Talk:Battle of Cowpens

I was just editing this article, and I found some plagarism. "Daniel Morgan knew both his men and his opponent" is a direct quote from a National Park Service article on Morgan found http://www.nps.gov/cowp/dmorgan.htm. sophysduckling

It's copied, not plagiarized. It's public domain--nothing was stolen.

Also it is too basic to be considered plagarism. Its a fact, not something that is copyrightable. Daniel.Cardenas (talk) 19:09, 19 November 2007 (UTC)

Similarities to Cannae

I would like to delete this entire section, because it's so full of peackocking and sounds like hero worship. Civil Engineer III 20:31, 11 October 2006 (UTC)

The goal of this strategy was to weaken and disorganize Tarleton's forces (which would be attacking the third line uphill) before attacking and defeating them.

Additionally, by placing his men downhill from the advancing British lines, Morgan exploited the British tendency to fire too high in battle

The above sentences appear in 2 consecutive paragraphs in the Cowpens article. They appear to be at odds with each other as to the position of the American forces. Were they uphill or downhill from the British? 170.97.167.61 18:07, 26 February 2007 (UTC)

00:19, 3 January 2009 (UTC)68.48.66.107 (talk)

Weapons Used

There is a total lack of discription of the small arms used by both sides. The American Militia had their deer rifles, which took a relatively long time to load, but were accurate at a much greater range. The British had the fast loading, short range, smooth-bore Brown Bess, the Continentials, I believe had American Contract muskets, copies of the Brown Bess. So the tactic of the militia firing 2 shots, then retreating worked particularly well. Their first shot was loaded before the British were on the field. They were able to pick out individuals, rather than to just throw a bunch of lead in the general direction of the enemy. That is why so many British officers fell. They were targeted by accurate fire, while the Americans were still out of range of the B/Bess. The second shot was quickly loaded and that round also had devistating impact. But by then the British were within range of the Brown Bess, so the militia was more than happy to retreat. Their return was of course, after their loading a third shot.

Retreat was a misunderstood order

The order by Howard was not meant for retreat but to turn slightly to the right to face the Highlanders. Because of the immense amount of noise on the battlefield, made worse by the bagpipes blowing, the troops began an orderly retreat. Here's what happened:

"Now Tarleton’s 71st Highlanders27, held in reserve, entered the charge toward the Continental line, the wild wail of bagpipes adding to the noise and confusion. A John Eager Howard order for the right flank to face slightly right to counter a charge from that direction, was, in the noise of battle, misunderstood as a call to retreat. As other companies along the line followed suite, Morgan rode up to ask Howard if he were beaten. As Howard pointed to the unbroken ranks and the orderly retreat and assured him they were not, Morgan spurred his horse on and ordered the retreating units to face about, and then, on order, fire in unison. The firing took a heavy toll on the British, who, by that time had sensed victory and had broken ranks in a wild charge. This event and a fierce Patriot bayonet charge in return broke the British charge and turned the tide of battle. The re-formed militia and cavalry re-entered the battle, leading to double envelopment28 of the British, perfectly timed. British infantry began surrendering en masse."[1] Jtpaladin 14:58, 3 May 2007 (UTC)

Battle Events

From Events under Battle the following sentence. "It is a mystery why the Patriot higher command did not make more use of Morgan as a commander." There is no mystery. Morgan was suffering from chronic back pain and sciatica. After Cowpens, Greene retired him telling Morgan that he'd earned the right to go home. William (Bill) Bean 17:04, 5 July 2007 (UTC)

Ah, you were watching the History Channel on July 4 as well? Is a cite to that particular episode of The Revolution acceptable?(SSJPabs 13:32, 13 August 2007 (UTC))

Notes on the quotes

I got you started on the cite formats. You need notes on the quotes and the longer quotes should probably be blockquotes.Dave (talk) 01:53, 11 December 2007 (UTC)

Casualties

The total casualties(including captured) for the British, add up to 1,239. How is that possible if there were only 1,100 troops? Red4tribe (talk) 15:44, 13 July 2008 (UTC)

You are forgetting that most of the wounded would also have been prisoners. 217.43.163.108 (talk) 10:38, 1 August 2008 (UTC)

The number of Continentals listed in the Background is ridicules. "When Greene took command the southern army numbered only 230,000 men, of whom just 949 were Continental regulars.[7]" Only 230,000? More like 2,300. Dristen (talk) 18:02, 26 December 2011 (UTC) 26 December 2011

Tarleton taking prisoners in other battles?

