Fall of Tenochtitlan

Siege of Tenochtitlan
Part of the Spanish conquest of the Aztec Empire
"Conquista de México por Cortés". Unknown artist, second half of the 17th century. Note that the depiction of the Aztecs' clothing and weaponry is inaccurate.
Date May 26 - August 13, 1521 Location Tenochtitlan, present-day Mexico City, Mexico Result Decisive Spanish and Tlaxcallan victory
Belligerents
Spain Tlaxcallān	Aztec Empire
Commanders and leaders
Hernán Cortés Pedro de Alvarado	Cuitláhuac † Cuauhtémoc  (POW)
Strength
16 guns 13 brigantines 80,000–200,000 native allies 86–96 cavalry 900–1,300 infantry	300,000 warriors(including war acallis)
Casualties and losses
450–860 Spanish 20,000 Tlaxcallan	100,000 warriors 100,000 civilians

The siege of Tenochtitlan, the capital of the Aztec Empire, came about in 1521 through the manipulation of local factions and divisions by Spanish conquistador Hernán Cortés. Though numerous battles were fought between the Aztecs and the Spanish army, which was composed of predominantly indigenous peoples, it was the siege of Tenochtitlan that was the final, decisive battle that led to the downfall of the Aztec civilization and marked the end of the first phase of the Spanish conquest of the Aztec Empire. The conquest of Mexico was part of the Spanish colonization of the Americas.

Early events

The road to Tenochtitlan

In April 1519, Hernán Cortés, who was the Chief Magistrate of Santiago, Cuba, came upon the coast of Mexico at a point he called Vera Cruz with 508 soldiers, 100 sailors and 14 small cannon. Velazquez called for Cortés to lead an expedition into Mexico after reports from a few previous expeditions to Yucatán caught the interest of the Spanish in Cuba. Velázquez then revoked Cortés' right to lead the expedition and soon after sent an army led by Pánfilo de Narvaez to take Cortés into custody. Cortés lacked the authority to execute his plan, a fact that would return to harass him when he came back to Spain.

As he moved inland, Cortés soon came into contact with a number of tribes who resented Aztec rule; Cortés skirmished with some of these natives such as the Totonacs and Tlaxcalans who surrounded his army onto a hilltop—which was protected by the impressing artillery fire from his cannons for two agonizing weeks. Bernal Diaz del Castillo wrote that his numerically inferior armed force probably would not have survived if it were not for Xicotencatl the Elder and his wish to form an allegiance with the Spaniards against the Aztecs.

It once was widely believed that the Aztecs initially thought Cortés was Quetzalcoatl, a mythical god prophesied to return to Mexico the same year Cortés landed, and to come from the same direction he came. This is presently believed to be a conquest invention, and scholars agree that the Aztecs were aware that Cortés was not a god.

Moctezuma sent a group of noblemen and other agents of his to meet Cortés at Quauhtechcac. These emissaries brought golden jewelry as a gift, which greatly pleased the Spaniards. According to the Florentine Codex, Lib. 12, f.6r., Moctezuma also ordered that his messengers carry the highly symbolic penacho (headdress) of Quetzalcoatl de Tula to Cortés and place it on his person. As news about the strangers reached the capital city, Moctezuma became increasingly fearful and considered fleeing the city but resigned himself to what he considered to be the fate of his people.

Cortés continued on his march towards Tenochtitlan. Before entering the city, on November 8, 1519 Cortés and his troops prepared themselves for battle, armoring themselves and their horses, and arranging themselves in proper military rank. Four horsemen were at the lead of the procession. Behind these horsemen were five more contingents: foot soldiers with iron swords and wooden or leather shields; horsemen in cuirasses, armed with iron lances, swords, and wooden shields; crossbowmen; more horsemen; soldiers armed with arquebuses; lastly, native peoples from Tlaxcalan, Tliliuhquitepec, and Huexotzinco. The indigenous soldiers wore cotton armor and were armed with shields and crossbows; many carried provisions in baskets or bundles while others escorted the cannons on wooden carts.

