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'{{short description|Mutually beneficial collusion among competing corporations}} {{About|economic cartels}} {{more citations needed|date=December 2019}} {{wikt|cartel}} {{Competition law}} [[File:RWKS Syndikatsgebäude-2.jpg|thumb|Headquarters of the Rhenish-Westphalian Coal Syndicate, Germany (at times the best known cartel in the world), around 1910]] A '''cartel''' is a group of independent market participants who [[Collusion|collude]] with each other in order to improve their profits and dominate the market. Cartels are usually associations in the same sphere of business, and thus an alliance of rivals. Most jurisdictions consider it anti-competitive behavior and have outlawed such practices. Cartel behavior includes [[price fixing]], bid rigging, and reductions in output. The doctrine in economics that analyzes cartels is [[cartel theory]]. Cartels are distinguished from other forms of collusion or anti-competitive organization such as [[corporate merger]]s. == Etymology == The word ''cartel'' comes from the Italian word ''[[wikt:cartello|cartello]]'', which means a "leaf of paper" or "placard", and is itself derived from the Latin ''charta'' meaning "card".<ref name=":0">{{Cite web|title=cartel {{!}} Search Online Etymology Dictionary|url=https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=Cartel|access-date=2021-08-16|website=www.etymonline.com}}</ref> The Italian word became ''cartel'' in [[Middle French]], which was borrowed into English. In English, the word was originally used for a written agreement between warring nations to regulate the treatment and exchange of prisoners<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/cartel|title=Definition of CARTEL|website=www.merriam-webster.com|language=en|access-date=2019-11-29}}</ref> from the 1690s onward.<ref name=":0" /> From 1899 onwards, the usage of the word became generalized as to mean [[Cartel (intergovernmental agreement)|any intergovernmental agreement]] between rival nations.<ref name=":0" /> The use of the English word cartel to describe an economic group rather than international agreements was derived much later in the 1800s from the German ''Kartell'', which also has its origins in the French ''cartel''.<ref name=":0" /> It was first used between German railway companies in 1846 to describe tariff- and technical [[standardization]] efforts. The first time the word was referred to describe a kind of restriction of competition was by the Austro-Hungarian political scientist [[Lorenz von Stein]],<ref>{{Cite book|last=Leonhardt|first=Holm A.|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/826595283|title=Kartelltheorie und Internationale Beziehungen theoriegeschichtliche Studien|date=2013|others=Michael Gehler|isbn=978-3-487-14840-3|location=Hildesheim|pages=14|oclc=826595283}}</ref> who wrote on tariff cartels: {{quote |text= There's no more one-sided perspective than the one saying that such rate-cartels are or cartels for the "exploitation of carriers".|sign= [[Lorenz von Stein]], 1874 <ref>{{Cite book|last=Leonhardt|first=Holm A.|url=https://www.worldcat.org/oclc/826595283|title=Kartelltheorie und Internationale Beziehungen theoriegeschichtliche Studien|date=2013|others=Michael Gehler|isbn=978-3-487-14840-3|location=Hildesheim|pages=14|oclc=826595283}}</ref>}} Cartels have existed since ancient times.<ref>Hans-Heinrich Barnikel: ''Kartelle in Deutschland.'' In: Ders. (Hrsg.): ''Theorie und Praxis der Kartelle'', Darmstadt&nbsp;1972, S.&nbsp;1.</ref> [[Guild]]s in the European [[Middle Ages]], associations of craftsmen or merchants of the same trade, have been regarded as cartel-like.<ref>Holm A. Leonhardt: ''Kartelltheorie und Internationale Beziehungen. Theoriegeschichtliche Studien'', Hildesheim&nbsp;2013, p.&nbsp;79.</ref> Tightly organized sales cartels in the mining industry of the late Middle Ages, like the 1301 salt syndicate in [[Kingdom of France (987–1498)|France]] and [[Kingdom of Naples|Naples]], or the [[Alaun]] cartel of 1470 between the [[Papal State]] and Naples.<ref>Nino Herlitzka: ''Bemerkungen zur historischen Entwicklung von Kartellen.'' In: Ludwig Kastl (Ed.): ''Kartelle in der Wirklichkeit.'' Köln&nbsp;1963, p.&nbsp;124–127.</ref> Both unions had common sales organizations for overall production called the ''Societas Communis Vendicionis'' ('Common Sales Society'). [[Laissez-faire]] (liberal) economic conditions dominated Europe and North America in the 18th and 19th centuries. Around 1870, cartels first appeared in industries formerly under [[free-market]] conditions.<ref>Holm A. Leonhardt: ''Kartelltheorie und Internationale Beziehungen. Theoriegeschichtliche Studien'', Hildesheim&nbsp;2013, S.