Talk:1953 Iranian coup d'état

Parliamentary Democracy vs Monarchy continued

Partridgeinapeartree,

There are a few issues you pointed out above which I think require some reconsideration.

You wrote:

"When the British embargoed Iranian oil it resulted in economic setbacks, and in declining support for Mossadegh among Iranians (ironically to this day, most Iranians look at the Mossadegh era not as an era of peace and democracy, but as an era of political chaos and poverty, while the 'autocratic' Shah's era is looked at as an era of stability and wealth!). As a result when the foreign backed coup d'etat occured, there was little popular protest."

First, a side note: the British did not just "boycott" Iranian oil. They sabotaged and sanctioned it, placing their military in the Persian Gulf and preventing the oil tankers from leaving (an act of war). That is a BIG difference.

But more importantly, what is it that is leading you to believe that Iranians preferred the Shah to Mossadeq? I have seen some sources which state this position (based on, IMHO very weak arguments) and many more which state the opposite. The 'autocratic' Shah's era was certainly not seen as an era of "stability and wealth". Almost immediately after Mossadeq's overthrow there were constant upheavals in Iran until 1979 when the Shah was overthrown outright. This movement began after a short lull following the Shah's execution and torture of Mossadeq's key advisers (for example see Hossein Fatemi, the architect of Mossadeq's nationalization program was executed immediately). In fact, student protests were organized immediately after the overthrow. The student leaders were promptly arrested and tortured, some killed (one of those student leaders who was tortured happens to be my father).

Another clear indication that this is false, is the fact that the Shah banned the National Front outright and turned Iran's elections into a one-party, Royalist system. If there was any truth to the notion that the Shah was popular, he would have never required such actions. The reality is that he and his regime feared that the National Front would have been reelected, possibly with an even larger majority, should they had the chance.

But after that short lull, caused by the executions/torture/repression, began a popular movement to overthrow the Shah outright, lead primarily by Mossadeq's living colleagues in the National Front (who used Khomeini as their symbolic figure). In fact, Mossadeq's head of NIOC, Mehdi Bazargan, would go on to become Iran's first post-revolutionary prime minister, before he, along with other members of the NF, were removed from power by the Islamists. Another nationalist, Abolhassan Banisadr, was elected president (Iran's first democratically elected president), before he too was removed by Islamists.

These notions that "most or many Iranians indirectly chose the coup over Mossadeq" or "Iranians preferred the stability of the Shah to democracy" are just Orientalist myths. They directly contradict a whole slew of facts, such as what happened after Mossadeq's overthrow and years of struggle before, from the Tobacco revolution to Mossadeq's election. It is absolutely incredible in my opinion to claim that the military coup was popular, when one considers that when in 1979, the Shah fled, the first act of the disorganized groups which lead the revolution was to execute the generals of the army. The second act was to over-run the American embassy (which was wide believed, correctly, to have been the central HQ for the coup). All these actions clearly indicate that the 79 revolution was the people's direct response to the 53 coup.

Today, the notion that Iranians prefer the Shah to Mossadeq holds absolutely no water. I am not saying that based on second-hand research. I am saying that from a first-person perspective, of an Iranian who has discussed this exact issue with literally hundreds of other Iranians (both expats and in the country). I have yet to meet 1 person (ONE single person), who has shown any inclination toward these views. They are nonsense. It is based on absolute fantasy (along with the myth of the possibility of the popular return of the Shah's son to power or the notion that the MEK are a democracy movement with support within Iran). In fact, these views are so wildly unpopular, that even the Shah's son distances himself from such views, criticizing his own father (generally a heresy among Royalists) in order to MAINTAIN support within his own small network.

The reality is that to this day, the vast majority of Iranian (myself included) see Mossadeq as a lost opportunity to achieve the elusive goal of democracy in Iran, which Iranians have been fighting for, for at least 100 years. This is precisely why Mossadeq is an important figure in Iranian history and not afforded the same status as the hundreds of other Prime Ministers that preceded and followed him (arguably with the notable exception of perhaps Amir Kabir and Mehdi Bazargan).

In fact, I can make my argument with a simple comparison.

If your argument that "No major protests were held after the 53 coup, therefore the coup must have been popular" is true; then it must be equally true that the 2009 election fraud and subsequent crushing of dissent was also popular, since from 2010 to today there were no major protests in the streets of Iran. Both arguments have the same structure, logic and predicate. Poyani (talk) 16:46, 26 August 2013 (UTC)

As for your assumptions regarding the intentions of the Shah, I generally do not like to play such games. It is impossible to decipher people's intentions. I have as much reason to believe that the Shah was doing what he thought was right for Iran, as I do in believing that Cecescu did what he believed was best for Romania or Muammar Gaddafi for Libya or even Khamenei in Iran today. It is an extremely cynical and egotistical view for one to believe that the people of a nation are better-off under his iron-grip, rather than in a democratic setting. Poyani (talk) 17:01, 26 August 2013 (UTC)

I think you are conflating the recent views of Iranians (and people of Iranian heritage) versus the view of the man on the street in 1953. There was a lot of support for the Shah back then, even if it was simply support for retaining the constitutional monarchy. Mosaddegh was starting to look very different in 1953—he was grabbing for power. He dissolved the Senate of Iran as well as the lower house, and he took emergency powers. People in Iran were worried he was becoming too dictatorial. Binksternet (talk) 17:07, 26 August 2013 (UTC)

Hello Poyani,

First of all, I am very sorry to hear about what happened to your father. I fully agree that nothing justifies such an action. The embargo part does make everything you mentioned clear.

