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'{{bilateral|Croatia–Russia|Croatia|Russia|filetype=png | mission1 = Croatian embassy in [[Moscow]] | envoy1 = Tomislav Car<ref>[http://www.mid.ru/da/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3476852 О встрече заместителя Министра иностранных дел Российской Федерации А.В.Грушко с Послом Республики Хорватии в России Т.Царом]. mid.ru, 16 January 2019.</ref><ref>[http://www.mvep.hr/en/diplomatic-directory/diplomatic-missions-and-consular-offices-of-croatia/russian-federation-(the)-moscow,173.html Diplomatic Missions and Consular Offices of Croatia / Russian Federation (The)] official web site of the Foreign Ministry of Croatia.</ref><br><small>(since January 2019)</small> | mission2 = Russian embassy in [[Zagreb]] | envoy2 = [[Andrey Nesterenko]]<br><small>(since 21 August 2020<ref>[http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001202008210008 Указ Президента Российской Федерации от 21.08.2020 № 519 «О Чрезвычайном и Полномочном После Российской Федерации в Республике Хорватии»]</ref>)</small> }} '''Croatia–Russia relations''' ({{lang-ru|Российско-хорватские отношения}}, {{lang-hr|Rusko-hrvatski odnosi}}) refer to [[bilateralism|bilateral]] [[diplomacy|foreign relations]] between [[Croatia]] and [[Russia]]. The countries established diplomatic relations on 25 May 1992. Croatia has an [[Embassy of Croatia in Moscow|embassy in Moscow]] and honorary consulates in [[Kaliningrad]], [[Novosibirsk]], and [[Sochi]].<ref>[http://www.mvep.hr/hr/predstavnistva/dmkurh-u-svijetu/ruska-federacija-moskva,97.html Diplomatske misije i konzularni uredi RH u svijetu]</ref> Russia has an embassy in [[Zagreb]] and honorary consulates in [[Pula]] and [[Split, Croatia|Split]]. While geographically not close, Croatia and Russia are both [[Slavs|Slavic]] countries and thus share distant [[Slavic culture|cultural heritage]]. Both countries are full members of the [[Council of Europe]] and the [[Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe]]. Croatia is a popular tourist destination with Russian travelers in spite of a drastic drop in the numbers after 2014 following the [[Ukrainian crisis]] that caused political tension between Russia and the [[European Union]], to which Croatia had [[2013 enlargement of the European Union|acceded in 2013]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://m.tportal.hr/biznis/386759/Dramatican-pad-broja-turista-iz-Rusije-u-Hrvatskoj.html|title=Dramatičan pad broja turista iz Rusije u Hrvatskoj}}</ref> At the end of 2016, Russian experts were cited as judging Russian–Croatian relations to be "cold" due to conflicting interests and alliances, primarily due to Croatia aligning itself with [[NATO]], [[United States]] and the European Union in international affairs.<ref name="cool">[https://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2016/12/13_a_10424873.shtml Лавров отмахнулся от Балкан: Между Россией и Хорватией возник спор о российской угрозе на Балканах] [[Gazeta.ru]], 13 December 2016.</ref> ==Background== {{See also|Russians of Croatia|Russia–Serbia relations#Inter-war period, Russian emigration}} Cultural and personal ties between Russia and persons from the territory of modern Croatia date far back prior to Croatian independence in 1991, such as a trip to Moscow by Croatian [[Catholic Church|Catholic]] missionary [[Juraj Križanić]] in 1659 who later was exiled to [[Tobolsk]] in Siberia where he spent 16 years writing manuscripts that promoted [[Pan-Slavism]]. Against the backdrop of the [[Illyrian movement]], a pan-[[South Slavs|South-Slavist]] movement, regarded in Croatian historiography as part of the Croatian national revival (''Hrvatski narodni preporod''), some prominent Croats in the 19th century (the lands of modern Croatia then being largely part of the [[Austrian Empire]], later [[Austria-Hungary]]) sought to develop a stronger relationship with Russia because "they saw in [[Russian Empire|Imperial Russia]] a world power and brotherly Slavic nation from which they had hoped to gain help during the [[Illyrian movement|Croatian National Revival]]."<ref>Otokar Keršovani, History of Croatia</ref> Croatian [[Croatian nationalism|nationalist]] [[Eugen Kvaternik]], who was one of the two founders of the Croatian nationalist [[Party of Rights]], traveled, among other countries, to Russia at the end of 1857 and stayed there for most of 1858 hoping to enlist help for the cause of the Croatian independence from the [[Austrian empire]] ([[Austria–Russia relations|Russo-Austrian relations]] were poor in the wake of the [[Crimean War]]), but did not accomplish much.