Agreed Framework
The Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was signed on October 21, 1994 between North Korea (DPRK) and the United States. The agreement largely broke-down by 2003. The main provisions of the agreement are:
- DPRK's graphite-moderated nuclear power plants, which could easily produce weapons grade plutonium, would be replaced with light water reactor (LWR) power plants by a target date of 2003.
- Oil for heating and electricity production would be provided while DPRK's reactors were shut down, until completion of the first LWR power unit.
- The two sides would move toward full normalization of political and economic relations.
- The U.S. would provide formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the U.S.
- The DPRK would take steps to implement the Korean Peninsula Denuclearization Declaration.
- The DPRK would remain a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
- IAEA ad hoc and routine inspections would resume for facilities not subject to the freeze.
- Existing spent nuclear fuel stocks would be stored and ultimately disposed of without reprocessing in the DPRK.
- Before delivery of key LWR nuclear components, the DPRK would come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
There are also some confidential minutes supporting the agreement, which have not been made public [1].
The pact is neither a treaty subject to Senate approval nor a contract, but more of a memorandum of understanding between the two countries noted by the United Nations Security Council [2]. It was signed in the wake of North Korea's abandonment of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, a U.S. military buildup near the country, and U.S. plans to bomb the active Yongbyon nuclear reactor [3].
Terms of the pact and consequent agreements included the shutdown of the pilot Yongbyon nuclear reactor, abandoning the construction of two larger nuclear power plants, and placing of spent fuel which could have been reprocessed to create plutonium for a nuclear weapon under IAEA controls. In exchange two light water reactors would be constructed in North Korea by 2003 at a cost of $4 billion, primarily supplied by Japan and South Korea. In the interim, North Korea would be supplied with 500,000 tons of heavy fuel oil annually, at no cost, to make up for lost energy production. When the LWR plants were completed, North Korea would dismantle its other nuclear reactors and associated facilities.
The Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) is a consortium of the United States, South Korea, Japan, and various other states that is responsible for implementating the energy-related parts of the agreement.
It is reported that US President Bill Clinton's officials agreed to the plan only because they thought that the North Korean government would collapse before the nuclear power project was completed [4]. North Korean officials at the time also suspected the U.S. anticipated an early collapse of the DPRK [5]. North Korea's leader Kim Il-sung had recently died.
Soon after the agreement was signed, U.S. Congress control changed to the Republican Party, who did not support the agreement. Some Republican Senators were strongly against the agreement, regarding it as appeasement [6] [7]. Initially U.S. Department of Defense emergency funds not under Congress control were used to fund the transitional oil supplies under the agreement [8], together with international funding. From 1996 Congress provided funding, though not always sufficient amounts [9]. Consequently some of the agreed transitional oil supplies were delivered late.
Some analysts believe North Korea agreed to the freeze primarily because of the U.S. agreement to phase out economic sanctions that had been in place since the Korean War. But because of congressional opposition, the U.S. failed to deliver on this part of the agreement. [10]
International funding for the LWR replacement power plants had to be sought. Significant spending on the LWR project did not commence until 2000. [11]
There was increasing disagreement between North Korea and U.S. on the scope and implementation of the treaty. When by 1999 economic sanctions had not been lifted and full diplomatic relations between U.S. and North Korea had not been established, North Korea warned that they would resume nuclear research unless the U.S. kept up its end of the bargain. U.S. has repeatedly stated that further implementation would be stalled as long as suspicions remained that the North Korean nuclear weapons research program continued covertly.
Construction of the first LWR reactor began in August 2002. Construction of both reactors is well behind schedule. The initial plan was for both reactors to be operational by 2003, but the construction had been halted indefinitely in late 2002.
In October 2002, a U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly visted North Korea to confront the North Koreans with the U.S. assessment that they had a uranium enrichment program [12]. Both parties' reports of the meeting differ. The U.S. delegation believed the North Koreans had admitted the existence of a highly enriched uranium program [13]. The North Koreans stated Kelly made his assertions in an arrogant manner, but failed to produce any evidence such as satellite photos, and they responded denying North Korea planned to produce nuclear weapons using enriched uranium. They went on to state that as an independent sovereign state North Korea was entitled to possess nuclear weapons for defense, although they did not possess such a weapon at that point in time [14] [15] [16]. Relations between the two countries, which had seemed hopeful two years earlier, quickly deteriorated into open hostility.
KEDO members considered in November 2002 whether to halt the fuel oil shipments in response to the previous month's developments. U.S. Assistant Secretary of State James A. Kelly warned Japanese officials that the U.S. Congress would not fund such shipments in the face of continued violations. The shipments were halted in December.
In December 2003, KEDO suspended work on the pressurized water reactor project. Subsequently KEDO shifted the focus of its efforts to ensuring that the LWR project assets at the construction site in North Korea and at manufacturers’ facilities around the world ($1.5 billion invested to date) are preserved and maintained.
On January 10, 2003, North Korea withdrew from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. On February 10, 2005, North Korea finally declared that it had manufactured nuclear weapons as a "nuclear deterrent for self-defence" [17]. On October 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test. US intelligence agencies believe that North Korea has manufactured a handful of simple nuclear weapons.
Although the agreement has largely broken down, as of 2005 North Korea has not restarted work on the two production size nuclear power plants that were frozen under the agreement. These plants could potentially produce enough weapons-grade plutonium to produce several nuclear weapons per year.
Discussions are taking place through the Six-party talks about a replacement agreement, reaching a preliminary accord on September 19, 2005. The accord makes no mention of the U.S. contention that North Korea has a secret, underground enriched uranium program. However the new accord would require North Korea to dismantle all nuclear facilities, not just specific plants as in the Agreed Framework. [18].
See also
External links
- 1994 Agreed Framework between the USA and the DPRK - Geneva, October 21, 1994
- Agreement on Supply of a Light-Water Reactor Project to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea - KEDO, 1995
- Ch 14: North Korea - from Deadly Arsenals, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (2002)
- Nautilus Institute - In-depth coverage of the North Korean situation since 1997
- North Korea's Nuclear Breach - Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
- Washington was on brink of war with North Korea 5 years ago, CNN, October 4, 1999
- Modernizing the US-DPRK Agreed Framework: The Energy Imperative, Nautilus Institute, February 16, 2001
- Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for - KCNA, October 25, 2002
- J. Kelly Failed to Produce ‘Evidence’ in Pyongyang - O Song Chol, DPRK Foreign Ministry, January 18, 2003
- Examining the Lessons of the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Deal, PBS, April 10, 2003
- The United States, North Korea, And The End Of The Agreed Framework, Naval War College Review, Summer 2003
- Dealing With North Korea’s Nuclear Programs - James A. Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, July 15, 2004
- Did North Korea Cheat?, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2005
- North Korea Says It Will Abandon Nuclear Efforts, New York Times, September 19, 2005
- U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open, New York Times, September 20, 2005
- Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula - text of agreement, February 19, 1992
- Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula - analysis , Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes, 2002