Siege of Malta (World War II)

Siege of Malta
Part of the Second World War Mediterranean theatre
Service personnel and civilians clear up debris on a heavily bomb-damaged street in Valletta, Malta on 1 May 1942 Service personnel and civilians clear up debris on a heavily bomb-damaged street in Valletta, Malta on 1 May 1942.
Date 11 June 1940–20 November 1942 Location Malta Result Decisive Allied victory
Belligerents
United Kingdom Malta Australia Canada New Zealand South Africa Supply operations only: Free France Greece Poland United States	Italy Germany
Commanders and leaders
Andrew Cunningham William Dobbie Keith Park Hugh Pughe Lloyd	Hans Geisler Albert Kesselring Martin Harlinghausen Francesco Pricolo
Strength
716 fighters over the course of the campaign	circa. 2,000 aircraft over the course of the campaign
Casualties and losses
369 fighters (air) 64 fighters (ground) 40 submarines 2 aircraft carriers 4 cruisers 19 destroyers 2,301 airmen killed or wounded 30,000 building destroyed or damaged 1,300 civilians killed	357 German aircraft 175 Italian aircraft 72% of the Italian Navy's transport fleet lost 23% of the Axis merchant fleet lost 2,304 merchant ships sunk 17,240 killed at sea ~50 German U-Boats (in entire MTO) Italian submarine losses ~16

The Siege of Malta was a military campaign in the Mediterranean Theatre of the Second World War. From 1940-1942, the fight for the control of the strategically important island of Malta pitted the air forces and navies of Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany against the Royal Air Force and the Royal Navy.

The opening of a new front in North Africa in mid 1940 increased Malta's already considerable value. British air and sea forces based on the island could attack Axis ships transporting vital supplies and reinforcements from Europe. Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, in command of Axis forces in North Africa, recognised its importance quickly. In May 1941, he warned that "Without Malta the Axis will end by losing control of North Africa".

The Axis resolved to bomb, or starve Malta into submission by attacking its ports, towns, cities and Allied shipping supplying the island. Malta was one of the most intensively bombed areas during the war. The Luftwaffe (German Air Force) and the Italian Regia Aeronautica (Italian Royal Air Force) flew a total of 3,000 bombing raids over a period of two years in an effort to destroy RAF defences and the ports. Success would have made possible a combined German—Italian amphibious landing (Operation Herkules) supported by German airborne forces (Fallschirmjäger). It was never carried out. In the end, Allied convoys were able to supply and reinforce Malta, while the RAF defended its airspace, though at great cost in material and lives.

By November 1942, the Axis had lost the Second Battle of El Alamein and the Allies landed forces in Vichy French Morocco and Algeria under Operation Torch. The Axis diverted their forces to the Battle of Tunisia, and attacks on Malta were rapidly reduced. The siege effectively ended in November 1942.

In December 1942, air and sea forces operating from Malta went over to the offensive. By May 1943, they had sunk 230 Axis ships in 164 days, the highest Allied sinking rate of the war. The Allied victory played a major role in the eventual Allied success in North Africa.

Background

Malta was a significant military and naval fortress, being the only Allied base between Gibraltar and Alexandria, Egypt. It became a vital linchpin in the British Empire overseas—a vital way station along Britain's lifeline, through Egypt and the Suez Canal to India and the Far East. It offered a haven for British shipping to and from those places, but also it gave the British an excellent staging platform of offensive thrusts against naval, land, air and shipping targets in the central Mediterranean. Owing to its exposed position, close to a potentially hostile Italy, the British had moved the headquarters of the Royal Navy Mediterranean Fleet from Valletta, Malta in the mid-1930s to Alexandria, Egypt in October 1939.

The island itself was an area of just under one hundred square miles, and had a population of around 250,000, all but three of four percent were native Maltese. According to the 1937 census, most of the inhabitants lived within four miles of the Grand Harbour, where the population density was more than six times that of the island as a whole. Amongst the most congested spots was Valletta, the capital which was its political, military and commercial centre. In this city, 23,000 people lived in a space around one quarter square mile. Across the Grand Harbour, in the so-called Three Cities, where the dockyards were located and the Admiralty had its headquarters, 28,000 more were packed into half a square mile. It was in these small areas that the heaviest, most sustained and concentrated of aerial bombing in history fell.

Map of Malta

The state of the Malta defences was poor, verging on non-existent. This stemmed from a pre-war conclusion that the island was indefensible and should not be defended. In the wider context, both the Italian and British surface fleets were evenly matched, but the Italians had significant numerical advantages in submarines and aircraft. The British, in particular the Admiralty, suffered from having to cover the Suez Canal, with the Mediterranean Fleet under Admiral Andrew Cunningham and Gibraltar with Force H under Vice-Admiral James Somerville. In October 1939 the Mediterranean Fleet was moved east, to Egypt, practically stripping the island of its naval protection. Just the monitor Terror and a few British submarines were left to defend the island from he sea. When the Maltese Government question the British' rationale, they were told that the island could be defended just as adequately from Alexandria as from Malta's Grand Harbour. This was not true, and the Maltese suspected Britain's commitment to defending the island was not as strong as it should have been.

While there were concerns that the island, far from Britain and near Italy, could not be defended, the British decided in July 1939 to increase the land and air defences, if not British sea forces protecting the island. The number of anti-aircraft guns and fighters on Malta. The British leadership had further doubts about whether to hold the island in May 1940 when French Prime Minister Paul Reynaud reported that the situation in France was dire, but that Italian dictator Benito Mussolini might be appeased by concessions, including Malta. After some discussion, Winston Churchill convinced the British War Cabinet that no concessions should be made. With Britain itself at risk, Malta was not the highest priority, so it was lightly protected. Only six Gloster Sea Gladiator biplanes were stationed on the island, with another six in crates, when on 10 June 1940, Mussolini declared war on the United Kingdom and France.

In the 1930s, Italy had looked for expansion in the Mediterranean and Africa; regions dominated by the British and French. The defeat of France in May–June 1940, removed the French Navy from the Allied order of battle and changed the balance of naval and air power in the Italian favour.

On declaring war, Mussolini called for an offensive throughout the Mediterranean. Within hours, the first bombs had dropped on Malta. After the French surrender on 25 June, Mussolini tried to take advantage of a Britain heavily engaged in the Battle of Britain by attacking Egypt in September, but was heavily defeated in a counter-offensive. Adolf Hitler was forced to rescue his ally. In February 1941, the Deutsches Afrikakorps (German Africa Corps, or DAK) commanded by Generalfeldmarschall (Field Marshal) Erwin Rommel was sent to North Africa to prevent an Axis rout. RAF and Royal Navy anti-shipping squadrons and submarines posed a significant threat to Axis supply and communications between Europe and North Africa, and both sides soon recognised the importance of the island in controlling the Mediterranean.

