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Islam in Albania

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Albanians

According to 2011 census, 58.79% of Albania's population adheres to Islam, making it the largest religion in the country. The majority of Albanian Muslims are Sunni with a significant Bektashi Shia minority. Christianity is practiced by 16.99% of the population, making it the 2nd largest religion in the country. The remaining population is either irreligious or belongs to other religious groups.[1] During the Ottoman rule of Albania, the majority of Albanians converted to the Muslim affiliation (Sunni and Bektashi). However, decades of state atheism which ended in 1991 brought a decline in religious practice in all traditions.

History

Islam is believed to have first arrived in the 9th century to the region called Albania today.[2]

Ottoman period

Conversion and consolidation (14th-18th centuries)

Skanderbeg's Christian forces (right) battle Muslim Ottoman army (left).

Albanians began converting to Islam when they became part of the Ottoman Empire in the 14th century.[3] The uptake of Islam at first occurred mainly amongst the Christian elite who retained some previous political and economic privileges and the emerging class of timar or estate holders of the sipahis in the new Ottoman system.[4][5] These included aristocratic figures such as George Kastrioti (Skanderbeg) who while in the service of the Ottomans was a convert to Islam and later reverted to Christianity during the late 15th century northern Albanian uprising he initiated.[3] In doing so, he also ordered others who had embraced Islam or were Muslim colonists to convert to Christianity or face death.[3] With the onset of Ottoman rule, only prominent churches with significant symbolic meaning or cultural value of a urban settlement where converted into mosques.[6]

The Ottoman conquest of certain northern cities from the Venetians happened separately to the initial conquest of Albania from local feudal lords. Cities such as Lezhë fell in 1478, Shkodër during 1478-1479 and Durrës in 1501 with the bulk of their Christian population fleeing.[7] Over the course of the sixteenth century the urban populations of these cites became primarily Muslim.[7] In the north, the spread of Islam was slower due to resistance from the Roman Catholic Church and the mountainous terrain which contributed to curb Muslim influence in the 16th century.[8] The Ottoman conquest and territorial reorganisation of Albania though affected the Catholic church as ecclesiastical structures were decimated.[9] The Ottoman wars with Catholic powers of Venice and Austria in the seventeenth century resulted in severe reprisals against Catholic Albanians who had rebelled which accentuated conversion to Islam.[10][11] Steep decreases therefore occurred during the 1630s-1670s where for example the number of Catholics in the diocese of Lezhë declined by 50%, whereas in the diocese of Pult Catholics went from being 20,000 to 4,045.[10]

The 16th-century built Lead mosque in Berat

The official Ottoman recognition of the Orthodox church resulted in the Orthodox population being tolerated until the late 18th century and the traditionalism of the church's institutions slowed the process of conversion to Islam amongst Albanians.[12][13] The Orthodox population of central and south-eastern Albania was under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of the Orthodox Archbishopric of Ohrid, while south-western Albania was under the Patriarchate of Constantinople through the Metropolis of Ioannina.[14][15] In the early 16th century the Albanian cites of Gjirokastër, Kaninë, Delvinë, Vlorë, Korçë, Këlcyrë, Përmet and Berat were still Christian and by the late 16th century Vlorë, Përmet and Himarë were still Christian, while Gjirokastër increasingly became Muslim.[14] Conversion to Islam in cities overall within Albania was slow during the 16th century as around only 38% of the urban population had become Muslim.[16][17] The city of Berat from 1670 onward became mainly Muslim and its conversion is attributed in part to a lack of Christian priests being able to provide religious services.[18] Differences between Christian Albanians of central Albania and archbishops of Ohrid led to conversions to Bektashi Islam that made an appeal to all while insisting little on ritual observance.[19] Central Albania, such as the Durrës area had by end of the 16th century become mainly Muslim.[20]

It was mainly during the late eighteenth century however that Orthodox Albanians converted in large numbers to Islam due overwhelmingly to the Russo-Turkish wars of the period, as the Orthodox population were viewed as allies of Russia.[12][18] As some Orthodox Albanians rebelled against the Ottoman Empire, the Porte applied force to convert Orthodox Albanians to Islam while also providing economic measures to stimulate religious conversion.[12][18] By 1798 a massacre perpetrated against coastal Orthodox Albanian villagers by Ali Pasha, semi-independent ruler of the Pashalik of Yanina led to another sizable wave of conversions of Orthodox Albanians to Islam.[12] Other conversions such as those in the region of Labëria occurred due to ecclesiastical matters when for example during a famine the local bishop refused to grant a break in the fast to consume milk with threats of hell.[17] Conversion to Islam also was undertaken for economic reasons which offered a way out of heavy taxation such as the jizya or poll tax and other difficult Ottoman measures imposed on Christians while opening up opportunities such as wealth accumulation and so on.[17][21] Other multiple factors that led to conversions to Islam were the poverty of the Church, illiterate clergy and worship in a language other than Albanian.[17][18] Additionally the reliance of the bishoprics of Durrës and southern Albania upon the declining Archbishopric of Ohrid, due in part to simony weakened the ability of Orthodox Albanians in resisting conversion to Islam.[18] Crypto-Christianity also occurred in certain instances throughout Albania amongst populations that had recently converted from Christian Catholicism and Orthodoxy to Islam.[10][11][17]

Prayer In The House Of An Arnaut Chief by Jean-Léon Gérôme (1857)

In the center and south by the end of the seventeenth century the urban centers had largely adopted the religion of the growing Albanian Muslim elite. The existence of an Albanian Muslim class of pashas and beys or in military employment as soldiers and mercenaries played an increasingly important role in Ottoman political and economic life that became an attractive career option for many Albanians.[22] As such, Albanians were also represented in sizable numbers at the imperial Ottoman court.[23] During Ottoman rule the Albanian population partially and gradually began to convert to Islam through the teachings of Bektashism, in order to gain considerable advantages in the Ottoman trade networks, bureaucracy and army. Many Albanians were recruited into the Ottoman Janissary and Devşirme and 42 Grand Viziers of the Ottoman Empire were of Albanian origin. The most prominent Albanians during Ottoman rule were Koca Davud Pasha, Hamza Kastrioti, Iljaz Hoxha, Köprülü Mehmed Pasha, Ali Pasha, Edhem Pasha, Ibrahim Pasha of Berat, Köprülü Fazıl Ahmed, Muhammad Ali of Egypt, Kara Mahmud Bushati and Ahmet Kurt Pasha.

Besides those associated with Sunni Islam, the Muslims of Albania during the Ottoman period belonged to several Sufi Orders.[24] The Qadiri order spread within urban areas of the seventeenth century and was linked with guilds of urban workers while in the 18th century the Qadiri had spread into central Albania and in particular the mountainous Dibër region.[24] The Qadiri contributed to the economic, and in the Dibër area, the socio-politcal milieu where they were based.[24] The Halveti order who competed with the Bektashis for adherents and based in the south and northeast of Albania.[24] Other Sufi orders were the Rufai and the Melami and so on. The most prominent of these in Albania were and still are the Bektashis, a mystic Dervish order belonging to Shia Islam that came to Albania during the Ottoman period, brought first by the Janissaries in the 15th century.[18] The spread of Bektashism amongst the Albanian population though occurred during the 18th and mainly early 19th centuries, especially in the domains of Ali Pasha who is thought to have been a Bektashi himself.[18][25] For Albanian converts to Islam, Bektashism with its greater religious freedoms and syncretism was viewed at times as a more appealing option to adhere to.[18] The Bektashi sect is considered heretical by conservative Muslims.[17] Traditionally Bektashis are found in sizable numbers within southern Albania and to a lesser extent in central Albania, while the rest of the Muslim population belong to Sunni Islam.[18]

"Despite the current lack of open religious fervor among the Albanians, Islam has contributed substantially to making the Albanians what they are today. It is now an inherent feature of Albania’s national culture and to be treated and respected as such."

