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'{{Primary sources|article|date=July 2013}} {{Criminal defenses}} In [[criminal law]], the '''duty to retreat''', or '''requirement of safe retreat''',<ref name=CL>''Criminal Law - Cases and Materials'', 7th ed. 2012, [[Wolters Kluwer Law & Business]]; [[John Kaplan (law professor)|John Kaplan]], [[Robert Weisberg]], [[Guyora Binder]], {{ISBN|978-1-4548-0698-1}}, [https://law.stanford.edu/publications/criminal-law-cases-and-materials-7th-edition/]</ref>{{rp|550}} is a legal requirement in some jurisdictions that a threatened person cannot [[stand one's ground]] and apply lethal force in [[self-defense]], but must instead retreat to a place of safety.<ref name="CL"/>{{rp|549–554}} It is a specific component which sometimes appears in the defense of [[self-defense (theory)|self-defense]], and which must be addressed if [[defendants]] are to prove that their conduct was [[excuse|justified]]. In those [[criminal jurisdiction|jurisdictions]] where the requirement exists, the [[Legal burden of proof|burden of proof]] is on the defense to show that the defendant was acting reasonably. Elements of acting reasonably include that the defendant had first avoided conflict and, secondly, had taken reasonable steps to retreat and so demonstrated an intention not to fight before eventually [[use of force|using force]]. ==U.S. law== Some U.S. jurisdictions <!-- rm which tag because the list is changing --> require that a person retreat from an attack, and allow the use of [[deadly force]] in self-defense only when retreat is not possible or when retreat poses a danger to the person under attack. The duty to retreat is not universal, however. For example, police officers are not required to retreat when acting in the line of duty. Other states apply what is known as the [[castle doctrine]], whereby a threatened person need not retreat within his or her own dwelling or place of work. Sometimes this has been the result of court rulings that one need not retreat in a place where one has an especial right to be.<ref>''State of Washington v. Allery'', 101 Wash.2d 591, 682 P.2d 312 (1984)</ref>. In other states, this has been accomplished by statute, such as that suggested by the [[Model Penal Code]]<ref>§ 3.04(2)(b)(ii)</ref>. Still other states have passed [[stand your ground law]]s that do not require an individual to retreat and allow one to match force for force, deadly force for deadly force. <ref>http://criminal.findlaw.com/criminal-law-basics/states-that-have-stand-your-ground-laws.html</ref> From a human rights and public policy point of view, these laws are highly problematic and typically irreconcilable with international human rights obligations assumed by the U.S. <ref> Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights and Personal Self-Defense in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2017, ch. 6, https://books.google.ht/books/about/Human_Rights_and_Personal_Self_Defense_i.html?id=8vfCDAEACAAJ&redir_esc=y </ref> Most state legal systems began by importing English common law such as Acts of Parliament of 2 Ed. III ([[Statute of Northampton]]), and 5 Rich. II of 1381 ([[Forcible Entry Act 1381]])—which imposed criminal sanctions intending to discourage the resort to self-help.<ref>[http://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/CACourts/ ''Dickinson v. Maguire,'' 9 Cal. 46], The [[Chief Justice of California]] during the ruling was [[David S. Terry]], who ironically, was later killed by order of [[Stephen Johnson Field | Associate Supreme Court Justice Field]] under the guise of self-defense.</ref><ref>[http://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/daluiso-v-boone-27416 Daluiso v. Boone , 71 Cal.2d 484] for English common law history</ref><ref>{{cite book |title=''Dustin v. Cowdry'' (1851) 23 Vt. 631, 639–640 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=f65LAAAAYAAJ&pg=PA616&lpg=PA616&dq=dustin+v.+cowdry+(1851)+23+vt.