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Praxeology

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Praxeology is the bullshit study of human action based on the action axiom.[1] The most common use of the term is in connection with the Austrian School of Economics,[2] as established by economist Ludwig von Mises.[3]

Origin and etymology

The neologism praxeology (Gr. praxis (πρᾶξις), action, and logos (λόγος), talk, speech) is often credited to Louis Bourdeau, the French author of a classification of the sciences, which he published in his Théorie des sciences: Plan de Science intégrale in 1882:[4]

On account of their dual natures of specialty and generality, these functions should be the subject of a separate science. Some of its parts have been studied for a long time, because this kind of research, in which man could be the main subject, has always presented the greatest interest. Physiology, hygiene, medicine, psychology, animal history, human history, political economy, morality, etc. represent fragments of a science that we would like to establish, but as fragments scattered and uncoordinated have remained until now only parts of particular sciences. They should be joined together and made whole in order to highlight the order of the whole and its unity. Now you have a science, so far unnamed, which we propose to call Praxeology (from πραξις, action), or by referring to the influence of the environment, Mesology (from μεơος, environment).[5]

The term, however, was in use with differing interpretations as far back as 1608, by Clemens Timpler in his Philosophiae practicae systema methodicum.[6] In this work, Timpler, when examining ethics, goes on to say:

The general ethics falls into two parts: 1) Aretologie and 2) Praxiologie, i.e., of virtue and of their action.... This distinction between the moral actions of the virtues seems a novelty; but it's necessary, however, because the habit of virtue and the move to action do not coincide.

It was later mentioned by Robert Flint in 1904.[7] The popular definition of this word was first given by Alfred V. Espinas (1844–1922),[8] the French philosopher and sociologist and the forerunner of the modern Polish school of the science of efficient action. The Austro-American school of economics was also based on a philosophical science of the same kind.

In the slightly different spelling, praxiology, the word was used by the English psychologist Charles A. Mercier (in 1911), and then proposed by Knight Dunlap to John B. Watson as a better name for his behaviorism.[9] It was rejected by Watson, but was accepted by the Chinese physiologist of behavior, Zing-Yang Kuo (b. 1898) in 1935,[10] and mentioned by William McDougall (in 1928, and later).[11]

Previously the word praxiology, with the meaning Espinas gave to it, was used by Tadeusz Kotarbiński (in 1923) and some time later by several economists, such as the Ukrainian, Eugene Slutsky (1926) in his attempt to base economics on a theory of action, the Austrian Ludwig von Mises (1933), the Russian, Nikolai Bukharin (1888–1938) during the Second International Congress of History of Science and Technology in London (in 1931), and the Pole, Oscar Lange (1904–1965) in 1959, and later.

The Sicilian philosopher, Carmelo Ottaviano, was using the Italianised version, prassiologia, in his treatises starting from 1935, but in his own way, as a theory of politics. After the Second World War the use of the term praxeology spread widely. After the emigration of von Mises to America his pupil Murray Rothbard defended the praxeological approach. A revival of Espinas's approach in France was revealed in the works of Pierre Massé (1946), the eminent cybernetician, Georges Théodule Guilbaud (1953), the Belgian logician, Leo Apostel (1957), the cybernetician, Anatol Rapoport (1962), Henry Pierron, psychologist and lexicographer (1957), François Perroux, economist (1957), the social psychologist, Robert Daval (1963), the well-known sociologist, Raymond Aron (1963) and the methodologists, Abraham Antoine Moles and Roland Caude (1965).

Under the influence of Tadeusz Kotarbiński, praxeology flourished in Poland. A special 'Centre of Praxeology' (Zaklad Prakseologiczny) was created under the organizational guidance of the Polish Academy of Sciences, with its own periodical (from 1962), called at first Materiały Prakseologiczne (Praxeological Papers), and then abbreviated to Prakseologia. It published hundreds of papers by different authors, and the materials for a special vocabulary edited by Professor Tadeusz Pszczolowski, the leading praxeologist of the younger generation. A sweeping survey of the praxeological approach is to be found in the paper by the French statistician, Micheline Petruszewycz, A propos de la praxéologie.[12]

Ludwig von Mises was influenced by several theories in forming his work on praxeology, including Immanuel Kant's works, Max Weber's work on methodological individualism, and Carl Menger's development of the subjective theory of value.[13]