Robert Elsie (albanologist), 2001.[26]

The Ottoman conquest also brought social, cultural and linguistic changes into the Albanian-speaking world. From the fifteenth century onward words from Ottoman Turkish entered the Albanian language.[21] While a corpus of poets and other Muslim Albanian authors wrote in Ottoman Turkish, Arabic, Persian or in the Albanian language in Arabic script (aljamiado) encompassing narrative prose, poetry, reflective treatises on religion and socio-political situations and so on.[21] Prominent amongst these authors were Yahya bey Dukagjini, Haxhi Shehreti or bejtexhinj poets like Nezim Frakulla, Muhamet Kyçyku, Sulejman Naibi, Hasan Zyko Kamberi, Haxhi Ymer Kashari and others.[21] Unlike Kosovo or Macedonia, architecturally Albania's Ottoman Muslim heritage was more modest in number, though prominent structures are the Mirahori Mosque in Korçë (built. 1495-1496), Murad Bey Mosque in Krujë (1533-1534), Lead Mosque in Shkodër (1773-1774), Et'hem Bey Mosque in Tiranë (begun. 1791-1794; finished. 1820-1821) and others.[21] Conversion from Christianity to Islam for Albanians also marked a transition from Rum (Christian) to Muslim confessional communities within the Ottoman millet system that collectively divided and governed peoples according to their religion.[27] The Ottomans were nonetheless aware of the existence of Muslim Albanians and used terms like Arnavud extensively as a ethnic marker to address the shortcomings of the usual millet religious terminology to identify people in Ottoman state records.[27][28] While the country was referred to Arnavudluk.[28] Also a new and generalised response by Albanians based on ethnic and linguistic consciousness to this new and different Ottoman world emerging around them was a change in ethnonym.[29] The ethnic demonym Shqiptarë, derived from Latin connoting clear speech and verbal understanding gradually replaced Arbëresh/Arbënesh amongst Albanian speakers between the late 17th and early 18th centuries.[29]

Minbar within richly decorated interior of Et'hem Bey Mosque, Tiranë.

Within scholarship in contemporary times, the conversion of Albanians and the legacy of Islam within Albania is a contested topic. According to scholar Hasan Kaleshi, the Ottoman conquest and conversion to Islam by Albanians averted assimilation into Slavs the same way that the Slavic invasions of the 6th century halted the romanization process of the progenitors of the Albanians.[30] Kaleshi maintained that though recognised within the millet system as Muslims only, Albanians were able to survive and even to geographically expand their Balkan area of settlement under the Ottomans.[30] Contemporary Albanian scholars, some with nationalist leanings interpret the Ottoman period as negative and downplay the conversion to Islam as having had barely any benefits to Albanians in a socio-cultural and religious sense.[30][31]

National Awakening (19th and early 20th centuries)

Approximate distribution of religions in Albania in the early 1900s, based on the 1908 Ottoman census and the 1918 Albanian census. Muslims: Green.

By the 19th century Albanians were divided into three religious groups. Catholic Albanians who had some Albanian ethno-linguistic expression in schooling and church due to Austro-Hungarian protection and Italian clerical patronage.[25] Orthodox Albanians under the Patriarchate of Constantinople had liturgy and schooling in Greek and toward the late Ottoman period mainly identified with Greek national aspirations.[25][32][33] While Muslim Albanians during this period formed around 70% of the overall Balkan Albanian population in the Ottoman Empire with an estimated population of more than a million.[25] With the rise of the Eastern Crisis, Muslim Albanians became torn between loyalties to the Ottoman state and the emerging Albanian nationalist movement.[25] Islam, the Sultan and the Ottoman Empire were traditionally seen as synonymous in belonging to the wider Muslim community.[25] While the Albanian nationalist movement advocated self determination and strived to achieve socio-political recognition of Albanians as a separate people and language within the state.[25]

The Russo-Ottoman war of 1878 and the threat of partition of Ottoman Albanian inhabited areas amongst neighbouring Balkan states at the Congress of Berlin led to the emergence of the League of Prizren (1878-1881) to prevent those aims.[25] The league began as an organisation advocating Islamic solidarity and restoration of the status quo (pre-1878).[25] In time it also included Albanian national demands such as the creation of a large Albanian vilayet or province which led to its demise by the Ottoman Empire.[25] The Ottoman Empire viewed Muslim Albanians as a bulwark to further encroachment by Christian Balkan states to its territory.[25] It therefore opposed emerging Albanian national sentiments and Albanian language education amongst its Muslim component that would sever Muslim Albanians from the Ottoman Empire.[25] During this time the Ottoman Empire appealed to pan-Islamic identity and attempted to console Muslim Albanians for example by employing only them in the Imperial Palace Guard and offering their elite socio-political and other privileges.[25][34] Wars and socio-political instability resulting in increasing identification with the Ottoman Empire amongst some Muslims within the Balkans during the late Ottoman period made the terms Muslim and Turk synonymous.[34] In this context, Muslim Albanians of the era were conferred and received the term Turk while having preferences to distance themselves from ethnic Turks.[34] This practice has somewhat continued amongst Balkan Christian peoples in contemporary times who still refer to Muslim Albanians as Turks and Turco-Albanians, with often pejorative connotations and historic negative socio-political repercussions.[35][36][37][38][39]

These geo-political events nonetheless pushed Albanian nationalists, many Muslim, to distance themselves from the Ottomans, Islam and the then emerging pan-Islamic Ottomanism of Sultan Abdulhamid II.[25][40] Another factor overlaying these concerns during the Albanian National Awakening (Rilindja) period were thoughts that Western powers would only favour Christian Balkan states and peoples in the anti Ottoman struggle.[40] During this time Albanian nationalists conceived of Albanians as a European people who under Skanderbeg resisted the Ottoman Turks that later subjugated and cut the Albanians off from Western European civilisation.[40] Muslim Albanians were heavily involved with the Albanian National Awakening producing many figures like Faik Konica, Ismail Qemali, Midhat Frashëri, Shahin Kolonja and others advocating for Albanian interests and self determination.[25][33][18] Representing the complexities and interdependencies of both Ottoman and Albanians worlds, these individuals and others during this time also contributed to the Ottoman state amongst other things as statesmen, military personal, religious figures, intellectuals, journalists and being members of Union and Progress (CUP) movement.[18][25][34] Such figures were Sami Frashëri who reflecting on Islam and Albanians viewed Bektashism as a milder syncretic form of Islam with Shiite and Christian influences that could overcome Albanian religious divisions through mass conversion to it.[40] The Bektashi sufi order during the late Ottoman period, with around 20 monasteries in Southern Albania also played a role during the Albanian National Awakening by cultivating and stimulating Albanian language and culture.[25][18]

During the late Ottoman period the sancaks or districts of Korçë and Gjirokastër contained a Muslim population that numbered 95,000 in 1908 in contrast to 128,000 Orthodox inhabitants.[41] Muslims in these areas that eventually came to constitute contemporary southern Albania were all Albanian speaking Muslims.[42][43] In 1908 the Young Turk revolution, in part instigated by Muslim Albanian Ottoman officials and troops with CUP leanings deposed Sultan Abdul Hamit II and installed a new government which promised reforms.[25] In 1908, an alphabet congress with some Muslim delegates agreed to adopt a Latin character based Albanian alphabet that was opposed by many Muslim Albanians.[25][18][44] They instead alongside some Muslim Albanian clerics preferred an Arabic based Albanian alphabet, due in part to concerns that a Latin based Albanian alphabet undermined ties with the Islamic world.[25][18][44] Toward the end of Ottoman rule, two Albanian revolts broke out. The first revolt was during 1910 in northern Albania and Kosovo reacting toward the new Ottoman government policy of centralization.[25] The other revolt in the same areas was in 1912 that sought Albanian political and linguistic self determination under the bounds of the Ottoman Empire and with both revolts many of the leaders and fighters were Muslim Albanians.[25] These Albanian revolts were also a turning point that impacted the Young Turk government which increasingly moved from a policy direction of pan-Ottomanism and Islam toward a singular national Turkish outlook.[34]

