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Space Shuttle Columbia disaster

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File:TIME feb 2003.jpg
Shuttle debris falling over Texas, on Time cover

The Space Shuttle Columbia disaster refers to the complete destruction of the Space Shuttle Columbia, which disintegrated over Texas on February 1, 2003 during reentry into the Earth's atmosphere on its 28th mission, STS-107. All seven members of the crew were killed.

The loss of the Columbia was caused by damage sustained during launch when most of the left bipod foam ramp (see below) broke off of, or was "shed" from, the main propellant tank under the aerodynamic forces of launch and struck the orbiter's left wing's leading edge. During this debris strike, one or more thermal protection system (TPS), more specifically the Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panels on that wing was damaged. While the shuttle was still in orbit, some engineers suspected damage to the thermal protection, but NASA managers limited the investigation, feeling that nothing could be done even if damage was found.

The damage to the TPS panel(s) allowed the hot gases of reentry to penetrate and destroy the internal wing structure and, fairly quickly, the entire vehicle. A massive ground search in parts of Texas, Louisana and Arkansas recovered crew remains and many vehicle fragments from over 2,000 debris fields.

While the technical details of the Columbia disaster differ, the organizational problems cited by the Columbia Accident Investigation Board echo the Challenger disaster in 1986, which also resulted in the loss of the spacecraft and its crew of seven. In both cases events happened which were not planned for or anticipated. In both cases, engineers were greatly concerned about possible problems but these concerns were not properly communicated to or understood by senior NASA managers. The vehicle gave ample warning beforehand of abnormal problems. A heavily layered, procedure-oriented bureaucratic structure inhibited necessary communication and action. A mindset among senior managers developed that concerns had to be objectively proven rather than simply suspected.

The board's recommendations address both technical and organizational issues.

Crew

The crew of STS-107.
File:Caib foam ramp.jpg
Close-up of the Left Bipod Foam Ramp that broke off and damaged the Shuttle wing.
Columbia lifting off on its final mission. The light-colored triangle visible at the base of the strut is the Left Bipod Foam Ramp. Video

Debris strike during launch

STS-107 had been delayed 18 times over the course of two years (despite its designation as the 107th mission, it was actually the 113th mission launched) from its original launch date of 11 January 2001 to its actual launch date of 16 January 2003. A well-publicized launch delay due to cracks in the shuttle's propellant distribution system occurred one month before a 19 July 2002 launch date, but the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) determined that this delay had nothing to do with the catastrophic failure six months later.

The Left Bipod Foam Ramp is an approximately three-foot (one-meter) piece made entirely out of foam, as opposed to being a metal ramp that is merely coated with foam. As such, the foam, not normally considered to be a structural material, is required to bear some aerodynamic loads. Because of these special requirements, the casting-in-place and curing of the ramps may be performed only by a senior technician. Apparently, even the best technical servicing available could not compensate for this fatal design flaw.

Bipod Foam Ramps had fallen off on at least three previous Shuttle flights, with at least one previous Shuttle strike but no serious damage. The euphemism used by NASA management to refer to this phenomenon was "foam shedding." As with the O-ring erosions that ultimately doomed the Challenger Shuttle, NASA management seemed to grow complacent and accustomed to these phenomena when no serious consequences resulted from these earlier episodes.

Video taken during lift-off was routinely reviewed two hours after the launch and revealed nothing unusual. The following day, higher-resolution film that had been processed overnight revealed that a piece of insulation foam fell from the external fuel tank 81.9 seconds after launch and appeared to strike the shuttle's left wing, potentially damaging the thermal protection on the Space Shuttle. The exact location where the foam struck the wing could not be determined due to the low resolution of the tracking camera footage.

Launch to landing

In a risk-management scenario similar to the Challenger disaster, NASA management failed to recognize the relevance of engineering concerns for safety. Two examples of this were failure to honor engineer requests for imaging to inspect possible damage, and failure to respond to engineer requests about status of astronaut inspection of the left wing.

Engineering made three separate requests for Department of Defense (DOD) imaging of the shuttle in orbit to more precisely determine damage. While the images were not guaranteed to show the damage, the capability existed for imaging of sufficient resolution to provide meaningful examination. In fact the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) recommended subsequent shuttle flights be imaged while in orbit using ground-based or space-based Department of Defense assets [1]. NASA management did not honor the requests and in some cases intervened to stop DOD from assisting.

