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Why using "a scientifc method"? I can't see more than one.
"History" shouldn't be the first Chapter. First we should say what the scientific method is.
"Elements of a scientifc method" isn't a good title. Maybe something like "Definition" or "Requirements" would be bettter.
"Evaluation and Iteration" and "Peer review evaluation" should be subtitles ot "Elements ..."
Markus Schmaus -- 21:56 3 Jun 2005 (UTC)
Adding my 2 cents here. The Scientific Method also encompasses the merging of hypotheses into working Scientific Models. And eventually, it all gets put together into a Scientific Theory or a Scientific Law. This site doesn't do a good job at describing these final steps of the Scientific Method, nor does it do much to distinguish between a Scientific theory and Law. Could somebody with better skills at this possibly integrate these essential points? (this edit was by User:SteenGoddik 06:57, 9 February 2006)
SteenGoddik, let's please continue this discussion below. --15:59, 19 February 2006 (UTC)
Actually, "Evaluation and Iteration" is the outer framework of the 4 inner steps. This outer framework is not part of the 4 inner steps of sci. method, but lies outside in a recursive/ retrospective / reflective / iterative loop; The 4 steps are part of a huge endless loop, to put it into software words. Subtitles would be inappropriate, but a "Repeat" or "Loop" or "Recursive" keyword which lay outside the 4 steps would also be accurate. However, that is not part of the English language, currently. The statement of the scientific could be made more precise in a pseudo-code which allowed loops or recursion as part of the language. If the 4 steps were in one color, and the loop of evaluation / review were in another color, that would show the actual structure of the method. But the essential point, which is the test of a prediction/deduction from hypothesis, where the hypothesis and prediction are made before the test is conducted, where the hypothesizers and the predicters lay their reputations on the line, and take a risk, is already stated as part of the 4 inner steps. That is the essential part. But to merely state "Repeat" does not adequately state the subtlety of the method. When workers in a field are exploring the concepts, they are engaging in a conversation about the subject, and typically, the expertise of one is a building block in the thinking of another, in the same field. Thus the iterations and recursions of the method serve as commentary on the discoveries in the subject. The "review" etc. are the timeless part. The reproducibility (repeatability) part is the workhorse of the method, but is not part of the inner loop. The reproducibility part is "Iteration". Ancheta Wis 15:55, 4 Jun 2005 (UTC)
You're right, but I still don't like the title "Elements of the scientific method" what about "Essential steps"? Markus Schmaus
I think I disagree that "Definition" is appropriate. "Discovery of ..." is more appropriate. We are not really at the mathematical stage yet, because people are still at the heart of the method. It takes a special person to engage in more than 1 or 2 of the steps. Galileo, Newton, {Einstein/Schwarzschild} together, {Watson/Crick/Rosalind Franklin/Maurice Wilkes/etc} together. You get the point; it is the people who are engaged in the method that make the method special. In other words, we need to acknowledge the role of the people in the method. That is also the reason that History is still the appropriate first part of the article. But if you believe it is not, then how about giving a rationale for another structure to the article. I think I have given some reasons for not starting with "Definition" first; it is part of the History of science. Ancheta Wis 15:55, 4 Jun 2005 (UTC)
I think we should first tell the reader how the scientific method is seen today before telling how this view developed. Markus Schmaus 21:33, 5 Jun 2005 (UTC)
DNA icon
The current DNA picture looks good large but is not made for an icon. What do you think about ? Markus Schmaus 13:46, 4 Jun 2005 (UTC)
Looks good to me, for one; would you like to do the replacement? I could, if you would like, but please feel free to do so. Any other editor's thoughts? Ancheta Wis 15:26, 4 Jun 2005 (UTC)
Hypothetico-deductive method
What is described inthe box in the section I have marked is not the hypothetico-deductive method. HD is the method behind Falsificationism; it seeks to falsify a hypothesis by examining deductions derived from it - hence the name. The method described here could just as easily be inductive, Bayesian or Coherentism. HD would test only the predictions made from the theory. Banno June 29, 2005 08:50 (UTC)
I propose replacement of the sentence "The above is a hypothetico-deductive method (disputed — see talk page), and includes observation in step one and four." with the sentence "The above includes observation in steps one and four.". Then a Falsificationist sentence might be restored to the Scientific method#Philosophical issues section as you see fit. Ancheta Wis 29 June 2005 09:56 (UTC)
Scientific method cannot always be used in science?
This article is great from a philosophical point of view, but there are some major points missing. Not all problems can be solved with the scientific method, especially areas of science that rely on historical evidence (geology for instance). It is not always possible to test hypotheses through experimentation. In some cases you are solving a problem by searching for evidence and so-called smoking guns. Plate tectonics is a very good example of this. I would like to see this POV added, I have seen a couple of articled in the scientific literature addressing it, but figured I'd mention it here first for some suggestions. --24.137.104.1603:16, 27 July 2005 (UTC)[reply]
Plate tectonics - seafloor spreading and continental drift illustrated on relief globe See, for example, the overviews in history of science. The topics of discussion in a scientific community might require several lines of evidence, which, when taken together, can be then explained by a single mechanism. As you point out, plate tectonics is an example cited in the history of science#Geology, where continental drift was not taken seriously until the discovery of seafloor spreading. Since it took observation, hypothesis, etc. to see this, one might argue that the scientific method actually does cover this case. Have you considered inverting the argument? I number the steps of the scientific method per the article -- Step 1 considers the lines of evidence: someone in the present considering events that have occurred in the past (and present). Step 2 is a generalization, the statement of a timeless relation which may or may not be true. Step 3 takes the point of view of a time (which may or may not be in the future) in which something from step 2 is true. Step 4 then looks for mechanism/actual happenstance -- in other words, step 3 "talks" (from the future) to something in the present -- step 4 (the past, from the point of view of someone thinking in terms of steps 2 and 3). Ancheta Wis08:51, 28 July 2005 (UTC)[reply]
I think that what I am touching on is that human imagination is a marvellous thing that can span everything -- from what has happened to what could happen. The scientific method merely places constraints on the imagination by stating requirements for lines of reasoning, and then going on from there. In other words, the scientific method does not cover flights of fantasy. (What Francis Bacon cautioned against, as referred to in the history section of the article.) However, the scientific community often takes as a responsibility, to explain that which has happened (as in the evidence for plate tectonics), while not ruling out that which could happen. In that case, the human imagination may yet uncover something as yet unvisioned, and someone could even make that something real. (I am thinking about Robert Goddard dreaming about space exploration.) Ancheta Wis09:23, 28 July 2005 (UTC)[reply]
as a venue for your line of thought? A scientific community can be both a help and a hindrance when working out something new. The portal is currently wide-open for additions. The points to which you are referring could be placed in a point/counterpoint framework there. The talk page there could be used as a venue for your line of reasoning. Ancheta Wis09:23, 28 July 2005 (UTC)[reply]
Thinking about the 'No recipe' section; there are those who think that scientific method is, or should be like a recipe in the sense that scientists use it to achieve and reproduce results in a detatched manner. Francis Bacon, for example, desired that "the entire work of the understanding be commenced afresh, and the mind itself be from the very outset not left to take its own course, but guided at every step; and the business be done as if by machinery." (Novum Organum).
Is there some way we could improve on this? It occurs to me that the recipe analogy, which I quite like, could be used to explain a number of points of view. --Chris14:04, 29 July 2005 (UTC)[reply]
The described method does require imagination and the no recipe section is accurate in its context. The article lacks NPOV in so far as it does not give a recipe for doing science, but I'm not aware of any such recipe. Markus Schmaus15:00, 29 July 2005 (UTC)[reply]
Well, first let me make it clear that I think there is no such recipe. Bacon did, unless I misunderstand him. And his conception of science remained strong throughout the 18th and 19th century. His recipe, if you like, was the method outlined in the history section. From the perspective of the philosophy of science, this view is no longer supportable. But not everyone pays a great deal of attention to what philosophers of science say, indeed it seems that the majority of practising scientists would have trouble naming just one of them (Stephen Jay Gould, The Hedgehog, the Fox, and the Magister's Pox). I believe that the scientific community of today (especially those who are also part of the skeptic community) is still basically Baconian in its understanding of scientific method. Can I back that up with some references? Not yet, but I'm curious now to see if I can. --Chris16:27, 29 July 2005 (UTC)[reply]
I would have hoped that Scientific method#Philosophical issues set out the reasons that such a recipe is impossible. The theory-dependence of observation and the indeterminacy of theory under empirical test necessitate the use of imagination and creativity, and of socialisation, in the scientific enterprise. Banno 12:05, July 30, 2005 (UTC)
It is unfortunate that the Philosophical issues section is so far down the article. The reader should be told fairly early on how problematic the very idea of a definitive scientific method is. But the first significant chunk of the article gives just the opposite impression. I think the intro should reflect a lot of that content more strongly.--ragesoss14:01, 1 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Some of the philosophical/psychological/organizational/social/cultural problems include:
Problems of definition. The initial tries are ostensive definitions, by the very nature of our limited understanding, at first.
The subjective nature of an observation. Most people will fail to connect the dots even when the observation is right in their faces. This is what Jared Diamond calls failure to perceive.
Cocksure POV, thinking that one understands when one really does not.
Timidity. This was Feynman's statement (You have to be brave.). Even when the observation is right in one's face, and the concept is ready to be characterized, some researchers will not step into the unknown; the prospect is daunting. In that case, they must somehow feel that they have something to lose in their reputation, and another who is willing to risk reputation will then step up and get the credit for the advance.
Fraud. The cloning debacle currently in the news makes the pressure to announce something new irrestible to some. But that is where reproducibility saves the method. There have been fools and pretenders in every age, so far.
The personal aspect of the method. It takes a special type of person to be able to get at one stage of the method, much less all four. In that case, it is like the Age of Exploration where some researchers are willing to risk even loss of life, like Ferdinand Magellan, who lost his in the attempted circumnavigation of the globe.
There is a parallel in the statement of the scientific method to the statement of the Carnot cycle, the theoretical basis of all mechanical engines. The point is that there needs to be a operating temperature and pressure for a workingfluid (which was steam in the nineteenth century). The Carnot cycle is real, although theoretical, and all the other realizations of the mechanical engine can be approximated by it. (One might argue in the history of science and also history of technology that civilization consists in finding the appropriate settings for the cycle of innovation to chug. It is definitely possible to ruin the settings and destroy the scientific community in a civilization. Several examples come to mind.) --Ancheta Wis15:49, 1 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
The Lwow school of mathematics is an example of a productive mathematical community which was destroyed by the failure of Poland to protect its citizens from WWII. The innovative power of this community may be glimpsed by the example of Stan Ulam who left Lwow for the US, and who helped develop the atomic bomb, inspired by the invasion of his homeland. Ulam has recounted how he would stay up all night to work out some mathematics which he could then casually disclose to his friends at the Scottish cafe in Lwow, as if it had been no effort at all.
The communities which arise in the production of a Wikipedia article are examples of productive/unproductive settings. It is a fine line which we are all familiar with in the encyclopedia. By the same token, when BBSs were the only method of discussion online, un-moderated BBSs were very often taken over by trolls. Those who argue that Wikipedia will never be able to produce articles are in the same philosophical position as those who argue for No Scientific Method; the obvious resolution is Who Knows?, a cat state.
Unfortunately, we need to talk about this large change to the article, which has attained an equilibrium for several seasons of a year, now. If we are to now augment the article with some other considerations, such as the relationship of a specific researcher to the larger community or to specific segments of the scientific community, then we need to talk to this point. But a characterization of a specific scientific result as Good or Bad is a judgement which necessarily involves a protocol. Otherwise, the judgement lies outside of the method itself. Based on the considerations of the method, I have reverted. Ancheta Wis22:05, 3 August 2005 (UTC)[reply]
perihelion precession of Mercury
The section on the perihelion precession of Mercury included the statement that
This consequence (a difference in the values for this precession of 42.5 arc-seconds per century) was known only after the Schwarzschild solution to the Einstein field equation was published in 1916.
EMS, according to the link above, the Einstein field equations had not reached their final form, and the precession in the perihelion of Mercury was indeed explained, but that the other consequences of this October 1914 form of the field equations were inconsistent with observation. In other words, the October 1914 form was not yet ready for prime time, even if they qualitatively explained the precession in the perihelion of Mercury. What do you think about a rewording of the sentence to
This consequence (a difference in the values for this precession of 42.5 arc-seconds per century) was satisfactorily explained only after the Schwarzschild solution to the Einstein field equation was published in 1916.
Think about what was being confirmed: It was not the Schwarzschild Solution itself but rather general relativity. The Schwarzschild solution itelf is just an exact solution of the Einstein field equations (which perhaps deserve to be mentioned first IMO). Here is the metric that Einstein used to do his calculations:
.
To a first order of magnitude, that is the same as the Schwarzschild Solution, and the difference in the perihelion precession of Mercury between the metrics is to this day undetectable. BTW - This use of approximate solutions is endemic to general relativity: It is unusual for the Einstein field equations to have exact solutions, although it is much easier to find them than Einstien himself had dared to hope. So your belief that the non-Newtonian perihelion precession prediction for Mercury had to await the discovery of the Schwarzschild Solution is unfounded. Instead that prediction was affirmed in November 1915 (when the correct field equations were published), and was not affected by Schwazschild's work. That is why I choose not to mention the Schwarzschild solution. --EMS | Talk21:06, 20 August 2005 (UTC)[reply]
I filed an article RFC on the Methodological naturalism article. You can read the issue here. Essentially, the question is whether or not the scientific method is an example of methodological naturalism (MN) or methodological supernaturalism (MS). Since it involves the Scientific Method, I thought I'd post something here hoping to get someone who knows the topic. Does the scientific method allow for supernatural investigations and causes? Your input would be appreciated. FuelWagon17:51, 11 September 2005 (UTC)[reply]
openning sentence: 'Scientific methods or processes', a matter of semantics
openning sentence: 'Scientific methods or processes', perhaps a matter of fine semantics; but, are methods processes? To me, a method is a procedure or algorithm describing or defining a process. It becomes an instance of a 'process' when it is put into action. i.e. A process is the execution of a method. Too fine of a distinction?
