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{{Infobox military conflict
|conflict = Sino-Soviet border conflict
|partof = the [[Cold War]] and the [[Sino-Soviet split]]
|image = [[File:China USSR E 88.jpg|300px]]
|caption = Some of the disputed areas in the Argun and Amur rivers. Damansky/Zhenbao is to the southeast, north of the lake
|date = March 2 – September 11, 1969
|place = Border between [[China]] and the [[Soviet Union]]
|territory =
|result = [[Status quo ante bellum]]
*Tactical Chinese victory<ref name="Kuisong p.29">Kuisong p.29</ref>
*Strategic Chinese victory: China maintained control of territories.<ref name="ReferenceA"/>
|combatant1 = '''{{flagcountry|Soviet Union}}'''
|combatant2 = '''{{flagcountry|China}}'''
|commander1 = {{Flag icon|Soviet Union|1955}} '''[[Leonid Brezhnev]]'''
|commander2 = {{Flag icon|People's Republic of China}} '''[[Mao Zedong]]'''
|strength1 = 658,000
|strength2 = 814,000
|casualties1 = 59 killed<br>94 wounded<ref name=ryabushkin>See {{ru icon}} D. S. Ryabushkin, ''Мифы Даманского''. Мoscow: АСТ, 2004, pp. 151, 263-264.</ref>(Soviet sources)<br>27 Tanks/APCs destroyed<ref>Kuisong p.25,26,29</ref>(Chinese sources)<br>1 Command Car<ref>Kuisong p.25</ref>(Chinese sources)<br>Dozens of trucks destroyed<ref name="Kuisong p.29">Kuisong p.29</ref>(Chinese sources)
|casualties2 = ~800 killed<ref name="JB">John Baylis et al. ''Contemporary Strategy: Vol. 2, The Nuclear Powers''. New York: Holmes & Meier, 1987, [http://books.google.bg/books?id=XioJAAAAIAAJ&q=sino+soviet+clashes+%22eight+hundred%22&dq=sino+soviet+clashes+%22eight+hundred%22&hl=en&sa=X&ei=hOCUUpOYFqqz4ATGioG4Dw&ved=0CEkQ6AEwBQ p. 89].</ref>(Soviet sources)<ref>name=ryabushkinbr>See {{ru icon}} D. S. Ryabushkin, ''Мифы Даманского''. Мoscow: АСТ, 2004, pp. 151, 263-264.</ref> <br/> 71 killed and 68 wounded (Chinese claim)
| casus =
}}
The '''Sino-Soviet border conflict''' was a seven-month [[Undeclared war|undeclared]] [[military conflict]] between the [[Soviet Union]] and [[China]] at the height of the [[Sino-Soviet split]] in 1969. Although military clashes ceased that year, the underlying issues were not resolved until the [[1991 Sino-Soviet Border Agreement]].
The most serious of these border clashes—which brought the two communist-led countries to the brink of war—occurred in March 1969 in the vicinity of [[Zhenbao Island|Zhenbao (Damasky) Island]] on the [[Ussuri River|Ussuri (Wusuli) River]]; as such, Chinese historians most commonly refer to the conflict as the '''Zhenbao Island Incident'''.<ref>People.com.cn. "[http://www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi/192/8559/8564/20020704/768476.html People.com.cn]." ''1969年珍宝岛自卫反击战.'' Retrieved on 2009-11-05.</ref>
==Background==
===History===
Under the governorship of [[Sheng Shicai]] (1933–1944) in northwest China's [[Xinjiang]] (then ''Sinkiang)'' province, China's nationalist [[Kuomintang]] recognized for the first time the existence of a "[[Uyghur people]]", following Soviet ethnic policy. This [[ethnogenesis]] of a "national" people eligible for territorialized autonomy broadly benefited the Soviet Union, which organized conferences in [[Fergana]] and [[Semirechye]] (in [[Soviet Central Asia]]), in order to cause "revolution" in [[Altishahr]] (southern Xinjiang) and [[Dzungaria]] (northern Xinjiang).<ref>{{cite book|title=Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang|first=James|last=Millward|publisher=Columbia University Press|year=2007|page=208}}</ref> Both the Soviet Union and the [[White movement]] covertly armed and fought with the [[Ili National Army]] which fought against the [[Kuomintang]] in the [[Three Districts Revolution]]. Although the mostly Muslim Uyghur rebels participated in [[pogrom]]s against [[Han Chinese]] in general, the turmoil eventually just resulted in the replacement of Kuomintang rule in [[Xinjiang]] (northwest China) with that of the [[Communist Party of China]] in the 1940s.<ref name="Forbes">{{cite book|title=Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949|first=Andrew|last=Forbes|publisher=CUP Archive|year=1986|pages=175, 178, 188}}</ref>
On the academic side, [[Soviet historiography]] and more specifically Soviet "Uyghur Studies" were politicized in increasing measure to match the tenor of the [[Sino-Soviet split]] from the 1960s and 1970s. One Soviet [[Turkology|Turkologist]] named Tursun Rakhminov, who worked for the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|CPSU]], argued that it was the modern Uyghurs who founded the ancient [[Toquz Oghuz Country]] (744-840), the [[Kara-Khanid Khanate]] (840–1212), and so forth. These premodern states' wars against Chinese dynasties were cast as struggles for national liberation by the Uyghur ethnic group. Soviet historiography was not consistent on these questions: when Sino-Soviet relations were warmer, for example, the Three Districts Revolution was portrayed by Soviet historians as part of the [[Chinese Civil War|greater Chinese anti-Kuomintang revolution]], and not an anti-Chinese bid for national liberation. The Soviet Union also encouraged migration of Uyghurs to its territory in [[Kazakhstan]] along the 4,380 km (2,738 mi) border. In May, 1962, when 60,000 ethnic [[Uyghur people|Uyghurs]] in China's [[Xinjiang]] Province crossed the frontier into the Soviet Union, fleeing the [[Great Leap Forward|desperate economic conditions]].<ref>{{cite book|title=Situating the Uyghurs Between China and Central Asia|first=Ildikó|last=Bellér-Hann|year=2007|publisher=Ashgate Publishing|pages=38–41}}</ref>
{{Infobox Chinese
|pic=Zhenbao island.png
|piccap=Zhenbao Island and the border.
