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Battle of Cuito Cuanavale

Coordinates: 15°09′50″S 19°10′23″E / 15.16389°S 19.17306°E / -15.16389; 19.17306
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Battle of Cuito Cuanavale
Part of Angolan Civil War and South African Border War
DateDecember 1987 – March 1988[2]
Location
15°09′50″S 19°10′23″E / 15.16389°S 19.17306°E / -15.16389; 19.17306
Cuito Cuanavale, Angola
Result Stalemate[3]
Belligerents
Angola Angola (FAPLA)
 Cuba (FAR)
SWAPO (PLAN)
Umkhonto we Sizwe[1]		  South Africa (SADF)
File:Flag of Unita.jpgUNITA
Commanders and leaders
Cuba Gen. Leopoldo "Polo" Cintras Frías South Africa Col. Deon Ferreira
Strength
11,500 combined estimate (1,500 Cuba;[4][Note 1] 10 000 FAPLA) 11 000–12 000 combined estimate (3000–4000 SADF;[5] 8000 UNITA[6])
Casualties and losses
- 39 Cuba[7] (Official)
- 4,785 Cuban/Faplan killed[Note 2]		 - 31 SADF(Official)
- 3000 UNITA[8]

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The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987/88 was an important episode in the Angolan Civil War (1975 to 2002). In an attempt to finally subdue the Angolan insurgent movement UNITA in south-eastern Angola, the Angolan Army (FAPLA) was decisively repelled in a series of battles at the Lomba River between 9 September and 7 October 1987 by the South African Army (SADF), which had once more intervened on UNITA’s behalf. With FAPLA retreating to their starting point at Cuito Cuanavale, the SADF and UNITA went on the offensive and started the siege by shelling Cuito with long-range artillery on 14 October. A major battle ensued and Angola, fearing a defeat, requested help from Cuba. With Cuban enforcements Cuito was held and the South African advance ended after six unsuccessful attempts to overcome the FAPLA-Cuban defences between 13 January and 23 March 1988. The SADF retreated but continued to shell Cuito from a distance.

Background

Independence from Portugal

Main article: Angolan War of Independence

For 13 years until 1974, three armed groups fought for Angola's independence from Portugal: the leftist MPLA (with its armed wing FAPLA), led by Agostinho Neto; the conservative FNLA, led by Holden Roberto and supported by Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaïre; and UNITA, led by Jonas Savimbi (a former Maoist who broke away from the FNLA, later sponsored by the CIA and South Africa).

After the Carnation Revolution of April 1974 in Portugal, the new revolutionary government of Portugal let go of Portugal's African overseas possessions, including Angola. The Treaty of Alvor comprised a series of agreements between the three rebel factions and Portugal that were to pave the way to independence. Under its terms, a transitional government was formed, elections were scheduled for the end of the year, and 11 November 1975 was slated as Angola's independence day.

Fighting between the three rebel factions started soon after the transitional government took office on 31 January 1975, with each movement gaining control of their traditional areas of influence by mid-1975: The MPLA in the capital and central Angola, the FNLA in the north and UNITA in the south.[9]

South Africa and Southwest Africa (Namibia)

Since the termination of the UN-mandate in 1966, South Africa had been illegally occupying Southwest Africa (Namibia), a territory adjoining Angola to the south, and extending apartheid rule. 1966 saw the beginning of the armed resistance by the Southwest African liberation movement SWAPO and South African counter insurgency. After Angola’s independence in 1975, SWAPO gained the UN-commended support of the Angolan government and operated against the South African occupants from bases in Southern Angola. Thus, in the Angolan civil war, UNITA had become a welcome and valuable ally to South Africa in its fight against SWAPO.

On 9 August the South African Army (SADF) occupied the Ruacana hydro-electric complex on the border with Namibia; on 14 October South Africa launched Operation Savanah in support of UNITA and FNLA advancing on Luanda and coming within 200 km of the city. The FNLA, supported by Zairian units, South Africans and Portuguese mercenaries advanced on Luanda from the east and got as far as Kifangondo. On 7 November Cuba launched Operation Carlota, intervening in favour of the MPLA (see Cuba in Angola) with up to 30.000 troops. This enabled the MPLA to hold Luanda and on 11 November Agostinho Neto proclaimed the independence of Angola.

Cold War

Main articles: Cold War and Angolan Civil War
Main article: Cuba in Angola

The Angolan Civil War played out against the backdrop of the Cold War struggle between the Soviet Union and the United States. Both superpowers tried to influence the outcome of the civil war through proxies.

