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This is an old revision of this page, as edited by Tyler Durden (talk | contribs) at 09:58, 20 June 2017 (→Jammu and Kashmir: reply). The present address (URL) is a permanent link to this revision, which may differ significantly from the current revision.

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The new timeline

As early as 13 September, armed Pathans had drifted into Lahore and Rawalpindi, and some Swatis had crossed into the Vale. About a week later, according to a deputy commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan, a scheme was launched to send tribesmen from Malakand to Sialkot, in lorries provided by the Pakistan Government.[71: Stephens, Pakistan, 1967, p.200] The report also referred to preparations in early October by Swat, Dir, and Chitral to attack Kashmir from the north-west. The Wali of Swat, a developed state, was an ambitious man. He had sought the governorship of the NWFP. It was now believed that he had been promised Kashmir if he could seize it. Cunningham knew that he 'had put up a lot of money for expenses of the Kashmir campaign'.[72: Cunningham's Diary, 26 Oct. 1947] He noted, too, that the Pir of Wana had personally recruited thousands of Mahsuds.[73: Cunningham's Diary, 26 and 30 Oct. 1947] There is little doubt that at the time when the north-western offensive began, Pathans were active further south in raids all along the Punjab border, from the Indus to the Ravi. The Maharaja and his PM complained of raiding, looting, and burning from Kathua to Kotli.[74: Mahajan to Patel, 23 Oct. 1947, Das, i.64-6]. Beside the clashes between rebels and the State forces, and the incursions of the raiders, Punjabi refugees in Kashmir heightened the communal temperature.[1]

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:44, 5 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

  • Another thing worth noting from RJ Moore's timeline. Action was happening already on 13 September. Until recently, we were led to believe that Liaquat Ali Khan ordered an invasion on 12 September, and that he was reacting to appeals from the Muslim Conference. I am now beginning to think this meeting was a decoy. Akbar Khan got fooled and so did we. The invasion got ordered much earlier. The 12 September meeting was just for organising the Poonch rebellion. More on that later. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 01:46, 6 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

The Theory 1 was that the Poonchis went to NWFP for arms, and the Pashtuns heard about the atrocities committed agains them and spontaneously decide to invade Kashmir (all on the same day of course). There have always been significant number of British commentators who supported this theory.

The Theory 2 that has been propagated by whisle-blowing Pakistanis is that the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan ordered the invasion. A meeting on 12 September has been mentioned, where 3 plans were discussed, one to arm the Poonchis, one to organise Pashtun tribals, and the third to organise the former INA officers and other interested Pakistanis from Punjab.

The Theory 3 is that the Pakistani Army organised the invasion under a plan called Operation Gulmarg. It has been discussed in detail by Indian military authors: Bajwa,[2] Jasbir Singh,[3] and various others. It was also mentioned breifly by K. V. Krishna Rao[4] and Arjun Subrahmaniam,[5] But some of the details were vague or inconsistent. A couple of days ago, I decided to check Kalkat's book[6] and, after squeezing enough information from Google snippet view, the details are fairly clear.

Major O. S. Kalkat was serving in the Bannu Brigade at Bannu at the time of partition. He was scheduled to leave for India at the beginning of September. On 20 August, when he was deputising for his commanding officer Brig. C. P. Murry (probably "Murray") who was away, there arrived in the post a letter marked "Personal - Top Secret". In it was a letter from General Frank Messervy attaching the plan for Operation Gulmarg. He was shocked, but quickly realized that the letter had to be personally acknowledged by his brigadier within 24 hours. So, he called him to return to base and gave him the letter. Probably the delay in the acknowledgement was enough for the higher officials to suspect foul play and he was put under house arrest. He escaped, reached Delhi on 18 October, and gave his information to a Gen. Kalwant Singh, Gen. Thapar and the defene minister Sardar Baldev Singh. None of them seems to have believed him. He was recalled on the 24th October after Nehru heard about it after the Operation Gulmarg started.

We don't have the official document that details what the the Army took down from him. Instead, we have the version published in Kalkat's book. I can't say whether this is exactly what he knew on 18th October or he modified it in the light of later events. The format of the version does look like the kind of thing he would have told the officials, point by point. If this is true, then the Theory 2 is entirely fictitious, a decoy meant for our consumption. Accordint to the Operation Gulmarg,

  • 20 lashkars were supposed to be recruited, one from each Pashtun tribe. The Deputy Commissioners (or District Collectors) and the Political Agents were responsible for recruiting them. (Mind you, many of them were British.)
  • The lashkars were supposed to gather at Bannu, Wanna, Peshwar, Kohat, Thall and Nowshera by the first week of September.
  • The Brigade Commanders at these places were to issue them arms, ammunition and clothing and presumaby train/indoctrinate them. (That is why the letter came to Brig. Murry.)
  • The lashkars were supposed to reach Abbottabad, the launching point, on 18th October
  • 10 lashkars were supposed to go into the Valley via three points.
  • Another 10 lashkars were supposed to operate in Poonch, Bhimbar and Rawalakot, with the intenion of capturing Poonch and Rajauri and then advance to Jammu.
  • Each lashkar was assigned a major, a captain and ten JCO's. The entire force was supposed to be commanded by "Major General" Akbar Khan (he was a Colonel at that time), with Birg. Sher Khan assisting. There is no mention of Khurshid Anwar.
  • There is no mention of the Poonch rebels ("Azad Army") except that they were supposed to act as guides for the lashkars, 10 guides per each lashkar. Akbar Khan was also given the task of organising the "Azad Army", the major portion of which was supposed to come from the Muslim element of the J&K State Forces. (Bullet point of 12 of Kalkat.)

Now, notice the corroboration from RJ Moore. It is known that, by 13 September, the Pathans were on the move. Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan was involved. Malakand Agency, Swat (princely state), Dir (princely state) and Chitral (princely state) were involved, which were all under the control of Political Agents. And, Pathans were being shipped to Sialkot.