Independence

Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and World War One (1914-1918)

With the onset of the Balkan Wars and the collapse of Ottoman rule in the Balkans, Albanians represented by Ismail Qemali declared Independence from the Otttoman Empire on the 28th Novmember 1912 in Vlorë. The main motivation for independence was to prevent Balkan Albanian inhabited lands from being annexed by Greece and Serbia, while the Ottoman CUP Young Turk government felt betrayed by these actions as it considered Albanians a kindred Muslim people.[34] Within the scope of the Balkan Wars (1912-1913) the Northern Epirote movement arose in southern Albania amongst the Orthodox population calling for unification with Greece who also opposed living in an Albania under leaders composed of Muslim Albanians.[19] Fighting broke out in southern Albania between Greek irregulars and Muslim Albanians who opposed the Northern Epirot movement.[45] After recognising Albanian independence and its provisional borders in 1913, the Great powers imposed on Albania a Christian German prince Wilhelm of Wied to be its ruler in 1914.[46] In the ensuring power struggles and disquiet over having a Christian monarch, a failed Muslim uprising (1914) broke out in central Albania that sought to restore Ottoman rule while northern and southern Albania distanced themselves from those events.[46]

Following the National Renaissance tenets and the general lack of religious convictions, during the 20th century, the democratic, monarchic and later the communist regimes followed a systematic dereligionization of the nation and the national culture. Due to this policy, as with all other faiths in the country, Islam underwent radical changes.

Interwar period (1919-1939): State interference and reforms

From the early days of interwar Albania and due to Albania's heterogeneous religious makeup, Albania's political leadership defined Albania as without a official religion.[47] Muslim Albanians at time time formed around 70% of the total population of 800,000 and Albania was the only Muslim country in Europe.[47] In the former Ottoman districts of Korçë and Gjirokastër forming southern Albania, the share of the Muslim population increased in 1923 to 109,000 in contrast to 114,000 Orthodox and by 1927 Muslims were 116,000 to 112,000 Orthodox.[41] Yugoslavia and Greece in their state polices of the 1920s claimed that Albania was a little Turkey hostile to Orthodox populations like Greeks and others and that the Muslim majority was persecuting them.[48] Albania refuted those claims of sectarian Muslim and Christian conflict and attributed tensions in its south to the movement for an independent Albanian Orthodox church and those wanting to remain under the Patriarchate.[48]

Great Mosque of Durrës, (built 1931).

Albanian secularist elites pushed for a reform of Islam as the process of Islamic religious institutions were nationalised and the state increasingly imposed its will upon them.[47] For example in 1923 at the first Islamic National Congress the criteria for delegates attending was that being clerics was not important and that instead patriots with a liberal outlook were favoured with some delegates being selected by the state.[47] Government representatives were present at the congress too.[47] Following the government program of reforms, the Albanian Islamic congress in Tirana therefore decided to deliberate and reform some Islamic traditional practices adopted from the Ottoman period with the reasoning of allowing Albanian society the opportunity to thrive.[46] The measures adopted by the congress was a break with the Ottoman Caliphate, banning polygamy (most of the Muslim Albanian population was monogamous) and the mandatory wearing of veil (hijab) by women in public.[46] A new form of prayer was also implemented (standing, instead of the traditional salat ritual).[49] As with the congress, the attitudes of Muslim clerics were during the interwar period monitored by the state who at times appointed and dismissed them at will.[47]

In 1925, Ahmet Zog, a emerging politician from a prominent Muslim Albanian family became president of Albania and by 1929 installed himself as king.[50] The regime lasted until Zog's ousting during the Italian invasion of 1939 and within that time implemented a series of modernising measures meant to further curb Islam's influence in Albania and reverse the legacy of the Ottoman period.[50][51] Amongst those were the abolition of Sharia law and replacement with Western law and translation of the Quran into Albanian that was criticized for its inaccuracies.[50][47] Increasing interference by the state of Islamic institutions led to Muslim clerics in 1926 to accuse the government of a propaganda campaign against the new madrasa in Shkodër, the new organisation of Jemaat (Islamic Community) and its finances.[47] Clerics that went outside state oversight and delivered sermons in mosques without permission were threatened with action by authorities of offenders.[47] As relations with the Muslim hierarchy and government officials became close, Islamic institutions were used by the state to implement social control like strengthening national unity, encouraging parents to send children to school and preventing diffusion of communist ideas.[47] By 1929 with the centralisation and reform of Islamic institutions the state funded a sizable portion of the Islamic community's budget and madrasas were closed with one remaining in Tiranë to train clerics in new modern ways.[47] Muslim Albanians resisted many of these changes on the restructuring of their Islamic committees, promoted da'wah or preaching of Islam to non-Muslim Albanians with risks of persecution, while their organisation underwent improvements.[50] New mosques were also built such as the Great Mosque in Durrës while an Islamic Institute in Tiranë was in 1936 accommodating up to 240 students.[50] After prolonged debate amongst Albanian elites during the interwar era and increasing restrictions, the wearing of the veil in 1937 was banned in legislation by Zog.[47][52]

World Headquarters of the Bektashi Community in Tiranë, Albania.

Throughout the interwar period, the Albanian intellectual elite often undermined and depreciated Sunni Islam, whereas Sufi Islam and its various orders experienced an important period of promising growth.[24] After independence, ties amongst the wider Sufi Bektashi community in former Ottoman lands waned.[53] In 1925 the Bektashi Order whose headquarters were in Turkey moved to Tiranë to escape Atatürk's secularising reforms and Albania would become the center of Bektashism where there were 260 tekes present.[50][53][54] In 1929, the Bektashi order severed its ties with Sunnism and by 1937 Bektashi adherents formed around 27% of the Muslim population in Albania.[50][55] Apart from Bektashis, there were other main Sufi orders present in Albania during the interwar period.[24] The Halvetis in the interwar period were involved in proselytizing and also opened new tekes in Leskovik and Korçë.[24] The Qadiris mainly located in urban areas and the Rufais, who spread their Tariqa order throughout Albania founding new tekes.[24] While the Tijaniyyah order, a newcomer in the early 20th century to Tiranë, Durrës and Shkodër rejected hereditary succession of the sheikhs, emphasised links with the Prophet Muhammad and played a part in the reform movement of mainstream Islam in Albania.[24] The sheikhs and dervishes of the various Sufi orders during the interwar period played an important role in Albanian society by often being healers to the public and Bektashi babas were at times involved in mediation of disputes and vendettas.[24] By 1936 with the existence of individual Sufi organisations and leagues of the various orders, Albanian Muslim authorities formed an association named Drita Hyjnore (Divine Light) so as to reorganise and better coordinate the activities of four of the orders.[24]

Communist period and persecution (1945-1991)

Mirahori mosque in 2002 with destroyed minaret from communist times (left) and with rebuilt minaret in 2013 (right).