NASA's chief thermal protection system (TPS) engineer was concerned about left wing TPS damage and asked NASA management whether an astronaut would visually inspect it. NASA managers never responded.

Throughout the risk assessment process, senior NASA managers were influenced by their belief that nothing could be done even if damage was detected, hence this affected their stance on investigation urgency, thoroughness and possible contingency actions. They decided to conduct a parametric "what-if" scenario study more suited to determine risk probabilities of future events, instead of inspecting and assessing the actual damage. The investigation report in particular singled out NASA manager Linda Ham for exhibiting this attitude.[2]

Much of the risk assessment hinged on damage predictions to the thermal protection system. These fall into two categories: damage to the silica tile on the wing lower surface, and damage to the reinforced carbon/carbon leading edge panels.

Boeing-developed damage prediction software was used to evaluate possible tile and reinforced carbon/carbon (RCC) damage. The software predicted severe penetration of multiple tiles by the impact, but Boeing engineers downplayed this. They believed that results showing that the software overstated damage from small projectiles meant that the same would be true of larger foam (SOFI) impacts. The program used to predict RCC damage was based on small ice impacts, not larger SOFI impacts. Under 1 of 15 predicted SOFI impact paths, the software predicted an ice impact would completely penetrate the RCC panel. Engineers downplayed this, too, believing that impacts of the less dense SOFI material would result in less damage than ice impacts. In an e-mail exchange, NASA managers questioned whether the density of the SOFI could be used as justification for reducing predicted damage. Despite engineering concerns about the energy imparted by the SOFI material, NASA managers ultimately accepted the rationale to reduce predicted damage of the RCC panels from complete penetration to slight damage to the panel's thin coating.[3]

NASA managers assumed a rescue or repair was impossible, so there was no point in trying to inspect the vehicle for damage while on orbit. However the CAIB determined either a rescue mission or on-orbit repair, though risky, might have been possible had NASA verified severe damage within five days into the mission[4] [5].

Ultimately the NASA Mission Management Team felt there was insufficient evidence to indicate that the strike was an unsafe situation, so they declared the debris strike a "turnaround" issue (not of highest importance) and denied the requests for the Department of Defense images.

Destruction during re-entry

The following is a timeline of Columbia's re-entry. The shuttle was scheduled to land at 9:16 a.m. EST.