This doesn't seem like a difficult question. This is an article about the battle of Cowpens. The text should deal with the battle of Cowpens. The question of whether Tarleton did, or did not, consent to take prisoners in other battles should be dealt with in the article on Banastre Tarleton, the articles about those battles, or possibly larger articles about the American Revolution or about the campaign in the Carolinas. Tarleton was not in a position to take prisoners in this battle. Vidor (talk) 20:50, 19 November 2009 (UTC)

For the record, here's the paragraph in question:

It was claimed by some of the Patriots after the battle that Tarleton had ordered his men, before they went into action, to take no prisoners. This may have been "black propaganda" of the sort that flourished amid the brutal conflict in the Carolinas during the Revolution. Tarleton's British Legion Cavalry were notorious for the way that they ruthlessly pursued defeated opponents, cutting them down as they tried to surrender. As a result, Tarleton was given the nickname "Barbarous Ban" by the Patriot press, a title that Tarleton relished since he felt it gave his command an advantage. But it is notable that nearly every time they defeated the enemy — Monck's Corner, Lenud's Ferry, Camden, Catawba Ford — Tarleton's men did in fact take some prisoners. Even at the Battle of Waxhaw Creek (alias The Buford Massacre), where Tarleton's men killed a high proportion of their opponents, they granted quarter to 203 Patriots.<ref name=page1174>Boatner, page 1174.</ref> By Tarleton's own account, his horse was shot from under him in the charge at Waxhaw Creek and chaos erupted when his men believed he had been killed. In the end, 113 Americans were killed and another 203 captured, 150 of whom were so badly wounded that they had to be left behind. Tarleton's casualties were five killed and 12 wounded.<ref name=page1174/> This does not disprove the allegation that Tarleton had issued a "no quarter" order before Cowpens but no explanation has been offered as to why Tarleton would suddenly have adopted this policy.

The first sentence contains the words "after the battle". The last sentence contains the words "before Cowpens". How do you claim this is not somehow about the battle? Why would comparisons to other battles not be appropriate, as long as focus is maintained?

I'll agree that some of this text is probably unnecessary (the description of Waxhaws for instance, can be trimmed significantly), but I think it is certainly valid to compare things that happened in and around a battle to others, and to discuss the reputations of its participants, in its article. Magic♪piano 21:30, 19 November 2009 (UTC)

• I claim the paragraph is not about the battle because it is not about the battle. It does not address the events of Cowpens at all. Also, the initial sentence that you cite is unsourced. The second sentence is both unsourced, a reference to the first unsourced sentence, and not about Cowpens. The third sentence talks about how Tarleton's Legion behaved when in pursuit, which they were not at Cowpens. The fourth sentence discusses Tarleton's nickname, which predated Cowpens. The fifth sentence discusses several battles, none of which were Cowpens. The next three sentences discuss the Waxhaw Massacre, which was not Cowpens. The final sentence, which echoes the initial in trying to refence Cowpens, is also unsourced. "it is certainly valid to compare things that happened in and around a battle to others" Tarleton did not take prisoners at Cowpens. Further, even if someone does come up with a source stating that participants at the battle of Cowpens accused Tarleton after Cowpens of not taking prisoners, it would STILL be irrelevant to the article unless it can be demonstrated that such belief somehow influenced the events of Cowpens. Did the Patriot soldiers at Cowpens kill any British troopers who were attempting to surrender? The paragraph makes no such claim. Vidor (talk) 22:26, 19 November 2009 (UTC)

The question of citations is beside my point. I agree that the sentences are uncited; if this is your concern, place {{fact}} tags and delete the offending words a month later when no one has cited them. Otherwise you should also be deleting huge tracts of uncited text from the rest of the article.

Second, nearly every article battle article I've worked on contains descriptions of things that happen before and after the battle (or war, or campaign) -- things that are "not the battle". It's called context, and it's a valuable tool in understanding why people are there, and where they go afterwards, and what people thought and wrote after the battle. The whole point of this paragraph is to draw parallels (real or perceived) between Cowpens and those other "not Cowpens" events. The fact that this belief did not somehow influence events at Cowpens is beside the point; it may have influenced events afterward (like later battles elsewhere), or merely been widely publicized. Are you trying to say this sort of analysis has no place here?