<ref>Eugen Kvaternik: Gorke uspomene "Hervatska", 1870.</ref><ref>Dr N.Z. Bjelovučić. [http://www.idoconline.info/article/845667 Dr. Eugen Kvaternik]</ref> He later came to view Russia as a threat to the cause of the Catholics in the Croatian lands as he believed that Russia sought to enhance its own influence in the [[Balkans]] by promoting the [[Eastern Orthodox Church|Orthodox faith]] and therefore supported the Orthodox [[Serbs]], whom he regarded as "Orthodox Croatians".<ref>Dragutin Pavličević. [https://hrcak.srce.hr/file/77135 Eugen Kvaternik o istočnom pitanju (1859-1868)]. Zagreb, 1995, pp. 87–88, 93.</ref> One of the notable figures of the [[Illyrian movement]], [[Ivan Kukuljević Sakcinski]], maintained contacts with a number of Russian academics, slavists, university professors, his contact person with them being the Russian priest at the Russian Embassy in Vienna, Mihail Fjodorović Rajevski. He wrote to Russian scientist [[Alexander Stepanovich Popov]] in 1877: "You in Moscow know very well for how long South Slavs had been waiting for salvation. You also know that the eyes of the Slavs are fixed on you and that our hearts are full with you".<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.historiografija.hr/hz/1966/HZ_19-20_16_OCAK.pdf |title=Grada Za Povijest Hrvatsko-Ruskih Veza U Drugoj Polovini Xix Stoljeca |website=Historiografija.hr |access-date=2016-11-07 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304122001/http://www.historiografija.hr/hz/1966/HZ_19-20_16_OCAK.pdf |archive-date=2016-03-04 |url-status=dead }}</ref> While Russia's [[Russia–Serbia relations#19th century–1900s|relations with Serbia]], a country popularly viewed as a traditional ally of Russia,<ref>Vuk Vuksanovic. [https://www.the-american-interest.com/2018/07/26/serbs-are-not-little-russians/?_ga=2.259681603.810181213.1533105670-1060719367.1533105670 Serbs Are Not “Little Russians”]. ''[[The American Interest]]'', 26 July 2018.</ref><ref>[https://eadaily.com/ru/news/2017/08/27/u-rossii-vsego-tri-soyuznika-armiya-flot-serby «У России всего три союзника — армия, флот, сербы»]. ''EurAsia Daily'', 27 August 2017.</ref> deteriorated following the 1878 [[Congress of Berlin]] ([[Principality of Serbia|Serbia]] viewed the terms thereof as unfavourable), her influence in the Croatian lands increased: the [[Party of Rights]] under [[Ante Starčević]] adopted a [[Russophilia|Russophile]] orientation, a tactic in their bid to achieve Croatian independence of the [[House of Habsburg|Habsburgs]].{{sfn|Enciklopedija Jugoslavije|1968|p=456}} Such aspirations notwithstanding, the visit to [[Saint Petersburg]] by Austrian Emperor [[Franz Joseph I of Austria|Franz Joseph]] and his conference with [[Nicholas II of Russia|Nicholas II]] of Russia in 1897 heralded a secret agreement between the two empires to honour and seek to maintain the ''[[status quo]]'' in the Balkans.{{sfn|Enciklopedija Jugoslavije|1968|p=456}}<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.hrono.info/dokum/1800dok/18970517ruan.php|title=Русско-австрийское соглашение|website=www.hrono.info}}</ref> In [[World War I|1914–1917]], several formations of the [[Royal Croatian Home Guard]] within the [[Austro-Hungarian Army]], as well as the [[Common Army]]′s (''[[Imperial and Royal|K.u.K.]]'') regiments recruited from the [[Kingdom of Croatia-Slavonia]] (such as the 79th Infantry Regiment from [[Otočac]]), participated in the [[Eastern Front (World War I)|WWI campaigns]] fighting against the [[Imperial Russian Army]] in [[Galicia (Eastern Europe)|Galicia]] and [[Bukovina]]; they incurred heavy losses in [[Battle of Galicia|August—September 1914]] and especially during the first phase of the [[Brusilov Offensive|Russian offensive]] in June 1916.<ref>Nikola Tominac. «Brusilovljeva ofenziva i velika stradanja ličke 79. Pješačke pukovnije iz Otočca». // VP: Magazin za vojnu povijest, [[Vecernji list]] D.o.o, № 82, January 2018, pp. 15, 19.</ref><ref>[[:uk:Пащенко Євген Миколайович|Jevgenij Paščenko]]. «Hrvatski grobovi 1914-1918. Karpati, Galicija, Bukovina». Zagreb, 2016, pp. 44—46.</ref><ref>Nikola Tominac. «LIČANI U "VELIKOM RATU": Zimska bitka za Karpate, siječanj – travanj 1915».