The timidity of the Italian Navy helped the Allied cause — they would only attack under favourable conditions. In 1940, conditions were more than favourable for an assault on Malta. Such a move stood a reasonable chance of gaining control of the island, which would have given the Italians naval and air supremacy in the central Mediterranean. Such a turn of events would have split the area in two and the British could not have transported supplies between their strongholds in the east and west without severe danger. The reluctance of the Italians to act throughout 1940 was strengthened by the Battle of Taranto, during which the Italian surface fleet was attacked and severely damaged by the Royal Navy Fleet Air Arm. To the Italians (and later the Germans), air power was the key weapon against Malta.

Italian siege June–December 1940

First Italian actions

An Italian Savoia-Marchetti S.M.79 bomber.

Air power was the method chosen to attack Malta. The Regia Aeronautica began the aerial bombardment of the island. On the first day, 55 Italian bombers and 21 fighters flew over Malta and dropped 142 bombs on the three airfields at Luqa, Hal Far and Takali. Later, 10 Italian Savoia-Marchetti SM.79s and 20 Macchi C.200s flew over the island, with no air opposition. At the time of these first air raids, the defending fighters on Malta consisted of obsolete Gloster Sea Gladiators, in the Hal Far Fighter Flight. Legend has it that there were just three aircraft, nicknamed 'Faith', 'Hope' and 'Charity' but, in reality, at least six Gladiators were deployed. There were also Hurricanes based there from the start, and it was this fighter which did most of the damage.

The Italians flew at around 20,000 feet. The monitor ships Terror and gunboats Aphis and Lady Bird opened fire. In the afternoon, another 38 bombers escorted by 12 fighters raided the capital. The effect of the raids were designed to impact the morale of the population rather than inflict damage to dockyards and installations. A total of eight raids were flown on that first day. The bombing did not cause much damage and most the casualties suffered were civilian. No interception of the raiders was made because their was no RAF force ready to meet them. No RAF airfield on Malta was operational at that time. One at Luque, was near to completion.

Despite the absence of any operational airfields, at least one RAF Gladiator flew against a raid of 55 Savoia Marchetti SM 78a and their 20 escorting fighters on 11 June. It surprised the Italians, but the defences, almost non-existent on the ground and in the air, failed to impede the Italian force. On 12 June, an Italian aircraft on a reconnaissance flight over Malta was shot down.

An odd development took place on 19 June. Fairey Swordfish, 12 in total, flew into the Fleet Air Arm (FAA) base at Hal Far. They were the 767 Training Squadron escaping southern France after the French capitulation. They flew to the French colony of Tunisia, but insecurity compelled them to seek friendly surroundings. The FAA aircraft were to form the nucleus of what was to become the No. 830 Squadron FAA, providing Malta with its first offensive strike aircraft. Before June was out, they raided Sicily and sank one Italian destroyer, damaged a cruiser and knocked out oil storage tanks in the port of Augusta.

By the start of July, the Gladiators had been reinforced by Hawker Hurricanes and the defences organised into No. 261 Squadron RAF in August. Twelve were delivered by HMS Argus in August, the first of several batches ferried to the island by the carrier. A further attempt to fly 12 Hurricanes into Malta on 17 November, led by a FAA Blackburn Skua, ended in disaster with the loss of eight Hurricanes. They took off too far west of the island and ran out of fuel. Several pilots were lost. A further two Hurricanes crashed, with one of the pilots rescued by a Short Sunderland flying boat. They arrival of more fighters was welcome. After just eight weeks, the original force of Hurricane units were grounded owing to a lack of spare parts were scarce.

The year ended with little impression made by the Regia Aeronautica. The RAF claimed 45 Italian aircraft shot down for minimal losses. The Italians admitted the loss of 23 bombers and 12 fighters with a further 187 bombers and seven fighters having suffered damage, mainly to anti-aircraft artillery.

Italian invasion plans

Italian battleship Giulio Cesare firing during the Battle of Calabria, on 9 July 1940.

In 1938 Mussolini had considered the invasion of Malta under Plan DG10/42. He envisaged the use of 40,000 men in its capture. He accepted the loss of nearly all the purpose-built 80-strong sea-craft that would land the Italian Army ashore. Landings would be made in the north, with attack upon the Victoria Line which lay across the centre of the island. Secondary landings would go ahead at Gozo, an island adjacent and north of Malta as well as the tiny island of Comino, which lay between the two. The entire navy would be involved as well as 500 aircraft. However, the lack of the means (logistical among other things), meant the planners did not believe the operation could be carried out. With Germany's success in May 1940, the plan was reduced to 20,000 men and included tanks. The elimination of the French and withdrawal of the British would give the Italians a prime opportunity to seize Malta. But Italian intelligence had overestimated the defences, and Mussolini's belief that Britain would sue for peace with Germany meant Malta would fall and be annexed without the need for military action on a large scale. Mussolini also thought that Franco's Spain would soon be in the war. If they captured Gibraltar, then the Mediterranean would be barred from Britain to the west. The failure to force the issue when the balance of power was in their favour was to have serious consequences for the Axis. It would not take long for the Royal Navy to realise the islands potential as a base for offensive operations, and thus conclude it was worth defending.

The reluctance of the Italian Admiralty to act was also down to other considerations. It had a complete lack of battle-experience. This meant a lack of training, skill and practice in the essential art of night-fighting. These were the major factors of why the Italians believed they could not best the Royal Navy's fleet of aging battleships or keep them bottled up in Alexandria, despite having, on the surface, a formidable navy themselves. Other matters, such as the lack of crude oil (the Italians did not discover the large reserves in Libya during their occupation of the country), were small. The Germans took most of the oil from Romania and left scarce resources for Italy to pursue large-scale operations on the Mediterranean. Not only did this negate any large-scale naval operations, it also left the Italians without adequate fuel for sharpening their combat skills at sea. By the start of 1941, total stocks meant only seven months of fuel could be guaranteed. Offensive naval sweeps by the British Mediterranean Fleet confirmed to Admiral Cunningham, that the Italians had an inferiority complex. The British confidence was eroded, when aircraft began to dominate the actions at sea later on in 1941 and 1942.

Cunningham revealed the reluctance of the Italian Navy to engage by probing their defences. On 9 July 1940, the Battle of Calabria was the only time the main Italian and British (with supporting Royal Australian Navy vessels) fleets engaged each other. It confirmed to the Maltese people, that the British still controlled the seas, if not from the Grand Harbour. This was confirmed again in March 1941, when Royal Navy forces decisively defeated Italian naval forces in the Battle of Cape Matapan. The Italians had been heading to intercept the British convoys sending reinforcements to aid Greece in the Greco-Italian War.