|picsize=130px
|showflag=stp
|s=中苏边界冲突
|t=中蘇邊界衝突
|p=Zhōng Sū biānjiè chōngtū
|mi={{IPAc-cmn|zh|ong|1|-|s|u|1|-|b|ian|1|j|ie|4|-|ch|ong|1|t|u|1}}
|w=
|l2=Zhenbao Island self-defense
|s2=珍宝岛自卫反击战
|t2=珍寶島自衛反擊戰
|p2=Zhēnbǎo dǎo zìwèi fǎnjí zhàn
|j=Zung1 Sou1 bin1gaai3 cung1dat6
|ci=
|rus=Пограничный конфликт на острове Даманский
|rusr=Pograničnyj konflikt na ostrove Damanskij
}}
Amid heightening tensions, the Soviet Union and China began border talks. In spite of the fact that the Soviet Union had granted all of the territory of the Japanese puppet state of [[Manchukuo]] to Mao's communists in 1945, decisively assisting the communists in the [[Chinese Civil War]], the Chinese now indirectly demanded territorial concessions on the basis that the 19th-century treaties transferring ownership of the sparsely populated Outer Manchuria, concluded by [[Qing dynasty]] China and [[Tsarist Russia]], were "[[Unequal Treaties|unequal]]", and amounted to annexation of supposedly rightful Chinese territory. [[Moscow]] would not accept this interpretation, but by 1964 the two sides did reach a preliminary agreement on the eastern section of the border, including Zhenbao Island, which would be handed over to China.
In July 1964, [[Mao Zedong]], in a meeting with a Japanese socialist delegation, stated that Tsarist Russia had stripped China of vast territories in [[Siberia]] and the [[Far East]] as far as [[Kamchatka]], which had never been controlled or claimed by a Chinese polity. Mao stated that China still had not presented a bill for this list. These comments were leaked to the public. Outraged, Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]] then refused to approve the border agreement.
===Geography===
The border dispute in the west centered on {{convert|52000|km2|sqmi}} of Soviet-controlled land in the [[Pamirs]] that lay on the border of China's [[Xinjiang]] region and the Soviet Republic of [[Tajikistan]]. In 1892, the Russian Empire and the Qing Dynasty had agreed that the border would consist of the ridge of the [[Sarikol Range]], but the exact border remained contentious throughout the 20th century. In the 1960s, the Chinese began to insist that the Soviet Union should evacuate the region.
Since around 1900, after the Treaty of Beijing, where Russia gained [[Outer Manchuria]], the east side of the border had mainly been demarcated by three rivers, the [[Argun River (Asia)|Argun River]] from the triparty junction with Mongolia to the north tip of China, running southwest to northeast, then the [[Amur River]] to [[Khabarovsk]] from northwest to southeast, where it was joined by [[Ussuri River]] running south to north. The Ussuri River was demarcated in a non-conventional means: the demarcation line was on the right (Chinese) side of the river, putting the river with all islands in Russian possession. (“The modern method (used for the past 200 years) of demarcating a river boundary “between states today is to set the boundary at either the median line (ligne médiane) of the river or around the area most suitable for navigation under what is known as the ‘[[thalweg]] principle.’<ref>{{Cite journal|url = http://lawreview.vermontlaw.edu/files/2012/02/shah.pdf|title = River Boundary Delimitation and the Resolution of the Sir Creek Dispute Between Pakistan and India|last = Shah|first = Sikander Ahmed|date = February 2012|access-date = February 18, 2015|journal = Vermont Law Review|issue = 357|publication-date = February 2012|volume = 34|page = 364|doi = |language = |format = PDF|bibcode = |quote = }}</ref>
China claimed these islands, as they were located on the Chinese side of the river (if demarcated according to international rule using shipping lanes). The USSR wanted (and by then, already effectively controlled) almost every single island along the rivers.
===Prelude to a nuclear crisis and a people's war===
During 1968, the [[Soviet Army]] had amassed along the 4,380 km (2,738 mi.) border with China — especially at the [[Xinjiang]] frontier, in north-west China, where the Soviets might readily induce [[Turkic peoples|Turkic]] separatists to insurrection. Militarily, in 1961, the USSR had 12 divisions and 200 aeroplanes at that border; in 1968, there were 25 divisions, 1,200 aeroplanes, and 120 medium-range missiles. Moreover, even though PRC has more manpower available than the USSR, and it had already tested its first nuclear weapon nuclear weapon ([[596 (nuclear test)|the 596 Test]] in October 1964, at [[Lop Nur]] basin), the [[People's Liberation Army]] was militarily inferior to the Soviet Army as far as equipment was concerned. Yet, the Chinese adopted a [[Asymmetric warfare|asymmetric]] deterrence strategy that threatened a large-scale conventional “People’s War” in response to a Soviet counterforce first-strike.<ref name="cna.org">https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0022974.A2.pdf</ref> China’s superiority in sheer numbers of troops was the cornerstone of Beijing’s strategy to deter a Soviet nuclear attack.<ref name="cna.org"/> Since 1949, Chinese military strategy as articulated by Chinese leader [[Mao Zedong]] continually emphasized the superiority of “man over weapons.” While weapons were certainly an important component of warfare, Mao argued that they were “not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and
morale.”<ref name="cna.org"/> In Mao’s view, non-material qualities, including subjectivity, creativity, flexibility, and high morale, were critical determinants in warfare.”<ref name="cna.org"/> The Soviets were not confident they could win such a conflict. A large-scale Chinese incursion could threaten key strategic centers in [[Blagoveshchensk]], [[Vladivostok]], and [[Khabarovsk]], as well as crucial nodes of the [[Trans-Siberian Railroad]].<ref name="cna.org"/> According to [[Arkady Shevchenko]], a high-ranking Russian
defector to the United States, “The [[Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Politburo]] was terrified that the Chinese might
make a large-scale intrusion into Soviet territory.<ref name="cna.org"/> A nightmare vision of invasion by
millions of Chinese made the Soviet leaders almost frantic. Despite our overwhelming
superiority in weaponry, it would not be easy for the U.S.S.R. to cope with an assault of
this magnitude.”<ref name="cna.org"/> Given China’s “vast population and deep knowledge and
experience in [[guerrilla warfare]],” if the Soviets launched a major attack on China’s
nuclear program they would surely become “mired in an endless war.”<ref name="cna.org"/> In fact,
concerns about China’s strength in manpower and its “people’s war” strategy ran so
deep that some bureaucrats in Moscow argued the only way to defend against a
massive conventional onslaught was to use nuclear weapons.<ref name="cna.org"/> Some even advocated
deploying nuclear mines along the Sino-Soviet border.<ref name="cna.org"/> By threatening to initiate a prolonged conventional conflict in retaliation for a nuclear strike, Beijing employed an
asymmetric deterrence strategy intended to convince Moscow that the costs of an
attack would outweigh the benefits.<ref name="cna.org"/> China had indeed found a potent threat. While most Soviet military specialists did not
fear a Chinese nuclear reprisal, believing that China’s arsenal was so small,
rudimentary, and vulnerable that it could not survive a first strike and carry out a
retaliatory attack, there was great concern about China’s massive conventional army.<ref name="cna.org"/> [[Nikolai Ogarkov]], a senior Soviet military officer, believed that a massive nuclear attack “would inevitably mean world war.”