After reading several things you had written, such as blaming the mass killings that Khomeini ordered on "disorganized groups" and writing that they were a "people's response" to the Revolution (actually most of the people were terrified at that time, it was Khomeini and his cohorts doing those atrocities and nobody else), I originally wrote another response. After some thought, I decided to rewrite my response to you. But either way, I cannot see those as anything other than a justification and a whitewashing of events that caused far more misery for Iranians than anything that happened under the Shah. I had also written in a longwinded manner, so I am correcting that as well.

My goal in my edits was not to defend anybody, but to expand an article that was written in a often incoherent manner, and with little details, especially about the coup itself. One who would read the article prior to my edits would have trouble understanding what even occured. Both my edits and this article are not biased against Mossadegh, it makes clear that Mossadegh was the supporter of parliamentary democracy, the Shah wanted absolute monarchy, and the CIA orchestrated the coup. However, I have added more details. However, one cannot ignore the facts either, and the failings of Mossadegh. History is not black and white.

Mossadegh supported democracy, but he failed to achieve any of his goals. He started out in a noble manner, and came to power intending to make Iran a democracy. Had he been able to actually do what he said he wanted to do, Iran's history would be very different. But instead, he made no real democratic reforms. The only "reforms" he made was taking power out of the Shah's hands and into his own. In other words, he was becoming a dictator. In that sense what difference was there between the two? His stubborness on the oil nationalization issue hurt Iran's economy, and helped seal his own fate. Perhaps a different way of looking at it is if Mossadegh actually achieved what he claimed he wanted to do, and turned Iran into a real democracy, Iran would not be the way it is today. Blaming everything that went wrong on the CIA or the Shah is simply refusing to accept responsibility, and blaming one's own faults on an outside source (a common tactic of another government that I am aware of).

One thing to remember is that in the 12 years prior to the coup, the Shah had taken a very limited role in politics. So people had no idea what kind of a leader he would be in the upcoming decades. But Mossadegh had began to abuse his powers (and that's not even refering to the economic hardships and political instability). The Mossadegh-Shah issue was not so much a democracy-dictatorship issue, but a contest between two major personalities. Iran was not a one-party state until 1975, prior to that there was a period of so-called "guided democracy", in which there was a two-party system. The Shah really has been a much maligned figure (although among most Iranians he has enjoyed a comeback in reputation).

The era of the Shah was always not one of torture and executions. For example, Ervand Abrahamian in his book Tortured Confessions describes that torture in Iran was uncommon between the 1920's to the 1970's. The worst one could expect in prison during that time was getting pushed around by a police officer. Torture and political imprisonment in Iran became common after the 1971 Siakhal Incident. Even during the 1970's, torture, jail and executions were used mostly against opponents who took up armed struggle against the government. By 1977, it had largely declined again after widespread complaints and Jimmy Carter's insistence. But that doesn't excuse the fact that his government was the first to start using it in Iran, and the Shah's government really sunk to a new low in allowing it, and developed a very poor human rights record. It is likely he wasn't fully aware of what was taking place either, but it happened yet.

Today in Iran people are tortured and even killed even for speaking out against the government (someone who takes up armed struggle is executed immediately). The primary practitioner of torture, imprisonment, and executions in Iran (and possibly the world) has been none other than the Islamic Republic's government, which has consistently carried it out in its more than 30 years of existence, to a degree more brutal than anything seen before in the country. Torture in Iran is not for gathering information, but simply to force the prisoner into making a "videotaped confession" where he/she converts to the ideology of the regime and repents for his "crimes" (how Orwellian). Abrahamian puts the Islamic Republic's Iran in the same league as Stalinist Russia, Maoist China, and early modern Europe in the use of torture to produce public recantations, writing that virtually no other governments in history used such tactics to the extent that these four did. Even Saddam Hussein's Iraq never did that. He just quickly killed opponents, he didn't imprison and systematically "re-educate" them like Iran's government does. I would imagine that being in an Iranian prison today is worse than death for many. I doubt Khosro Golsorkhi could have made his famous and impassioned defense against the Shah's abuses in an Islamic Republic "court of law".