British counter-attacks

When it became clear to the British that the Italian air forces were limited and having little impact on the population which could endure, a steady stream of reinforcements arrived. The potential of the base was released and Whitehall ordered further aircraft into the island; including Hurricane fighters, Martin Marylands, Sunderlands, Vickers Wellingtons, more Swordfish and submarines. It provided an increasingly potent offensive arm. The Wellingtons arrived in October, from No. 148 Squadron RAF.

Meanwhile the Italian invasion of Egypt had failed to achieve its goals and the British counter-offensive, Operation Compass, drove the Italians back into Libya. The diversion of the North African Campaign drew away significant Italian air units which were rushed from Italy and Sicily to deal with the disasters. The relief on Malta was significant, and in November 1940, after months of poorly coordinated Italian air strikes, the FAA and Royal Navy struck at Italian naval forces in Taranto. The following Battle of Taranto was a victory for sea-air power. Fairey Swordfish torpedo bombers disabled a number of Italian heavy units. The withdrawal of the Italian fleet to Naples, out of reach of British aircraft was a strategic victory which handed naval supremacy to the British for the time being.

The Royal Navy's submarines also began a period of offensive operations. British U class submarine began operations as early as June. Larger submarines began operations, but after 50 percent losses per mission, they were withdrawn. U Class submarines operated from the Manoel Island Base known as HMS Talbot. Unfortunately no bomb-proof pens were available as the building project had been scrapped before the war owing to cost cutting policies. The new force was named the Tenth Submarine Flotilla and was placed under Flag Officer Submarines (FOS) Admiral Max Horton who appointed Commander G.W.G Simpson to command the unit. Until U Class vessels could be made available in numbers, British T class submarines were used. They had successes, but suffered heavy losses when they began operations on 20 September 1940. Administratively, the Tenth Flotilla operated under the First Submarine Flotilla at Alexandria, itself under Cunningham. In reality, Cunningham gave Simpson and his unit a free hand. Owing to the shortage of torpedo weapons, the ship was not to be attacked unless it was a warship, tanker or other significant vessel.

The performance of the Fleet was mixed at first. They sank 37,000 tons of Italian shipping, half by one vessel, HMS Truant. It amounted to one Italian submarine, nine merchant vessels and one Motor Torpedo Boat (MTB). The loss of nine submarines and their trained crews and commanders was serious. Most of the losses were to mines. On 14 January 1941, U Class submarines arrived, and the submarine offensive began in earnest.

Luftwaffe arrives (January–April 1941)

German intervention

German intervention over Malta was largely a result of the Italian defeats in North Africa than Italian failures to deal with Malta. Hitler had little choice other than to rescue his Italian ally or lose the chance of taking the Middle Eastern oilfields in Arabia. The Deutsche Afrika Korps (DAK or Africa Corps) under Erwin Rommel was dispatched to secure the Axis front in Africa in February 1941. Operation Colossus signalled a dramatic turn around. The Germans launched Operation Sonnenblume, which reinforced the Italians in North Africa. They then began a counter-offensive and drove the British back into Egypt. But operating overseas in Africa meant most of the supplies to Axis forces would come via the sea. This made Malta a dangerous threat to Axis logistical concerns. In response, the Oberkommando der Luftwaffe (OLK or Air Force High Command) sent Fliegerkorps X (Flying Corps Ten) to Sicily, which arrived in January 1941, to strike at naval forces in and around Malta, as well as RAF positions on the island to ease the passage of supplies.

The best protection for German ships transporting the German forces to Libya proved to be the Royal Navy itself. The submarines failed to interdict them successfully. The damaging of the 7,889-ton German ship Duisberg was the only noteworthy attack. On 9 February 1941 three submarines missed the same convoy bringing supplies to Tripoli. It was this city which was the principal Italian port which could receive six ships being unloaded at a time. These were the best port facilities west of Alexandria, 1,000 miles to the east. A large part of the success was naval mines. The Italians deployed 54,000 mines around Malta to prevent it being supplied. These mines were the bane of the Royal Navy's submarines. Around 3,000 mines were laid off Tunisia's coast by Italian naval forces as well.

The failure to intercept Axis shipping was evident in the figures. In January—April 1941 the Axis sent 321,259 tons to Libya and all but 18,777 tons reached port. This amounted to a 94 percent success rate. Of the 73,991 men sent by sea, 71,881 (97 percent) arrived in Africa.

At night, the British proved that they could destroy Axis shipping when the destroyers HMS Jervis, HMS Janus, HMS Mohwak and HMS Nubian sank five ships (mainly German); Sabaudia (1,500 tons), the Aegina (2,447 tons), Adana (4,205 tons), Isetlhon (3,704 tons) and Arta. Three Italian destroyers, the Targo, Lampo and Balendir were sunk for the loss of Mohawk. The mounting, albeit small, losses were sarting to concetn Rommel.

Operation Excess and the Illustrious 'Blitz'

File:Ju 87D-1.jpg

Junkers Ju 87. It was the Luftwaffe's main strike weapon over Malta in 1941.

On 10 December 1940 Fliegerkorps X under the command of Hans Ferdinand Geisler, and with support of his chief of staff Major Martin Harlinghausen, was ordered to Sicily in order to attack Allied shipping in the Mediterranean. By the start of the first German operation, Geisler had 95 aircraft and 14,389 men in Sicily. Geisler pursuaded the OKL to give him four more dive-bomber gruppen (Groups). On 10 January he could muster 255 (179 serviceable) aircraft including 209 dive and medium bombers.

By 2 January 1941, the first German units reached Trapani on Sicily's southern coast. The Luftwaffe's two units were both Junkers Ju 87 Stuka Gruppen (Groups). The first was I./Sturzkampfgeschwader 1 and II./Sturzkampfgeschwader 2 (I and II Group Dive Bomber Wings 1 and 2). The units numbered some 80 Ju 87s. This led to a notable increase in the bombing of Malta. A Stabsstaffel of Sturzkampfgeschwader 3 (StG 3) arrived. Oberstleutnant Karl Christ, Geschwaderkommodore of StG 3 was given orders to intercept heavy units. One particular target was aircraft carriers. Days later he gave ordered to the other Ju 87 gruppen, to sink the carrier HMS Illustrious. The new 23,000-ton carrier was the British' newest aircraft carrying vessel. It took part in the Battle of Taranto which handed naval supremacy to the British. It also put the ship top of the Axis' target list. The Italians had failed to sink her, now the Ju 87s would try.