In the aftermath of World War Two, the communist regime came to power after overcoming conflicts with occupying Axis forces and the opposition force Balli Kombëtar. Muslims, most from southern Albania were represented from early on within the communist leadership group such as leader Enver Hoxha (1908-1985), his deputy Mehmet Shehu (1913-1981) and others.[56] Albanian society was still traditionally divided between four religious communities.[44] The communist regime through Albanian Nationalism attempted to forge a national identity that transcended and eroded these religious and other differences with the aim of forming a unitary Albanian identity.[44] Albanian communists viewed religion as a societal threat that undermined the cohesiveness of the nation.[44] Within this context, religions like Islam were denounced as foreign and clergy such as Muslim muftis were criticised as being socially backward with the propensity to become agents of other states and undermine Albanian interests.[44] After 1945, material wealth, institutional properties and land of the religious communities in Albania were confiscated by the state.[57][58] While mosques had until 1965 undergone a state of dilapidation due to meagre finances for repair.[57] Muslim architectural heritage was perceived by Albanian communists to be a unwanted vestige of the Ottoman period used for converting Albanians into Muslims.[57] In 1965 the communist regime initiated a cultural revolution based on the Chinese model that saw the wide scale destruction of most mosque minarets due to them being a prominent feature of Islamic architecture.[57]

Inspired by Pashko Vasa's late 19th century poem for the need to overcome religious differences through Albanian unity, Hoxha took the stanza "the faith of the Albanians is Albanianism" and implemented it literally as state policy.[44] In 1967 therefore the communist regime declared Albania the only non-religious country in the world, banning all forms of religious practice in public.[59][44] The Muslim Sunni and Bektashi clergy alongside their Catholic and Orthodox counterparts suffered severe persecution and to prevent a decentralisation of authority in Albania, many of their leaders were killed.[59] Jumu'ah or communal Friday prayers in a mosque that involves a sermon afterwards were banned in Albania due to their revolutionary associations that posed a threat to the communist regime.[60] People who still preformed religious practices did so in secret, while others found out were persecuted and personal possession of religious literature such as the Quran forbidden.[59][44][58] Amongst Bektashi adherents transmission of knowledge became limited to within few family circles that mainly resided in the countryside.[24] Mosques became a target for Albanian communists who saw their continued existence as exerting a ideological presence in the minds of people.[57] Through the demise of mosques and religion in general within Albania, the regime sought to alter and sever the social basis of religion that lay with traditional religious structures amongst the people and replace it with communism.[57][58] Islamic buildings were hence appropriated by the communist state who often turned into them into gathering places, sports halls, warehouses, barns and cinemas in an attempt to erase those links between religious buildings and people.[59][44][57]

Kubelie Mosque in Kavajë, circa 1939 (left) and rebuilt mosque after communist destruction in 1967 with original colonnade, 2007 (right).

In 1967 within the space of seven months the communist regime destroyed 2,169 religious buildings and other monuments.[57] Of those were some 530 tekes, turbes and dergah saint shrines that belonged mainly to the Bektashi order.[57] Pilgrimage thereafter amongst Bektashi adherents to those shrines became limited occurring only in certain locations and indirectly through gatherings like picnics near those sites such as the Sari Salltëk tyrbe in Krujë.[24] While 740 mosques were destroyed, some of which were prominent and architecturally important like the Kubelie Mosque in Kavajë, the Clock Mosque in Peqin and the two domed mosques in Elbasan dating from the 17th century.[57] Of the roughly 1,127 Islamic buildings existing in Albania prior to the communists coming to power, only 50 mosques remained thereafter with most being in a state of disrepair.[61] Some number of mosques that were deemed structures of cultural importance and historic value by the communists did survive such as the Muradiye mosque in Vlorë, the Lead mosque in Shkodër, Naziresha Mosque in Elbasan, the Lead, Beqar, Hynkar and Hysen Pasha mosques of Berat, Fatih mosque in Durrës, Bazar mosque of Krujë, Allajbegi mosque of the Dibër area, Mirahor mosque in Korçë, Teke mosque in Gjirokastër and the Gjin Aleksi mosque of the Sarandë area.[57] In Tiranë during 1991, only two mosques were in a position to be used for worship, one of them being the Ethem Bey mosque.[61]

Republic of Albania (1992 onward)

(2011 census)[62]

Following the wider trends for socio-poltical pluralism and freedom in Eastern Europe from communism, a series of fierce protests by Albanian society culminated with the communist regime collapsing after allowing two elections in 1991 and then 1992. Toward the end of the regime's collapse, it had reluctantly allowed for limited religious expression to reemerge.[59] In 1990, the first mosque, alongside a Catholic church were opened in Shkodër once again.[24] Muslims, this time mainly from northern Albania such as Azem Hajdari (1963-1998) and Sali Berisha, who later served multiple terms as president and prime minster, were prominent leaders in the movement for democratic change. Areas that had been traditionally Muslim in Albania prior to 1967 reemerged in a post-communist context once again mainly as Muslim with its various internal complexities.[24]

Headquarters of the Muslim Community of Albania, Tiranë.

In the 1990s, Muslim Albanians placed their focus on restoring institutions, religious buildings and Islam as a faith in Albania that had overall been decimated by the communists.[59][63] During this time the restoration of Islam in Albania appealed to older generations of Muslim Albanian adherents and limited numbers of young school age people who wished to qualify and study abroad in Muslim countries.[63] Most mosques and some madrassas destroyed and damaged during the communist era had by 1996 been either reconstructed or restored in former locations where they once stood before 1967.[63] Muslim religious teachers and prayer leaders were also retrained abroad in Muslim states or in Albania.[63] The Muslim Community of Albania is the main organisation overseeing Sunni Islam in Albania and during the 1990s it received funding and technical support from abroad to reconstitute its influence within the country.[63] The Albanian Sunni Community has over time established links with oversees Muslims.[59] Due to funding shortages in Albania these ties have been locally beneficial as they have mobilised resources of several well funded international Muslim organsations like the OIC which has allowed for the reestablishment of Muslim ritual and spiritual practices in Albania.[59] Particular efforts have been directed toward spreading information about Islam in Albania through media, education and local community centres.[59] In April 2011, Bedër University in Tirana, which was attempted to be Albania's first Islamic university,[64] couldn't be opened as Islamic university due to the opposition of the Gülen movement.

While a traditional reliance on hierarchy and internal structures the restoration of Sufi Islam, akin to Sunni Islam, has faced organisational problems in restablishing and stabilising former systems of authority.[59] That stood in contrast with the activities of local people who were quick to rebuild the destroyed tyrbes and other mausoleums of Sufi saints by the end of 1991.[24] As Albanian migrants went abroad financial resources were sent back to fund other reconstruction projects of various Sufi shrines and teke monasteries.[24] The main Sufi order, the Bektashi within Albania have attempted to appeal to a younger, urban and also intellectual demographic and placing itself within the wider socio-political space.[24] Bektashis have also reconnected with the wider Muslim would, in particular groups and organisations based in Turkey and Shiite Iran.[24] Members from the Albanian government in the 1990s onward have favoured Bektashism as a milder from of Islam for Albanian Islam and it playing a role as a conduit between Islam and Christianity.[24] The Gülen movement based on the Muslim values of the Turkish preacher Fethullah Gülen has also entered Albania from 1992 onward and set up schools known for their high quality and mainly secular education based on Islamic ethics and principles.[65]

Within the Balkans apart from the ethno-linguistic component of Albanian identity, Albania's Orthodox neighbours also view it through religious terms.[44] They refer to Albanians therefore as a Muslim nation and as Muslim fundamentalists which has placed the secular part of Albanian identity under strain.[44] Among Albanian intellectuals and other notable Albanians, many Muslim, this has generated much discussions and at times debates about Islam and its role within Albania and amongst Albanians as a whole in the Balkans.[66] Prominent in those discussions were written exchanges in newspaper articles and books between novelist Ismail Kadare of Gjirokastër and literary critic Rexhep Qosja, an Albanian from the former Yugoslavia in the mid-2000s.[66] Kadare asserted that Albania's future lay with Europe due to its ancient European roots, Christian traditions and being a white people, while Qosja contended that Albanian identity was both a blend of Western (Christian) and Eastern (Islam) cultures and often adaptable to historical contexts.[66] In a 2005 speech given in Britain by president Alfred Moisiu of Orthodox heritage, he referred to Islam in Albania as having a "European face", it being "shallow" and that "if you dig a bit in every Albanian, he can discover his Christian core".[66] The Muslim Forum of Albania responded to those and Kadare's comments and referred to them as "racist" containing "Islamophobia" and being "deeply offensive".[66]

