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Denmark in World War II

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Headquarters of the Schalburgkorps, a Danish SS unit, after 1943. The occupied building is the lodge of the Freemasons located on Blegdamsvej, Copenhagen.

Germany's occupation of Denmark was commenced by Operation Weserübung 9 April 1940, and lasted until the German forces withdrew at the end of World War II following their surrender to Allied forces on 5 May 1945. Contrary to the situation in other countries under German occupations during the war, most Danish institutions continued to function relatively unaffected until 1943. The Danish government remained in the country in an uneasy relationship between a democratic and a totalitarian system until German authorities dissolved the government following a wave of strikes and sabotage.

Invasion

The occupation of Denmark was never an important objective for the German government. The decision to occupy their small northern neighbour was made to facilitate the invasion of the strategically more important Norway; and as a means against the awaited British campaign in Norway. German military planners believed that a base in the northern part of Jutland, most importantly the airfield of Ålborg, would be essential in the invasion of Norway, and began planning an occupation of parts of Denmark, but as late as February 1940, the decision to occupy Denmark had not yet been made. [1] The issue was finally settled when Hitler personally crossed out the words die Nordspitze Jütlands (the Northern tip of Jutland) and replaced them with Dä, a German abbreviation for Denmark.

Although the Danish territory of South Jutland was home to a significant German minority, and the province had been regained from Germany as a result of a plebiscite as part of the hated Versailles Treaty, Germany was in no apparent urgency to reclaim it. In a vaguer and much more long term way some Nazis hoped to incorporate Denmark into a greater "Nordic Union" at some stage, but there was no serious plan of that sort. Officially Germany claimed to be protecting Denmark from a British invasion.[2]

A group of Danish soldiers on the morning of the German invasion, 9 April 1940. Two of these men were killed later that day.

At 4:15 in the morning of 9 April 1940 (Danish standard time), German forces crossed the border to neutral Denmark, in direct violation of a German-Danish treaty of non-aggression signed the previous year. In a coordinated operation, German ships began disembarking troops at the docks in Copenhagen. Although outnumbered and with poor equipment, soldiers in several parts of the country fought back, most importantly the Royal Guards in Copenhagen, and units in South Jutland. At the same time, German planes dropped the notorious Oprop leaflets over Copenhagen calling for Danes to accept the German occupation peacefully claiming that Germany had only occupied Denmark in order to protect it against England and France. Colonel Lunding later confirmed that Danish intelligence knew the attack would be coming on either April 8th or 9th and had warned the cabinet accordingly. Ambassador Zahle in Berlin issued a similar warning which was also ignored.

Sixteen Danish soldiers died defending Denmark, but after only two hours of military resistance the Danish government surrendered believing that resistance was useless and hoping to work out an advantageous agreement with Germany. The flat territory of Jutland, immediately adjacent to Germany, was a perfect area for the German army to operate in, and the sneak attack on Copenhagen had made any attempt to defend Zealand impossible. The Germans had also been quick in establishing control over the bridge across the Little Belt, thus gaining access to the island of Funen. The German forces were technologically sophisticated and large; the Danish armed forces tiny in comparison and using obsolete equipment, partially a result of a pre-war policy of trying to avoid antagonizing Germany. Even stiff resistance from the Danes would not have lasted long. Believing that further resistance would only result in the futile loss of even more Danish lives, the Danish cabinet ultimately decided to bow to the German pressure "under protest".[3] As a result of the rapid turn of events, the Danish government did not have the time to officially declare war on Germany.

The occupation happened so rapidly that most Danes got out of bed without realizing that their country had already been occupied. To the rest of the world these events seemed perplexing, almost as if Denmark's Social Democratic government had sided with Germany. However, the Danes were generally pro-British and possessed a historical antagonism towards Germany, making the German incursion widely unpopular. People, however, were divided about what would be the best policy toward Germany.

After the occupation of Denmark, British forces made a pre-emptive invasion of the Faroe Islands - then still a Danish amt (county) - to prevent their occupation by German troops. See: The British occupation of the Faroe Islands 1940-1945. Britain also occupied Iceland but later turned it over the the United States, before that country entered the war.

