. While Fabius refrained himself from being drawn into battle, his troops became increasingly irritated by his “cowardly and unenterprising spirit” ^[5]. His inactive policies, while tolerable among wiser minds in the Roman Senate, were deemed unpopular, because the Romans had been long accustomed to facing their enemies in the field. Fabius’s strategy was especially frustrating to the mass of the people, who were eager to see a quick conclusion to the war. Moreover, it was widely believed, that if Hannibal continued plundering Italy unopposed, the terrified allies, believing that Rome was incapable of protecting them, might defect and pledge their allegiance to the Carthaginians.

As the year wore on Hannibal decided that it would be unwise to winter in the already devastated lowlands of Campania but Fabius had ensured that all the passes out of Campania were blocked. Fortunately, the Carthaginian general hit upon a highly imaginative deception scheme. At night, he gathered together all the cattle, and after tying burning torches to their horns, he drove them along a ridge near the pass. To the Romans guarding the pass, this gave the impression that the Carthaginians, aided by torches, were attempting to escape through the woods, and thus left the defile to attack them. After the Romans had chased off after the cattle, Hannibal promptly occupied the passed, and his army made their way through the pass unopposed. Fabius was within striking distance but in this case his caution worked against him. Smelling a stratagem (rightly) he stayed put. For the winter, Hannibal found comfortable quarters in the Apulian plain. What Hannibal achieved in extricating his army was, as Adrian Goldsworthy puts it, "a classic of ancient generalship, finding its way into nearly every historical narrative of the war and being used by later military manuals". This was severe blow to Fabius’s prestige, and soon after this, his period of power ended. The rest of autumn season continued that year albeit with frequent skirmishes— and after six months of exercising dictatorial power, Fabius would be removed from his position, in accordance with the Roman law.

Battle of Cannae

In the campaign of 217 BC Hannibal had failed to obtain a following among the Italians; in the following year he had an opportunity to turn the tide in his favor. Once the Roman Senate resumed their Consular elections in 216, they appointed Caius Terentius Varro and Lucius Aemilius Paullus as Consuls. In the meantime, the Romans, hoping to gain success through sheer strength in numbers, raised a new army of unprecedented size. “They decided”, Polybius writes, “to bring eight legions into the field, a thing which had never been done before by the Romans, each legion consisting of about five thousand men...Most of their wars are decided by one Consul and two legions, with their quota of allies; and they rarely employ all four at one time and on one service. But on this occasion, so great was the alarm and terror of what would happen, they resolved to bring not only four but eight legions into the field^{[6]^{. As each legion was accompanied by an equal number of allied troops, both infantry and cavalry, the total strength of the army which faced Hannibal could not have been much less than 90,000 ^Cottrell. Some estimates have the Roman forces as large as 100,000 men, though this figure cannot be completely validated. This large Roman army advanced into Apulia in order to crush him and accepted battle at Cannae.}}

In the Spring of 216 B.C. Hannibal took the initiative and seized the large supply depot at Cannae in the Apulian plain. Thus, by seizing Cannae, Hannibal had placed himself between the Romans and their crucial source of supply. As Polybius notes the capture of Cannae “caused great commotion in the Roman army; for it was not only the loss of the place and the stores in it that distressed them, but the fact that it commanded the surrounding district”. The Roman and Allied legions of the Consuls Aemilius and Varro, resolving to confront Hannibal, marched southward in search of the Carthaginian general. After a two days’ march, they found him on the left bank of the Audifus River, and encamped six miles away. Ordinarily, each of the two Consuls would command their own portion of the army, but since the two armies were combined into one, the Consuls had to alternate their command on a daily basis. The Consul Varro, who was in command on the first day, was a man of reckless and hubris nature, and was determined to defeat Hannibal.