&nbsp;80–87.</ref> Although cartels existed in all economically developed countries, the core area of cartel activities was in central Europe. The [[German Empire]] and [[Austria-Hungary]] were nicknamed the "lands of the cartels".<ref>Holm A. Leonhardt: ''Kartelltheorie und Internationale Beziehungen. Theoriegeschichtliche Studien'', Hildesheim&nbsp;2013, S.&nbsp;83–84.</ref> Cartels were also widespread in the United States during the period of [[Robber baron (industrialist)|robber baron]]s and industrial [[Trust (business)|trust]]s.<ref>Holm Arno Leonhardt: The development of cartel theory between 1883 and the 1930s. Hildesheim&nbsp;2018. p.&nbsp;18.</ref> The creation of cartels increased globally after [[World War I|World War&nbsp;I]]. They became the leading form of [[industrial organisation|market organization]], particularly in Europe and Japan. In the 1930s, authoritarian regimes such as [[Nazi Germany]], Italy under [[Mussolini]], and Spain under [[Francisco Franco|Franco]] used cartels to organize their [[Economics of fascism|corporatist economies]]. Between the late 19th century and around 1945, the United States was ambivalent about cartels and trusts. There were periods of both opposition to [[market concentration]] and relative tolerance of cartels. During [[World War II|World War&nbsp;II]], the United States strictly turned away from cartels.<ref>Holm A. Leonhardt: ''Kartelltheorie und Internationale Beziehungen. Theoriegeschichtliche Studien''. Hildesheim&nbsp;2013, p.&nbsp;251–292.</ref> After 1945, American-promoted [[Economic liberalism|market liberalism]] led to a worldwide cartel ban, where cartels continue to be obstructed in an increasing number of countries and circumstances. == Types == Cartels have many structures and functions that ideally enable corporations to navigate and control market uncertainties and gain collusive profits within their industry. A typical cartel often requires what competition authorities refer to as a CAU (Contact, Agreement or Understanding). <ref>{{Cite journal|last=Jeffrey|first=R|title=Cartels, Concerns and Trusts|journal=The Oxford Handbook of Business History|publisher=Ontario 2001|pages=269–274|via=Oxford Univ. Pres, 2007}}</ref> Typologies have emerged to distinguish distinct forms of cartels: * Selling or buying cartels unite against the cartel's customers or suppliers, respectively. The former type is more frequent than the latter. * Domestic cartels only have members from one country, whereas international cartels have members from more than one country.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Regulating Competition: Cartel registers in the twentieth-century world|last1=Fellman|first1=Susanna|last2=Shanahan|first2=Martin|publisher=Routledge|year=2015|isbn=9781138021648|location=London|pages=224}}</ref> There have been full-fledged international cartels that have comprised the whole world, such as the international steel cartel of the period between World War&nbsp;I and&nbsp;II. * Price cartels engage in [[price fixing]], normally to raise [[price]]s for a commodity above the competitive price level. The loosest form of a price cartel can be recognized in [[tacit collusion]] (implicit collusion), wherein smaller enterprises individually devise their prices and market shares in response to the same market conditions, without direct communication, resulting in a less competitive outcome. This type of collusion is generally legal and can achieve a monopolistic outcome. <ref>{{Cite journal|date=2014-03-01|title=Implicit collusion in non-exclusive contracting under adverse selection|url=https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0167268113003119|journal=Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization|language=en|volume=99|pages=85–95|doi=10.1016/j.jebo.2013.12.013|issn=0167-2681|last1=Han|first1=Seungjin}}</ref> * Quota cartels distribute proportional shares of the market to their members. * Common sales cartels sell their joint [[Output (economics)|output]] through a central selling agency (in [[French language|French]]: ''[[wikt:comptoir|comptoir]]''). They are also known as [[syndicate]]s (French: ''syndicat industriel''). * Territorial cartels distribute districts of the market to be used only by individual participants, which act as [[monopolist]]s. * Submission cartels control offers given to [[Tender offer|public tenders]]. They use [[bid rigging]]: bidders for a tender agree on a bid price. They then do not bid in unison, or share the return from the winning bid among themselves.<ref>John M. Connor and Dan Werner. Variation in Bid-Rigging Cartels' Overcharges: SSRN Working Paper No.&nbsp;3273988. (October 27, 2018). [http://ssrn.com/abstract=3273988|Abstract].