  • 2:30 a.m. EST, February 1 2003 – The Entry Flight Control Team began duty in the Mission Control Center.
    The Flight Control Team had not been working on any issues or problems related to the planned de-orbit and re-entry of Columbia. In particular, the team had indicated no concerns about the debris impact to the left wing during ascent, and treated the re-entry like any other. The team worked through the de-orbit preparation checklist and re-entry checklist procedures. Weather forecasters, with the help of pilots in the Shuttle Training Aircraft, evaluated landing-site weather conditions at the Kennedy Space Center.
  • 8:00 – Mission Control Center Entry Flight Director polled the Mission Control room for a GO/NO-GO decision for the de-orbit burn.
    All weather observations and forecasts were within guidelines set by the flight rules, and all systems were normal.
  • 8:10 – The Capsule Communicator notified the crew that they are GO for de-orbit burn.
  • 8:15:30 (EI-1719) – Commander Husband and Pilot McCool executed the de-orbit burn using Columbia’s two Orbital Maneuvering System engines.
    The Orbiter was upside down and tail-first over the Indian Ocean at an altitude of 175 statute miles (282 km) when the burn was executed. The de-orbit maneuver was performed on the 255th orbit, and the 2-minute, 38-second burn slowed the Orbiter from 17,500 mph (7.8 km/s) to begin its re-entry into the atmosphere. During the de-orbit burn, the crew felt about 10% of the effects of gravity. There were no problems during the burn, after which Husband maneuvered Columbia into a right-side-up, forward-facing position, with the Orbiter's nose pitched up.
  • 8:44:09 (EI+000) – Entry Interface (EI), arbitrarily defined as the point at which the Orbiter enters the discernible atmosphere at 400,000 feet (120 km), occurred over the Pacific Ocean.
    As Columbia descended from space into the atmosphere, the heat produced by air molecules colliding with the Orbiter typically caused wing leading-edge temperatures to rise steadily, reaching an estimated 2,500 degrees Fahrenheit (1400 °C) during the next six minutes.
  • 8:48:39 (EI+270) – A sensor on the left wing leading edge spar showed strains higher than those seen on previous Columbia re-entries.
    This was recorded only on the Modular Auxiliary Data System, and was not telemetered to ground controllers or displayed to the crew.
  • 8:49:32 (EI+323) – Columbia executed a pre-planned roll to the right. Speed: Mach 24.5.
    Columbia began a banking turn to manage lift and therefore limit the Orbiter's rate of descent and heating.
  • 8:50:53 (EI+404) – Columbia entered a 10-minute period of peak heating, during which the thermal stresses were at their maximum. Speed: Mach 24.1; altitude: 243,000 feet (74 km).
File:Columbia 02-01-03 - 0857 EST.jpg
Columbia at approximately 0857. Debris is already starting to come off from the left wing. Video
  • 8:52:00 (EI+471) – Columbia was approximately 300 miles (500 km) west of the California coastline.
    The wing leading-edge temperatures usually reached 2,650 degrees Fahrenheit (1450 °C) at this point.
  • 8:53:26 (EI+557) – Columbia crossed the California coast west of Sacramento. Speed: Mach 23; altitude: 231,600 feet (70.6 km).
    The Orbiter's wing leading edge typically reached more than 2,800 degrees Fahrenheit (1540 °C) at this point.
  • 8:53:46 (EI+597) – Signs of debris being shed were sighted. Speed: Mach 22.8; altitude: 230,200 feet (70.2 km).
    The superheated air surrounding the Orbiter suddenly brightened, causing a noticeable streak in the Orbiter's luminescent trail. Observers witnessed another four similar events during the following 23 seconds.
  • 8:54:24 (EI+613) – The Maintenance, Mechanical, and Crew Systems (MMACS) officer informed the Flight Director that four hydraulic sensors in the left wing were indicating "off-scale low." In Mission Control, re-entry had been proceeding normally up to this point.
    "Off-scale low" is a reading that falls below the minimum capability of the sensor.
    The Entry Team continued to discuss the failed indicators.
  • 08:54:25 (EI+614) – Columbia crossed from California into Nevada airspace. Speed: Mach 22.5; altitude: 227,400 feet (69.3 km).
    Witnesses observed a bright flash at this point and 18 similar events in the next four minutes.
  • 8:55:00 (EI+651) – Nearly 11 minutes after Columbia re-entered the atmosphere, wing leading-edge temperatures normally reached nearly 3,000 degrees Fahrenheit (1650 °C).
  • 8:55:32 (EI+683) – Columbia crossed from Nevada into Utah. Speed: Mach 21.8; altitude: 223,400 ft (68 km).
  • 8:55:52 (EI+703) – Columbia crossed from Utah into Arizona.
  • 8:56:30 (EI+741) – Columbia initiated a roll reversal, turning from right to left over Arizona.
  • 8:56:45 (EI+756) – Columbia crossed from Arizona to New Mexico. Speed: Mach 20.9; altitude: 219,000 feet.
  • 8:57:24 (EI+795) – Columbia crossed just north of Albuquerque.
Columbia debris (in red, orange, and yellow) detected by National Weather Service radar over Texas and Louisiana.
  • 8:58:00 (EI+831) – At this point, wing leading-edge temperatures typically decreased to 2,880 degrees Fahrenheit (1580 °C).
  • 8:58:20 (EI+851) – Columbia crossed from New Mexico into Texas. Speed: Mach 19.5; altitude: 209,800 feet (64 km).
    At about this time, the Orbiter shed a Thermal Protection System tile, the most westerly piece of debris that has been recovered. Searchers found the tile in a field in Littlefield, Texas, just northwest of Lubbock.
  • 8:59:15 (EI+906) – MMACS informed the Flight Director that pressure readings had been lost on both left main landing-gear tires. The Flight Director then told the Capsule Communicator (CAPCOM) to let the crew know that Mission Control saw the messages and was evaluating the indications, and added that the Flight Control Team did not understand the crew's last transmission.
A makeshift memorial at the main entrance to Johnson Space Center
  • 8:59:32 (EI+923) – A broken response from the mission commander was recorded: "Roger, uh, bu - [cut off in mid-word] ..." It was the last communication from the crew and the last telemetry signal received in Mission Control.
  • 9:00:18 (EI+969) – Videos made by observers on the ground revealed that the Orbiter was disintegrating. In Mission Control, while the loss of signal was a cause for concern, there was no sign of any serious problem.
  • 9:05 – Residents of north central Texas reported a loud boom, a small concussion wave, smoke trails and debris in the clear skies above the counties southeast of Dallas.
  • 9:12:39 (EI+1710) – After hearing of reports of the shuttle being seen to break apart, the NASA flight director declared a contingency (events leading to loss of the vehicle) and alerted search and rescue teams in the debris area. He told the ground controller to "lock the doors", which is the code phrase that indicates a contingency is in effect. Nobody was permitted to enter or leave the room, and flight controllers had to preserve all the mission data for later investigation[6].