Even a limited counterforce strike on China’s nuclear facilities was dangerous,
Ogarkov argued, because a few nuclear weapons would “hardly annihilate” a country
the size of China, and in response China would “fight unrelentingly.”<ref name="cna.org"/>
==Border conflict of 1969==
The number of troops on both sides of the Sino-Soviet border increased dramatically after 1964.
===Eastern border===
On March 2, 1969, a group of [[People's Liberation Army]] (PLA) troops ambushed [[Soviet Border Troops|Soviet border guards]] on [[Zhenbao Island]]. The Soviets suffered 59 dead, including a senior colonel, and 94 wounded.<ref name="ReferenceA">The Chinese People's Liberation Army since 1949 by Benjamin Lai</ref> They retaliated on March 15 by bombarding Chinese troop concentrations on the Chinese bank of the [[Ussuri River]] and by storming Zhenbao Island.<ref name="ReferenceA">The Chinese People's Liberation Army since 1949 by Benjamin Lai</ref> The Soviets sent four then-secret [[T-62]] tanks to attack the Chinese patrols on the island from the other side of the river. One of the leading tanks was hit and the tank commander was killed. On March 16, 1969, the Soviets entered the island to collect their dead; the Chinese held their fire. On March 17, 1969, the Soviets tried to recover the disabled tank, but their effort was repelled by the Chinese artillery.<ref name="ReferenceA">The Chinese People's Liberation Army since 1949 by Benjamin Lai</ref> On March 21, the Soviets sent a demolition team attempting to destroy the tank. The Chinese opened fire and thwarted the Soviets.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> With the help of divers of the [[People's Liberation Army Navy|Chinese navy]], the PLA pulled the T-62 tank onshore. The tank was later given to the [[Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution|Chinese Military Museum]].<ref name="ReferenceA"/>
===Western border===
Further border clashes occurred in August 1969, this time along the western section of the Sino-Soviet border in [[Xinjiang]]. After the Tasiti incident and the Bacha Dao incident, the [[Tielieketi Incident]] finally broke out. Chinese troops suffered 28 losses. Heightened tensions raised the prospect of an all-out nuclear exchange between China and the Soviet Union .<ref name="Kuisong">Kuisong, Yang. "[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713999906#.UmwWGXC-r3N The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement]," ''Cold War History'' 1 (2000): 21-52.</ref> In the early 1960s, the United States had "probed" the level of Soviet interest in joint action against Chinese nuclear weapons facilities; now the Soviets probed what the United States' reaction would be if the USSR attacked the facilities.<ref name="burr2001">Burr, William. "[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/ The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969]" [[National Security Archive]], 12 June 2001.</ref>
==Consequences of 1969==
[[File:Captured T-62 tank.jpg|thumb|The Soviet T-62 tank captured by the Chinese during the 1969 clash, now on display at the [[Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution]]]]
As war fever gripped China, Moscow and Beijing took steps to lower the danger of a large-scale conflict. On September 11, 1969, Soviet Prime Minister [[Alexei Kosygin]], on his way back from the funeral of the Vietnamese leader [[Ho Chi Minh]], stopped over in Beijing for talks with his Chinese counterpart, [[Zhou Enlai]]. Symbolic of the frosty relations between the two communist countries, the talks were held in [[Beijing Capital International Airport|Beijing airport]]. The two premiers agreed to return [[ambassador]]s previously recalled and begin border negotiations.
The Chinese believe a different version of the conflict took place. The Chinese [[Cultural Revolution]] increased tensions between China and the USSR. This led to brawls between border patrols, and shooting broke out in March 1969. The USSR responded with tanks, [[Armoured personnel carrier|APCs]], and artillery bombardment. Over three days the PLA successfully halted Soviet penetration and eventually evicted all Soviet troops from Zhenbao island. During this skirmish the Chinese deployed two reinforced infantry platoons with artillery support. Chinese sources state the Soviets deployed some 60 soldiers and six [[BTR-60]]s and in a second attack some 100 troops backed up by ten tanks and 14 APCs including artillery.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> The PLA had prepared for this confrontation for two to three months.<ref>Kuisong p.28</ref> From among the units of three armies, the PLA selected three reconnaissance companies, each of which was composed of two to three hundred soldiers and commanded by army staff members with combat experience.<ref>Kuisong p.28-29</ref> They were provided with special training and special equipment. Then they were secretly dispatched to take position on Zhenbao island in advance.<ref name="Kuisong p.29">Kuisong p.29</ref> On 2 March when the Soviets conducted their offensive they were hopelessly outnumbered by the Chinese.<ref name="Kuisong p.29">Kuisong p.29</ref> Chinese General [[Chen Xilian]] stated the Chinese had won a clear victory on the battlefield.<ref name="Kuisong p.29">Kuisong p.29</ref> On 15 March the Soviets dispatched another 30 soldiers and six combat vehicles to Zhenbao island.<ref name="Kuisong p.26">Kuisong p.26</ref> After an hour of fighting the Chinese had destroyed two of the Soviet vehicles.<ref name="Kuisong p.26"/> A few hours later the Soviets sent a second wave with artillery support. The Chinese would destroy five more Soviet combat vehicles.<ref name="Kuisong p.26"/> A third wave would be repulsed by effective Chinese artillery which destroyed one Soviet tank and four APCs while damaging two other APCs.<ref name="Kuisong p.26"/> The Chinese proved once again to be better prepared than the Soviets were.<ref name="Kuisong p.26"/> The Chinese gave their soldiers the credit for their victories over the better equipped Soviets citing superior intellect and spirit of the Chinese soldier.<ref name="Kuisong p.27">Kuisong p.27</ref> Chinese propaganda described the Soviet troops as being politically degenerated and morally decadent.<ref name="Kuisong p.27"/>
The view on the reasoning and consequences of the conflict differ between western and Russian historians. Western historians believe the events at Zhenbao Island and the subsequent border clashes in Xinjiang caused Mao to re-appraise China's foreign policy and to seek [[rapprochement]] with the [[United States]],<ref name="Kuisong"/> while Russian historians point out that the consequences of the conflict stem directly from the desire of the PRC to take a leading role in the world and strengthen ties with the US. Such a local conflict with the USSR would be a sign of a split with the USSR and signal the US that China was ready for dialogue.<ref>Goldstein, Lyle J. "[http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=96239 Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why it Matters]." ''The China Quarterly'' 168 (December 2001): pp. 985-97.</ref> The PRC began ideological preparation for the split with the USSR in the late 1950s,<ref name="Bloodshed on Damansky (Кровопролитие на Даманском)">{{cite web|url=http://www.konkurent.ru/print.php?id=2038|title=Bloodshed on Damansky (Кровопролитие на Даманском)|publisher=Konkurent.ru |accessdate=2012-09-29}}</ref> and the Soviet Border Service started to report intensifying Chinese military activity in the region during the early 1960s.