</ref> During the [[Interwar period|period between the world wars]], in the 1920s–1930s, the [[Kingdom of Yugoslavia]], which had incorporated the Croatian lands, hosted a sizable part of the [[White émigré|White exiles]] who fled Soviet Russia during the [[Russian Civil War]]. Along with [[Serbia]], Croatia accepted thousands of mainly indigent<ref name="politikapreprod">″Препродаја блага у београдској залагаоници: Из тајних архива УДБЕ: РУСКА ЕМИГРАЦИЈА У ЈУГОСЛАВИЈИ 1918–1941.″ // ''[[Politika]]'', 6 December 2017, p. 13.</ref> Russian refugees led by General [[Pyotr Wrangel]] and Metropolitan [[Antony (Khrapovitsky)|Anthony Khrapovitsky]]. Until his death in 1936, Metropolitan Anthony was regarded as a leader of all the Russian refugees in Yugoslavia,<ref name="politikaantonija">″Политика митрополита Антонија: Из тајних архива УДБЕ: РУСКА ЕМИГРАЦИЈА У ЈУГОСЛАВИЈИ 1918–1941.″ // ''[[Politika]]'', 16 January 2018, p. 21.</ref> a country whose staunchly anti-Soviet, anti-Communist monarchist regime refused to establish diplomatic relations with the [[USSR]] until June 1940. Zagreb and some other Croatian cities had numerous military, religious, educational and professional [[Russians of Croatia#History and legal status|Russian establishments]], all of which were closed down in May 1945, after the imposition of the Communist regime in Croatia. Most of those few Russians who had failed to leave for the West, were subjected to reprisals and prosecution, or forced to leave for the USSR.<ref>Škiljan, Filip (2014). ''Rusi u Hrvatskoj'' [Russians in Croatia] (in Croatian). Zagreb: Savez Rusa u Republici Hrvatskoj. {{ISBN|9789535832706}}. p. 25.</ref><ref>Puškadija-Ribkin, Tatjana (2006). ''Emigranti iz Rusije u znanstvenom i kulturnom životu Zagreba'' (in Croatian). Zagreb: Prosvjeta. {{ISBN|953-7130-36-3}}. p. 96.</ref> During the [[Eastern Front (World War II)|German-Soviet War]] (June 1941–May 1945), the [[369th Croatian Reinforced Infantry Regiment (Wehrmacht)|369th Croatian Reinforced Infantry Regiment]] (a unit of [[Nazi Germany|Germany]]′s [[100th Jäger Division (Wehrmacht)|100th Jäger Division]] of the [[German Army (Wehrmacht)|German Army]], under Croatian officers [[Viktor Pavičić]] and later [[Marko Mesić (soldier)|Marko Mesić]]) distinguished itself in the [[Battle of Stalingrad]], but [[Friedrich Paulus#Capitulation|surrendered]] along with the German [[6th Army (Wehrmacht)|6th Army]] in early February 1943. At the end of the [[World War II|war]] [[European theatre of World War II|in Europe]], units of the [[Red Army]]′s [[3rd Ukrainian Front]] fought in some Croat-populated territories, then mostly [[Hungarian occupation of Yugoslav territories|outside the borders]] of the pro-[[Nazi Germany|Germany]] [[Independent State of Croatia]] (the NDH). On the day [[Operation Barbarossa|Germany attacked the Soviet Union]], 22 June 1941, the [[Communist Party of Yugoslavia]] (CPY) received orders from the Moscow-based [[Communist International|Comintern]] to come to the Soviet Union′s aid<ref name="ramet142">{{cite book|last=Ramet |first=Sabrina|author-link=Sabrina P. Ramet|title=The Three Yugoslavias: State-Building and Legitimation, 1918–2005 |year=2006 |publisher=[[Indiana University Press]] |location=New York |isbn=0-253-34656-8 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=FTw3lEqi2-oC&pg=PA142 |page=142}}</ref> and on the [[Anti-Fascist Struggle Day|same day]], Croatian communists set up the [[First Sisak Partisan Detachment|1st Sisak Partisan Detachment]], the first armed anti-fascist [[Guerrilla warfare|guerrilla]] unit formed in occupied Yugoslavia during World War II. From July 1941, [[Josip Broz Tito|Tito's]] [[Yugoslav Partisans]], supported by the USSR, [[World War II in Yugoslavia|fought against]] Germany, the NDH, and allies thereof, as well as [[Chetniks]]. In November 1944, during the [[Battle of Batina]] (now in Croatia), 1,237 men of the Red Army were killed fighting against the combined [[Axis powers|Axis]] forces. On the other hand, the [[1st Cossack Cavalry Division]] and the 2nd Cossack Cavalry Division merged into the [[XV SS Cossack Cavalry Corps]] in February 1945 under German command and manned mainly by [[Repatriation of Cossacks after World War II|Cossacks from the USSR]], from 1943 conducted successful tactical operations in Croatia against both Communist guerrillas and — from late 1944 — the Red Army.<ref>Mladenko Colić. ''Pregled operacija na jugoslovenskom ratištu: 1941-1945''. — Beograd: Vojnoistorijski Institut, 1988, pp. 298—305.