Regarding Greenland, on April 9, 1941, the Danish envoy (ambassador) to the United States, Henrik Kauffmann signed a treaty with the U.S. authorising it to defend Greenland and construct military stations there. Kauffmann was supported in this decision by the Danish diplomats in the United States and the local authorities in Greenland. Signing this treaty "in the name of the King" was a clear violation of his diplomatic powers but Kauffmann argued that he would not receive orders from an occupied Copenhagen.

Danish 'Protectorate' Government 1940-43

Erik Scavenius, Danish PM 1942-43 with Werner Best, the German plenipotentiary in Denmark.

As a result of the cooperative attitude of the Danish authorities, German officials claimed that they would "respect Danish sovereignty and territorial integrity, as well as neutrality."[4] The German authorities were inclined towards lenient terms with Denmark for several reasons:

  • They had no particular strategic or ideological interests in the country, so they were happy to leave the responsibilities and burdens of administration to a Germanic 'brother' people.
  • Their only strong interest in Denmark, i.e. surplus agricultural products, would likely be supplied anyway by the Danes – out of economic necessity. German records indicate that the German administration had not fully realized this potential before the occupation took place.
  • They also hoped to score propaganda points by making Denmark, in Hitler's words, "a model protectorate."[5] It would show to the world what a future Nazi controlled Europe could be.
  • On top of these more practical goals, Nazi race ideology held that Danes were "fellow Nordic" Aryans, and could therefore to some extent be trusted to handle their own domestic affairs.

These factors combined to allow Denmark a very favourable relationship with Nazi Germany. The government remained intact and the parliament continued to function more or less as it had before. They were able to maintain much of their former control over domestic policy.[6] The police and judicial system remained in Danish hands and unlike most occupied countries, King Christian X remained in the country as Danish Head of State. The German Reich was formally represented by a Reichsbevollmächtigter ('Imperial Plenipotentiary'), i.e. a diplomat accredited to the Sovereign, a post awarded to Cecil von Renthe-Fink, the German ambassador, and then in November 1942 to the lawyer and SS-general Werner Best.

Danish public opinion generally backed the new government, particularly after the fall of France in June 1940.[7] There was a general feeling that the unpleasant reality of German occupation must be confronted in the most realistic way possible, given the international situation. Politicians realized that they would have to try hard to maintain Denmark's privileged position by presenting a united front to the German authorities, so all of the mainstream democratic parties formed a new government together. Parliament and the government agreed to work closely together.[8] Though the effect of this was close to the creation of a one party state, it remained a representative government.

The Danish government was dominated by Social Democrats, such as the pre-war Prime Minister, Thorvald Stauning, who found the Nazi party repulsive. Stauning himself was deeply depressed by the prospects for Europe under Nazism. Nonetheless, his party pursued a strategy of cooperation, hoping to maintain democracy and Danish control in Denmark for as long as possible. There were many issues that they had to work out with Germany in the months after the occupation. In an effort to keep the Germans happy they compromised Danish democracy and society in several important ways:

  • Newspaper articles and news reports "which might jeopardize German-Danish relations" were outlawed. [9]
  • Normal relations with Allied governments were severed.
  • Industrial production and trade was, partly due to geo-political and economic necessity, redirected toward Germany. Denmark had traditionally been a major trading partner of both Britain and Germany. Many government officials saw expanded trade with Germany as vital to maintaining social order in Denmark.[10] Increased unemployment and poverty was feared to lead to more of open revolt within the country, since Danes tended to blame all negative developments on the Germans. It was feared that any revolt would result in a crackdown by the German authorities.[11]
  • The Danish army was largely demobilised, although some units remained until August 1943. The army was allowed to maintain 2,200 men + 1,100 auxilliary troops. [12] Much of the fleet remained in port, but in Danish hands. In at least two towns, the army created secret weapons caches on 10 April. [13]

Stauning remained Prime Minister until his death in 1942 as head of a coalition cabinet encompassing all major political parties (the exceptions being the tiny Communist and Nazi parties). Vilhelm Buhl replaced him briefly, only to be replaced by foreign minister Erik Scavenius who had been the main link to the Nazi authorities throughout the war. Scavenius was a diplomat, not an elected politician, and had an elitist approach to government.[14] He was very afraid that emotional public opinion would destabilize his attempts to build a compromise between Danish sovereignty and the realities of German occupation. Scavenius felt strongly that he was Denmark's most ardent defender. After the war there was much recrimination of his stance, particularly from members of the active resistance who felt that he had hindered the cause of resistance and threatened Denmark's national honour. He felt that these people were vain, seeking to build their own reputations or political careers through emotionalism.