Hannibal capitalized on the eagerness of Varro and drew him into a trap by using an envelopment tactic which eliminated the Roman numerical advantage by shrinking the surface area where combat could occur. Hannibal drew up his least reliable infantry in a semicircle in the center with the wings composed of the Gallic and Numidian horse. The Roman legions forced their way through Hannibal's weak center but the Libyan Mercenaries in the wings swung around by the movement, menaced their flanks. The onslaught of Hannibal's cavalry was irresistible, and Hasdrubal, his brother, who commanded the left, pushed in the Roman right and then swept across the rear and attacked Varro's cavalry on the Roman left. Then he attacked the legions from behind. As a result, the Roman army was hemmed in with no means of escape. Thanks mainly to brilliant tactics, Hannibal, with much inferior numbers, managed to surround and destroy all but a small remainder of this force. Depending upon the source, it is estimated that 50,000-70,000 Romans were killed or captured at Cannae. Among the dead were the Roman consul Lucius Aemilius Paullus, as well two consuls for the preceding year, two quaestors, twenty-nine out of the forty-eight military tribunes, and an additional eighty senators (at a time when the Roman Senate was comprised of no more than 300 men, this constituted 25%—30% of the governing body). This makes the Battle of Cannae one of the most catastrophic defeats in the history of Ancient Rome, and one of the bloodiest battles in all of human history (in terms of the number of lives lost within a single day).

The moral effect of this victory was such that most of southern Italy joined his cause. As Polybius notes, “How much more serious was the defeat of Cannae, than those which preceded it can be seen by the behavior of Rome’s allies; before that fateful day, their loyalty remained unshaken, now it began to waver for the simple reason that they despaired of Roman Power.” ^[7]. During that same year, Hannibal had managed to gain foreign support from the Greeks, in which the Greek King Philip V of Macedon had pledged his support, thus initiating the First Macedonian War against Rome. Had Hannibal now received proper material reinforcements from his countrymen at Carthage he might have made a direct attack upon Rome; for the present he had to content himself with subduing the fortresses which still held out against him, and the only other notable event of 216 BC was the defection of Capua, the second largest city of Italy, which Hannibal made his new base. Yet even this defection failed to satisfy him as only a few of the Italian city-states which he had expected to gain as allies consented to join him.

Stalemate

The war in Italy settled into a strategic stalemate in the years following Cannae. The Romans, after suffering three consecutive defeats and losing countless other battles, had at this point, learned their lesson. They utilized the attritional strategies Fabius had taught them, and which, they finally realized, were the only feasible means of defeating Hannibal. They always kept Hannibal in view, they only fought when everything was in their favor; they sought to starve him rather than destroy him in battle; and cut down his power of doing harm as fast as circumstances warranted ^[8]. Despite their defeats and the defections, the Romans could still field larger armies than Hannibal, and could readily replace their loses. The consuls the Roman Senate elected always had an upwards of 80,000 men to oppose Hannibal, whose army was deteriorating in quality and barely more than half of that of the Romans’. Instead of using a single large army, Rome now began to field multiple smaller armies. These armies sought to tire Hannibal through fatiguing marches, constant skirmishes, and famine. As a result, for the next few years, Hannibal was forced to sustain a scorched earth policy and obtain local provisions for protracted and ineffectual operations throughout Southern Italy. Since he was no longer able to draw his opponents into a pitched battle, his immediate objectives were reduced to minor operations which centered mainly round the cities of Campania.

As the war drew on, Hannibal repeatedly appealed to the Carthaginian Senate for reinforcements and aid. The War-faction and the Pro-Roman Peace Party were the two main political parties that controlled Carthage during this time. The latter, represented Peace and Conciliation with Rome, and the other, represented a war policy and a policy of resistance to Rome. Despite the apparent unanimity of the acceptance of war, Hanno, the leader of the Peace Party, condemned Hannibal’s actions. As spokesperson for the Carthaginian noble class, he opposed the policy of foreign conquest pursued by Hannibal. As a result, Hanno undermined support in Carthage for Hannibal's military efforts in Italy. Reinforcements desperately needed by Hannibal in Italy were otherwise rerouted to Spain. Hannibal also had great difficulty materializing his allies. Many of the allies defected to the Carthaginians, on the condition that they could not be forced to serve against their will. This not only rendered this defection less beneficial to Hannibal, but also ensured him that he could not rely on his allies as he hoped for. To make matters worst, his men grew increasingly weak beyond the point where he was no longer able to beat the Romans, who were daily growing stronger in numbers and experience.