Cortés' army entered the city on the flower-covered causeway (Iztapalapa) associated with the god Quetzalcoatl. Cortés was amicably received by Moctezuma who told him "You have come to sit on your throne." The captive woman Malinalli Tenépal, also known as La Malinche or Doña Marina, translated from Nahuatl to Maya chontal; the Spaniard Gerónimo de Aguilar translated from Maya chontal to Spanish.

Moctezuma was later taken hostage as a safety measure by the vastly outnumbered Spanish. According to all eyewitness accounts, Moctezuma initially refused to leave his palace but after a series of threats from and debates with the Spanish captains he agreed to move to the Axayáctal palace with his retinue. The first captain assigned to guard him was none other than Pedro de Alvarado. Other Mexican lords were also detained by the Spanish. The palace was surrounded by over a hundred Spanish soldiers in order to prevent any attempt to rescue the Huey Tlatoani (emperor).

Tensions mount between Aztecs and Spaniards

It is uncertain why Moctezuma cooperated so readily with the Spaniards. It is possible he feared losing his life or political power. It could also have been a tactical move: Moctezuma may have wanted to gather more information on the Spaniards, or to wait for the end of the agricultural season and strike at the beginning of the war season. However, he did not carry out either of these actions even though high-ranking military leaders such as his brother Cuitlahuac and nephew Cacamatzin urged him to do so. With Moctezuma captive, Cortés did not need to worry about being cut off from supplies or being attacked. He also assumed that he could control the Aztecs through Moctezuma. However, Cortés had little knowledge of the ruling system of the Aztecs; Moctezuma was not all-powerful as Cortés imagined. Being appointed to the throne and maintaining the position was dependent on the king’s ability to rule decisively; he could easily be replaced by another noble if he failed to do so. At any sign of weakness, Aztec nobles within Tenochtitlan and in other Aztec tributaries were liable to rebel. As Moctezuma made orders as demanded by Cortés, such as commanding tribute to be gathered and given to the Spaniards, his authority was slipping, and quickly his people began to turn against him.

Cortés and his army were permitted to stay in the Palace of Axayacatl, and tensions continued to grow. While the Spaniards were in Tenochtitlan, Governor Velazquez, the highest Spanish authority in the Americas, assembled a force of nineteen ships, more than 800 soldiers, twenty cannons, eighty horsemen, one-hundred and twenty crossbowmen, and eighty arquebusiers under the command of Pánfilo de Narvaez to capture Cortés and return him to Cuba. Velazquez felt that Cortés had exceeded his authority, and had been aware of Cortés's misconduct for nearly a year. He had to wait for favorable winds, though, and was unable to send any forces until spring. Narvaez’s troops landed at San Juan de Ulúa on the Mexican coast around April 20, 1520.

After Cortés became aware of their arrival, he brought a small force of about three hundred to Narvaez’s camp in Cempohuallan on May 27. Cortés ambushed Narvaez’s camp late at night, taking Narvaez hostage and easily gaining his surrender. Evidence suggests that the two were in the midst of negotiations at the time, and Narvaez was not expecting an attack. Cortés had also divided Narvaez’s forces with promises of the vast wealth in Tenochtitlan, inducing them to surrender more quickly. Narvaez was imprisoned in Vera Cruz, and his army was integrated into Cortés’s forces.

Rapid deterioration of relations

Massacre at the festival of Tóxcatl

During Cortés’s absence, Pedro de Alvarado was left in command in Tenochtitlan, with eighty soldiers, including fourteen arquebusiers, eight crossbowmen, as well as five horses, several cannons, and the last of the powder.

At this time, the Aztecs began to prepare for the annual festival of Toxcatl, in honor of the war god Huitzilopochtli. They had asked permission of Moctezuma to hold the festival, and asserted that the Spanish wanted to learn about their traditions. Alvarado agreed to allow the festival on the condition that the gatherers were unarmed. The evening before the festival, a statue of Huitzilopochtli was created and decorated in great detail.

