Whitney v. California

Whitney v. California
Whitney v. California
	Supreme Court of the United States
Argued October 6, 1925; Reargued March 18, 1926; Decided May 16, 1927
Full case name	Charlotte Anita Whitney; v. ; People of the State of California
Citations	274 U.S. 357 (more) 47 S. Ct. 641; 71 L. Ed. 1095; 1927 U.S. LEXIS 1011
Case history
Prior	Defendant convicted, Superior Court of Alameda County, California; affirmed, 207 P. 698 (Cal. Ct.App, 1922); review denied, Supreme Court of California, 6-24-22; dismissed for want of jurisdiction, 269 U.S. 530 (1925); rehearing granted, 269 U.S. 538 (1925)
Subsequent	None
Holding
	Defendant's conviction under California's criminal syndicalism statute for membership in the Communist Labor Party did not violate her free speech rights as protected under the Fourteenth Amendment, because states may constitutionally prohibit speech tending to incite crime, disturb the public peace, or threaten the overthrow of government by unlawful means.
Court membership
	Chief Justice William H. Taft Associate Justices Oliver W. Holmes Jr. · Willis Van Devanter; James C. McReynolds · Louis Brandeis; George Sutherland · Pierce Butler; Edward T. Sanford · Harlan F. Stone
Case opinions
Majority	Sanford, joined by Taft, Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, Butler, Stone
Concurrence	Brandeis, joined by Holmes
Laws applied
	U.S. Const. amend. XIV; California Criminal Syndicalism Act
	Overruled by
	Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969)

Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), was a United States Supreme Court decision upholding the conviction of an individual who had engaged in speech that raised a threat to society.

Background of the case

Anita Whitney, a member of a distinguished California family, was convicted under the state's 1919 Criminal Syndicalism Act for allegedly helping to establish the Communist Labor Party of America, a group the state charged was devoted to teaching the violent overthrow of government. Whitney claimed that it had not been her intention, nor that of other organizers, that the party become an instrument of violence.

The Supreme Court's decision

The question before the court was whether the 9 Criminal Syndicalism Act of California violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s “due process” and “equal protection” clauses. The Court, by a 9-0 vote, held that it did not and upheld Whitney's conviction. Justice Sanford wrote for the seven-justice majority opinion, and invoked the Holmes test of "clear and present danger" but went further. The Court held that the state in exercise of its police power has the power to punish those who abuse their rights to freedom of speech "by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to incite crime, disturb the public peace, or endanger the foundations of organized government and threaten its overthrow." In other words, if words have a "bad tendency" they can be punished.

Brandeis's concurrence

The Whitney case is most noted for Justice Louis Brandeis's concurrence, which many scholars have lauded as perhaps the greatest defense of freedom of speech ever written by a member of the high court.^[1] Justice Brandeis and Justice Holmes concurred in the result because of the Fourteenth Amendment questions, but there is no question that the sentiments are a distinct dissent from the views of the prevailing majority and supported the First Amendment.

Holmes in Abrams had been willing to defend speech on abstract grounds, believing that unpopular ideas should have their opportunity to compete in the "marketplace of ideas." But Brandeis had a much more specific reason for defending speech, and the power of his opinion derives from the connection he made between free speech and the democratic process. Citizens have an obligation to take part in the governing process, and they can only fulfill this obligation if they can discuss and criticize governmental policy fully and without fear. If the government can punish unpopular views, then it cramps freedom, and in the long run, will strangle democratic processes. Thus, free speech is not only an abstract virtue, but a key element that lies at the heart of a democratic society.

Implicitly, Brandeis here moves far beyond the clear and present danger test, and he insists on what some have called a "time to answer" test: no danger flowing from speech can be considered clear and present if there is full opportunity for discussion. While upholding full and free speech, Brandeis tells legislatures that while they have a right to curb truly dangerous expression, they must define clearly the nature of that danger. Mere fear of unpopular ideas will not do.

Subsequent jurisprudence and further developments

Justice William O. Douglas believed that had Brandeis lived longer, he would have abandoned the clear and present danger test; Whitney is in fact the precursor to the position Douglas and Hugo L. Black would take in the 1950s and 1960s, that freedom of speech is absolutely protected under the First Amendment. Brandeis does not go that far here, and his views were ultimately adopted by the Court in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), which explicitly overruled Whitney.

Whitney was later pardoned by the Governor of California based on Justice Brandeis' concurring opinion. ^{[citation needed]}

Quotes

"[A legislative declaration] does not preclude enquiry into the question whether, at the time and under the circumstances, the conditions existed which are essential to validity under the Federal Constitution. . . . Whenever the fundamental rights of free speech and assembly are alleged to have been invaded, it must remain open to a defendant to present the issue whether there actually did exist at the time a clear danger; whether the danger, if any, was imminent; and whether the evil apprehended was one so substantial as to justify the stringent restriction interposed by the legislature." Justice Louis Brandeis in the Whitney opinion.^[2]
"Every denunciation of existing law tends in some measure to increase the probability that there will be violation of it. Condonation of a breach enhances the probability. Expressions of approval add to the probability. Propagation of the criminal state of mind by teaching syndicalism increases it. Advocacy of lawbreaking heightens it still further. But even advocacy of violation, however reprehensible morally, is not a justification for denying free speech where the advocacy falls short of incitement..."
"Fear of serious injury cannot alone justify suppression of free speech and assembly. Men feared witches and burnt women. It is the function of speech to free men from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify suppression of free speech, there must be reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will result if free speech is practiced. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is a serious one." Justice Louis Brandeis in the Whitney opinion. ^[3]

References

^ Lewis, Anthony (1991). Make No Law: The Sullivan case and the First Amendment. New York: Random House. p. 85. ISBN 0-394-58774-X.
^ Quoted in the opinion of Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), 844.
^ Whitney, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), 377

External links

Works related to Whitney v. California at Wikisource

Text of Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927) is available from: Findlaw Justia
First Amendment Library entry on Whitney v. California
Major ACLU Cases by Decade

[1] Lewis, Anthony (1991). Make No Law: The Sullivan case and the First Amendment. New York: Random House. p. 85. ISBN 0-394-58774-X.

[2] Quoted in the opinion of Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978), 844.

[3] Whitney, 274 U.S. 357 (1927), 377

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