Throughout the duration of the Communist regime, national Albanian identity was constructed as being irreligious and based upon a common unitary Albanian nationality.[67] This widely spread ideal is still present, though challenged by religious differentiation between Muslims and Christians which exists at a local level.[67] Contemporary Muslim Albanians in Albania see themselves as being the purest Albanians.[68] This view is based on the large contribution Muslim Albanians made to the National Awakening (Rilindja) and resistance to the geo-political aims of the Serbs.[68] Albanian Muslims also hold the view that unlike them, Christian Albanian communities of the Orthodox historically identified with the Greeks and Catholics with the Italians.[68] In southern Albania relations between Muslim Albanians and the Orthodox Albanian population vary and are often distant with both communities traditionally living in separate villages and or neighbourhoods.[69][70] There have been also instances where Muslim Albanian migrants to Greece converted to Orthodoxy and changed their names to Christian forms in order to be accepted into Greek society.[71][72]

The Muslim Albanian community has also contended with increasing numbers of Christian missionaries which has made some of the Sunni Albanian leadership become more assertive and calling for Islam to be declared the official religion of Albania.[59] These calls within the scope of political Islam have greatly waned after non-Muslim Albanians objected to those suggestions.[59] Islamic fundamentalism has though become a concern for Albania and its backers amongst the international community.[73] In the 1990s, small groups of militant Muslims took advantage of dysfunctional government, porous borders, corruption, weak laws and illegal activities occurring during Albania's transition to democracy.[73] These Muslim militants used Albania as a base for money laundering and as a transit route into the West with at times the assistance of corrupt government employees.[73] There were claims by critics of the Albanian government that high profile militants like Osama Bin Laden passed through Albania while president Sali Berisha and head of Albanian intelligence Bashkim Gazidede had knowledge and assisted militants, though no credible evidence has emerged.[73]

With the collapse of the isolationist communist regime, Albania's geopolitical orientation between West and East became debated among Albanian intellectuals and its politicians.[44] In 1992 Albania became the only entirely European member of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation and generated intense controversy within Albania due to concerns that Albania might drift from a secular European future.[44] Berisha refuted those claims and viewed membership for Albania in acting as a bridge between the Muslim-Christian worlds.[66] By 1998-1999 Albania's OIC membership was suspended and temporary withdrawn by prime-minister Fatos Nano who viewed it as inhibiting Albania's European aspirations.[44][74][75] In the post communist period different socio-poltical reactions have occurred by regional neighbours and international powers toward Albania and Muslim Albanians. For example in the 1990s, Greece preferred and assisted Orthodox Albanian leaders like Fatos Nano in Albania over Muslim Albanian ones like Sali Berisha as they were seen as being friendlier to Greek interests.[76] Though generally supportive of the USA, in 1999 due to the Kosovo war and ethnic cleansing of mostly Muslim Albanians by Orthodox Serbs and subsequent refugee influx into the country, Albania's status as an ally of the USA was confirmed.[58] Support for the USA has remained high at 95% in Muslim majority Albania in contrast to the rest of the Muslim world.[58] Within the wider Balkans region Albania is considered to be the most pro-EU and pro-Western country.[77] While state relations of Albania with Turkey are friendly and close, due to the Albanian diaspora of Turkey maintaining close links with Albanians of the Balkans and vice versa while also Turkey maintaining close socio-political, cultural, economic and military ties with Albania.[78][79][80][81][77] Turkey has been supportive of Albanian geopolitical interests within the Balkans.[80] In Gallup polls conducted in recent times Turkey is viewed as a friendly country by 73% of people in Albania.[80]

Demographics

A recent Pew Research Center demographic study put the percentage of Muslims in Albania at 79.9%.[82] However, a recent Gallup poll gives percentages of religious affiliations with only 43% Muslim, 19% Eastern Orthodox, 15% Catholic and 23% atheist or nonreligious.[83] In the 2011 census the declared religious affiliation of the population was: 56.70% Sunni Muslims, 2.09% Bektashis, 10.03% Catholics, 6.75% Orthodox, 0.14% Evangelists, 0.07% other Christians, 5.49% believers without denomination, 2.05% Atheists, 13.79% undeclared.[84] 65% of Albanian Muslims are non-denominational Muslims.[85]