The Luftwaffe crews believed four direct hits would sink the ship and began practice operations on floating mock-ups off the Sicilian coast. The vast flight deck offered a target of 6,500 square metres. An opportunity to attack the vessel came on the 6 January. Operation Excess was launched which included a series of convoy operations by the British across the Mediterranean Sea. On 10 January they were within range of the Ju 87 bases. II./StG 2 sent 43 Ju 87s with support from I./StG 1. Ten Italian SM 79s had drawn off the carrier's Fairey Fulmar fighters while the escorting cruiser HMS Bonaventure sank the Italian MTB Vega. Some 10 Ju 87s attacked the carrier unopposed. Witnessed, by Andrew Cunningham, C-in-C of the Fleet from HMS Warspite, the Ju 87s scored six hits. One destroyed a gun, another near her bow, a third demolished another gun, while two hit the descending lift wrecking the aircraft below deck causing explosions of fuel and ammunition below deck. Another went through the armoured deck and exploded deep inside the ship. Two further attacks were made without result. Heavily damaged, her main engines were intact and she steered for the now dubious haven of Malta. The attack lasted six minutes and killed 126 crew members and wounded 91. Within sight of Malta, Italian torpedo bombers attacked the carrier, but were driven off by intense anti-aircraft fire.

HMS Illustrious under Ju 87 attack in the Grand Harbour. The carrier is to the right of the large crane.

The operation should not have been launched. ULTRA had informed the Air Ministry of Fliegerkorps X's presence on Sicily as early as the 4 January. They did not pass on the intelligence to the Admiralty, who likely would not have sailed within range of the Ju 87s.

The RAF was in no condition to prevent a major German air attack, with only 16 Hurricanes and a couple of Gladiator aircraft serviceable. On 11 January 1941 10 more Ju 87s were sent to sink her. They chanced upon HMS Southampton and HMS Gloucester. Hits were scored on both. Southampton was so badly damaged her navy escorts scuttled her. Over the next 12 days the workers at the shipyard in the Grand Harbour repaired the carrier under determined air attack so that she might make Alexandria. On 13 January the Ju 87s, now equipped with SC 1000 bombs failed to achieve a hit. On 14 January 44 Ju 87s scored a near hit on the ill-fated aft after lift. On 18 January, the Germans switched to attacking the airfields at Hal Far and Luqa in an attempt to win air superiority before returning to the Illustrious. On 20 January two close hit alongside her breached the hull below the water line and hurled her hull against the Wharf. Still, the engineers won the battle. On 23 January she slipped out of the Grand Harbour and arrived in Alexandria two days later. The carrier later sailed to America where she was out of action for a year.

The Luftwaffe had failed to sink the carrier. However, their losses were few—three losses on 10 January and four Ju 87s over several following weeks—and the Germans had impressed the British with the effectiveness of land-based air power. They withdrew their fleet's heavy units from the central Mediterranean and risked no more than trying to send cruisers through the Sicilian Narrows. Both the British and Italian navies digested their experiences over Taranto and Malta.

German air superiority

Messerschmitt Bf 109F. The Bf 109F was more than the out-dated Hawker Hurricanes could handle. Operated by Jagdgeschwader 26, they gained air superiority over the worn out aircraft and inexperienced pilots of Malta's RAF contingent.

The appearance in February of a staffel (squadron) of Messerschmitt Bf 109 and F fighters of 7 Staffel Jagdgeschwader 26 (Fighter Wing 26 or JG 26), led by Oberleutnant Joachim Müncheberg, quickly led to a sudden and marked rise in RAF losses, as the experienced Luftwaffe fighter pilots made their presence felt. The Allied pilots on Malta had little combat experience and their Hawker Hurricanes were well worn. Over the next four months, few of JG 26's Bf 109s were damaged, let alone shot down. In exchange they claimed 42 air victories, twenty of them (including one over Yugoslavia) were credited to Müncheberg.

In contrast, the Hurricanes were patched up, and cannibalised well past the usual shelf-life. Their performance, already inferior to the Bf 109F, was greatly reduced as a result of being patched up. Small numbers of reinforcements arrived; five at the beginning of March, another six on the 18 March. However five were lost in between costing the RAF five pilots. The odds of surviving combat for RAF pilots was poor.

On 1 March, the Luftwaffe mounted very effective raids. Attacks on the airfields destroyed all the Wellingtons brought in October. Royal Navy warships and Sunderland flying boats could not use the island for offensive operations. The two main fighter squadrons, No. 261 and 274 Squadrons were put under severe pressure.

German air superiority was taking its toll on the island. There were several raids per day. Over 107 Axis attacks took place in February and 105 in March with Bf 109 fighters contributinh by strafing any signs of movement on the ground. Rationing also started, reducing morale further. All males between the age of 16 and 56 were conscripted into Maltese service. Large numbers of Maltese had already volunteered. By February around 14,600 men, one-sixth of the island's work force had answered the call to arms. By this time Royal Malta Artillery now guarded the Grand Harbour. By this time the Axis bombing had already done severe damage to the Three Cities.

Joachim Müncheberg (left) and Feldmarschall Erwin Rommel (right). Müncheberg's staffel was no more than 12 Bf 109s strong. Yet, this force gained air superiority over Malta in the first four months of 1941.

Some prestige was gained in April, with the victory at sea in the Battle of the Tarigo Convoy. Further success was had by the Malta Convoys. An urgent supply convoy from Gibraltar to Alexandria (Operation Tiger) coincided with reinforcements for the Mediterranean Fleet, two small convoys from Egypt to Malta, and 48 more Hurricanes flown off HMS Ark Royal and Furious (Operation Splice). The only loss was one transport Empire Song, which hit a mine and sank. Tiger was transporting tanks (Matildas and the new Crusader tanks) needed for the operations in North Africa. The operation was completed on 12 May. I., II., and III., StG 1 made a determined effort against Tiger and Malta without result.

Nevertheless, the Germans held air superiority. Hitler ordered Fliegerkorps X to protect Axis shipping, prevent Allied shipping passing through the central Mediterranean, and neutralise Malta altogether as an Allied base. Around 180 German and 300 Italian aircraft would carry out the directive. The Luftwaffe in particular swarmed over the island almost at will. The RAF was barely able to put more than six to eight fighters in the air at one time. Occasionally a dozen would be flown in off British carriers, but being heavily outnumbered, the replacements were soon used up. The Axis were successful in implementing Hitler's directive. By mid-May, the central Mediterranean had been sealed off to Allied shipping, and the DAK was able to send reinforcements to Rommel in North Africa with the loss of only three percent of its supplies, personnel and equipment. From 11 April to 10 May, just 111 Axis raids were carried out. All targeted military installations. Most heavy equipment in the Grand Harbour was destroyed; the drydocks could only be operated by hand. Workshop efficiency was down to 50 percent, some down to 25 percent.

