Battle of Vukovar

Battle of Vukovar
	Part of Croatian War of Independence
	; A destroyed Yugoslav Army tank in Vukovar, 1991
Date	August 25 - November 18, 1991
Location	Vukovar, Croatia
Result	Serbian victory (see below)
Belligerents
Various pro-Serbian forces	Croatia
Commanders and leaders
general Mladen Bratić,; general Života Panić	Blago Zadro,; colonel Mile Dedaković,; major Branko Borković
Strength
50,000 soldiers,; 600 tanks and APCs,; around 1000 artillery pieces,; around 100 aircraft and helicopters	1,800 soldiers
Casualties and losses
(Croatian sources); over 8,000 soldiers killed,; over 15,000 wounded,; up to 400 tanks and armors,; 20 planes shot down; (Serbian sources); total 2,300	600 soldiers killed,; 1,100 civilians killed,; over 4,000 wounded,; over 3,000 taken prisoner,; around 500 MIA

Template:TotallyDisputed

The Battle of Vukovar was an 87-day siege of the Croatian city of Vukovar by a multitude of Serbian forces during the Croatian War of Independence in 1991.

During the three-month siege, the old city of Vukovar, located on the border of Croatia and Serbia on the Danube river, witnessed the most horrific devastation in its history, as well as numerous tales of human ingenuity and endurance. The city was almost completely destroyed when it was finally occupied by the Serbian forces, and its Croat inhabitants exiled or killed.

Prelude to battle

In 1991, Croatia became an independent state, which was opposed by the Serb minority (see History of modern Croatia).

The months prior to battle were, like in other parts of Croatia and Former Yugoslavia, filled with ethnic tensions and isolated cases of ethnic violence. According to the 1991 census, Vukovar had a small Croat majority (52,98%) and a large Serb minority (36,28%), and was, as such, a perfect example of a divided city. Serb minority was, however, concentrated in the Vukovar suburbs, most notably Borovo Selo, where, in May 1991, 12 Croat policemen were killed and 21 were wounded while trying to disarm armed Serb paramilitaries. In a number of incidents, Croat and Serb houses and businesses were damaged, people beaten, dissapeared or even killed. These acts were supposedly orchestrated by local paramilitary groups, both Serb and Croat. In his letter to Tudjman, Marin Vidic Bili, the government commissioner for Vukovar county at the time, writes that such activities are creating "psychotic fear among local Croats and Serbs, which has prompted many to leave the town". The killing or dissapearance of some 80 Serb civilians from Vukovar in the few months prior to the War also prompted questions in the Croatian media about the manageability of those paramilitary groups. Official Serbian media used the incidents (greatly exaggerated) for propagandist purposes and, in many ways, as a pretext for the horrific events that followed.

In July 1991, shortly following Croatia's and Slovenia's Declaration of Independance, the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and various Serbian paramilitary troops attacked the easternmost parts of Croatia. Some of these originated from the same territory, but many came from the direction of Vojvodina, Serbia. During that time, Croatia was in the process of secession from the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the JNA, as the incumbent state army, was still stationed all over Croatia.

The intent of the Yugoslav People's Army was to prevent Croatia from becoming independent. The intent of the Serbian paramilitaries was opposition to the Croatian government. Their actions would ultimately result in the attaching the territory of and around Vukovar to the "Republic of Serbian Krajina" – see that article for more about the rationale and history of the conflict.

The initial objective of the 12th Corps and the 1st armoured-mechanized Division of the JNA was to secure Slavonia, where army barracks had been blockaded by the Croatians (not unlike those in the rest of Croatia).

During July and August, the Serbian forces progressed through the easternmost part of Croatia towards Vukovar, taking control of villages not inhabited by Serbs one by one. They also deployed tanks and artillery on the other side of the Danube, and maintained air supremacy.

By mid-August, the JNA and the Serbian paramilitaries virtually encircled Vukovar. The Serbian forces totalled 50,000 men, 600 tanks, around 1,000 guns and around 100 aircraft.

They were to be opposed in the city by a Croatian defence force rallied in a rather ad hoc manner. The defenders were led by Tomislav Merčep up to mid-August, after which he was succeeded by Blago Zadro. They managed to rally around 1,800 men inside Vukovar: between 700 and 800 trained members of the police and the 204th brigade of Zbor Narodne Garde, later Croatian Army, as well as around a thousand volunteers.

Their armament and munition was feeble in comparison: they had automatic and semi-automatic rifles, several machine guns and cannons, a small number of anti-tank weapons, a large number of mines and small reserves of ammunition.

Battle

The first long-range artillery shell had fallen on August 24. On August 25 the Serbian troops began besieging the town with a comprehensive tank and infantry assault. The Vukovar garrison of less than 2,000 successfully resisted all attempts to storm the place. At the time they were under the command of Blago Zadro as well as colonel Mile Dedaković ("Jastreb") who was posted in Vukovar on September 1st. The fighting slightly subsided after a few days, but the Serbs now controlled all traffic in and out of the city. At this time there were still 15,000 people in the town - and there was only enough food for one month.

The next attempt to penetrate the city started on September 14 and lasted until September 20th. During that week, around 130 Serbian tanks and armored vehicles were destroyed while attempting to enter the city. The main vector of attack was via the Trpinja road on the northwest, and afterwards it was known as "tank graveyard". After having failed in the all-out tank assaults tactics, the Serbian army changed their tactics. They proceeded to bombard the city using artillery and aircraft, day and night, while the subsequent attempts to penetrate the defenses were concentrated on smaller areas.