Method is usually under the control of a single person (or mind). Process moves out control from the aegis of single persons, and allows things to play out in real-time without micro-management by a single person (or mind). Ancheta Wis03:58, 2 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]
The latest change blurs the line between 2nd (intuitive) and 3rd stage (logical). "reasoning including deductive reasoning" because reasoning also includes abductive reasoning (guessing) which is clearly 2nd stage (intuitive). That is the whole reason there is a 1st stage (incubation, speculation, observation, justification, belief, etc.), where everything is up for grabs in the face of an unknown. The first stage is the difficult one. The 2nd stage is the first formulation of a coherent thought. The 3rd stage is the logical consequence of the coherent thought. Please justify this change. Ancheta Wis21:45, 2 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]
I have clarified the article to make it clear that as stated in the beginning, that the elements of scientific method can come in a multitude of orderings and interleavings.--Carl Hewitt00:45, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]
Professor Hewitt, welcome to the article page! Reading between the lines on your published work on the future automation of the Scientific Community, it appears that you might tend to support the possibility that there could be agents in a community which might propose hypotheses, that there could be other agents in a community which might search for evidence that might support those hypotheses and that there could be still other agents in a community which might search for evidence which might contradict those hypotheses. Putting aside the practical implementation of automated hypothesizer-agents, and simply assuming that automated hypothesizer-agents will eventually exist, or perhaps that humans might assume their traditional role as hypothesizers, then it appears that you might tend to support the possibility that the first stage of the scientific method might well be approximated by automated 2nd, 3rd, and 4th stage processes. Not that there is anything wrong with that, as Jerry Seinfeld might have said. Ancheta Wis00:34, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]
However this possibility would contradict the current assertion on the article page that "imagination, creativity and intelligence are necessary to the scientific method". It may be that the (human) Scientific Community might learn to depend on these agents as they make their appearance in our lives. Ancheta Wis00:34, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]
I guess another possibility is that human scientists could all congregate in the 1st stage of effort, and wait impatiently for implementing programmers to get on with delivery of 2nd, 3rd and 4th stage agents, so that the humans can publish! Ancheta Wis00:34, 3 October 2005 (UTC)[reply]
So if I understand this, some Ether programming language pseudo-code for the innermost loop of Scientific Method could be:
characterization C survives while
a researcher can propose some hypothesis in C
and that hypothesis is supported
and that hypothesis is not opposed
My mental mapping of these 4 lines corresponds, as might be expected, to the 4 elements of the article.
Prof. Hewitt,
I am searching for a citation for this pseudo-code, for the article. Also, when I was searching for a user's manual for Ether, I could feel the effect of reading (about yours and others work) on my mind; what I was reading was literally rearranging my previous thought. To my consternation, I could not remember the way I had previously thought that thought :-). Ancheta Wis09:49, 4 October 2005 (UTC) So far I have found a bit-mapped version of Kornfeld 1979 (AIM-561) but the graphical downloads of each page are very slow.[reply]
Sections 7 and 8
7. Scientific method and the practice of science
needs such extensive rework that my suggestion is to delete it.
Since it only says that publishing and $$ are necesary to practice
science, it says either too much or too little. Furthermore the
entire last paragraph gives great weight to the complaints of
the fringers. So please simply remove the section for now.
8. Quotations
This quotation, from a play, is entirely inappropriate. I
suggest replacing it with a quotation from an actual scientist,
for example, Sir Issac Newton's quotation about "one man or age".
I moved most of the content of the History section to a separate page. The text there needs alot of work, I think. Karol17:17, 12 November 2005 (UTC)[reply]
Re: "A scientific method" / "The scientific method"/ "Scientific methods". Previous versions of the article have used these definite/indefinite articles, and the lead sentence reflected a consensus. You may wish to re-consider the edits of Carl Hewitt, for example. --Ancheta Wis17:26, 12 November 2005 (UTC)[reply]
What kind of consensus was this? It seems very strange to me to refer to a subject in the plural form, especially in an encyclopedia, and more so in a lead paragraph. I understand the incentive here is that there are various flavors of the scientific method? Karol11:07, 13 November 2005 (UTC)[reply]
"Main article: History of the scientific method --The development of the scientific method is unseparable from the history of science itself." Please reconsider separating this section from either the main article or History of science. If it is not in the main article, then please consider how it may be integrated into History of science. --Ancheta Wis19:19, 12 November 2005 (UTC)[reply]
Karol, perhaps an announcement of an Article Improvement Drive for History of scientific method would be useful; might you consider that? There are examples, in the style of say, the History of Russia or History of Poland which might be useful templates in the structuring of History of scientific method. This might be coordinated with the History of science series, as well, in which the idea of cross-cuts (see talk page in History of science) across science might be used to illustrate issues and ideas in History of scientific method, as it could be a history of ideas rather than a timeline. --Ancheta Wis20:20, 12 November 2005 (UTC)[reply]
Sure. I wasn't thinking about this at all when moving the content, although the text is very poor. The move, however, seemed justified. Was it not? Karol11:07, 13 November 2005 (UTC)[reply]
Great! Then perhaps we could collaborate? History of science was a wonderful collaboration, even though we didn't get to Featured Article status. The current 40K length of the articles is a reasonable target. We exceeded 60 or 70 K at one time on History of science. What do you say to our posting a template for History of [the] scientific method right here, and getting attention directed to the articles? The History of ... templates might work, but it seems to me that we could simply list the major items in the template, without regard to a timeline. Perhaps a philosophical or logical list? Or perhaps use Carl Hewitt's Scientific Community idea as the organizing principle? -- Regards, Ancheta Wis13:03, 13 November 2005 (UTC).[reply]
I could post a strawman template here for criticism, where the contents of the list would be the major items for the History. But everything would be up in the air for change until consensus was attained. I will wait for a response, OK? --Ancheta Wis13:15, 13 November 2005 (UTC)[reply]
Indeterminacy of theory under empirical testing
While reading through this article I suddenly noticed the use of a personal pronoun. I don't believe that appeared anywhere else in the article proper.
Changed "the scientist is making a personal choice when she chooses some particular theory over another" to read "the scientist is making a personal choice when using one particular theory over another."
No, I'm not bashing the use of the word "she" in an article -- I'm suggesting that we don't mix our writing styles. In this new iteration, our scientist does not exist; the way it was, suddenly our scientist embodied a particular entity.
- Dr. Morelos
History
I feel that the either a separate History article should be established or the History section of this article should be fleshed out. Major contributions by those such as DesCartes should receive mention. The Jade Knight07:05, 9 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]
What about non natural physical phenomena? Is this not science?
Hello. It seems this page is almost entirely dedicated to explain science as the study of natural phenomena. I would be very interested in knowing what the community of editors of this page thinks of non natural physical phenomena... Let me please explain what I mean by giving you the prototype of a non natural physical phenomenon: a computation. It obeys physical rules, yet it is human crafted: computations (typically) occure inside of physical systems which are man crafted (typically, computers). (Other examples can be thought of, like the study of chemical components which do not exist in nature).
This brings a second question. Computer science (CS), or at least (depending on the acception of CS) scientific aspects of CS can arguably be defined as the study of computations. How doese CS fit into the scientific method? It is (IMHO) very much like mathematics, however it differs in the sense that it studies a physical phenomenon: computations, and that empirical approaches are also used. It probably differs from physics in the sense that the border line between the science (computer science in this case), and technology is much more fuzzy (and, of course, in the fact that the physical phenonenon is non natural...).
I think that the definition of the scientific method tries to capture the essence of scientific practise. Computer science, as I see it, is the newest science. From my POV, the question is not wether CS is a science or not in the sense that it would or would not follow the scientific method. I see CS as a science, and the question is: is the definition of the scientific method up to date? (and therefore doese it captures CS practise?), or doese it need to be adapted in order to aknowledge its failure to capture the fact that CS is a science.
From what I see of this page, and in my opinion, the definition of the scientific method needs updating in order to ackowledge the fact that it misses computer science. (It may also bring an interesting perspective on the question of wether mathematics are a science or not since it seems to me CS is somehow in between physics and mathematics...(So I say informally)).
Do you feel my POV is widely accepted enough to be cited in the article, or yield minor modifications to it? Or is it a POV which (if pushed further) may well belong to an encyclpedia one day, but which needs to succeed in going through an "original research phase" first?
I am only an amateur phylosopher of sciences, so I am very intersted in the POV of wiser wikipedians on this subject.
best regards: --Powo20:02, 27 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]
JWSchmidt is correct - "natural" in this (scientific) sense, means "not supernatural". We can explain computers, we can see them. God and Miracles and the like are not "natural" but computers are "natural". KillerChihuahua?!?21:34, 27 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]
Good point Powo, I've tried to make this clearer using "the natural world" which is given as an alternative at the start of the nature article, and emphasising that "artificial" works are included as that article equivocates about its philosophical position. Hope that helps. ...dave souza10:31, 28 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]
DNA examples are wrong
"Linus Pauling proposed that DNA was a triple helix. Francis Crick and James Watson learned of Pauling's hypothesis, figured out that Pauling was wrong and realized that Pauling would soon realize his mistake. So the race was on to figure out the correct structure. Except that Pauling did not realize at the time that he was in a race!"
Pauling proposed this in early 1953; Watson/Crick had first built a triple-helix model in late 1951. They showed it to Rosalind Franklin, who pointed out several errors with their model. After they saw her X-ray photographs (without her permission), they were able to deduce the correct structure. See [1].
I don't know the history well enough to correct the DNA examples (and incorporate what Watson and Crick might have claimed), but I do know the examples are wrong at present. --TidyCat11:12, 30 December 2005 (UTC)
-[reply]
Prose can always be fixed. In broad terms, the statements are correct. See the link. Pauling proposed a triple helix. His son was at Cambridge with Crick and Watson, and shared this info with them. The protocol of not working on someone else's project (Wilkins and Franklin) was therefore scrapped because an American (Pauling) might well solve the puzzle before the UK teams. I have not attempted to touch these sentences in awhile, but please be more specific. Crick and Watson knew of other helical molecules, such as the tobacco mosaic virus, before the DNA triumph. One might discount the 4th sentence onward, but even there the sentences are broadly true. Would you object if someone struck sentence 4 onward? --Ancheta Wis11:28, 30 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]
When I examine the Oct 2 edit, I see
"When James Watson was sent to investigate what Rosalind Franklin had found in her X-ray diffraction images of DNA, he saw the X-shape which Crick had predicted for a helical structure."
That was correct. Wilkins was also on the DNA project and would not have had any problems getting at the photos. He showed the photos to Watson. Again, I see no problems with the Oct 2 edit. But if you are objecting to the subsequent edits, please state your objections. --Ancheta Wis11:42, 30 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]
Reexamining it, I realize that the above text can be fixed by replacing figured out with understood. 'Figured out' implies they didn't already know the triple helix was incorrect.--TidyCat11:33, 31 December 2005 (UTC)[reply]
Scrapping scientific method section from Science article
I am cutting out a chunk of badly-formatted content someone added recently to Science#Scientific method. I guess someone could scrap some material onto this page, if useful, although I notice some of the content overlaps and is contradictory... Karol09:08, 1 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
FIVE STEPS IN THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
Observation: The scientific method starts with observations and descriptions of a phenomenon or group of phenomena. The scientist then raises a question about the observations. The question raised must have a concrete answer that can be obtained by performing an experiment.
Hypothesis: A hypothesis is an educated guess. It forms a feasible explanation for the phenomena. It will make a prediction as to the expected results if the hypothesis and other underlying assumptions and principles are true and an experiment is done to test that hypothesis. The hypothesis will many times describe a causal mechanism or a mathematical relation.
Testing:Experiments that are repeatable and confirmable will be developed to support the hypothesis. If results from the experiments disprove the hypothesis, then the hypothesis is ruled out. At times, the failure of an experiment may not disprove a hypothesis, but will itself have defects that need to be resolved. If the hypothesis holds up under an experiment, then the experiment becomes evidence that supports the hypothesis, but is not proof that the hypothesis is true.
Peer Review: Experimental tests of the predictions by several independent experimenters and properly performed experiments will either support or discredit the hypothesis.
Conclusion: Based on the experiments conducted, a conclusion will be reached regarding the reliability and ramifications of the hypothesis. If sufficient experimental evidence supports a hypothesis to become generally accepted in the scientific community, then it either becomes a theory or modifies an existing theory.
TERMINOLOGY RELATED TO THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD
A theory is a generalization based on many observations and experiments; a well-tested, verified hypothesis that fits existing data and explains how processes or events are thought to occur. It is a basis for predicting future events or discoveries. Theories may be modified as new information is gained. This is in contrast to the common usage of the word that refers to ideas that have no firm proof or support.
To say "the apple fell" is to state a fact, whereas Newton's theory of universal gravitation is a body of ideas that explain why the apple fell. Thus a multitude of falling objects are reduced to a few concepts or abstractions interacting according to a small set of laws, allowing a scientist to make predictions about the behaviour of falling objects in general.
An especially fruitful theory that has withstood the test of time and has an overwhelming quantity of evidence supporting it is considered to be "proven" in the scientific sense. Some universally accepted models such as heliocentric theory, biological evolution, and atomic theory are so well-established that it is nearly impossible to imagine them ever being falsified. Others, such as relativity and electromagnetism have survived rigorous empirical testing without being contradicted, but it is nevertheless conceivable that they will some day be supplanted. Younger theories such as string theory may provide promising ideas, but have yet to receive the same level of scrutiny.