During the German occupation, King Christian X became a powerful symbol of national sovereignty. The image was taken on the King's birthday in 1940. Note that he is not accompanied by a guard.

The Danish authorities were able to use their more cooperative stance to win important concessions for the country. They continually refused to enter a customs and currency union with Germany. Danes were concerned both about the negative economic effects of the German proposals, as well as the political ones. German officials did not want to risk their special relationship with Denmark by forcing an agreement on them as they had in other countries. The Danish government was also able to stall negotiations over the return of North Slesvig to Germany, ban "closed rank uniformed marches" that would have made nationalist German or Danish Nazi agitation more possible, keep National Socialists out of the government, and hold a relatively free election with decidedly anti-Nazi results in the middle of the war.[15] Danish military officials also had access to sensitive German information which they delivered to the Allies under government cover.[16] The economic consequences of the occupation were also mitigated by German-Danish cooperation. The influx of German investment in industry, agriculture, and most notably defensive installations and troop deployments caused serious inflation in the first year of the war. The Danish government was able to renegotiate the arbitrary exchange rate between the Mark and Krone to deal with this problem.[17] The success most often alluded to in regard to the Danish policy toward Germany is the protection of the Jewish minority in Denmark.

Throughout the years of its hold on power the government consistently refused to accept German demands regarding the Jews.[18] The authorities would not enact special laws concerning Jews and their civil rights remained equal with the rest of the population. German authorities became increasingly exasperated with this position but concluded that any attempt to remove or mistreat Jews would be "politically unacceptable."[19] Even the Gestapo officer, Dr. Werner Best, plenipotentiary in Denmark from November 1942 believed that any attempt to remove the Jews would be enormously disruptive to the relationship between the two governments and recommended against any action concerning the Jews of Denmark.

King Christian X remained in Denmark throughout the war, a symbol of courage much appreciated by his subjects, though the story claiming that he would wear the star of David if Jews were forced to is apocryphal.[20]

Anti-Comintern Pact

On 20 November 1941, 5 months after the invasion of the USSR, the Danish government received a German "invitation" to join the Anti-Comintern pact. Finland accepted reluctantly on 25 November and stated that it presumed that Denmark would also attend the ceremony (effectively conditioning its own attendance). Erik Scavenius argued that Denmark should sign the pact but the Cabinet ministers refused stating that this would violate the policy of neutrality [21]. Scavenius reported this decision to Renthe-Fink. Fink replied on 21 November that "Germany would be unable to comprehend" a Danish rejection and demanded this decision be reversed before the end of the day. He assuered Scavenius that the pact cotained neither "political or other obligations" (i.e. going to war with the USSR). At a cabinet meeting the same day, it was suggested to seek a written confirmation of this promise in an addendum to the protocol. Stauning agreed on these terms since it would effectively made the signing meaningless. The Danish foreign office drew up a list of four terms that stated that Denmark only committed itself to "police action" in Denmark and that the nation remained neutral. The German foreign ministry agreed to the terms, provided that the protocol was not made public (which was the intent of the Danish foreign ministry).