See also

References

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  2. ^ Jørgen Nielsen; Samim Akgönül; Ahmet Alibašić; Egdunas Racius (2013). "Albania". Yearbook of Muslims in Europe. Vol. 5. Leiden, Boston: Brill. p. 23. Retrieved 2016-03-12.
  3. ^ a b c Ramet, Sabrina (1998). Nihil obstat: religion, politics, and social change in East-Central Europe and Russia. Duke University Press. ISBN 9780822320708. p. 209. "The Ottomans first invaded Albania in 1385. A second Ottoman force was sent to Albania 1394-96, occupying the country. Given both the Ottoman disposition to tolerate religious diversity among loyal subjects and the generally bellicose traditions of the Albanians, Ottoman authorities adopted a conciliatory policy toward Albanian Christians in the early decades of occupation. Still, although conversion to Islam was not required, a Christian Albanian lord could count on winning favor if he converted. If the Ottomans did not believe that religious reasons could compel a Christian to convert to Islam, they nonetheless looked askance when a Muslim converted (or reconverted) to Christianity. This happened in 1443 when Gjergj Kastrioti (called Skenderbeg), who had been reared as a Muslim in the sultan’s palace, abandoned the Islamic faith and publicly reverted to the creed of his forefathers. But this conversion was not merely a public gesture of defiance. It was the first act in a revolutionary drama. For, after changing his religious allegiance, Skenderbeg demanded that Muslim colonists and converts alike embrace Christianity on pain of death, declaring a kind of holy war against the sultan/caliph."
  4. ^ Ergo, Dritan (2010). "Islam in the Albanian lands (XVth-XVIIth Century)". In Jens Schmitt, Oliver & Andreas Rathberger (eds). [Religion und Kultur im albanischsprachigen Südosteuropa [Religion and culture in Albanian-speaking southeastern Europe]]. Peter Lang. ISBN 978-3-631-60295-9. p. 22.
  5. ^ Giakoumis, Konstantinos (2010). "The Orthodox Church in Albania Under the Ottoman Rule 15th-19th Century". In Schmitt, Oliver Jens & Andreas Rathberger (eds). Religion und Kultur im albanischsprachigen Südosteuropa [Religion and culture in Albanian-speaking southeastern Europe]]. Peter Lang. p. 6, 8.
  6. ^ Ergo. Islam in the Albanian lands. 2010. p. 18.
  7. ^ a b Malcolm, Noel (2015). Agents of Empire: Knights, Corsairs, Jesuits and Spies in the Sixteenth-century Mediterranean World. Oxford University Press. ISBN 9780190262785. pp. 12-13.
  8. ^ Ramet. Nihil obstat. 1998. pp. 209-210.
  9. ^ Ergo. Islam in the Albanian lands. 2010. p. 8.
  10. ^ a b c Ramet. Nihil obstat. 1998. p. 210. "Then, in 1644, war broke out between Venice and the Ottoman empire. At the urging of the clergy, many Albanian Catholics sided with Venice. The Ottomans responded with severe repressions, which in turn drove many Catholics to embrace Islam (although a few elected to join the Orthodox Church instead)… Within the span of twenty-two years (1649-71) the number of Catholics in the diocese of Alessio fell by more than 50 percent, while in the diocese of Pulati (1634-71) the number of Catholics declined from more than 20,000 to just 4,045. In general, Albanian insurrections during the Ottoman-Venetian wars of 1644-69 resulted in stiff Ottoman reprisals against Catholics in northern Albania and significantly accelerated Islamization… In general, a pattern emerged. When the Ottoman empire was attacked by Catholic powers, local Catholics were pressured to convert, and when the attack on the Ottoman empire came from Orthodox Russia, the pressure was on local Orthodox to change faith. In some cases Islamization was only superficial, however, and in the nineteenth century many villages and some entire districts remained “crypto-Catholic” in spite of the adopting the externals of Islamic culture."
  11. ^ a b Skendi, Stavro (1967). "Crypto-Christianity in the Balkan Area under the Ottomans". Slavic Review. 26. (2): 235-242.
  12. ^ a b c d Ramet. Nihil obstat. 1998. p.203. "The Ottoman conquest between the end of the fourteenth century and the mid-fifteenth century introduced a third religion – Islam - but the Turks did not at first use force in its expansion, and it was only in the 1600s that large-scale conversion to Islam began – chiefly, at first, among Albanian Catholics."; p.204. "The Orthodox community enjoyed broad toleration at the hands of the Sublime Porte until the late eighteenth century."; p. 204. "In the late eighteenth century Russian agents began stirring up the Orthodox subjects of the Ottoman empire against the Sublime Porte. In the Russo-Turkish wars of 1768-74 and 1787-91 Orthodox Albanians rose against the Turks. In the course of the second revolt the “New Academy” in Voskopojë was destroyed (1789), and at the end of the second Russo-Turkish war more than a thousand Orthodox fled to Russia on Russian warships. As a result of these revolts, the Porte now applied force to Islamicize the Albanian Orthodox population, adding economic incentives to provide positive stimulus. In 1798 Ali Pasha of Janina led Ottoman forces against Christian believers assembled in their churches to celebrate Easter in the villages of Shen Vasil and Nivica e Bubarit. The bloodbath unleashed against these believers frightened Albanian Christians in other districts and inspired a new wave of mass conversions to Islam."
  13. ^ Ergo. Islam in the Albanian lands. 2010. p. 26.
  14. ^ a b Ergo. Islam in the Albanian lands. 2010. p. 37.
  15. ^ Giakoumis. The Orthodox Church in Albania. 2010. p. 5.
  16. ^ Ergo. Islam in the Albanian lands. 2010. p. 38.
  17. ^ a b c d e f Giakoumis. The Orthodox Church in Albania. 2010. p. 8.
  18. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n Skendi, Stavro (1967). The Albanian national awakening. Princeton University Press. pp. 10-13, 143, 181-189, 370-378.
  19. ^ a b Winnifrith, Tom (2002). Badlands-borderlands: a history of Northern Epirus/Southern Albania. London: Duckworth. ISBN 0-7156-3201-9. p. 107. "But the difficult archbishops of Ohrid must have produced some difference in their flocks. Less contentious faiths were available. It so happens that converting to Islam in central Albania was eased by the strength there of the Bektashi cult, a mystical faith, designed to appeal to all, demanding little in the way of strict rules of observance."; 130 "...in Northern Epirus loyalty to an Albania with a variety of Muslim leaders competing in anarchy cannot have been strong".
  20. ^ Giakoumis. The Orthodox Church in Albania. 2010. p. 6.
  21. ^ a b c d e Norris, Harry Thirlwall (1993). Islam in the Balkans: religion and society between Europe and the Arab world. University of South Carolina Press. pp. 47-48, 56, 61-81.
  22. ^ Hammond, Nicholas Geoffrey Lemprière (1967). Epirus: the Geography, the Ancient Remains, the History and Topography of Epirus and Adjacent Areas. Clarendon Press. p. 217.
  23. ^ Ergo. Islam in the Albanian lands. 2010. p. 23.
  24. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t Clayer, Nathalie (2007). "Saints and Sufi's in post-Communist Albania". In Kisaichi, Masatoshi (ed.). Popular Movements and Democratization in the Islamic World. Routledge. pp. 33-40.
  25. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v Gawrych, George (2006). The crescent and the eagle: Ottoman rule, Islam and the Albanians, 1874-1913. IB Tauris. pp. 21-22, 43-53, 60-70, 72-105, 140-169, 177-179, 182, 190-196.
  26. ^ Elsie, Robert (2001). A dictionary of Albanian religion, mythology, and folk culture. NYU Press. p.126.
  27. ^ a b Anscombe, Frederick (2006). "Albanians and "mountain bandits"". In Frederick Anscombe (ed.), The Ottoman Balkans, 1750-1830 Markus Wiener Publishers. p.88: "This Albanian participation in brigandage is easier to track than for many other social groups in Ottoman lands, because Albanian (Arnavud) was one of the relatively few ethnic markers regularly added to the usual religious (Muslim-Zimmi) tags used to identify people in state records. These records show that the magnitude of banditry involving Albanians grew through the 1770s and 1780s to reach crisis proportions in the 1790s and 1800s."; p.107. "In light of the recent violent troubles in Kosovo and Macedonia and the strong emotions tied to them, readers are urged most emphatically not to draw either of two unwarranted conclusions from this article: that Albanians are somehow inherently inclined to banditry, or that the extent of Ottoman "Albania" or Arnavudluk (which included parts of present-day northern Greece, western Macedonia, southern Montenegro, Kosovo, and southern Serbia) gives any historical “justification" for the creation of a "Greater Albania" today."
  28. ^ a b Anscombe, Frederic (2006). "The Ottoman Empire in Recent International Politics - II: The Case of Kosovo". The International History Review. 28.(4): 772. "In this case, however, Ottoman records contain useful information about the ethnicities of the leading actors in the story. In comparison with ‘Serbs’, who were not a meaningful category to the Ottoman state, its records refer to ‘Albanians’ more frequently than to many other cultural or linguistic groups. The term ‘Arnavud’ was used to denote persons who spoke one of the dialects of Albanian, came from mountainous country in the western Balkans (referred to as ‘Arnavudluk’, and including not only the area now forming the state of Albania but also neighbouring parts of Greece, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Montenegro), organized society on the strength of blood ties (family, clan, tribe), engaged predominantly in a mix of settled agriculture and livestock herding, and were notable fighters — a group, in short, difficult to control. Other peoples, such as Georgians, Ahkhaz, Circassians, Tatars, Kurds, and Bedouin Arabs who were frequently identified by their ethnicity, shared similar cultural traits."
