Jump to content

Hideki Tojo

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Fang2415 (talk | contribs) at 12:25, 6 September 2006 (Article lead looks good, but the rest needs a cleanup (esp. for language & fact details)). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

You must add a |reason= parameter to this Cleanup template – replace it with {{Cleanup|reason=<Fill reason here>}}, or remove the Cleanup template.

Hideki Tojo
40th
Prime Minister of Japan
In office
October 18, 1941 – July 22, 1944
Preceded byFumimaro Konoe
Personal details
BornDecember 30, 1884
Kanagawa Prefecture, Japan
DiedDecember 23, 1948
Tokyo, Japan

Hideki Tojo (Kyūjitai: 東條 英機; Shinjitai: 東条 英機; Tōjō Hideki) (December 30 1884December 23 1948) was a General in the Imperial Japanese Army, an ultranationalist thinker, and the 40th Prime Minister of Japan; he served as prime minister during much of World War II, from October 18 1941 to July 22 1944. He was executed on December 23, 1948 after being sentenced to death for war crimes.

Military and political life

Tojo was born in Tokyo, Japan in 1884. He was the third son of Hidenori Tojo, a Lieutenant General in the Japanese Army. Tojo's two older brothers died before his birth. In 1909 he married Katsuko Ito, with whom he had three sons and four daughters.

In 1905 he graduated from the Imperial Military Academy and entered service as a Second Lieutenant in the infantry. He rose through the ranks of the Army, graduating with top grades from the Army college in 1915. After graduation, he taught at the war college and served as an infantry officer.

During the 1920s, Tojo was also member of the Tosei-Ha (Control Group) along with Kazushige Ugaki, Gen Sugiyama, Koiso Kuniaki, Yoshijiro Umezu, and Tetsuzan Nagata. They attempted to represent the more conservative moderates in opposition to the extremist group Koda-Ha (Imperial Benevolent Rule or Action Group) led by Sadao Araki. Both factions derived from the Double Leaf Society, a 1920s militaristic group with fanatical ultranationalistic beliefs.


By 1935, he was a major general commanding the Kempeitai of the Kantogun (also known as Kwantung Army) in the Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo, and by 1937 he was chief of staff of that army. In 1938, Tojo served as Vice-Minister of War. From December of 1938 to 1940, Tojo was Inspector-General of Army Aviation. He was also the real commander-in-chief in charge of the Japanese Secret Services before and during the Pacific War period, and was in direct contact with Koki Hirota and leading the secret services in the Black Dragon Society and other Japanese secret societies.

During the 2-26 Incident, Tojo and Shigeru Honjo, a noted supporter of Sadao Araki, surprisingly acted against the rebels. Emperor Hirohito acted with unusual force against the coup, and after a brief political crisis and stalling from the military, the rebels were forced to surrender. In the aftermath, many radical officers were retired and the coup leaders were tried and executed.

During his period at the Home Ministry, he led the Keishicho (Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department).

In the late 1930s, Tojo became a member of the military clique, the Kodoha, that pushed Japan into the Second World War. Appointed War Minister in 1940, he was instrumental in leading Japan into the Axis Alliance with Germany and Italy. In July 1940, he was appointed War Minister in the second Fumimaro Konoe Cabinet, and remained in that post in the third Konoe Cabinet. When Prime Minister Konoe was unable to secure an agreement with the United States, Tojo's faction drove him into retirement. In 1941, Tojo was appointed prime minister by Emperor Hirohito and took command of the entire Japanese military. He also took leadership in Imperial Way Faction at that time. At varying times during his premiership, Tojo held the portfolios of Foreign Affairs, Education, Home Affairs, Commerce and Industry, and Munitions. As education minister, he continued militaristic and nationalist indoctrination in the national education system, and reaffirmed illiberal policies in government, in accordance with outlines traced by Sadao Araki, his ideological and political precursor.

In February 1944, Tojo assumed the post of Chief of the Army General Staff. However, following a series of military disasters, culminating in the fall of Saipan, he was abandoned by his backers and forced to resign on July 18, 1944. He retired to the first reserve list and went into seclusion.

Tojo's nickname was "the razor [kamisori]".

Military service

2dLt (Infantry), April 1905; was graduated from War College, December 1915; official duty, Switzerland, August 1919; Major, August 1920; official duty, Germany, July 1921; LtCol, August 1924; Colonel, August 1918; Regimental Commander, 1st Infantry, August 1929; MajGen, March 1933; Commandant,"Rikugun Shikan Gakko" (Military Academy), March 1934;

He became the Commander of the 24th Infantry Brigade in August 1934; the Commanding General of the Military Police in the Kantogun in September 1935; Lieutenant General in December 1936; Chief of Staff of the Kantogun in March 1937; the Vice-Minister of War in May 1938 (during the first Konoe Cabinet); and the Inspector General of Army Aviation in December 1938.