I will admit right here and now, had the government that replaced him been a normal and humane government, I and others may not regret the Shah's loss. The vast majority of Iranians miss the Shah, whether one likes it or not. I don't know very many Iranians that are still happy about the Shah's overthrow, mainly because Iran had been dragged so badly in the mud since then. I am not even talking about the monarchists, I am refering to your average Iranian. The Shah was obviously bad for his time, but he can't be compared to today. If Reza Pahlavi admits his father's wrongdoings, then I commend him. Perhaps Iranians don't need another Mossadegh nor another Shah. They don't need a government that is dominated by a powerful personality, but one that actually represents its people in a true democracy. The hardcore Mossadegh supporters are no different than hardcore Shah supporters in that they refuse to accept any wrongdoing that their hero carried out.

The history you gave of the Iranian Revolution is not necessarily backed up by history. Khomeini was no figurehead, he was the leader of the Revolution. He used the National Front to help achieve his goals, the same way he used leftist groups and religious people. According to Abbas Milani, the only reason the National Front was given "power" was to have a democratic face for the Revolution and manipulate the West into abandoning the Shah, and they were quickly discarded of once they served their purpose.

One person you did not mention was Dr. Shahpour Bakhtiar (I am sure you know who he is). Bakhtiar was one of the most important figures in the National Front during the Revolution. He realized what a disaster was about to take place, and where the revolution would lead Iran. He managed to become prime minister, and he attempted to reform the system from within (the Shah was in no position to resist). But instead, he was kicked out of the National Front, and later was murdered for his troubles. Had the people not been so hardheaded, they would have seen that Bakhtiar was the one they should support, not Khomeini. Other National Front people you forgot to mention are those like Karim Sanjabi, who persuaded Iranians to support Khomeini. You also forgot to mention Ibrahim Yazdi, who became a Revolutionary Court judge and helped sentence people like General Mehdi Rahimi to death. Abdolhassan Banisadr was the prosecutor for that court. Mehdi Bazargan (a respectable man) could do nothing to stop the killings. They certainly were "democratic" opponents!

You made a comparison of the Shah to Ceausescu and Gaddafi. Aside from the fact that they destroyed their nation's economies and plundered wealth while the Shah was turning Iran into an industrial and economic giant, they also fought back against the tide of revolution, even if it resulted in the deaths of many. The Shah on the other hand was unwilling to use violence against his own people. He gave up his power rather than ordering his army to kill them. As a result, his country became the first and possibly only 20th century Middle Eastern country to overthrow a government via popular revolution. That is not to say that there were no deaths, but the Revolution was largely a bloodless one (something most historians have even recognized). If not for anything else, the Shah will always have a place in the hearts of Iranians for this exceptional act.

And lastly, you talked about post 1953 coup protests. You argued that a relative lack of protests against the Shah post 1953 coup did not mean that people were happy Mossadegh was gone, and you made a comparison of it to the lack of Green Movement protests in Iran post 2010. That argument I am afraid is completely wrong. First of all, there were major protests in Iran in 2011. The main post coup protests took place in the University of Tehran (which were the ones you were describing), which resulted in the shooting deaths of 3 students. At the time it was very shocking. Nobody else died though, and there were very few additional protests because there was little support for Mossadegh. On the contrary, in 2009 Iranian riot police entered the same university and beat to death 5 students. Those five students were among nearly 100 to die during the protests. During the post-1953 era, the worst that could happen to a protester was that he/she would be jailed for a short while. Even during the Revolution, protesters could expect little retribution. During the recent protests, protesters were arrested, beaten, raped, tortured with whips, cables, and electic batons, dragged under cars, and even killed (don't forget forced confessions). Most of the abuses took place within prisons. Many were taken to Kahrizak prison in the middle of the desert, and subjected to indescribable torture. Several even died, and almost all were on the verge of death when reports of the prison reached Western media, and the government transfered the prisoners out. I have read descriptions written by the survivors of that prison, and it was similar to a concentration camp. There were other similar prisons as well which I do not know of by name.

Such slaughterhouses simply did not exist under the Shah. Prisoners were never treated that way even during the worst years of his rule. Had he employed such force against his own people, the Revolution would simply have failed on the first day. Saying the Islamic Republic's response to protests vs. the Shah's were alike is something that not ONE single person in Iran accepts. Virtually everybody knows how much more brutality this current government employs against dissidents compared to the Shah.