+631+vermont&source=bl&ots=98_6oObfZ-&sig=txFhnVjC0-N-cITDIP3lHgHn3_Q&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ZZj0UfmmILLj4APMh4H4CA&ved=0CCwQ6AEwAA#v=onepage&q=dustin%20v.%20cowdry%20(1851)%2023%20vt.%20631%20vermont&f=false |publisher=Official Vermont Reports, Vol. 23, Pg. 631 (Supreme Court of Vermont reporter)|date=1851|accessdate=July 27, 2013 |quote="[H]ad the present plaintiff elected to have proceeded under the statute, there can be no doubt, he might have subjected the defendants to punishment by way of fine, obtained restitution of the possession, and sustained an action of trespass, and recovered three fold damages for the expulsion and detention. And if such be the undeniable rights of the parties, under the statute, it is difficult to see, why, if the party waive all penalty under the statute, he may not sustain trespass qu. cl. against the defendants, the same as against any other wrong doers. Their [defendants'] right to possession gave them no more right to enter in that manner [by force], than if they had been mere strangers. ..."}}</ref> This required a threatened party to retreat, whenever property was "involved" and resolve the issue by civil means. Today, the majority of American states have construed their statutes of forcible entry, both penal and civil, in such a manner as to abrogate (i.e. abolish) the common law privilege to use force in the recovery of possession of land.<ref>1 Harper and James, op.cit. supra, at § 3.15, p. 258; Prosser, Law of Torts (3d ed. 1964) § 23, p. 125. See e.g., Mason v. Hawes (1884) 52 Conn. 12, 16 [52 Am.Rep. 552]; McIntyre v. Murphy (1908) 153 Mich. 342, 346–347 [116 N.W. 1003, 1004–1005, 15 Ann.Cas. 802]; Lobdell v. Keene (1901) 85 Minn. 90, 101 [88 N.W. 426, 430]; Strauel v. Lubeley (1915) 186 Mo.App. 638, 643–644 [172 S.W. 434, 435–436]; Mosseller v. Deaver (1890) 106 N.C. 494, 496–498 [11 S.E. 529, 530, 8 L.R.A. 537, 19 Am.St.Rep. 540]; Weatherly v. Manatt (1919) 72 Okla. 138, 139–140 [179 P. 470, 471]; Walgreen Co. v. Walton (1932) 16 Tenn.App. 213, 229 [64 S.W.2d 44, 53]; Ray v. Dyer (Tex.Civ.App. 1929) 20 S.W.2d 328, 330; Buchanan v. Crites (1944) 106 Utah 428, 436 [150 [71 Cal.2d 493] P.2d 100, 103]. See also Whitney v. Brown (1907) 75 Kan. 678, 681–683 [90 P. 277, 278, 11 L.R.A. N.S. 468, 12 Ann.Cas. 768]; Rest.2d Torts, § 185, com. a.) See [http://scocal.stanford.edu/opinion/daluiso-v-boone-27416 Daluiso v. Boone , 71 Cal.2d 484]</ref> In ''[[Erwin v. State]]'' (1876), the [[Supreme Court of Ohio]] wrote that a "[[true man]]", one without fault, would not retreat.<ref name=NDR>No Duty to Retreat:Violence and Values in American History and Society 4030 (1991)</ref> In ''[[Runyan v. State]]'' (1877), the Indiana court rejected a duty to retreat, implying it was [[un-American]],<ref name="CL"/>{{rp|551–2}} writing of a referring to the distinct [[American mind]],<ref name=NDR/> "the tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly against" a duty to retreat.<ref name=NDR/> The court went further in saying that no statutory law could require a duty to retreat, because the right to stand one's ground is "founded on the law of nature; and is not, nor can be, superseded by any law of society." ==English law== In [[English law]] the focus of the test is whether the defendant is acting reasonably in the particular situation. There is no specific requirement that a person must retreat in anticipation of an attack. Although some withdrawal would be useful evidence to prove that the defendant did not want to fight, not every defendant is able to escape. In ''R v Bird'' the defendant was physically attacked, and reacted instinctively and immediately without having the opportunity to retreat. Had there been a delay in the response, the reaction might have appeared more revenge than self-defense.