By the day of the festival, Cortés had been absent for twenty days. The Aztecs gathered very early in the morning in single file in front of the image of Huitzilopochtli, and brought offerings. Many young warriors came, having had agreed beforehand to dance as well as possible to impress the Spanish. The celebrants then filed into the courtyard of the Great Temple to perform the Dance of the Serpent. When everyone had entered, the singing and dancing began. Keeping in file, the highest-esteemed warriors were in the lead, with the less experienced behind them.

There are many different accounts of what next occurred. According to some, Alvarado feared for the safety of the Spanish forces, and thought the Aztecs were planning an attack. However, the assembled warriors were outfitted in regalia, not dressed and armed for combat. Another account of the situation by the Spanish relates that they attempted to prevent a human sacrifice. However, it is also possible that Alvarado wanted to decimate the vulnerable Aztec leadership at the celebration; the Aztec forces were superior in number, and the Spanish would not have been victorious in a fair battle.

While the people were singing and dancing, the Spanish came out ready for battle, armed with swords, lances, and wooden or metal shields, and closed all the escape routes behind them. They proceeded to attack the assembled Aztecs. Some of those inside were able to make it over the walls, but nearly all inside were killed. It is uncertain how many died. The event came to be known as The Massacre in the Main Temple.

Aztec revolt

When it became more clear what was happening to the Aztecs outside the Temple, the alarm was sounded. Aztec warriors came running, and fired darts and launched spears at the Spanish forces. This may have been due to the fact that their military infrastructure was severely damaged after the attack on the festival, as the most elite and seasoned warriors were killed.

Alvarado sent for word to Cortés of the events, and Cortés came back to Tenochtitlan on June 24 with 1,300 soldiers, 96 horses, 80 crossbowmen, and 80 arquebusiers. Cortés also came with 2,000 Tlaxcalan warriors on the journey. Cortés entered the palace unscathed, the Aztecs had planned to ambush them. The Aztecs stopped sending food and supplies to the Spanish. They became suspicious and watched for people trying to sneak supplies to them; many innocent people were slaughtered because they were suspected of helping them. The roads were shut and the causeway bridges became raised. The Aztecs halted any Spanish attacks or attempts to leave the palace. Every Spanish soldier that was not killed was wounded.

Cortés failed to grasp the full extent of the situation, as the attack on the festival was the last straw for the Aztecs, who now were completely against Moctezuma and the Spanish. Thus, the military gains of the attack also had a serious political cost for Cortés.

Cortés attempted to parley with the Aztecs, and after this failed he sent Moctezuma to tell his people to stop fighting. However, the Aztecs refused. The Spanish asserted that Moctezuma was stoned to death by his own people as he attempted to speak with them. The Aztecs claimed that Moctezuma was murdered by the Spanish. Two other local rulers were found strangled as well. Moctezuma’s younger brother Cuitláhuac, who had been ruler of Ixtlapalapan until then, was chosen to be the new Tlatoani.

La Noche Triste and the Spanish flight to Tlaxcalan

Main articles: La Noche Triste and Battle of Otumba

This major Aztec victory is still remembered as “La Noche Triste,” The Night of Sorrows. Popular tales say that Cortés wept under a tree the night of the massacre of his troops at the hands of the Aztecs.

Though a flight from the city would make Cortés appear weak before his indigenous allies, it was this or death for the Spanish forces. Cortés and his men were in the center of the city, and would most likely have to fight their way out no matter what direction they took. Cortés wanted to flee to Tlaxcalan, so a path directly east would have been most favorable. Nevertheless, this would require hundreds of canoes to move all of Cortés’s people and supplies, which he was unable to procure in his position. Thus, Cortés had to choose among three land routes: north to Tlatelolco, which was the least dangerous path but required the longest trip through the city; south to Coyohuacan and Ixtlapalapan, two towns that would not welcome the Spanish; or west to Tlacopan, which required the shortest trip through Tenochtitlan, though they would not be welcome there either. Cortés decided on the causeway to Tlacopan, needing the quickest route out of Tenochtitlan with all his provisions and people.

