Jump to content

A Problem from Hell

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Trovare (talk | contribs) at 07:29, 10 July 2006. The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide (Basic Books, 2003, ISBN 0060541644) is a book by Samantha Power, Professor of Human Rights Practice at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, which explores America's understanding of, response to, and inaction on genocides in the 20th century from the Armenian genocide to the "ethnic cleansings" of the Kosovo War. It won the Pulitzer Prize for General Non-Fiction in 2003.

A Problem from Hell argues that American citizens, journalists, and policymakers traditionally refuse to imagine that genocides can take place, and once atrocities begin, expect that ordinary citizens will avoid persecution. Power argues that Americans would rather negotiate, use traditional diplomacy, urge ceasefires, and donate humanitarian aid than condemn, advocate, or use military action. The book details how American policymakers fail to take the lead on these conflicts, especially since not enough pressure from the public creates risks for inaction. When genocide occurs, policymakers tend to avoid the word "genocide" and argue that national interests trump interest in foreign conflicts, that U.S. response is futile, or that U.S response would amplify atrocities. (xvii-xviii)

Summary

Page numbers refer to the paperback edition published by Harper Perrenial

Chapter 1: "Race Murder"

This chapter outlines the Armenian Genocide and international indifference.

Chapter 2: "A Crime Without a Name"

Chapter 2 describes Raphael Lemkin's efforts to lobby for American action against Nazi atrocities in Europe.

Chapter 3: The Crime with a Name

Power describes further the difficulties of individuals' efforts to convince Americans and other members of the Allied Powers to recognize the Holocaust, compounded by the focus on World War II and anti-Semitic indifference. Lemkin coins the word "genocide."

Chapter 4: Lemkin's Law

Power describes how Lemkin brought genocide to the forefront of foreign policy issues, leading to the 1948 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Chapter 5: "A Most Lethal Pair of Foes"

This chapter focuses on Lemkin's mounting disappointments and multiplying adversaries until his death in 1959. Senator William Proxmire and others picked up the torch.

Chapter 6: Cambodia: "Helpless Giant"

The U.S.'s inaction in response to the Khmer Rouge's genocide in Cambodia.

Warning: American operations in Cambodia derived directly from stragetic interests during the Vietnam War. Operating under the widespread government assumption that both the Vietnamese and Cambodian Communists were united, U.S. President Richard Nixon ordered bombings of and ground troops into Cambodia secretly beginning March 1969 in order to prevent Communist Cambodians from attacking U.S. troops in Vietnam. Power argues that this campaign, along with U.S. support of the corrupt and repressive Lon Nol regime, swelled the ranks of the Communist opposition, the Khmer Rouge who captured the capital Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975.

As the Vietnamese war wound down and U.S. government and media interest in Cambodia dissipated, U.S news correspondents left Cambodia. U.S. foreign service officer Kenneth Quinn and Washington Post journalist Elizabeth Becker had tried to warn U.S. policymakers about the KR before it came into power, but were dismissed. Becker's article on the Khmer Rouge was criticized because she had not personally seen the KR territory (they denied journalist access and "vanished" those who went anyway), by the government because she argued that the KR and Vietnamese were opponents (not allies, as U.S. officials assumed), and by the left because they believed she was being fed CIA falsehoods.

Meanwhile, Cambodians maintained wishful thinking, assuming that once victorious the Khmer Rouge would have no need for excess brutality and would be constrained by goodwill for their countrymen.

Though President Gerald Ford's administration warned of a massacre, public distrust after Watergate and Vietnam blocked further debate.

Recognition: Many in the U.S. remained skeptical of refugee reports and intelligence reports of KR atrocities, especially since the KR's reclusiveness and secrecy forced reporters to rely upon refugee stories, "including reminders that they had only 'unconfirmed reports,' 'inconclusive accounts,' or 'very fragmentary information.'" Meanwhile, the U.S. left believed that reports of atrocities were part of media and government exaggerations. Amnesty International, unaccostumed to dealing with massive killing, wrote a cautious report on the KR filled with qualifications. Power argues that skeptics were Communist sympathizers, people against the corrupt Lon Nol regime, and/or people naturally incapable of imagining genocide.

Response: U.S. nonintervention predicated on the futility, perversity, and jeopardy of response prevailed. The KR was supported by the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Syria in blocking a UN Commission on Human Rights investigation. In Congress, Representative Stephen Solarz and Clairborne Pell generated some interest but not action. Meanwhile, the Holocaust became impressed into the collective American consciousness (partly by the popular TV miniseries Holocaust), leading U.S. advocates to draw parallels between Pol Pot and Adolf Hitler. Senator George McGovern, a former anti-Vietnam-war critic, called for a U.S.-led international military intervention, but was criticized for seemingly changing his position on war and for assuming the operation would be easy.

Aftermath: The major part of the Khmer Rouge genocide ended when Vietnam, backed by the Soviets, toppled the unpopular regime in two short weeks between December 25, 1978 and January 7, 1979, though fighting continued after. After Vietnam's defeat of the KR, the U.S. decided that maintaining amicable relations with China and preventing further U.S.S.R. and Vietnamese expansion in Asia trumped concerns over KR atrocities. It led a UN vote to recognize the ousted KR as the rightful regime in Cambodia. Meanwhile, while grateful for their liberation from the KR, Cambodians still yearned for independence from their occupiers.

Chapter 7: Speaking Loudly and Looking for a Big Stick

Power shows how Senator Proxmire and President Ronald Reagan worked to gain support for the ratification of the Genocide Convention.

Chapter 8: Iraq: "Human Rights and Chemical Weapons Use Aside"

Chapter 8 looks at the U.S.'s response to Saddam Hussein's crimes against the Kurds.