"... participants at the battle of Cowpens accused Tarleton after Cowpens of not taking prisoners": this is a misreading of the first sentence. Magic♪piano 00:47, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

It's called context Context is often helpful. In fact, the article could use more context, in that it is short on material explaining where Morgan was going and why he was going there and how he wound up in that particular part of South Carolina facing Tarleton. I plan to bust out my copy of Buchanan's book and add that at some point. However, a paragraph-long digression on whether or not Tarleton had prisoners shot at other battles is not context. why people are there, and where they go afterwards, and what people thought and wrote The paragraph in question does not address either one of the first two you list, not at all. As for the third, there is no cite saying that the Patriots who fought at Cowpens made such an accusation about Tarleton after Cowpens. I doubt that they did, since, as I said above, Tarleton was in no position to take prisoners at Cowpens. The whole point of this paragraph is to draw parallels (real or perceived) between Cowpens and those other "not Cowpens" events. And what parallel is that? We have an article about Cowpens that is interrupted for one paragraph with a meditation on whether or not Tarleton was in the habit of taking prisoners when he won battles. Where's the parallel? it may have influenced events afterward (like later battles elsewhere), or merely been widely publicized. Are you trying to say this sort of analysis has no place here? Yes. That is precisely what I am saying. Whether or not anti-Tarleton propaganda influenced events after Cowpens is immaterial. Whether or not anti-Tarleton propaganda was "widely publicized" is even more immaterial. This article is about the battle of Cowpens. This article is not a biography of Banastre Tarleton nor a history of the Revolution in South Carolina. "Context" would include background information on why and how the battle was fought, and the battle's effects on the campaign in the Carolinas and the war. Vidor (talk) 02:17, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

I agree that the article is generally lacking in context. Your characterization of the para as an interruption strikes me as odd; it appears after the description of the battle proper. As far as anti-Tarleton propaganda, if the propaganda is rooted in this event, it ought to be mentioned here.

I haven't done any significant work on this article; it happened to get on my watchlist for other reasons. If you're going to work on it, I'm not going to push this any further. Magic♪piano 03:20, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

But the anti-Tarleton propaganda isn't rooted in this event, it's rooted in his previous victories, most notably at the Waxhaws. I absolutely agree that the material we're discussing would have homes in the article on the Waxhaws and the article about Tarleton. Vidor (talk) 04:41, 20 November 2009 (UTC)

Prelude section

When Greene took command the southern army numbered only 230,000Italic text men, of whom just 949 were Continental regulars. This is ridicules it should be 2,300. Dristen (talk) 17:55, 26 December 2011 (UTC) December 26, 2011

[7]In accordance with what I wrote above, I have written a new introductory section, including some info on the commanders, the overall tactical situation, and the events that led to the battle. I think this is an improvement over the article in its previous form, which had very little of this. Vidor (talk) 09:07, 24 November 2009 (UTC)

Fixed the obviously incorrect numbers. Dougweller (talk) 20:17, 26 December 2011 (UTC)

Lack of detail and innacuracy on Tarleton's army

The description of Tarleton's army; "Most of his infantry (including that of the Legion) would be assembled in linear formation". Its well established that the British fought almost entirely in open order loose formation from 1776-onwards, known as "loose files and American scramble", there is plenty of evidence for this including the study by Matthew H.Spring, also books like 'British Redcoat 1740-93'. Indeed, Tarleton himself blamed this style of fighting on his defeat: "the loose manner of forming which has always been practised by the King’s troops in America". http://books.google.co.uk/books?id=-d1YAAAAMAAJ&pg=PA228&lpg=PA228&dq=the+loose+manner+of+forming+which+had+always+been+practised+by+the+King%E2%80%99s+troops+in+America&source=bl&ots=gh4Y-bvJSk&sig=dkrPqdPIO1RPI9e9tyv7uNfXabY&hl=en&sa=X&ei=irrzUd_nJIiR7Aaq2IHoDg&ved=0CDgQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=the%20loose%20manner%20of%20forming%20which%20had%20always%20been%20practised%20by%20the%20King%E2%80%99s%20troops%20in%20America&f=false Tarleton goes onto explain the "extreme extension of files always exposed British regiments and corps", which is refering to the fact that the British advanced in extended file; one single line, which left no reserve if the main line began to falter. The British lines were so perilously extended in the southern campaigns because their armies were so small, and the colonial armes were almost always larger which meant the Americans could create successive lines of defence. Ben200 (talk) 12:40, 27 July 2013 (UTC)