Heavy rains and a moonless night provided some cover for the escaping Spanish. On that "Sad Night," July 1, 1520, the Spanish forces exited the palace first with their indigenous allies close behind, bringing as much treasure as possible. Cortés had hoped to go undetected by muffling the horses’ hooves and carrying wooden boards to cross the canals. The Spanish forces were able to pass through the first three canals, the Tecpantzinco, Tzapotlan, and Atenchicalco.

However, they were discovered on the fourth canal at Mixcoatechialtitlan. One account says a woman fetching water saw them and alerted the city, another says it was a sentry. Some Aztecs set out in canoes, others by road to Nonchualco then Tlacopan to cut the Spanish off. The Aztecs attacked the fleeing Spanish on the Tlacopan causeway from canoes, shooting arrows at them. The Spanish fired their crossbows and arquebuses, but were unable to see their attackers or get into formation. Many Spaniards leaped into the water and drowned, weighed down by armor and booty. When faced with a gap in the causeway, Alvarado made the famous “leap of Alvarado” using a spear to get to the other side. Approximately a third of the Spaniards succeeding in reaching the mainland, while the remaining ones died in battle or were captured and later sacrificed on Aztec altars. After crossing over the bridge, the surviving Spanish had little reprieve before the Aztecs appeared to attack and chase them towards Tlacopan. When they arrived at Tlacopan, a good number of Spanish had been killed, as well as most of the indigenous warriors, and some of the horses; all of the cannons and most of the crossbows were lost. The Spanish finally found refuge in Otancalpolco, where they were aided by the Teocalhueyacans. The morning after, the Aztecs returned to recover the spoils from the canals.

To reach Tlaxcalan, Cortés had to bring his troops around Lake Texcoco. Though the Spanish were under attack the entire trip, because Cortés took his troops through the northern towns, they were at an advantage. The northern valley was less populous, travel was difficult, and it was still the agricultural season, so the attacks on Cortés’s forces were not very heavy. As Cortés arrived in more densely inhabited areas east of the lake, the attacks were more forceful.

Before reaching Tlaxcalan, the scanty Spanish forces arrived at the plain of Otumba Valley (Otompan), where they were met by a vast Aztec army intent on their destruction. The Aztecs intended to cut short the Spanish retreat from Tenochtitlan. The Aztecs had underestimated the shock value of the Spanish caballeros because all they had seen was the horses traveling on the wet paved streets of Tenochtitlan. They had never seen them used in open battle on the plains. Despite the overwhelming numbers of Aztecs and the general poor condition of the Spanish survivors, Cortés snatched victory from the jaws of defeat when he spotted the Aztec general in his ornate and colourful feather costume and immediately charged him with several horsemen, killing the Aztec commander. There were heavy losses for the Spanish, but in the end they were victorious. The Aztecs retreated.

When Cortés finally reached Tlaxcala five days after fleeing Tenochtitlan, he had lost over 860 Spanish soldiers, over a thousand Tlaxcalans, as well as Spanish women who had accompanied Narvaezs troop. Cortés claimed only 15 Spaniards were lost along with 2,000 native allies. Than Cano, another primary source, gives 1150 Spaniards dead, though this figure was most likely more than the total number of Spanish. Francisco López de Gómara, Cortés' chaplain, estimated 450 Spaniards and 4,000 allies had died. Other sources estimate that nearly half of the Spanish and almost all of the natives were killed or wounded.

The women survivors included Cortés's translator and lover Doña Marina, María Estrada and two of Moctezuma's daughters who had been given to Cortés, including the emperor's favorite and reportedly most beautiful daughter Tecuichpotzin (later Doña Isabel Moctezuma). A third daughter died, leaving behind her infant by Cortés, the mysterious second "María" named in his will.

Both sides attempt to recover

Shifting alliances

Cuitlahuac was elected to be the new King after Moctezuma’s death. Immediately, it was necessary for him to prove his power and authority to keep the tributaries from revolting. Usually, the new king would take his army on a campaign before coronation; this demonstration would solidify necessary ties. However, Cuitlahuac was not in a position to do this, as it was not yet war season; therefore, allegiance to the Spanish seemed to be a good option for many tributaries. The Aztec empire was very susceptible to division: most of the tributary states were divided internally, and their loyalty to the Aztecs was based on their own interests or the possibility of punishment.