Vukovar was gradually demolished by constant shelling, and the activities of the citizens were all moved underground into basements. The city hospital building was also targeted and devastated, and it also had to move into its basement in order to keep functioning. By this time, the international media had started reporting about the tragic siege of the city, and the international humanitarian and health organizations began sending convoys of aid. Few convoys made it to the city in October, having been intercepted by Serbian patrols. While the Red Cross did manage to evacuate around a hundred wounded people, this did little to alleviate the situation in the hospital.

The Croatians in the city were de facto isolated and could receive no assistance from outside. On October 1 the Serbs captured the village of Marinci to the southwest, completely cutting off the only route from the rest of Croatia to the town. Attempts to relieve the siege continued from mid-October to mid-November, but without success. European Economic Community observers even urged Croatia to stop trying to break through to the city in mid-October. In early October, Mile Dedaković was moved to Vinkovci; his place in the command of the city's army defences was taken by his deputy Branko Borković ("Mladi Jastreb").

Some Croatian journalists think that by this time, Vukovar was deliberately left with no assistance, essentially being sacrified. There were two possible motives for this: fighting a losing battle would win sympathy from the West and secure international recognition for the secession of Croatia, and at the same time resources would be better spent on securing cities and territories that were in a more favourable strategic situation. However, no Croatian historian or military analyst accepts such a supposition.

On October 16, the JNA attacked the northern suburbs, where the 3rd battalion of the 204th brigade fought a desperate house-to-house defence. Croatian commander Blago Zadro was killed on October 16th, and from that point Branko Borković was the single defense leader in the city. The bitter fighting in the ruins of the city was universally described by soldiers as a nightmare. By mid-October every yard of the city was contested. Fighting in suburd of Sajmište was particularly merciless. The suburd changed hands several times. Every croatian commander who fought there was killed.

Croatian artillery outside Vukovar continued to place Serbian positions under fire. In Vukovar, croatian defenders used the resulting ruins as defensive positions. Serbian tanks became useless in heaps of rubble up to five meters hight. If they still were able to move forward, they were taken under Croatian anti-tank fire from the rooftops.

In the beginning of November, the Serbian forces moved their field headquarters just outside the city, and organized their attacks on the suburb of Lužac from there. During this attack, the commanding general Bratić was killed, but the incursion eventually succeeded because the Croats ran out of anti-armor munitions. The commanding officer of the JNA became general Života Panić.

By mid-November all but two suburbs had fallen. On November 11, the village of Bogdanovci located immediately to the southwest of the city was also occupied by the Serbs. On the 12th of November thousands of Serbian soldiers again assaulted the town, and at the second attempt managed to create an entrance for themselves. The defences were split at two places: between Lužac and the Danube, and through the Vuka river bed down to the city center.

The town was still defended street by street, but soon left without food or ammunition, the Croatian soldiers split up in smaller groups and made a break towards the west. Two groups at Borovo Naselje and at Mitnica were forced to surrender together with the civilians on November 18, marking the fall of the city.

Overview

Croatian military losses were around 600 armed men. About 1,100 Vukovar civilians - old people, women and children - were also killed during the siege. Over 4,000 people were wounded, anywhere between three and five thousand people were taken prisoner, and less than 500 are considered "missing" — civilians and soldiers alike.

According to Croatian sources Serbian military losses included from 8,000 to 12,000 dead and between 15,000 and 25,000 wounded. Over 200 tanks and up to 200 other armored vehicles, 100 guns and 20 aircraft were also lost during the siege.

According to Serbian sources regarding the number of Serbian soldiers who died or went missing during all the wars in Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, the number often mentioned is 2,300.[1], and most of them, around a half, are believed to have died in the battle for Vukovar. The cited article states also that "most experts agree with the figure". But, dissenting voiceshad appeared in the Serbian military analysts milieu.

During the siege, the Serbian military fired around 800,000 shells and dropped more than 1,000 bombs on Vukovar, in one of the heaviest bombardments of post-war Europe.

Aftermath

After the city was occupied, the remaining Croatian population was soon exiled, and a large number of them were killed. This was regarded as an act of barbaric ethnic cleansing by the local and international media, who captured the column of Croatian civilians leaving the city on tape. Some of the more agitating footage was shot in the city where a Serbian paramilitary unit was shown chanting "Slobodane, Slobodane, šalji nam salate, biće mesa, biće mesa, klaćemo Hrvate!" (Slobodan (*Milošević), send us salad, there will be meat, we will slaughter the Croats).

Many of the wounded Croatians in the Vukovar hospital (est. 260) were taken by the Serb forces to the nearby field of Ovčara and executed. At least one criminal investigation is in progress at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) because of the committed mass murder. Serbian commanding officers Mile Mrkšić, Veselin Šljivančanin and Miroslav Radić are all ICTY indictees.

Small groups of remaining Croatian soldiers, despite the risk of landmines, broke through and marched towards Croatian territory. Many died in the process, but some made it through. Some Croatian soldiers were taken as prisoners and interned at Sremska Mitrovica and elsewhere. Some were later released in prisoner exchanges, some died after being subjected to torture in prisons.

The nearby Croatian cities of Osijek and Vinkovci were also both nearly surrounded. However, by the time Vukovar was lost, the defence in those cities had entrenched sufficiently to withhold Serbian attacks.

Effects

Overall Serbian advance into Croatia was delayed by the resistance at Vukovar.

During the siege, the Croats had declared independence on October 8, 1991. General Anton Tus, a former JNA officer, took command of the new Croatian army, which was training and gathering suplies while the Vukovar garrison was buying them time.

Perhaps more importantly, the stamina of Vukovar defenders encouraged the Croatian cause and lifted the morale of Croatian soldiers fighting elsewhere.

Vukovar was also the first example of appaling devastation caused by Serbian artillery and tanks, much of it later repeated during the war in Bosnia. It brought the war to the attention of the international community, in combination with the siege of Dubrovnik, that practically demolished the Serbian cause and the Western media started exposing them.

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