The African liberation movements, which also opposed apartheid in South Africa, found mainly support in socialist countries. Angola and SWAPO were basically supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union and some countries of the Eastern bloc while the West, foremost the United States supported South Africa, albeit clandestinely, and their ally, UNITA.

After the Cubans had helped the MPLA gain power in 1975 they found it necessary to stay in the country until conditions stabilized. The Soviet Union and other Eastern Bloc countries supplied the Angolan army (FAPLA) with armament, advisors and specialized technical staff. UNITA managed to rebound and, with South African and US support, posed a threat to the Angolan government. UNITA also received backing from the US allies. While the U.S. helped with money and weaponry, South Africa sent around 5000 troops in aid. South Africa's interests lay in preventing the Angolan government from gaining control of south-eastern Angola and in UNITA keeping hold of the territory as a buffer zone. Angola bordered on South African occupied Namibia (at the time called South West Africa). UNITA and South African control of southern Angola would make it difficult for SWAPO to fight for Namibian independence from bases in Angola.

The South African government's strategic concern was to ensure continued UNITA control over regions bordering Namibia, so as to prevent the SWAPO guerrillas from receiving Angolan support and gaining a springboard in southern Angola from which to launch attacks into Southwest Africa. It’s security strategy was shaped by the doctrines of pre-emptive interventionism and counter-revolutionary warfare. After South Africa had been unable to prevent the leftist MPLA, which it viewed as a Soviet surrogate, from taking power in Angola in 1975, it regarded the country as a threat to its security. This view was only confirmed by the deployment of Cuban troops in Angola. Therefore the apartheid regime’s goal was to overthrow and replace the MPLA-government in Luanda with a ‘friendly’ and anti-Communist one. It actively supported the ‘’de facto’’ secession of Southern Angola and, in 1979, decided to install the UNITA as its ‘’de facto’’ government. After South African operation ‘’Protea’’ in August 1981, in which it occupied 50.000 km² of Cunene province, UNITA took effective administrative control of most of Cunene in January 1982.[10]

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Angola

Operação Saludando Octubre ("Operation Greeting October ")

Because of UNITA’s continued insurgency, the central government never managed to gain control of the whole country; UNITA more or less held on to much of south-eastern Angola. Whenever it was threatened, South Africa intervened on its behalf. South Africa itself continuously kept the whole southern border in Angola and, at times, up to 50.000 km² of Cunene province occupied and repeatedly undertook invasions and raids into the country.[10]

In 1987, as part of the Angolan government's repeated campaigns against UNITA and for the control of south-eastern Angola, the Angolan army launched campaign Operação Saludando Octubre to rout UNITA forces from their stronghold cities of Mavinga, a former Portuguese military base and Jamba in the southeast of the country just above the Caprivi Strip.[11] As in the previous ones, planning and leadership was taken over by the Soviets and the higher ranks in the units were taken over by Soviet officers. General Konstantin Shaganovitch would command the Angolan forces in the battle.[12] Soviet command did not include the Cuban forces in Angola[13] and the Cubans initially did not actively engage in combat but only took over support functions. FAPLA's equipment was upgraded including 150 T-55 and T-62 tanks and Mi-24 helicopters. The Soviets dismissed the advice of the Cubans, as in the campaigns before, who warned that the operation would create another opportunity for a South African intervention. It was decided to commence the attack from Cuito Cuanavale.

Taking notice of the massive military build-up, South Africa warned UNITA. The Angolan campaign was initially successful and made considerable gains into south-eastern Angola. The South African government became aware that UNITA would not be able to withhold the onslaught. On 15 June it decided to intervene and authorized covert support.[14] On 4 August 1987 the SADF launched Operation Moduler which was to stop the Angolan advance on Mavinga. The SADF 61 Mechanized Battalion crossed into Angola from their base at the border town of Rundu.

Battle of the Lomba River

In August the FAPLA 21st, 25th (both light infantry), 47th (armoured) and the 59th (mechanized) brigades (some sources[who?] also include the 16th brigade) of FAPLA, departed from the Cuito Cuanavale. They received air support from the airbase at Menongue, including MiG 23s deployed in a ground-attack role.[15] Facing them were the UNITA forces composed of the 3rd Regular, 5th Regular, 13th Semi-Regular and 275th Special Forces Battalions[16] On 28 August they reached the northern banks of the Lomba River near Mavinga, where they were expected by the SADF.