  29. ^ a b Lloshi, Xhevat (1999). "Albanian". In Hinrichs, Uwe, & Uwe Büttner (eds). Handbuch der Südosteuropa-Linguistik. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag. p. 277. "They called themselves arbënesh, arbëresh, the country Arbëni, Arbëri, and the language arbëneshe, arbëreshe. In the foreign languages, the Middle Ages denominations of these names survived, but for the Albanians they were substituted by shqiptarë, Shqipëri and shqipe. The primary root is the adverb shqip, meaning "clearly, intelligibly". There is a very close semantic parallel to this in the German noun Deutsche, "the Germans" and "the German language" (Lloshi 1984) Shqip spread out from the north to the south, and Shqipni/Shqipëri is probably a collective noun, following the common pattern of Arbëni, Arbëri. The change happened after the Ottoman conquest because of the conflict in the whole line of the political, social, economic, religious, and cultural spheres with a totally alien world of the Oriental type. A new and more generalised ethnic and linguistic consciousness of all these people responded to this."
  30. ^ a b c Elsie, Robert (2005). Albanian literature: A short history. I.B. Tauris. ISBN 9781845110314. p.34. "Modern Albanian scholars tend to view the consequences of these centuries of Turkish rule as completely negative, in terms of wild Asiatic hordes ravaging and plundering a country which might otherwise have flourished in the cradle of European civilization… Scholar Hasan Kaleshi (1922-1976) has convincingly suggested that the Turkish occupation of the Balkans had at least the one positive consequence. It saved the Albanians from ethnic assimilation by the Slavs, just as the Slavic invasion of the Balkans in the sixth century had put an end to the process of Romanization which had threatened to assimilate the non-Latin-speaking ancestors of the Albanians a thousand years earlier. Although not recognized by the Turks as an ethnic minority (the population of the Ottoman Empire was divided according to religion, not according to nationality), the Albanians managed to survive as a people and indeed substantially expand their areas of settlement under Turkish rule."
  31. ^ Kopanski, Atuallah Bogdan (1997). "Islamization of Albanians in the Middle Ages: The primary sources and the predicament of the modern historiography". Islamic studies. 36. (2/3): 192. "The sophisticated culture, literature and art of Islam were ignored by the generality of historians who hardly even tried to conceal their anti-Muslim bias. Their ferociously anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish attitude not only obscured and distorted the amazing process of mass conversion of entire Christian communities to Islam, but also provided an intellectual prop for the ultra nationalist policy of ethnic and religious cleansing in Bosnia, Hum (Herzegovina), Albania, Bulgaria and Greece. For against the backdrop of the history of the Balkans, as generally portrayed, what appeared as a kind of historical exoneration and an act of retaliation for the 'betrayal' of Christianity in the Middle Ages. The policy of destroying Islamic culture and way of life in Albania after the World War II is the primary reason why the history of medieval Islam in this land has not been properly studied. And when it was studied, it was studied within the parameters of the Stalinist ideology which emphasized only the mythical image of medieval Albanians as the 'heroic Illyrian proletariat'. The handful of Muslim scholars in the Communist Eastern Europe who resisted the anti-Islamic and anti-Turkish propaganda were ostracized and often penalized. Albanian nationalist historians like Ramadan Marmallaku, Kristo Frashëri Skender Anamali, Stefanaq Pollo, Skender Rizaj and Arben Puto in their books deliberately emphasized ad nauseam only 'the Turkish savagery' and the 'heroic' Christian resistance against the Osmanli state in Albania."
  32. ^ Nitsiakos, Vassilis (2010). On the border: Transborder mobility, ethnic groups and boundaries along the Albanian-Greek frontier. LIT Verlag. p. 56. "The Orthodox Christian Albanians, who belonged to the rum millet, identified themselves to a large degree with the rest of the Orthodox, while under the roof of the patriarchate and later the influence of Greek education they started to form Greek national consciousness, a process that was interrupted by the Albanian national movement in the of the 19th century and subsequently by the Albanian state."
  33. ^ a b Skoulidas, Elias G. (2014). The Albanian Greek-Orthodox Intellectuals: Aspects of their Discourse between Albanian and Greek National Narratives (late 19th - early 20th centuries). Hronos. 07. para. 2, 19, 26-27.
  34. ^ a b c d e f Karpat, Kemal H. (2001). The politicization of Islam: reconstructing identity, state, faith, and community in the late Ottoman state. Oxford University Press. p. 342. “After 1856, and especially after 1878, the terms Turk and Muslim became practically synonymous in the Balkans. An Albanian who did not know one word of Turkish thus was given the ethnic name of Turk and accepted it, no matter how much he might have preferred to distance himself from the ethnic Turks.”; 369-370.
  35. ^ Megalommatis, M. Cosmas (1994). Turkish-Greek Relations and the Balkans: A Historian's Evaluation of Today's Problems. Cyprus Foundation. p. 28. “Muslim Albanians have been called “Turkalvanoi” in Greek, and this is pejorative.
  36. ^ Nikolopoulou, Kalliopi (2013). Tragically Speaking: On the Use and Abuse of Theory for Life. University of Nebraska Press. p. 299. “Instead of the term “Muslim Albanians”, nationalist Greek histories use the more known, but pejorative, term “Turkalbanians”.
  37. ^ League of Nations (October 1921). "Albania". League of Nations –Official Journal. 8: 893. "The memorandum of the Albanian government… The memorandum complains that the Pan-Epirotic Union misnames the Moslem Albanians as “Turco-Albanians”"
  38. ^ Mentzel, Peter (2000). "Introduction: Identity, confessionalism, and nationalism." Nationalities Papers. 28. (1): 8. "The attitude of non Muslim Balkan peoples was similar. In most of the Balkans, Muslims were “Turks” regardless of their ethno-linguistic background. This attitude changed significantly, but not completely, over time."
  39. ^ Blumi, Isa (2011). Reinstating the Ottomans, Alternative Balkan Modernities: 1800-1912. Palgrave MacMillan. New York. p. 32. "As state policy, post- Ottoman “nations” continue to sever most of their cultural, socioeconomic, and institutional links to the Ottoman period. At times, this requires denying a multicultural history, inevitably leading to orgies of cultural destruction (Kiel 1990; Riedlmayer 2002). As a result of this strategic removal of the Ottoman past—the expulsion of the “Turks” (i.e., Muslims); the destruction of buildings; the changing of names of towns, families, and monuments; and the “purification” of languages—many in the region have accepted the conclusion that the Ottoman cultural, political, and economic infrastructure was indeed an “occupying,” and thus foreign, entity (Jazexhi 2009). Such logic has powerful intuitive consequences on the way we write about the region’s history: If Ottoman Muslims were “Turks” and thus “foreigners” by default, it becomes necessary to differentiate the indigenous from the alien, a deadly calculation made in the twentieth century with terrifying consequences for millions."
  40. ^ a b c d Endersen, Cecile (2011). "Diverging images of the Ottoman legacy in Albania". In Hartmuth, Maximilian, (ed.) Images of imperial legacy: Modern discourses on the social and cultural impact of Ottoman and Habsburg rule in Southeast Europe. Lit Verlag Münster. 40-43.
  41. ^ a b Nußberger, Angelika & Wolfgang Stoppel (2001). Minderheitenschutz im östlichen Europa (Albanien). (PDF) (in German). Cologne: Universität Köln. pp.9-10. "In den südlichen Landesteilen hielten sich Muslime und Orthodoxe stets in etwa die Waage: So standen sich zB 1908 in den Bezirken (damals türkischen Sandschaks) Korca und Gjirokastro 95.000 Muslime und 128.000 Orthodoxe gegenüber, während 1923 das Verhältnis 109.000 zu 114.000 und 1927 116.000 zu 112.000 betrug. [In the southern parts of the country, Muslims and Orthodox were broadly always balanced: Thus, for example in 1908 were in the districts (then Turkish Sanjaks) Korca and Gjirokastro 95,000 Muslims and in contrast to 128,000 Orthodox, while in 1923 the ratio of 109,000 to 114,000 and 1927 116,000 to 112,000 it had amounted too.]"