A scientific method or process is considered fundamental to the scientific investigation and acquisition of new knowledge based upon physical evidence. Scientists use observations, hypotheses and deductions to propose explanations for natural phenomena in the form of theories. Predictions from these theories are tested by experiment. If a prediction turns out to be correct, the theory survives. Any theory which is cogent enough to make predictions can then be tested reproducibly in this way. The method is commonly taken as the underlying logic of scientific practice. A scientific method is essentially an extremely cautious means of building a supportable, evidencedunderstanding of our natural world.
Introduction
I may be reintroducing this since I have not looked through the talk archives. The introduction seems to be a little long and dense at present. Shouldn't we be aiming this at the layman, specifically school kids who use this page to try and understand the scientific method? This introduction will blow them out of the water. Part of an encylopedias role is to make a difficult concept more understandable. I hope this does not offend editors on this article, but I think the current introduction does the opposite. David D.(Talk)00:52, 8 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Multiple editors have been adding content. At one time, the intro was a paragraph, which seems a reasonable length. Perhaps the current intro might be saved by adding its content to the intro of the scientific method portal. This action might be timed to coincide with the release of a new introduction to the article page. --Ancheta Wis05:39, 8 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
It was a simple matter to copy the intro to the portal, which dramatized how long the intro is, currently. David D., if you are so inclined, you might choose to work on shortening the intro. --Ancheta Wis05:46, 8 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
O.K. I'm really slow here, so you have already moved it? In that case I'll have a look at the archived versions in the next few days and try and write something more concise aimed at a upper level high school science student, if that is OK with others here? David D.(Talk)06:13, 8 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
David D., if possible, might you craft that concise intro in a location separate from the article itself, and then announce when you are ready? If you prefer to use the wiki action, then you might wish to craft that concise intro on this talk page. Then others could simply pick up the changes on their watch lists. --Ancheta Wis15:20, 8 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I looked back at previous version and came up with something along the following lines. I am sure this needs to be refined but it is a starting point. David D.(Talk)19:17, 8 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Scientific methods or processes are considered fundamental to scientific investigation and the acquisition of new knowledge based upon physical evidence. Scientists use observations, hypotheses and deductions to propose explanations for natural phenomena in the form of theories. Predictions from these theories that can be reproducibly tested by experiment are the basis for developing new technology.
Scientists use scientific methods to build a supportable, evidence-based understanding of our world. However, there is often controversy in scientific communities about various aspects of these understandings. This leads to new testable hypotheses and further refinement of the scientific theories.
Comment: I like the brevity. What we want is the questioning minds of the high school students. Do you think this will help or hinder? Brevity is good because they can see what is important. Any other points? Anyone? Once they have this under their belts, will they want more? How to get them to scroll down the page? --Ancheta Wis20:49, 8 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, for the sake of the higher Wiki-gods, let's move this to 'Scientific Method (Incomprehensible)' (or Philosophy), and get back to our roots. This is really necessary for everyday life, and would be a great social contribution! --Zeizmic18:27, 10 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
One more vote for the more concise introduction. By saying that the scientific method "is considered fundamental …" instead of saying bluntly that it "is fundamental" we avoid undermining the Popper-Kuhn-Lakatos-Feyerabend views on method. Also the current introduction juxtaposes elements of falsificationism with a more traditional, schematic scientific method ("an important aspect of a hypothesis is that it must be falsifiable…"). If we don't wish to mislead, I think we would be better off describing Popper's philosophy as something distinct from inductive methods.
One last comment. The proposed introduction says "Scientists use observations, hypotheses and deductions to propose…". This is better than referring to some nebulous form of reasoning as in the current version. I wonder if we could say here "logic" instead of "deduction". --Chris21:58, 10 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Seeing Ancheta's question about whether the intro will grip its intended audience got me thinking. The last paragraph hints at controversy and of course there is an enormous amount of controversy surrounding scientific method, so let’s beef this paragraph up a bit. Here’s a slight re-write,
Scientific methods or processes are considered fundamental to scientific investigation and the acquisition of new knowledge based upon physical evidence. Scientists use observations, hypotheses and logic to propose explanations for natural phenomena in the form of theories. Predictions from these theories that can be reproducibly tested by experiment are the basis for developing new technology.
Scientists use the scientific method to build a supportable, evidence-based understanding of our world. However, there is often disagreement in scientific communities over the various aspects of these understandings. In philosophical circles scientific method has been the source of much controversy. Philosophers and historians of science have not only questioned the nature of scientific method, but also its supposed efficacy.
The point that science seeks natural explanations and does not consider the supernatural is important, and could be simply stated by adding a word to the first paragraph, suggested phrase "and logic to propose natural explanations for natural phenomena". While some groups are trying to change this to a revival of natural theology, the Kitzmiller v. Dover Area School District conclusions firmly establish this point. ....dave souza22:48, 10 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Terms like natural and supernatural are likely to turn out either meaningless or tautologous. The critical logical feature is just that explanations must be falsifiable.
Jon Awbrey23:06, 10 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
For sure we could tie ourselves in philosophical knots over every word we come across, but for me at least the word 'natural' is meaningful enough that I can use and understand it in normal communication. Anyhow I like Dave's proposed change.
You'll have to explain a bit more the relationship between falsifiability and logic before I can follow you. When I used the word logic it was in the mathematical sense and I was thinking more of the tools scientists use. I was not, in any case, thinking of the logic of the method itself. --Chris23:39, 10 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I think I managed to confuse even myself with that last paragraph. The relationship between falsifiability and logic is obvious in this context and whether I was thinking of logic in the mathematical sense or not is hardly relevant. In any case it appears when I re-read that indeed we might be talking about the logic of the method itself. Jon, you would choose, if I understand, in favour of a scientific method based on deduction rather than induction. So far we have managed an introduction that mentions neither explicitly and it might be argued that we should leave things that way. Are you happy with that? --Chris00:13, 11 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Here I was responding to the proposed rewrite of a proposed rewrite, namely to insert natural as in this paragraph:
Scientific methods or processes are considered fundamental to scientific investigation and the acquisition of new knowledge based upon physical evidence. Scientists use observations, hypotheses, and logic to propose natural explanations for natural phenomena in the form of theories. Predictions from these theories that can be reproducibly tested by experiment are the basis for developing new technology.
Let me go back to the current version and break this down play by play:
The scientific method or scientific process is fundamental to scientific investigation and to the acquisition of new knowledge based upon physical evidence by the scientific community.
Under the working assumption of methodological materialism, observable events in the natural world (including the artificial works of humanity) are explained only by natural causes without assuming the existence or non-existence of the supernatural.
I'm merely pointing out that passing the buck to naturalism doesn't have any explanatory value.
It used to have some in the days when naturalism meant a definite type of determinism, but we lost any sort of naive determinism like that some time ago. We are left with only a couple of options for naturalism. One is based on the tenet:
1. Everything that happens is natural.
But this makes natural a tautologous or unfalsfiable property, and thus one that has no explanatory value.
The second option is to give a rule to nature that makes its domain a contingent property, for example, via this tenet:
2. Nature is what keeps on happening.
This is basically just Aristotle's observation about the limitation of scientific knowledge to phenomena that have a nature, that is, to phenomena that embody general properties or laws, thus limiting science to recurrent phenomena and reproducible results. This is sometimes expressed in the phrase, "there is no science of the idiosyncratic" -- if there were I would certainly know about it! But qualifying the non-contingent everything in (1) with the contingent hedge in (2), we end up with:
3. Whatever happens in nature is natural.
So again the invocation of nature explains nothing, and we appear to be reduced to the task of simply describing as best we can what happens, or keeps on happening. Jon Awbrey04:36, 11 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
a natural clarification
Subheading as this was getting rather long. The importance of seeking only "natural" explanations is that the supernatural is inherently inexplicable and bound up with faith. Unfortunately a vocal evangelical movement is seeking to remove this restriction and restore a natural philosophy that gives scientific credibility (and access to classrooms) to religious propositions. In the Kitzmiller case Judge Jones has set our a brief legal assessment of this point. The point is important to a brief definition of the scientific method, but the introduction is not the place for a deep philosophical analysis of what "nature" is – in an encyclopaedia that can reasonably be expected in the body of the article or in another linked article. Please ensure this point is briefly made in the introduction, ...dave souza18:36, 11 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, I understand, and fully sympathize, but better no line of demarcation at all than one that leaves science with the short end of the continent. Since the contemporary fuss is not really about faith versus knowledge -- all people in their right minds exhibit some characteristics of hope, faith, charity, etc. -- but predicated on both a 'lack of confidence' and a 'lack of knowledge', of different kinds, on both sides, there is no good reason to play that game by distorting the current understanding of science, as it's understood among those who do it, by engaging in the gambits of noncontingent assertions. Because the public to be educated will not then be able to see the difference in the actual conduct of the players, and that is the difference that really makes a difference. Jon Awbrey19:26, 11 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Jon, you’ve baffled me (which unfortunately isn’t that difficult). I’m not sure that I catch your drift but I’ll try. To my mind, we have not gone so far as to draw a line of demarcation. And yet I can see, if we were to say "Scientists use observations…to propose natural explanations for natural phenomena…" how we might be read as restricting the domain of science. Maybe this really is a problem as many scientific ‘explanations’ that come to my mind are of an abstract, mathematical nature; not really what you would call natural. Still I’m not sure this is what’s on your mind. Maybe I’ll have to read over what you’ve written again; sometimes I’m just a bit slow to catch on.
Concerning the point you make about the meaninglessness of the words ‘nature’ and ‘supernatural’, I’m not convinced that there is an issue. For sure it seems difficult, perhaps impossible to come up with a useful analytic definition for the words, but I don’t believe it follows that they are meaningless. --Chris22:09, 11 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
The passive voice, indefinite person "are considered" is considered by some to fall under the head of "weasel words". It leaves the reader scratching his/her/its head(s) and asking "are considered" by whom?. Jon Awbrey02:30, 12 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Do you think them weasel words in the sense that they subtly impose an agenda on the rest of the article? I don’t see that, but I do miss things. Perhaps we could be more precise and say "Scientific methods or processes are generally considered…". My feeling is that the word 'generally' is somewhat implied. There are, of course, well respected scientists and influential philosophers who don’t consider the scientific method fundamental to scientific progress. Maybe you feel some discomfort in not making this clear from the outset. Is that the case? If so, I don’t think you need worry; the second paragraph suggests that there are a number of philosophical stances taken on scientific method. --Chris06:57, 12 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I mean "weasel word" in the sense of "pay no attention to the man behind the screen" in the Wizard of Oz. If you do ask the "who considers" question, then it can only be the community that agrees with the assertion, so why not make that explicit? Well, maybe because the "community of inquiry" (COI) behind the screen doesn't look so great and powerful when the screen drops.
Jon Awbrey07:12, 12 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I'll take some time to think about what you say. Meanwhile I took a quick look at the weasel word notes and saw that an exception to the rule is granted,
When the holders of the opinion are too diverse or numerous to qualify
It could be that the exception holds for us, since the importance of scientific method is assumed both within and outside the scientific community. The alternatives I see are as follows:
We take a stance and just say, as in the previous intro that “Scientific methods…are fundamental”. And then, perhaps in the second paragraph we avoid imposing this POV by explaining that this is not universally acknowledged.
We attribute the opinion to different communities: the scientific community, philosophers of science, the modern day sceptics. One problem is that we would have to qualify such an attribution since there are prominent members of these communities (perhaps with the exception of the sceptics) who do not think scientific method fundamental. I feel that a qualified general statement (like the one we have) is less confusing when you consider that there are people outside these communities who hold similar views on method. After all, most of us have received some kind of exposure to scientific method through schooling, edutainment and elsewhere.
We attribute the opinion to a "community of inquiry" (COI), as you say. I'm not really convinced that there exists such a uniform community holding this opinion. COI looks to be a contrivance.
We avoid any general statement about scientific method and attribute the opinion to one or more people, perhaps adding a quote if we find a good one.
Good idea. Judge Jones at the above link attributes this definition to the NAS (the National Academy of Sciences of the United States) "In science, explanations are restricted to those that can be inferred from the confirmable data – the results obtained through observations and experiments that can be substantiated by other scientists. Anything that can be observed or measured is amenable to scientific investigation. Explanations that cannot be based upon empirical evidence are not part of science." .If this suits it should be possible to get a link to the original he's citing. ... dave souza13:15, 12 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: I understand the heat of the battle thing, but ... I think that we need to get our minds out of the courts, lest we give the impression that methods of scientific inquiry rest their defense on the method of authority, whether it be dictated by legal authority or the authority of recipes that we learned from grammar school textbooks. Jon Awbrey14:48, 12 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Sorry to have mentioned the court, the quote is from the NAS which seems a reasonable attribution. Perhaps someone can find an equally suitable quote from, say, the Royal Society. There is a need to be careful, as some people want science defined as "systematic enquiry" to “change the ground rules” of science in a way which would also embrace astrology. This position has very little support in the scientific community, but is widely touted in some countries. ....dave souza20:53, 12 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: Yes, I understand, but there's nothing terribly new about all that. And the fastest way to lose the baby is to confuse it with the bathwater, and not be clear about the kind of science in which the vast majority of practicing "scientific methodists" have faith, and why exactly they do. There's a whole lot of background to draw on here, and I'm not in any particular hurry myself ... Jon Awbrey21:30, 12 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Inquiry Into Inquiry
JA: I am getting this strange sense of deja vu all over again, so I think I will recycle the title that I used for this sort of investigation all through my share of the last millennium. I have resolved to do more production, less discussion this year, but still this question of method tugs at the edge of my attention. So maybe I will just widen the horizon a bit and address some of the issues that I know about, especially ones that have been widely discussed over the years of my acquaintance, as much of this discussion already rounds up all the usual suspects and begins to fall into all the usual ruts, and I won't worry so much about the nits that can be picked out of the introduction.