After the conflict, America showed actual interest in strengthening ties with the Chinese government by secretly sending [[Henry Kissinger]] to China for a meeting with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in 1971, during the so-called [[Ping Pong Diplomacy]], paving the way for [[Richard Nixon]] to visit China and meet with [[Mao Zedong]] in 1972.<ref name="Henry Kissinger plays ping-pong (Генри Киссинджер играет в пинг-понг)">{{cite web |title=Henry Kissinger plays ping-pong |url=http://tabletennis.hobby.ru/news/news/0116.shtml |publisher=Tabletennis.hobby.ru |accessdate=2012-09-29}}</ref>
[[Sino-Soviet relations|China's relations with the USSR]] remained sour after the conflict, despite the border talks, which began in 1969 and lasted inconclusively for a decade. Domestically, the threat of war, caused by the border clashes, inaugurated a new stage in the [[Cultural Revolution]]; that of China's thorough militarization. The [[National Congress of the Communist Party of China#After 1949|9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China]], held in the aftermath of the Zhenbao Island incident, confirmed Defense Minister [[Lin Biao]] as Mao's [[heir-apparent]]. Following the events of 1969, the Soviet Union further increased its forces along the Sino-Soviet border, and in the [[Mongolian People's Republic]].
Overall, the Sino-Soviet confrontation, which reached its peak in 1969, paved the way to a profound transformation in the [[International relations|international political system]].
==Chinese combat heroes==
During the Zhenbao Island clashes with the Soviet Army in March 1969 one Chinese [[Rocket-propelled grenade|RPG]] team, Hua Yujie and his assistant Yu Haichang destroyed four Soviet APCs and achieved more than ten kills.<ref name="Benjamin Lai p.12">Benjamin Lai p.12</ref> Hua and Yu received the accolade "Combat Hero" from the CMC, and their action was commemorated on a postage stamp.<ref name="Benjamin Lai p.12"/>
==Border negotiations in the 1990s and beyond==
{{Main article|1991 Sino-Russian border agreement}}
Serious border demarcation negotiations did not occur until shortly before the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. In particular, both sides agreed that Zhenbao Island belonged to China. (Both sides claimed the island was under their control at the time of the agreement.) On October 17, 1995, an agreement over the last {{convert|54|km|mi}} stretch of the border was reached, but the question of control over three islands in the Amur and Argun rivers was left to be settled later.
In a border agreement between Russia and China signed on October 14, 2003, that dispute was finally resolved. China was granted control over [[Tarabarov Island]] (Yinlong Island), Zhenbao Island, and approximately 50% of [[Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island]] (Heixiazi Island), near [[Khabarovsk]]. China's [[Standing Committee of the National People's Congress|Standing Committee]] of the [[National People's Congress]] ratified this agreement on April 27, 2005, with the Russian [[Duma]] following suit on May 20. On June 2, Chinese Foreign Minister [[Li Zhaoxing]] and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs [[Sergei Lavrov]] exchanged the ratification documents from their respective governments.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-06/02/content_3037975.htm|title=China, Russia solve all border disputes|accessdate=2008-07-23 |author= |date=June 2, 2005 |publisher=''[[Xinhua]]''}}</ref>
On July 21, 2008, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, signed an additional Sino-Russian Border Line Agreement marking the acceptance of the demarcation the eastern portion of the Chinese-Russian border in Beijing, China. An additional protocol with a map affiliated on the eastern part of the borders both countries share was signed. The agreement also includes the PRC gaining ownership of Yinlong/Tarabarov Island and half of Heixiazi/Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/21/content_8739941.htm|title=China, Russia complete border survey, determination |accessdate=2008-07-23 |author= |date=July 21, 2008 |publisher=''[[Xinhua]]''}}</ref>
==See also==
*[[History of the Soviet Union (1964–1982)]]
*[[History of the People's Republic of China]]
*[[Foreign relations of the People's Republic of China]]
*[[Soviet Invasion of Xinjiang]]
*[[Xinjiang War (1937)]]
*[[Pei-ta-shan Incident]]
==Notes==
1, 2. [http://www.ibiblio.org/chinesehistory/contents/03pol/c04s05.html#1969%20Border%20Conflict Exploring Chinese History, 1969 Border Conflict]
==References==
{{Reflist|2}}
==External links==
*[http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_ussr_e_88.jpg Map showing some of the disputed areas]
*[http://www.damanski-zhenbao.ru/index_en.htm Damanski-Zhenbao website]
*[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/ Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969]
*[http://rbth.com/blogs/2015/09/02/how_comrade_mao_was_perceived_in_the_soviet_union_48893.html How Comrade Mao was perceived in the Soviet Union]
*https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0022974.A2.pdf
*http://www.damanski-zhenbao.ru/files/zhenbaodao.pdf
{{Brezhnev era}}
{{USSR conflicts}}
{{Russian Conflicts}}
{{PRC conflicts}}
{{Cold War}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Sino-Soviet Border Conflict}}
[[Category:Conflicts in 1969]]
[[Category:1969 in China]]
[[Category:1969 in the Soviet Union]]
[[Category:China–Soviet Union relations]]
[[Category:Cold War military history of the Soviet Union]]
[[Category:History of Manchuria]]
[[Category:History of the Russian Far East]]
[[Category:Wars involving the People's Republic of China]]
[[Category:Wars involving the Soviet Union]]
[[Category:Territorial disputes of China]]
[[Category:Territorial disputes of the Soviet Union]]
[[Category:China–Soviet Union border]]
[[Category:China–Russia border]]' |
New page wikitext, after the edit (new_wikitext ) | '{{For|the earlier border conflict|Sino-Soviet conflict (1929)}}
{{Infobox military conflict
|conflict = Sino-Soviet border conflict
|partof = the [[Cold War]] and the [[Sino-Soviet split]]
|image = [[File:China USSR E 88.jpg|300px]]
|caption = Some of the disputed areas in the Argun and Amur rivers. Damansky/Zhenbao is to the southeast, north of the lake
|date = March 2 – September 11, 1969
|place = Border between [[China]] and the [[Soviet Union]]
|territory =
|result = [[Status quo ante bellum]]
*Tactical Soviet victory<ref name="Kuisong p.29">Kuisong p.29</ref>
*Strategic Chinese victory: 1991 Sino-Soviet Border Agreement.<ref name="ReferenceA"/>
|combatant1 = '''{{flagcountry|Soviet Union}}'''
|combatant2 = '''{{flagcountry|China}}'''
|commander1 = {{Flag icon|Soviet Union|1955}} '''[[Leonid Brezhnev]]'''
|commander2 = {{Flag icon|People's Republic of China}} '''[[Mao Zedong]]'''
|strength1 = 658,000
|strength2 = 814,000
|casualties1 = 59 killed<br>94 wounded
|casualties2 = 200~800 killed
| casus =
}}
The '''Sino-Soviet border conflict''' was a seven-month [[Undeclared war|undeclared]] [[military conflict]] between the [[Soviet Union]] and [[China]] at the height of the [[Sino-Soviet split]] in 1969. Although military clashes ceased that year, the underlying issues were not resolved until the [[1991 Sino-Soviet Border Agreement]].