  42. ^ Baltsiotis, Lambros (2011). The Muslim Chams of Northwestern Greece: The grounds for the expulsion of a "non-existent" minority community. European Journal of Turkish Studies. para 14 "The fact that the Christian communities within the territory which was claimed by Greece from the mid 19th century until the year 1946, known after 1913 as Northern Epirus, spoke Albanian, Greek and Aromanian (Vlach), was dealt with by the adoption of two different policies by Greek state institutions. The first policy was to take measures to hide the language(s) the population spoke, as we have seen in the case of “Southern Epirus”. The second was to put forth the argument that the language used by the population had no relation to their national affiliation... As we will discuss below, under the prevalent ideology in Greece at the time every Orthodox Christian was considered Greek, and conversely after 1913, when the territory which from then onwards was called “Northern Epirus” in Greece was ceded to Albania, every Muslim of that area was considered Albanian."
  43. ^ Kokolakis, Mihalis (2003). Το ύστερο Γιαννιώτικο Πασαλίκι: χώρος, διοίκηση και πληθυσμός στην τουρκοκρατούμενη Ηπειρο (1820-1913) [The late Pashalik of Ioannina: Space, administration and population in Ottoman ruled Epirus (1820-1913). EIE-ΚΝΕ. p.53. "Με εξαίρεση τις ολιγομελείς κοινότητες των παλιών Ρωμανιωτών Εβραίων της Αρτας και των Ιωαννίνων, και την ακόμη ολιγομελέστερη ομάδα των Καθολικών της Αυλώνας, οι κάτοικοι της Ηπείρου χωρίζονται με το κριτήριο της θρησκείας σε δύο μεγάλες ομάδες, σε Ορθόδοξους και σε Μουσουλμάνους. [With the exception of a few members of the old communities such as Romaniote Jews of Arta and Ioannina, and even small groups of Catholics in Vlora, the residents of Epirus were separated by the criterion of religion into two major groups, the Orthodox and Muslims.]"; p. 54. "Η μουσουλμανική κοινότητα της Ηπείρου, με εξαίρεση τους μικρούς αστικούς πληθυσμούς των νότιων ελληνόφωνων περιοχών, τους οποίους προαναφέραμε, και τις δύο με τρεις χιλιάδες διεσπαρμένους «Τουρκόγυφτους», απαρτιζόταν ολοκληρωτικά από αλβανόφωνους, και στα τέλη της Τουρκοκρατίας κάλυπτε τα 3/4 περίπου του πληθυσμού των αλβανόφωνων περιοχών και περισσότερο από το 40% του συνόλου. [The Muslim community in Epirus, with the exception of small urban populations of the southern Greek-speaking areas, which we mentioned, and 2-3000 dispersed "Muslim Romani", consisted entirely of Albanian speakers, and in the late Ottoman period covered approximately 3/4 of population ethnic Albanian speaking areas and more than 40% of the total area."; pp.55-56. p.374.
  44. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o Duijzings, Gerlachlus. (2000). Religion and the politics of identity in Kosovo. C. Hurst. pp.163-164.
  45. ^ Smith, Michael Llewwellyn (2006). "Venizelos’ diplomacy, 1910-23: From Balkan alliance to Greek-Turkish Settlement". In Kitromilides, Paschalis M. (ed). Eleftherios Venizelos: the trials of statesmanship. Edinburgh University Press. p.150. "When the Greek army withdrew from Northern Epirot territories in accordance with the ruling of the Powers, a fierce struggle broke out between Muslim Albanians and Greek irregulars."
  46. ^ a b c d Vickers, Miranda (2011). The Albanians: a modern history. IB Tauris. pp. 82-86, 108-109.
  47. ^ a b c d e f g h i j k l Clayer, Nathalie (2014). "Behind the veil The reform of Islam in Inter-war Albania or the serach for a “modern” and “European” Islam". Cronin, Stephanie (ed.). In Anti-Veiling Campaigns in the Muslim World Gender, Modernism and the Politics of Dress. Routledge. pp. 231-232, 234-247.
  48. ^ a b Austin, Robert Clegg (2012). Founding a Balkan State: Albania's Experiment with Democracy, 1920-1925. University of Toronto Press. p. 95. “A cornerstone of Greek policy, an approach also employed by the Yugoslavs, was to encourage religious differences in Albania and stress that Albania was a little ‘Turkey’ hostile to Orthodox Greeks. To popularize the idea of two Albanian states, one Moslem, the other Christian, throughout the early 1920s Greece continually complained that Albania’s majority Moslem population was actively persecuting the Orthodox minority. Albania denied this, stressed its well— documented legacy of religious tolerance, and added that while there was tension in the southern perimeter of the country, it was not between Muslims and Christians, but rather a rift had emerged because of the movement to create an autocephalous Albanian Orthodox Church and some citizens wished to remain under the Patriarchate”.
  49. ^ Albania dispatch, Time magazine, April 14, 1923
  50. ^ a b c d e f g Ezzati, Abul-Fazl (2002). The Spread of Islam: The Contributing Factors. ICAS Press. p. 450.
  51. ^ Welton, George & Adrian Brisku (2007). "Contradictory Inclinations? The role of ‘Europe’ in Albanian Nationalist Discourse". In Sanghera, Balihar, & Sarah Amsler (eds). Theorising social change in post-Soviet countries: critical approaches. Peter Lang. p. 99.
  52. ^ Pavlowitch, Stevan K (2014). A History of the Balkans 1804-1945. Routledge. p. 304.
  53. ^ a b Doja, Albert (2006). "A Political History of Bektashism in Albania". Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions. 7. (1): 98.
  54. ^ Young, Antonia (1999). "Religion and society in present‐day Albania". Journal of Contemporary Religion. 14. (1): 9.
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  61. ^ a b Ramet. Nihil obstat. 1998. p.220. "Of the 1,127 mosques in Albania before the communist takeover, only fifty survived that era, most of them dilapidated. As of 1991, only two mosques in Tiranë were fit for use by worshipers."
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  67. ^ a b De Rapper, Gilles (2002). "Culture and the Reinvention of Myths in a Border Area." In Schwandner-Sievers, Stephanie, & Bernd Jürgen Fischer (eds). Albanian Identities. Myth and History. Indiana University Press. p. 191. “It is common in Albania to say that all Albanians, whether Christian or Muslim, are brothers, and that their only religion is their common Albanian nationality. The dogma of national unity as against religious differentiation is at the core of the most widely-spread Albanian national rhetoric. However, this rhetoric is challenged when local society is underpinned by, and conceptualised in terms of, religious differentiation."
  68. ^ a b c Nitsiakos, Vassilis (2010). On the border: Transborder mobility, ethnic groups and boundaries along the Albanian-Greek frontier. LIT Verlag. p. 209. "On their part, the Muslims believe that they are the purest Albanians, because they constituted the nucleus of the national renaissance and as great patriots resisted the Serbs, who tried to penetrate and conquer Albanian territories. In reference to Christians, they claim that the Orthodox identified with the Greeks and the Catholic with the Italians."
  69. ^ De Rapper, Gilles (2002). "Culture and the Reinvention of Myths in a Border Area. In Schwandner-Sievers, Stephanie & Bernd J. Fischer (eds). Albanian Identities. Myth and History. Indiana University Press. p. 191. "This is the case in mixed areas, where Muslims and Christians live in separate villages (or in separate neighbourhoods), and both have strong identities as religious communities – as in Devoll. In this specific context, religion cannot consist of just being Albanian. On the contrary, people are very well aware of their belonging to a specific religious community, and national identity is rarely thought of outside the basic opposition between Muslims and Christians.”
  70. ^ De Rapper, Gilles (2005). "Better than Muslims, Not as Good as Greeks: Emigration as Experienced and Imagined by the Albanian Christians of Lunxhëri". In King, Russell; Mai, Nicola; Schwandner-Sievers, Stephanie (eds). The New Albanian Migration. Brighton-Portland: Sussex Academic. p. 181. "The Muslims from Erind – the only village in Lunxhëri to be Muslim in majority – are not perceived as the descendants of migrants from other Muslim areas, but they are nonetheless definitely different, and the relations between Erind and the neighbouring villages are marked by the same stereotypes as the relations between Muslims and Christians usually are: people from Erind are said to be violent and dirty, to have no culture, and to be responsible for anything bad happening in the area."
  71. ^ Kretsi, Georgina (2005). 'Shkëlzen ou Giannis? Changement de prénom et stratégies identitaires, entre culture d'origine et migration [Shkëlzen or Giannis? Change of Name and Identity strategies, between Culture of Origin and Migration]'. Balkanologie. 1. (2): para 2, 23, 31-33.
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  73. ^ a b c d Abrahams, Fred (2015). Modern Albania: from dictatorship to democracy in Europe. NYU Press. p. 233.
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  76. ^ Konidaris, Gerasimos (2005). “Examining policy responses to immigration in the light of interstate relations and foreign policy objectives: Greece and Albania”. In King, Russell, & Stephanie Schwandner-Sievers (eds). The new Albanian migration. Sussex Academic. pp. 80-81. "Greece’s favorite candidate in these elections was clearly MR. Nano. As emerges from the interview material, he –unlike Berisha- was held in high esteem by the Greek side. It should not escape notice that Nano was by origin Orthodox Christian from Southern Albania, whereas Berisha was a northern Muslim... Greece’s favour towards Nano was clearly demonstrated in June, when he was allowed to speak to a crowd of Albanian citizens at a pre-election rally in one of Athen’s central squares. The police did not interfere and no arrests of illegal immigrants were made."
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