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Operation Ferdinand

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For The 1942 system of pacific war coastal observers, codenamed Operation Ferdinand,, see Coastwatchers.
Operation Ferdinand
Part of Operation Bodyguard
Grayscale map of Europe with the subordinate plans of Operation Bodyguard labelled
Ferdinand formed part of Operation Bodyguard, a Europe-wide deception strategy for 1944
Operational scopeMilitary deception
Planned1944
Planned byLondon Controlling Section

Operation Ferdinand was a military deception employed by the Allies during the Second World War. It formed part of Operation Bodyguard, a major strategic deception intended to misdirect and confuse German high command about Allied invasion plans during 1944. Ferdinand consisted of strategic and tactical deceptions intended to draw attention away from the Operation Dragoon landing areas, in Southern France, by threatening an invasion of Genoa in Italy. Planned by Eugene Sweeney in June and July 1944 and operated until early September, it has been described as "quite the most successful of 'A' Force's strategic deceptions".[1] It helped the Allies achieve complete tactical surprise in their landings and contained German troops in the genoa region until late July.

Background

Main article: Operation Bodyguard

Operation Royal Flush formed part of Operation Bodyguard, a broad strategic military deception intended to confuse the Axis high command as to Allied intentions during the lead-up to the Normandy landings.[2] During early 1944 the main thrust of deceptions in the Middle Eastern theatre were contained under Operation Zeppelin, which developed threats against Greece and France, and Operation Royal Flush, which ran political deceptions against Spain and Turkey.[3] On 14 June the Allies committed to a landing in Southern France, codenamed Operation Dragoon (formerly Anvil).[4] Royal Flush and Zeppelin were scaled back, to tone down the threat to France, and it was decided a new plan (Ferdinand) was required to cover the intended invasion.[5][6]

The Allied nations invaded Italy in September 1943 and by mid-1944 had pushed the Germans back to the Gothic Line in the North of the country.[1][7] Ferdinand was intended to develop a threat against Genoa, as part of an expected Allied assault on the Gothic line in August/September 1944.[4] German forces in the French Riviera (originally threatened by Vendetta) were to be put at relative ease, but not left feeling to secure lest they be moved to re-inforce Normandy.[8] Planning for the operation was handled by 'A' Force; the department in charge of deception in the Middle East.[9] A large part of the operation planning was handed to Major Eugene J Sweeney, an Irish-American career officer who had joined the department in late 1943 with the express task of learning the arts of deception before the war ended.[10] Working out of Algiers, at Advanced HQ (West), Sweeney helped implement several deceptions. The most notable of which was Operation Oakfield, the cover plan for Operation Shingle and the Battle of Anzio.[11][12]

John Bevan, head of the London Controlling Section, met with Clarke in Algiers in early June to decide on the outline for Ferdinand. After four days he returned to London leaving 'A' Force to work on the draft. On 4 July the draft was approved by Field Marshall Henry Wilson, Supreme Allied Commander in the Mediterranean theatre.[4][13] In July, Seventh Army HQ (the army group due to be used for Dragoon) moved from Algeria to Naples. Sweeney moved with them, as the head of the newly formed No. 2 Tac HQ, and tasked by Colonel Dudley Clarke (head of 'A' Force) to focus entirely on planning for Ferdinand.[9][11] Sweeney worked on the plan until its final form on 28 July. Despite not being completed until the end of the month Ferdinand went into affect as soon as the first draft was approved.[4]

Operation

Ferdinand was a complex plan, involving misinformation and extensive physical deception. The underlying plot ran that the Allied forces had been surprised to find the Germans hadn't moved forces from the mediterranean to re-inforce Normandy. Therefore plans to invade southern France and the Balkans we're looking less appealing. Instead the Allied commanders had decided to focus all of their resources on the Italian campaign. The real force assigned to Dragoon, the US VI Corps, would land in Genoa. Meanwhile notional formations, such as the Seventh Army and the British 5th Airborne Division would support pushes along the Italian front and threaten targets in the Balkans. Ferdinand also recycled some of Zeppelin's threats against Turkey with the fictional British Ninth and Twelfth Armies.[4]

The key to Ferdinand was the threat Genoa. Intelligence intercepts...[14]

The deception was maintained on the invasion date itself, with a tactical deception. The Dragoon fleet travelled on a course toward Genoa until late at night on the 14 August, when they turned west toward their real target.[15] Around the real target, deceptions involving dummy fleets and paratroopers were enacted similar to those enacted on D-Day.[15]

Impact

Ferdinand successfully led Fremde Heere West (German high command for the Western Front, also referred to as FHW) to expect a landing in Genoa. In late July and early August the build up of forces in Italy made it clear that a seaborne invasion was imminent, and the deception was successful in creating this as a realistic threat to Genoa.[15] In his history of British wartime intelligence, historian Michael Howard calls it the "most successful of 'A' Force's strategic operations".[16] However, Howard states that the overwhelming force used for Operation Dragoon meant that the element of surprise was less important than on D-Day.[16]

References

  1. ^ a b Holt (2005), pg. 620
  2. ^ Latimer (2001), pg. 218
  3. ^ Holt (2005), pg. 597
  4. ^ a b c d e Holt (2005), pg. 616
  5. ^ Holt (2005), pg. 602
  6. ^ Crowdy (2008), pg. 290
  7. ^ Lloyd (2003), pg. 93
  8. ^ Howard (1990), pg. 155
  9. ^ a b Holt (2005), pg. 615
  10. ^ Holt (2005), pg. 592
  11. ^ a b Holt (2005), pg. 609
  12. ^ Holt (2005), pg. 830
  13. ^ Heathcote (1999), pg. 310
  14. ^ Holt (2005), pg. 617
  15. ^ a b c Howard (1990), pg. 158
  16. ^ a b Howard (1990), pg. 159

Bibliography

  • Crowdy, Terry (2008). Deceiving Hitler : double cross and deception in World War II. Oxford: Osprey. ISBN 978-1-84603-135-9.
  • Heathcote, Tony (1999). The British Field Marshals 1736–1997. Barnsley (UK): Pen & Sword. ISBN 0-85052-696-5.
  • Holt, Thaddeus (2005). The Deceivers: Allied Military Deception in the Second World War. Phoenix. ISBN 0-7538-1917-1.
  • Howard, Michael (1990). British intelligence in the Second World War : strategic deception. New York: Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-40145-6.
  • Latimer, Jon (2001). Deception in War. New York: New York: Overlook Press. ISBN 978-1-58567-381-0.
  • Lloyd, Mark (2003). The Art of Military Deception. Pen and Sword. ISBN 1-4738-1196-1.


  • Barbier, Mary (2007). D-Day Deception: Operation Fortitude and the Normandy Invasion. Westport: Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0-275-99479-1.
  • Levine, Joshua (2011). Operation Fortitude: The True Story of the Key Spy Operation of WWII That Saved D-Day. London: HarperCollins UK. ISBN 0-00-741324-6.

Category:World War II deception operations Category:Operation Bodyguard

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