More than 2,000 debris fields, as well as human remains, were found in sparsely populated areas southeast of Dallas from Nacogdoches in East Texas, where a high amount of debris fell, to western Louisiana and the southwestern counties of Arkansas. This debris included containers with live Caenorhabditis elegans worms from a science package that survived the re-entry. NASA issued warnings to the public that any debris could contain hazardous chemicals, that it should be left untouched, its location reported to local emergency services, or government authorities and that anyone in unauthorized possession of debris would be prosecuted.

Response from the President

At 14:04 EST (19:04 UTC), a somber President George W. Bush addressed the United States: "This day has brought terrible news and great sadness to our country... The Columbia is lost; there are no survivors." Despite the major setback, the President reassured Americans that the space program would continue: "The cause in which they died will continue. Our journey into space will go on." [7]

Initial investigation

NASA Space Shuttle Program Manager Ron Dittemore reported that "The first indication was loss of temperature sensors and hydraulic systems on the left wing. They were followed seconds and minutes later by several other problems, including loss of tire pressure indications on the left main gear and then indications of excessive structural heating" [8]. Analysis of 31 seconds of telemetry data which had initially been filtered out because of data corruption within it showed the shuttle fighting to maintain its orientation, eventually using maximum thrust from its reaction control system jets.

The focus of the investigation centered on the foam strike from the very beginning. Incidents of debris strikes from ice and foam causing damage during take-off were already well known, and had actually damaged orbiters, most noticeably during STS-45, STS-27, and STS-87 [9]. Tile damage had also been traced to ablative insulating material from the solid rocket motors in the past. The composition of the foam insulation had been changed in 1997 to exclude the use of freon, a chemical that causes ozone depletion; while NASA was exempted from legislation phasing out CFCs, the agency chose to change the foam nonetheless. This led to many statements linking the foam strike to environmental pressures. STS-107 used an older "lightweight tank" where the foam was sprayed on to the larger cylindrical surfaces using the newer no freon foam. However the bipods were manufactured from BX-250 foam which was excluded from the EPA regulations and did use the original freon formula. The composition change did not contribute to the accident.

Possible emergency procedures

Had NASA management acted in time, two possible contingency procedures were available: A rescue mission by shuttle Atlantis, and an emergency spacewalk to attempt repairs to the left wing thermal protection.

Rescue

The CAIB determined a rescue mission, though risky, might have been possible provided NASA management took action soon enough.

Normally a rescue mission isn't possible, due to the time required to prepare a shuttle for launch, and the limited consumables (power, water, air) of an orbiting shuttle. However in this case Atlantis was well along in processing for a March 1 launch. Also Columbia carried an unusually large quantity of consumables due to an Extended Duration Orbiter (EDO) package. This would have allowed Columbia to stay in orbit until flight day 30 (February 15). NASA investigators determined that Atlantis processing could have been expedited with no skipped safety checks for a February 10 launch. Hence if nothing went wrong there was a five day overlap for a possible rescue.

Repair

NASA investigators determined on-orbit repair by the shuttle astronauts was possible but risky, primarily due to the uncertain resiliency of the repair using available materials.