As the forces detached under his lieutenants were generally unable to hold their own, and neither his home government nor his new ally Philip V of Macedon helped to make good his losses, his position in southern Italy became increasingly difficult and his chance of ultimately conquering Rome grew ever more remote. Granted, Hannibal still won a number of notable victories: Completely destroying an army 18,000-strong in 212 B.C. (Battle of the Silarus), another 16,000 strong during the same year (Battle of Herdonia), another 7,000-strong in 210 B.C., and at one point, killing two Consuls (which included the famed Marcellus) in a battle in 208 B.C. Nevertheless, without the resources his allies could contribute, or reinforcements from Carthage, Hannibal could not make further signficant gains. Thus, inadequately supported by his Italian allies, abandoned by his own government, and unable to match Rome’s resources, the ill-fated Carthaginian slowly began losing ground. Marching up and down the length of the Italian Peninsular, Hannibal continued defeating the Romans whenever he could bring them into battle, yet he was never able to complete another decisive victory that produced a lasting strategic effect. Leonard Cottrell encapsulated the situation with a interesting analogy: “So the rest of the war becomes rather like a group of lesser animals [The Romans] following a wounded lion [Hannibal]. Every now and then the beast turns, and they scatter. Sometimes it conceals itself and then, leaping out, tears its tormentors to pieces. Afterwards, it moves on alone and unmolested for a while, but before very long it hears once again the stealthy pad-pad of footsteps following some way behind.” In the end, Rome had driven one of history's most brilliant military minds from Italy, with sheer manpower, and numbers. This expensive response almost bankrupted the Roman Republic ^{[9]^.}

End of War in Italy

In 212 BC the Romans had so alienated Tarentum that conspirators admitted Hannibal to the city. The conspirators then blew the alarm on some Roman trumpets allowing Hannibal's troops to pick off the Romans as they stumbled out into the streets. Hannibal was able to keep control of his troops to the extent that there was no general looting. Instead Hannibal having committed himself to respect Tarentine freedom told the Tarentines to mark every house where Tarentines lived. Only those houses not so marked and thus belonging to Romans were looted. The citadel, however, held out so denying Hannibal the use of harbor. His brother Hanno, however, was defeated at Beneventum further depleting the overall Carthaginian force. Despite resisting a siege by Roman forces at Herdonea, the tide was slowly beginning to turn in Rome's favor. Further, in the same year, he lost his hold upon Campania, where he failed to prevent the concentration of three Roman armies around Capua.

Two Roman armies besieged Capua so persistently that Hannibal himself was forced to attack the besieging armies with his full force in 211 BC. It was only a temporary relief, for two years later the Romans were again before Capua with three armies. By a sudden march through Samnium that brought him within 3 kilometers of Rome, Hannibal attempted to draw them away by a feint against their capitol. He was hoping that his feint on Rome would force the siege of Capua to be lifted, and draw the army out into the open where Hannibal could destory them in a pitched battle. Yet his strategy caused more alarm than real danger to the city. The siege of Capua continued, and the city fell in the same year. During the same year, Hannibal defeated Fulvius at Herdonea in Apulia, but the next year he lost Tarentum. In 210 BC Hannibal again proved his superiority in tactics by a severe defeat inflicted at Herdoniac (modern Ordona) in Apulia upon a proconsular army, and in 208 BC destroyed a Roman force engaged in the siege of Locri Epizephyri. But with the loss of Tarentum in 209 BC and the gradual reconquest by the Romans of Samnium and Lucania, his hold on south Italy was almost lost. In 207 BC he succeeded in making his way again into Apulia, where he waited to concert measures for a combined march upon Rome with his brother Hasdrubal. On hearing, however, of his brother's defeat and death at the Metaurus he retired into Bruttium, where he maintained himself for the ensuing years. With the failure of his brother Mago in Liguria (205 BC-203 BC) and of his own negotiations with Philip of Macedon, the last hope of recovering his ascendancy in Italy was lost. In 203 BC, after nearly fifteen years of fighting in Italy, and with the military fortunes of Carthage rapidly declining, Hannibal was recalled to Carthage to direct the defence of his native country against a Roman invasion under Scipio Africanus.

Conclusion of Second Punic War (203—201 B.C.)

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Scipio Africanus

Return to Africa

In 203 BC, when Scipio was carrying all before him in Africa and the Carthaginian peace party were arranging an armistice, Hannibal was recalled from Italy by the war party at Carthage. After leaving a record of his expedition engraved in Punic and Greek upon brazen tablets in the temple of Juno at Crotona, he sailed back to Africa. His arrival immediately restored the predominance of the war party, who placed him in command of a combined force of African levies and his mercenaries from Italy. In 202 BC Hannibal, met Scipio in a fruitless peace conference. Despite mutual admiration, negotiations floundered due to Roman allegations of "Punic Faith," referring to the breach of protocols which ended the First Punic War by the Carthaginian attack on Saguntum, as well as perceived breach in contemporary military etiquette (Hannibal's numerous ambuscades). The decisive battle at Zama soon followed.

