File talk:WE.177 safety keys.jpg

Extraneous parts

The keys illustrated have a number of extra parts that are not officially part of the key set. I worked with the organisation that oversaw the manufacture and testing of the various parts of the weapon and checked and handled more of these sets of keys than I care to remember.

The key sets were made in two identical parts. The sets illustrated have been tampered with in various ways.

Each set consisted of the large cream coloured object (which was to remove the cover from the lock of the Ground Control Unit located behind an access panel in the weapon). This was placed on a 'key ring'. The key itself was placed on a second key ring along with the engraved stainless steel disc that bore the the key set part number and the serial number of the Ground Control Unit it was associated with. Both key rings were threaded together and the ends welded so that no items could be added or removed. The two sets were then treaded onto a third key ring, to keep them together for transport or storage. This third key ring was not welded to permit the two parts to be separated.

The items illustrated differ from an official set in the following ways.

• The key rings holding the official parts are not welded, which suggests that the originals have been cut and replaced.
• The left hand set has two items on that do not belong. The blue disk with a number. The metal hexagonal tag behind it.
• The first two digits of the number on the blue tag seem to match the visible digits on the key behind it.
• The key has a number on it. The correct keys were not identified with a profile number. The only way to identify the profile was to refer back to the Ground Control Unit manufacturing documentation.
• The number shown does not match the format of the Ground Control Unit serial number (two letters followed by three digits). The weapon serial number was not identified on the key set. It was necessary to refer to the documentation to find the Ground Control Unit serial number to identify the correct key.
• The keys in the picture are bright chrome plated. The correct keys were not plated but were made from matt finished stainless steel.

It is my belief that a pair of oridinary commercially available keys have been substituted for the officially correct keys. This may be because the key profile may still be classified. The hexagonal tag and the blue disc have also been added. Their purpose is unknown. 86.169.33.6 (talk) 15:44, 2 June 2012 (UTC)

Whilst what the poster above says may be true, he/she should bear in mind the following:

• 1 - the key set is from a drill round and may be different from the key set used in the live one - if only for identification purposes.

The manufacture of the keys for training rounds was identical to thise for live rounds. The only difference was that all training key profiles are the same. 86.157.171.34 (talk)

• 2 - the poster may have been involved in issuing the key sets but the key sets were made over a period of twenty years or so, and he/she would therefore have to claim knowledge of ALL the key sets issued during this period. He/she would also have to have been present on every operational RAF station/HM ship in order to have known what happened to the key sets after they were issued, as he/she is in no position to know what individual station armourers did with the keys. I would suspect, for example, that the hexagonal Allen key was issued after the keys themselves left the original poster's domain, in which case, then he/she may well have been unaware of them.

I was involved for the latter 10 years, and during that time also pulled weapons from the stockpile for testing that were older than this (The warhead was not tested though!!). The method of manufacture of the key sets did not change over th project lifetime appart from a change to the plastic used to mould the tool to remove the lock cover. What happened to the key sets on the operational stations was strictly laid down in the handling procedures and any variation would be met with court martial action. Any incident involving live or training rounds was fully investigated (training always being considered live). The hexagonal (allen) type key was not part of the keyset. The hex key was used by the armourers when they loaded the aircraft. The strike enable key was only then used by one of the two nominated responsible officers once he had checked the armourer's settings against the orders. 86.157.171.34 (talk)

• 3 - the pictured key set was quite clearly shown in the BBC Newsnight video - unfortunately now no longer online - to operate the drill round and so is nevertheless valid as an example.

And television has been a reliable source of information since when? 86.157.171.34 (talk)

• 4 - the pictured key set is from the Imperial War Museum who are, if I can put this in a way without sounding unkind to the original poster, a more reliable source than an anonymous editor who's credentials are unknown.

The keys depicted are chrome plated. Chrome plating of the keys or any part of the lock was completely forbidden because of the small risk that the plating could flake off and jam the lock. All keys were stainless steel. 86.157.171.34 (talk)

• 5 - the person who uploaded the relevant images is, along with myself, one of the editors who greatly expanded the WE177 article page some years ago, using declassified documents released by the MoD in the early 2000s and now placed in the archives at TNA - formerly the PRO Kew. In addition, the person who uploaded the image (and who stated the source) is a bona fide researcher who was indeed the person appearing in the Newsnight video.

It is believed that the key profiles used are still classified, so any exhibited key set would be unlikely to be original keys. This is further underlined because when the weapon system was decommisioned, all the keys were physically destroyed (and part of my duties was to ensure that they were all accounted for). Any keys encountered cannot be originals. 86.157.171.34 (talk)

Therefore whilst the original poster may be correct in his/her statement, he/she is in no position to know what happened to the pictured key set, whether it is indeed different from the ones he/she issued for live weapons, neither is he/she in a position to know what was done to the key sets after they left his/her supervision.

The only thing that was possible was to separate the two key/ cover tool/ ID disk into two separate key sets. The ring that held the two key sets was not welded closed. All the other key rings were welded closed precisely to ensure that nothing could be added or removed from the set. In particular to ensure that the identifying stainless steel disk was not separated from its key as there was no other method of matching the key to a round.86.157.171.34 (talk)

Nevertheless his/her comments are appreciated for the additional information on the key sets that he/she has supplied here. Perhaps he/she might like to open a Wikipedia account and place some of his/her credential on the user page, although I should perhaps point out that both myself and my colleague who uploaded the key set image both left Wikipedia exactly because of the sort of disputes that are taking place here. If you do decide to join and open an account then both I and my colleague, I'm sure, wish you the best of luck. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 80.7.147.13 (talk) 11:11, 26 December 2012 (UTC)

A minor correction; just checked it and found the BBC2 Newsnight film is still online on the BBC website: here — Preceding unsigned comment added by 94.14.138.109 (talk) 13:11, 26 December 2012 (UTC)

I believe one of the contributors runs a separate website with much (hopefully publicly available) information. It does however have a number of errors (evidence for many of which are actually on the site). I even prepared an e-mail pointing out the errors and suggesting corrections, but my intimate knowledge of the project has prevented me from sending it, because I cannot easily differentiate between publicly available information or otherwise. 86.157.171.34 (talk) 17:16, 14 January 2013 (UTC)