It was necessary for Cortés, too, to rebuild his alliances after his escape from Tenochtitlan before he could try again to take the city. He started with the Tlaxcalans. Tlaxcalan was an autonomous state, and a fierce enemy of the Aztecs. Another strong motivation to join forces with the Spanish was that Tlaxcalan was encircled by Aztec tributaries. The Tlaxcalans could have crushed the Spaniards at this point. In fact, the Aztecs sent emissaries promising peace and prosperity if they would do just that. The Tlaxcalans leaders rebuffed the overtures of the Aztec emissaries, deciding to continue their friendship with Cortés.

Cortés managed to negotiate an alliance; however, the Tlaxcalans required heavy concessions from Cortés for their continued support, which he was to provide after they defeated the Aztecs. They expected the Spanish to pay for their supplies, to have the city of Cholula, an equal share of any of the spoils, the right to build a citadel in Tenochtitlan, and finally, to be exempted from any future tribute. Cortés was willing to promise anything and in the name of the King of Spain, and agreed to their demands, though the Spanish complained about having to pay for their food and water with their gold and other jewels with which they had escaped Tenochtitlan. The Spanish authorities later disowned this treaty with the Tlaxcalans.

Cortés needed to gain new alliances as well. And as long as the Spaniards could protect new allies from the possibility of Aztec retribution, changing sides would not be too difficult for other tributaries. It was not difficult for Cortés’s forces to defeat the smaller armies of some of the tributary states, either. Once Cortés had demonstrated his political power, states such as Tepeyac, and later Yauhtepec and Cuauhnahuac, were easily won over. Cortés also used political maneuvering to assure the allegiance of other states, such as Tetzcoco. In addition, Cortés replaced kings with those who he knew would be loyal to him. Cortés now controlled many major towns, which simultaneously bolstered Cortés’s forces while depriving the Aztecs.

Though the largest group of indigenous allies were Tlaxcalans, the Huexotzinco, Atlixco, Tliliuhqui-Tepecs, Tetzcocans, Chalca, Alcohua and Tepanecs were all important allies as well, and had all been previously subjugated by the Aztecs.

Even the former Triple Alliance member, city of Tetzcoco (or Texcoco) became a Spanish ally. As the rebellion attempt led by the Tetzcocan Tatloani, Cacamatzin in times of Moctezuma's reclusion was conjured by the Spanish, Cortés named one of Cacamatzin's brothers as new Tlatoani. He was Ixtlilxóchitl II, who was on dispute with his brother and always proved friendly to the Spanish. Later, Cortés also occupied the city as base for the construction of brigantines. Nevertheless, a faction of Tetzcocan warriors remained loyal to the Aztecs.

Cortés had to put down internal struggles within the Spanish troops as well. The remaining Spanish soldiers were somewhat divided; many wanted nothing more than to go home, or at the very least back to Vera Cruz to wait for reinforcements. Cortés hurriedly quashed this faction and was determined to finish what he started. Not only had he staked everything he had or could borrow on this enterprise, he had completely compromised himself by defying his superior Velazquez. He knew that in defeat he would be considered a traitor to Spain, but that in success he would be its hero. So he argued, cajoled, bullied and coerced his troops, and they began preparing for the siege of Mexico. Clearly, Cortés was skilled at exploiting the divisions within and between the Aztec states while hiding those of his own troops.

Smallpox decimates the local population

While Cortés was rebuilding his alliances and garnering more supplies, a smallpox epidemic struck. The disease was brought by a Spanish slave from Narvaez’s forces, who had been abandoned in the capital during the Spanish flight. The disease broke out in Tenochtitlan in late October; the epidemic lasted sixty days, ending by early December. Many of the residents of Tenochtitlan died from disease, but starvation also devastated the population. Since so many were afflicted, people were unable to care for others, and many starved to death. While the population of Tenochtitlan was recovering, the disease continued to Chalco, a city on the southeast corner of Lake Texcoco that was formerly controlled by the Aztecs but now occupied by the Spanish. The disease killed an estimated forty percent of the native population in the area within a year. The Aztecs codices give ample depictions of the disease's progression. It was known to them as the huey ahuizotl (great rash).