During the first four months of German operations, the Luftwaffe had dropped 2,500 tons of high explosives on Malta. It was many more times the tonnage dropped by the Italians but would fall far short of the amount dropped in the coming year. According to official figures, more than 2,000 civilian buildings were destroyed as opposed to only 300 during the Italian siege. Human casualties remained light. After the bombing of HMS Illustrious, most of the civilians moved out to safer surroundings. By May 1941, nearly 60,000 people had left the cities. In the capital Valletta, some 11,000 people (two-thirds) left the area. One of the main reasons for this was a lack of shelter. The British focused on protecting military targets. Eventually 2,000 miners and stonemasons were recruited to build public shelters. They pay was poor and the miners threatened strike action, only to be threatened in turn with a draft into the army. They backed down, but worked as little as possible. Had they been motivated, the shelters could have built twice as cheaply and at one-third the cost.

German withdrawal

In April, Hitler was forced to intervene in the Balkans which led to the Balkans Campaign (German invasion of Yugoslavia and the Battle of Greece) owing to the failed Italian invasion of Greece. The subsequent campaign and the heavy German losses in the Battle of Crete convinced Hitler that air drops behind enemy lines, using paratroopers, was no longer feasible unless surprise was achieved. He acknowledged the chances of surprise in an air operation of that kind were worn out. Hitler lived up to his word, and the German airborne forces did not undertake any operations again. This had important consequences for Malta, as it indicated the island would have to taken by Axis siege. In June, Hitler attacked the Soviet Union under Operation Barbarossa. Fliegerkorps X departed for the Eastern Front, and the Regia Aeronautica was left to continue its ineffective hit and run tactics against Malta in the coming months. Geisler, commanding the remnants of Fliegerkorps X, could count upon minelaying aircraft from Kampfgeschwader 4 (KG 4) and Ju 87s in night operations. Supply issues were bad, and the small German force left was forced to abandon operations on 22 April 1941. By early May 1941, the Luftwaffe had flown 1,465 strike, 1,144 fighter and 132 reconnaissance missions for just 44 losses.

By June, Geisler had been moved to Libya to support the DAK in the North African Campaign. The mounting supply losses, which affected his ability to support Erwin Rommel and his forces, caused tension between the Army and the Luftwaffe. Geisler was to be returned to Sicily to solve the issue. However, the Germans backed down over Italian protests. On 6 October he did extend his air sector responsibilities to cover the Tripoli-Naples sea route. On 2 October, Hermann Goring, commander-in-chief of the Luftwaffe met with his Regia Aeronautica counterpart Francesco Pricolo to discuss reinforcements. Goring displayed surprising sensitivity to Italian failings while discussing sending German reinforcements. Hans Jeschonnek, Goring's chief of staff, suggested sending Luftflotte 2 and its commander Albert Kesselring to Sicily from the Eastern Front. Goring agreed, and was willing to send 16 Gruppen, anticipating Soviet collapse in the east. This level of support did not arrive. However, Bruno Loerzer and his command, Fliegerkorps II, did arrive in January 1942, with Kesselring as the Southern Commander in Chief, which had nominally been Benito Mussolini's responsibility. Kesselring was given this role officially on 1 December 1941.

Allied recovery (April-October 1941)

Allied reinforcement

While the Regia Aeronautica was ineffective, so was the Italian Navy. The defeat in the Battle of Cape Matapan encouraged the Italians to be even more half-hearted in their operations against Malta. A lack of oil also crippled their ability to attack the British sea-lanes. The defeat stunned Mussolini. He still maintained a healthy numerical superiority over the enemy, but he was convinced of Italian inferiority. Much to the anger of the Germans, he refused to seek out and engage the British thereafter. British naval forces passed through to Malta, almost unchallenged. Several hundred tons of supplies, 2,000 soldiers and 200 tons of medical stores made it to Malta untouched, which undid all of the work of the Luftwaffe in the first four months of 1941. The supply situation was described as excellent by the autumn, 1941. With the exception of coal, fodder, kerosene and essential civilian supplies were such that an eight to fifteen month reserve was built up. Operation Substance was particularly successful in July 1941. Around 65,000 tons made it into Malta altogether in July. No supplies were sent in August, but Operation Halberd in September 1941 brought in a large 85,000 tons of supplies, shipped by nine merchant vessels escorted by one aircraft carrier, five cruisers and 17 destroyers. One cargo ship, the Imperial Star was sunk, and the battleship HMS Nelson was damaged by a torpedo. This convoy proved critical to saving Malta, as it supplies proved essential when the Germans returned in December.

In mid 1941, new squadrons — No. 185 and No. 126 — were formed and the defenders received the first cannon-armed Hurricane Mk IIAs. Naval carriers flew in a total of 81 more fighters in April–May. By the 12 May, there were 50 Hurricanes on the island. On 21 May No. 249 Squadron RAF arrived, taking over from No. 261. No. 46 Squadron RAF arrived in June, to be renumbered No. 126 Squadron RAF. May to December 1941 also saw the arrival of the first Bristol Blenheim unit (No. 113 Squadron RAF) and Bristol Beaufighter units, 252 and 272 Squadrons.

Malta was now being used as a base for supplying Egypt. Between July and December 1941, 717 RAF fighters passed through Malta and 514 left for North Africa. By early August 1941, Malta now had 75 fighters and 230 anti-aircraft guns. Bristol Blenheim bombers also joined the defenders and began offensive operations.

Allied offensive

On 1 June, Air Vice Marshal Forster Maynard, Malta's Air Officer Commanding, was replaced by Air Commodore Hugh Pughe Lloyd. The Allies were able to launch offensive operations from Malta. Some 60% of Axis shipping was sunk in the second half of 1941. The DAK and its allies needed 50,000 short tons (45,000 t) of supplies a day, but were not receiving that much, and as a result were unable to resist a strong counter-offensive by British forces in Operation Crusader. For example, in July 62,276 tons of supplies was landed by the Axis in July, half of the figure in June. In September 1941, the No. 830 Naval Air Squadron sank or damaged the ships Andrea Gritti (6,338 tons) and the Pietro Barbaro (6,330 tons). ULTRA intercepts confirmed that 3,500 tons of air bombs, 4,000 tons of aummunition, 5,000 tons of food, one entire tank workshop, 25 Bf 109 engines and 25 cases of glycol coolant for their engines were lost. Further success was had later in the month, though the losses against anti-aircraft fire from Italian ships was sometimes heavy. No. 38, 40 and 104 Squadrons equipped with Wellington bombers hit Axis convoys in Tripoli doing some damage to shipping.

In concert with Royal Navy submarines, the RAF and FAA sank 108 Axis ships (300,000 grt) between June and September. During November, submarines cut Axis supplies to Africa by 62 percent of the total sent that month. In June, the Italians unloaded 125,000 tons (37,000 for the Germans). But that figure fell to 83,000 tons (27,300 for the Germans) and by November it was just 29,843 tons (5,100 tons for the Germans), from 79,208 sent out.