In a series of bitter fights (Battle of the Lomba River II[17]) between 9 September and 7 October, SADF and UNITA prevented the FAPLA, which suffered heavy losses, from crossing the river. The Soviets withdrew their advisors and left the FAPLA without senior leadership. On 29 September, South African and UNITA forces, having gained the upper-hand, launched an offensive (Operation Hooper). On 3 October they attacked and annihilated a FAPLA-battalion on the southern banks of the Lomba River near Mavinga and two days later the Angolan army headed into a retreat over 190 km back to Cuito Cuanavale, which it desperately held on to.[18][19] If Cuito Cuanavale was lost by FAPLA, the next closest comparable outpost would be Menongue, 300 km from Mavinga and 500 km from UNITA's headquarters at Jamba.[20] In pursuit of the retreating FAPLA units the SADF and UNITA started the siege of Cuito Cuanavale on 14 October with long-range shelling by 155 mm artillery from a distance of 30 to 40 km.

Cuito Cuanavale

By November, the SADF had cornered the remnants of three FAPLA units on the east of the Cuito River, across from the town itself and was poised to destroy them.[21] The quite demoralised 59th FAPLA motorised infantry brigade, 21st and 25th FAPLA light infantry brigades, in positions near Tumpo and east of the Cuito River, were effectively cut off due to SADF artillery control of both the bridge and airstrip and to UNITA guerrilla control of the road from Menongue, which they had mined and were prepared to ambush.[22][23] With no functioning armour or artillery remaining, the FAPLA-units faced annihilation.[24] On 15 November, the Angolan government requested urgent military assistance from Cuba. Although not responsible for the dismal situation of the FAPLA Cuba felt impelled to intervene in order to prevent a total disaster for the Angolans. In Castro's view, a South African victory would have meant not only the capture of Cuito and the destruction of the best Angolan military formations, but, quite probably, the end of Angola's existence as an independent country. Thus, Fidel Castro responded immediately by sending — in what was called "Maniobra XXXI Aniversario de las FAR" — materiel and 15 000 elite troops, retaking the initiative from the Soviets.[25] The first Cuban reinforcements in Cuito arrived by helicopter on 5 December with about 160[26]–200[27] technicians, advisers, officers, and special forces.[28]

General Ochoa Sanchez, a veteran of the 1976 Angola campaign and of tank battles in Ethiopia, was made overall commander of the forces on the government side. General Cintras Frias was made commander at Cuito Cuanavale. The Cuban's initial priority was saving Cuito Cuanavale, but while enforcements were arriving at the besieged garrison they made preparations for a second front to the west of Cuito Cuanavale in Lubango where the SADF had been operating unhindered for 8 years.[29][30]

On 25 November the UN Security Council demanded the SADF's unconditional withdrawal from Angola by 10 December, yet, without threatening any sanctions.[31] Through December the situation for the besieged Angolans became critical as the SADF tightened the noose around Cuito Cuanavale. Observers expected it to fall into South African hands any time soon and UNITA prematurely announced the town had been taken.[32]

As of 21 December the SADF planned the final assault "pick off" the FAPLA units which were still caught to the east of the Cuito river "before moving in to occupy the town if the conditions were favourable".[33] On 9 January the SADF destroyed the important bridge across the Cuito river using a smart bomb.[34][35] The Cubans managed to construct a wooden footbridge in its place which they baptised Patria o Muerte (fatherland or death).[36]) They partly buried disabled tanks so that their turrets could be used as fixed artillery pieces.[37]

The SADF brought up reinforcements[38] and then carried out, beginning 13 January until 23 March,[39] the first of what would prove to be six major ground assaults on the entrenched FAPLA positions east of the river, none of which delivered tangible results.[40] A large Cuban and FAPLA column was on the way from Menongue for the relief of Cuito Cuanavale, but progress in the rainy season was slow due to the need to clear the UNITA minefields and guard against possible ambushes. They did not reach Cuito Cuanavale in time to take part in the first engagement.[41]

Although the first attack on 13 January 1988 was successful, spelling near disaster for a FAPLA brigade, the SADF unable to continue withdrew to its starting positions. A month later, on 14 February, the SADF withdrew from a second assault after successfully driving FAPLA-Cuban units off the Chambinga high ground. Close to a catastrophe, the FAPLA units east of the Cuito River withdrew to the Tumpo (river) triangle, a smaller area, ideally suited to defence. In a third assault on 19 February the SADF suffered a first major setback when it was repelled by FAPLA battalion north of the Dala river; unable to reach FAPLA's forward positions the SADF had to withdraw. In the following days the Cubans stepped up their air attacks against South African positions. On 25 February the FAPLA-Cubans repelled a fourth assault and the SADF had to return to its positions east of the Tumpo River. The failure of this attack "proved a turning point of the battle of Cuito Cuanavale, boosting FAPLA's flagging morale and bringing the South African advance to a standstill." [42] A fifth SADF-attack was beaten back on 29 February delivering a third consecutive defeat. After some more preparation the South Africans launched their last and fourth unsuccessful attack on 23 March. As SADF-Colonel Jan Breytenbach wrote, the South African assault "was brought to a grinding and definite halt" by the combined Cuban and Angolan forces.[43][44][45]