</ref><ref>[[:ru:Александров, Кирилл Михайлович|Александров К. М.]] ''Русское казачество во Второй мировой войне: трагедия на Драве, декабрь 1944 г.'' Новый часовой, 2001, pp. 118—139.</ref> Also fighting on the territory of the NDH from October 1944 — against the Communist partisans and the Soviet troops — were the retreating units of the [[Russian Protective Corps]], whose commander, Russian general [[Boris Shteifon]], died in Zagreb on 30 April 1945. The defeat of the NDH in mid-May 1945 was followed by [[Bleiburg repatriations|mass killings of Croat prisoners]] and the establishment later that year of a pro-Soviet ([[Tito–Stalin split|until mid-1948]]) [[One-party state|one-party]] [[Communist state|Communist]] [[Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia|Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia]], the [[Socialist Republic of Croatia|People's Republic of Croatia]] being one of its constituent republics. The USSR maintained a consulate general in Zagreb. Social scientists in 2016 concurred that for most people in Croatia, a constituent republic of Yugoslavia until 1991 where the equality of ethnic [[Serbs in Croatia|Serbs]] and Croats, as constituent nations, was formally recognized in every aspect,<ref>[https://books.google.com/books?id=PvjLRzgyKKkC&pg=PA477&lpg=PA477&dq=serbs+constituent+nation+croatia&source=bl&ots=6V6rdoRDvc&sig=UOuL_YLflCnMeQoU1-D2t87JeCs&hl=pt-BR&sa=X&ved=0CDQQ6AEwA2oVChMI1_eapce2xwIVw3EUCh0hsgej#v=onepage&q=serbs%20constituent%20nation%20croatia&f=false Yugoslavia Through Documents: From Its Creation to Its Dissolution] edited by Snežana Trifunovska, page 477, it says: "at the Second and Third sessions of the National Anti-Fascist Council of the Peoples Liberation of Croatia (ZAVNOH),...,the equality of the Serbs and the Croats, as constituent peoples of the federal unit of Croatia, were recognized in every respect."</ref> the dominant political narrative that tended to determine voting at elections, perpetuated their respective families′ political affiliation during WWII: either with Tito's Communist partisans, or supporters of the [[Nazi Germany|Nazi]]-backed [[Ustaše|Ustasha]] regime of the NDH, a schism in Croatia's society that had grown even wider since the consensus-based political goal of acceding to the EU was accomplished in 2013.<ref name="basketcase">[https://www.economist.com/news/europe/21700837-balkan-problem-child-unable-stop-squabbling-even-football-pitch-its-government?zid=307&ah=5e80419d1bc9821ebe173f4f0f060a07 As its government falls, Croatia is fighting about Communists and fascists again: A Balkan problem child is unable to stop squabbling, even on the football pitch] ''[[The Economist]]'', 21 June 2016.</ref> A number of prominent Croats in Socialist Yugoslavia had close ties with the USSR and these people's influence in the government of independent Croatia that [[Breakup of Yugoslavia|emerged in 1991]] continued thereafter.<ref>Boris Rašeta. ''Moskovska veza od Josipa Broza do danas.'' // ''24sataExpress'', 16 December 2016.</ref><ref>[https://radiogornjigrad.wordpress.com/2016/07/13/romano-bolovic-ruska-hrvatska/ Romano Bolković: Ruska Hrvatska]</ref> ==History== ===1990s=== {{See also|Croatian War of Independence}} [[File:Vladimir Putin 16 April 2002-1.jpg|thumb|200px|right|Croatian President [[Stjepan Mesić]] and Russian President [[Vladimir Putin]] in [[Moscow]] in 2002]] [[File:Dmitry Medvedev greetings 9 May 2010-5.jpeg|thumb|200px|right|Croatian President [[Ivo Josipović]] and Russian President [[Dmitri Medvedev]] in [[Moscow]] in 2010]] According to the allegations in the Croatian press, in violation of the [[United Nations Security Council Resolution 713|UN arms embargo]] imposed on the former [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia|Yugoslavia]], during the [[Croatian War of Independence]], significant amounts of arms were delivered from Russia to Croatia. Russian president [[Boris Yeltsin]] allegedly approved shipments of weapons by 150 airplanes, which took off from a military base 200 kilometers east of Moscow in the period from 1992 to 1997. There were 150 to 160 flights that transported hundreds of tons of weaponry per year.