<ref>''R v Bird'' (1985) 1 WLR 816</ref> ===Carrying weapons=== As to carrying weapons in anticipation of an attack, ''Evans v Hughes'' held that for a defendant to justify his possession of a metal bar on a public highway, he had to show that there was an imminent particular threat affecting the particular circumstances in which the weapon was carried.<ref>''Evans v Hughes'' (1972) 3 A ER 412</ref> Similarly, in ''Taylor v Mucklow'' a building owner was held to be using an unreasonable degree of force in carrying a loaded airgun against a builder who was demolishing a new extension because his bills were unpaid.<ref>''Taylor v Mucklow'' (1973) CLR 750</ref> More dramatically, in ''AG's Reference (No 2 of 1983)'' [[Geoffrey Lane, Baron Lane|Lord Lane]] held that a defendant who manufactured ten petrol bombs to defend his shop during the [[1981 Toxteth riots|Toxteth riots]] could set up the defense of showing that he possessed an explosive substance "for a lawful purpose" if he could establish that he was acting in self-defense to protect himself or his family or property against an imminent and apprehended attack by means which he believed to be no more than reasonably necessary to meet the attack.<ref>''Attorney General's Reference (No 2 of 1983)'' (1984) 1 AER 988</ref> ==International human rights law== Human rights law does not require police officers to retreat from a confrontation with a suspect and avoid thereby the use of lethal force. In principle, they may stand their ground to uphold law and order. However, they have a duty to deescalate situations so as to minimize the need to use force. This may mean in some situations, securing the area and staging a tactical withdrawal from an area (while preventing an escape of the suspect), so as to allow time to resolve the situation by negotiation or other non-violent means. <ref> Jan Arno Hessbruegge, Human Rights and Personal Self-Defense in International Law, Oxford University Press, 2017, ch. 4, https://books.google.ht/books/about/Human_Rights_and_Personal_Self_Defense_i.html?id=8vfCDAEACAAJ&redir_esc=y </ref> ==See also== *[[Castle Doctrine in the United States]] *[[Stand-your-ground law]] *[[Trespasser]] ==References== {{reflist}} ==Further reading== *{{cite journal |first1=Melissa |last1=Wheatcroft |date=Winter 1999 |title=Duty to Retreat for Cohabitants – In New Jersey a Battered Spouse's Home Is Not Her Castle |journal=Rutgers Law Journal |volume=30 |pages=539}} *{{cite journal |first1=Joseph H. |last1=Beale |date=June 1903 |title=Retreat from a Murderous Assault |journal=Harvard Law Review |volume=16 |issue=8 |pages=567–82 |jstor=1323119 |doi=10.2307/1323119}} *{{cite journal |doi=10.1017/S0008197300086128 |title=Self-Defence and the Right to Life |year=2009 |last1=Ashworth |first1=A. J. |journal=The Cambridge Law Journal |volume=34 |issue=2 |pages=282}} *{{cite journal |first1=Garrett |last1=Epps |date=Winter 1992 |title=Any Which Way but Loose: Interpretive Strategies and Attitudes Toward Violence in the Evolution of the Anglo-American 'Retreat Rule' |journal=Law and Contemporary Problems |volume=55 |issue=1 |pages=303–31 |url=http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/lcp/vol55/iss1/16 |jstor=1191769 |doi=10.2307/1191769}} *{{cite journal |first1=Richard Maxwell |last1=Brown |year=1979 |title=Southern Violence — Regional Problem or National Nemesis?: Legal Attitudes Toward Southern Homicide in Historical Perspective |journal=Vanderbilt Law Review |volume=32 |issue=1 |pages=225–50}} *Brown, Richard Maxwell (1991). ''No Duty to Retreat: Violence and Values in American History and Society''. (New York: Oxford University Press). *{{cite journal |last1=Ross |first1=Luevonda P. |date=Fall 2007 |title=Transmogrification of Self-Defense by National Rifle Association-Inspired Statutes: From the Doctrine of Retreat to the Right to Stand Your Ground |journal=Southern University Law Review |volume=35 |pages=1}} *Suk, Jeannie. (2009). ''At Home in the Law: How the Domestic Violence Revolution is Transforming Privacy''. (New Haven: Yale University Press). [[Category:Criminal defenses]] [[Category:Legal doctrines and principles]]'