Part of the reason for the success in November 1941, was the arrival of the Royal Navy's Force K. It's forces successfully destroyed an entire Axis convoy during the Battle of the Duisburg Convoy, which practically blockaded Libyan ports. Soon after, Force K was reinforced by the arrival in Malta of Force B with two light cruisers, Ajax and Neptune, and two K-class destroyers, Kimberley and Kingston, on 27 November 1941. Joint operations with the RAF were so effective that during November 1941 the Axis supply line suffered significant losses. Among the contributors was No. 828 Naval Air Squadron, No. 830 Naval Air Squadron, the British 10th Naval Flotilla, and No. 69 Squadron RAF which shadowed convoys with their Maryland aircraft. Special Flights of RAF Wellingtons which were fitted with air to surface vessel radar, were critical to Force K operations. ULTRA intelligence would reach Malta on Axis Convoy movements. The Malta Command would then dispatch the ASV-Wellingtons to sweep the seas and direct the British naval forces to the targeted convoy.

However the success did not come without cost. On 19 December 1941 ships from both Forces ran into a minefield while pursuing an Italian convoy. Damage from the mines sank one cruiser (Neptune) and damaged another (Aurora). A destroyer (Kandahar) was also mined while attempting to assist the stricken Neptune. The damaged Kandahar was scuttled the next day by destroyer Jaguar. Following this, and with a resurgence of the aerial bombardment of Malta, surface ships were withdrawn from the central Mediterranean in January 1942.

The RAF defenders on Malta had claimed 191 aircraft shot down from June 1940—December 1941, while losses were 94 fighters. No. 185 Squadron claimed 18 destroyed seven probable victories and 21 damaged for 11 killed or missing. Among those losses was Squadron Leader Peter "Boy" Mould.

In response to the reverses, the Luftwaffe returned in force in December 1941 to renew intensive bombing. The response was also naval. The Kriegsmarine sent nearly half of all the German U-Boats on operations in the Atlantic Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea to support the effort against Malta. By 15 December, half of these vessels were either in the Mediterranean, or on their way to the Theatre. The RAF was, however, making life difficult for the German submarines, which had to pass by the British naval and air base at Gibraltar to reach the contested waters.

Luftwaffe returns (December 1941—August 1942)

Stuggle for air superiority

File:Spitvbtropvo.jpg

Spitfire Vc(trop) in North Africa. The Spitfire arrived in Malta in March 1942, providing the island with the RAF's main frontline fighter.

German reinforcements were swift to arrive. Messerschmitt Bf 110s and Ju 88 night fighters were flown into to Sicily to support Fliegerkorps II from Zerstörergeschwader 26 (ZG 26, or Destroyer Wing 26) and Nachtjagdgeschwader 1 (NJG 1 or Night Fighter Wing 1). They quickly eliminated Malta's striking force, which was beyond the range of fighter escort while over the Mediterranean. In the first two months, around 20 RAF bombers and reconnaissance aircraft were shot down.

In February 1942, Squadron Leader Stan Turner arrived to take over 249 Squadron. His experience flying with Douglas Bader over Europe soon meant the adoption of the loose finger-four formation in an attempt to cut RAF losses. The outmoded Hurricanes still struggling against the very latest Bf 109Fs of Jagdgeschwader 53 (JG 53) now operating over the island, and the Italian Macchi C.202s. The Ju 88 bomber version also proved a difficult enemy. To restore qualitive parity, on 7 March 1942, a contingent of 16 Supermarine Spitfire Mk Vs flew to Malta from the aircraft carrier HMS Eagle as part of Operation Spotter. A further run by Eagle delivered nine Spitfires.

The reinforcement of Malta by carrier ("Club Runs") became more frequent through 1942. Then, USS Wasp and HMS Eagle despatched 47 more (Operation Calendar) on 13 April 1942. All but one reached the island. While the Spitfires were a match for the Axis aircraft, many of the ones delivered in March and April were destroyed on the ground and in the air—where they were outnumbered. For instance, for five days in April there was just one Spitfire available to defend the island; for two days there were none. The Germans had watched their delivery, and pressed home heavy attacks. By the 21 April 1942, just 27 Spitfires were still airworthy. By that evening, that had fallen to 17. Also, the overwhelming Axis bombardments had substantially eliminated Malta’s naval and aerial offensive capabilities. The Luftwaffe achieved a measure of air superiority in March—April 1942. The Regia Aeronautica also pressed home attacks with determination. Often, three to five bombers would fly very low over their targets and drop their bombs with precision, regardless of the RAF attacks and heavy ground fire.

On 9 May 1942, Wasp and Eagle delivered 64 more Spitfires (Operation Bowery). Malta now had five full Sptifire squadrons; No. 126, 185, 249, 601 and 603 Squadrons. Between 18 May and 9 June 1942, Eagle made three runs carrying another 76 Spitfires to Malta. With such a force established, the RAF had the firepower to deal harshly with any Axis attacks. By August 1942, 163 Spitfires were on hand to defend Malta, 120 were serviceable. HMS Furious also delivered many Spitfires. On the 11 August, 17 August and 24 October 1942, under the respective actions, Operation Bellows, Operation Baritone and Operation Train, it brought another 85 Spitfires to Malta. Often, the Spitfires were asked to undertake flights of five and a half hours, travelling the same distance of from London to Saint Petersburg. This was achieved using 170-gallon ferry tank. This combined with a 29-gallon tank in the rear fuselage which brought up the total tank capacity to 284 gallons.

By mid-1942, the Axis air forces ranged against the island were at their maximum strength: some 520 Luftwaffe and 300 Regia Aeronautica aircraft. The main adversaries for the defenders were the 140 or so Bf 109Fs of JG 53 and II/JG 3 'Udet' and the 80 Macchi C.202s of the 4th and 51st Stormo. Bombers units included the Junkers Ju 88s of II./LG 1, II and III./KG 77, I./KG 54, Kgr.606, and Kgr. 806.

Canadian fighter ace George Beurling known as the "Knight of Malta" shot down 27 Axis aircraft in just 14 days over the skies of Malta.

When the RAF could not put up a fighter cover, Malta's Fighter Control would transmit a dummy radio communication, aping the scrambling and interception of incoming raids as if fighters were already in the air, knowing the Luftwaffe would be monitoring the conversations.

Axis invasion plan

Main article: Operation Herkules

On 29–30 April 1942, a plan for the invasion of the island was approved by Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini. It envisioned an airborne assault with one German and one Italian airborne division, under the command of German General Kurt Student. This would have been followed by a seaborne landing of two or three divisions protected by the Regia Marina. However, while the invasion was supported by Rommel wholeheartedly, Hermann Göring was against it. In the end, the operation was repeatedly delayed and eventually cancelled.