Cuitlahuac contracted the disease and died after ruling for only eighty days. Though the disease drastically decreased the numbers of warriors on both sides, it had more dire consequences for the leadership on the side of the Aztecs, as they were much harder hit by the smallpox than the Spanish leadership.

Aztecs regroup

It is often debated why the Aztecs took little action against the Spanish and their allies after they fled the city. One reason was that Tenochtitlan was certainly in a state of disorder: the smallpox disease ravaged the population, killing still more important leaders and nobles, and a new king, Cuauhtémoc, son of King Ahuitzotl, was placed on the throne in February 1521. The people were in the process of mourning the dead and rebuilding their damaged city. Also, it is possible that the Aztecs truly believed that the Spanish were gone for good. In any case, staying within Tenochtitlan as a defensive tactic may have seemed like a reliable strategy at the time. This would allow them the largest possible army that would be close to its supplies, while affording them the mobility provided by the surrounding lake. And any Spanish assault would have to come through the causeways, where the Aztecs could easily attack them.

Siege of Tenochtitlan

Cortés plans and prepares

Cortés’s plan for his siege was to trap the Aztecs within their capital. Cortés intended to do that by increasing his mobility on the lake, previously one of his main weaknesses. He ordered the construction of thirteen brigantines by his master shipbuilder, Martín López, and sent to Vera Cruz for the ships he had previously scuttled and any other supplies that had arrived. Cortés continued to receive a steady stream of supplies from Vera Cruz, some of it intended for Narvaez, since he had left the city.

Cortés first decided to have ships built in Tlaxcala, while moving his base to Tetzcoco. With his main headquarters in Tetzcoco, he could stop his forces from being spread too little around the lake, and there he could contact them where they needed. Nevertheless, this plan was bad, and he moved the shipbuilders and other supplies towards Tetzcoco in the start of February 1521.

Cortés had 86 horsemen, 118 arbalesters and arquebusiers, plus 700 Spanish foot soldiers. He stationed 25 soldiers plus artillerymen on every ship, since each was equipped with one cannon. He put his remaining land forces into three separate groups. Under the guidance of Alvarado was 30 horsemen, 18 arbalesters and arquebusiers, 150 Spanish foot soldiers and 25,000 Tlaxcalans, to be ordered to Tlacopan. Cristobal de Olid had 20 arbalesters and arquebusiers, 175 foot soldiers, and 20,000 native allies, who would be sent to Coyohuacan. Gonzalo de Sandoval was in command of 24 horsemen, 14 arquebusiers, 13 arbalesters, 150 foot soldiers, and 30,000 natives, who would be sent to Ixtlapalapan. The three major causeways that connected Tenochtitlan to the mainland were by each of the cities. Cortés forces went for their positions on May 22.

The first battles

The forces under Alvarado and Olid marched first towards Chapultepec to disconnect the Aztecs from their water supply. There were springs there that supplied much of the city’s water by aqueduct; the rest of the city’s water was brought in by canoe. The two generals then tried to bring their forces over the causeway at Tlacopan, resulting in the Battle of Tlacopan. The Aztec forces managed to defeat the Spanish and halt the march to the capital in a brilliant, though bloody and long, land and naval attack.

The Aztec canoe fleets worked well for attacking the Spanish because they allowed the Aztecs to surround the Spanish on both sides of the causeway. Cortés decided to make an opening in the causeway so that his brigantines could also be used on both sides of the causeway. Now the Aztecs could no longer attack from their canoes on the opposite side of the Spanish brigantines.

With his brigantines, Cortés could also send forces and supplies to areas he previously could not, which put a kink in Cuauhtémoc's plan. To make it more difficult for the Spanish ships, the Aztecs dug deep pits in shallow areas of the lakes and also stuck pointed sticks into the lake bottom to spear ships.