</ref> * Technology and [[patent]] cartels share knowledge about technology or science within themselves while they limit the information from outside individuals. * Condition cartels unify [[contractual term]]s – the modes of [[payment]] and delivery, or [[warranty]] limits. * [[Standardization]] cartels implement common standards for sold or purchased products. If the members of a cartel produce different sorts or grades of a good, conversion factors are applied to calculate the value of the respective output. * [[Compulsory cartel]]s, also called "forced cartels", are established or maintained by external pressure. Voluntary cartels are formed by the free will of their participants. == Effects == A survey of hundreds of published economic studies and legal decisions of antitrust authorities found that the median price increase achieved by cartels in the last 200 years is about 23 percent.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Levenstein|first1=Margaret C.|last2=Suslow|first2=Valerie Y.|date=2006|title=What Determines Cartel Success?|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/30032296|journal=Journal of Economic Literature|volume=44|issue=1|pages=43–95|doi=10.1257/002205106776162681|jstor=30032296|hdl=2027.42/35837|issn=0022-0515|hdl-access=free}}</ref> Private international cartels (those with participants from two or more nations) had an average price increase of 28 percent, whereas domestic cartels averaged 18 percent. Less than 10 percent of all cartels in the sample failed to raise market prices.<ref>John M. Connor. Cartel Overcharges, p.&nbsp;249–387 of The Law and Economics of Class Actions, in Vol. 29 of Research in Law and Economics, edited by James Langenfeld (March&nbsp;2014). Bingley, UK: Emerald House Publishing&nbsp;Ltd. June&nbsp;2017</ref> In general, cartel agreements are economically unstable in that there is an [[incentive]] for members to cheat by selling at below the cartel's agreed price or selling more than the cartel's production quotas. Many cartels that attempt to set product prices are unsuccessful in the long term because of cheating punishment mechanisms such as price wars or financial punishment.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Levenstein|first1=Margaret C.|last2=Suslow|first2=Valerie Y.|date=2006|title=What determined cartel success?|journal=Journal of Economic Literature|volume=44|pages=43–95|doi=10.1257/002205106776162681|hdl=2027.42/35837|via=American Economic Association|hdl-access=free}}</ref> Empirical studies of 20th-century cartels have determined that the mean duration of discovered cartels is from 5 to 8 years and overcharged by approximately 32%.<ref>[[Margaret Levenstein|Levenstein, Margaret C.]] and Valerie Y. Suslow. "What Determines Cartel Success?" Journal of Economic Literature 64 (March&nbsp;2006): 43–95</ref> Within the industries that have operating cartels, the median number of cartel members is 8. Once a cartel is broken, the incentives to form a new cartel return, and the cartel may be re-formed. Publicly known cartels that do not follow this [[business cycle]] include, by some accounts, OPEC. Cartels often practice price fixing internationally. When the agreement to control prices is sanctioned by a multilateral treaty or protected by national sovereignty, no antitrust actions may be initiated.<ref>Connor, John M. ''Private International Cartels: A Concise Introduction: SSRN Working Paper.'' (November 12, 2014). [http://ssrn.com/abstract=2523883 Abstract].</ref> OPEC countries partially control the price of oil, and the [[International Air Transport Association]] (IATA) fixes prices for international airline tickets while the organization is excepted from antitrust law.<ref>{{Cite journal| last=Hannigan| first=John A.|date=1982|title=Unfriendly Skies: The Decline of the World Aviation Cartel| journal=The Pacific Sociological Review| volume=25 |issue=1| pages=107–136| doi=10.2307/1388890| issn=0030-8919| jstor=1388890| s2cid=158297510}}</ref><ref name="IATA: Its legal structure">{{Cite journal | last= Koffler| first= Warren| date=Spring 1966 |title=IATA: Its legal structure - A critical review| url=https://scholar.smu.edu/jalc/vol32/iss2/4/ |journal=Journal of Air Law and Commerce |volume=32 |pages=222–235 }}</ref> == Organization == Drawing upon research on organizational misconduct, scholars in economics, sociology and management have studied the organization of cartels.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Faulkner|first1=Robert R.|last2=Cheney|first2=Eric R.|last3=Fisher|first3=Gene A.|last4=Baker|first4=Wayne E.