The Battle of Zama

Both Scipio and Hannibal met on the field of Zama. Hannibal amassed some 50,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry, while Scipio had a total of 34,000 infantry and 8,700 cavalry at his disposal. Placing his inexperienced cavalry on the flanks, Hannibal aligned his troops in three phalangial lines behind eighty war elephants. The first line consisted of mixed infantry of Gauls, Ligurians, and Balerians. In his second line he placed the Carthaginian and Libyan levies while his veterans from Italy were placed in the third line. Hannibal intentionally held back his third infantry line (perhaps the first example of a true reserve in military history), in order to thwart Scipio's tendency to pin the Carthaginian center and envelop his opponent's lines, as he had previously done at the Battle of Ilipa. Hannibal hoped that the combination of the war elephants and the depth of the first two lines would weaken and disorganize the Roman advance, whereupon he would complete a victory with his reserves in the third line and overlap Scipio's lines. Though this formation was indeed well-concieved, it failed to materialize into a victory for the aging Hannibal, who was suffering from mental exhaustion and deteriorating health after years of campaigning in Italy.

At the outset of the battle, the superior Roman cavalry swept their Carthaginian counterparts and pursued them off the field— depriving him of his entire body of cavalry (though it is believed that Hannibal had intended his cavalry to lure the Roman cavalry away from the battlefield). Likewise, Hannibal’s first two lines, unable to cope against the well-trained and confident Roman soldiers, were disposed of thereafter. For years, Hannibal had won victories with his experienced army, but now he facing the best of Roman army, while he himself commanded a makeshift army, who fared poorly against the Romans. As Livy states “...the Romans immediately drove back the line[s] of their opponents; then pushing their elbows and the bosses of their shields, and pressing forward into the places which they had pushed them, they advanced at a considerable pace, as if there had been no one their to resist them...” ^[10].

Moreover, Scipio came up with an inventive method of neutralizing Hannibal's elephants. Hannibal lost all of his original elephant troops (who crossed the Alps with him) by the battle of Cannae, but they were replenished in Africa. First of all, Scipio knew that elephants could only be ordered to charge forward, but they could only continue their charge in a straight line. So rather than lining his Roman forces in the traditional manipular lines, which put the velites, princeps, and triari in succeeding lines of 500 men groups, Scipio instead put the maniples in a chequer pattern, with his elite heavy infantry in diagonals. Scipio realized that intentionally opening gaps in his troops meant that the elephants would continue between them, without harming a soul. He did this, and after the elephants passed through his troops harmlessly and were picked off on the other side (many of them were so distraught, in fact, they charged back into their own Carthaginian lines). Scipio's troops then fell back into formation and continued marching.

Despite of these setbacks, the battle remained a closely contended engagement. When the Roman infantry confronted the Carthaginian third line, the resulting clash was fierce and bloody, with neither side achieving local superiority. In fact, during one point of the battle, it seemed that Hannibal was on the verge of victory. However, Scipio was able to rally his men, and his cavalry, after pursuing the Carthaginian cavalry, returned in time to deliver a devastating blow in Hannibal's rear. This two-pronged attack caused the Carthaginian formation to disintegrate and collapse. Unable to cope against the well-trained and confident Roman soldiers with his own indifferent troops after losing his notorious advantage, Hannibal experienced a crushing defeat that put an end to all resistance on the part of Carthage. In total, as many as 20,000 men of Hannibal’s army were mercilessly killed at Zama, and an equal number of men were taken as prisoners. The Romans on the other hand, lost as few as 500 dead and 4,000 wounded. With their foremost general defeated, the Carthaginians had no choice but to accept defeat and surrender to Rome.

Later career

Peacetime Carthage (200—196 B.C.)

