Uganda Army (1962–1971)
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Uganda Army | |
---|---|
Active | 1962–1971 |
Country | Uganda ("Sovereign State" and First Republic) |
Type | Armed forces |
Size | 700 (1962) 1,500 (1963) 4,500 (1965) 9,800 (1968) |
Garrison/HQ | Kampala |
Nickname(s) | UA |
Engagements | Rwenzururu insurgency Simba rebellion Mengo Crisis |
Commanders | |
Commander-in-Chief | Milton Obote |
Notable commanders | Shaban Opolot Idi Amin Suleiman Hussein |
The Uganda Army (abbreviated UA), initially called the Uganda Rifles, served as the national armed forces of Uganda during the presidencies of Mutesa II and Milton Obote (known as "Obote I"). As time went on, the military was gradually expanded and increasingly interfered in Uganda's national politics. It played a prominent role in defeating local insurgencies, supressing opposition to Obote, and intervened in conflicts in the Congo as well as Sudan. Dissatisfied soldiers overthrew Obote in 1971, resulting in the establishment of the Second Republic of Uganda under the dictatorship of army commander Idi Amin. The Uganda Army was purged, with thousands of suspected pro-Obote troops killed or fleeing the country. The military was consequently split into an army serving under Amin – the Uganda Army (1971–1980) – and exiled rebel factions. The latter helped to overthrow Amin's regime during the Uganda–Tanzania War of 1978–79, and became the core of the Uganda National Liberation Army which would serve as Uganda's national military from 1980 to 1986.
History
Uganda's first post-independence military originated as cadres of the King's African Rifles, colonial troops who were organized to secure several British colonies in Africa.[1][2] The British preferred to recruit members of certain ethnic groups for the military, regarding some Ugandan peoples as "martial races", while also exploiting and creating ethnic rivalries. As a result, soldiers from northern Uganda were dominant in the colonial army, with Nubians being especially overrepresented.[2] Ugandan King's African Rifles had served in various conflicts on behalf of the United Kingdom, including World War I, World War II,[3] and the Mau Mau Uprising in neighboring Kenya.[2]
After Uganda was granted independence from the United Kingdom in 1962,[1] the 4th Battalion, King's African Rifles, at Jinja,[2] was transformed into the country's first military force, the 1st Battalion Uganda Rifles. It counted just 700 soldiers at this point, but was rapidly expanded by enlisting volunteers.[4] The national military was renamed to "Uganda Army" on 1 August 1962.[5] By July 1963, the army had grown to 1,500. Uganda continued to cooperate with the United Kingdom in military matters, and most of the early Ugandan officers were trained in the United Kingdom, while equipment was also of British origin.[4] Considering various security threats, posed by local militant resistance groups such as the Rwenzururu movement,[6] and potential threats from the Congo and Sudan, the country's military was further expanded through the establishment of a 2nd Battalion in 1964. By this point, Uganda also enlisted Israeli help in training and arming its forces.[7]
On 23 January 1964, the 1st Battalion mutinied following similiar mutinies in Kenya and Tanzania. The soldiers were upset about the conditions of their service, and the Ugandan government was only able to put down the mutineers with British assistance. Several demands by the soldiers were subsequently met, including an increase in pay as well as the Africanisation of the officers. As a result of the latter agreement, Idi Amin was appointed commander of the 1st Battalion,[8] while Shaban Opolot was made Army Commander.[9] The mutiny also strongly impacted national politics, as Obote's government increasingly viewed the military as a potential threat as well as asset. In April 1964, the General Service Unit (GSU) was set up as a militarised intelligence agency and bodyguards to protect the government from civilian and military threats.[8][10] In addition, Obote decided to not only africanize the officer corps, but also reduce cooperation with the British military in general so that the latter had less leverage in Uganda.[10] In late July 1964, the British Army completely withdrew from the country, while cooperation with Israel was increased to set up armoured forces well as an air force for the Uganda Army.[8][11]