|date=2003|title=Crime by Committee: Conspirators and Company Men in the Illegal Electrical Industry Cartel, 1954–1959|journal=Criminology|language=en|volume=41|issue=2|pages=511–554|doi=10.1111/j.1745-9125.2003.tb00996.x|issn=1745-9125}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Genesove|first1=David|last2=Mullin|first2=Wallace P|date=2001|title=Rules, Communication, and Collusion: Narrative Evidence from the Sugar Institute Case|journal=American Economic Review|language=en|volume=91|issue=3|pages=379–398|doi=10.1257/aer.91.3.379|s2cid=153786791|issn=0002-8282|url=http://www.nber.org/papers/w8145.pdf}}</ref> They have paid attention to the way cartel participants work together to conceal their activities from antitrust authorities. Even more than reaching efficiency, participating firms need to ensure that their collective secret is maintained.<ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Baker|first1=Wayne E.|last2=Faulkner|first2=Robert R.|date=1993|title=The Social Organization of Conspiracy: Illegal Networks in the Heavy Electrical Equipment Industry|journal=American Sociological Review|volume=58|issue=6|pages=837|doi=10.2307/2095954|jstor=2095954}}</ref> == Cartel theory versus antitrust concept == The scientific analysis of cartels is based on [[cartel theory]]. It was pioneered in 1883 by the Austrian economist [[Friedrich Kleinwächter]] and in its early stages was developed mainly by German-speaking scholars.<ref>Holm Arno Leonhardt: The development of cartel theory between 1883 and the 1930s. Hildesheim&nbsp;2018.</ref> These scholars tended to regard cartels as an acceptable part of the economy. At the same time, American lawyers increasingly turned against [[trade restrictions]], including all cartels. The [[Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890|Sherman act]], which impeded the formation and activities of cartels, was passed in the United States in 1890. The American viewpoint, supported by activists like [[Thurman Arnold]] and [[Harley M. Kilgore]], eventually prevailed when governmental policy in Washington could have a larger impact in World War II. == Legislation and penalties == Because cartels are likely to have an impact on market positions, they are subjected to [[competition law]], which is executed by governmental [[competition regulator]]s. Very similar regulations apply to [[corporate merger]]s. A single entity that holds a [[monopoly]] is not considered a cartel but can be sanctioned through other abuses of its monopoly. Prior to World War II, members of cartels could sign contracts that were enforceable in courts of law except in the United States. Before 1945, cartels were tolerated in Europe and specifically promoted as a business practice in German-speaking countries.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Competition Policy in the European Union|last1=Cini|first1=Michelle|last2=McGowan|first2=Lee|publisher=Palgrave Macmillan|year=2009|isbn=978-0-230-00675-1|location=New York|pages=63}}</ref> In ''U.S. v. National Lead Co. et al.'', the [[Supreme Court of the United States]] noted the testimony of individuals who cited that a cartel, in its versatile form, is {{blockquote|a combination of producers for the purpose of regulating production and, frequently, prices, and an association by agreement of companies or sections of companies having common interests so as to prevent extreme or unfair competition.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Strategies to Achieve a Binding International Agreement on Regulating Cartels: Overcoming Doha Standstill|last=Lee|first=John|publisher=Springer|year=2016|isbn=978-981-10-2755-0|location=Berlin|pages=13}}</ref>}} The first legislation against cartels to be enforced was the [[Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890|Sherman Act 1890]], which also prohibits price fixing, market-sharing, output restrictions and other anti-competitive conduct.<ref>{{Cite book|last=Sullivan|first=E. Thomas|title=The political economy of the Sherman Act: The first one hundred years|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=1991|isbn=9780195066425}}</ref> Section 1 and 2 of the Act outlines the law in regards to cartels,<blockquote>Section 1: Every contract, combination in the form of [[Trust (19th century)|trust]] or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal.<ref>{{Cite web|title=15 U.S. Code § 1 - Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty|url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/1|access-date=2021-04-26|website=LII / Legal Information Institute|language=en}}</ref> Section 2: Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding $100 million if a corporation, or, if any other person, $1 million, or by imprisonment not exceeding ten years, or by both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.