JA: I doubt if the "screened off bodies of thought" (SOBOT's) are really so diverse and numerous as to defy all description, and it does seem like it's our job to describe all sorts of diverse and numerous things, which folks here go about with notorious avidity, so I'm guessing that there's some other kind of resistance involved in the avoidity thereof.
JA: A good start could be made in very broad brush strokes. This is not the philosophy of science article, but it needs to coordinate with it in a sensible way. In that article we need to sort out the working philosophies -- the not always fully articulated philosophies in practice of the reflective practitioners -- from the vicarious philosophies of the speculating spectators. Each group sees different things, sometimes more, sometimes less, by dint of their different perspectives. But here it makes sense to give the bigger ear to the method as she's actually bespoken.
POV's on scientific method — Considering the sources
JA: As I read the newer versions of the introduction, the "sez who" issue keeps coming to mind. This arises over many points.
JA: First, there are the different POV's or the variety of perspectives on "scientific method", and even disagreements as to whether there is such a thing, sometimes attributed-blamed-credited to Feyerabend or with less justice to Kuhn. That raises the question of whether scientific method is constituted by what scientists do and think and write, or whether it is constituted by what various onlookers, some of whom will indeed be the very same doers in moments of reflection and some of whom will be more like never-did-it-much-themselvers. What sort of balance should the article strike among this diversity of POV's, and not just the POV's of reflecting practitioners, but radically different directions of perspective? And while we're at it, what sort of continuity is there between what card-carrying scientists do and what T.C. Pits, "the common person in the street", can't help doing just to get through the problems and questions of his or her day?
JA: Second, more incidentally to the present state of the intro, do we wish to communicate right up front that what science is about is "praising famous names" and by implication "arguments from authority"? I will vote "no" on that one. I realize that this particular "sez who" arose as a proffered solution to a problem of sourcing claims, of providing an active subject for the passive "as considered by" phrasing, but I think that this is the wrong solution. Jon Awbrey13:30, 19 January 2006 (UTC)[reply]
agree on the last part -- is this supposed to be inferred from a source, or is it just assumed that the characterization of scientific method fits with Newton's views?? Holon13:41, 20 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Scientific Theory or Scientific Law
SteenGoddik, it is my opinion that "Scientific Theory or Scientific Law" are not part of this article. The reason is that scientific method is simply that, a list of steps, almost a how-to, which is not necessarily a validation procedure for admitting a concept into the western canon. As the article clearly states, it is the people practicing the method who are the essential ingredient in the method. Thus someone simply stepping through the checklist without the essential understanding of the problem is practicing cargo cult science and anyone who simply proclaimed by fiat that "Concept A" has passed through all the stages of the Scientific Method, and is hereby declared Scientific Law Number 27A-5156. Anyone caught violating 27A-5156 is subject to .... It is not necessary to declare Concept A as Law. It is simply true, or it isn't. And the violations of the law are not subject to punishment by The State. It isn't necessary. The Concept would thus simply be a trope if some exception or limitation to a purported Law A became known. Now if some technology were introduced into our world based on a wrong law, that technology would simply fail.
Now after brutally simplifying the argument, let's examine why Scientist A has mooted some concept A. Well, that's the characterization stage. Scientist A, after some consideration has decided that concept A is notable in some way. If there are conditions and exceptions, the concept must be suitably qualified and limited, or else scientist A has severely limited his employability in the field. Scientist A has noted that this concept seems to solve some problem in the list of unknowns which are all around us.
SteenGoddik, I think you're dead right. Theory is so fundamental to science that it is difficult to see how one can do justice to an article on scientific method without a strong characterization of theory, preferably tying it in with examples. Some of the components of the section 'hypotheses development' would to me be more fittingly stated in relation to the theoretical developments. Holon13:38, 20 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Iteration differs from recursion, in this case.
I can sympathize with an abstract statement that recursion includes iteration. However, iteration came first. The primary loop in the scientific method is iterative, and the stack required for recursion is not a given; what if the datatypes are different. It takes experience to properly characterize a problem, and recursion takes a base case to be properly formulated, or else we have a problem with levels of abstraction improperly interacting and confusing the issue. I encourage you to read History of science for the examples. A classic case is the size and shape of Earth.
The DNA example is instructive here. It took several generations of scholars to zero in on the issues and problems. If you are looking for a mathematical analogy, it is similar to the solution of a differential equation, where the solver has to hunt to converge on the answer. Thus iteration involves clarifying the issues. Blocking and tackling, to use a sports analogy. Iteration=try and try again.
But a recursion differs from this. Once a theory is established, then a researcher can build on existing theory as a building block to solve his/her problem. The classic example is the triad of theories Newtonian mechanics / Maxwell's equations / Special relativity. They are not independent; two of them can derive the third. This I submit is the recursion. It takes a basic case, like Einstein's question to himself what would it be like to ride a beam of light?, and based on what he knew, derive SR from the previous 2 legs of the triad.
Maxwell's equations are themselves a unification of previous work. The same could be said for Newton's laws.
What's the point of the difference between iteration and recursion? Feynman said it very well: the sciences are an interconnected web of knowledge, with one point from one science dovetailing with another seemingly unrelated point from another science, all consistent with what has gone on before it in a huge web of relationships, not all at the same scale but building on what has come before it. That is the best use of the term recursion. --Ancheta Wis00:21, 26 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Newton's admonition à propos:
Tis much better to do a little with certainty, and leave the rest for others that come after you, than to explain all things.
the basic methods are observation, hypothisis, experament, conclution, and abstract.
On controversy, its prevalence, its sources, and the lacks thereof
JA: With regard to the following statement, added by Eric Forste:
EF: There is some controversy as to whether practicing scientists actually accomplish their real work by any defined and describable method.
JA: I modified it in the following way.
JA: There is some controversy, mostly among those who are not, as to whether practicing scientists actually accomplish their real work by any defined and describable method.
JA: My clarification is a well-considered one, and it is, within the limits of approximation imposed by brevity, true. I know from ample experience that vastly more practicing scientific researchers spend overwhelmingly more of their long working days worrying about how to raise their significance levels from 95% to 98% than ever bat an eye about the whether there's a method to their madness.
JA: More generally, there has been a constant erosion of the substance of this article from bystanders who are quite evidently innocent of any significant acquaintance with scientific method as she is bespoke in actual practice.
JA: I have already suggested that editors who supply various models of scientific method need to provide more sources for their texts — likewise, editors who supply various bits of scepticism about scientific method need to provide more sources for theirs. Jon Awbrey16:06, 7 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I'll work on providing more sources for my texts. I'm surprised that the controversy is news to people who actively edit this article. --arkuat(talk)05:23, 23 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: Well, not everybody who edits an article bothers to read the previous discussions. The Twinkieth Century was a lot like that. And of course we still have to source stuff that's so familiar that we have forgotten the last place where we read it. I had added what I thought was a fairly balanced and decent summary of the critical regard of method-ism in the second paragraph, but it seems to have gotten buried somewhere in the philosophical epiphenomena. There are times when one simply observes. Jon Awbrey05:41, 23 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I liked your edits, JA, but they've all gotten hidden away too. As you say, time to observe for a while. In the meantime, I recommend that everyone follow the link to the prematurely archived peer-review. There's not much there. --arkuat(talk)09:19, 23 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Descartes
somebody needs to talk about Descartes in this article.
I agree that it seemed odd to include Bacon without mention of Descartes (particularly as Bacon's work mentioned is not included in the timeline, I will add it now); so I have included a single line in the history mentioning Descartes and the Discourse on Method. Is there some kind of Bacon vs Descartes posturing thing at work? If so, is it worthy of mention? an interesting resource perhaps: http://www.thingsrevealed.net/dscrtbacn.htm ? -- dwxyzq|T09:06, 19 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I am not quite sure what you mean? :) I noticed Descartes contribution had futher coverage there but this summary of the history (I assume that is what it is meant to be) seemed to for some reason skip Descartes while Bacon is included. At the same time Bacon is also covered fuller in history of the scientific method. I don't really know, it just seemed like they should both either be included or not included; I chose inclusion. :) -- dwxyzq|T09:32, 19 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Further Reading
The Further reading list is very long and not all of it looks notable. I suggest taking some of them out (possibly ones with red linked authors). JoshuaZ05:30, 21 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: The list is rather carefully chosen to cover some of the standard variations in models of scientific method and the variety of perspectives on it, but let me know which you have in mind deleting. It was not supposed to be a list of celebrities, though I was surprised after I typed it in how many were already notarized in WP. The thing is that many of the more recent texts will tend to have redlinked authors, and I've been told by some old hands that this is really not a problem, as it just flags people who might eventually deserve articles. At any rate it was the works themselves that are intended to be helpful to the reader. Jon Awbrey05:48, 21 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
After looking at the list in more detail, I'm inclined to agree with you. If someone read all the books, I think there would be substantial overlap, but none of them seem to be redundant. That is, a large amount would be lost by removing any specific one. Consider the suggestion withdrawn. JoshuaZ05:57, 21 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: I'm "planning to" add some exposition based on the sources that I'm adding to the Readings, at which time I will elevate them to References, but it may be a week or three before I can get time and concentration to focus on that, so please indulge me while I pad the bib a bit more and leave it an exercise for the Reader. Jon Awbrey20:44, 22 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Systematic guessing
Several years ago, the hypothesis section of this article used the term guess, which is the blunt truth. Later, it was appended with an exclamation point guessing!, as if the editor could not believe that scientists could dare to admit that they would guess. It was later softened to systematic guessing. Now I see that the Peirce article no longer states his quote abductive reasoning is neither more nor less than guessing.
To be fair to the younger readers of this article, I believe that it is better for the encyclopedia to admit that 'guessing' is a good thing, something not to be ashamed of, or suppressed. In fact, a part of scientific method, along with 'test' (experiment). Ancheta Wis14:32, 21 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: The Charles Peirce quote must have been excised before I came on board, or I certainly would have insisted on keeping it. But that whole article has been under considerable development over the past few months, and when it grew past 100 Kb there was a request to spin off various subtopics, so the quote may have ended up in one of those. At any rate, wiki-links to article subsections tend to be not very persistent around here. Jon Awbrey15:10, 21 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: I would recommend that we call in some expert help with that, as there are many historically inaccurate cliches about Medieval scholasticism that I don't think we should be in the business of promulgating without doing some serious fact-checking. Jon Awbrey14:58, 21 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Kenosis, what would you say to some wikilinks? In addition, when mooting a concept the grammatical mood might be a little more jussive than imperative.
The scientific method involves the following basic checklist:
Description (that information must be be reliable, i.e., replicable (repeatable) as well as valid (relevant to the inquiry)).
Prediction (that information must be be valid for observations past, present, and future of given phenomena, i.e., purported "one shot" phenomena do not give rise to the capability to predict, nor to the ability to repeat an experiment) ?what about supernovas?
Control (that one gaining the ability to might manipulate a variable, if possible and appropriate).
Understanding (that one identify the cause or causes of a particular phenomenon to the best achievable extent). Before a factor that is the object of research can be said to be understood, that the following conditions must be be met:
Time-order relationship (that hypothesized cause occur before hypothesized effect)
Elimination of plausible alternatives (this is a gradual process, possibly requiring repeated experiments by multiple researchers who seek to replicate the results in order to validate them).
...
One of the things which I personally find quite valuable is your bold synopsis of the checklist of factors which are necessary to gain confidence that one truly understands something. Especially the 'gradual process' statement above.
Good.
I personally would place the Prediction item at the foot of this list, as Expectations typically do not get formed without an ensemble of supporting data. Otherwise, the Predicted item would necessarily remain personal and unspoken until one gains confidence in the strength of the mooted Prediction.
--Ancheta Wis07:43, 22 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Or perhaps the Prediction item listed above is really a condition to be fulfilled before a Prediction is possible. In that case, I would not disagree with its position in the list other than a possible relabelling. --Ancheta Wis07:46, 22 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Hi Ancheta. Just noticed this. As indicated in the lead-in, "subject only to marginal disagreements about specific aspects". Supernovas are a class of phenomena, so NP there. As to "...to the best achievable extent", this leads into the extremely important discussion at the bottom of the box, which outlines tentative hypotheses/theories, and quest for results which increase confidence. "Confidence" used intentionally to draw on its statistical implications too. As to "must be", this "must" remain because these are general requirements, subject to disagreement only in exceptional cases (this is how intelligent design advocates start, for instance, by questioning the very basics and reading in what they choose to loosen up the method for attack with pseudotheories). As to "gaining the ability", this assumes scientists very commonly work in groups rather than solely as individuals. This basic form of outline is actually a composite from several sources which assumes a wide range of more specific methods within it, and intentionally is formatted to include tenets common to both natural and life sciences. I intentionally did not even dare to mention certain exceptions for idiographic "sciences", which is one of many reasons I included the "subject only to marginal disagreements" caveat. Thanks for the request to review and check the thoughts...Kenosis07:24, 23 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Having said the above, kindly allow me a few days to see if a consistently syntaxed jussive set of the parenthetized explanations hits me? Thanks...Kenosis09:34, 23 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Another thing, Ancheta Wis. You raise a good point about whether prediction should be after control here. For this schema, I think it must be before "understanding" because of the importance of explaining tentativeness (related also to falsifiability) and confidence in a hypothesis/theory as a variable (rather than true-false proposition) to the less-than-technical reader unfamiliar with the wisdom of the process of perpetual tentativeness of propositions (I hear the speed of light may be changing too, incidentally--kneejerk creationists ought have a grand time with that one-- now nobody in the "scientific community" knows what they're doing).