The question now is, who ordered this operation? Obviously, General Messervy couldn't do it on his own. Neither did Liaquat Ali Khan have the power to order the General. Only Jinnah could have ordered it, and the British government had to be in on it. The implications are mind-boggling. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:05, 7 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry for the late, I was working for my exams. I have finished reading the message and the references just now. And coming to the point:
  • Theory 1 is nonsense — rule out.
  • Here comes a doubt, my new theory, Theory 4 - why is it not possible that Theory 2 (12 September meeting) was a large scale extension and effective implementation of Theory 3 (Operation Gulmarg plan) ? All the difference they have in timelines was a few weeks. I mean the meeting could have been held to discuss, plan and execute things more elaborately and extensively. Also if it was a decoy, we've to assume that Akbar Khan was also a part of decoying it. Because, he was visibly involved in 'Operation Gulmarg', and later wrote a book on these issues, but did not mention a word about the Operation Gulmarg. Now Pakistan was also keeping the '12 September plan' and its details, quite secret later, for so long time after the First Kashmir War, saying Pakistan did not encourage/back the tribal invasion in any way. So why did Akbar Khan even mention about the 4000 guns, '12 September plan', and all, if he was with that decoying objectives? He could have simply endorsed Theory 1. According to Theory 4, as to why Akbar Khan did not mention 'Operation Gulmarg' in his book, may be he thought mentioning the 12 September meeting, in which he was directly & importantly involved, as duly sufficient, because of its predominant consequentiality on the later events (acc to him).
The most interesting part is your ending statement. Going by either Theory 3 or Theory 4, the occurrence of Operation Gulmarg plan is validated. So whose doing it was? First of all, are you sure that the Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, or some other guy other than Jinnah, could not, or anyway practically did not order it? There would've been many powerful people, other than the Governal General himself, at that point of time, who could de facto insist or persuade the Commander-in-chief, General Messervy, though they might not be having the de jure powers to do so. And if it was Jinnah who planned this strategically foolish act, what about the accounts in Shams Rehman's writings from the blog you once sent me?[7] After few months Professor Ishaq and Ch Hameed ullah met Quaid e Azam in Karachi where according to professor Qureshi Mr Jinnah asked them annoyingly that why we caused all the mess in Kashmir despite his advice not to indulge in violence? Professor Qureshi said we did not do this. It was your Prime Minister and other top officials who staged the invasion. Mr Qureshi told me that when I said this, Quaid e Azam who was sitting on sofa upwards and leaning towards front, almost fell back against the back of sofa, closed his eyes and did not speak a word for few minutes. This is also a part of decoying? Please remember, Theory 3 alone, is literally rewriting the history. — TylerDurden10 (talk) 23:21, 7 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]
This is becoming worse than the worst conspiracy theory ever. But, unfortunately, that is where the evidence is leading us. Liaquat Ali Khan was led to believe that he was orchestrating the whole thing. But somebody else was orchestrating it behind the scenes and making him think that he was doing it. Honestly, I can't believe that I am writing this. It is like a bad Hollywood movie. But I don't know what else to say.
If Akbar Khan was indeed the designated commander, then Liaquat Ali Khan took him off (without knowing he was doing it) and gave the job to Khurshid Anwar, at least for a while. But that "while" was enough to lose the war. That heartburn is what caused Akbar Khan to write the book. He didn't write it to reveal the truth to the world. He wrote it to get at Liaquat Ali Khan and the political class. Remember that Akbar Khan is the only source for the Theory 2. There is no other information available from anywhere else. Shuja Nawaz, Effendi and all other scholars like Srinath Raghavan et al. are just regurgitating Akbar Khan's theory.
Akbar Khan wrote a plan for arming the Poonch rebels. 4,000 guns. Nothing compared to the 20,000 Pashtuns organised by Messervy. The Poonchies were a side show. He needed Liaquat Ali Khan to approve that. But Liaquat went beyond his pay grade. He somehow came up with his own idea of a Pashtun invasion, and started interfering with the Army's carefully laid out plan. That is how the war was lost.
Khurshid Anwar took all the credit for mobilising the Pashtuns. In reality, they were already mobilised by the time he got there. He probably just gave a few speeches and made himself the commander. The Army thought :it was fine to have some bafoons around; it gives us deniability." So, they let him be. But there wasn't much they could do about it anyway without exposing themselves.
Jinnah didn't order it. It is not in his character. He is a constitutionalist. Besides, he liked having princes around, which made him an emperor. Why should he get rid of the princes?
The evidence points only one way. On 22nd October, Messervy was in London. By then Kalkat had escaped, and Messervy knew the Indians would know his plan. He had to explain himself to the masters and figure out damage control. I suppose he did. And it worked. India never exposed him. Neither did Pakistan or any of its whistle blowers. The truth is burried for ever, unless the Russians can hack into MI6. There ends the story. The worst Hollywood movie ever. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 00:14, 8 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Many small questions left: Acc to you, if Akbar Khan wrote the his book to get back at Liaquat and other politicians for taking him off, why did he not tell that directly in the book? That, 'Operation Gulmarg' was planned carefully by the army on its own (or someone else outside, whose identity is buried forever - say 'X'), political class fiddled with it later and made things messy and caused the loss of war? I think, it was because he didn't want to reveal that it was the Army (may be with that X) who actually conspired first and wanted to blame it on political class, am I right? And who is this Khurshid Anwar? Why was Liaquat so interested to particularly send this MLNG chief to command such high profile military operations, instead of leaving them to army people themselves?
Why was the Brit, Frank Messervy, so enthusiastically favouring and participating in these Pakistan Army's mischievous secret plans? More importantly, why would India not expose Messervy at some point? Who did they cover it for? Besides, it would have greatly strengthened India's case in UN and all, when Pakistan was trying is best to deny its involvement in tribal invasion and endorsing Theory 1!
Lastly, why can't we document about 'Operation Gulmarg' to a possible extent in the article(s) from the sources we have? — TylerDurden10 (talk) 10:33, 8 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]
@Kautilya3: Also, please check your mail once, cheers! --- TylerDurden10 (talk) 11:03, 8 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]
See Khurshid Anwar (Major).
Akbar Khan told us what he wanted to tell us. Why would he try to expose the British officers? It wouldn't make sense. Pakistan Army was totally dependent on the British. According to a Pakistan Army man, Disgusted with Liaquats conduct in Kashmir war Akbar later planned a coup against him in 1950.[8]
As for the British strategies on Kashmir, there is a lot of research on it, which you will have to read at leisure (Panigrahi, Sarila, Dasgupta etc. that I have cited to you before.) Unfortunately, Google didn't put them online. The Operation Gulmarg would have been planned over several months. It didn't happen in four days. 20 August is when it became operational. Kalkat's description of his boss's reaction is revealing: The Brigadier arrived at Bannu on 21st August; and soon I presented the vital document to him. He read it and stood aghast. For a long time he stared into the distance with astonishment. It seemed to have upset him a great deal; probably he did not expect that the newly split Indian and Pakistan armies, with the exigencies of the partition had torn apart, should come to such a pass to fight each other. The Mr. X must have been extremely powerful to pull this off. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:21, 8 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

The major questions, when you have time:

  • Why would India not expose Messervy at some point, if they did come to know about the Operation Gulmarg? Who did they cover it for? Besides, it would have greatly strengthened India's case in UN and all, when Pakistan was trying is best to deny its involvement in tribal invasion and endorsing Theory 1!
  • Why shouldn't we document about 'Operation Gulmarg' to a possible extent in the article(s) from the sources we have?