<ref>{{Cite web|title=15 U.S. Code § 2 - Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty|url=https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/15/2|access-date=2021-04-26|website=LII / Legal Information Institute|language=en}}</ref></blockquote> In practice, detecting and desisting cartels is undertaken through the use of economic analysis and leniency programmes. Economic analysis is implemented to identify any discrepancies in market behaviour between both suspected and unsuspected cartel engaged firms. A structural approach is done in the form of screening already suspicious firms for industry traits of a typical cartel price path. A typical path often includes a formation phase in which prices decline, followed by a transition phase in which prices tend to rise, and end with a stationary phase in which price variance remains low. <ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Jr|first1=Joseph E. Harrington|last2=Chen|first2=Joe|date=2002|title=Cartel Pricing Dynamics with Cost Variability and Endogenous Buyer Detection|url=https://ideas.repec.org/p/jhu/papers/514.html|journal=The Johns Hopkins University,Department of Economics|language=en|via=Economics Working Paper Archive}}</ref>Indicators such as price changes alongside import rates, market concentration, time period of permanent price changes and stability of companies' market shares are used as economic markers to help supplement the search for cartel behaviour.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=IVALDI|first=Marc|title=Cartel Damages to the Economy: An Assessment for Developing Countries|url=https://cepr.org/sites/default/files/Ivaldi%20-Cartel%20Damages%20061214.pdf|journal=Toulouse School of Economics and CEPR|via=CEPR}}</ref> On the contrary, when aiming to create suspicion around potential cartels, a behavioural approach is often used to identify behavioural collusive patterns, to initiate further economic analysis into identifying and prosecuting those involved in the operations. For example, studies have shown that industries are more likely to experience collusion where there are fewer firms, products are homogeneous and there is a stable demand. <ref>{{Cite journal|last1=Grout|first1=Paul|last2=Sonderegger|first2=Silvia|date=2005|title=Predicting Cartels|url=https://danielmorochoruiz.files.wordpress.com/2018/02/paul-grout-structural-approaches-to-cartel-detection.pdf|journal=Office of Fair Trading, Economic Discussion Paper|via=European University Institute}}</ref> === Leniency programmes === Leniency programmes were first introduced in 1978 in the US, before being successfully reformed in 1993.<ref>{{Cite web|date=2015-06-25|title=Leniency Program|url=https://www.justice.gov/atr/leniency-program|access-date=2021-04-26|website=www.justice.gov|language=en}}</ref> The underlying principle of a leniency program is to offer discretionary penalty reductions for corporations or individuals who are affiliated with cartel operations, in exchange for their cooperation with enforcement authorities in helping to identify and penalise other participating members. According to the Australian Department of Justice, the following 6 conditions must be met for admission into a leniency program: # The corporation is the first one to come forward and qualify for leniency with respect to the illegal activity being reported; # The Division, at the time the corporation comes in, does not yet have evidence against the company that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction; # The corporation, upon its discovery of the illegal activity being reported, took prompt and effective action to terminate its part in the activity; # The corporation reports the wrongdoing with candor and completeness and provides full, continuing and complete cooperation that advances the Division in its investigation; # The confession of wrongdoing is truly a corporate act, as opposed to isolated confessions of individual executives or officials; # Where possible, the corporation makes restitution to injured parties; and # The Division determines that granting leniency would not be unfair to others, considering the nature of the illegal activity, the confessing corporation's role in it, and when the corporation comes forward. <ref>{{Cite journal|last=Martyniszyn|first=Marek|date=2017|title=Foreign State's Entanglement in Anticompetitive Conduct|url=https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3116910|language=en|location=Rochester, NY|ssrn=3116910}}</ref> The application of leniency programme penalties varies according to individual countries policies and are proportional to cartel profits and years of infringement. However, typically the first corporation or individual to cooperate will receive the most reduced penalty in comparison to those who come forward later. <ref>{{Cite web|last=Commission|first=Australian Competition and Consumer|date=2019-09-04|title=ACCC immunity & cooperation policy for cartel conduct - October 2019|url=https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/accc-immunity-cooperation-policy-for-cartel-conduct-october-2019|access-date=2021-04-26|website=Australian Competition and Consumer Commission|language=en}}</ref> The effectiveness of leniency programmes in destabilising and deterring cartels is evidenced by the decreased formation and discovery of cartels in the US since the introduction of the programmes in 1993.