The most serious of these border clashes—which brought the two communist-led countries to the brink of war—occurred in March 1969 in the vicinity of [[Zhenbao Island|Zhenbao (Damasky) Island]] on the [[Ussuri River|Ussuri (Wusuli) River]]; as such, Chinese historians most commonly refer to the conflict as the '''Zhenbao Island Incident'''.<ref>People.com.cn. "[http://www.people.com.cn/GB/junshi/192/8559/8564/20020704/768476.html People.com.cn]." ''1969年珍宝岛自卫反击战.'' Retrieved on 2009-11-05.</ref>
==Background==
===History===
Under the governorship of [[Sheng Shicai]] (1933–1944) in northwest China's [[Xinjiang]] (then ''Sinkiang)'' province, China's nationalist [[Kuomintang]] recognized for the first time the existence of a "[[Uyghur people]]", following Soviet ethnic policy. This [[ethnogenesis]] of a "national" people eligible for territorialized autonomy broadly benefited the Soviet Union, which organized conferences in [[Fergana]] and [[Semirechye]] (in [[Soviet Central Asia]]), in order to cause "revolution" in [[Altishahr]] (southern Xinjiang) and [[Dzungaria]] (northern Xinjiang).<ref>{{cite book|title=Eurasian Crossroads: A History of Xinjiang|first=James|last=Millward|publisher=Columbia University Press|year=2007|page=208}}</ref> Both the Soviet Union and the [[White movement]] covertly armed and fought with the [[Ili National Army]] which fought against the [[Kuomintang]] in the [[Three Districts Revolution]]. Although the mostly Muslim Uyghur rebels participated in [[pogrom]]s against [[Han Chinese]] in general, the turmoil eventually just resulted in the replacement of Kuomintang rule in [[Xinjiang]] (northwest China) with that of the [[Communist Party of China]] in the 1940s.<ref name="Forbes">{{cite book|title=Warlords and Muslims in Chinese Central Asia: A Political History of Republican Sinkiang 1911-1949|first=Andrew|last=Forbes|publisher=CUP Archive|year=1986|pages=175, 178, 188}}</ref>
On the academic side, [[Soviet historiography]] and more specifically Soviet "Uyghur Studies" were politicized in increasing measure to match the tenor of the [[Sino-Soviet split]] from the 1960s and 1970s. One Soviet [[Turkology|Turkologist]] named Tursun Rakhminov, who worked for the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union|CPSU]], argued that it was the modern Uyghurs who founded the ancient [[Toquz Oghuz Country]] (744-840), the [[Kara-Khanid Khanate]] (840–1212), and so forth. These premodern states' wars against Chinese dynasties were cast as struggles for national liberation by the Uyghur ethnic group. Soviet historiography was not consistent on these questions: when Sino-Soviet relations were warmer, for example, the Three Districts Revolution was portrayed by Soviet historians as part of the [[Chinese Civil War|greater Chinese anti-Kuomintang revolution]], and not an anti-Chinese bid for national liberation. The Soviet Union also encouraged migration of Uyghurs to its territory in [[Kazakhstan]] along the 4,380 km (2,738 mi) border. In May, 1962, when 60,000 ethnic [[Uyghur people|Uyghurs]] in China's [[Xinjiang]] Province crossed the frontier into the Soviet Union, fleeing the [[Great Leap Forward|desperate economic conditions]].<ref>{{cite book|title=Situating the Uyghurs Between China and Central Asia|first=Ildikó|last=Bellér-Hann|year=2007|publisher=Ashgate Publishing|pages=38–41}}</ref>
{{Infobox Chinese
|pic=Zhenbao island.png
|piccap=Zhenbao Island and the border.
|picsize=130px
|showflag=stp
|s=中苏边界冲突
|t=中蘇邊界衝突
|p=Zhōng Sū biānjiè chōngtū
|mi={{IPAc-cmn|zh|ong|1|-|s|u|1|-|b|ian|1|j|ie|4|-|ch|ong|1|t|u|1}}
|w=
|l2=Zhenbao Island self-defense
|s2=珍宝岛自卫反击战
|t2=珍寶島自衛反擊戰
|p2=Zhēnbǎo dǎo zìwèi fǎnjí zhàn
|j=Zung1 Sou1 bin1gaai3 cung1dat6
|ci=
|rus=Пограничный конфликт на острове Даманский
|rusr=Pograničnyj konflikt na ostrove Damanskij
}}
Amid heightening tensions, the Soviet Union and China began border talks. In spite of the fact that the Soviet Union had granted all of the territory of the Japanese puppet state of [[Manchukuo]] to Mao's communists in 1945, decisively assisting the communists in the [[Chinese Civil War]], the Chinese now indirectly demanded territorial concessions on the basis that the 19th-century treaties transferring ownership of the sparsely populated Outer Manchuria, concluded by [[Qing dynasty]] China and [[Tsarist Russia]], were "[[Unequal Treaties|unequal]]", and amounted to annexation of supposedly rightful Chinese territory. [[Moscow]] would not accept this interpretation, but by 1964 the two sides did reach a preliminary agreement on the eastern section of the border, including Zhenbao Island, which would be handed over to China.