— TylerDurden10 (talk) 13:47, 8 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

As far as I can see, Nehru never suspected somebody in Britain orchestrating it. He probably believed that the Pakistan government (Jinnah, Liaquat and whoever) were doing it. Both Messervy and Lockhart got fired in short order. (Messervy apparently shared the information with Lockhart, but Lockhart never told the political leaders about it.) That was the extent of Nehru's retaliation. Had Nehru suspected that Britain was behind the attack, he would never have taken Kashmir to the UN.
We can create a page on Operation Gulmarg, but we don't have good sources. K. V. Krishna Rao is the best I could find. Arjun Subramaniam would have been good, but his coverage is totally wrong. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 15:41, 8 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]
A seperate page would be too much for the sources we have. But I think we can add content about 'Operation Gulmarg' to a possible extent, in First Kashmir War and 1947 Poonch Rebellion pages.
Why because, knowing all this about Operation Gulmarg is a big disappointment to me. It meant that nothing triggered things. Not Poonch rebellion, not 'Hari Singh's tilt towards India', literally nothing! All research on how the India-Pakistan conflict originated is a joke now. It would have started any anyway by Pakistan, and it did. --- TylerDurden10 (talk) 23:49, 8 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I found some more sources.[9][10][11][12][13][14] — TylerDurden10 (talk) 01:11, 9 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry for demolishing your expectations. But that is how science progresses. New evidence leads to new theories. The new theory is not anything if not earth-shaking. The India-Pakistan conflict was created by the British. The plans were prepared by the British officers, well before independence. There were only six Pakistani officers at the rank of Colonel or above in 1947, most of them in non-combat roles. It was the British officers that were running the show. 20,000 Pashtun tribesmen were brought to six Brigade headquarters, many of them in which the Kashmir forces themselves fought togethter in the Second World War, in order to wage war on those very forces. Lockhart's testimony is mind-numbing for its callousness:

"The Prime Minister sent for me on the morning of 26th January. I walked over to his office and found him looking stern and somewhat agitated. Without any preliminaries, he asked me whether I had been given prior information about the massing of Pathan tribesmen near Attock just before the tribal invasion of Kashmir. I was quite taken aback, not so much at having to answer the question but because I realised that the only person who could have fed this information to the P.M. was Roy Bucher. A few days previously I had told him about the incident of General Sir Douglas Gracey's telephone conversation with me in late October – which I had subsequently forgotten about. I had mentioned the incident to no one else...."[15]

This is the Commander-in-Chief of Indian Army speaking: subsequently forgotten about. He was more concerned about the treachery of his own subordinate officer than with his own total disregard for his office. Do you know that the British burnt all their documents regarding princely states before they handed things over to the Indians? When the war started, India did not even have a map of Kashmir. The navy was intercepting Pakistan Army communications throughout October, but they didn't have any clue where this action was taking place. Where the hell was "Sensa"?

Indian incompetence in handling Kalkat's information is also mind-boggling. "Sardar" Baldev Singh imagined that a Sikh officer who risked his family to urgently reach Delhi to convey the information in time, was hallucinating![16] Nehru got mad that Kalkat was ignored. But he didn't process the information either. Did it register with him that the orders were issued on 20th August, by the British C-in-C of Pakistan to British officers? That should have been enough for him to raise hell with Britain. Kalkat's information doesn't appear in the White Paper either. Nobody in India paid any attention to Kalkat's information except the Army people themselves, and that too after Kalkat published his memoirs. And, why is Arjun Subramaniam, the only one outside the Army circles that covered the information doing it so incompetently? Even if nobody else does, one would expect India's security establishment to process the information with the due care that it deserves.

So, there is plenty for you to do. Perhaps not on Wikipedia, but in real world where things should actually happen. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 08:36, 9 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Nehru might have overlooked it, that the letter came by 20th August in Kalkat's testimony, and most probably did not think that it was the Britishers themselves who conspired all this, instead of Pakistanis. He would've thought Britishers were just supporting and following Pakistan's plans. Otherwise why would he go to UN, at least? (Even if we assume that he didn't want to take on the Britishers due to his friendly relations with them.) Or my extreme admiration for the architect of India is blinding my intuition to doubt him, may be?
Tell me exactly what to do, outside Wikipedia. I'll try my best, with your help. This should not be left hidden somewhere deep in the archives, it must be brought to light. Scholars like Snedden are writing books with the slogan — it was all initiated because of the all indigenous Poonch rebellion, and people like me get carried away with those foolish theories. Any average researcher/reader in future who wants to find out where it all started, should not burden his mind and waste his time between not so significant & consequential things like Poonch rebellion & 'Hari Singh's tilt' to know the truth. One has to be informed that the intention & plan of the Britishers for Pakistan to invade Kashmir prior to all these events, was the starting point of both the conflict and all the later (non-partition) violence during 1947-48 in J&K. --- TylerDurden10 (talk) 11:49, 9 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Well, Kalkat says Nehru threw paperweights at Baldev Singh and Thapar. Indians should have thrown paperweights at Nehru too, because he was the External Affairs minister and he neglected to follow through with the external affairs implications of Kalkat's information. At the least, it could have been used as leverage with the British government. Attlee communicated to Pakistan the very next day that the raiders could stay in Kashmir until a satisfactory settlement was reached, contrary to India's demand. A copy of the communication was dispatched to Lord Ismay, Mountbatten's Chief of Staff, in essence telling Mountbatten what he needs to do. So, Britain had defined its policy within a day of the Indian airlift. Could it have done so if Nehru confronted them with the information? Presumably Messervy was expecting to face hellfire in London. But nothing happened. Nehru dropped the ball. That is the only way of putting it.
Kalkat should have been systematically debriefed by trained professionals and all the policy implications should have been worked through. Kalkat should have been retained in the defence ministry as an advisor to the Kashmir operations. Instead, he was posted at Ambala in some random post, and he was kept getting called everyday to Delhi with some stupid question or the other. The whole thing smacks of total incompetence.
What can you do outside Wikipedia? Well, you can do a Ph.D. on it and write high-quality journal articles. Then we will be able to cover them in Wikipedia.
By the way, I have a good source now.[17] I will add a section in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 page. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:46, 9 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I added a section in the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 page. I have my doubts about the claimed leadership by Akbar Khan. For one, he was a Colonel at that time but Kalkat refers to him as "General". He also says that Akbar Khan was to be assisted by Brigadier Sher Khan, even though Sher Khan was senior to him. It is possible that Kalkat's description is the 1983 version, not what he saw in 1947. Somebody needs to find the record from 1947 for this to go anywhere. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 17:17, 9 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