Eventually Cuban troop strength in Angola increased to about 55 000, with 40 000 deployed in the south. Due to the international arms embargo since 1977, South Africa’s aging air force was outclassed by sophisticated Soviet-supplied air defence systems and air-strike capabilities fielded by the Cubans and Angolans and it was unable to uphold the air supremacy it had enjoyed for years; its loss in turn proved to be critical to the outcome of the battle on the ground.[46] The Cuito airstrip was kept in repair, but since it was under constant observation by the SADF artillery and air force it could not be safely used by fixed wing aircraft.[47][48]

Rear view of a G-5 howitzer

After the failed assault on 23 March 1988 under orders from Pretoria the SADF withdrew the bulk of their forces, initially leaving a 1,500-man "holding force" behind (Combat Group 20) to continue deception operations and lay mines in order to prevent or slow any FAPLA offensive operations. For months it continued to shell Cuito Cuanavale and the airstrip using their long-range G-5 artillery from a distance of 30 to 40 km.[29][43] [49] [50] [51] [52][53] While the Cubans had purported to be moving south into Namibia according to comments from Castro they instead moved to cut off elements of the SADF. The SADF had left much of its powerful G-5 artillery units in place due to the difficulty in transporting during the rainy season. For whatever reasons—possibly not wanting to upset strategic negotiations, willingness to risk casualties or similar difficulties with mechanized forces—the Cubans did not attempt to take the SADF positions and settled for surrounding the small force.[54][55]

With that manoeuvre, Fidel Castro increased the cost to South Africa of continuing to fight in Angola and placed Cuba in its most aggressive combat position of the war, thus fortifying his present argument that he is preparing to leave Angola with his opponents on the defensive.[56]

Aftermath

Probably the most significant impact of the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale in terms of the Cold War was the capture of a complete SA-8 anti-aircraft missile system on 3 October 1987 by elements of 32 Battalion.[57] This was the first time that such a system had ever fallen into non-Warsaw Pact forces hands, effectively tipping the strategic balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact once again. The capture of this system had an interesting twist in that the SADF refused to hand it over to the USA, smarting at the fact that the USA had refused Stinger missile support when needed earlier. This system was thus handed over to the Israeli Defense Force who in turn handed it over to the USA in time for Operation Desert Storm. Some commentators view this strategic loss as a turning point for the entire Cold War in Africa, similar to that which occurred when Stinger systems were introduced to Afghanistan, effectively turning the tide of that war.[58]


In the aftermath of Cuito Cuanavale on the eve of the first round of peace talks in two years Castro ordered Cuban, FAPLA and SWAPO units under General Cintras Frías opened a second front to the west at Calueque (Lubango) with a force of 40 000 Cuban troops and a larger number of Angolan forces,[59][Note 3] and with support from MiG-23 fighter bombers. The first South African resistance was encountered near Calueque on 15 March, followed by three months of bloody clashes as the Cubans slowly progressed towards the Namibian border.

On 9 March 1988, the Angolans, now joined by the Cubans, entered into the first round of US-brokered peace negotiations. On 3 May 1988 the South Africans returned to the peace negotiations which they had abandoned two years before.[citation needed]

