Security dilemma
The Security Dilemma asserts that both strength and weakness in national security can be provocative to other nations. If a nation is too strong, this can be provocative since “most means of self-protection simultaneously menace others.”[1] On the other hand, if a nation is too weak, “great dangers arise if an aggressor believes that the status quo powers are weak in capability or resolve."[2] Thus, directly and indirectly, both strength and weakness can upset the balance of security in international relations.
This concept is also referred to as the Spiral model. This term is used in international relations and refers to a situation in which actions by a state intended to heighten its security, such as increasing its military strength or making alliances, can lead other states to respond with similar measures, producing increased tensions that create conflict, even when no side really desires it. [3]
The term was coined by the German scholar John H. Herz in his 1951 book Political Realism and Political Idealism. At the same time British historian Herbert Butterfield described the same situation in his History and Human Relations, but referred to it as the "absolute predicament and irreducible dilemma."[4]
A frequently cited example of the security dilemma is the beginning of World War I. Supporters of this viewpoint argue that the major European powers felt forced to go to war by feelings of insecurity over the alliances of their neighbors, despite not actually desiring the war. Furthermore, Germany's fear of fighting war on two fronts led it to the formulation of the infamous Schlieffen Plan, which specified a particularly accelerated mobilization timetable. The onset of German mobilization, in turn, put pressure on other states to start mobilizing early as well. However, other scholars dispute this interpretation of the origins of the war, contending that some of the states involved really did want the conflict.
The security dilemma is a popular concept with cognitive and international relations theorists, who regard war as essentially arising from failures of communication. Functionalist theorists affirm that the key to avoiding war is the avoidance of miscommunication through proper signaling.
References
- ^ Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976, pg 63.
- ^ Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976, pg. 58.
- ^ Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167–174; and Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978), pp. 58–113
- ^ Roe, Paul. The Intrastate Security Dilemma: Ethnic Conflict as a 'Tragedy'? Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 36, No. 2. (Mar., 1999), pp. 183-202.