I agree very much about the incompetence. But I don't think Nehru compromised national interests, he just made a big mistake. Things were greatly overlooked as far as I can see. To be precise, the timeline was not carefully examined (as you can see, even till today, no writer has given its due importance to the 20 August, and tried to establish that the date was well before any of the so-called "triggering" events in J&K state) and the identity of the orchestrator(s) was not properly analysed, it would have been simply assumed that the Pakistan, by its own, was the perpetrator. Without suspecting the direct involvement from the British Government (which remains only a suspicion, sadly, as we don't have a proof now also). That's where the ball was dropped, acc to me. But then again, its only my theory.
I saw the section, cheers! And okay, he might have mis-remembered about it then. It is possible that it was other way round. Colonel Akbar Khan assisting Brigadier Sher Khan, and Kalkat mistakenly interchanged the identities (speculation). I'm afraid as to what other record from 1947 can be found! Unfortunately, Kalkat's account is probably the only record available to anyone regarding the Operation Gulmarg. — Tyler Durden (talk) 18:07, 9 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Moore, Robin James (1987), Making the new Commonwealth, Clarendon Press, p. 49, ISBN 978-0-19-820112-0
  2. ^ Bajwa, Jammu and Kashmir War 2003, p. 82-89.
  3. ^ Jasbir Singh, Roar of the Tiger 2013, p. 129-130.
  4. ^ Krishna Rao, K. V. (1991), Prepare or Perish: A Study of National Security, Lancer Publishers, pp. 59–, ISBN 978-81-7212-001-6
  5. ^ Subramaniam, India's Wars 2016, Chapter 8.
  6. ^ Kalkat, Onkar S. (1983), The Far-flung Frontiers, Allied Publishers
  7. ^ "Azad Kashmir Government: Birth and growth, by Shams Rehman".
  8. ^ Amin, Maj Agha Humayun (1999), "The 1947-48 Kashmir War: The war of lost opporunities" (PDF), The Pakistan Army Till 1965, Strategicus and Tactitus
  9. ^ Krishna, Ashok. India's Armed Forces: Fifty Years of War and Peace. Lancer Publishers. p. 12. ISBN 9781897829479.
  10. ^ Capt, Ranbir Singh Gp. Major Defence Operations Since 1947. Ocean Books. p. 18. ISBN 9788188322671.
  11. ^ Shankar, Vijay N. Storm in Kashmir. Cambridge India. pp. multiple.
  12. ^ Bhattacharya, Brigadier Samir. NOTHING BUT!. Partridge Publishing. p. 19. ISBN 9781482816266.
  13. ^ VSM, Brig Amar Cheema. The Crimson Chinar: The Kashmir Conflict: A Politico Military Perspective. Lancer Publishers. p. 45. ISBN 9788170623014.
  14. ^ "Armed forces top brass and autobiographical account of their careers". India Today.
  15. ^ Palit, D. K. (1997), Major General A.A. Rudra: His Service in Three Armies and Two World Wars, Reliance Publishing House, p. 328, ISBN 978-81-7510-043-5
  16. ^ There was enough evidence about Tribal Raid, Kashmir Sentinel, 2012.
  17. ^ Prasad & Pal, Operations in Jammu & Kashmir 1987, p. 17.

Frank Messervy

I am trying to see what was known about Kalkat before the publication of his book. Absolutely nothing. Here is a book[1] published in 1982, which has loads of analysis about the British. It even has a chapter called British complicity in invasion of Kashmir. But no mention of Kalkat. About Messervy, we learn:

Pakistan C-in-C, General Messervy returned to Pakistan from London via New Delhi where he had a meeting with Mountbatten,[22] perhaps to give him a fuller briefing on behalf of the British Cabinet or the Service Chiefs on the lines of action recommended by them. This supposiiton is based on the fact that from New Delhi, Messervy went to Rawalpindi and before settling down to his work went to Peshawar to talk to Cunningham. The instructions from London evidently had to be relayed on to all the Englishmen concerned.[2]

Cunningham records:

"Messervy came up from Pindi for a talk; just back from England. He was in Delhi two days ago and was surprised to find Mountbatten directing the military operations in Kashmir. M. B. is daily becoming more and more an anathema to our Muslims, and it certainly seems as if he could see nothing except through Hindu eyes." (November 7, 1947).[3]

If "we" can have "our Muslims", why not Mountbatten have "his Hindus"? Obviously not. Being British, he is not allowed to favour "Hindus". That is so very un-British.

While India’s intervention was militarily successful, it was also highly controversial. General Sir Frank Messervy, Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, alleged that India had planned to militarily intervene in the state several weeks before the event (Messervy 1949).[4]

Still think Nehru doesn't deserve those paperweights? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 21:26, 9 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

WHAAAT THE ....? LOL!
Why did Nehru stay silent even when India was being ironically, reversely alleged? Why was Kalkat and his testimony taken so lite, even after 24 October? What was the reason? Do you have any idea/theory? — Tyler Durden (talk) 06:52, 10 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Nehru was a freedom fighter. He didn't know how to run a state.
Patel did, surprisingly. That is how the Kashmir operations succeeded. But Patel got pushed out of Kashmir issues by January. It went downhill from then on. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:13, 10 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"Several weeeks before the event". Perhaps Messery believed that information about his operation got leaked to India several weeks before the event? It would then make sense to assume that India was well-prepared? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 11:15, 10 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Hehehe, seems reasonable, your assessment. But poor Messervy didn't know, India was too lazy to process the information, or even acknowledge it for that matter! — Tyler Durden (talk) 14:21, 10 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]
@Kautilya3: Summarize about 'Operation Gulmarg' in the Kashmir conflict article also. You know to choose words carefully, better than I do. — Tyler Durden (talk) 11:51, 12 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I will think about it. It can only be the briefest possible mention because that article has to be based on neutral, third-party sources. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:25, 12 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I think, 2-3 lines with attribution shall be appropriate in that case. — Tyler Durden (talk) 12:34, 12 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Pandit, Fragments of history 1982.
  2. ^ Pandit, Fragments of history 1982, p. 265.
  3. ^ Razvi, Mujtaba (1971), The Frontiers of Pakistan: A Study of Frontier Problems in Pakistan's Foreign Policy, National Publishing House
  4. ^ Webb, Matthew J. (2012). "Escaping history or merely rewriting it? The significance of Kashmir's accession to its political future". Contemporary South Asia. 20 (4): 471–485. doi:10.1080/09584935.2012.737311. ISSN 0958-4935.

Bibliography


From Yusuf Saraf

Mountbatten's secret visit to Lahore

Generall Muhammad Musa revealed in Dawn, 1 September 1970 that Mountbatten secretly flew to Lahore sometime between 22nd and 27th October. He was accompanied by senior British officers of the Indian Army. He gave no advance announcement and did not inform the Pakistan government, even after landing.[1]

One morning in October 1947 I was rung by the Pakistan Air Force Control room and was told that a few British General Officers had landed at the airport (Walton) and another aircraft was due in shortly from India, carrying VIPs... No one in our HQ had any previous warning of their visit. I went to the airport. The C-in-C of both the dominions [does this include Auchinleck?] and their senior officers were standing outside our improvised reception office. The Pakistan Chief of General Staff had told me that they had come for a meeting with their Indian counterparts regarding the developments in Kashmir and I was to make the necessary arrangement immediately. As far as I can recollect, Lord Mountbatten had also come. ... The meeting lasted till lunch time. No Pakistani officer attended it. I, therefore, could not ascertain the decisions arrived at between the representatives of two States despite my relentless efforts to ascertain the outcome of discussions.

From what we know, R. L. Batra had come to Delhi on 24th, and, that evening, Nehru took Mountbatten aside during a State dinner and told him about the invasion of Kashmir. It appears from several sources that Mountbatten already knew about it. On 25th morning, there was a Defence Committee meeting. On 26th morning, Mahajan came to meet Nehru at his house, after which there was another Defence Committee meeting.