I hope I have addressed all of your concerns. Cheers. Partridgeinapeartree (talk) 21:17, 2 September 2013 (UTC)

Please keep this talk page focused on specific improvements to the article rather than general discussion of the topic. Binksternet (talk) 21:38, 2 September 2013 (UTC)

Certainly, I was responding to Poyani's concerns. Thank you. Partridgeinapeartree (talk) 21:49, 2 September 2013 (UTC)

Partridgeinapeartree, First and foremost, I never once "(blamed) the mass killings that Khomeini ordered on 'disorganized groups'". I don't know where you got that from, but it certainly was not from me. Nor am I here to get into an ideological or factional argument with you or anyone else. If there is an academic consensus on an issue you can post it on the page. The notion that Mossadeq was trying to bring democracy to Iran is itself controversial. As you mentioned yourself, scholars agree that he did many dubious things. What is not controversial is that he lead a democratically elected government (the first government where the Prime Minister and the Cabinet were selected by the elected parliament, rather than hand-picked by the Shah), and that he was overthrown. The notion that he was unpopular is dubious, since not only is it not supported by the Reliable Sources listed, but is in actuality in direct contradiction of most of them, which say the opposite. If you feel that there is relevant information, supported by Reliable Sources, which is missing from this article, bring it in. Otherwise please do not add your opinions or analysis to the page. All the best, Poyani (talk) 22:25, 19 June 2014 (UTC)

Extreme POV which has been introduced to this article

I have, on previous occasions, been very amicable in including fair criticisms of Mossadeq into this article (such as his questionable behaviour on the undemocratic and unconstitutional plebiscite which he used to dismiss Majlis). However, over the last month or so, the content article has become a sad joke, with examples of outright distortions, in direct contradictions to the sources used to justify them.

One extreme case for example is the sentence regarding Khalil Tahmasebi. The new article indicates that he murdered Mossadeq's main opponent for the position of Prime Minister, suggesting underhandedly that Mossadeq and his supporters may have been involved. It further makes this suggestion by claiming that he was pardoned and freed by Mossadeq. This is an outright fabrication.

What actually happened (as even noted in the sources currently listed), Khalil Tahmasebi was captured after the assassination of Ali Razmara and quickly sentenced to death. However, due to the suspicious and speedy nature of his trial there was widespread belief among the general public that he was innocent (many to this day believe the murder was carried out by the Iranian army). Here is where the outright distortion starts. Neither Mossadeq, nor anyone in his government, freed nor pardoned Tahmasebi. THEY ONLY ORDERED A NEW TRIAL. In fact, under Tahasebi's own Wikipedia article it states (correctly) that he was tried in 1952 (when Mossadeq was in power) and sentenced to death. When was he freed? When was he "pardoned" for the assassination?

Not only was this fabrication added to the article, it is placed under the grotesque heading "Assassination attempt on the Shah, and the Appointment of Mossadegh as Prime Minister", further underhandedly suggesting that Mossadeq was killing his way to power (a huge lie).

The fabrication above is hardly the only case of bias in the article.

It seems that there has been a great effort to minimize the affect of sources which directly address the subject (the 1953 coup - such as Kitzner's book which occurs mostly in inline attributions now) and a MASSIVE increase in reliance on parsed biographical material on the Shah.

There seems to be a clear patterns of trying to lionize the Shah prior to mentioning the coup, by noting, in great detail, his achievements. Can anyone explain why the section on the breakaway Soviet Republics is included, other than to emphasize the congratulatory "the Shah's role in resolving the crisis garnered him much popularity among Iranians"? What is the link between the Soviet Republics of Azerbaijan and Mashhad (and the uprising in Gilan), all of which occured in northern Iran, with the coup which occurred 8 years later due to concerns in southern Iran (Bandar Abbas and the Gulf)?

Why has the material regarding Reza Shah been added? That has also been greatly parsed to lionize the Pahlavis. It states the Shah's achievements but goes to great lengths to minimize his faults (neither of which even belong in this article since they are irrelevant to the coup). The Shah's enemies were called "warlords" (they were tribal leaders who existed throughout Iranian history) and they were "defeated" (in reality according to the listed source, they were executed, their villages raised, and the culture and language of their tribes banned under severe punishment). The Reza Shah is noted to have been overthrown "neutral" in World War II (he was extremely pro-Nazi, even claiming Iran was part of the Aryan super-race. He did not join he war militarily because of the existence of the nearby Russian and English armies).

Dubious sources have been used to make questionable suggestions regarding the popularity of Reza Shah today (the blog section of the Wall Street Journal).

Iran's constitution has been greatly misrepresented, for example, renaming the "vote of inclination" (a phrase often used by Milani) for the totally incorrect "vote of confidence". The vote of Majlis has been redubbed "the vote of the largest party in Majlis" (totally incorrect as noted even by the stated source).

All these errors are suspiciously one-sided. They, undermine Mossadeq while lionizing the Shah. And that is not even noting the numerous instances of spelling mistakes and errors which have been introduced. Is there any reasons why we should not revert back to the version we had last month? Poyani (talk) 17:45, 26 August 2013 (UTC)

It appears that you are talking about this series of edits starting from 19 August to now, one week later. The quick answer to your question asking for reasons not to revert is that quite a few editors have been working on this new material in the last week, from various new accounts to an anonymous IP in Hartlepool Borough Council government in the UK, and especially established editors such as Partridgeinapeartree, MakeBelieveMonster, Harel, Mohamed CJ, ClarkF1, Arjayay, Lbeaumont, Magioladitis, Egeymi, Modest Genius, M2545, Spencer, Mar4d, Matt Heard, Bender 235, Tpbradbury, Bo Basil, Chris.ennen, Kaldari, EamonnPKeane, Geraldshields11, Wikimucker, Arthur Rubin, Rjwilmsi, and myself. All of these editors, several of them administrators, have been working with the article to improve it.