Hannibal was still only in his forty-sixth year and soon showed that he could be a statesman as well as a soldier. Following the conclusion of a peace that left Carthage stripped of its formerly mighty empire Hannibal prepared to take a back seat for a time. However, the blatant corruption of the oligarchy gave Hannibal a chance of a come back and he was elected as suffet, or chief magistrate. The office had become rather insignificant, but Hannibal restored its power and authority. The oligarchy, always jealous of him, had even charged him with having betrayed the interests of his country while in Italy, for neglecting to take Rome when he might have done so. So effectively did Hannibal reform abuses that the heavy tribute imposed by Rome could be paid by installments without additional and extraordinary taxation. He also reformed the Council of One Hundred, stipulating that its membership be chosen by direct election rather than co-option

Exile and death (195—183 B.C.)

Seven years after the victory of Zama, the Romans, alarmed at Carthage's renewed prosperity, demanded Hannibal's surrender. Hannibal thereupon went into voluntary exile. First he journeyed to Tyre, the mother-city of Carthage, and thence to Ephesus, where he was honorably received by Antiochus III of Syria, who was preparing for war with Rome. Hannibal soon saw that the king's army was no match for the Romans. He advised him to equip a fleet and land a body of troops in the south of Italy, offering to take command himself. But he could not make much impression on Antiochus, who listened more willingly to courtiers and flatterers and would not entrust Hannibal with any important charge.

Cicero offers a story of Hannibal while at the court of Antiochus III. Hannibal attended a lecture by a certain Phormio, a philosopher, that ranged through many topics. When Phormio finished the portion about the duties of a general, Hannibal was asked his opinion. "I have seen," he replied, "during my life many an old fool; but this one beats them all." There is another story told about Hannibal while in exile, which puts an odd spin on his supposed "Punic perfidy". Antiochus III showed off a vast and well armed formation to Hannibal and asked him if they would be enough for Rome, to which Hannibal replied, "Yes, enough for the Romans, however greedy they may be."

In 190 BC he was placed in command of a Phoenician fleet but was defeated in a battle off the river Eurymedon. According to Strabo and Plutarch, Hannibal also received hospitality at the Armenian court of Artaxias where he planned and supervised the building of the new royal capital Artaxata. From the court of Antiochus, who seemed prepared to surrender him to the Romans, Hannibal fled to Crete, but he soon went back to Asia Minor and sought refuge with Prusias I of Bithynia, who was engaged in warfare with Rome's ally, King Eumenes II of Pergamum. Hannibal went on to serv Prusias in this war. In one of the victories he gained over Eumenes at sea, it is said that he used one of the first examples of biological warfare - he threw cauldrons of snakes into the enemy vessels. Once more the Romans were determined to hunt him down, and they sent Flaminius to insist on his surrender. Prusias agreed to give him up, but Hannibal determined not to fall into his enemies' hands. At Libyssa on the eastern shore of the Sea of Marmora, he took poison, which, it was said, he had long carried about with him in a ring. The precise year of his death is a matter of controversy. If, as Livy seems to imply, it was 183 BC, he died in the same year as Scipio Africanus.

Sources

Most of the sources we have about Hannibal are Romans, who considered him the greatest enemy they had ever faced. Livy gives us the idea that he was extremely cruel. Even Cicero, when he talked of Rome and her two great enemies, spoke of the "honorable" Pyrrhus and the "cruel" Hannibal. Yet a different picture is sometimes revealed. When Hannibal's successes had brought about the death of two Roman consuls, he vainly searched for the body of Gaius Flaminius on the shores of Lake Trasimene, held ceremonial rituals in recognition of Lucius Aemilius Paullus, and sent Marcellus' ashes back to his family in Rome. By contrast, when Nero had accomplished his march back and forth to and from the Metaurus he flung the head of Hannibal's brother into Hannibal's camp. Any bias attributed to Polybius, however, is more troublesome, since he was clearly sympathetic towards Hannibal. Nevertheless, Polybius spent a long period as a hostage in Italy and relied heavily on Roman sources, so there remains the possibility that he was reproducing elements of Roman propaganda.