While these internal developments affected the military, Uganda was drawn into the Simba rebellion of the Congo. Prime Minister Obote's government supported the Simba rebels, and Uganda Army soldiers occasionally fought alongside the Congolese insurgents against the Congo's Armée Nationale Congolaise (ANC).[12] Border clashes between the two countries took place in 1964,[13] and the Congolese even launched air attacks on two Ugandan villages. Obote responded by further expanding in Uganda Army,[12][14] as the 3rd Battalion was set up in February and the 4th Battalion in March 1965.[8] There were also reports about Ugandan troops crossing the border in a raid targeting Mahagi and Bunia in retaliation for the Congolese air attacks.[15]
By July 1965, the Uganda Army counted 4,500 troops and organized its 1st Brigade.[8] In 1966, political tensions between Prime Minister Obote and President Mutesa II of Buganda led to the Mengo Crisis, culminating in Obote deposing Mutesa in a violent coup. Uganda Army troops under Amin assaulted Mutesa's palace, overpowering and killing his guards, resulting in his flight into exile. Obote consequently assumed the presidency,[16] and increased the military budget, acquiring more heavy equipment and deepening military ties with the Eastern Bloc.[8] He rewarded soldiers who remained loyal to him during the crisis, and used the expanded budget to disburse patronage to increase his following in the army.[17]
The military continued to grow in the following years: The Military Police, the Paratrooper Battalion, the Border Guard Unit, the 5th Mechanised Regiment, and the 2nd Brigade were organized, and the entire Uganda Army consisted of about 9,800 soldiers by 1968, of which only 200 were officers. Northerners remained dominant at about 61%, whereas 22% were from the eastern and 12% from the western parts of Uganda.[8] Unrest and infighting also significantly worsened among the military, as Obote and Amin had become rivals and attempted to dominate the Uganda Army by recruiting partisans supportive of their political factions. Although these factions did not completely correspond to ethnicities, Amin found most of his support among troops from the West Nile Region and migrants from Sudan as well as Zaire, whereas Obote was mainly aided by Acholi and Langi soldiers. This development resulted in growing ethnic tensions within the army.[18]
References
- ^ a b Cooper & Fontanellaz 2015, p. 5.
- ^ a b c d Bruce-Lockhart, Katherine (7 March 2018). "Becoming "Amin's Soldiers"". University of Toronto: Jackman Humanities Institute. Retrieved 1 March 2020.
- ^ Omara-Otunnu 1987, pp. 34–37.
- ^ a b Cooper & Fontanellaz 2015, p. 7.
- ^ Omara-Otunnu 1987, p. 52.
- ^ Rothchild 1997, p. 90.
- ^ Cooper & Fontanellaz 2015, pp. 7–8.
- ^ a b c d e f g Cooper & Fontanellaz 2015, p. 8.
- ^ Kato, Joshua (23 March 2012). "Shaban Opolot rejected plans to attack the Lubiri in 1966". New Vision. Retrieved 12 October 2020.
- ^ a b Omara-Otunnu 1987, p. 65.
- ^ Omara-Otunnu 1987, p. 66.
- ^ a b Mujaju 1987, p. 484.
- ^ Risdel Kasasira (27 February 2017). "Life as an Amin army commander". Daily Monitor. Archived from the original on 11 May 2019. Retrieved 11 May 2019.
- ^ Omara-Otunnu 1987, p. 71.
- ^ Anstey 1965, p. 173.
- ^ Cooper & Fontanellaz 2015, p. 6.
- ^ Omara-Otunnu 1987, pp. 78–79.
- ^ Cooper & Fontanellaz 2015, pp. 6, 8.
Works cited
- Anstey, Roger (April 1965). "The Congo Rebellion". The World Today. 21 (4): 169–176. JSTOR 40393719.
{{cite journal}}
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(help) - Cooper, Tom; Fontanellaz, Adrien (2015). Wars and Insurgencies of Uganda 1971–1994. Solihull: Helion & Company Limited. ISBN 978-1-910294-55-0.
- Mujaju, Akiiki B. (October 1987). "The Gold Allegations Motion and Political Development in Uganda". African Affairs. 86 (345): 479–504. doi:10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a097945. JSTOR 722666.
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(help) - Omara-Otunnu, Amii (1987). Politics and the Military in Uganda, 1890–1985. London: Palgrave Macmillan. ISBN 978-1-349-18738-6.
{{cite book}}
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(help) - Rothchild, Donald S. (1997). Managing ethnic conflict in Africa: pressures and incentives for cooperation. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-8157-7593-5.