So this visit could have happened only on the 23rd or 24th morning. I would guess 24th. Messervy was already in London. So they would have had to meet Gracey. We have to conclude that Gracey was in Lahore that day, and they called and found out where he was, before landing. Or, perhaps, the first flight brought Gracey from Rawalpindi and the second flight from Delhi brought Mountbatten and Indian officers.

Of course, Yusuf Saraf regards this as a yet another Mountbatten conspiracy, but we know better. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 13:15, 26 May 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Das Gupta[2]

The request of the Maharaja was considered by the Defence Committee of India, presided over by Lord Mountbatten, on 25 October [at 11:00am], at which General Lockhart, Commander-inchief of the Indian Army, read out a telegram from the Headquarters of the Pakistan Army (similarly manned by the Britishers) stating that some five thousand tribesmen had attacked and taken possession of Muzaffarabad and Domel and that considerable tribal reinforcement could be expected. Reports showed that they were already little more than thirty-five miles from Srinagar.[47: Alan Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, p.120]

Everybody has reproduced this information, but I don't know of anybody that has actually seen the telegram. Some of them say that the telegram was sent by Gracey on 24th. Pakistan government has claimed:[3]

The British acting Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, General Gracey, sent a telegram on 24 October to the Defence Secretary which warned of "chaos in Kashmir with consequent repercussions on adjoiniong Pakistan districts and inter-Dominion border". It said: "Consider only way to prevent further tribal incursion and persuade return of lashkars already in Kashmir is for tribal leaders to be told categorically that policy of Pakistan Government was and still is strict neutrality".

We might imagine that these telegrams were sent because Mountbatten and Auchinleck told Gracey to behave. But the question then is, how did Mountbatten and Auchinleck know by 24th morning that an invasion had occurred? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:43, 26 May 2017 (UTC)[reply]
When Yusuf Saraf says "C-in-C of both the dominions", that only gives us Lockhart and Gracey(acting C-in-C, as Messervy was in London then). But when he adds "C-in-C of both the dominions and their senior officers, that can mean Auchinleck. Who else would be the "senior officer" of C-in-Cs, if not Auchinleck, who was the Supreme Commander of all British forces in India and Pakistan? As to how Mountbatten and Auchinleck knew about the invasion by 24th morning, Mountbatten would've gotten the word that this invasion was being planned from the Pakistan's side from some of his British sources. Even if we put the Kalkat's Operation Gulmarg theory aside, one thing is for sure — now that we know beyond doubt that Pakistan had planned the tribal invasion with the involvement of both its administration and Army, it certainly cannot go without the knowledge of the Britishers, who had eyes and ears all over Pakistan's circles in administration and Army. So even if we assume that the British was not involved in the invasion plans, it definitely did support them. Now an interesting part here is, apart from Auchinleck (if he was there in the secret meeting), neither Mountbatten (the Governor General of India) nor Lockhart (the C-in-C of India! seriously?) bothered to give any information regarding the invasion to Indian Government/J&K State Government, before rushing to Pakistan to take safety measures for the Britain. That shows some "beautiful" responsibility.
Of course, Yusuf Saraf regards this as a yet another Mountbatten conspiracy - Seriously? Does he mean conspiracy against Pakistan? How? Why would Mountbatten rush and have a secret meeting in Pakistan, with all his British officers of India and Pakistan, to conspire against Pakistan on Kashmir, when the invasion itself was already being launched from the Pakistani side? Does this make any sense anywhere? — Tyler Durden (talk) 18:02, 26 May 2017 (UTC)[reply]
No, we don't have any information about the involvement of the British officers on the Pakistani side, except for Kalkat's information. We do know that Gracey had told Lockhart about the impending invasion sometime that he calls "late October". But he said that he had told only Roy Bucher about it, and he got pissed off with Bucher when Nehru confronted him. We can be sure that Bucher would have been among their senior officers, but were there others? Did Lockhart tell Mountbatten as well, or did Mountbatten get his information via some other source? If so, who was the source that has enough wherewithal to inform Mountbatten?
Since the term "Supreme Commander" doesn't occur, it would appear that Auchinleck wasn't among the entourage. If Mountbatten went without Auchinleck, that would be really odd, because he had no authority over Gracey to tell him what to do. He could do that only if he was relaying instructions from Whitehall.
As to why Yusuf Saraf thinks it is a conspiracy, it is obvious, isn't it? Mountbatten was apparently restraining Pakistani Army from helping the invasion and doing a yet another favour to India. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:19, 26 May 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Yes, talking about the British officers involvement without Kalkat's evidence is WP:OR. I just said it for the discussion's sake. And as to the 'who told Mountbatten' dilemma, I think, Lockhart himself might have told him. (or why not Bucher?)
If Mountbatten went without Auchinleck, that would be really odd, because he had no authority over Gracey to tell him what to do. He could do that only if he was relaying instructions from Whitehall. — He had no authority. But he can just warn him of the possible consequences, if this goes to his superiors. That would be enough for a sane Gracey to take a step back. — Tyler Durden (talk) 11:21, 27 May 2017 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Saraf, Muhammad Yusuf (2015) [first published 1979 by Ferozsons], Kashmiris Fight for Freedom, Volume 2, Mirpur: National Institute Kashmir Studies, pp. 196–197
  2. ^ Das Gupta, Jyoti Bhusan (2012), Jammu and Kashmir, Springer, ISBN 978-94-011-9231-6
  3. ^ Government of Pakistan (1977), White Paper on Jammu and Kashmir Dispute, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan

Provisional government

Yusuf Saraf also completely discounts the first Provisional Government. It was apparently formed in Lahore.when he himself was in Lahore running the liberation movement's "Publicity Bureau", but he was told nothing about it. It was apparently formed by the Mirza, and all the people involved were Ahmadiyyas, including Gilkar. Gilkar then went to Rawalpindi and issued press notices. But there was no known involvement of the liberation movement itself in either the formation or the announcement. It looks like Snedden got this controversy right. Sardar Ibrahim was certainly running things during this period. (But the information we have put on the page is from Das Gupta, cites Civil & Military Gazette, 7 November 1947.)

On 25 October, Yusuf Saraf gave a speech in Lahore where he mentioned the (second) Provisional Government and Hamidullah objected to the mention saying that it was unauthorised. However, on 4 November, a meeting was held in Rawalpindi, where everybody accepted Sardar Ibrahim as president. (This part is fine as narrated by Shams Rehman.)