Luftwaffe targets convoys

Operation Pedestal, 11 August: A general view of the convoy under air attack showing the intense anti-aircraft barrage put up by the escorts. The battleship HMS Rodney is on the left and HMS Manchester is on the right

In May, accelerated and more effective deployments of Spitfires allowed the British to contest air superiority against the Germans over Malta for the first time. In June, the Royal Navy undertook Operation Harpoon and Operation Vigorous. The two convoys departed for Malta, the former from Gibraltar and the latter from Haifa and Port Said. The eastern convoy was forced to turn back in the face of air attacks. Two freighters of the western convoy made it to Malta and delivered 15,000 short tons (14,000 t) of supplies. Yet the island appeared to the Axis forces to be neutralised, and they decided that there was no need for further intensive bombing raids. For instance, on 10 May, Albert Kesselring, Commander-in-Chief South of Axis forces, reported to the German High Command that "There is nothing left to bomb." By July, the Axis air offensive had reached its peak, and the attacks were reduced.

On 15 April, King George VI awarded Malta the George Cross, the highest civilian award for gallantry in the Commonwealth, normally awarded to individuals: "to honour her brave people, I award the George Cross to the Island Fortress of Malta to bear witness to a heroism and devotion that will long be famous in history". President Franklin Roosevelt, describing the wartime period, called Malta "one tiny bright flame in the darkness". Some historians argue that the award was in fact a propaganda gesture to justify the huge losses sustained by Britain to prevent Malta from capitulating as Singapore had done in the Battle of Singapore.

In the first six months of 1942, there was only one 24-hour period without air raids. Luftwaffe records indicate that between 20 March and 28 April, Malta was subjected to 11,819 sorties and 6,557 t (7,228 short tons) of bombs. 1,493 civilians were killed and 3,674 wounded out of a population of 270,000.

The siege caused significant hardships for everyone on Malta. Bombs killed many and left even more homeless. Businesses and civil infrastructure were destroyed. The disruption of shipping caused food, fuel, and other commodities to be in very short supply. During the greatest times of starvation, it is said that foods were rationed to "three boiled sweets, half a sardine and a spoonful of jam a day". Poor nutrition and sanitation led to the spread of disease. Soldiers rations were also reduced, from four to two thousand calories a day. Malta was starting to starve.

Allied victory

RAF victory in the air

The tide really began to turn in July, however, with the appointment of Air Vice Marshal Sir Keith Park as air officer commanding. He changed the way in which Malta's fighters were used, repeating his successful Battle of Britain tactics of intercepting enemy raids as soon as possible, on their way to the target, rather than waiting to mount massed attacks on them as they retreated. Losses to the Axis attackers, reinforced by aircraft transferred from Russia, immediately increased, and British losses fell. [1]

Britain took advantage of the lull in Axis attacks to fly in 61 Spitfire Mk Vs from HMS Furious, which immediately improved the aerial defensive situation, although food, ammunition, and aviation fuel remained critically short. Operation Pedestal was a major attempt to resupply Malta with a convoy of 14 merchant ships supported by 44 major warships, including battleships and aircraft carriers, and diversionary naval attacks by the Mediterranean Fleet at the other end of the Mediterranean. The convoy was attacked relentlessly in the early days of August. On 13 August, the surviving merchant ships started arriving at Malta, ending on 15 August, the feast of Santa Marija (St Mary), a public holiday on Malta, with the British-crewed U.S. tanker SS Ohio; she had been hit by torpedoes, bombs, and a crashed dive bomber, but survived with her vital aviation fuel. The cost: nine of the 14 freighters, an aircraft carrier, two cruisers and a destroyer were sunk, and a carrier and two cruisers were badly damaged.

Throughout this period, Royal Navy submarines, RAF bombers and Fleet Air Arm torpedo bombers operating from Malta continued to wreak havoc on Axis shipping, severely curtailing vital supplies and reinforcements to the German and Italian forces in North Africa, thereby limiting Rommel's ability to advance across the western desert towards Alexandria and Cairo.

The Luftwaffe responded with a renewed wave of attacks on 11 October. However, this time the defenders were mass equipped with Spitfire Mk VB/Cs. Over 17 days, the Luftwaffe suffered 34 Ju 88s and 12 Bf 109s destroyed and 18 damaged. RAF losses amounted to 23 Spitfires shot down and 20 crash landed. 12 RAF pilots were killed.

Other events

The Allied efforts in the Middle East, in particular at the Second Battle of El Alamein, were beginning to have their effect, and supplies were reaching Malta. As the Axis forces were progressively defeated in North Africa the siege of Malta was lifted. This was complete with Operation Stone Age a convoy that delivered 35,000 tons of supply that reached Malta from Alexandria, Egypt on 20 November 1942 with no ships lost and only minimal damage. Malta based Spitfires provided air cover for the final 80 mile section of the operation. This convoy is seen as the end of the two-year siege of Malta. On 6 December, another supply convoy under the codename Operation Portcullis reached Malta without suffering any losses. After that, ships sailed to Malta without joining convoys. The last air raid over Malta occurred on 20 July 1943. It was the 3,340th alert since 11 June 1940.

The Allied infrastructure built up on the island in 1942 was later turned to offensive use, as over a dozen Spitfire squadrons based there commenced operations covering the amphibious Allied invasion of Sicily.

Casualties

Allied warship losses

HMS Ark Royal in 1939, with Swordfish of 820 Naval Air Squadron passing overhead. The ship was sunk in 1941

Allied casualties in warships:

• Two aircraft carriers:

HMS Eagle, Ark Royal

• Four cruisers:

HMS Cairo, Hermione, Manchester, Neptune, Southampton

• 19 destroyers:

HMS Airedale, Bedouin, Fearless, Foresight, Gallant, Gurkha, Hasty, Hyperion, Jersey, Kandahar, Kingston, Kujawiak (Polish Navy), HMS Lance, Legion, Maori, Mohawk, HMAS Nestor (Royal Australian Navy), HMS Pakenham and Southwold.

• British submarine losses amounted to 38:

HMS Cachalot, Grampus, Odin, Olympus, Orpheus, Oswald, Undaunted, Union, P36, P38, P48, P222, P311, Pandora, Parthian, Perseus, Rainbow, Regent, Regulus, Saracen, Splendid, Talisman, Tempest, Tetrarch, Thunderbolt, Tigris, Traveller, Triad, Triton, Triumph, Trooper, Turbulent, Upholder, Urge, Usk and Utmost. The Free French submarine Narwhal and Greek Navy vessel Glaukos, were also lost.