Chapter 9: Bosnia: "No More than Witnesses at a Funeral"

Power explores America's reaction to Serbia's "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia.

Chapter 10: Rwanda: "Mostly in a Listening Mode"

Chapter 10 focuses on why President Bill Clinton and other American policymakers responded too late to the Hutu massacre of the Tutsi tribe in Rwanda.

Chapter 11: Srebenrica: "Getting Creamed"

This chapter focuses on the genocide in Srebenrica and the U.S.'s response.

Chapter 12: Kosovo: A Dog and a Fight

Power looks at the Kosovo genocide and the U.S.'s response.

Chapter 13: Lemkin's Courtroom Legacy

Conclusion

Awards

References

  • Samantha Power: "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide. Harper Perennial, 2003. ISBN 9780060541644

"A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide (Basic Books, 2003, ISBN 0060541644) is a book by Samantha Power, Professor of Human Rights Practice at Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government, which explores America's understanding of, response to, and inaction on genocides in the 20th century from the Armenian genocide to the "ethnic cleansings" of the Kosovo War. It won the Pulitzer Prize for General Non-Fiction in 2003.

A Problem from Hell argues that American citizens, journalists, and policymakers traditionally refuse to imagine that genocides can take place, and once atrocities begin, expect that ordinary citizens will avoid persecution. Power argues that Americans would rather negotiate, use traditional diplomacy, urge ceasefires, and donate humanitarian aid than condemn, advocate, or use military action. The book details how American policymakers fail to take the lead on these conflicts, especially since not enough pressure from the public creates risks for inaction. When genocide occurs, policymakers tend to avoid the word "genocide" and argue that national interests trump interest in foreign conflicts, that U.S. response is futile, or that U.S response would amplify atrocities. (xvii-xviii)

Summary

Page numbers refer to the paperback edition published by Harper Perrenial

Chapter 1: "Race Murder"

This chapter outlines the Armenian Genocide and international indifference.

Chapter 2: "A Crime Without a Name"

Chapter 2 describes Raphael Lemkin's efforts to lobby for American action against Nazi atrocities in Europe.

Chapter 3: The Crime with a Name

Power describes further the difficulties of individuals' efforts to convince Americans and other members of the Allied Powers to recognize the Holocaust, compounded by the focus on World War II and anti-Semitic indifference. Lemkin coins the word "genocide."

Chapter 4: Lemkin's Law

Power describes how Lemkin brought genocide to the forefront of foreign policy issues, leading to the 1948 U.N. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.

Chapter 5: "A Most Lethal Pair of Foes"

This chapter focuses on Lemkin's mounting disappointments and multiplying adversaries until his death in 1959. Senator William Proxmire and others picked up the torch.

Chapter 6: Cambodia: "Helpless Giant"

Warning: American operations in Cambodia derived directly from stragetic interests during the Vietnam War. Operating under the widespread government assumption that both the Vietnamese and Cambodian Communists were united, U.S. President Richard Nixon ordered bombings of and ground troops into Cambodia secretly beginning March 1969 in order to prevent Communist Cambodians from attacking U.S. troops in Vietnam. Power argues that this campaign, along with U.S. support of the corrupt and repressive Lon Nol regime, swelled the ranks of the Communist opposition, the Khmer Rouge who captured the capital, Phnom Penh on April 17, 1975.

As the Vietnamese war wound down and U.S. government and media interest in Cambodia dissipated, U.S news correspondents left Cambodia. U.S. foreign service officer Kenneth Quinn and Washington Post journalist Elizabeth Becker had tried to warn U.S. policymakers about the KR before it came into power, but were dismissed. Becker's article on the Khmer Rouge was criticized because she had not personally seen the KR territory (they denied journalist access and "vanished" those who went anyway), by the government because she argued that the KR and Vietnamese were opponents (not allies, as U.S. officials assumed), and by the left because they believed she was being fed CIA falsehoods.

Meanwhile, Cambodians maintained wishful thinking, assuming that once victorious the Khmer Rouge would have no need for excess brutality and would be constrained by goodwill for their countrymen.

Though President Gerald Ford's administration warned of a massacre, public distrust after Watergate and Vietnam blocked further debate.

Recognition:

Response:

Aftermath:

The U.S.'s inaction in response to the Khmer Rouge's genocide in Cambodia.

Chapter 7: Speaking Loudly and Looking for a Big Stick

Power shows how Senator Proxmire and President Ronald Reagan worked to gain support for the ratification of the Genocide Convention.

Chapter 8: Iraq: "Human Rights and Chemical Weapons Use Aside"

Chapter 8 looks at the U.S.'s response to Saddam Hussein's crimes against the Kurds.

Chapter 9: Bosnia: "No More than Witnesses at a Funeral"

Power explores America's reaction to Serbia's "ethnic cleansing" in Bosnia.

Chapter 10: Rwanda: "Mostly in a Listening Mode"

Chapter 10 focuses on why President Bill Clinton and other American policymakers responded too late to the Hutu massacre of the Tutsi tribe in Rwanda.

Chapter 11: Srebenrica: "Getting Creamed"

This chapter focuses on the genocide in Srebenrica and the U.S.'s response.

Chapter 12: Kosovo: A Dog and a Fight

Power looks at the Kosovo genocide and the U.S.'s response.

Chapter 13: Lemkin's Courtroom Legacy

Conclusion

Awards

References

  • Samantha Power: "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide. Harper Perennial, 2003. ISBN 9780060541644


Awards

References

  • Samantha Power: "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide. Harper Perennial, 2003. ISBN 9780060541644