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatsku-naoruzali-rusi-jeljcin-odobrio-150-letova-transportera-569795 |title=Hrvatsku naoružali Rusi: Jeljcin odobrio 150 letova transportera - Večernji.hr |publisher=Vecernji.hr |date=2013-06-15 |access-date=2016-05-01}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.glassrpske.com/novosti/region/Rusi-naoruzali-Hrvatsku/lat/122727.html |title=Rusi naoružali Hrvatsku |publisher=Glassrpske.com |date=2013-06-16 |access-date=2016-05-01}}</ref> In 2016, Croatian daily [[Večernji List]] published an article in which Marin Tomulić, representative of the [[Croatian Government]]'s Office for the Protection of the Constitutional Order in negotiations on weaponry, stated that he received a catalog of all types of ″Russian″ weapons from the [[French Government]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/ja-sam-svjedok-rusi-su-za-vrijeme-domovinskog-rata-naoruzavali-hrvate-a-ne-srbe-1131787|title='Ja sam svjedok. Rusi su za vrijeme Domovinskog rata naoružavali Hrvate, a ne Srbe'}}</ref> In 2017, [[Večernji List]] published an article in which businessmen Zvonko Zubak, owner of a company that was Croatia's main weapons supplier during the war, claimed that Russian Ambassador to Croatia [[Anvar Azimov]] had summoned him to the Russian Embassy asking for an "inventory of all arms that arrived to Croatia via Russia between 1992 and 1997"; the article cited Azimov as allegedly stating that Croatia "should be reminded of who was arming and rescuing it during the embargo". The inventory, that Večernji List has seen, cites 16.000 tonnes of various Russian weapons, including two [[Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21|MiG 21]] jets, few squadrons of transport and assault helicopters, including [[Mil Mi-24]], and anti-aircraft systems, including the [[S-300 missile system]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/postoji-previse-svjedoka-da-bi-se-ogromne-posiljke-ruskog-naoruzanja-hrvatskoj-sada-tretirale-kao-fatamorgana-1163564|title=Postoji previše svjedoka da bi se ogromne pošiljke ruskog naoružanja Hrvatskoj sada tretirale kao 'fatamorgana'}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/ruski-pritisak-isporucili-smo-vam-s-300-gdje-su-nestale-rakete-1162920|title=Novi ruski pritisak na Hrvatsku: Isporučili smo vam S-300, gdje su nestale rakete?}}</ref> In April 2017, former Croatian president [[Ivo Josipović]] said that "during the war, Russia helped Croatia, not only with weaponry, but also politically".<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/ivo-josipovic-srbija-se-uznemirila-jer-cinjenica-o-ruskom-naoruzavanju-hrvatske-rusi-mit-da-je-rusija-njihov-ekskluzivni-prijatelj-1163707|title='Srbija se uznemirila jer činjenica o ruskom naoružavanju Hrvatske ruši mit da je Rusija njihov ekskluzivni prijatelj'|date=16 April 2017}}</ref> In April 2017, [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia)|Russian Foreign Ministry]] officials rejected such allegations as false.<ref>[https://ria.ru/defense_safety/20170419/1492575953.html В МИД России прокомментировали сообщения о поставках С-300 в Хорватию] [[RIA Novosti]], 19 April 2017.</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.ambasadarusije.rs/ru/vesti/zajavlenie-avcepurina-agentstvu-tanjug|title=Заявление А.В.Чепурина агентству "Танюг" - Посольство Российской Федерации в Республике Сербии|website=www.ambasadarusije.rs}}</ref><ref>«С-300 из Украјине преко Загреба завршио у САД.» [[Politika]], 19 April 2017, p. 1, 6.</ref> On 4 November 1996, Russian President Yeltsin awarded Croatian President [[Franjo Tuđman]] with [[Medal of Zhukov]].<ref>{{cite web|url=https://vojnapovijest.vecernji.hr/vojna-povijest/predsjednik-rh-franju-tudmana-je-boris-jeljcin-1996-godine-odlikovao-medaljom-zukov-1002572|title=Tuđmana je Boris Jeljcin 1996. godine odlikovao "Medaljom Žukov"}}</ref> During the 1990s, major fortunes were made in Russia by some Croatian nationals such as Danko Končar, who attributed his business success in Russia, among other things, to his "normal human contact" with the [[Federal Security Service|FSB]], Russia's successor agency to the USSR's [[KGB]].<ref>[http://arhiva.nacional.hr/clanak/108115/danko-koncar-prve-milijune-zaradio-sam-preko-noci Danko Končar: 'Moj financijski uspon dogodio se preko noći']. ''[[Nacional (weekly)|Nacional]]'', 15 May 2011.</ref><ref>[https://www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/misteriozne-milijarde-danka-koncara-kako-je-postao-najbogatiji-hrvat-1213149/ Misteriozne milijarde Danka Končara: Kako je postao najbogatiji Hrvat]. Dnevno, 28 August 2018.