The facet of "control" is a bit of a tough one here, because the reason we engage in methodological natualism is so we can control things (else why bother? pass me that spleef again). And of course there's control vs. manipulated variable; and of course there's the attempt to achieve control over an independent variable to manipulate it (assuming it's appropriate of course, recalling some of the Nazi experiments). Maybe an appropriate course here is to think about removing "control" and try a three-tenet explanation with the existing three qualifications to "understanding"?...Kenosis10:01, 23 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Deleted Text — Scope and Goals of Scientific Method
JA: I did not write this, but I think that there are a few ideas in it that are important for the reader to understand — something about the continuity of scientific inquiry with everyday problem-solving maybe — so I will copy it here till I or somebody can think of a way to salvage the good of it. Jon Awbrey04:06, 23 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Scope and goals
Scientific method can be applied to anything within the range of our experiences. As long as something has an effect on our lives, we can formulate theories and try to predict what this effect might be. The effect itself is an experiment, testing whether our theory was right.
People use scientific methods all the time. They have hypotheses about devices and make predictions how those will react to their actions. If a device does not work as expected, the experiment may disprove their hypothesis. If they adjust their hypothesis, they are applying scientific methods; if they nevertheless stick to their hypothesis because of nonscientific reasons, they are not.
Scientific method does not aim to give an ultimate answer. Its iterative and recursive nature implies that it will never come to an end, so any answer it gives is provisional. Hence it cannot prove or verify anything in a strong sense. However, if a theory passed many experimental tests without being disproved, it is usually considered superior to any theory that has not yet been put to a test.
I agree that at minimum the part about everyday problem solving is potentially useful to the article if stated in a way that falls short of advocating logical positivism in every facet of daily life and love. Far too many urban myths out there for sure.
Good idea to save it here--makes sense not to have to parse through the history should some of this be needed as grist for the mill. If I were writing the article from scratch, this section would be right up front after the intro, with a useful discussion that could be read by the less-than-highly-technical person, then present the technical material a bit farther down. But the article was written to this stage mainly by astute writers with technical concerns and a desire to be useful to folks directly involved in the method. So I chose to leave the Elements of method section up front so as not to dissuade those in search of these things from pursuing the excellent material included in that section and in the several sections that follow it. Anything else would have been arbitrary and disrespectful without a condition precedent arising from this talk page.
Tell you what-- how about discussing the following format and see where the consensus goes on it? Maybe: Intro, Scope and goals, History, Philosophy, Elements of scientific method, followed by the rest?...Kenosis07:55, 23 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
What Popper did was advocate increased emphasis on deductive reasoning and take the trend of the last several centuries farther away from the ashes of the Dark Ages and the Medieval speculations, and from the pronouncements of truth by the King and the Pope (induction to the max to say the least). Popper's advocacy has worked of course, and has not discouraged theorizing much, but instead put it in a somewhat more proper place. Thus much more useful research work gets done today than 50 years ago across the gamut of science. In successfully advocating falsifiability as a requisite, he placed "science" in a very significantly better position to operate as a community (or a large number of field-specific communities if you prefer). Open source, cooperation, and creative tension, even reasoned competition in a community bring powerful gains in effectiveness taken as a whole.
Which brings me to a more direct response. The availability of a hypothesis or theory to be peer reviewed is integral to the demand for falsifiability. Why else advocate falsifiability, when a mere pronouncement of "scientific truth" would otherwise suffice? Don't have a citation for you on that one, though it seemed an obvious inference based on what is widely citable. If you feel strongly about it, do cross it out. Good to run across you here...Kenosis08:29, 23 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
It seems to me to be a possibly ironic page to have an OR issue, but I don't know enough about Popper's influence to feel comfortable removing it, so I'll just leave it alone. JoshuaZ02:25, 24 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Joshua, I'm comfortable enough with leaving that phrase in on its own merits (if indeed there are any) for now. And Jon Aubrey is beginning to show us some further grist for the mill immediately below here. Most all of this could be said much better than it is, and the fact is that the only paragraph I'm currently comfortable with in that whole section is the one on Peirce.
What I was most concerned about was getting some perspective into the article so it's more difficult for someone with a chip on their shoulder to arbitrarily stomp in and argue that scientific method is subject to genuine disagreement as to its central foundations (as we've seen in another article we know of). As well, for similar reasons, I felt the intro needed to made accessible enough so a reasonably intelligent non-technical person could get some perspective before drowning in the [excellent] technical discussion.Kenosis04:02, 24 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Peer review
JA: As far as the US scene goes, and making peer review an integral part of American academic life, I think that a better case could be made for the indefatigable efforts of John Dewey. Jon Awbrey18:28, 23 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Hmmmm... I think i will pull together some of this maybe next week mainly for the History of Scientific Method article, and then see if a more specific history of peer review works in this article. Saw the Bacon quote too.... Thanks...Kenosis01:59, 24 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Enchoiry — Learning by Doing vs. Preaching to the Choir
JA: It was so much work coming up with that title that I will have to leave it as an "Exercise for the Reader" until after lunch. Jon Awbrey18:42, 23 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Philosophy section
The current philosophy section is long, rambling and borderline incoherent. Jon, what do you think you are doing to it? JoshuaZ06:17, 24 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JoshuaZ, I have reverted to the time when the section was last called Philosophical issues. JA, let's work on this section on the talk page first, OK? Ancheta Wis11:24, 24 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: As best I can recall, I am reponsible for the part of it copied below, though the last paragraph seems to be a residue of an earlier mention of Feyerabend that I was merely trying to make a transition to. You may remember that we had been having some discussion about the "no-method" school of thought, and I was initially for downplaying it, as I know that it really has very little impact on workaday research. But it fills the pop press and the pop phil sci courses, and it needs to be dealt with. That third paragraph was initially in the introduction, and I thought way back when that it was enough to say on the matter. In the mean time, though, I've had some rather odd experiences with (Pseudo-scient)-ologists, in a non-associative way, and it has convinced that we all have a lot more work to do as far as the "public reception of science" (PROS) goes.
JA: One of the big problems is the widespead confusion about the respective roles of science and philosophy of science. There are scientists who reflect on science and who take the time to explain it to the public, but they are rare compared to the numbers of philosophers of science and science writers who shape the public conception of science in ways that are not always very realistic. There's nobody to blame for that really — most doers are too busy doing science to explain how they view it, and there's nothing wrong with having specialized "reflectors" who stand at a distance from the action — sometimes they see things from a distance that the doers fail to see for standing too close to the picture. But somehow or other it is necessary to explain how the different perspectives relate to each other, or else the public gets a distorted picture of science. On this trial effort, I was trying to say all that in a way that places the continuities between doing science and reflecting on it within a natural context.
JA: The second paragraph speaks to the sea-change that occurred with Kant, where he accepted the workings of science at face value as if were just another phenomenon to be explained. This is a novel way to finesse the usual difficulties at the beginning, and it approaches the whole problem of justification in a positive way. That, as I recall, was the original idea of positivism, before it got wacked all out of proportion. So here I am trying to explain the bifurcation that took place historically, arising from a difference in attitude as to what a solution to the problem of justification would have to do.
Philosophy of science takes its cue from the moment when the play of inquiry is interrupted by a question about the activity of inquiry itself. The inquirer in question may have been, just a moment before, absorbed in a bit of data or immersed in the study of a problematic phenomenon — and throughout history it was normally that way — or maybe a curious bystander, or perhaps a person whose profession is philosophy. In any case, there are a number of questions that a reflective observer will typically think to ask about the conduct of scientific inquiry as a phenomenon that is interesting for its own sake.
What happens next depends on the attitude that the person who examines the phenomenon of science — quite literally the appearance of science — brings to the test. The attitude may be positive, taking the appearance of science at face value as a process that works as it seems to. Or the attitude may be negative, less disposed to accept appearances and more inclined to be critical or even skeptical of the possibilty that anything like science can work as it seems. These choices that any individual can make are also reflected in moments of history when one of the other tended to predominate, at least in particular circles of thought.
The philosophy of science has among its topics of interest the question of how far the actual practice of scientific researchers conforms to the espoused methods or the ostensible norms, to which the majority of them expressly or tacitly assent. In the process of subjecting the conventional assumptions to critically reflective examination, writers in these fields periodically generate controversies as to whether scientific knowledge is actually produced by a defined, describable, or determinate methodology (see, for instance, the writings of Feyerabend and Kuhn).
But when the same type of methodology is applied to a classroom and children are not benefitting, clearly the science is not there yet. Perhaps the article might benefit from a discussion why. There are other mismatches which we could discuss, if not on this page, then on other Science pages.
"The understanding must not therefore be supplied with wings, but rather hung with weights, to keep it from leaping and flying. Now this has never been done; when it is done, we may entertain better hopes of the sciences." --Francis Bacon
JA: In my experience argumentum ad revertum and genuine dialogue are mutually exclusive. Good luck with that science by fiat thing. You're really showing the kiddies how it's done. Jon Awbrey13:48, 24 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Jon, the main problem I observe is that the direction you were heading with that, while obviously well thought, opens the door wide for every thoughless slant possible without justifiable recourse to revert those inevitable POVs which would follow...Kenosis20:10, 24 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: The way I work is gradual, incremental, requiring no small amount of algorhythmic backtracking from time to time, but all importantly I work in public — perhaps you recognize the modus operandi. I appreciate your appreciation of my creativity that you think I could open any doors that are not already swinging wide on every saloon and salon in the Wiki City, but for sooth's sake I must decline the compliment. The loophole that anybody could drive an 18-wheeler semio-truck (articulated lorry in the UK) through, however, is opened up the moment that soi-disant scientists start appealing to the authority of the biggest army as the raison detour of science, if you catch my semantic drift. What's the alternative? Well, it's Popperly known as the via dolorosa of falsifiability, which makes it incumbent on soi-disant scientists to try poking holes in all their own pet theories, even their own theory of how science works. Scientific method? Use it or lose it. Jon Awbrey20:50, 24 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Jon, I'm having trouble understanding what you say above, but it seems like you are saying that you regard this section as "your work." I strongly recommend that you read WP:OR and WP:OWN. JoshuaZ21:07, 24 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: That would be a rather, well, creative interpretation of the single word "work". We're all working here. Being bold means making changes on the main attractor, however strange, except when there's some really serious dispute, which I didn't think we were having, not here, not yet. This article is, after all, tagged as a Philosophy article. So why is all the philosophy relegated to an afterthought? Indeed, my whole effort on that issue arose from trying to accord the benefit of the doubt to some perspectives that my first instincts, a month ago, were to discount. Yes, it was clearly a work in progress, begun late at night, and it usually takes me ≥ 3 rewrites to clean thinks up, but reverting that much good faith work on a common issue without discussion is just not WP:COOL in my book. Jon Awbrey21:28, 24 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Are you asserting inter alia that the editors should write this section in a way that it will lead into the Elements section rather than an afterthought to it? If so, then the [relatively minor] direction I just started pursuing with it should give way to a considered preparation for putting it up front. Let me know, OK?...Kenosis21:44, 24 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: I am saying that when we are done with this article, it had better be something more than a WP:PEACOCK paen to the cookbook recipes for scientific method that all of us learned, at least in my day, in our 4th-grade science textbooks. It had better exhibit an up-to-date, > 1-eyed literate, philosophically critical and reflective attempt to tackle the questions that have been being asked and addressed by many people who are genuinely concerned about science education, professional training, and the public reception of science. Otherwise we might as well just paste up a link to some 4th-grade textbook and give it up at that. Jon Awbrey22:00, 24 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
OK, then the Heisenberg quote should stay, and the point should be that it is in fact an art too. Like other arts such as law and engineering, that doesn't mean "anything goes" as Feyerabend argued. The rest of the article speaks for itself...Kenosis22:37, 24 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Philosophy section--last two paragraphs tentatively removed for further consideration
I removed these two paragraphs becasue the ideas are not effectvely contexted as yet. Here they are, for further consideration if desired.
Adherence to a Scientific Method is often used to discern scientific disciplines from non-scientific ones. That is, method is used as the criterion for demarcation between science and non-science. If it is not possible to articulate a definitive method, then it may also not be possible to articulate a definition of science, and distinguish between science and pseudoscience, between scientists and non-scientists.
The scientific method is nevertheless often held up as a model for rational thinking. For example, Carl Sagan, in his book The Demon-Haunted World, argues that we should use a scientific method as a tool for skeptical thinking, in order to identify and reject those movements that misrepresent science - pseudoscience or quackery. Many authors have suggested that we would benefit from applying the scientific method to other areas. At its extreme, the application of scientific methods outside of science leads to dogmatic scientism
Agreed, my instinct was to consider it a stranded paragraph which left an extremely important question hanging in mid-air. To start back in along these important lines, the existing paragraph could be followed by a checklist such as that below (courtesy of the intelligent design article editors, but really fairly standard), or some derivative thereof:
Adherence to a Scientific Method is often used to discern scientific disciplines from non-scientific ones. That is, method is used as the criterion for demarcation between science and non-science. If it is not possible to articulate a definitive method, then it may also not be possible to articulate a definition of science, and distinguish between science and pseudoscience, between scientists and non-scientists. The follwing checklist is typical of what is proposed as a guide to these damarcations. To reasonably be termed a hypothesis or theory, a conjecture should attach to as many of the following descriptors as the particular methodological circumstances permit:
Consistent (internally and externally)
Parsimonious (sparing in proposed entities or explanations, see Occam's Razor)
Useful (describes and explains observed phenomena)
Empirically testabile & falsifiable (see Falsifiability)
Based upon multiple observations, often in the form of controlled, repeated experiments
Correctable & dynamic (changes are made as new data are discovered)
Progressive (achieves all that previous theories have and more)
Provisional or tentative (admits that it might not be correct rather than asserting certainty)
The view expressed here is essentially coherentist. There are other possibilities. Some re-wording might be needed to ensure that this is not POV. Banno20:43, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Fair enough. It seemed to me it needed to start somewhere, and I would expect some kind of edits to it. For instance, Correctible and Provisional could easily be brought together I imagine. But, I'd also want to know of a science, any science, even some recognized branch of sociology or psychology for instance, in which these criteria do not apply to a proposition recognized as legitimate in the particular field. To this extent these descriptors are actually somewhat pedantic, but need to be set forth in some form I think...Kenosis21:07, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Why did mention of Feyerabend's strong programme get cut? Why not the scare quotes instead?