In July 1964, [[Mao Zedong]], in a meeting with a Japanese socialist delegation, stated that Tsarist Russia had stripped China of vast territories in [[Siberia]] and the [[Far East]] as far as [[Kamchatka]], which had never been controlled or claimed by a Chinese polity. Mao stated that China still had not presented a bill for this list. These comments were leaked to the public. Outraged, Soviet leader [[Nikita Khrushchev]] then refused to approve the border agreement.
===Geography===
The border dispute in the west centered on {{convert|52000|km2|sqmi}} of Soviet-controlled land in the [[Pamirs]] that lay on the border of China's [[Xinjiang]] region and the Soviet Republic of [[Tajikistan]]. In 1892, the Russian Empire and the Qing Dynasty had agreed that the border would consist of the ridge of the [[Sarikol Range]], but the exact border remained contentious throughout the 20th century. In the 1960s, the Chinese began to insist that the Soviet Union should evacuate the region.
Since around 1900, after the Treaty of Beijing, where Russia gained [[Outer Manchuria]], the east side of the border had mainly been demarcated by three rivers, the [[Argun River (Asia)|Argun River]] from the triparty junction with Mongolia to the north tip of China, running southwest to northeast, then the [[Amur River]] to [[Khabarovsk]] from northwest to southeast, where it was joined by [[Ussuri River]] running south to north. The Ussuri River was demarcated in a non-conventional means: the demarcation line was on the right (Chinese) side of the river, putting the river with all islands in Russian possession. (“The modern method (used for the past 200 years) of demarcating a river boundary “between states today is to set the boundary at either the median line (ligne médiane) of the river or around the area most suitable for navigation under what is known as the ‘[[thalweg]] principle.’<ref>{{Cite journal|url = http://lawreview.vermontlaw.edu/files/2012/02/shah.pdf|title = River Boundary Delimitation and the Resolution of the Sir Creek Dispute Between Pakistan and India|last = Shah|first = Sikander Ahmed|date = February 2012|access-date = February 18, 2015|journal = Vermont Law Review|issue = 357|publication-date = February 2012|volume = 34|page = 364|doi = |language = |format = PDF|bibcode = |quote = }}</ref>
China claimed these islands, as they were located on the Chinese side of the river (if demarcated according to international rule using shipping lanes). The USSR wanted (and by then, already effectively controlled) almost every single island along the rivers.
===Prelude to a nuclear crisis and a people's war===
During 1968, the [[Soviet Army]] had amassed along the 4,380 km (2,738 mi.) border with China — especially at the [[Xinjiang]] frontier, in north-west China, where the Soviets might readily induce [[Turkic peoples|Turkic]] separatists to insurrection. Militarily, in 1961, the USSR had 12 divisions and 200 aeroplanes at that border; in 1968, there were 25 divisions, 1,200 aeroplanes, and 120 medium-range missiles. Moreover, even though PRC has more manpower available than the USSR, and it had already tested its first nuclear weapon nuclear weapon ([[596 (nuclear test)|the 596 Test]] in October 1964, at [[Lop Nur]] basin), the [[People's Liberation Army]] was militarily inferior to the Soviet Army as far as equipment was concerned. Yet, the Chinese adopted a [[Asymmetric warfare|asymmetric]] deterrence strategy that threatened a large-scale conventional “People’s War” in response to a Soviet counterforce first-strike.<ref name="cna.org">https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0022974.A2.pdf</ref> China’s superiority in sheer numbers of troops was the cornerstone of Beijing’s strategy to deter a Soviet nuclear attack.<ref name="cna.org"/> Since 1949, Chinese military strategy as articulated by Chinese leader [[Mao Zedong]] continually emphasized the superiority of “man over weapons.” While weapons were certainly an important component of warfare, Mao argued that they were “not the decisive factor; it is people, not things, that are decisive. The contest of strength is not only a contest of military and economic power, but also a contest of human power and
morale.”<ref name="cna.org"/> In Mao’s view, non-material qualities, including subjectivity, creativity, flexibility, and high morale, were critical determinants in warfare.”<ref name="cna.org"/> The Soviets were not confident they could win such a conflict. A large-scale Chinese incursion could threaten key strategic centers in [[Blagoveshchensk]], [[Vladivostok]], and [[Khabarovsk]], as well as crucial nodes of the [[Trans-Siberian Railroad]].<ref name="cna.org"/> According to [[Arkady Shevchenko]], a high-ranking Russian
defector to the United States, “The [[Politburo of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union|Politburo]] was terrified that the Chinese might
make a large-scale intrusion into Soviet territory.<ref name="cna.org"/> A nightmare vision of invasion by
millions of Chinese made the Soviet leaders almost frantic. Despite our overwhelming
superiority in weaponry, it would not be easy for the U.S.S.R. to cope with an assault of
this magnitude.”<ref name="cna.org"/> Given China’s “vast population and deep knowledge and
experience in [[guerrilla warfare]],” if the Soviets launched a major attack on China’s
nuclear program they would surely become “mired in an endless war.”<ref name="cna.org"/> In fact,
concerns about China’s strength in manpower and its “people’s war” strategy ran so
deep that some bureaucrats in Moscow argued the only way to defend against a
massive conventional onslaught was to use nuclear weapons.<ref name="cna.org"/> Some even advocated
deploying nuclear mines along the Sino-Soviet border.<ref name="cna.org"/> By threatening to initiate a prolonged conventional conflict in retaliation for a nuclear strike, Beijing employed an
asymmetric deterrence strategy intended to convince Moscow that the costs of an
attack would outweigh the benefits.<ref name="cna.org"/> China had indeed found a potent threat. While most Soviet military specialists did not
fear a Chinese nuclear reprisal, believing that China’s arsenal was so small,
rudimentary, and vulnerable that it could not survive a first strike and carry out a
retaliatory attack, there was great concern about China’s massive conventional army.<ref name="cna.org"/> [[Nikolai Ogarkov]], a senior Soviet military officer, believed that a massive nuclear attack “would inevitably mean world war.”
Even a limited counterforce strike on China’s nuclear facilities was dangerous,
Ogarkov argued, because a few nuclear weapons would “hardly annihilate” a country
the size of China, and in response China would “fight unrelentingly.”<ref name="cna.org"/>
==Border conflict of 1969==
The number of troops on both sides of the Sino-Soviet border increased dramatically after 1964.