On 26 May, the chief of the SADF announced that heavily armed Cuban and SWAPO forces had moved south within 60 km of the Namibian border. The remaining SADF forces at Cuito Cuanavale Combat Group 20 was left in place to construct minefields and carry out deception operations in order to prevent a FAPLA offensive.[60] A number of skirmishes occurred while the SADF forces were disengaging, most notably Operation Hilti/Excite. In response to this 32 Battalion inserted an intelligence team under the command of Capt. Herman Mulder, who set up a tactical HQ at Ruacana, supporting two teams doing reconnaissance south-each of Techipa along the Devangulu Mountains; with the second team operating in the Handa Rotunda area.[61] After gathering the required intelligence Operation Hilti/Excite was initiated on 13 June with the deployment of one company from 61 Mechanized Battalion at Dongue, 25 km south-west of Xangongo. An attack was also laucnhed against Ongiva by 32 Battalion. G5 and G2 artillery pieces were provided to 61 Mechanized Battalion and they engaged the Cuban 50th Division based at Ongiva.[61] A fierce skirmish took place at Cuamato and 201 Battalion lost some vehicles but held the town on 24 June 1988. Operation Displace was launched and became the last significant hot engagement of the entire war at Techipa on 26 June. A running fire fight happened when a platoon from 32 Battalion was engaged in an action that took place over a 20 km distance. On 27 June 61 Mechanized Battalion engaged a Cuban tank squadron before they crossed the Cunene River back into Namibia. The MiG-23's lost their tactical advantage for some unknown reason and bombed Calueque Dam, causing the last loss of life in that conflict when they kill 10 soldiers from 8 SAI.[62] Two MiG-23's were damaged by ground fire. On 8 June 1988, hoping to send a strong message to the Cubans that they would respond to any movement into South-West Africa the South African government called up 140,000 men of the reserves (Citizen Force).[63][64] This was known as Operation Desert Fox and it consisted of 81 Armoured Brigade, which positioned itself on 30 July 1988 just south of Ruacana, tasked with the responsibility of neutralizing the very aggressive Cuban 50th Brigade if need be.[62] The signing of the formal peace treaty at Ruacana on 22 August 1988 meant that Operation Desert Fox could be aborted.

By the end of May, Cuba had two divisions in south-western Angola. By June, they constructed two forward airbases at Cahama and Xangongo with which Cuban air power could be projected into Namibia.[65] All of southern Angola was covered by a radar network and SA-8 air defence ending South African air superiority.[66]

In June 1988, the Cubans prepared to advance on Calueque starting from Xangongo and Tchipa. In case of serious South African counter attacks, they were prepared to destroy the Ruacana reservoirs and transformers and attack South African bases in Namibia.[citation needed] The offensive started from Xangongo on June 24 immediately clashing with the SADF en route to Cuamato. An SADF screening force encountered the Cuban advance in a firefight resulting in the withdrawal of the SADF force and the decision of the FAPLA-Cubans to return to their base. On 26 June the SADF conducted Operation Excite to test Cuban forces in the area. The SADF sent up decoys to provoke SAM sites into revealing their positions and shelled Tchipa with long-range artillery effectively destroying the Cuban's ability to utilize their own artillery. A series of firefights ensued with SADF tanks launching a spoiling attack on the initial gathering armor forces then withdrawing fearing being overwhelmed by Cuban reinforcements.[67]

Cuban MiGs carried out the attacks on the SADF positions around the Calueque dam, 11 km north of the Namibian border, also damaging the bridge and hydroelectric installations.[68] The major force of the Cubans, still on the way, never saw action and returned to Tchipa. With the withdrawal of the SADF into Namibia an 27 June the hostilities ceased.[69]

The South Africans, impressed by the suddenness and scale of the Cuban advance and believing that a major battle "involved serious risks" withdrew.[70] For their part the Cubans were shocked at the heavy casualties they had suffered and put their troops on alert to expect a strong South African response.[71] Five days later Pretoria ordered Combat Group 20 which was still operational east of Cuito Cuanavale to scale back to avoid any more casualties, effectively withdrawing from all fighting, and a SADF division was deployed in defence of Namibia's northern border.[72]

At the bargaining table the South Africans agreed to withdraw from Angola by 1 September 1988 and to the implementation of Resolution 435 for Southwest Africa on 1 November, leading to the independence of Namibia. This agreement was based on intelligence that indicated the Soviet Union would no longer sustain surrogate forces in the Third World, and that Cuba was starting to take strain from the mounting casualties.[62] The Cubans in return would pull troops out of Angola by 1 July 1991. A peace accord, mediated by Chester Crocker, was finally signed on 22 December 1988 in New York.

Nelson Mandela considered the FAPLA-Cuban success at Cuito and in Lubango a turning point in the Angolan civil war as well as in the struggle for Namibian independence.[73] The battle at Cuito, raging for 6 months, was the biggest battle on African soil since World War II".[58]Template:Citation needed - Kent. The casualties were high, especially on the Angolan side; in its course around 20 000 soldiers were killed.

Claims of victory in this battle have been made from all sides, depending on the military, political or moral point of view. It was a clear-cut military victory that South Africa and UNITA repelled the Angolan offensive at the Lomba River and went on the counter offensive, also in terms of human and material losses.

The conflict cost an estimated half a million lives[74][Note 4] and devastated the country's infrastructure until the conflict finally ended after Savimbi was shot by government forces in 2002.

The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale is commemorated in several countries in Southern Africa. The 20th anniversary in 2008 was especially celebrated in Namibia.