Columbia did not carry the Canadarm, or Remote Manipulator System, which would normally be used for camera inspection or transporting a spacewalking astronaut to the wing. Therefore an unusual emergency EVA would have been required. While there was no astronaut EVA training for maneuvering to the wing, astronauts are always prepared for a similarly difficult emergency EVA – to close the external tank umbilical doors located on the orbiter underside. During launch these doors are open for the propellant feed lines from the external tank to supply the main engines in the orbiter tail. If they fail to close after jettisoning the external tank, it constitutes a thermal protection breach which would destroy the orbiter upon reentry. This requires an emergency EVA to close them manually. Similar methods could have reached the shuttle left wing for inspection or repair.

For the repair, astronauts would have to use tools and small pieces of titanium, or other metal, scavenged from the crew cabin. These heavy metals would help protect the wing structure and would be held in place during re-entry by a water-filled bag that had turned into ice in the cold of space. The ice and metal would help restore wing leading edge geometry, preventing a turbulent airflow over the wing and therefore keeping heating and burn-through levels low enough for the crew to survive re-entry and bail out before landing. Because the NASA team could not verify that the repairs would survive even a modified re-entry, the rescue option had a considerably higher chance of bringing Columbia's crew back alive.

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board

Main article: Columbia Accident Investigation Board
File:Columbia debris grid.jpg
Grid on the floor of the Reusable Launch Vehicle (RLV) Hangar where workers in the field bring in pieces of Columbia's debris. The Columbia Reconstruction Project Team attempted to reconstruct the bottom of the orbiter as part of the investigation into the accident.

Following protocols established after the loss of Challenger, an independent investigating board was created immediately following the accident. The Columbia Accident Investigation Board, or CAIB, consisted of expert military and civilian analysts who investigated the accident in great detail.

Columbia's flight data recorder was found near Hemphill, Texas on March 20, 2003. Unlike commercial jet aircraft, the space shuttles do not have flight data recorders intended for after crash analysis. Rather the vehicle data is transmitted in real time to the ground via telemetry. However since Columbia was the first shuttle, it had a special flight data OEX (Orbiter EXperiments) recorder, designed to help engineers better understand vehicle performance during the first test flights. Even after these were completed, the recorder was never removed from Columbia, and was still functioning. It records many hundreds of different parameters and contained very extensive logs of structural and other data which allowed the CAIB to reconstruct many of the events during the process leading to breakup. Investigators could often use the loss of signals from sensors on the wing to track how the damage progressed. This was correlated with analysis of debris and tests to obtain a final conclusion about the probable events.

On July 7, 2003 foam impact tests were performed by Southwest Research Institute, which used a foam block of similar size, mass and speed to that which struck Columbia, and it created a hole 41 cm by 42.5 cm (16.1 inches by 16.7 inches) in the protective RCC panel [10]. The tests clearly demonstrated that a foam impact of the type Columbia sustained could seriously breach the protective RCC panels on the wing leading edge [11].

On August 26, the CAIB issued its report on the accident. The report confirmed the immediate cause of the accident was a breach in the leading edge of the left wing, caused by insulating foam shed during launch. The report also delved deeply into the underlying organizational and cultural issues that led to the accident. The report was highly critical of NASA's decision-making and risk-assessment processes. It concluded the organizational structure and processes were sufficiently flawed that compromise of safety was expected no matter who was in the key decision-making positions. An example was the position of Shuttle Program Manager, where one individual was responsible for achieving safety, timely launches and acceptable costs, which are often conflicting goals. The CAIB report found that NASA had accepted deviations from design criteria as normal when they happened on several flights and did not lead to fatal consequences. One of those was the conflict between a design specification stating the thermal protection system was not designed to withstand significant impact damage and the common occurrence of impact damage to it during flight. The board made recommendations for significant changes in processes and culture.

In late July 2003, an Associated Press poll revealed that Americans' support for the space program remained strong, despite the tragedy. Two-thirds believed the space shuttle should continue to fly and nearly three-quarters said that the space program was a good investment. On the question of sending humans to Mars, 49% thought it was a good idea, while 42% opposed it. Support slipped for sending civilians like teachers into space with 56% supporting the idea and 38% opposed.