As Berlin grew tired of waiting, Joachim von Ribbentrop called Copenhagen on 23 November threatening "cancelling the peaceful occupation" unless Denmark complied. On 23 November, the Wehrmacht in Denmark was put on alert and Renthe-Fink met Stauning and Foreign Minister Munch at 10 AM stating that there would be no room for "parliamentary excuses". If the German demands were not met Germany would no longer be committed by the promises given on 9 April 1940" (the threat of a state of war, a Nazi government, and territorial dismemberment). In a Cabinet meeting at 2 PM that day, Stauning, Scavenius, Munch, Gunnar Larsen and 1 minor minister advocated accession; 7 ministers opposed. In a meeting the same day in the Nine Man committee, three more ministers caved in most notably Vilhelm Buhl stating "Coorporation is the last shred of our defence". Prime Minister Stauning's notes from the day stated: The objective is a political positioning. But this was established by the occupation. The danger of saying no - - I would not like to see a Terboven here. Sign with addendum - - that modifies the pact.[22]

Scavenius boarded a train and headed for Berlin where he arrived on Monday 24 November. The next crisis came when he was met by Renthe-Fink who informed him that Ribbentrop had informed Fink that there had been a "misunderstanding" regarding the four clauses and that clause 2 would be deleted. This had specified that Denmark only had police-like obligations. Scavenius had a strict mandate not to change a sentence and stated that he would be unable to return to Copenhagen with a different content from the one agreed upon, but that he was willing to reopen negotiations to clarify the matter futher. This reply enraged Ribbentrop (and rumours claim that he was considering ordering the SS to arrest Scavenius). The task fell to German diplomat von Weizsäcker to patch up a compromise. He watered down the wording but left the content pretty intact. Nonetheless, for Scavenius it was a strong setback that the four clauses would now only get the status of a unilateral Danish declaration (Aktennotitz) with a comment on it by Fink that its content "no doubt" was in compliance with the pact. Furthermore he was instructed to give a public speech while abstaining from mentioning the four clauses but only making general statements about Denmark's status as a neutral nation. Scavenius signed the pact. At the following reception, the Italian ambassador described Scavenius as "a fish dragged on land ... a small old gentleman in a suit asking himself how on earth he got to this place". Lidegaard comments that the old man remained defiant: during a conversation with Ribbentrop in which the latter complained about the "barbarous cannibalism" of Russian POWs, Scavenius rhetorically asked if that statement meant that Germany didn't feed her prisoners. [23]

When news of the signing reached Denmark it left the population outraged, and rumours immediately spread about what Denmark had now committed itself to. The cabinet sent a car to pick up Scavernius at the ferry, to avoid him riding the train alone to Copenhagen. At the same time a large demonstration gathered outside of Parliament, which led the Minister of Justice to remark that he didn't like to see Danish police beating up students singing patriotic songs. When Scavenius had returned to Copenhagen, he asked the cabinet to debate once and for all where the red lines existed in Danish relations with Germany. This debate concluded that three red lines existed: 1) No legislation discriminating against Jews, 2) Denmark should never join the Axis Pact between Germany, Italy and Japan, 3) No unit of the Danish army should ever fight against foreign forces. To the surprise of many, Scavenius accepted these instructions without hesitation. [24]

Frikorps Danmark

On the 29th of June, 1941, days after the invasion of the USSR, Frikorps Danmark (Free Corps Denmark) was founded as a corps of Danish volunteers to fight against the Soviet Union. Frikorps Danmark was set up at the initiative of the SS and DNSAP who approached Lieutenant-Colonel C.P. Kryssing of the Danish army shortly after the invasion of the USSR had begun. The Nazi paper Fædrelandet proclaimed the creation of the corps on 29 June 1941 [25].

According to Danish law, it was not illegal to join a foreign army but active recruiting on Danish soil was illegal. The SS disregarded this law and began recruiting efforts - predominantly recruiting Danish Nazis and members of the German minority. [26] The Danish government found out and concentrated on persuading the Germans not to recruit underage boys. General Prior wanted to sack Kryssing and his designated second-in-command but decided to consult the cabinet. It agreed that Kryssing should be sacked in its meeting on 2 July 1941, but this decision was later withdrawn when Eric Scavenius - who had not attended the original meeting - returned from negotiations and announced that he had reached an agreement with Renthe-Fink that soldiers wishing to join this corps could be given leave until further notice. The government issued an announcement stating that "Lieut.Colonel C.P. Kryssing, Chief of the 5th Artillery reg., Holbæk, has with the consent of the Royal Danish Government assumed command over 'Frikorps Danmark'". The Danish text only explicitly says that the government recognizes that Kryssing had been given a new command, it does not sanction the creation of the corps which had already happened without consulting the government [27]. In July 1941 Heinrich Himmler complained that Denmark was unofficially trying to stop recruitment since the word ran in the army that anyone joining would be committing treason. The government later instructed the army and navy not to obstruct applications from soldiers wishing to leave active duty and join the corps.