I noticed this had recently been removed:
While this scheme often taught as the basis of science, many philosophers, historians and sociologists of science (particularly Paul Feyerabend and advocates of the "strong programme") claim that it has little relation to the ways science is actually practiced.
Why?
I propose restoring that passage, since it is apparently well-sourced, and deleting all the "scare quotes" instead. They convey essentially no information, and what they do contain is often only a baised point of view. --James S.02:32, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Hi: I just noticed this, though your reversion was adequately explanatory of your view. This article is being worked on at present, so i apologize for appearing to have stepped on it completely. I agree Feyerabend is important, as is the strong programme, though in a separate context actually. So is Polanyi incidentally. I will ensure further proposed reorganizations that involve this vocal minority's notable alternative views are discussed here prior to editing...Kenosis03:02, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Incidentally, the reason the article is being worked on is because previously it was a mess; a lot of good content mixed in with a lot of junk and multiple superimposed edits with little or no context with respect to each other. Anyway, we've been hacking it through, and bit by bit I believe we're getting closer to something that's informative and can actually be read by those interested in the subject of the article...Kenosis03:10, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Philosophical reflections on scientific method
JA: The levels of misunderstanding that I see exhibited here are turning out to be far worse than I thought. These misunderstandings have to do with:
The character of scientific inquiry,
The character of the critical questions that reflective observers will persist in asking about purported scientific inquiry until they are satisfied by the answers,
The project of "defending science",
The ways that concerned parties can legitimately defend, explain, justify, or warrant science,
The forms of so-called defense that actually undermine both the integrity and the public understanding of science.
JA: One of factors that seems to be preventing the sort of genuine dialogue among concerned parties that might help to find real solutions to these misunderstandings is, I'm sad to say, a kind of "bunker mentality" that I see developing in the soi-disant "defenders of science". After many tries it has so far been impossible to get it through to some people that critical thinking is not about picking sides. It involves the critique of sloppy reason wherever it occurs, no matter who does it. It has so far been impossible to get across the simple logical point that many stories have > 2 sides, that a person who criticizes the arguments put forward on behalf of X is not ipso facto an "adherent" of ¬X. I have personally had to endure insinuations and even explicit insults like that from people who have no other data about "what side I'm on" than the fact that I criticize their reasoning on a given point.
JA: I think I understand something about the dynamics that brings this to pass, and up to a point I sympathize with those who have been so embroiled in this or that battle against scientific heresy that they begin to take on the characters of similar inquistors in the past. But I still have hopes that they will do better than their precursers, take pause to clear the fog of war, the "blood in the eye" (BITE), from what should be their better vision. Whether they know it or not, many others have been tackling these problems and trying to do something positive about them, for longer than they seem to realize. Jon Awbrey03:56, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Jon, I don't fully understand what you are saying above. Could you clarify and explain its relevance to the page at hand? Thanks. JoshuaZ03:59, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: I believe that I have already made more than a good faith effort to explain all of my contributions to the article and all of the problems that I see with its current condition. When others begin to make a corresponding effort to explain their objections to my additions, then maybe there will be reason to say more. Jon Awbrey04:08, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Jon, 1) to put it bluntly you don't explain yourself very well and 2) none of your stuff gives many references, which lead to serious OR problems with your versions, even if it was understood. JoshuaZ04:12, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Jon, if you are in some part reacting to my comment above about "vocal minority" I hereby retract that one. Of course science proceeds in paradigms and sometimes gets stuck in them too, enter Polanyi, Feyerabend, and also the strong programme (how you get to "Feyerabend's strong programme" I don't know for sure, and it even got me confused for awhile). As well, of course it is a process rather than simply a drone-like repetition of The Method. Obviously there's some more work to do here, but i think I'm going to take a break for a bit and come back to it with hopefully a fresh perspective...Kenosis04:23, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: It's late again where I am, so I'll try to be wise and make this short. Look, these are such bedeviled questions that I lose track of which devils I'm advocating on a given day. My POV of the moment is this: There are philosophers of science who show some familiarity with the history and the actual practice of science, like Peirce or Kuhn, and then there are those who show all the marks of being outside speculators, like Popper or Feyerabend. That's not an assignment of different colored hats in the trite Western picture-show sense, but merely a question of recognizing different perspectives for what they are. But a philosophical article on scientific method still has to deal with these issues without simply dimissing them out of hand. Now, I sat back quietly and observed your labors of house-&-stable-cleaning, and on the whole I think that's "that's a good thing". But some stuff that was right on in spirit if not in letter got tossed out with bathwater.
JA: So when things quieted down a bit, I tried to go back and deal with the issues that I know from long experience won't go away, since they have been recurringly raised by whole bodies of curriculum reform folks and hard-nosed science-minded professionals for the last 40 years or so, just since I personally have been paying attention. Because I tried to explain a tricky issue in the vernacular, prompted by many requests and WP guidelines to do so, it suddenly got branded and reverted as "personal essay". But these were nothing more personal or creative than paraphrases of philosophical issues that are as old as the hills. And now I'm told that it's "original research". I suppose that if some people are not aware of the histories that I mentioned here and above then it might seem like news in the WP:NOR sense, but at least providing references is something that I know how to do. So let's all practice what we preach and do likewise. Jon Awbrey05:12, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Syllabus of QV's
JA: I know that some people think that links should not be replicated, but I find that a good compendium of related topics is a very useful study aid, both on first and on subsequent readings. It also serves contributors in helping to see some of the discontinuities that will need to be smoothed out across diverse and sundry regions of Wikipedia. Jon Awbrey17:42, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
History and philosophy
Coming from outside, in that I have not edited this page for quite some time, may I point out that the distinction between the history and philosophy of the scientific method appears quite arbitrary? These two sections could profitably be combined - perhaps by putting the philosophy section in historical order? Banno20:39, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
"History of scientific method" has laid out some material in more detail in that particular regard. I agree with you insofar as the History section really focuses on the History of the philosophy of method. Yet, a true "History of scientific method" would not deal in only leading philosophy, but also give perspective on what the practice is actually like in a given day. Now that would be a task to research and organize. I'm going to leave it as is, with the assumption that yes, all this could be combined as Philosophy, and subsected as something like History, Problem of demarcation, Paradigmatic observations (e.g., Heisenberg, Polanyi, Feyerabend, Kuhn, and sociology including Strong programme). This, if considered desirable, could be done fairly readily with minimal further editing...Kenosis22:33, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Then of course there's the sociology of the history of philosophy of scientific method, which also operates padigmatically, and the philosophy of sociology of history of philosophy of scienfific method :)...Kenosis 22:38, 25 March 2006 (UTC) Banno, thanks for the material you already put in on this, which I was pleased to use verbatim as a description of the demarcation problem and lead-in to a typical set of criteria for demarcation...Kenosis22:49, 25 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I am inclined to delete, or at least truncate, the first paragraph of History section. The reason is that the "method" on the papyrus is nothing more than the fourfold medical diagnosis model which among other things was used by the historical Buddha: What's the problem?, What's the cause of the problem? Can the problem be solved (pick "yes" or "no")? and What's the solution? This is not scientific method, but standardized practical troubleshooting and repair methodology that is not even close to a method of analysis of how nature works.
What's the problem? You have a headache.
What's the cause? The God of Headaches.
Can the problem be solved? Yes, it will cost you one cow.
What's the solution? Come into my tent; I have a potion for you.
JA: There is a rather important distinction between the history of scientific method and the philosophy of scientific method. History is the record of past events. Despite what some people think, philosophy is not purely a thing of the past. Philosophy of science has to do with reflection on scientific inquiry as a whole. This includes (1) comparative and critical examinations of scientific activity, (2a) problems about the different types of reasoning involved in inquiry, (2b) the grounds of their validity, and (2c) their coordination with one another, (3) questions about the justification or warrant of scientific method, that is, whether, how, and why we think it works. And so on, just to mention a few things off the top of my head, as Data would say. Jon Awbrey02:15, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
This is the way I read the content of the present Philosophical issues section too. I might venture to read into Banno's point, in part, that what is already written in the History section is really a history of philosophy of method rather than a recitation of what actual forms of practice have historically prevailed -- and so it could legitimately all be titled "Philosophy". I responded that it could readily be re-sectioned, with appropriate subsections, without substantively rewriting the content should that become a preference. I'm also OK with the sectioning as it is, though I think there's still some more work to be done on the content...Kenosis03:02, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: I cannot make sense of what the issue is here. Maybe the concatenations of "F of G of H of ..." have exceeded the limits of my pushdown stack. If people are saying that the history section could be made more outlinish in view of already having the History of science and History of scientific method main artcles, that makes sense to me. If they are saying that the contemporary academic and cultural conversation about the nature of scientific inquiry can be separated from this article and relegated to a subsection of the Hist of Sci or Phil of Sci articles, then I think that would be a mistake on many grounds. Please clarify. Thanks, Jon Awbrey15:58, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Not saying the latter, Jon. Only that per Banno, all the History and Philosophy as currently written could legitimately go under Philosophy if desired, without significant change in content and form. I have no strong preference...Kenosis17:20, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: And I am trying to say that they are two different topics, indeed, radically different topologies for looking at science. The contemporary philosophical topics are not properly dealt with as history, since the contemporary issues, by definition, all have the time coordinate "now". Jon Awbrey17:32, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
There is a concept which has been lost in the edits, and which needs to be reinstated in the intro. "Scientific method (and science itself) deals with new knowledge". If no one has thought the thoughts before, then it qualifies as science. Originality is part of the currency with which scientists deal. Other investigations are certainly knowledge, but are rather more scholarship than science. This does not mean that new sounds or words or fashion or other tropes are science. That's where scientific method is applied to demarcate science from other forms of new knowledge. --Ancheta Wis16:25, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Phenomenally important little point. As well as the integration, elimination, and/or explanation of old knowledge...Kenosis17:23, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Deleted text: Quotations
JA: As wonderful as all of these quatotions are, their piquancy is considerably weakened by being tossed together in a salad bon mot. For my part I like to use such things as pithy epigraphs to lead off pertinent sections of the text, but I've been told that this practice is "not encyclopedic". So I'll put them here for case by case reconsideration. Jon Awbrey03:08, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
"The scientific approach to the examination of phenomena is a defense against the pure emotion of fear." - Tom Stoppard, Rosencrantz & Guildenstern Are Dead (1967, page 17 in Grove edition)
"Science is a way of thinking, much more than it is a body of facts." - Carl Sagan
"Science is what we have learned about how to keep from fooling ourselves." - Richard Feynman
"The brightest flashes in the world of thought are incomplete until they have been proven to have their counterparts in the world of fact." - John Tyndall (1820-1893), physicist
"It is wrong always, everywhere, and for anyone, to believe anything upon insufficient evidence." - William Kingdon Clifford
"A habit of basing convictions upon evidence, and of giving to them only that degree of certainty which the evidence warrants, would, if it became general, cure most of the ills from which this world is suffering." - Bertrand Russell
"The plural of anecdote is not data." - Roger Brinner
Models of scientific inquiry
JA: I will be adding some text to the main article under the heading indicated above on the various models of scientific inquiry that have been discussed in the literature over the years, in good time drawing on some of the references that I've already added — probably starting with Salmon, Hacking, Earman, etc. Jon Awbrey02:58, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Questions about scientific method
JA: On third reading of the previous comments about history and philosophy, I think that I can recognize a persistent phenomenon, one that I have tried with no big success to address already, so let me vary a variable or three and make another trial of it today.
JA: The philosophy section needs to be organized by philosophical topics, not by chronological order. The questions that any reflective person or critical thinker will eventually think to ask about the conduct of scientific inquiry are recurrent not serial.
JA: Over the last week there has been a persistent attempt to push any modicum of critical reflection about scientific method off the table, under the rug, anywhere but our backyard, etc. Assuming that most interested parties still want to keep this article under the aegis of Philosophy (a defeasible hypothesis), I think that this tendency is ill-advised and inappropriate. The reader is owed an accurate account of the current scene, with all its wrinkles and warts.
JA: I tried, in what may have been too vernacular or folksy a way, to make the point that reflection on science is not the exclusive preserve of professional philosophers of science, but that it arises "in the wild" anytime anybody pauses to reflect on what they are doing, no matter whether they are doing Big Science or micro-problem-solving in everyday life. This continuity is one route to a better understanding of science on the public scene. So I think that it's very important.
JA: In brief: It is not the profession that constitutes the reflection, it us the quality of the reflection that constitutes the profession. Jon Awbrey16:24, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
This article, currently at 47K, was once trimmed to 30K by Karol but has since grown out again. There is probably room for a series of articles "in depth" as for Isaac Newton. That would mean a navigation template and a return to the Summary Style currently favored by those who want to make the encyclopedia useful for the current speedy generation of new learners.