So, things were quite chaotic, with infighting and all. Shams Rehman is right that both the governments were announced at the instigation of Pakistan, presumably to provide cover for the military actions being launched, but the Muslim Conference ratified it (in a manner of speaking) on 4 November. The appointed minister from Jammu arranged for lorry-loads of refugee civil servants to be shipped from Jammu, who were then appointed to their respective departments, with promotions, in the new government. But, all these ministers and officials had nothing to do for a quite a while! -- Kautilya3 (talk) 12:26, 27 May 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Gilkar then went to Rawalpindi and issued press notices. - Wasn't Gikar arrested in Srinagar, and that's how the first provisional government fizzled out, as the article says now?
1947 Poonch Rebellion - Seems like every piece of this article is an apparent mess. I did not have an iota of idea regarding what a chaos this subject is, when I created the article. You seriously deserve a medal for putting so much amount of remarkable efforts for it. — Tyler Durden (talk) 15:35, 27 May 2017 (UTC)[reply]
For Yusuf Saraf, the provisional government was basically mythical, because it had no support or authority from anybody. But we have CMG saying that Sardar Ibrahim was the appointed PM. He certainly wasn't mythical. Neither did he fizzle out. So, I guess we have to ignore Saraf. (Gilkar issued press notices before he went to Srinagar. Why he went to Srinagar is not clear either. Saraf doesn't know anything about it. Some people have said that he went to talk to Sheikh Abdullah and persuade him to support Pakistan.)
As for the article, we certainly know a lot more about the subject now than we did when you started it. So no harm done! -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:50, 27 May 2017 (UTC)[reply]
See Muhammad Yusuf Saraf. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 16:52, 27 May 2017 (UTC)[reply]

D-day

As we have read elsewhere, there were two D-days: 6 October, when the Poonch Rebellion was launched, and 22 October, when the tribal invasion was launched. I haven't yet located this discussion in the book, but there is some evidene that the second D-day of 22 October was inconvenient from the Pakistani point of view. Saraf says that, after Abdullah's release, roughly a week before his trip to Delhi, three Punjabi politicians visited him including Mian Iftikharuddin. Abdullah mentioned the other two in his autobiography but omitted Iftikharuddin. According to Saraf, the three of them persuaded Abdullah to support accession to Pakistan. Sheikh agreed to consider it, stated his conditions, and sent G. M. Sadiq to negotiate. He himself promised to visit Pakistan soon after his trip to Delhi. While he was still in Delhi, the invasion got launched.

How did this happen? The dates are not mentioned clearly. But I surmise that the three politicians must have visited around 12 October, a week before Abdullah's trip to Delhi around 19 October. So, on 12 October, Iftikharuddin didn't know that there was a D-day on 22 October. That seems strange. On the other hand, Major A.S.B. Shah, another central minister that was trying to negotiate with Mahajan in Srinagar, seems to have known. He was giving ultimatums. "Sign this or else..." After being turned down, he went back to Pakistan and warned Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan on 18 October that aggression on Kashmir would provoke the Maharaja to accede to India.

Iftikharuddin must have been in touch with Liaquat Ali Khan. He was in the planning meeting on 12 September. So, this seems to imply that the timetable was not under the control of Liaquat Ali Khan. Who was controlling it?

There are also issues with numbers. Saraf says that Khurshid Anwar arranged with Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan for 2,000 tribesmen. But Anwar said he went in with 4,000 tribesmen. But other independent observers have said in excess of 12,000. These tribesmen apparently kept on coming even after the invasion started. Who was sending them? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 22:18, 2 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

  • Kautilya3 First things first. Saraf says that, after Abdullah's release, roughly a week before his trip to Delhi, three Punjabi politicians visited him including Mian Iftikharuddin. Abdullah mentioned the other two in his autobiography but omitted Iftikharuddin. - Then how do you know that Iftikharuddin is one among the three?
You mean, how does Saraf know? Mr. Justice Sheikh Anwarul Haq, Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, who accompanied the delegation to Srinagar confirmed to this writer on 28th July, 1974 while on a visit to Muzaffarabad in the company of Mr. Hamoor-ur-Rehman, Chief Justice, that it had been agreed that Sheikh Abdullah would visit Karachi after his visit to Delhi for talks with the Pakistan Government. The three Pakistani leaders then returned to Lahore. (p.95) Pretty respectable source there. Let us note that Iftikharuddin is a pretty central figure in the whole saga. Sardar Ibrahim got his attention in Lahore (and only his), and he then set the ball rolling, leading to the 12 September meeting. Iftikharuddin knew that the Muslim Conference was moribund and the National Conference held the key to the state. So he was opening a second channel. He [Abdullah] also told them that so long as he did not come to Karachi, the situation should not be precipitated. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 06:59, 3 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
  • Major A.S.B. Shah, another central minister... was giving ultimatums (to Mahajan). "Sign this or else..." After being turned down, he went back to Pakistan and warned Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan on 18 October that aggression on Kashmir would provoke the Maharaja to accede to India. - This doesn't give enough evidence to believe that he particularly knew the timeline of 22 October.
The manner of his negotiation with Mahajan indicates that he knew that things were going to get "precipitated". The fact that he went back and met Khan Abdul Qayyum Khan shows that he knew what was going on. He may not have known the exact date, but he knew that it was close. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 07:07, 3 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
  • All these aside, if all your theory is true, there are only two possibilities. 1) The tribal invasion was mostly indigenous. 2) Akbar Khan along with the British officers in the Army planned this, and only they knew all the details about this. 1) is ruled out for so many reasons. But as usual, we need evidence for 2). — Tyler Durden (talk) 04:23, 3 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
1) No, indigenous invasion has been ruled out by Robin James Moore. It was at least a "provincial operation" (from NWFP). 2) There is strong circumstantial support that it was an Army operation. Firstly, the scale of it, and secondly the lack of knowledge of its scale by any of the politicians. (When George Cunningham called Liaquat Ali Khan's office, he was asked, how many men have we got there? Are they getting their supplies all right? Ergo, Liaquat Ali Khan did not know about the details either. It has been outsourced to Khan Abdul.) Nobody in Poonch knew about it. General Kiani didn't know about it. The Pir of Manki Sharif didn't know about it. Thirdly, the timing of it. It was sudden and massive. Everybody was shocked, though they all welcomed it. Khurshid Anwar had totally outdone himself! Or somebody outdid him. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 07:48, 3 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

On the Maharaja

Some revelations (p.64):

With the accession of Hari Singh, the extreme fanaticism that prevailed in the Durbar came to an end and the Swami [Sant Dev] was banished from the court. Hari Singh, it may be said to his credit, was a liberal-minded ruler when he ascended the throne and remained so till 1931 when to his great misfortune, the political awakening among Muslims touched great heights and led to the demand for responsible government which obviously meant the end of his personal rule. Hari Singh was prepared to be liberal; he was prepared to give better treatment to his Muslim subjects than they had received before, but he was not prepared for radical political reforms.

Sheikh Abdullah says (Flames of Chinar, p.91)

The Maharaja had always appeared to be free from religious prejudices. He was close to his Muslim courtiers especially Nawab Khusro Jung, Abdul Rahman Afandi and Sahibzada Noor Mohammad. But things took a drastic turn at the time when the shuddhi and tabligh movements gathered force. Khawaja Hasan Nizami in his magazine, Manadi, announced that the Maharaja of a Hindu state was about to embrace Islam. This caused panic among the Hindus, who tightened their grip on him, and the Maharaja moved closer to the Arya Samaj camp. Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, taking advantage of the situation, planted Mehr Chand Mahajan and Ram Lal Batra in the Kashmir administration.