A 1998 study showed that the average recruit to Frikorps Danmark was a Nazi and / or a member of the German minority in Denmark and that recruitment was very broad socially. [28]. Bo Lidegaard notes: "The relationship between the population and the corps was freezing cold, and legionaires on leave time and again came into fights with civilians meeting the corps' volunteers with massive contempt." . Lidegaard gives the following figures for 1941: 6,000 Danish citizens had signed up to German army duty (1,500 of these belonged to the German minority in Denmark). [29]

Telegram Crisis

In 1942, Adolf Hitler transmitted a long birthday telegram to King Christian. The King replied with a simple Meinen besten Dank. Chr. Rex (English: My best thanks. King Christian) sending the Führer into a state of rage and seriously damaging Danish relations with Germany. Hitler immediately recalled his ambassador and expelled the Danish ambassador from Germany. The plenipotentiary, Rente-Fink was replaced by Werner Best and orders to crack down in Denmark were issued. Hitler also demanded that Erik Scavenius become prime minister, and all remaining Danish troops were ordered out of Jutland.[30]

Increasing Hostility

Barricades erected during a general strike, Nørrebro, Copenhagen, July 1944

As the years dragged on, the population became increasingly hostile to the Germans. Soldiers stationed in Denmark had found most of the population cold and removed from the beginning of the occupation, but their willingness to cooperate had made the relationship cordial. The government had attempted to discourage sabotage and violent resistance to the occupation, but by the autumn of 1942 the numbers of violent acts of resistance were increasing steadily to the point that Germany declared Denmark "enemy territory" for the first time.[31] After the battles of Stalingrad and El-Alamein the incidents of resistance, violent and symbolic, increased exponentially.

In March 1943 the Germans allowed an election that embarrassed them by giving good results to anti-Nazi parties. The election, discontent, and a growing feeling of optimism that Germany would be defeated led to wide spread strikes and civil disturbances in the summer of 1943. The Danish government refused to deal with the situation in a way that would satisfy the Germans, who presented an ultimatum to the government, including the following demands, on August 28, 1943:

A ban on people assembling in public, outlawing strikes, the introduction of a curfew, censorship should be conducted with German assistance, special (German military) courts should be introduced, and the death penalty should be introduced in cases of sabotage. The city of Odense should pay 1 million kroner as a fine (for the death of a German soldier killed in that city) and hostages should be held as security. [32]

The Danish government refused so on 29 August 1943 the Germans officially dissolved the Danish government and instituted martial law. The Danish cabinet handed in its resignation, although since King Christian never officially accepted it, the government remained functioning de jure until the end of the war, but this is a technicality. In reality all day-to-day business had been handed over to the Permanent Secretaries, each effectively running his own ministry. The Germans ran the rest of the country.

When German troops invaded the Naval Dockyard in the morning of 29 August 1943, orders were issued by the Danish naval command to scuttle the fleet. In 1941, the Danish government had caved in to heavy German pressure, and surrendered six torpedo boats - a move which prompted King Christian X to order the Dannebrog flown on half mast at the Sixtus Battery of the Naval port of Copenhagen. This usually only happens following the death of a Danish king [33]. This time, the Navy resisted. Of the fifty-two vessels in the Royal Danish Navy, two were at Greenland, thirty-two were scuttled, four escaped to Sweden, and fourteen were captured undamaged by the Germans [34].

After the fall of the government, Denmark was exposed to the full extent of Nazi power. In October the Germans decided to remove all Jews from Denmark, but thanks to information leaks and swift action by the Danish and Swedish peoples, almost all of the Jews were transported to the safety of neutral Sweden. Sabotage, unencumbered by government opposition grew greatly in number and severity, though it was rarely of very serious concern to the Germans. Nonetheless, the Danish resistance movement had some successes such as on D-Day when the train network in Denmark was disrupted for days, delaying the arrival of reinforcements in Normandy. An underground government was established and the illegal press flourished. Allied governments who had been skeptical about the commitment to fight Germany in Denmark began recognizing it as a full ally.[35]

In September 1943 a variety of resistance groups grouped together in the Danish Freedom Council which coordinated resistance activities.