Miscellaneous items

Unfounded fears of terrorism

Despite some initial fears that the addition of the first Israeli astronaut to the crew had made the Columbia a more likely target for terrorists, there is no evidence to support any theory that terrorism was involved. In any case, security surrounding the launch and landing of the space shuttle had been increased to ward off any potential terrorist attack [12]. The Merritt Island launch facility, like all sensitive government areas, had increased security measures put in place in the wake of the September 11 attack. Gordon Johndroe, spokesman for the United States Department of Homeland Security, stated: "There is no information at this time that this was a terrorist incident." Although it was not the result of a terrorist strike, some Muslims in some Middle Eastern countries celebrated the destruction of the Columbia Space Shuttle; their celebration was covered along with the tragedy in subsequent news broadcasts.

Surviving worms

A group of small (1 mm adult) Caenorhabditis elegans worms, living in petri dishes enclosed in aluminum canisters, survived re-entry and impact with the ground and were recovered weeks after the disaster[13] [14]. They were part of a Biological Research in Canisters (BRIC) experiment (led by Catharine Conley of NASA Ames Research Center) designed to study the effect of weightlessness on physiology. The researchers were able to recover some usable data.

Ground search fatalities

Debris Search Pilot Jules F. Mier Jr. and Debris Search Aviation Specialist Charles Krenek died in a helicopter crash that injured three others while contributing to the ground search effort.

Memorials

Plaque of the Challenger and Columbia crews at KSC
Columbia Memorial on Mars
Columbia Memorial at Arlington National Cemetery

On February 4, 2003, President George Bush and his wife Laura led a memorial service for the astronauts' families at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center. Two days later, Vice President Dick Cheney and his wife Lynne led official Washington in paying tribute at a similar service at Washington National Cathedral. During that service, singer Patti LaBelle sang "Way up There" [15].

On March 26 the United States House of Representatives' Science Committee approved funds for the construction of a memorial at Arlington National Cemetery for the STS-107 crew. A similar memorial was built at the cemetery for the last crew of Space Shuttle Challenger.

On August 6, 2003, NASA announced that the IAU had approved naming seven asteroids discovered in July 2001 at the Mount Palomar observatory in honor of the seven astronauts: 51823 Rickhusband, 51824 Mikeanderson, 51825 Davidbrown, 51826 Kalpanachawla, 51827 Laurelclark, 51828 Ilanramon, 51829 Williemccool [16].

A mountain peak near Kit Carson Peak and Challenger Point in the Sangre de Cristo Range was renamed Columbia Point. A dedication plaque was placed on the point in August 2003.

On October 28, 2003, the names of the astronauts were added to the Astronaut Memorial at the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex

On October 29, 2003, at the Florida Institute of Technology in Melbourne, Florida, just down the road from the Kennedy Space Center Visitor Complex, the Crane Creek Apartments, a complex of seven buildings, which were under construction were renamed Columbia Village. Each crew member is honored with a building named after them.

Also during 2003, the city of Amarillo, Texas renamed its airport Rick Husband Amarillo International Airport, after its native son and commander of STS-107.

On January 6, 2004, NASA announced that the landing site of the Mars rover Spirit would henceforth be known as Columbia Memorial Station. On February 2, it was also announced that NASA was naming a complex of hills east of the landers 'The Columbia Hills', after the crew of Columbia. The Spirit lander incudes a memorial plaque to the Columbia crew mounted on the back of its high gain antenna.

On January 10, 2004, Columbia Elementary school in the Brevard County School District, planted seven oak trees, with plaques for each crewmember, and dedicated eight new classrooms to the crew.

On June 13, 2004, Creighton University in Omaha, Nebraska dedicated the plaza east of the newly-constructed Hixson-Lied Science Building in Anderson's memory.

On August 25, 2005, NASA announced the renaming of the National Scientific Balloon Facility. It will be known as the Columbia Scientific Balloon Facility.

Impact for space programs

Following the loss of Columbia, the space shuttle program was suspended. The further construction of the International Space Station was also delayed, as the space shuttles were the only available delivery vehicle for station modules. The station was supplied and crews exchanged using Russian-manned Soyuz spacecraft and unmanned Progress ships, and forced to operate on a skeleton crew of two.