Austrian School approach

Von Mises writes that action axiom is the basis of all praxeology, and it is the basic proposition that all specimens of the species Homo sapiens, the homo agens, purposefully utilize means over a period of time in order to achieve desired ends. In his magnum opus Human Action, Von Mises defined “action” in the sense of the action axiom by elucidating:[14]

Human action is purposeful behavior. Or we may say: Action is will put into operation and transformed into an agency, is aiming at ends and goals, is the ego's meaningful response to stimuli and to the conditions of its environment, is a person's conscious adjustment to the state of the universe that determines his life. Such paraphrases may clarify the definition given and prevent possible misinterpretations. But the definition itself is adequate and does not need complement of commentary.

Von Mises argues that praxeology is not concerned with the individual's definition of end satisfaction, just the way he sought that satisfaction and that individual's increase of their satisfaction by removing sources of dissatisfaction or "uneasiness". In his theory, an acting man is defined as one capable of voluntary and conscious behaviour—to be otherwise would be to make one a mere creature who simply reacts to stimuli by instinct. Similarly, an acting man must have a source of dissatisfaction which he believes can be changed, otherwise he cannot act.

Von Mises writes that economics, the study of human choice under conditions of scarcity, can be treated as a specialization of praxeology, the study of all human action. Like other members of the Austrian School, von Mises rejected the standard scientific approach of relying upon empirical observation in the study of economics, and instead, favored the use of logical analysis, a logic which is influenced by Immanuel Kant's analytic–synthetic distinction. Von Mises writes that the empirical methods used in the natural sciences cannot be applied to the social sciences because the principle of induction does not apply. In essence, he believed that a theory constructed to predict how humans will act (what ends they will seek) in a "complex" situation could not arise from studying how they acted in "simple" situations. Furthermore, there are limits to how much can be learned from even a "simple situation". As a criticism to empirical studies seeking to find justification in the economic action of individuals, von Mises proposed that only the human actor knows the ends toward which he acts.

Another conclusion that von Mises reached was that decisions are made on an ordinal basis. That is, it is impossible to carry out more than one action at once, the conscious mind being capable of only one decision at a time—even if those decisions can be made in rapid order. Thus man will act to remove the most pressing source of dissatisfaction first and then move to the next most pressing source of dissatisfaction. Additionally, von Mises dismissed the notion that subjective values could be calculated mathematically; man can not treat his values with cardinal numbers, e.g., "I prefer owning a television 2.5 times as much as owning a DVD player." As a person satisfies his first most important goal and after that his second most important goal, then his second most important goal is always less important than his first most important goal. Thus, the satisfaction, or utility, that he derives from every further goal attained is less than that from the preceding goal. This assumes, of course, that the goals are independent, which is not always the case—for example, acquiring the television may enable one to pursue the goal of watching a documentary on biology, which may make one decide to study biology, which opens the goal of writing a research paper, and so on. In human society, many actions will be trading activities where one person regards a possession of another person as more desirable than one of his own possessions, and the other person has a similar higher regard for his colleague's possession than he does for his own. This assertion modifies the classical economic view about exchange, which posits that individuals exchange goods and services that they both appraise as being equal in value. This subject of praxeology is known as catallactics.

Categories

The categories of praxeology, the general, formal theory of human action, as outlined by Murray Rothbard are as follows:[15]

A. The Theory of the Isolated Individual (Crusoe Economics)
B. The Theory of Voluntary Interpersonal Exchange (Catallactics, or the Economics of the Market)
1. Barter
2. With Medium of Exchange
a. On the Unhampered Market
b. Effects of Violent Intervention with the Market
c. Effects of Violent Abolition of the Market (Socialism)
C. The Theory of Propositional Exchange, or Law and Argumentation Ethics,
D. The Theory of War – Hostile Action
E. The Theory of Games (e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern)
F. Unknown

Criticisms

Keynesian Thomas Mayer has argued that the Austrian economists rejection of the scientific method which employs positivism and empiricism in the development of (falsifiable) theories; invalidates Austrian methodology.[16][17] Austrians argue that logical positivism cannot predict or explain human action and that empirical data itself is insufficient to describe economics which in turn implies that empirical data cannot falsify economic theory and that logical positivism is not the proper method of conducting economic science.[18][19]