I am not opposed to this idea; indeed this is the direction it has been heading. On the other hand, for a topic as important as this, 75k, or even more, is not excessive assuming it is effectively organized and informative...Kenosis19:25, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Tighten treatment of examples & Length issue
JA: For my part, I do not think that 47 Kb is all that excessive for a keystone article like this, but one way to trim it would be to tighten up the paradigm examples to the few that can be carried through all of the stages in parallel, maybe just two examples from widely diverse fields. I notice that all of them now are from the natural sciences, which is a source of potential warp in the fabric of science being presented. Skimming through the examples, the paragraph on Light seemed most isolated and not so well written in its current state. Jon Awbrey17:08, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: Text deleted:
Light
Light had long been supposed to be made of particles. Isaac Newton, and before him many of the Classical Greeks, was convinced it was so, but his light-is-particles account was overturned by evidence in favor of a wave theory of light suggested most notably in the early 1800s by Thomas Young, an English physician. Light as waves neatly explained the observed diffraction and interference of light when, to the contrary, the light-as-a-particle theory did not. The wave interpretation of light was widely held to be unassailably correct for most of the 19th century. Around the turn of the century, however, observations were made that a wave theory of light could not explain. This new set of observations could be accounted for by Max Planck's quantum theory (including the photoelectric effect and Brownian motion—both from Albert Einstein), but not by a wave theory of light, nor by a particle theory.
Deleted text: Formal approaches
JA: Moving this paragraph here for reconsideration:
JA: There may be some other section, present or TBA, that it would fit under, but it seemed like a dangling factoid where it was. Jon Awbrey17:41, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: Yes, I think that these navigation guides can be very useful, as I always try to craft my own in the See also seas anyway. The only problem that I've seen with them in other places, say Semiotics, is the possibility of dismembering aspects of a subject, Osiris-like, that can only be properly integrated when taken up in close coordination with each other. This is part of what I'm getting at when I say that critical reflection is not just for professional critics and reflectors. Jon Awbrey18:30, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Jon Awbrey, What would you think if we were to have more of a communications protocol; those little DNA icons which are getting elided were a device to demarcate illustrations of the phases of scientific method. They were placed there in response to a request. This is recorded in the archives. It might help if you were to note your motive before these types of edits. Then others could assent, thus making the editing process more of a collaboration. --Ancheta Wis18:22, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Ancheta Wis, I'm personally inclined to defer for now and see where this goes so long as these tidbits are saved here and the main body is left intact (indeed it was Jon who got me on the track of saving deletions here just in case). Y'all deferred to me before, and unlike the brief ramble that got started on philosophical content a bit earlier, this in general seems worthy of consideration. For instance, by moving the History section to the end, he plainly is moving the focus to more to the present state of the discussion, and I have adapted the History accordingly. For another instance, a cleaned up version of the wave/particle problem can always be reinserted afterwards if desired. And his motive has, I think, also been by and large recorded. Just one person's thought of course...Kenosis18:41, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: Speaking as a mere reader, I found them extremely distracting, causing my eyes simply to skip over the heiroglyphed paragraph. I think that I can understand what somebody was trying to achieve, but it simply did not work in practice. Alas! the way of all experiment. Jon Awbrey18:38, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: I daresay that I have been far above the par of this group in giving notice of my edits, discussing them on the talk page, and preserving for reconsideration on the talk page what some previous soul took the time to type in, and I receive a remark like that with some irony from those who have yet to reciprocate its sentiment. But I will of course observe as best I can, short of due boldness, inconsistency with global norms, and intellectual paralysis, any form of communication protocol that achieves a local consensus. Jon Awbrey18:52, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Thank you. The custom that substantive change be telegraphed (viz., notification of others in advance, perhaps with a timestamp ~~~~~ & a statement of intent) allows more incubation time. Sometimes, the proposed text even gets improved with no additional effort on the original editor's part. Markus Schmaus has done that, for example, with his improvement of the DNA icon, as well as for the image of the precession of Mercury. --Ancheta Wis19:47, 26 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
It's a great idea, but anti-Wiki -- where "be bold" is the mindnumbing mantra of the masses. On the other hand, it's still a great idea for major changes, but for minor changes the format you describe would likely become unworkable as the talk page would become so cluttered as to be unreadable, with the alternative of frequent archiving creating problems when new editors, who haven't the attention span of a gnat, decide to adit without reading said archives. •Jim62sch•22:07, 27 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Ancheta Wis, Jon and others, in light of this tradition here, you have my apology for diving in so quickly a week or so ago. A couple of points offered to confirm or reject here, if I may:
(1) I trust that the approach of offering some material that can be absorbed by a non-technical but reasonably intelligent reader, prior to suffering near-certain drowning in the technical stuff, is appropriate in this article?
(2) I too am concerned about the important content in this article being articulated in a way that is not stale to the insider, and also in a way is not easy pickins for every thoughtfree passerby with some perceived nit to pick off of the discussion of method for whatever reason they might care to have. But I happen to think the discussion does not need to be completely oblique and inacessible to all but the "top 1-percenters," as it were. Certain terms of art (e.g. to pick a current one--"robust") do not absolutely need to be used, in my estimation, when a somewhat more straightforward term or combination of terms may also suffice. (This is not a slap here; just a good-faith criticism of work that is extremely artful but somewhat inacessible). If this is to be an insiders' conversation, why put it in Wikipedia? So, I am only advocating that if there is a way to say it so it can be understood by a reasonably intelligent layperson without sounding pedantic, then I feel that is the preferred option. That said, I begin to appreciate more readily what I see in this article at present (I thought Jon's reworking of the Demarcation subsection was dandy, the obliqueness criticism notwithstanding). Most of what is presently inn the article requires effort for me to grasp, but makes sense upon studying it.
Ancheta, The custom is nice, but, believe it or not, the Wiki "rules" still take precedence. I also note in going over the edit history that you've been an editor of this article for some time (and have done an exellent job) but likely feel a special attachment to it (as I do with articles that I've done the primary writing on). However, a lesson I had to learn was WP:OWN, and I think that may be important here.
As for the language, I agree with Kenosis -- just because we can write for the top one percent doesn't mean we should in this case. Yes, in my job I frequently write on a doctoral level, equal at least to that of the Harvard Law review, but that's a different environment. Wiki is here for the vulgus, the hoi polloi and writing over their heads does a disservice to the communicating the importance of the subject. Our purpose should be to get people to understand and embrace the scientific method, not to have them read the first few paragraphs and then run off defeated by the language. I'm not saying it needs to be be written on an idiot level, as I doubt any of us are capable of that, and we all probably find it repugnant, but we could at least try to make it a bit more accessible.
Kenosis makes an interesting point however, when he notes that "Most of what is presently inn [sic] the article requires effort for me to grasp." From what I've seen of Kenosis in the past month, if he is having difficulty grasping the article, it's written at too high of a level, as Kenosis is quite bright, far brighter than the average Tom, Dick or Mary. •Jim62sch•11:15, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
That is an argument for splitting the article. Then there can be multiple levels of accessibility. But we need an outline for that kind of effort so that different editors can contribute to different facets of scientific method. --Ancheta Wis11:26, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I was not personally advocating spoonfeeding either, merely parsimony and best-possible accessible choice of language without diminution of the necessary concepts. Recursions is an example of this; bet a nickel no one can think of another word that captures the concept as this does (a bet that I'd be happy to lose, for accessibility's sake). And I also am advocating an intro that can sum up the essence of method (and also demarcation) in a way that makes best-possible sense to the less-than-highly technical reader before diving in--many fine textbooks are written this way...Kenosis15:51, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Thoroughly Modern Millie — Peacock Terms & Progressivist Fallacies
JA: Recent edits show a tendency toward a type of progressivist fallacy that wore out its welcome in the late great "modern" era, namely the practice of using words like "modern" as honorific terms, rhetorically fashioned to confer some order of unquestioned — and ∴ "unscientific" — legitimacy on a contemporary doctrine. Now that "modern" has passed from hip to hip replacemnt in our thoroughly post*modern era, the use of the term "contemporary" is more accurate and less of a WP:PEACOCK word. Now, I do not question, too much, that science is one of those domains where most of us have faith that progress can be made, over the long haul, but nobody with a historical (See Elsewhere, Coriolanus) consciousness could dare to call that progression monotonic. Jon Awbrey04:04, 27 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
'Tis an inevitable byproduct of faster information turnover and longer lives. Ahh, for the good old days when most all of us died off before much of anything changed in the world, and the next cohort could use 'modern' with a fresh start!...Kenosis03:47, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: It's a deal, if you don't use "modern" I won't use "post-modern". So do what I say and nobody gets hurt.
JA: P.S. That's a Kleene star that I use in "post*modern".
Thus it is clear that:
Ahh, "contemporary style", so '50s Festival of Britain. Guess it will do here, but beware of "contemporary" meaning "of the time" rather than of the nowadays style time. Can someone think of a better term for distinguishing science as we know it from ye olde natural history? ...dave souza, talk12:34, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Please do not tempt me to change that to nowadays...Kenosis 15:34, 28 March 2006 (UTC) My preference is "today", but you can only use it so many times. Contemporary is fine in general, and "modern," as properly pointed out, has been corrupted by the proliferation of ideas like "post-modern". Excellent points about all this, though...Kenosis15:37, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Demarcation
JA: I have problems with the demarcation section. It's mostly just Popper's bugaboo again, sans citations, and it suffers from the following problems:
Is this checklist a new definition of scientific method?
Is it really the criteria that one uses to tell science from non-science?
Is the demarcation question itself a scientific question, in other words, one that can be answered by scientific procedures?
JA: No, no, maybe, but not this way.
JA: We already have a highly contentious article on Pseudoscience, and I would prefer not to replicate those peculiar trials here. So I think that it's better to "describe", not necessarily "define", scientific method in positive terms, and now that we have a reasonable outline, to stick with it.
JA: The items on that checklist are usually referred to as heuristic principles. Heuristic principles, much as Bohr observed about "deep truths", and much like muscles, tend to come in opposing pairs. In short, they are approximate maxims, and not internally consistent among themselves. Their proper application requires experience with the exigencies of given domains, that is, "practical wisdom", or what the Greeks called phronesis. Thus they serve even worse as a recipe than the more standard statements of method, and a lot of nonsense can be generated by the novitiate taking them too literally and rigidly. Jon Awbrey04:40, 27 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I agree. Also the section is out of sync with the main demarcation problem article. I would suggest rewiting the section according to the demarcation article rather than the other way around. --Chris12:00, 21 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Ockham's Taser
JA: Here is one of my previous attempts at delineating the demarcation problem in positive terms. I'll probably feather this in momentarily, though I think that these sorts of border disputes probably do more harm than good.
The criteria for a system of assumptions, methods, and theories to qualify as science vary in their details from application to application, but they typically include (1) the formulation of hypotheses that meet the logical criterion of contingency, defeasibility, or falsifiability and the closely related empirical and practical criterion of testability, (2) a grounding in empirical evidence, and (3) the use of scientific method. The procedures of science typically include a number of heuristic guidelines, such as the principles of conceptual economy or parsimony that fall under the rubric of Occam's Razor. A conceptual system that fails to meet a significant number of these criteria is likely to be considered "nonscience".
I tend to disagree as it is semantically correct, but then I dislike robust in this case (additionally, it has become something of a buzzword and is devoid of meaning -- one could, I suppose, argue the same about progressive). Surely there must be some word that covers both meanings that will be acceptable to all. •Jim62sch•22:21, 27 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: "Robust" is a fairly respectable term in the engineering circles that I lately buzzed about, though its cousin "agile" has been getting more buzziness of late. But let me remind you that this sorites of heuristics are "rules of thumb". There's a major artery in your thumb. If you try to shave 'em too fine, you end up with blood all over your razor. Nobody wants that, now do they? Jon Awbrey22:36, 27 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: "Robust" also has a standard meaning in statistics — where I first learned it I think: "A statistic is said to be robust if it is not sensitive to outliers". From there it got used in AI to mean "graceful recovery from anomalies", also "non-brittleness", capable of laughing off a request to divide by zero, etc. John von Neumann, John Holland, etc. Jon Awbrey23:00, 27 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
But rules of thumb are opposable. (OK, that was bad). The problem I see is that most folks associate robust with beer "has a robust flavour but won't add to your waistline", and occasionally people (sad, but true). What about "powerful" or "potent" instead? •Jim62sch•23:11, 27 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Robust is an almost meaningless term by itself in this context. Phrenology was robust in its day, but not progressive; rather, it was a dead end. Robust and progressive captured the essence here--why make it inacessible to non-scientists if it can be synthesized for both scientists and laypersons. Arnold Schwarzenegger is robust...Kenosis23:42, 27 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: Y'know, I'm really can't make everything up. The word "robust" really is used in just that technical sense. "Progressive", again, is used in connection with "incrementalism", and progresses from there to progressivist fallacies. Fallacies are a bad thing to fall into. Jon Awbrey03:56, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Personally I kind of like "recursive" as an adjunct descriptor here, but that's already used in another more micro context and suffers the obliqueness problem too. ...Kenosis04:12, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
How about something like:
Progressive, robust and corrigible. Subsumes previous theories as approximations, and allows possible subsumption by future theories. See Correspondence principle.04:12, 28 March 2006 (UTC)
JA: It's okay except for the "progressive", which is a seriously misleading word. I will dig up some references, but it may be a while, schedule interruptions coming up. Jon Awbrey04:18, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
OK, talk 2ya later then. I still think progressive is essential here, and think it's only marginally open for misinterpretation without the adjuncts...Kenosis 04:22, 28 March 2006 (UTC)Also please see my query in Communications Protocol above Jon...Kenosis04:22, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: The remark about phrenology clued me in to what the misunderstanding might be. Deriving from its use in statistics, robustness is a property of a measure on distributions that is insensitive to outliers, like the median, but not the mean. For "distribution" think "science as a whole", for "outlier" think "phrenology". It is precisely the ability of science to recover from its local cul-de-sacs (cultist acts) that we call its robustitude. Jon Awbrey06:10, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I'm compelled to disagree on this. Phrenology was robust because it was filled with speculations; add another one or three?, no big deal. Astrology today is rather robust too...Kenosis15:19, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: Again, the same misunderstanding of the term. If Phrenology were robust it would still be around. Yes, there are some forms of dyad-in-the-wool reductionism that survive by continually changing their names, but never mind that now. The word robust applies to science as a whole — remember your P's & Q's, Polanyi and Quine and their various holisms — not the individual sidetracks that have to be backtracked from time to time. Effective generativity depends on this, otherwise science gets stuck in the hoarse laffitudes of the Markov, the Context-free, and the Primitive recursive. Jon Awbrey16:44, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Agreed on the whole. The term is reasonable as it is applied in the art of statistical analysis, but suffers even more greatly than 'progressive' from popular misunderstanding. As such, some combined set of proper descriptors will, in the end, become reliable and stable in the article (with occasional re-checking for arbitrary edits in the future, of course), and at the risk of OR accusations, might even help the philosophy of science along a tad. If we discuss it properly here on the talk page and source each of the terms (which we have), a synthesis is fully defensible and sustainable...Kenosis18:01, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Family resemblance issues
JA: An anonymous editor prepended the definite article before our not so definite article, after all this time of discussing the plurality versus commonality issues, leading me to recognize that something very important must still not be clear about that, so here is what fell out of trying to fix that:
Scientific method refers to a body of techniques for the investigation of phenomena and the acquisition of new knowledge about them, as well as the correction and integration of previous knowledge, as a whole based on observableevidence and subject to laws of reasoning. Alhough specialized procedures vary from one field of inquiry to another, there are identifiable features that distinguish scientific inquiry from other methods of developing knowledge. Specific hypotheses are formed to propose explanations for natural phenomena and experimentalstudies test the predictions for accuracy in order to make increasingly dependable predictions of future results. Hypotheses in a given field of inquiry are logically bound together by a wider theory that assists researchers in forming new hypotheses, as well as in placing groups of specific hypotheses into a broader context of understanding.