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Miller|first=Nathan H.|date=2009|title=Strategic Leniency and Cartel Enforcement|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25592481|journal=The American Economic Review|volume=99|issue=3|pages=750–768|doi=10.1257/aer.99.3.750|jstor=25592481|issn=0002-8282}}</ref> Some prosecuted examples include: * [[File:The number of cartel discoveries per six-month period in the US.png|thumb|Graph showing the decline in formation and discoveries of cartels in the US following the introduction of leniency programmes in 1993. Following the introduction, cartel formations and discoveries decreased to all time lows.]][[Lysine price-fixing conspiracy|Lysine]] Cartel: An employee of [[Archer Daniels Midland|Archer Daniels Midland (ADM)]] alerted authorities of the existence of the cartel within the Lysine industry. <ref>{{Cite journal|last=Connor|first=John M.|date=1998|title=Lysine: A Case Study in International Price-Fixing|url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/43663287|journal=Choices|volume=13|issue=3|pages=13–19|jstor=43663287|issn=0886-5558}}</ref> * Stainless steel: Buyers of the product complained to the [[European Commission|European Commission (EC)]] about price spikes. <ref>{{Cite web|title=Competition - Cartels - Cases - European Commission|url=https://ec.europa.eu/competition/cartels/cases/cases.html|access-date=2021-04-26|website=ec.europa.eu}}</ref> * Sodium gluconate: Defendants in the lysine case informed authorities of collusive behaviours between corporations in this industry.<ref>{{Cite web|title=Case search - Competition - European Commission|url=https://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_36756|access-date=2021-04-26|website=ec.europa.eu}}</ref> === Price fixing === Today, price fixing by private entities is illegal under the antitrust laws of more than 140 countries. The commodities of prosecuted international cartels include [[lysine]], [[citric acid]], [[graphite]] [[electrode]]s, and bulk [[vitamin]]s.<ref>Connor, John M. (2008): ''Global Price Fixing: 2nd Paperback Edition''. Heidelberg: Springer.</ref> In many countries, the predominant belief is that cartels are contrary to free and fair competition, considered the backbone of political democracy.<ref>{{Cite book|title=Controlling International Technology Transfer: Issues, Perspectives, and Policy Implications|last1=Sagafi-Nejad|first1=Tagi|last2=Moxon|first2=Richard|last3=Perlmutter|first3=Howard|publisher=Pergamon Press|year=2017|isbn=978-0-08-027180-4|location=New York|pages=180}}</ref> Maintaining cartels continues to become harder for cartels. Even if international cartels cannot be regulated as a whole by individual nations, their individual activities in domestic markets are affected.<ref>Fellman & Shanahan, p.&nbsp;224.</ref> Unlike other cartels, export cartels are legal in virtually all jurisdictions, despite their harmful effects on affected markets.<ref>{{cite journal |last1=Martyniszyn |first1=Marek |title=Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of Recent Case Law |journal=Journal of International Economic Law |date=2012 |volume=15 |issue=1 |page=181 |doi=10.1093/jiel/jgs003 |s2cid=153887704 |url=https://pure.qub.ac.uk/en/publications/export-cartels-is-it-legal-to-target-your-neighbour-analysis-in-light-of-recent-case-law(76b0a369-a9db-4f5e-aadb-7ffdc7b84164).html }}</ref> == Examples == [[File:ATF policy.jpg|thumb|The printing equipment company [[American Type Founders]] (ATF) explicitly states in its 1923 manual that its goal is to "discourage unhealthy competition" in the printing industry.]] * The [[Phoebus cartel]] was established by lighting manufacturers in the early 20th century to control the pricing and lifespan of incandescent light bulbs. * The [[Quinine cartel]] existed among producers of the [[Antimalarial medication|anti-malarial drug]] [[Quinine]] to control production rates and pricing, operating in the early 20th century with two incarnations. During the early years of its operation, Quinine