The new text introduces a reference authored in 1991 by Wolfgang K. Kressin who was a captain in the US Air Force writing his master's thesis about the interaction of Mossadegh and Kashani. It also greatly increases the reliance on Abbas Milani who was previously used as a reference but now is more heavily cited, especially his new book The Shah. Another new source is the book Oil Kings by Andrew Scott Cooper, published in 2011. Yet another new source is the book Iran at War: 1500-1988 by Kaveh Farrokh, published in 2011. So the new version of the article continues to be based on reliable sources, but newer ones. Binksternet (talk) 19:20, 26 August 2013 (UTC)

Regarding your specific concerns which are identified in your post, I encourage you to edit the article to address those inaccuracies. I disagree with your assessment that an "extreme POV" has been applied to the article, but I acknowledge that there is disagreement among our reliable sources regarding many of the facts about the coup. This article should attribute its sources where the facts are disputed. With attribution, the main versions should each be described. Binksternet (talk) 19:29, 26 August 2013 (UTC)

Even though I share some of your concerns Poyani I will agree (on the narrower point of best policy for the short to medium term) with that Binksternet said - is to suggest you find citations to correct, or add to/augment, etc. In the longer term, if several of us find a general overall tone corrected or needing adjustments (based on such citations) to what Binksternet or anyone else has put, we can discuss this together and how to adjust (I fully admit I have not had time to delve into details in most sections of the article in current form) I trust all concerned will their their best to avoid such tilt. I will agree and repeat one thing Poyani said - we should keep in mind this is not an article about the Shah, so mentions should be limited, and, what many may see as "defending" the Shah coup versus "critical" should be (factual, cited and) balanced. Hope everyone has had a good week. Harel (talk) 19:30, 30 August 2013 (UTC)

Hello Poyani,

Although you did not directly address me, I wanted to briefly write something. To the best of my knowledge, the information in this article has been written according to the sources. If there are discrepancies (which there could be), feel free to fix them. Like I said, while new facts have been added, it is still clear that ultimately whatever occured, Mossadegh was the supporter of parliamentary democracy, the Shah was an absolute monarch, and the CIA supported the coup.

I used "vote of confidence" in order to use a more understandable term, and it makes no difference either, as they all are practically synonymous. As for the "vote by the largest party", the National Front was the largest party, and their votes were the majority, like in any other parliament in the world, so how does that misrepresent Iran's constitution?

I highly doubt Mossadegh personally ordered the death of Razmara. He may had been aware of the plans to do it though. Either way, he benefited from it. Even the sources I added agree that a good chunk of National Front "support" came with the fear of assasination. One can debate the details of Razmara's death, but the facts are clear. On top of that, Razmara wasn't the only victim. Days later, Iran's minister of education was also killed by the Fadaian as well. When the oil bill was passed, an angry Majlis member said "Eight grains of gunpowder brought this bill about".

Yes, Khalil Tahmasebi was arrested and sentenced to hang. But the National Front came to the rescue. In mid 1952 (a year and a half after the assasination) they voted on an urgent emergency bill which authorized Tahmasebi's freedom. The triumphant Tahmasebi declared that he did not expect to live after killing the prime minister (thus admitting his guilt), and even took proud tour of the country. After Mossadegh was overtrown, he was rearrested and hanged.

It was certainly NOT a retrial, as you said. Even if Mossadegh did not personally order Razmara's killing (which I doubt he did order), the bill to release Tahmasebi was a shameful act especially for a prime minister that preaches democracy, and thus Mossadegh was morally guilty for Razmara's death. Denial or dodging the issue is not going to change history either.

The section about Reza Shah is needed. Since the article goes in depth into the historical aspect of the coup, a mention of Reza Shah is necessary (as well as a mention of the Constitutional Revolution). Had Reza Shah not carried out his reforms, I doubt Iran would have had the capacity to resist the British and nationalize its oil. Before he came to power, the British has a sphere of influence over southern Iran. But eventually, Iran under his rule got to a point where they could challenge them in 1951 (something Steven Kinzer himself has stated).

The breakaway Soviet republics and the Shah is simply a brief, one line mention, and makes little difference in this article.

The whole issue of Reza Shah and "Nazism" was largely a failed attempt by the British to justify their invasion of Iran in 1941. I don't know why those allegations are still being repeated over 70 years later. Reza Shah was the first Iranian leader to publicly recognize the Jews, and both his government and his son's government resuced over 1,500 Jews from occupied Europe by giving them Iranian passports and allowing them to settle in the country.