===Eastern border===
On March 2, 1969, a group of [[People's Liberation Army]] (PLA) troops ambushed [[Soviet Border Troops|Soviet border guards]] on [[Zhenbao Island]]. The Soviets suffered 59 dead, including a senior colonel, and 94 wounded.<ref name="ReferenceA">The Chinese People's Liberation Army since 1949 by Benjamin Lai</ref> They retaliated on March 15 by bombarding Chinese troop concentrations on the Chinese bank of the [[Ussuri River]] and by storming Zhenbao Island.<ref name="ReferenceA">The Chinese People's Liberation Army since 1949 by Benjamin Lai</ref> The Soviets sent four then-secret [[T-62]] tanks to attack the Chinese patrols on the island from the other side of the river. One of the leading tanks was hit and the tank commander was killed. On March 16, 1969, the Soviets entered the island to collect their dead; the Chinese held their fire. On March 17, 1969, the Soviets tried to recover the disabled tank, but their effort was repelled by the Chinese artillery.<ref name="ReferenceA">The Chinese People's Liberation Army since 1949 by Benjamin Lai</ref> On March 21, the Soviets sent a demolition team attempting to destroy the tank. The Chinese opened fire and thwarted the Soviets.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> With the help of divers of the [[People's Liberation Army Navy|Chinese navy]], the PLA pulled the T-62 tank onshore. The tank was later given to the [[Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution|Chinese Military Museum]].<ref name="ReferenceA"/> On March 15, 1969, the Chinese troops were repelled from Zhenbao Island (Damansky Island) with significant losses and did not return until September of that year, when Soviet border guards received the order to not open fire against them.
===Western border===
Further border clashes occurred in August 1969, this time along the western section of the Sino-Soviet border in [[Xinjiang]]. After the Tasiti incident and the Bacha Dao incident, the [[Tielieketi Incident]] finally broke out. Chinese troops suffered 28 losses. Heightened tensions raised the prospect of an all-out nuclear exchange between China and the Soviet Union .<ref name="Kuisong">Kuisong, Yang. "[http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/713999906#.UmwWGXC-r3N The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement]," ''Cold War History'' 1 (2000): 21-52.</ref> In the early 1960s, the United States had "probed" the level of Soviet interest in joint action against Chinese nuclear weapons facilities; now the Soviets probed what the United States' reaction would be if the USSR attacked the facilities.<ref name="burr2001">Burr, William. "[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/ The Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969]" [[National Security Archive]], 12 June 2001.</ref>
==Consequences of 1969==
[[File:Captured T-62 tank.jpg|thumb|The Soviet T-62 tank captured by the Chinese during the 1969 clash, now on display at the [[Military Museum of the Chinese People's Revolution]]]]
As war fever gripped China, Moscow and Beijing took steps to lower the danger of a large-scale conflict. On September 11, 1969, Soviet Prime Minister [[Alexei Kosygin]], on his way back from the funeral of the Vietnamese leader [[Ho Chi Minh]], stopped over in Beijing for talks with his Chinese counterpart, [[Zhou Enlai]]. Symbolic of the frosty relations between the two communist countries, the talks were held in [[Beijing Capital International Airport|Beijing airport]]. The two premiers agreed to return [[ambassador]]s previously recalled and begin border negotiations.
The Chinese believe a different version of the conflict took place. The Chinese [[Cultural Revolution]] increased tensions between China and the USSR. This led to brawls between border patrols, and shooting broke out in March 1969. The USSR responded with tanks, [[Armoured personnel carrier|APCs]], and artillery bombardment. Over three days the PLA successfully halted Soviet penetration and eventually evicted all Soviet troops from Zhenbao island. During this skirmish the Chinese deployed two reinforced infantry platoons with artillery support. Chinese sources state the Soviets deployed some 60 soldiers and six [[BTR-60]]s and in a second attack some 100 troops backed up by ten tanks and 14 APCs including artillery.<ref name="ReferenceA"/> The PLA had prepared for this confrontation for two to three months.<ref>Kuisong p.28</ref> From among the units of three armies, the PLA selected three reconnaissance companies, each of which was composed of two to three hundred soldiers and commanded by army staff members with combat experience.<ref>Kuisong p.28-29</ref> They were provided with special training and special equipment. Then they were secretly dispatched to take position on Zhenbao island in advance.<ref name="Kuisong p.29">Kuisong p.29</ref> On 2 March when the Soviets conducted their offensive they were hopelessly outnumbered by the Chinese.<ref name="Kuisong p.29">Kuisong p.29</ref> Chinese General [[Chen Xilian]] stated the Chinese had won a clear victory on the battlefield.<ref name="Kuisong p.29">Kuisong p.29</ref> On 15 March the Soviets dispatched another 30 soldiers and six combat vehicles to Zhenbao island.<ref name="Kuisong p.26">Kuisong p.26</ref> After an hour of fighting the Chinese had destroyed two of the Soviet vehicles.<ref name="Kuisong p.26"/> A few hours later the Soviets sent a second wave with artillery support. The Chinese would destroy five more Soviet combat vehicles.<ref name="Kuisong p.26"/> A third wave would be repulsed by effective Chinese artillery which destroyed one Soviet tank and four APCs while damaging two other APCs.<ref name="Kuisong p.26"/> The Chinese proved once again to be better prepared than the Soviets were.<ref name="Kuisong p.26"/> The Chinese gave their soldiers the credit for their victories over the better equipped Soviets citing superior intellect and spirit of the Chinese soldier.<ref name="Kuisong p.27">Kuisong p.27</ref> Chinese propaganda described the Soviet troops as being politically degenerated and morally decadent.<ref name="Kuisong p.27"/>
The view on the reasoning and consequences of the conflict differ between western and Russian historians. Western historians believe the events at Zhenbao Island and the subsequent border clashes in Xinjiang caused Mao to re-appraise China's foreign policy and to seek [[rapprochement]] with the [[United States]],<ref name="Kuisong"/> while Russian historians point out that the consequences of the conflict stem directly from the desire of the PRC to take a leading role in the world and strengthen ties with the US. Such a local conflict with the USSR would be a sign of a split with the USSR and signal the US that China was ready for dialogue.<ref>Goldstein, Lyle J. "[http://journals.cambridge.org/action/displayAbstract?fromPage=online&aid=96239 Return to Zhenbao Island: Who Started Shooting and Why it Matters]." ''The China Quarterly'' 168 (December 2001): pp. 985-97.</ref> The PRC began ideological preparation for the split with the USSR in the late 1950s,<ref name="Bloodshed on Damansky (Кровопролитие на Даманском)">{{cite web|url=http://www.konkurent.ru/print.php?id=2038|title=Bloodshed on Damansky (Кровопролитие на Даманском)|publisher=Konkurent.ru |accessdate=2012-09-29}}</ref> and the Soviet Border Service started to report intensifying Chinese military activity in the region during the early 1960s.