A high profile resister was former government minister John Christmas Møller who fled to England in 1942 and became a widely popular commentator because of his broadcasts to the nation over the BBC.

Economy

There were extremely serious economic problems in Denmark during the war. The Danish economy was fundamentally hurt by the rising cost of raw material imports such as coal and oil. The blockade against Germany affected Denmark too with unfortunate results. Since the country has virtually no natural resources of its own it was very vulnerable to these price shocks and shortages. The government had foreseen the possibility of coal and oil shortages and had stockpiled some before the war, which, combined with rationing, prevented some of the worst potential problems from coming to the country. The disruptions to the European trading network were also damaging to the economy, but all things considered, Denmark did quite well compared to other countries during the war.

The country, at least certain sections of it, did so well that it has been open to the accusation of profiteering from the war. After the war there was some effort to find and punish profiteers, but the consequences and scope of these trials were far less severe than in many other countries, largely a reflection of the general acceptance of the realistic need for cooperation with Germany. On the whole, though the country fared relatively well, this is only a relative measure. Phil Giltner has worked out that Germany had a "debt" of roughly 6.9 billion Kroner to Denmark as a whole.[36] This means that they had taken far more out of the Danish economy than they had put in, aside from the negative side effects of the war on trade.

This German debt means that the occupation of Denmark was overall an economic benefit to their war effort. This represents an unhappy reality for Danes who would like to think that they contributed to the downfall of Nazi Germany.

Hardship and the end of the War

Denmark was liberated from German rule in May of 1945 by the famous General Bernard Montgomery, although the easternmost island Bornholm was liberated by Soviet forces who remained there for more than a year.

Although Denmark was spared many of the difficulties other areas of Europe suffered from, there were still some hardships for the population, particularly after the Germans took charge in 1943. Yet, on the whole, Denmark can be said to have suffered the least of all the European combatants from the war.[37] Many were killed and imprisoned because of their work resisting the German authorities. There were small bombing raids on select targets in the country, but nothing comparable to that suffered by, for instance, neighbouring Norway or the Netherlands. One area that was badly damaged was the island of Bornholm, largely due to Soviet bombardment of the German garrison there.

Just over 850 members of the resistance were killed during the war. Roughly 900 Danish civilians were killed through various causes, either caught in air raids, killed during civil disturbances, or in reprisal killings, the so-called clearing-murders. 39 Danish soldiers were killed or injured during the invasion, and 4 were killed on 29 August 1943 when the Germans dissolved the Danish government. About 360 Danes died in concentration camps. The largest groups of fatalities was amongst Danish sailors who continued to operate throughout the war, most falling victim to submarines. 1,850 sailors died. Just over 100 soldiers died as part of Allied forces.

After the war 40,000 people were arrested on suspicion of collaboration. Of these 13,500 were punished in some way. 78 were death sentences, although only 46 were carried out. Most received prison sentences of under 4 years. Many people criticized the process for victimizing "small" people disproportionately, while many politicians and businesses were left untouched. Another difficult issues was what to do with collaborators who were essentially "following orders" that their own government had given them, such as business executives who had been encouraged to work with the Germans.

Although some members of the resistance tried to organize new political parties after the war to reshape the political order in Denmark, they were unable to do so. The only strong impact the resistance had on the elections in October 1945 was that the communists, widely credited with much of the resistance work had a large surge in support, receiving 1/8th of the popular vote.

See also

References

  • Lundbak, Henrik. Besættelsestid og frihedskamp 1940-45. København: Frihedsmuseet, 1996. ISBN 87-89384-40-7
  • Flender, Harold. Rescue in Denmark. New York: Holocaust Library, 1963.
  • Dethlefsen, Henrik. "Denmark and the German Occupation: Cooperation, Negotiation, or Collaboration," Scandinavian Journal of History. 15:3 (1990), pp. 193-206.
  • Giltner, Phil. "The Success of Collaboration: Denmark's Self-Assessment of its Economic Position after Five Years of Nazi Occupation," Journal of Contemporary History 36:3 (2001) pp. 483-506.

