Kuhn's theorem

Kuhn's Theorem is a theorem in game theory, which relates perfect recall, mixed and unmixed strategies, and the expected payoffs thereof.

The theorem states that if a Game is a game of perfect recall (ie a C-game), for every mixed strategy there is a behavioral strategy that has an equivalent payoff(ie the strategies are equivalent). The theorem does not specify what this strategy is, only that it exists. It is valid both for finite games, as well as infinite games(ie games with continuous choices, or iterated infinitely)Template:Ref:Robert Aumann, Mixed and Behavior Strategies in Infinite Extensive Games, (Advances in Game Theory, Annals of Mathematics, Studies 52, edited by M. Dresher, L. S. Shapley, and A. W. Tucker, pp. 627–650, Princeton, University Press, Princeton, 1964).