See also

Notes

  1. ^ On the other hand, Gen. Geldenhuys of the SADF estimated, as quoted in The New York Times, 20 April 1988, that in the period prior to 25 February, Cuban forces numbered about 1000.
  2. ^ Estimates vary. Renée-Jacques Lique, editor of Afrique Express (Montreuil, France) says "D'un côté 7 000 soldats de l'armée d'Afrique du Sud et 10 000 combattants de l'UNITA, le mouvement rebelle angolais de Jonas Savimbi. De l'autre, 20 000 soldats gouvernementaux angolais des FAPLA (Forces armées populaires de libération de l'Angola) et 5 000 soldats d'élites cubains. …La bataille de Cuito Cuanavale dure huit jours : du 12 au 20 janvier. Les FAPLA et les Cubains en sortent vainqueurs au prix de 4 600 morts. Les troupes sud-africaines sont stoppées, mais plus important encore, dans le même temps, Cubains et Angolais ont avancé sur la Namibie. On the one side, 7000 soldiers of the South African Army and 10 000 combatants of UNITA, the Angolan rebel movement of Jonas Savimbi. On the other, 20 000 Angolan Government soldiers of FAPLA and 5000 elite Cuban soldiers… The battle of Cuito Cuanavale lasted eight days: from 12–20 January. The FAPLA and the Cubans were victorious at the cost of 4,600 dead. The South African troops were stopped but, even more importantly, at the same time Cubans and Angolans had advanced on Namibia." http://www.afrique-express.com/archive/AUSTRALE/angola/angolahome.htm On the other hand, Karl Maier, journalist for The Washington Post and The Economist, on a visit to the front on 28 February 1988, repeated an estimate of 10 000 combined FAPLA/Cuban forces defending the town: Angola: Promises and Lies, London, 1996, p. 29.
  3. ^ Some estimates say only 10 000–20 000 Cubans: Gleijeses, Piero (2007). "Cuba and the Independence of Namibia", Cold War History, Volume 7, Issue 2. pp. 285–303. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help), and Jaster, op., cit., p. 22.
  4. ^ See also Afrique Express (Montreuil, France), no. 247, 4 February 2002. "La guerre civile angolaise a fait plus de 500.000 morts, plus de 100.000 mutilés et a entraîné le déplacement forcé de plus de 4 millions de personnes sur une population de 12 millions d'Angolais." [The Angolan civil war left more than 500 000 dead, more than 100 000 wounded and forcibly displaced more than 4 million people (out of a population of 12 million)]. http://www.afrique-express.com/archive/AUSTRALE/angola/angolapol/247lapaixenfin.htm

