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Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi

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The Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi (less correctly spelled as Unkiar Skelessi) was a treaty signed between Russia and the Ottoman Empire on July 8, 1833, following the military aid of Russia against Mehmed Ali that same year. The treaty brought about an alliance between the two powers, as well as a guarantee that the Ottomans would close Dardanelles to any foreign warships if the Russians requested such action. The treaty would have significant consequences regarding the Ottoman Empire’s foreign relations, especially with Great Britain, as the terms of the treaty worried the other great powers of Europe.

Background

Mehmed Ali, ostensibly only a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, was seeking to increase his personal power and gain control over Palestine, Syria, and Arabia. In order to justify the assault on his liege, he used the pretext of a personal dispute with the pasha of Acre.[1]

Egyptian Advance

In late 1831, he sent his newly reformed army towards Syria, under the command of his son Ibrahim Pasha, resulting in the Egyptian–Ottoman War (1831–1833) against the Ottoman Sultan, Mahmud II. Ibrahim’s forces quickly capture Gaza and Jerusalem, and successfully laid siege to Acre before marching on to Aleppo and Damascus, “winning successive battles against Mahmud’s new troops, which were not yet a match for so practiced an enemy”; by June 18, 1832, Ibrahim had managed to seize control of all of Syria.[2] For a time, the Egyptian army halted while Mehmed Ali attempted to negotiate with the Sultan. However, once it became clear that diplomacy had failed, Ibrahim led his forces into Anatolia itself where he rallied opponents of the Sultan and captured the city of Konya on November 21.[3] Mahmud II dispatched a large army to try to halt the Egyptian advance, but it was crushed in the Battle of Konya on December 21 and “in a single blow [opened] the way for a complete conquest of Anatolia.”[4] Ibrahim continued his advance until he was within striking distance of Istanbul, the Ottoman capital.

Response

Panic spread through the imperial city as the Egyptian army pushed closer to the seat of Ottoman authority. Mahmud II urgently dispatched pleas for assistance to both Britain and France, but was turned down due to domestic concerns as well as the involvement of both nations nations in managing the state of affairs after the recently ended Belgian Revolution. Lord Kinross argues that this left the Sultan no choice but to call upon his former enemy, Russia, for assistance.[5] According to Bailey, the response from the Tsar was so positive and swift, that Mahmud II hesitated in accepting, believing it might be a trap.[6] Nevertheless, the Sultan was willing to welcome any help he could receive, and accepted the Russian offer. The Tsar immediately dispatched a sizeable force of troops to block the potential Egyptian advance on Istanbul. It is unclear exactly how many troops the Tsar sent; Lord Kinross claims it was an army of approximately 18,000 men in total while Bailey suggests it may have been a force more than twice that size of nearly 40,000 troops.[7][8] Regardless of the exact size of the Russian host, it was formidable enough to cause Ibrahim to decide to begin negotiating with the Sultan rather than risk a battle with the Russians.[9] Thus, the mere presence of Russian troops was enough to halt the Egyptian onslaught.

European Reaction

The presence of Russian troops so close to the Ottoman capital also worried Britain and France considerably. Seeing this potential threat forced the two nations into action. Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign Secretary, led the effort and brought strong diplomatic pressure “to bear upon the Sultan to insist on the Russian withdrawal, in return for concessions to Mehmed Ali and an Anglo-French guarantee against his further invasion.”[10] Diplomacy was not the only tool they employed however, as both the British and the French dispatched fleets to the Dardanelles.[11] This action served the dual purpose of coercing the Sultan to accept their demanding proposal, while also threatening the Russians and checking any further military action they might take.

The Treaty

On 8 July 1833, the Russians and Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi. This treaty amended certain articles of the Treaty of Adrianople of 1829. Under the Treaty the annual indemnity payments required of Turkey were curtailed.[12] However, the Treaty bound Turkey and Russia to a promise of mutual assistance should either be attacked by a foreign power—a defensive treaty.[12] A secret article exempted the Ottoman Empire from sending military forces; instead, they were to close the Dardanelles to all non-Russian ships—possibly an offensive treaty.[13][14]

Britain and France were suspicious of the treaty, fearing that Ottoman had given Russia freedom of action to send warships through the Dardanelles. Thus creating the offensive treaty that worried Russian European opponents. Doubts, about the Treaty of Hünkâr İskelesi were, however, quelled in 1841 by the London Straits Convention.

Footnotes

  1. ^ Lord Kinross, The Ottoman Centuries: The Rise and Fall of the Turkish Empire, (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 1977), 467.
  2. ^ Lord Kinross, 467.
  3. ^ Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkey, Volume II: Reform, Revolution, and Republic: The Rise of Modern Turkey, 1808-1975, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 33.
  4. ^ Shaw and Shaw, 33.
  5. ^ Lord Kinross, 468.
  6. ^ Frank Edgar Bailey, British Policy and the Turkish Reform Movement: A Study in Anglo-Turkish Relations, 1826-1853, (Cambridge, MA: The Harvard University Printing Office, 1942), 48.
  7. ^ Lord Kinross, 468.
  8. ^ Bailey, 48.
  9. ^ Lord Kinross, 468.
  10. ^ Lord Kinross, 468.
  11. ^ Virginia H. Aksan, Ottoman Wars 1700-1870: An Empire Besieged, (London: Pearson Education Limited, 2007), 375.
  12. ^ a b Karl Marx, "Palmerston: Fifth Article" contained in the Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Volume 12 (International Publishers: New York, 1979) p. 379.
  13. ^ Karl Marx, "Palmerston: Fifth Article" contained in the Collected Works of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels: Volume 12 p. 379.
  14. ^ Efraim Karsh (2001). Empires of the Sand: The Struggle for Mastery in the Middle East. Harvard University Press. p. 35.
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