Infrastructure damage

In the tiny but densely populated island, 5,524 private dwellings were destroyed, 9,925 damaged but reparable, and 14,225 damaged by bomb blast. In addition 111 Churches, 50 Hospitals, institutions or colleges, 36 theatres, clubs, government offices, banks, factories, flour mills and other commercial buildings suffered destruction or damage — a total of 30,000 building in all.

Axis shipping losses

Total Axis losses in the Mediterranean were heavy. Human casualties amounted to 17,240 personnel at sea. In supplies, the Axis lost 315,090 short tons (285,840 t). This was more than reached Malta. The Allied Navies sank 773 Axis ships, totalling 1,342,789 long tons (1,364,337 t). Mines sank another 179 ships of 214,109 long tons (217,545 t) in total. The Navies and Air Forces shared in the destruction of 25 ships for 106,050 long tons (107,750 t), and Air Forces sank 1,326 ships, for a total of 1,466,208 long tons (1,489,736 t). Mines and Naval craft shared a further ship destroyed between them, accounting for 1,778 long tons (1,807 t). In all, 2,304 Axis ships were sunk, with a combined displacement of 3,130,969 long tons (3,181,211 t).

Below is a table charting Axis losses in shipping to Libya, June 1940–January 1943:

•   This indicates the periods the Regia Aeronautica was the only enemy air force in action against Malta
•   This indicates the periods the Luftwaffe made significant efforts against Malta
•   This indicates the influence of the Royal Navy Force K operations against Axis shipping
•   This indicates the influence of Bristol Beaufighter operations against Axis shipping

Axis Personnel and supplies to Libya, 1940

Month	Personnel Shipped	Personnel Reached	Supplies shipped	Supplies reached
June	1,358	1,308	3,618	3,608
July	6,407	6,407	40,875	40,875
August	1,221	1,221	50,669	50,669
September	4,602	4,602	53,669	53,669
October	2,823	2,823	29,306	29,306
November	3,157	3,157	60,778	60,778
December	9,731	9,731	65,556	58,574

Axis Personnel and supplies to Libya, 1941

Month	Personnel Shipped	Personnel Reached	Supplies shipped	Supplies reached
January	12,491	12,214	50,505	49,084
February	19,557	19,557	80,357	79,173
March	20,975	20,184	101,800	92,753
April	20,698	19,926	88,597	81,472
May	12,552	9,958	73,367	69,331
June	12,886	12,886	133,331	125,076
July	16,141	15,767	77,012	62,276
August	18,288	16,753	96,021	83,956
September	12,717	6,603	94,115	67,513
October	4,046	3,541	92,449	73,614
November	4,872	4,628	79,208	29,843
December	1,748	1,074	47,680	39,092

Axis Personnel and supplies to Libya, 1942

Month	Personnel Shipped	Personnel Reached	Supplies shipped	Supplies reached
January	2,840	1,355	66,214	66,170
February	531	531	59,468	58,965
March	391	284	57,541	47,588
April	1,349	1,349	151,578	150,389
May	4,396	4,241	93,188	86,439
June	1,474	1,249	41,519	32,327
July	4,566	4,435	97,794	91, 491
August	1,281	790	77,134	51,655
September	1,367	959	96,903	77,526
October	1,011	631	83,695	46,698
November	1,031	1,031	85,970	63,736
December	5	5	12,981	6,151

See also

• Malta Convoys
• Military history of Gibraltar during World War II
• Adrian Warburton, RAF pilot who conducted reconnaissance missions from the island.
• George Beurling, RAF fighter pilot who claimed 27 victories while defending Malta.

References

• Bungay, Stephen. Alamein. Aurum Press. 2002. ISBN 1-85410-929-4
• Bradford, Ernle. Siege: Malta 1940–1943. Pen & Sword. 1986. ISBN 978-0850529302
• Crawford, Alex. Gloster Gladiator. Redbourn, UK: Mushroom Model Publications, 2002. ISBN 83-916327-0-9.
• de Zeng, H.L; Stanket, D.G; Creek, E.J. Bomber Units of the Luftwaffe 1933–1945; A Reference Source, Volume 2. Ian Allen Publishing, 2007. ISBN 978-1-903223-87-1
• de Zeng, H.L; Stanket, D.G; Creek, E.J. Bomber Units of the Luftwaffe 1933–1945; A Reference Source, Volume 1. Ian Allen Publishing, 2007. ISBN 978-1-85780-279-5
• Holland, James. Fortress Malta: An Island Under Siege, 1940–1943. New York: Miramax Books, 2003. ISBN 1-4013-5186-7.
• Hogan, George. Malta: The Triumphant Years, 1940–1943. Robert Hale. 1978. ISBN 978-0709171157
• Keegan, John. The Oxford Companion to World War Two. Oxford University Press. 2005. ISBN 0-19-280666-1
• Mallett, Robert. The Italian Navy and Fascist Expansionism, 1935–1940. Frank Cass. 1998. ISBN 0-7146-4432-3
• McAulay, Lex. Against All Odds: RAAF Pilots in the Battle for Malta, 1942. Milsons Point. 1989.
• Rogers, Anthony. 185: The Malta Squadron. Spellmount, London, 2005. ISBN 1-86227-274-3
• Rogers, Anthony. Battle Over Malta: Aircraft Losses and Crash Sites, 1940–42 . Sutton Books. 2000. ISBN 978-0750923927
• Scutts, Jerry. Bf 109 Aces of North Africa and the Mediterranean. London: Osprey Publishing, 1994. ISBN 1-85532-448-2.
• Shores, Christopher and Cull, Brian with Malizia, Nicola. Malta: The Hurricane Years. London: Grub Street, 1987. ISBN 0-948817-06-2
• Smith, Peter C. The Battles of the Malta Striking Forces. Littlehampton Book Services. 1974. ISBN 978-0711005280
• Spooner, Tony. Supreme Gallantry: Malta's Role in the Allied Victory, 1939–1945. London. 1996. 978-0719557064
• Taylor, A.J.P. and S.L. Mayer, eds. A History Of World War Two. London: Octopus Books, 1974. ISBN 0-70640-399-1.
• Terraine, John.The Right of the Line: The Royal Air Force in the European War, 1939–1945. Sceptre Publishing. 1985. ISBN 0-340-41919-9
• Thomas, Andrew. Gloster Gladiator Aces. Botley, UK: Osprey Publishing, 2002. ISBN 1-84176-289-X.
• Wingate, John. The Fighting Tenth: The Tenth Submarine Flotilla and the Siege of Malta. Pen & Sword. 1991. ISBN 978-0850528916

External links

• Combat History of the Supermarine Spitfire – The Defence of Malta (1942)
• The Air Battle of Malta, 1940–1942 (HMSO 1944)