I had orginally written that Reza Shah was a harsh man who dealt violently with dissent. After reading a few more sources, I believe I was wrong. According to Ervand Abrahamian, there were 200 political prisoners in Iran at that time, and none had faced torture. Several died, but virtually none were executed. Prison interrogations were more like those in the 21st century United States, and prisoners had even cordial relations with interrogators. Torture and political imprisonment in Iran began during the 1970's under the Mohammad Reza Pahlavi's rule against armed opponents, and under the Islamic Republic against everybody. Please separate the account of Reza Shah from his son; Reza Shah was a relatively good man and leader, his son was the one that caused all of the trouble.

The people who divided Iran up during the early 20th century were warlords. While a percentage were tribal leaders, others were corrupt governors, landowners, European backed insurgencies, etc. They had divided a completely undeveloped and impoverished Iran, and the central government only really ruled Tehran. I do not know about villages being burned, it is possible, and if so it was a very harsh and cruel act.

Since when have native languages been banned? Farsi has always been taught at schools (whether under the Pahlavis or the current government), and used as the official language. The regional (native) languages are widely spoken by the people living in those regions (such as Gilaki, Mazandarani, Azeri Turkish, etc.) They certainly haven't been banned.

But enough about him, this article is not about Reza Shah. Whatever one's criticisms of him (and there were plenty), he is widely seen as the creator of modern Iran, and respected as such, like Ataturk. Even several hardline supporters of the Islamic Republic that I know agree that he was a profound leader who helped mold Iran into a modern nation state.

Anyway, the edits are not one sided at all, they are simply bringing some balance to the article. Mossadegh still is clearly (whatever his flaws) shown a relatively democratic leader whose intention was democratic constiutional monarchy, the Shah is still portrayed as an absolute monarch (which more or less, he was) and the CIA coup is accepted as fact.

Cheers. Partridgeinapeartree (talk) 23:43, 30 August 2013 (UTC)

Partridgeinapeartree, so you are the one who added all this nonsense to the article. Lets start with a clear concept. Do not add your own analysis to the article. Your own analysis, until published in a peer-reviewed source, is just original research and irrelevant. Whether you "highly doubt Mossadegh personally ordered the death of Razmara" is not relevant. Unless there is a consensus among academics that says "(Mossadeq) benefited from (the death of Razmara)" and shows that this is somehow related to the 1953 coup, don't add it.

A "vote of confidence" and a "vote of inclination" are not synonyms as you seem to believe (they mean exact opposite things; one is used to put a person in power and the other is used to remove a person from power). Unless you find a source stating that Mossadeq was put in power via a "vote of confidence", then don't add it. Unless you have a source which says "Khalil Tahmasebi was freed by Mossadeq" and clearly shows that this is related to the 1953 coup, do not put it in this article. Whether you think it is important is not relevant. For the record, Tahmasebi was tried in 1952 (when Mossadeq was Prime Minister) and sentenced to death. The death penalty was carried out in 1955. If you already know that the lionization of Reza Shah for recapturing Gilan "makes little difference in this article" then don't add them. If you feel that Reza Shah's pro-Axis stance was "largely a failed attempt by the British to justify their invasion of Iran in 1941", then keep it to yourself. The academic consensus is that Reza Shah was in fact pro-Axis. You claimed that Ervand Abrahamian has written that "Prison interrogations were more like those in the 21st century United States". I am familiar with Abrahamian's work and I know for a fact he has made no such claim. If you are making the claim, provide the citation so I can look it up. If you feel that Iran's early 1910/1920s century tribal leaders are "warlords", then great, discuss it with your family and friends. Unless you have a source which connects this classification directly with the 1953 coup, don't put it in this article. Similarily, if you feel that Reza Shah is "widely seen as the creator of modern Iran, and respected as such, like Ataturk" then feel free to discuss your theories with friends or publish them at your first opportunity. Unless you have a source which backs your claim and connects it to the 1953 coup, keep it out of this page.

Despite your claims, your edits do not "bring balance to the article". Stating that Mossadeq benefited from the murder of previous Prime Ministers (hinting his involvement) is a gross misrepresentation of facts. Lionizing Reza Shah by stating he was the creator of modern Iran and equal to Ataturk, does not bring any balance to the article; it is irrelevant. Misrepresenting Abrahamian does not bring any balance to the article; it hurts Abrahamian's reputation.

Please do not add any information to this page that is not consensus among RS on both validity and its direct relation to the 1953 coup. Poyani (talk) 23:00, 19 June 2014 (UTC)

Dear Poyani,

I have attempted to be very even-handed and reasonable with you, so I do not appreciate being addressed rudely as you have done above. Even though you have revived this nearly year-old discussion in such a manner, I will still attempt to be cordial with you.