</ref> ===2000—2020=== In the 2000s and early 2010s, consecutive presidents of Croatia, [[Stjepan Mesić]] and [[Ivo Josipović]], made multiple official and working visits to Russia.<ref>[http://tass.ru/info/4654286 Визиты президентов Хорватии в Россию. Досье] [[TASS]], 17 October 2017.</ref><ref name="ria2010">[https://ria.ru/spravka/20100511/231717545.html Межгосударственные отношения России и Хорватии. Справка] [[RIA Novosti]], 11 May 2010.</ref> According to former Croatian ambassador to Russia [[Božo Kovačević (politician)|Božo Kovačević]], Russia's leadership stopped taking the Croatian government seriously by the end of the 2000s, as they had realised that successive governments of Croatia had been consciously deceiving their Russian counterparts when pledging cooperation on the [[Druzhba pipeline#Druzhba Adria|Druzhba Adria pipeline]] project, whose eventual rejection by the Croatian side Kovačević puts down primarily to [[Croatia–United States relations|pressure on the part of the U.S.]]<ref>[[Večernji list]], 29 october 2017, p. 14–15: Intervju: Božo Kovačević.</ref> Instead, in order to create a powerful instrument of influence and secure Russian capture of Croatia's political establishment, Russia embarked on its tried-and-tested strategy of weakening the market position of a national oil and gas company, namely [[INA d.d.]], whose dominant role in the Croatian gas market had by 2017 been assumed by the [[Prvo Plinarsko Društvo]] (PPD) gas trading company, a proxy for importing [[Gazprom]]’s gas<ref>{{cite web|url=https://faktograf.hr/2020/02/28/the-croatian-energy-sector-has-been-plundered-and-captured/|title=The Croatian energy sector has been plundered and captured |publisher=faktograf.hr|date=28 February 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://medium.com/@rafaelramea/the-croatian-energy-company-you-probably-didnt-hear-about-but-you-should-prvo-plinarsko-dru%C5%A1tvo-2e5a64075b1 |title=The Croatian energy company you (probably) didn't hear about but you should: Prvo Plinarsko Društvo |date=18 October 2018}}</ref><ref name="RUSKIOBRUČ">{{cite web|url=https://net.hr/danas/ruski-obruc-oko-hrvatske-kontroliraju-plin-zele-naftu-a-upravo-su-dobili-kontrolu-nad-brojnim-poljima-i-izvorima-vode-sada-mogu-raditi-sto-zele/ |author= Filip Raunić |title=RUSKI OBRUČ OKO HRVATSKE: Kontroliraju plin, žele naftu, a upravo su dobili brojna polja i izvore vode; 'Sada mogu raditi što žele'|publisher=net.hr|date=23 January 2020}}</ref> (PPD is owned by the Energia Naturalis Group<ref name="ppdaboutus" >{{cite web|url=https://www.ppd.hr/en/about-us-s107 |title=About Us |publisher=PPD|access-date=22 February 2021}}</ref>). Among other things, by extending a loan, PPD financed the [[2014–15 Croatian presidential election|2014–15 presidential election]] campaign of [[Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović]], who went on to win the election.<ref name="RUSKIOBRUČ" /><ref name="skorijenimauruskomplinu" /> In the opinion of [[Denis Kuljiš]], Russia had always sought to exercise control over Croatia′s president as it was understood that [[Government of Croatia|Croatia′s government]] "must take orders from [[Institutions of the European Union|Brussels]]".<ref>[[Denis Kuljiš]]. ''Prorok prije proroka: Briljantna priča o [[Zoran Milanović|Zoranu Milanoviću]]''. // ''START style & news'', # 13, Spring 2020, p. 73.</ref> Additionally, Russian state-controlled oil company [[Zarubezhneft]] attempted, in the early 2010s, to get hold of INA's oil exploration concessions and to this end set up the Russian-Croatian company, Zarubezhneft Adria, with a minority stake owned by Croatian state-controlled crude oil transportation company JANAF ([[Jadranski naftovod]]).<ref name="jutlistudruzio">{{cite web|url=https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/sef-janaf-a-ante-markov-udruzio-se-s-rusima-da-ini-otmu-naftno-plinski-biznis-u-slavoniji-1633398 |author=Krešimir Žabec |title=Šef JANAF-a Ante Markov udružio se s Rusima da Ini otmu naftno-plinski biznis u Slavoniji |newspaper=[[Jutarnji list]]|date=19 January 2012}}</ref> JANAF's consecutive CEOs, Ante Markov and Dragan Kovačević, were reputed to have close ties to Russia and lobby Russia's business interests in Croatia.