Economist Mark Blaug has criticized over-reliance on methodological individualism, arguing it would rule out all macroeconomic propositions that cannot be reduced to microeconomic ones, and hence reject almost the whole of received macroeconomics.[20]

See also

References

  1. ^ http://www.lewrockwell.com/rothbard/rothbard38.html
  2. ^ Praxeology: The Methodology of Austrian Economics
  3. ^ Roderick T. Long. "What the Hell is Praxeology?". Retrieved 7 March 2012.
  4. ^ Bourdeau, Louis, Théorie des sciences: Plan de Science intégrale, Paris, 1882, p. 463
  5. ^ "À raison de leur double caractère de spécialité et de généralité, les fonctions doivent constituer l’objet d’une science distincte. Quelques—unes de ses parties ont été étudiées de bonne heure, car ce genre de recherches, dont l’homme pouvait se faire le sujet principal, a présenté de tout temps le plus vif intérêt. La physiologie, l’hygiène, la médecine, la psychologie, l’histoire des animaux, l’histoire humaine, l’économie politique, la morale, etc., représentent des fragments de la science que nous voudrions établir; mais fragments, épars et sans coordination, sont restés a l’état de sciences particulières. Il faudrait les rapprocher et en faire un tout afin de mettre en lumière l’ordre de l’ensemble et son unité. On aurait alors une… science, innommée jusqu’ici et que nous proposons d’appeler Praxéologie (de πραξις, action), ou, en se référant a l’influence des milieu, Mésologie (de μεơος, milieu)."
  6. ^ Timpler, Clemens. Philosophiae practicae systema methodicum, in tres partes digestum, in quo universa probe honesteque vivendi ratio tam generatim, quam speciatim per praecepta et quaestiones breviter ac perspicue explicatur et probatur, pars prima, complectens ethicam generalem, libris IV pertractatam. Hanoviae, Apud Gulielmum Antonio, 1608. p. 388
  7. ^ Flint, Robert, Philosophy as Scientia Scientiarum, Edinburgh, 1904, esp. pp. 254–55.
  8. ^ Ostrowski, Jean J., 'Notes biographiques et bibliographiques sur Alfred Espinas', Review Philosophique de la France et de l'Etranger, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, No. 3, Juillet-Septembre, 1967, pp. 385–391
  9. ^ Watson, John B., Behaviourism: the early years, Volume 4
  10. ^ Edited by Murchison, Carl Allanmore, The Journal of psychology, Volumes 3–4, 1935
  11. ^ McDougall, William, The battle of behaviorism: an exposition and an exposure, 1928, pg 35
  12. ^ In 'Mathématiques et Sciences Humaines', Paris, Centre de mathématique sociale et de statistique-Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, No. 11. Ete, 1965, pp. 11–18, and a rejoinder 'Réponse a un appel' by J. Ostrowski, ibid,, No. 19, Ete, 1967, pp. 21–26
  13. ^ George Selgin. Praxeology and Understanding: An Analysis of the Controversy in Austrian Economics (pdf). Review of Austrian Economics 2 (1987): 22.
  14. ^ Ludwig von Mises. Human Action, p. 11, "r. Purposeful Action and Animal Reaction". Referenced 2011-11-23.
  15. ^ Murray N. Rothbard. "Praxeology: Reply to Mr. Schuller", American Economic Review, December 1951, pp. 943–46.
  16. ^ Mayer, Thomas (1998). "Boettke's Austrian critique of mainstream economics: An empiricist's response". Critical Review. 12. Routledge: 151–171. doi:10.1080/08913819808443491. {{cite journal}}: Invalid |ref=harv (help); Unknown parameter |month= ignored (help)(subscription required)
  17. ^ "Rules for the study of natural philosophy", Newton 1999, pp. 794–6, from Book 3, The System of the World.
  18. ^ Ludwig von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics, http://mises.org/epofe/c1p1sec5.asp
  19. ^ http://mises.org/rothbard/praxeology.pdf
  20. ^ Blaug, Mark (1992). The Methodology of Economics: Or, How Economists Explain. Cambridge University Press. pp. 45–46. ISBN 0-521-43678-8.

Further reading