In case you start wondering whether Patel did this, I don't think so. Mahajan was Hari Singh's own choice, picked in April/May 1947. It was only after Mahajan accepted the post of PM in mid-September that he visited Delhi and started talking to Patel as well as Nehru about Kashmir. There is no evidence that either of them had any influence with Hari Singh prior to this. (In fact, they were considered "enemies".) It is true that Hari Singh got under the influence of Arya Samaj towards 1946-47, but that was most likely due to his wife, Tara Devi, and also the prevailing partition tensions. Both Mahajan and Batra might have been the Maharani's choices. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 10:23, 5 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Hmm, I see. So your position that — Hari Singh was "secular" until his power had gone at stake, and until he came under (or was driven to) the influence of Arya Samaji circles — is correct. I regret ridiculing this perspective before. :-) Cheers, Tyler Durden (talk) 12:43, 5 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Hello Tyler Durden

Hello Tyler Durden, you leaved a message in my talk page. i am new in wikipedia, so i am learning how to edit :) How did you added the smiley emoji in edit. Please tell me. --WikiBodhiVamsa (talk) 07:12, 12 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Hi WikiBodhiVamsa, the smiley is part of the image. And the whole welcome message I posted on your talk page is sent using the template: ''{{welcome-personal}}'', through WP:Twinkle. Cheers, Tyler Durden (talk) 07:31, 12 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Hi Tyler Durden, Thanks for letting me know :) i want to know are you from Hyderabad.? i lived so many years in hyderabad too. Are you inclined toward certain ideology left or right.??? --WikiBodhiVamsa (talk) 07:37, 12 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Well, left & right are quite complex, contextual and vast ideologies. I'm mostly (but not in all contexts) somewhere between centre and left. You can call me a moderate-leftist. Cheers, Tyler Durden (talk) 08:19, 12 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Hi Tyler Durden Hello Vamsee Krishna, dear vamsee, i didn't indulge in Edit war, i contributed to the article but username "Vanamonde93" deleting the reverting my edit. I added information on the article but he repeatedly deleting it. Please see the history again. he is doing edit war with me. i didnt. I think you know him. is he is your fellow comrade? i am just asking i don't know dear. i am new in wikipedia, i am learning so bare with me :) --WikiBodhiVamsa (talk) 08:23, 12 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

(tps) @WikiBodhiVamsa: do you understand why your previous accounts got blocked? -- Kautilya3 (talk) 09:07, 12 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Hi Kautilya3 Hello Kautilya3, which account you are talking about.? i don't know when i discussed something with one comrade other comrade(with multiple account) jump into the discussion and try to dominate. This is Left wing fascism, try to suppress other views and hackled opinion with different views. Why Communist has taken over the Free open-source platform like wikipedia.? i think "Tyler Durden", "Kautilya3" and "Vanamonde93" are fellow comrade with Hinduphobia mindset, a distinct hatred for hindus. is i am correct.? is this allow in wikipedia.? --WikiBodhiVamsa (talk) 12:09, 12 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
@WikiBodhiVamsa: I have warned you on your userpage for the record, but please read WP:NPA and abide by it. Otherwise, you are likely to be blocked fairly quickly. Vanamonde (talk) 12:12, 12 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
@Vanamonde93: Can you please warn Dbfirs too. he is personally attacking. WP:NPA. i am waiting for your reply --WikiBodhiVamsa (talk) 12:34, 12 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Don't be ridiculous. You asked him for help: he gave you some good advice, which you have decided to ignore. Please cut this out, and make constructive contributions instead. Vanamonde (talk) 12:39, 12 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
@Vanamonde93: Sir i want to make constructive contribution to Wikipedia and want to make it better. But when i add information to article citing source then some user revert it & delete it, try to have monopoly. Like Godhara incident page. reverting & deleting it destructive. i added the "target" & "Perpetrators". This is clear that all victims are Hindus and All accused are Muslim it was pre-planned conspiracy( Verdict my SC) i am wrong.? Please tell me then why i am not allowed to add this information.? i am worried Plz reply. your student --WikiBodhiVamsa (talk) 13:03, 12 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
I'm afraid that, like many others, you have misunderstood what Wikipedia is about. It is an encyclopaedia, which ONLY summarises what independent sources have published about subjects. Your additions were unsourced. Theroadislong (talk) 13:07, 12 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Inside the tribal raid

Krishna Mehta, the wife of the wazir-i-wazarat of Muzaffarabad, survived the tribal raid, and after several ordeals, got returned to India. She later became an MP from Kashmir. Some of what she says:[1]

Both the raiders understood Hindustani and they were in a fix as to how to answer my question. They could not help agreeing iwth me, and said, "Islam does not teach us to torture people. In that you are right. But we are helpless. We are here to carry out orders." (p.33)

Meanwhile, the tribesmen who had earlier carried away several women from our party returned. Among them were also Muslim deserters from Jammu and Mirputi [Mirpur?]. The scramble started all over again. Every woman was surrounded by a host of raiders, tormented and bullied. The rebels proved to be much worse than the tribesmen; they were more callous and more brutal. They snatched away children sleeping cosily in their mothers' laps and flung them to the ground and dragged the women out of the room. (p.37)

Our guide was hardly twenty-two and on the way I tried to talk to him. "Why have you left your home and come all this way?" I asked.

"Because the rulers of Pakistan told us that Islam was in danger and the Muslims in Kashmir were being tyrannized and their women threatened with dishonour," was the ready answer that he made.

"Do you get paid for all this?" I enquired out of sheer curiosity. "Oh, no," he said, "nothing has been decided so far. We have only been told to kill the Hindus, carry away the girl of our choice, plunder anything that we can lay hands on, and burn the houses down. Of course, what we really want is the land." (p.43)

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 23:32, 12 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

K, This is quite ugly and bizarre! Why and by whom were they particularly ordered to carry out such gross violence against Hindus? Wasn't the tribal raid intended by the Pakistani political & military administration, merely to occupy Kashmir? Do you have any idea on who was involved in these orders, and for what they wanted so much revenge there? Is it the usual hatred during partition violence? And why did the tribesmen also attack Muslims in Muzaffarabad & Baramulla? --- Tyler Durden (talk) 09:22, 13 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
The "orders" would have been mostly from tribal leaders, but orchestrated by Khurshid Anwar and whoever was commanding/advising them from the Pakistani army. Revenge for whatever they heard about from Punjab, Poonch and Jammu would have been part of the motivation. But the raiders were also authorised to loot (money and women, considered war booty). She mentions some retreating raiders who filled their pockets with hands chopped off from victims, because they didn't have time to retrieve the rings/bangles etc. It was a free for all. Why burning happened is not clear. I guess it was their idea of how an invasion was supposed to work.
It is clear that the rebels/deserters were fully part of the "raid".
Why were Muslims too targeted? The official explanation is that the raiders said they couldn't distinguish between Kashmiri Hindus and Muslims. But Krishna Mehta also narrates an incident where the daughter of a Moulvi she was taking shelter from was targeted. The girl told them that she was Muslim, but it didn't make any difference. When the Moulvi himself went and pleaded, they released her, but rather reluctantly. "Rescuing Muslims" was the cover story. But really, the raiders weren't going to stick to it.
But all this was in Muzaffarabad though. Baramulla was quite different. There the tribal bosses began fighting with each other to decide who was going to be the Nawab of Srinagar. The tribesmen were then left to themselves, and a general free-for-all ensued. -- Kautilya3 (talk) 14:23, 13 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