Legacy

Cultural References

Hannibal's name is also commonplace in popular culture, an objective measure of his influence on Western European history. It was written that he taught the Romans, who claimed to be fierce descendents of Mars, the meaning of fear. Long after his death, his name continued to carry a portent of great or imminent danger within the Roman Republic. For generations, Roman housekeepers would tell their children brutal tales of Hannibal when they misbehaved (the equivalent of the modern day "Bogeyman"). In fact, Hannibal became such a figure of terror, that when ever disaster struck, the Roman Senators would exclaim " Hannibal ad portas" (“Hannibal is at the Gates!”) to express their fear or anxiety. This famous Latin phrase evolved into a common expression that is often used when a client arrives through the door or when one is faced with calamity^{[11]^{. This illustrates the psychological impact Hannibal's presence in Italy had on Roman Culture .}}

Similiar to Robert E. Lee and Erwin Rommel after him, Hannibal's victories against superior forces in an ultimately losing cause won him enduring fame that outlasted his native country. His crossing of the Alps remains one of the most monumental military feats of ancient warfare ^{[12]^{and has since captured the imagination of the Western World (romanticized by several artworks and subject to Roman folklore).}}

Military history

Hannibal's legacy also extends to the field of military history, as he is universally ranked as one of the greatest military strategists and tacticians of the Western world, alongside Epaminondas, Alexander the Great, Julius Caeser, Scipio, Gustavus Adolphus, Turenne, The Duke of Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon among others. In fact, his exploits (especially his victory at Cannae) continue to be studied in several military academies all over the world.

The author of the 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica article praises Hannibal in these words: "As to the transcendent military genius of Hannibal there cannot be two opinions. The man who for fifteen years could hold his ground in a hostile country against several powerful armies and a succession of able generals must have been a commander and a tactician of supreme capacity. In the use of stratagems and ambuscades he certainly surpassed all other generals of antiquity. Wonderful as his achievements were, we must marvel the more when we take into account the grudging support he received from Carthage. As his veterans melted away, he had to organize fresh levies on the spot. We never hear of a mutiny in his army, composed though it was of Africans, Spaniards and Gauls. Again, all we know of him comes for the most part from hostile sources. The Romans feared and hated him so much that they could not do him justice. Livy speaks of his great qualities, but he adds that his vices were equally great, among which he singles out his more than Punic perfidy and an inhuman cruelty. For the first there would seem to be no further justification than that he was consummately skilful in the use of ambuscades. For the latter there is, we believe, no more ground than that at certain crises he acted in the general spirit of ancient warfare. Sometimes he contrasts most favorably with his enemy. No such brutality stains his name as that perpetrated by Claudius Nero on the vanquished Hasdrubal. Polybius merely says that he was accused of cruelty by the Romans and of avarice by the Carthaginians. He had indeed bitter enemies, and his life was one continuous struggle against destiny. For steadfastness of purpose, for organizing capacity and a mastery of military science he has perhaps never had an equal."

According to the military historian, Theodore Ayrault Dodge, “Hannibal excelled as a tactician. No battle in history is a finer sample of tactics than Cannae. But he was yet greater in logistics and strategy. No captain ever matched to and fro among so many armies of troops superior to his own numbers and material as fearlessly and skillfully as he. No man ever held his own so long or so ably against such odds. Constantly overmatched by better soldiers, led by generals always respectable, often of great ability, he yet defied all their efforts to drive him from Italy, for half a generation.” Furthermore, Dodge christened Hannibal as the "father of strategy" due to his visionary conduct of warfare^{[13]^{. He wrote: "Excepting in the case of Alexander, and some few isolated instances, all wars up to the Second Punic War, had been decided largely, if not entirely, by battle-tactics. Strategic ability had been comprehended only on a minor scale. Armies had marched towards each other, had fought in paralell order, and the conqueror had imposed terms on his opponent. Any variation from this rule consisted in ambuscades or other strategems. That war could be waged by avoiding in lieu of seeking battle; that the results of a victory could be earned by attacks upon the enemy’s communications, by flank-maneuvers, by seizing positions from which safely to threaten him in case he moved, and by other devices of strategy, was not understood . . .For the first time in the history of war, we see two contending generals avoiding each other, occupying impregnable camps on heights, marching about each other's flanks to seize cities or supplies in their rear, harasssing each other with small-war, and rarely venturing on a battle which might prove a fatal disaster—all with a well-conceived purpose of placing his opponent at a strategic disadvantage. . .That it did so was due to the teaching of Hannibal".}}