<ref name="jutlistudruzio" /><ref name="dnevnoobracun" >{{cite web|url=https://www.dnevno.hr/vijesti/rimac-i-kovacevic-zrtve-americkog-obracuna-s-rusijom-on-je-ruski-lobist-a-ona-teklic-velikih-igraca-1576381/ |title=RIMAC I KOVAČEVIĆ ŽRTVE AMERIČKOG OBRAČUNA S RUSIJOM?! On je ruski lobist, a ona teklić velikih igrača! |publisher=Dnevno.hr|date=29 September 2020}}</ref> According to Croatian press, the strategy of the [[2019–20 Croatian presidential election|2019 presidential campaign]] of [[Zoran Milanović]] was conceived in the corporate "club" owned by JANAF, whose CEO, Dragan Kovačević, was arrested on criminal charges of corruption the following year, a move that was interpreted as the [[United States]]′ settling of scores with Russia.<ref name="dnevnoobracun" /><ref>''7Dnevno'', 30 October 2020, pp. 1, 4–5. // Iva Međugorac. ''Milanovićeva kampanja krenula je iz kluba u Slovenskoj''.</ref> In the period between 2017 and [[2019–20 Croatian presidential election|2019]], while formally out of politics, according to Croatian press reports, Milanović stayed in Moscow multiple times (Milanović was then in private business, having founded a consulting firm called EuroAlba Advisory).<ref>''7Dnevno'', 16 April 2021, p. 5. // Iva Međugorac. ''Vrdoljak na meti USKOK-a: U HDZ-u otkrivaju kako bi afera Janaf mogla biti problematična i za predsjednika Milanovića''.</ref> Having become president in 2020, Milanović began to make public statements and foreign policy moves aimed, in the opinion of Croatian political analyst Davor Gjenero, at undermining the neighbouring [[Bosnia and Herzegovina]]′s prospects of joining the EU and NATO as well as the [[Cabinet of Andrej Plenković II|government of Croatia]], a policy that Gjenero attributed to Milanović being beholden to Russia′s geopolitical agenda in the region.<ref>{{cite web|title=Gjenero: Ruski pogon i Milanovićevo crtanje granica Herceg-Bosne |url=https://radiosarajevo.ba/metromahala/ja-mislim/gjenero-ruski-pogon-i-milanovicevo-crtanje-granica-herceg-bosne/423938 |publisher=[[Radio Sarajevo]]|date=13 July 2021}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Analitičar Davor Gjenero: Milanović postaje opasnost i za BiH i za Hrvatsku |url= https://radiosarajevo.ba/vijesti/bosna-i-hercegovina/analiticar-davor-gjenero-milanovic-postaje-opasnost-i-za-bih-i-za-hrvatsku/439387 |publisher=[[Radio Sarajevo]]|date=7 December 2021}}</ref> [[File:Croatia's post-match huddle after the 2018 FIFA World Cup Final.jpg|thumb|275px|[[Croatia national football team|Croatia football players]] pose with presidents, Vladimir Putin and [[Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović]], following the [[2018 FIFA World Cup Final]], which Croatia lost to [[France national football team|France]] 4–2, the [[Luzhniki Stadium]], Moscow.<ref>[https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-soccer-worldcup-croatia-president/soaked-but-smiling-croatian-president-wins-admirers-at-world-cup-final-idUKKBN1K611H Soaked but smiling, Croatian president wins admirers at World Cup final]. Reuters, 16 August 2019.</ref>]] In February 2015, the [[Cabinet of Zoran Milanović|Milanović government]] went ahead with the pre-planned Russian-Croatian Economic Forum held in Moscow, thus defying the publicly made warning against doing so on the part of the U.S.; the Croatian delegation was led by the minister of economy [[Ivan Vrdoljak]].<ref>[http://www.poslovni.hr/hrvatska/rusko-hrvatski-gospodarski-forum-izazvao-podijeljena-misljenja-290127 Rusko-hrvatski gospodarski forum izazvao podijeljena mišljenja]. ''Poslovni dnevnik'', 17 February 2015.</ref><ref>[http://lider.media/aktualno/biznis-i-politika/svijet/klisovic-rusko-hrvatski-gospodarski-forum-ne-bavi-se-politikom-nego-gospodarstvom/ Klisović: Rusko-hrvatski gospodarski forum ne bavi se politikom, nego gospodarstvom]. 17 February 2015.</ref><ref>[https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/Vrdoljak-poveo-100-hrvatskih-poduzetnika-u-Moskvu;-SAD-Ne-mozete-tako/801723.aspx Vrdoljak poveo 100 hrvatskih poduzetnika u Moskvu; SAD: Ne možete tako]. index.hr, 17 February 2015.</ref> At the beginning of 2016, Russian ambassador to Croatia [[Anvar Azimov]] complained publicly that none of the ten Croatian ministers invited by him to attend various events in Russia had visited Russia.<ref name="azim">[http://www.vecernji.hr/hrvatska/hrvatska-nece-dobro-proci-kad-rusiji-zavrse-sankcije-1111139 Veleposlanik Ruske federacije u RH: Hrvatska neće dobro proći kad Rusiji završe sankcije] [[Večernji list]], 4 September 2016.</ref> At the end of 2016, Russian experts were cited as assessing Russian–Croatian relations as "cold".