Footnotes

  1. ^ "Cuito Cuanavale: Fallen MK soldiers to be remembered". South Africa: Mail and Guardian.
  2. ^ James, W. Martin and Susan Herlin Broadhead (2004). Historical dictionary of Angola, 2nd ed. Scarecrow Press. p. 14.
  3. ^ "2". Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report (PDF) (Report). Vol. 2. Truth and Reconciliation Commission (South Africa). 1988-10-29. p. 59.
  4. ^ Gleijeses, Piero (11 July 2007). Mail and Guardian. South Africa.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  5. ^ Jaster (Autumn 1990). "The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-western Africa". Adelphi Papers. 253. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: 17. the South Africans assembled [at Mavinga] a considerable force: …totalling some 3000 men, plus another 1500–2000 Namibian troops from the South West African Territorial Force (SWATF).
  6. ^ Jaster (Autumn 1990). "The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-western Africa". Adelphi Papers. 253. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: 19. Fighting continued on a large scale, with an estimated 4000 SADF and SWATF troops, 8000 UNITA and 10000 FAPLA forces…
  7. ^ "Cuban Tanks".
  8. ^ Marcum, John (1990). "South Africa and the Angola-Namibia Agreement", in: Disengagement from Southwest Africa: The Prospects for Peace in Angola and Namibia, edited by Owen Ellison Kahn. New Brunswick: University of Miami Institute for Soviet and East European Studies. p. 135. ISBN 0887383610. UNITA and the SADF pursued retreating MPLA forces to the advanced air base and provincial capital of Cuito Cuanavale. There they laid siege to what became known as the Stalingrad of Angola, from December 1987 to March 1988. Caught in a conventional action for which it was ill-prepared, UNITA suffered some 3000 battle dead from among the ranks of its best units. {{cite book}}: |access-date= requires |url= (help)
  9. ^ Jaster (Autumn 1990). "The 1988 Peace Accords and the Future of South-western Africa". Adelphi Papers. 253. The International Institute for Strategic Studies, London: 8–11.
  10. ^ a b Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Vol. 2, Chapter 2, p. 42-61
  11. ^ John Frederick Walker (2004). A Certain Curve of Horn: The Hundred-Year Quest for the Giant Sable Antelope. Grove Press. p. 177. ISBN 0802140688.
  12. ^ http://www.sa-soldier.com/data/06_sadflinks/UsedPDFs/SADF_OPs_analysis.pdf
  13. ^ George Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, p. 183
  14. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 201
  15. ^ Vanemann, Peter. Soviet Foreign Policy for Angola/Namibia in the 1980's, in Owen Kahn, op. cit., p. 76.
  16. ^ http://www.fireandfury.com/orbats/modunita.pdf
  17. ^ James, W. Martin and Susan Herlin Broadhead (2004). Historical dictionary of Angola, 2nd ed. Scarecrow Press. p. 16.
  18. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 206-208
  19. ^ Crocker, Chester A. (1992). High Noon in Southern Africa: Making Peace in a Rough Neighborhood. W.W. Norton. ISBN 0393034321. In some of the bloodiest battles of the entire civil war, a combined force of some 8000 UNITA fighters and 4000 SADF troops not only destroyed one FAPLA brigade but badly danaged several others out of a total FAPLA force of some 18 000 engaged in the three-pronged offensive. Estimates of FAPLA losses ranged upward of 4000 killed and wounded….Large quantities of Soviet equipment were destroyed or fell into UNITA and SADF hands when FAPLA broke into a disorganized retreat... The 1987 military campaign represented a stunning humiliation for the Soviet Union, its arms and its strategy. ... As of mid-November, the UNITA/SADF force had destroyed the Cuito Cuanavale airfield and pinned down thousands of FAPLA's best remaining units clinging onto the town's defensive perimeters. Crocker was U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs during the Reagan Administration
  20. ^ Michael Radu, Anthony Arnold (1990). The New Insurgencies: Anticommunist Guerrillas in the Third World. Transaction Publishers. p. 149. ISBN 9780887383076. Retrieved 2008-05-11.
  21. ^ Mail & Guardian Online: Gleijeses, Piero, Cuito Cuanavale revisited, ANALYSIS, July 11, 2007 http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=313386&area=/insight/insight__comment_and_analysis/
  22. ^ "Angola: The siege of Cuito Cuanavale". Africa Confidential vol. 29 No 3. London: 2. 5 February 1988.
  23. ^ Vanneman, Peter. op. cit. p. 79.
  24. '^ Bole-Richard, Michel (1988-01-23). "Angola : une importante garnison gouvernementale serait sur le point de tomber aux mains de l'UNITA". Le Monde (Paris) (in French). p. 5., Le Mondes Johannesburg correspondant reported that these units had been without resupply for three weeks. See also Benemelis, Juan. Las Guerras Secretas de Fidel Castro. cap. 18. {{cite book}}: Unknown parameter |nopp= ignored (|no-pp= suggested) (help)
  25. ^ Vanemann, Peter, op. cit., p. 79.
  26. ^ Bole Richard, Michel (23 January 1988). "Angola: Une importante garnison gouvernementale serait sur le point de tomber aux mains de l'UNITA". Paris): Le Monde.
  27. ^ Ricardo Luis, Roger. Preparanse a vivir: cronicas de Cuito Cuanavale. p. 6.
  28. ^ Barber, Simon in: Castro explains, why Angola lost battle against the SADF, July 27, 1989
  29. ^ a b Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Part Two, p. 59, http://www.doj.gov.za/trc/report/finalreport/TRC%20VOLUME%202.pdf
  30. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 210-212