Less than a year later, President Bush announced the Vision for Space Exploration, calling for the retirement of the space shuttle fleet following the completion of the International Space Station and the development of the Crew Exploration Vehicle. NASA planned to return the space shuttle to service around September 2004. That date was pushed back to July 2005. On July 26, 2005, at 10:39 am EST, Space Shuttle Discovery cleared the tower, marking NASA's return to space. Overall the STS-114 flight was highly successful, but a similar piece of foam from a different portion of the tank was shed, although the debris did not strike the Orbiter. Due to this, NASA once again grounded the shuttles until the problem was solved. After delaying their re-entry by two days due to adverse weather conditions, the shuttle safely returned to Earth on August 9, 2005.

Later that same month, the external tank construction site, Michoud Assembly Facility located in New Orleans, Louisiana was damaged by Hurricane Katrina, with all work shifts cancelled up to September 26, 2005. At the time, there was concern that this would set back further Shuttle flights by at least two months and possibly more.

The second "Return to Flight" mission, STS-121, launched on July 4, 2006, at 2:37:55 PM (EDT), after two previous launches were scrubbed because of lingering thunderstorms and high winds around the launch pad and the launch took place despite objections from its chief engineer and safety head. This mission increased the ISS crew to three. A five-inch crack in the foam insulation of the external tank gave cause for concern; however, the Mission Management Team gave the go for launch. [17] Space Shuttle Discovery touched down successfully on July 17, 2006 at 9:14:43 AM (EDT) on Runway 15 at the Kennedy Space Center.

Following the success of STS-121, it appears the Shuttle will now start flying regularly again. The next mission, STS-115, is scheduled for launch on August 28, 2006.

In reaction to the disaster, foreign plans to develop and deploy next-generation manned spacecraft appear to have accelerated, as have plans forwarded by private industry.[citation needed]

See also

References

Among The Stars-Life and Dreams of Kalpana Chawla by Gurdeep Pandher

  1. ^ Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003). "CAIB Recommendation R6.3-2 (PDF)" (PDF). Retrieved January 30. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  2. ^ Columbia Accident Investigation Board, (2003) Volume 1, Chapter 6, p. 138.[1](pdf); retrievedd June 8, 2006
  3. ^ nasa-global.speedera.net
  4. ^ Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003). "Report of Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Volume I, chapter 6, page 173 (PDF)" (PDF). Retrieved January 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  5. ^ Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003). "In-Flight Options Assessment, Volume II, appendix D.12 (PDF)" (PDF). Retrieved January 30. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  6. ^ Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003). "Report of Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Volume I". Retrieved January 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  7. ^ Bush, George W. (2003). "President Addresses Nation on Space Shuttle Columbia Tragedy". The White House. Retrieved January 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  8. ^ Dittemore, Ron (2003). "CNN Breaking News - NASA Briefing, Part I". CNN. Retrieved January 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  9. ^ Woods, David (2004). "Creating Foresight: Lessons for Enhancing Resilience from Columbia" (PDF). Retrieved February 1. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  10. ^ Justin Kerr (2003). "Impact Testing of the Orbiter Thermal Protection System (PDF)" (PDF). Retrieved January 30. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  11. ^ Columbia Accident Investigation Board (2003). "Report of Columbia Accident Investigation Board, Volume I, chapter 3, page 78 (PDF)" (PDF). Retrieved January 4. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  12. ^ "Israel mourns first astronaut's death". CNN. 2003-02-01. Retrieved 2004-02-24. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  13. ^ Szewczyk, Nathaniel; et al. (2005). "Caenorhabditis elegans Survives Atmospheric Breakup of STS-107, Space Shuttle Columbia". Mary Ann Liebert, Astrobiology. Retrieved January 17. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Explicit use of et al. in: |author= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  14. ^ "Worms survived Columbia disaster". BBC News. 2003-05-01. Retrieved 2005-12-16. {{cite news}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  15. ^ "A Memorial Service for the Crew of the Space Shuttle Columbia". Washington National Cathedral. Retrieved May 29. {{cite web}}: Check date values in: |accessdate= (help); Unknown parameter |accessyear= ignored (|access-date= suggested) (help)
  16. ^ "Asteroids Dedicated To Space Shuttle Columbia Crew" (Press release). NASA. 2003-08-06. {{cite press release}}: Check date values in: |date= (help)
  17. ^ Chien, Philip (June 27, 2006) "NASA wants shuttle to fly despite safety misgivings." The Washington Times
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