After the conflict, America showed actual interest in strengthening ties with the Chinese government by secretly sending [[Henry Kissinger]] to China for a meeting with Prime Minister Zhou Enlai in 1971, during the so-called [[Ping Pong Diplomacy]], paving the way for [[Richard Nixon]] to visit China and meet with [[Mao Zedong]] in 1972.<ref name="Henry Kissinger plays ping-pong (Генри Киссинджер играет в пинг-понг)">{{cite web |title=Henry Kissinger plays ping-pong |url=http://tabletennis.hobby.ru/news/news/0116.shtml |publisher=Tabletennis.hobby.ru |accessdate=2012-09-29}}</ref>
[[Sino-Soviet relations|China's relations with the USSR]] remained sour after the conflict, despite the border talks, which began in 1969 and lasted inconclusively for a decade. Domestically, the threat of war, caused by the border clashes, inaugurated a new stage in the [[Cultural Revolution]]; that of China's thorough militarization. The [[National Congress of the Communist Party of China#After 1949|9th National Congress of the Communist Party of China]], held in the aftermath of the Zhenbao Island incident, confirmed Defense Minister [[Lin Biao]] as Mao's [[heir-apparent]]. Following the events of 1969, the Soviet Union further increased its forces along the Sino-Soviet border, and in the [[Mongolian People's Republic]].
Overall, the Sino-Soviet confrontation, which reached its peak in 1969, paved the way to a profound transformation in the [[International relations|international political system]].
==Chinese combat heroes==
During the Zhenbao Island clashes with the Soviet Army in March 1969 one Chinese [[Rocket-propelled grenade|RPG]] team, Hua Yujie and his assistant Yu Haichang destroyed four Soviet APCs and achieved more than ten kills.<ref name="Benjamin Lai p.12">Benjamin Lai p.12</ref> Hua and Yu received the accolade "Combat Hero" from the CMC, and their action was commemorated on a postage stamp.<ref name="Benjamin Lai p.12"/>
==Border negotiations in the 1990s and beyond==
{{Main article|1991 Sino-Russian border agreement}}
Serious border demarcation negotiations did not occur until shortly before the end of the Soviet Union in 1991. In particular, both sides agreed that Zhenbao Island belonged to China. (Both sides claimed the island was under their control at the time of the agreement.) On October 17, 1995, an agreement over the last {{convert|54|km|mi}} stretch of the border was reached, but the question of control over three islands in the Amur and Argun rivers was left to be settled later.
In a border agreement between Russia and China signed on October 14, 2003, that dispute was finally resolved. China was granted control over [[Tarabarov Island]] (Yinlong Island), Zhenbao Island, and approximately 50% of [[Bolshoy Ussuriysky Island]] (Heixiazi Island), near [[Khabarovsk]]. China's [[Standing Committee of the National People's Congress|Standing Committee]] of the [[National People's Congress]] ratified this agreement on April 27, 2005, with the Russian [[Duma]] following suit on May 20. On June 2, Chinese Foreign Minister [[Li Zhaoxing]] and Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs [[Sergei Lavrov]] exchanged the ratification documents from their respective governments.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2005-06/02/content_3037975.htm|title=China, Russia solve all border disputes|accessdate=2008-07-23 |author= |date=June 2, 2005 |publisher=''[[Xinhua]]''}}</ref>
On July 21, 2008, Chinese Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi and his Russian counterpart, Sergei Lavrov, signed an additional Sino-Russian Border Line Agreement marking the acceptance of the demarcation the eastern portion of the Chinese-Russian border in Beijing, China. An additional protocol with a map affiliated on the eastern part of the borders both countries share was signed. The agreement also includes the PRC gaining ownership of Yinlong/Tarabarov Island and half of Heixiazi/Bolshoi Ussuriysky Island.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-07/21/content_8739941.htm|title=China, Russia complete border survey, determination |accessdate=2008-07-23 |author= |date=July 21, 2008 |publisher=''[[Xinhua]]''}}</ref>
==See also==
*[[History of the Soviet Union (1964–1982)]]
*[[History of the People's Republic of China]]
*[[Foreign relations of the People's Republic of China]]
*[[Soviet Invasion of Xinjiang]]
*[[Xinjiang War (1937)]]
*[[Pei-ta-shan Incident]]
==Notes==
1, 2. [http://www.ibiblio.org/chinesehistory/contents/03pol/c04s05.html#1969%20Border%20Conflict Exploring Chinese History, 1969 Border Conflict]
==References==
{{Reflist|2}}
==External links==
*[http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_ussr_e_88.jpg Map showing some of the disputed areas]
*[http://www.damanski-zhenbao.ru/index_en.htm Damanski-Zhenbao website]
*[http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB49/ Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969]
*[http://rbth.com/blogs/2015/09/02/how_comrade_mao_was_perceived_in_the_soviet_union_48893.html How Comrade Mao was perceived in the Soviet Union]
*https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/PDF/D0022974.A2.pdf
*http://www.damanski-zhenbao.ru/files/zhenbaodao.pdf
{{Brezhnev era}}
{{USSR conflicts}}
{{Russian Conflicts}}
{{PRC conflicts}}
{{Cold War}}
{{DEFAULTSORT:Sino-Soviet Border Conflict}}
[[Category:Conflicts in 1969]]
[[Category:1969 in China]]
[[Category:1969 in the Soviet Union]]
[[Category:China–Soviet Union relations]]
[[Category:Cold War military history of the Soviet Union]]
[[Category:History of Manchuria]]
[[Category:History of the Russian Far East]]
[[Category:Wars involving the People's Republic of China]]
[[Category:Wars involving the Soviet Union]]
[[Category:Territorial disputes of China]]
[[Category:Territorial disputes of the Soviet Union]]
[[Category:China–Soviet Union border]]
[[Category:China–Russia border]]' |
Whether or not the change was made through a Tor exit node (tor_exit_node ) | 0 |
Unix timestamp of change (timestamp ) | 1468861878 |