In July 1937, he personally led the units of the 1st Independent Mixed Brigade in Operation Chahar. When the China Incident occurred, the section stationed in Manchukuo moved to Hopei and fought near Peking against Chinese forces. Then the Brigade was ordered to participate in the offensive in Chahar Province. The Brigade marched via Chengde and Dolonnor and reached Zhangbei in five days. The distance of this march was 700km. Units were assigned to certain infantry divisions. Seeing this use of armor, Sakai Kouji, the tank commader, opposed Tojo, who was the commander of the Chahar Expeditionary Force; another officer in same operation was Kitsuju Ayabe who later became the highest commander of all Japanese forces.

Rise to office of Prime Minister

File:Tojo3.jpg
Tojo in military uniform

In those days, the Japanese army was strongly pushing to begin the war because Germany was winning. Tojo was one of these advocates of war. However, Hirohito did not want to start the war and preferred to keep negotiating with the U.S. in order to find a way out of the conflict. However, the prevailing opinion within the Japanese Army at that time was that continued negotiations could be dangerous. In addition, the US cut off Japan's oil supply. Hirohito thought that he might be able to control extreme opinions in the army by using Tojo since he was charismatic and had many connections within the military. Actually, at that time, Tojo was said to be the only person who could control the army. Also, Tojo was a loyal retainer of the emperor as Hirohito said later. Therefore, Hirohito called Tojo to come to the Imperial Palace one day before Tojo took office. Tojo wrote in his diary, "I thought I was called because the emperor was really angry at my opinion."

The signal for war in the Pacific was given on August 26 1941, at a session of the Black Dragon Society in Tokyo. At this meeting, War Minister Hideki Tojo ordered that preparation be made to wage a total war against the armed forces of the United States, and that Japanese guns be mounted and supplies and munitions concentrated in the Marshalls and Caroline groups of the mandated islands by November, 1941. Approving Tojo's war orders, former Foreign Minister Koki Hirota, head of the Black Dragons secret services, discussed the advantages and consequences of a conflict with the United States. Many of those at the meeting considered December, 1941, or February, 1942, the most suitable time for Japan to attack.

During September 1941 the situation worsened with continued sanctions imposed against Japanese trade and became irreversibly worse in October when Lieutenant-General Hideki Tojo became Japanese Prime Minister with the support of the Nippon nations powerful military establishment.

After arrival, Tojo was given one order from the emperor: that was to keep negotiating no matter what. The emperor of Showa said from Japanese record, "keep negotiating even if the U.S requires Japan to retreat its soldiers from China to Manchuria." Tojo accepted this order, and pledged to obey it because he was respecting the emperor. With that, Tojo then became the Prime Minister.

Tojo did his best to keep negotiating. However, the results were not good for the Japanese side. Japan then made the final decision to begin the war after seeing the Hull Note. The night of December 7 (The U.S was 6th), Tojo was said to have sat on a futon (Japanese bed) with his back straight and his knees together, sobbing. He might have regretted his act, or might have been apologizing to the emperor.

On 5 November Prime Minister Tojo revealed to his inner circle of the offensive plans for a defensive war that he felt was increasingly certain to happen. The eventual plan drawn up by Army and Navy Chiefs of Staff envisaged such a mauling of the western powers that defense perimeter line established based on the abilities of Japanese tenaciousness, operating on interior lines for communications and western casualty counts, could not be breached.

In addition, the Japanese fleet which attacked the Pearl Harbor was ordered by admiral Isoroku Yamamoto that if the negotiation did not succeed immediately before the attack, the fleet must return to Japan without the air raid on Pearl Harbor.

Numerous theories about political forces at work during this process include conspiracy theories about a concerted effort within the military-industrial complex of Japan and the right wing to derail negotiations and forge ahead with plans for colonialism and war.

General Tojo, diplomatic actions and politics

This fallacy became apparent as the course of the war against Japan unfolded. Japan had come to believe that the wars in Europe had so weakened the imperialists that the Mikado could pick up an extended East Asian empire at will. The Japanese military hierarchy planned a line of defence based on islands stretching from Rabaul in the Bismarck Archipelago to the Kuriles north of Japan, intending to swallow and digest the insular possessions of France, Britain, Netherlands, Australia, the Portuguese, and of the United States, while finishing off the Chinese - concluding the decades-long conflict that began with the notorious "Twenty-One Demands".

The "Indies" was the Crown Jewel to the Japanese. Without it, the embargoes placed against Japan would bankrupt her. Japan had 2 years supply of oil reserve for non-military use, one year if she went to war.

The growth of Japanese military dominance of East Asia

The aggressive Japan's major problem lay in that with great modern industrial expansion had turned into a major manufacturing nation and required sufficient raw materials that could be obtained over eastern Asia. Hence Japan's swift advance in securing these areas which brought on an immediate conflict with the western powers, who also had considerable political and economic interests in the Far East region. The Japanese move into French Indo-China and diplomatic discourse with Siam (Thailand) constituted a threat to the security of British Malay, the American Philippines, Dutch East Indies and the southern lands of Australia and New Zealand.

On Sunday 7 December the Imperial Japanese Navy hit the American military base at Pearl Harbor with an aerial onslaught. The elements of total war were clearly revealed by the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor. Itself in line with the practices of total warfare, was also in the Japanese military tradition, for they had begun other wars previously the same way.