References

  1. ^ Mehta, Krishna (2005) [first published 1954 as Chaos in Kashmir], Kashmir 1947: A Survivor's Story, Penguin Books, ISBN 978-0-14-400017-3

NPP

Hi,
I am not sure what your interests are on wikipedia, but would you please consider becoming Wikipedia:New pages patrol/Reviewers? Reviewing/patrolling a page doesn't take much time, currently wikipedia needs experienced users at this task. (After gaining the right, patrolling is not mandatory. One can do it at their convenience). But kindly read the tutorial before making your decision. Thanks. —usernamekiran(talk) 17:46, 15 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

@Usernamekiran: Thanks for the invite. I'm interested to contribute, but I see that there is some application process over there. Do I need to write an elaborate application for convincing that I'm worthy enough for this? In that case, sorry, I'm not interested. Please don't get me wrong, I'm just lazy for that kind of stuff. If there is nothing of that sort, do tell me, and I'll apply. Best regards, Tyler Durden (talk) 20:51, 15 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
lol. no, all you have to say is that you want to contribute to wikipedia through this method. and "you should take look at my contribution history, and decide if I am worthy enough to handle the task."

Edit summaries 2

I understand that you are frustrated, but tone down those edit summaries a trifle. A lot of POV pushers will be removed by this community eventually, but that process becomes longer and more difficult if the folks who are sticking to policy are loosing their cool. Regards, Vanamonde (talk) 10:40, 17 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

+1, Ms Sarah Welch (talk) 21:47, 17 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

+2 From Gandhi and Nehru. They always practised and preached patience and tolerance towards everyone and everything in their life. Mahant Yogi Adityanath (talk) 08:40, 18 June 2017 (UTC) And please don't block me using something. I am someone who loves you. I am not Bodhivamsa. I only disturbed you. I did not disturb any others like him. And I have a lot of respect for comrades. You had good evidence for Bodhivamsa which I saw on others talkpage. You wasted all of it by including me in the complaint. Mahant Yogi Adityanath (talk) 08:54, 18 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

@Mahant Yogi Adityanath: I'm afraid you are in no position to lecture anybody, given the edits that you were making. You need to carefully read WP:NPOV, WP:V, WP:RS, WP:NPA, and WP:CIVIL. Yes, that's a lot of pages, but I'm afraid there are several issues with what you were doing. Vanamonde (talk) 13:50, 18 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
Van and Sarah, sorry that I forgot to reply here. Will certainly keep that mind, thank you. Best, Tyler Durden (talk) 06:04, 20 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Pending changes reviewer granted

Hello. Your account has been granted the "pending changes reviewer" userright, allowing you to review other users' edits on pages protected by pending changes. The list of articles awaiting review is located at Special:PendingChanges, while the list of articles that have pending changes protection turned on is located at Special:StablePages.

Being granted reviewer rights neither grants you status nor changes how you can edit articles. If you do not want this user right, you may ask any administrator to remove it for you at any time.

See also:

Mz7 (talk) 22:18, 17 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Send welcome message

Idiot. I made 10 undeleted edits. Nobody welcomed me except the automatic XLinkBot because I made one copyright infringement in external links. You come and send me a welcome message soon. Signature: Marla Durden (talk) 14:35, 19 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

"This edit has been prevented because unregistered and new editors can not modify other editors' userpages, or you attempted to add or remove unlocked userpage when you are not the owner of the userpage. If you want to contact this editor, you may do so at the editor's talk page. Requests for changes can be made there as well. If this is your userpage, please log in to edit your userpage." So I am contacting you on your talk page. Give me your log in. ^_^ Signature: Marla Durden (talk) 15:13, 19 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

(talk page stalker) Hi, Marla. You were apparently unable to edit Tyler Durden's userpage, as is proper — why should you modify another user's userpage? Asking Tyler Durden for his "login" is inappropriate, as you are by no means allowed to log into somebody else's account, even if you are their sister as you state here. Bishonen | talk 20:10, 19 June 2017 (UTC).[reply]
Bish & Mz7: Yes, she is my sister. She came to WP yesterday itself just like that, after asking me to teach how to edit. She wanted to make a few edits on some local topics, but she was also behaving a bit childish with me. She didn't have a proper idea about the ways of Wiki. And its true that she merely edited my user page from my PC, I had to allow her after she insisted me. Anyways, she doesn't have my password, and I can assure that nothing of this sort will happen ever again, from my side or her side. I hope, this time it won't get any further serious.
Marla: See. [1] [2] - And again, brilliant edit summaries, darling! So unrevealing. Just attracted warnings from two new admins on my talk page. Keep it up. — Tyler Durden (talk) 06:01, 20 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Sorry, I alone am responsible for this. Sorry for creating a lot of trouble and bothering many people. I promise to be careful from now onwards and not do anything inappropriate. Besides I will only make small changes in small pages. Thank you all for your time. Tyler Durden, thanks a lot for your kind compliments. I am honored. Signature: Marla Durden (talk) 08:14, 20 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Jammu and Kashmir

Karan Singh says [3]:

... the "major mistake" New Delhi has been making in the past few decades on Kashmir issue was approaching it as an issue of the Valley.

"There is no such state called Kashmir. The state is called Jammu and Kashmir. The major mistake was to approach it as Kashmir issue. They are realising it now," he said.

He said that after the Dogra rule was abolished the "glue that had held the state together "disappeared" and Sheikh Abdullah could never make peace with Dogras.

-- Kautilya3 (talk) 07:56, 20 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]

K: Well, I wouldn't blame Sheikh for not making peace with the Dogras. He couldn't. Jammu agitation's rallying cry of outright "Ek Vidhan, Ek Nishan, Ek Pradhan" ("one constitution, one flag and one premier") was too hard to deal with from Kashmiri-perspective.
There is no such state called Kashmir - Its true that the issue was never dealt from the angle of Jammu vs Kashmir, as Balaj Puri also states in his article. But the Kashmiris have been mainly & largely demanding to liberate the state called Kashmir.
Incidentally I wonder why Karan Singh talks nothing about Jammu massacres when he says, "Had Maharaja Hari Singh and Sheikh Abdullah been able to come to an agreement, the whole history of the sub-continent would have been different." and states that the "glue that had held the state together disappeared with the abolishing of Dogra rule." (which in Balaj Puri's words: "loyalty to the Maharaja was a common link between Hindu and Muslim leaders of Jammu on the issue of accession and hostility to Kashmiri leaders.") No comments. Cheers, Tyler Durden (talk) 09:57, 20 June 2017 (UTC)[reply]
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