I'll be honest, I agree with the deinite article. Otherwise, this sentence, "Scientific method refers to a body of techniques..." would need to read, "Scientific methodology refers to a body of techniques..." Absent the definite article it simply reads wrong (an unprofessional description, but accurate nontheless). •Jim62sch•23:52, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: Other notes. I also brought forward the mention of laws of reasoning, as the balance between empirical and rational aspects was a bit lopsided. Further, it's best to emphasize "observable" and mention "measurable" as coming of age in the normal course of development, when observations become mature enough to quantify. The historical fact is that fields of science can grow rather robustly for centuries at a time in a condition of making qualitative observations before they are old enough to start measuring anything sensibly. Misunderstanding this point is what got Phrenology into trouble, you'll remember. Jon Awbrey13:20, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: The word empirical is currently dabbed to empiricism, which is currently a POV article, as it stakes out a philosophical position that is decidedly not the position of all scientific researchers. In time I might be able to fix that article so that it describes a heuristic ism and not a dogmatic Ism, but right now the POV by association is false and misleading. Jon Awbrey16:04, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: Peirce — he would — had a word for it, but it was pure G(r)eek and about 7 slobbles long, and I kant remember it anyway. But looking through Newell's UTOC, the word "integrative" appears to leap off the page in about the same context and sense. Will cite chapter and verse later on. Jon Awbrey18:14, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I have put it in the relevant place of Demarcation problem criteria, pending further discussion and consensus...Kenosis19:19, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: For my part, an ubertous acronym is all-important -- and the irritation of doubt is next to IRCsomeness my estimation, so that starts to fit. Jon Awbrey19:30, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Natural ⇒ Anti-Social ?
JA: Look, I confess to being a naturalist myself, which means I think everything that happens is natural. But adjunction of the adjective "natural" to "phenomenon" has a tendency to bias the discussion of phenomena, "that which appears in the world", toward what are conventionally called the "natural sciences" in contradistinction to the "social sciences", and that leads to various distortions in the concept of science that I'm sure are not intended here. This not a substantive matter, but one that has to do with the peculiar usage of words on the modern scene, and I do mean "modern". Jon Awbrey20:32, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: Okay, I looked at the other end of the Natural world, and I have to say that my hypothesis is not disconfirmed — there is a rather rank "hard scientism" connoted by this link:
Nature (also called the material world, the material universe, the natural world, and the natural universe) is all matter and energy, especially in its essential form.
JA: Again, this is not for me a question about whether everything is made of quarks or whatever it is this week, as I'm totally accepting of all that. But there has been 2 or 3 hundred years of discussion already leading to the commonly accepted working basis that the various sciences operate at modular levels that don't really require one to reduce all one's talk about chemico-bio-psycho-socio-poli-sci systems to talk about quarks, even if one buys the whole bag of beans that "it's gotta be possible in principle". So this adjectival link is misleading with regard to how science actually gets done. Jon Awbrey21:16, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I agree "natural" shouldn't be directly attached to "phenomena". But I must say the Natural world article provides a fairly concise and clear description of the most important of the demarcations of science; I surely couldn't resist replacing "them" with something that adds further clarity to the agreed boundaries of scientific inquiry. Far too many casual conversationalists refer to "things" such as "supernatural phenomena" and other such oxymorons. This helps, or should help, make this one "thing" clear as it can possibly be to the non-technical reader right from the getgo...Kenosis21:17, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: Yes, I get all that, but we can't be reacting like billiard balls here. Probably the answer is to make a better job of the article on Phenomena. Put it on the list. Jon Awbrey21:24, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
OK, I think the article's bit-by-bit getting closer to informative and stable as to the introduction Your point duly noted...Kenosis21:43, 28 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Indeed, it seems to be coming along nicely. Sadly, I haven't as much time to devote to this article as either of you, but, as it is in good hands, that really doesn't matter. •Jim62sch•00:17, 29 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Wikis In Progress, Not Of Necessity Monotonically, Of Course
JA: I'm not worrying all that much at this stage about blade-running all those replicant wikis — very few trees are harmed in making them, anyway — since the ordering of sections is not all that stable in certain areas. 14:12, 29 March 2006 (UTC)
Some reduntant wikis are appropriate depending on context; for instance, the placement of three in succession in History, abductive, inductive and deductive, may be appropriate. The reader can sometimes develop a new interest in checking such things upon receiving an important point from the content of the article; In the Peirce paragraph for instance, whereas earlier in the paragraph no real need to check was given in context early in the paragraph, when the point is made that the three forms are interdependent today, now there's a reason to check. This would be an appropriate place to have links in both places of the same paragraph, despite convention. I chose to put those at the end where the important point was made...Kenosis16:28, 29 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
I would like to get feedback on the possible addition of a very important aspect of method today to the second introductory paragraph of the article, or some variant hereof...Kenosis17:07, 31 March 2006 (UTC)[reply]
"Because science is extended for its potential benefits to others, scientific work today is expected to be open to repeated close scrutiny by others, and is expected to be made available for expert peer review of all relevant data and methodology." 17:07, 31 March 2006 (UTC)
In other words, no Wizards behind the curtain in today's scientific method-- though as we know there is the occasional theory that's sufficiently self supporting to just throw it out there and say "here, go check it." Seems to me the expectation of openness/transparency is sufficiently basic that it perhaps should be right up front in the intro, but don't know for sure, which is why I asked here first rather than just dropping some form of it in there. A review of pseudosciences will show that this is perhaps the most widely violated expectation-- that of transparency so others can reproduce, verify, assess reliability, confidence intervals, etc etc...Kenosis19:35, 2 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: TWISI, the most pernicious form of pseudoscience today is what we might call OOPS, "oval office prestidigitous science", which has already learned how to outwit all the games of im-peerious prestige and manages to keep so many sweating the small stuff while the planet just keeps heating up. Jon Awbrey19:56, 2 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Ahh, the junk factor — indeed it is so obviously so (hey, I gotta wife and kids to take care of) — we have a rough idea how that goes...Kenosis20:01, 2 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: The point being this: How is peer review different from other forms of authority-based belief formation? Unless you find that especially easy to explain to the general public, then I would recommend focussing on the ways that scientific inquiry is something more than peer pressure. Jon Awbrey20:24, 2 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
OK, duly noted. Peer review as stated from one Member of the Scientific Community to another: "Hey Hank, like that theory of permissisquidity at whoooole lot." Of course that's not what peer review is supposed to be. Let me ponder this, because you're right Jon-- the system's highly imperfect, and often worse when public policy and corporate well being is involved. Yet, disclosure is primary. One calls it "science" to draw on the accumulated credibility of science. And if you can't check it in order to make reasoned judgments whether to rely on someone's results, unlike a hundred years or more ago it ain't science. That includes the opportunity for others to weigh in in advising the general public about results of additional research of the same set of phenomena, and with reliability and other important issues in evaluation of results. These can only be determined with proper disclosure of the relevant data and methodology...Kenosis21:04, 2 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
We are talking about the value added by a review. If there truly is communication between the author and reviewer, they are 'on the same page' and are not talking past each other. Otherwise, they are speaking to their constituencies for support and otherwise. This implies that review is a stage toward acceptance of some facet of the method. --Ancheta Wis05:21, 3 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
And about transparency and some form of publication or at least availability of data and method as a minimal expectation? Implicit, if not explicit, in the "Method" is an expectation of openness here fairly immediately upon any public announcement of result, otherwise it's in the category of R&D or pseudoscience...Kenosis21:52, 5 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Meiosis
JA: The more I look at what it will take to do a decent job on that Models of scientific inquiry section, the more I realize it will probably take an article of its own, so I have created a stub at Scientific explanation for that eventuality, or maybe Models of scientific inquiry will fit better, haven't decided yet. Travelling now, so will discuss more when I get back. Jon Awbrey15:06, 2 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: If there's a better way to split off a section as a separate article, please advise, but I thought this would be unproblematic as we've been discussing the need to do so for a while. Jon Awbrey18:34, 2 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
JA: I put in some very approximate links for the subsections on the various models of scientific inquiry. These will need to be expanded and refined as time goes on. Jon Awbrey20:34, 2 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
Subsection removed for consideration
I have removed the material below for further consideration by the editors. As written, it was off point for this article...Kenosis00:03, 12 April 2006 (UTC)[reply]
===Logical positivism===
This section needs expansion. You can help by adding to it.
Logical positivism (later referred to as logical empiricism, rational empiricism, and also neo-positivism) is a philosophy that combines positivism with a version of apriorism.
It originated in the Vienna Circle in the 1920s, where Rudolf Carnap, Otto Neurath, et al. divided statements into those which are analytic (true a priori) and those which are synthetic (verified by sensory experience). Logical positivism holds that philosophy should aspire to the same sort of rigor as science. Philosophy should provide strict criteria for judging sentences true, false and meaningless.00:03, 12 April 2006 (UTC)
Introduction to The Scientific Method
Richard A. Kapnick
Science is the empirical study of patterns and processes in the Universe.
The Scientific Method is the self-correcting tool used by scientists in honestly seeking truth at all costs. It is arranged in six steps to be followed in order.
1. Observation. Using our senses to gather information about the world around us.
A. This includes the "mapping process" used by the human brain to organize this information.
B. It also includes reflection on thoughtful questions that naturally arise after an observation is made.
2. Hypothesis. An hypothesis is a creative idea that helps explain the observation above. It is a trial solution that has not been verified. An hypothesis is stated in a manner that can be tested to see if it is true or false.
3. Prediction. The first step to verify the truth or non-truth of an hypothesis. A prediction extends critical thinking beyond that which is observed. Predictions are a logical "If . . . then" type of statement. ("If x is true, then y must also be true.")
4. Experimentation. An empirical (verified by actual experience) manner of testing the predictions of an hypothesis. All
experiments must be repeatable.
A. An experiment may be designed to test the truth of an hypothesis by trying to demonstrate the accuracy of its predictions,
or
B. If direct experiments are difficult to perform, experiments may be designed to test and eliminate other hypotheses or
explanations, leaving the original hypothesis as the only explanation.
5. Theory. A theory is an hypothesis with some degree of verification by empirical evidence. The evidence appears to indicate the hypothesis might be true. A theory states the apparent relationships and underlying principles of certain observed phenomena that have been verified to some degree. A theory is not a “proven true” idea.
6. Law of Science. A Law of Science is a theory that has undergone extensive testing and has accurately matched the observed
phenomena or data again and again and again. It has withstood the "test of time." While Laws of Science are accepted as responsible and accurate factual* truth, they are continually reviewed in the search for absolute truth. No Law of Science is a final statement of the way the universe is. Laws of Science are modified when new empirical facts are discovered.
The Scientific Method is universal in its application. An hypothesis, thought, idea, or belief that cannot be verified by the Scientific Method cannot be verified by any other means known to man.
The idea of “cause and effect” was discarded with the acceptance of quantum mechanics, largely because QM approaches explanations
for nature with ranges of probabilities. We now realize that “cause and effect” is a contrived human concept. If two events have a near-
absolute correlation, then they are subsets of the whole, larger, summed event–defined within QM’s probability range.
_____________________________
Facts are not “the Absolute Truth of the Universe.” Instead, facts are the best current human approximation of the truth. Facts are
changed or adjusted as new information is discovered. Knowledgeable people realize facts may change at some future date. However,
these folks are able to live comfortably with the best “facts” currently available.
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? Markus Schmaus 13:46, 4 Jun 2005 (UTC)
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