First, one of your major faults with my edit stems from your accusations that I "lionized" Reza Shah. First of all, I resent the way you repeatedly use the term "lionize". Based on your writing, if someone puts something even remotely non-negative about a government that you clearly dislike, they are doing something wrong and must defend themselves. This "lionization", as you put it, took up a very small portion of the article, far less than the additions I made about Mossadegh's reign. Yet it is quite vital. As I previously explained to you, those reforms of Reza Shah strengthened Iran enough in order for Mossadegh to resist the British the way he did. He made Iran a centralized state, crafted modern nationalism, and began the development of the economy. Here is a article from Stephen Kinzer himself where he explains much of what I am referring to (see pages 2 & 3): http://www.smithsonianmag.com/people-places/inside-irans-fury-11823881/?no-ist=&page=3

Nobody denies that Reza Shah had controvertial leanings towards the Axis powers, the enemies of the British. But as you can clearly see from my writing, I wrote of Reza Shah and Nazism. Please do not misrepresent what I have written.

You are absolutely right, Dr. Abrahamian never wrote that Reza Shah's prisons were like 21st century American ones. Guess what, I never wrote that he did either! That is my own commentary, based on the reading on the book. Here is the sentence I wrote: According to Ervand Abrahamian, there were 200 political prisoners in Iran at that time, and none had faced torture. Several died, but virtually none were executed. Prison interrogations were more like those in the 21st century United States, and prisoners had even cordial relations with interrogators. My quote about Abrahamian was referring specifically to 200 political prisoners, with none facing torture. The rest of it was my own description of his writing, including my belief based on his writings that interrogation in Reza Shah's political prisons were more like those in the 21st century United States. Not explicitly included in my statement, but clearly obvious, was the allusion to contemporary dictatorships of the 1930's (aka. Communist Russia, Nazi Germany, etc.). There was no torture of political prisoners under his reign. His human rights record can clearly be seen as being superior to most contemporary authoritarian states.

About Razmara's murder: All I wrote in the article was that it was carried out by the Fadaian-e-Khalq, which Kashani supported. Then I wrote that Kashani was appointed Speaker of Parliament by Mossadegh, and that the convicted murderer was freed soon after by Mossadegh's party. If one draws a conclusion that Mossadegh personally either benefited from it, then they are probably right, even if I did not mention it in the article. Dr. Abbas Milani apparantly thinks so as well, as described on page 243 of his book Eminent Persians.

Here is one source describing the release of Tahmasebi (not counting the ones already on the article):

http://content.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,817453,00.html (by this time Mossadegh and Kashani were already having problems, but Kashani remained the main clerical leader of the nationalists). Page 483 of Eminent Persians also refers to it as well. The sources on Tahmasebi's Wiki page should give you additional detail. The WK Kressin article describes the impact the assasination had on the oil nationalization vote (describing a fear of death for those who voted "no"). Another source: http://www.fouman.com/Y/Get_Iranian_History_Today.php?artid=1242,

As for the "vote of confidence" vs "vote of inclination", if I made a mistake with the names in the article, feel free to correct it. And as I have previously written, if there are discrepencies between my sources and what I have written, feel free to correct them.

Unfortunately, I cannot please everybody. I have added relevant and reliable information into this article. It is clear that what you and I consider to be relevant and reliable information differs greatly. I have dealt with you in the past politely and cordially, attempting to address your concerns point by point, yet you have become increasingly hysterical and rude, dismissing my contributions "nonsense" and not "relevant", and misrepresenting what I have written (ex. Abrahamian's quote).

Perhaps you should evaluate yourself before judging others, and find out what your own motives are for trying to edit this article. My sources on the article are not in dispute, my edits at all times were clearly related to the subject matter, and what I have written previously on this talk page was written in an honest attempt to address your points.

I have neither the time nor the interest to reply to any more of these unproductive and insulting comments, which clearly seem motivated not by any desire to actually improve the article, but simply to make it conform to your political views. If I wish to edit this article, or any other article, I will do so at any time, in compliance to the policies of Wikipedia. You are entitled to your own personal opinions, but if you wish to play a constructive role here then you need to act in an unbiased manner. Partridgeinapeartree (talk) 08:49, 22 June 2014 (UTC)

Partridgeinapeartree, I did not mean to insult you. However, please note that there is a time and place for everything. Wikipedia is not a place for Original Research. This article is about the 1953 Coup. Yet, if you take a look at the article, there is about 730 word written about the coup, and an additional 2500 words of historical context. You can make the argument that if it was not for the actions of Reza Shah, there would be no Iran at all for Mossadeq to become Prime Minister. Likewise, if it was not for the actions of Cyrus, there may never have been a Persia to turn into Iran, so that Mossadeq could become Prime Minister. It is arguable, that if it was not for Ferdowsi, there would not have been a unique Iranian culture and hence no Iranian nation, which means Mossadeq would never come to power. None of that has ANY PLACE in this article. They are not cited by other reliable sources (and even if they are cited by one, that makes this interpretation a marginal view which should not have equal weight here).