On 16 February 1942, the British diplomats secretly proposed a peace deal with Japan.[citation needed] A possible agreement was that if Great Britain formally recognised the authority of imperial Japan over Northern China and Manchuria, the Japanese would give Britain sovereignty over the Malay Peninsula and Singapore.

At the same time as this diplomatic movement, a political confrontation was in progress between the Toho kai party and the Toseiha party. This was possibly the last internal political power struggle in the government before the Midway and Coral Sea defeats in 1942, which sent the Japanese military reeling.

The ultranationalist Toho kai party was led by Nakano Seigo who appeared to have some political influence at the time and expressed his outright support and confidence for Japanese Navy. He anxiously awaited the approval of the peace talks, so as to stabilize the recent conquests in Southeast Asia. Seigo also wanted to prevent any further sacrifices by the Japanese people towards the war effort, and pressured the government to halt the ambitious conquest of Asia.

On the other side was the largely pro-Imperialist faction, which represented the military interests of Japan, was led by Tojo. He displayed a completely different perspective over the issue. He reasoned that the successes in recent campaigns in Southeast Asia were extremely rapid, and continuation of the conquests could lead to gaining most of Asia and Australia before the United States and the Allies could react to further develop the so-called Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.

General Tojo rejected any form of peace processes in the conquered lands and gave authorization for more conquests. This angered and frustrated the Toho Kai until Seigo finally committed suicide on October 27 1943. When Japan rejected such peace agreements, the imperial empire lost the opportunity to mantain their new territories in Southeast Asia. In the long term Japan was unable to reinforce the defensive infantries, which allowed the United States to launch counter-offensives by 1943.

Elated by these early successes Admiral Yamamoto, the Chief of the Combined Fleet, convinced his superiors to expand further including the objectives of Midway, the Aleutians, and the Solomons, expanding the thin line of sea communications dangerously thinner. Individual Japanese commanders of the new Rising Sun Empire of Asia would go off on wild hunts to enhance their name after easy conquests unrelated to any overall strategic plan and was categorised as "victory disease" by the Japanese people.

Prime Minister Tojo and the Navy plan to invade Australia

Prime Minister Tojo believed that there were no contingency plans considered for Yamamoto's invasion plan to Australia. Tojo was concerned that the Japanese merchant and transport fleets were extended to its limit and the Americans could readily divert their B-17 Flying Fortresses to Sydney to destroy the invading forces.

Emperor Hirohito decided to postpone the invasion plan until Japanese forces had taken Burma and joined forces with the rebel Indian Nationalists. The outcomes of the battles of the Coral Sea and Midway ensured the invasion plan for Australia never took place.

General Tojo was an ardent supporter of the North Strike Group and declared his intention to realize operations from Manchukuo and nearby areas against the Russians in the Soviet Far East, Outer Mongolia and Siberian lands, as well as against the Kwantung Army. He was a fanatical anticommunist since his time leading Kempeitai forces in Manchukuo.

Postwar legacy

After Japan surrendered in 1945 Tojo shot himself in the chest in a suicide attempt. He survived and was arrested. He recovered from his injuries at a hospital. After recovering, Tojo was held at the Sugamo prison.

He then was tried by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East for war crimes. He was found guilty of the following crimes:

  • count 1 (waging wars of aggression, and war or wars in violation of international law)
  • count 27 (waging unprovoked war against China)
  • count 29 (waging aggressive war against the United States)
  • count 31 (waging aggressive war against the British Commonwealth)
  • count 32 (waging aggressive war against the Netherlands (Indonesia))
  • count 33 (waging aggressive war against France (Indochina))
  • count 54 (ordering, authorizing, and permitting inhumane treatment of Prisoners of War (POWs) and others)

He was sentenced to death on November 12, 1948 and executed by hanging.

Because of the crimes committed under his authority, Tojo is often considered responsible for the murder of more than 8 million civilians in China, Korea, Philippines, Indochina, and in the other Pacific island nations, as well as the murder of tens of thousands of Allied POWs and for the approval of government-sanctioned biological experiments on POWs and Chinese civilians (see Unit 731). There is some controversy over the extent of his responsibility, as he often claimed to be working on the orders of Emperor Hirohito, who was granted immunity from war crimes prosecution. As a result, some believe that Tojo and many other convicted war criminals ultimately became martyrs for the Emperor.

Tojo's commemorating tomb is located in a shrine in Hazu, Aichi. He was survived by a number of his descendants, including his granddaughter, Yuko Tojo, a right-wing activist, and his second son, Teruo Tojo, who designed fighter and passenger aircraft during and after the war and eventually served as an executive at Mitsubishi Heavy Industries.

Will

"Japanese gentlemen, Now, the Imperial edict of the end of the war is only merely carefully caught, whatever there may be. However, the allies provoke Greater East Asia War and I am only who fought unavoidably because of national survival and national self-defense. Although our country was unluckily defeated by that countries, reason's being in our country firmly is being unable to deny. Japan is the divine land. I wish you gentlemen are sure of the fate of the Empire and wait for the time of conquering this difficulty by making a devotion effort. I wish the sun being rejuvenated."


Preceded by Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan
1942
Succeeded by

Template:Japanese prime ministers