  31. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959-1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Secretary of State to American Embassy, Pretoria, December 5, 1987, Freedom of Information Act
  32. ^ Cuito Cuanavale – "Afrikas Stalingrad", Ein Sieg über Pretorias Apartheid" in: Neues Deutschland, April 19/20. 2008
  33. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 214
  34. ^ Meier, Karl. op. cit. p. 31.
  35. ^ "loc. cit". Africa Confidential.
  36. ^ Ricardo Luis, Roger (1989). Prepárense a vivir: Crónicas de Cuito Cuanavale. Havana: Editora Politica.
  37. ^ Holt, C. (2005). At Thy Call we did not falter. Zebra Press. p. 84. ISBN 1770071172.
  38. ^ Nortje, P. (2004). 32 Battalion. Struik. ISBN 1-86872-914-1. says that the "lull" in fighting from 26 November 1987 to 10 December 1987 was "politically motivated". But French, Damian. "SADF 1SAI Ratels in Op Hooper (1987–1988)". Archived from the original on 2008-05-08. Retrieved 2008-01-04. says that his units of the 1st South Africa Infantry arrived, after training, at the front only in Dec. 1988.
  39. ^ Liquer, loc. cit.
  40. ^ George, Edward (2005). The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991 From Che Guevara to Cuito Cuanavale. Routledge. ISBN 0415350158.
  41. ^ "op. cit". Africa Confidential: 2.
  42. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 227
  43. ^ a b Stührenberg, Michael in: Die Zeit 17/1988, Die Schlacht am Ende der Welt, p. 11
  44. ^ Truth and Reconciliation Commission of South Africa Report, Part Two, p. 59
  45. ^ Mail & Guardian Online: Piero Gleijeses, Piero, Cuito Cuanavale revisited, ANALYSIS, July 11, 2007 http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=313386&area=/insight/insight__comment_and_analysis/
  46. ^ Jacklyn Cock, Laurie Nathan (1989). War and society: the militarisation of South Africa. New Africa Books. p. 23. ISBN 086486115X.
  47. ^ Meier, Karl. op. cit. p. 31.
  48. ^ "loc. cit". {{cite journal}}: Cite journal requires |journal= (help)
  49. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965-1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 234
  50. ^ Mail & Guardian Online: http://www.mg.co.za/article/2007-07-11-cuito-cuanavale-revisited
  51. ^ Trainor, Bernard E. (12 July 1988). "South Africa's Strategy on Angola Falls Short, Enhancing Cubans' Role". The New York Times.
  52. ^ Bernard E. Trainor (1988-07-12). "South Africa's Strategy on Angola Falls Short, Enhancing Cubans' Role". New York Times.
  53. ^ Pazzanita, Anthony (1991). "The Conflict Resolution Process in Angola", The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 29, No. 1 (March 1991). p. 105. The SADF and UNITA had relaxed the siege of the town by May, 1988, although at least several hundred South Africans remained on the outskirts.
  54. ^ Bole-Richard, Michel (1988-06-10). "Les conflits en Afrique australe La progression des troupes cubaines dans le Sud-angolais inquiète Pretoria". Le Monde (Paris) (in French). p. 3..
  55. ^ McFaul, Michael (1990). Rethinking the "Reagan Doctrine" in Angola, International Security vol. 14 no. 3 (Winter 1989-1990). M.I.T. press. ...Castro boldly responded that Pretoria was "no longer in a position to request anything south of Angola. Instead of attacking inside Namibia, however, the Cuban forces moved east along the border to cut off the South Africans still camped near Cuito Cuanavale. By August 1988, the strategy had worked, leaving some 400-500 South African soldiers completely surrounded for several months.page=126 {{cite book}}: line feed character in |quote= at position 267 (help)
  56. ^ Treaster, Joseph B.:"Castro Faults Soviet Tactics in War in Angola. (Foreign Desk).",The New York Times, 28 July 1988
  57. ^ Turton, A.R. 2010. Shaking Hands with Billy. Durban: Just Done Publications.
  58. ^ a b Mills, Greg. & Williams, David. 2006. Seven Battles that Shaped South Africa. Cape Town: Tafelberg.
  59. ^ Benemelis, Juan, loc. cit.
  60. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 234
  61. ^ a b Nortje, P. 2003. 32 Battalion. Cape Town: Struik Publishers.
  62. ^ a b c Turton, A.R. 2010. Shaking Hands with Billy. Durban: Just Done Publications. http://www.shakinghandswithbilly.com
  63. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 242
  64. ^ Mail & Guardian Online: Piero Gleijeses, Cuito Cuanavale revisited, ANALYSIS, July 11, 2007 http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx?articleid=313386&area=/insight/insight__comment_and_analysis/
  65. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 236-237
  66. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 236-237
  67. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 243-245
  68. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 243-246
  69. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 243-246
  70. ^ Gleijeses, Piero: Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976 (The University of North Carolina Press) quoting: Abramowitz (Bureau of Intelligence and Research, US Department of State) to Secretary of State, May 13, 1988, Freedom of Information Act
  71. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 246
  72. ^ George, Edward in: The Cuban Intervention in Angola, 1965–1991, Frank Cass, London, New York, 2005, ISBN 0-415-35015-8, p. 245
  73. ^ http://www.iol.co.za/index.php?set_id=1&click_id=6&art_id=vn20080323114759543C298108
  74. ^ Maier, Karl (1996). Angola: Promises and Lies. London: Serif. p. 14. ISBN 1 874959 47 1. some observers estimate that 500 000 people have died in the fighting and the famine and disease it has provoked.

References

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