Notes

  1. ^ Henrik Dethlefsen, “Denmark and the German Occupation: Cooperation, Negotiation, or Collaboration,” Scandinavian Journal of History. 15:3 (1990), p. 201.
  2. ^ Jørgen Hæstrup, Secret Alliance: A Study of the Danish Resistance Movement 1940-45. Odense, 1976. p. 9.
  3. ^ Henrik Dethlefsen, “Denmark and the German Occupation: Cooperation, Negotiation, or Collaboration,” Scandinavian Journal of History. 15:3 (1990), p. 193.
  4. ^ Jørgen Hæstrup, Secret Alliance: A Study of the Danish Resistance Movement 1940-45. Odense, 1976. p. 9.
  5. ^ Henning Poulsen, “Dansk Modstand og Tysk Politik,” Jyske Historiker 71(1995), p.10.
  6. ^ Phil Giltner, “The Success of Collaboration: Denmark’s Self-Assessment of its Economic Position after Five Years of Nazi Occupation,” Journal of Contemporary History 36:3 (2001) p. 486.
  7. ^ Henning Poulsen, “Hvad mente Danskerne?” Historie 2 (2000) p. 320.
  8. ^ Dethlefsen, 202.
  9. ^ Jerry Voorhis, “Germany and Denmark: 1940-45,” Scandinavian Studies 44:2 (1972) p. 174.
  10. ^ Voorhis, 175.
  11. ^ Poulsen, Historie, 320.
  12. ^ http://forsvaret.dk/FKO/Nyt+og+Presse/Arkiver/Nyhedsarkiv/Nyheder/2003/29+aug+2003.htm
  13. ^ Colonel Lunding's memoirs.
  14. ^ Voorhis, 181.
  15. ^ Voorhis, 176.
  16. ^ John Oram Thomas, The Giant Killers, (London: 1975), p. 13.
  17. ^ Giltner, 488.
  18. ^ Andrew Buckser, “Rescue and Cultural Context During the Holocaust: Grundtvigian Nationalism and the Rescue of Danish Jews,” Shofar 19:2 (2001) p. 10.
  19. ^ Harold Flender, Rescue in Denmark, (New York: 1963) p. 30.
  20. ^ http://www.snopes.com/history/govern/denmark.htm
  21. ^ Bo Lidegaard (ed.) (2003): Dansk Udenrigspolitiks historie [The History of Danish Foreign Policy], vol. 4, pp. 475)
  22. ^ (Bo Lidegaard (ed.) (2003): Dansk Udenrigspolitiks historie [The History of Danish Foreign Policy], vol. 4, pp. 476-77
  23. ^ (Lidegaard, p. 479)
  24. ^ (Lidegaard, "Dansk Udenrigspolitisk Historie" vol. IV, pp. 474 - 483.)
  25. ^ (ibid., p. 461
  26. ^ ibid. p. 461.
  27. ^ (ibid. p. 462-3)
  28. ^ (p. 463)
  29. ^ (Lidegaard, p. 464)
  30. ^ http://www.um.dk/Publikationer/UM/English/Denmark/kap6/6-15.asp
  31. ^ Voorhis, 179.
  32. ^ http://www.4maj.dk/PDF-filer/Vesterbro%20under%20II.%20V.K..pdf#search=%22%22ultimatum%22%20%22Dr.%20Best%22%22
  33. ^ http://www.navalhistory.dk/English/History/1939_1945/torp_udlevering_1941.htm
  34. ^ http://www.navalhistory.dk/English/History/1939_1945/us_safari.htm
  35. ^ Voorhis, 183.
  36. ^ Phil Giltner, “The Success of Collaboration: Denmark’s Self-Assessment of its Economic Position after Five Years of Nazi Occupation,” Journal of Contemporary History 36:3 (2001)
  37. ^ Giltner, 486.
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