Cortés was forced to adapt his plans again, as his initial land campaigns were ineffective. He had planned to attack on the causeways during the daytime and retreat to camp at night; however, the Aztecs moved in to occupy the abandoned areas as soon as the Spanish forces left. Consequently, Cortés had his forces set up on the causeways at night to defend their positions. This allowed the Spanish to progress closer and closer towards the city.

The Spanish advance closer

As the Spanish employed more successful strategies, their stranglehold on Tenochtitlan evolved, and famine began to affect the Aztecs. The Aztecs were cut off from the mainland because of the occupied causeways. In addition, Cortés maintained a blockade with the help of the canoes of his indigenous allies, as his brigantines were not so useful in this situation. Both sides utilized ambushes in naval battles for a while, attempting to lure enemy ships or canoes into a trap or separate them from the group.

Cortés also had the advantage of fighting a mostly defensive battle. Though Cuauhtémoc organized a large-scale attack on Alvarado’s forces at Tlacopan, the Aztec forces were pushed back. As Cortés attained victory after victory, more tributary states joined his side, even smaller states that were useful for contributing food, laborers, and supplies. This only worsened the position of the Aztecs. Throughout the siege, the Aztecs had little aid from outside of Tenochtitlan. The remaining loyal tributaries had difficulty sending forces, because it would leave them vulnerable to Spanish attack. Many of these loyal tributaries were surrounded by the Spanish.

Though the tributaries often went back and forth in their loyalties at any sign of change, the Spanish tried hard not to lose any allies. They feared a “snowball effect,” in that if one tributary left, others might follow. Thus, they brutally crushed any tributaries who tried to send help to Tenochtitlan. Any shipments of food and water were intercepted, and even those trying to fish in the lake were attacked. Many Aztecs drank salt water because of their severe thirst and contracted dysentery. The famine was so severe that the Aztecs ate anything, even wood, leather, and bricks for sustenance.

The Spanish continued to push closer to Tenochtitlan. The Aztecs changed tactics as often as the Spanish did, preventing Cortés’s forces from being entirely victorious. However, the Aztecs were severely worn down. They had no new troops, supplies, food, nor water. The Spanish received a large amount of supplies from Vera Cruz, and, somewhat renewed, finally entered Tenochtitlan.

Fall of Tenochtitlan

The Aztecs' last stand

The Spanish forces advanced into the city. Almost every building and rooftop was occupied by Aztec warriors. The Spanish fought through the city street by street, and were slowed, though not stopped, by fierce Aztec resistance. While the fighting in the city raged, the Aztecs cut out the hearts of 70 Spanish prisoners at the altar at Huichilobos. By August, many of the people of the city had fled Tlatelolco. Cortés sent emissaries to negotiate with the Tlatelolcas to join his side, but the Tlatelolcas remained loyal to the Aztecs.

Throughout the battles with the Spanish, the Aztecs still practiced the traditional ceremonies and customs. Tlapaltecatl Opochtzin was chosen to be outfitted to wear the quetzal owl costume. He was supplied with darts sacred for Huitzilopochtli, came with wooden tips and flint tops. When he came, the Spanish soldiers appeared scared and intimidated. They chased the owl-warrior, but he was neither captured or killed. The Aztecs took this as a good sign, the Aztecs could fight no more, and after discussing with the nobles, Cuauhtémoc began talks with the Spanish.

The surrender

The Aztecs surrendered on August 13, 1521. Supposedly, Cortés demanded the gold lost during La Noche Triste soon after. Cuauhtémoc was taken hostage and later executed.

"The Torture of Cuauhtémoc", a 19th century painting by Leandro Izaguirre.

Aztecs fled the city as the Spanish forces continued to attack the city even after the surrender, slaughtering thousands of the remaining population and looting the city. As this practice was generally not done in European warfare, it suggests that Cortés’s indigenous allies had more power over him than he suggested. The survivors marched out of the city for the next three days. Almost all of the nobility were dead, and the remaining survivors were mostly very young children. 240,000 Aztecs are estimated to have died during the siege, which lasted eighty days. The remaining Spanish forces consisted of 900 Spaniards, eighty horses, sixteen pieces of artillery, and Cortés’s thirteen brigantines. In addition to the massive numbers of civilians killed, military casualties were high on both sides. About 450–860 Spanish soldiers and 20,000 Tlaxcalan warriors were killed during the siege. 100,000 Aztec warriors died of combat, starvation, or disease during the fighting.