As for the issue of lionizing Reza Shah: I did not say that if you put anything non-negative, you are lionizing Reza Shah. Please feel free to add all the positive aspects of Reza Shah in his article. They DO NOT belong here. In this article, discussions of how Reza Shah was a cunning and noble ruler, serves no purpose other than to make the Pahlavis look in a better light. Reza Shah's actions in Gilan have no bearing whatsoever on the 1953 coup (the subject of this article) and even if they do, unless there is a consensus among RS on the issue, it is irrelevant.

The "historical background" section of this article should be a concise and brief section which deals only with the history of the AIOC in Iran. Having said that, I admit that the current Historical Background section of the article, is still significantly better than the one I criticized at the beginning of this thread. My main problem now is with the lead, where the phrase "democratically elected government" which is critical to this article's essence, has been repeatedly removed (for several years now) without any serious explanation. Poyani (talk) 21:05, 23 June 2014 (UTC)

List of government officials overthrown

It was not just Mossadeq who was overthrown in the 1953 coup. It was his whole government. This is my attempt to create an incomplete list of ministers who were removed from office by the coup.

• Mossadeq (Prime Minister)
• Hossein Fatemi (Foreign Affairs Minister)
• Abol-Ghasem Kashani (Speaker of the House)
• Mehdi Bazargan (Deputy Minister)

Poyani (talk) 16:38, 12 February 2014 (UTC)

DO NOT REMOVE "Democratically elected government" from the article

There seems to be an unending effort to remove the phrase "democratically elected government" from the lede of this article. This has been the subject of numerous discussions, all ending with a plurality of editors agreeing that the phrase is appropriate, since it has been used, word for word, in numerous peer-reviewed works pertaining to the coup. Please refrain from removing it again. Poyani (talk) 23:11, 19 June 2014 (UTC)

Yesterday's version of the article, before you changed it, contained the phrases "democratically elected parliament", "democratically elected prime minister", "overthrow a democratically elected government", "overthrow a democratically elected, civil government", "overthrow of a democratically elected Iranian government" and "democratic Prime Minister of Iran", so I don't know what you are complaining about. So much repetition beats the reader over the head. As it says in the article, the shah ruled as an executive in Iran, so "when a shah was weak, the government was more democratic, but when the shah acted on his own, the democratic aspects of the government could be sidelined." In fact, the democratic aspects of Iran were always in a state of flux, with assassination, intrigue and corruption working just as effectively as democracy. Very little was accomplished by the act of voting. Your further hammering of the point puts undue weight on the idea that Iran was such a marvelous example of a democracy, when it was not. Binksternet (talk) 23:57, 19 June 2014 (UTC)

"The 1953 Iranian coup d'état, known in Iran as the 28 Mordad coup, was the overthrow of the Prime Minister of Iran Mohammad Mosaddegh on..." is incorrect. It implies that it was the replacement of one prime minister with another. Source 1 listed in the lede (End of British Imperialism) begins its chapter on the subject by stating "the overthrown of Musaddiq (sic) government ...". Source 3 from the New York Times begins "the Central Intelligence Agency's secret history of its covert operation to overthrow Iran's government in 1953..." . All The Shah's Men (the definitive work on the 1953 coup which you have by now relegated to just a side-note, while listing its critique in the refs) begins with "More than half a century has passed since the United States deposed the only democratic government Iran ever had". Even the word coup d'état means to overthrow a government. Hence it is incorrect and incomplete to state that the 1953 Iranian coup d'état was the overthrown of the Prime Minister. It was the overthrow of a government as stated in the RS and as per the very definition of the word. This is also confirmed by the repeated use of the word "government" in the declassified US government documents about the coup http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/summary.pdf

Lets not pretend this is about a MoS issue Binksternet. You have now been involved in a multi-year jihad against the phrase "democratically elected government" and you have used numerous dubious means to remove the phrase. From misrepresenting the works of others (Milani in particular) to claim "democratically elected" is incorrect, to your own incorrect Original Research which claimed an appointed PM could not be democratically elected, to now, where you are claiming that the overthrow wasn't really that of a "government", this seems like a never ending story. Please end this edit-war and let the correct description of the 1953 coup (as confirmed by nearly every single reliable source on the subject) remain in place.Poyani (talk) 20:37, 23 June 2014 (UTC)

False flag operations

Binksternet it was a False flag operations, why did you reverted the edit?--Setareh1990 (talk) 07:05, 6 July 2015 (UTC)

Because nobody describes it as a false flag operation. Binksternet (talk) 12:41, 6 July 2015 (UTC)

They are... just read what false flag operation mean, and you'll see that it describes exactly how the coup happened.--Setareh1990 (talk) 14:14, 6 July 2015 (UTC)