was the only viable medical treatment for malaria. * The [[British Valve Association]] existed among British manufacturers of vacuum tubes to regulate the pricing, electrode structure, and part numbering system for its members. * The [[Seven Sisters (oil companies)|Seven Sisters]] was the name for the consortium of seven transnational oil companies which dominated the global petroleum industry from the 1940s to the 1970s. The contemporary equivalent is [[OPEC]], an international organization of petroleum producing nations that sets production targets and prices among its members. * The [[Swiss Cheese Union]], an industry organization of cheese producers, functioned as a cartel through the extent of its control on cheese production in the 20th century. * Between 1995 and 2004, several of the largest [[elevator]] manufacturers operated a market-rigging cartel, including [[ThyssenKrupp]], [[Kone]], and [[Otis Worldwide|Otis]], which were fined by the European Union in 2001.<ref>{{Cite news|date=2007-02-21|title=Record EU fine for lift 'cartel'|language=en-GB|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6383913.stm|access-date=2021-10-09}}</ref> * The [[Federation of Quebec Maple Syrup Producers]], a government-sanctioned private organization that regulates the production and marketing of [[maple syrup]] in Quebec. ==See also== {{div col|colwidth=30em}} * [[Cartel seat (monument)]] * [[Drug cartel]] * [[Industrial organisation]] * [[Corporate group]] {{div col end}} ==Bibliography== * Connor, John M.: ''[https://www.researchgate.net/profile/John_Connor7/publication/5218804_Private_International_Cartels_Effectiveness_Welfare_and_Anticartel_Enforcement/links/59e8f3faa6fdccfe7fa8efc6/Private-International-Cartels-Effectiveness-Welfare-and-Anticartel-Enforcement.pdf Private international cartels. Effectiveness, welfare, and anti-cartel enforcement]''. Purdue University. [[West Lafayette]], Indiana&nbsp;2003. * Fear, Jeffrey R.: ''Cartels''. In: Geoffrey Jones; Jonathan Zeitlin (ed.): The Oxford handbook of business history. Oxford: Univ. Press, 2007, p.&nbsp;268–293. * Freyer, Tony A.: ''Antitrust and global capitalism 1930–2004'', New York&nbsp;2006. * Hexner, Ervin, ''The International Steel Cartel'', Chapel Hill&nbsp;1943. * [[Friedrich Kleinwächter|Kleinwächter, Friedrich]], ''Die Kartelle. Ein Beitrag zur Frage der Organization der Volkswirtschaft'', Innsbruck&nbsp;1883. * [[Holm Arno Leonhardt|Leonhardt, Holm Arno]]: ''Kartelltheorie und Internationale Beziehungen. Theoriegeschichtliche Studien'', Hildesheim&nbsp;2013. * [[Holm Arno Leonhardt|Leonhardt, Holm Arno]]: ''The development of cartel+ theory between 1883 and the 1930s – from international diversity to convergence: syndicats industriels, ententes, comptoirs, trusts, pools, combinations, associations, kartells, cartelle, Unternehmerverbände''. Hildesheim&nbsp;2018. [https://www.uni-hildesheim.de/ojs/index.php/HiBTG/article/view/77 Einloggen | Hildesheimer Beiträge zu Theologie und Geschichte]. * [[Margaret Levenstein|Levenstein, Margaret C.]] and Valerie Y. Suslow. "What Determines Cartel Success?" ''Journal of Economic Literature'' 64 (March&nbsp;2006): 43–95. * [[Robert Liefmann|Liefmann, Robert]]: ''Cartels, Concerns and Trusts'', Ontario&nbsp;2001 [London&nbsp;1932] * Martyniszyn, Marek, "Export Cartels: Is it Legal to Target Your Neighbour? Analysis in Light of Recent Case Law", ''Journal of International Economic Law'' 15 (1) (2012): 181–222. * [[George J. Stigler|Stigler, George J.]]: ''The extent and bases of monopoly''. In: ''The American economic review'', Vol. 32 (1942), pp.&nbsp;1–22. * [[George W. Stocking Sr.|Stocking, George W.]] and Myron W. Watkins: ''Cartels in Action''. New York: Twentieth Century Fund (1946). * [[George W. Stocking Sr.|Stocking, George W.]] and Myron W. Watkins: ''Cartels or competition? The economics of international controls by business and government''. New York: Twentieth Century Fund 1948. * Strieder, Jakob: ''Studien zur Geschichte kapitalistischer Organizationsformen. Monopole, Kartelle und Aktiengesellschaften im Mittelalter und zu Beginn der Neuzeit''. München 1925. * Wells, Wyatt C.: ''Antitrust and the Formation of the Postwar World'', New York 2002. == References == {{Reflist}} ==External links== * [https://web.archive.org/web/20060904173538/http://www.agecon.purdue.edu/staff/connor/papers/PRICE%20FIXING_OVERCHARGES_FULL_TEXT_8-20-05.pdf Price-Fixing Overcharges] from [[Purdue University]] * [https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-13064928 BBC on cartels] {{Business organizations}} {{Authority control}} [[Category:Commercial crimes]] [[Category:Anti-competitive practices]] [[Category:Cartels]] [[Category:Imperfect competition]]'