It is well accepted that Cortés’s indigenous allies, which may have numbered as many as 200,000, were responsible for his success, though their aid was virtually unacknowledged and they derived little benefit aside from being rid of the Aztecs. As there were several major allied groups, no one in particular was able to take power, and the person who benefited was Cortés.

See also

• History of Mexico
• History of the Aztecs

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References

Primary sources

• Cervantes de Salazar, Francisco. Crónica de la Nueva España. Madrid: Linkgua Ediciones, 2007. ISBN 8-498-16211-4
• Hernán Cortés, Letters – available as Letters from Mexico translated by Anthony Pagden (1986) ISBN 0-300-09094-3
• Francisco López de Gómara, Hispania Victrix; First and Second Parts of the General History of the Indies, with the whole discovery and notable things that have happened since they were acquired until the year 1551, with the conquest of Mexico and New Spain
• Bernal Díaz del Castillo, The Conquest of New Spain – available as The Discovery and Conquest of Mexico: 1517–1521 ISBN 0-306-81319-X
• León-Portilla, Miguel (Ed.) (1992) [1959]. The Broken Spears: The Aztec Account of the Conquest of Mexico. Ángel María Garibay K. (Nahuatl-Spanish trans.), Lysander Kemp (Spanish-English trans.), Alberto Beltran (illus.) (Expanded and updated edition ed.). Boston: Beacon Press. ISBN 0-8070-5501-8. {{cite book}}: |edition= has extra text (help)

Secondary sources

• Andrea, Alfred J. and James H. Overfield. The Human Record: Sources of Global History, Volume II. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2005.
• Black, Jeremy, ed. World History Atlas. London: Dorling Kindersley, 2000.
• Gruzinski, Serge. The Aztecs: Rise and Fall of an Empire. New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1987.
• Hassig, Ross. Mexico and the Spanish Conquest. New York: Longman, 1994.
• Hassig, Ross. Mexico and the Spanish Conquest. 2nd edition. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006. ISBN 0-8061-3792-3 OCLC 64594483
• Conquest: Cortés, Montezuma, and the Fall of Old Mexico by Hugh Thomas (1993) ISBN 0-671-51104-1
• Cortés and the Downfall of the Aztec Empire by Jon Manchip White (1971) ISBN 0-7867-0271-0
• History of the Conquest of Mexico. by William H. Prescott ISBN 0-375-75803-8
• The Rain God cries over Mexico by László Passuth
• Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest by Matthew Restall, Oxford University Press (2003) ISBN 0-19-516077-0
• The Conquest of America by Tzvetan Todorov (1996) ISBN 0-06-132095-1
• "Hernando Cortés" by Fisher, M. & Richardson K.
• "Hernando Cortés" Crossroads Resource Online.
• "Hernando Cortés" by Jacobs, W.J., New York, N.Y.:Franklin Watts, Inc. 1974.
• "The World’s Greatest Explorers: Hernando Cortés." Chicago, by Stein, R.C., Illinois: Chicago Press Inc. 1991.
• Davis, Paul K. (2003). "Besieged: 100 Great Sieges from Jericho to Sarajevo." Oxford: Oxford University Press.
• History of the Conquest of Mexico, with a Preliminary View of Ancient Mexican Civilization, and the Life of the Conqueror, Hernando Cortes By William H. Prescott [2]
• The Aztecs by Michael E. Smith (1996, 2003), Blackwell Publishing, ISBN 0-631-23016-5

External links

• Hernando Cortes on the Web – web directory with thumbnail galleries
• Catholic Encyclopedia (1911)
• Conquistadors, with Michael Wood – website for 2001 PBS documentary
• Ibero-American Electronic Text Series presented online by the University of Wisconsin Digital Collections Center
• Página de relación