Even his Roman chroniclers acknowledged his military genius, writing that, “he never required other to do what he could and would not do himself” ^{[14]^{. Napoleon Bonaparte himself regarded Hannibal as a gifted strategist, describing him as “the most audacious of all, probably the most stunning, so hardy, so sure, so great in all things.” Alfred Graf von Schlieffen’s famous pre-World War I strategy was developed from his military studies, with particularly heavy emphasis on Hannibal's victory at Cannae, emphasizing swift and annihilating force on two fronts. Patton believed that he was a reincarnation of General Hannibal as well as many other people including a Roman legionary. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of the Coalition Forces in the Gulf War, claimed that "The technology of war may change, the sophistication of weapons certainly changes. But those same principles of war that applied to the days of Hannibal apply today".}}

Hannibal in film

Hannibal (2006) — starring Vin Diesel.
The Phantom of the Opera (2005) — the beginning Opera being rehearsed is one about Hannibal so titled Hannibal.
True Story of Hannibal (2005) — English documentary.
Hannibal: The Man Who Hated Rome (2001) — English documentary.
The Great Battles of Hannibal (1997) — English animation.
Annibale (1960) — starring Victor Mature. Italian.

List of battles

218 BC

Battle of the Ticinus - Hannibal defeats the Romans under Publius Cornelius Scipio the :Elder in a small cavalry fight.

Battle of the Trebia - Hannibal defeats the Romans under Titus Sempronius Longus.

217 BC

Battle of Lake Trasimene - In an ambush, Hannibal destroyed the Roman army of Gaius Flaminius, who is killed.

216 BC

Battle of Cannae - Hannibal destroys the Roman army led by Lucius Aemilius Paullus and Gaius Terentius Varro in what is considered one of the great masterpieces of the tactical art.

First Battle of Nola - Roman general Marcus Claudius Marcellus holds off an attack by Hannibal.

215 BC

Second Battle of Nola - Marcellus again repulses an attack by Hannibal.

214 BC

Third Battle of Nola - Marcellus fights an inconclusive battle with Hannibal.

212 BC

First Battle of Capua - Hannibal defeats the consuls Q. Fulvius Flaccus and Appius Claudius, but the Roman army escapes.

Battle of the Silarus - Hannibal destroys the army of the Roman praetor M. Centenius Penula.

First Battle of Herdonia - Hannibal destroys the Roman army of the praetor Gnaeus Fulvius.

Second Battle of Capua - Hannibal is unable to break the Roman siege of the city.

210 BC

Second Battle of Herdonia - Hannibal destroys the Roman army of Fulvius Centumalus, who is killed

Battle of Numistro - Hannibal defeats Marcellus once more

209 BC

Battle of Asculum - Hannibal once again defeats Marcellus, in an indecisive battle

207 BC

Battle of Grumentum - Roman general Gaius Claudius Nero fights an indecisive battle with Hannibal, then marches north to confront Hannibal's brother Hasdrubal, who has invaded Italy

204 BC

Battle of Crotona - Hannibal fights a drawn battle against the Roman general Sempronius in Southern Italy.

202 BC

Battle of Zama (October 19) - Scipio Africanus Major decisively defeats Hannibal in North Africa, ending the Second Punic War

Quote

"We will either find a way, or make one."—Hannibal in response to the claimed impossibility of crossing the Alps with elephants.
"God has given no greater spur to victory than contempt of death."—Hannibal

References

^ Cottrell, Leonard, Enemy of Rome, Evans Bros, 1965. ISBN 0237443201 (pbk)
^ Goldsworthy, A. (2000). The Punic Wars. London: Cassell and Company.
^ Dodge, Theodore. Hannibal. Cambridge Massachusetts: De Capo Press, 1891 ISBN 0306813629
^ Hart, Liddell Strategy New York City, New York; Penguin Group; 1967
^ Healy, Mark Cannae: Hannibal Smashes Rome's Army Steerling Heights, Missouri; Osprey Publishing, 1994
^ Richard J.A. Talbert, ed., Atlas of Classical History (Routledge, London / New York, 1985) ISBN 0-415-03463-9
^ Cowley, Robert (Editor), Parker, Geoffrey (Editor) The Reader’s Companion to Military History, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1996 ISBN 0-395-66969-3

External links

Hannibal Barca and the Punic Wars
Ancient History Sourcebook: Polybius (c.200-after 118 BC): The Character of Hannibal
"Rome and Carthage: Classic Battle Joined" Article by Greg Yocherer from Military History Magazine
Cannae A treatise by General Fieldmarshal Count Alfred von Schlieffen

This article incorporates text from the public domain 1911 Encyclopædia Britannica.