<ref name="cool"/> In September 2016, [[Jutarnji list]] reported that Croatia had expelled one Russian diplomat suspected of spying. An unnamed source, described as "a former Croatian diplomat who was well familiar with the situation in Russia", stated that he knew for a fact that "the Russians were very hurt" and that they responded by expelling one Croatian diplomat.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/otkrivamo-veliku-spijunsku-aferu-kako-je-hrvatska-protjerala-diplomata-iz-ruske-ambasade-u-zagrebu/4684148/|title=OTKRIVAMO VELIKU ŠPIJUNSKU AFERU Kako je Hrvatska protjerala diplomata iz ruske ambasade u Zagrebu|date=10 September 2016}}</ref> An article published in the [[Foreign Affairs]] magazine in July 2017 referred to [[Andrej Plenković]]′s government as "currently the West’s strongest ally against Russian expansion in the [[Balkans]]."<ref>Dagmar Skrpec. [https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/croatia/2017-07-25/croatia-russia-and-balkan-great-game Croatia, Russia, and the Balkan Great Game: Why the West Needs Zagreb] ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'', 25 July 2017.</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=AMERIČKI ČASOPIS 'Hrvatska je najjači saveznik zapada protiv ekspanzije Rusije na Balkanu'|publisher=Novi List|url=http://www.novilist.hr/Vijesti/Hrvatska/AMERICKI-CASOPIS-Hrvatska-je-najjaci-saveznik-zapada-protiv-ekspanzije-Rusije-na-Balkanu}}</ref> The visit to Russia by Croatia's president [[Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović]] in October 2017 was seen by Russian commentators as a sign of tentative warming of relations that had been ″semi-frozen″ on the official level since 2009.<ref>[https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3441596 Хорватия поворачивается лицом к России: Но с оглядкой на США и Евросоюз] [[Kommersant]], 18 October 2017.</ref> President Grabar-Kitarović stressed the prospects of economic cooperation between the countries.<ref name="index.hr">{{cite web|url=https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/predsjednica-porucila-rusija-je-hrvatskoj-vazan-gospodarski-partner/1001975.aspx|title=Predsjednica poručila: Rusija je Hrvatskoj važan gospodarski partner}}</ref> On 26 March 2018, Croatia expelled one Russian diplomat as a show of solidarity with the [[United Kingdom]] which accused Russia of [[Poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal|poisoning Sergei and Yulia Skripal]]. In retaliation, Russia on 30 March banned the chief of staff of the [[Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (Croatia)|Croatian foreign minister]] [[Marija Pejčinović Burić]] — Rina Eterović Goreta, who had from 2015 until 2017 been Croatia's chargé d'affaires in Moscow, — from entering its territory in an official capacity. Russia's choice of person was judged to be a surprise by experts.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/iskusni-diplomati-objasnili-rusku-osvetu-hrvatskoj-ovo-je-iznenadjenje/1035692.aspx|title=Iskusni diplomati objasnili rusku osvetu Hrvatskoj: "Ovo je iznenađenje"}}</ref><ref>[http://ba.n1info.com/Regija/a251760/Moskva-uzvratila-Zagrebu-diplomata-nepozeljan-u-Rusiji.html Moskva uzvratila Zagrebu, diplomata nepoželjan u Rusiji]. [[N1 (TV channel)|N1]], 30 March 2018.</ref><ref>[https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/mvep-hrvatski-diplomat-rusija-moskva-1236214 Nepoželjna šefica ureda ministrice, kćer počasnog konzula Moskve: Ruski “odabir” Rine Eterović Gorete, bivše zaposlenice i sadašnje tajnice ministričina ureda, ali i kćeri ruskog počasnog konzula, iznenadio je mnoge.] ''[[Večernji list]]'', 30 August 2018.</ref> According to mass media reports, some Croat businesspeople and politicians, namely [[Milijan Brkić]], during the [[2018 Bosnian general election]] campaign in [[Bosnia and Herzegovina]] were closely coordinating their activities with [[Intelligence agencies of Russia|Russia's security and intelligence]] officials, specifically [[Nikolai Patrushev]], Secretary of the [[Security Council of Russia]] and previously Director of the Russian [[Federal Security Service]]<ref>Berislav Jelenić. ''Brkić se ipak uključio u kampaniju predsjednice.'' / ''[[Nacional (weekly)|Nacional]]'', 3 September 2019, # 1115, p. 12.</ref><ref>{{cite news |date=6 July 2018 |title=RUSKI OBAVJEŠTAJCI S ČELNICIMA HDZ-a BiH: Pripremljen plan za ostanak Dragana Čovića u Predsjedništvu BiH|work=Dnevno.ba|url=https://www.dnevno.ba/vijesti/ruski-obavjestajci-s-celnicima-hdz-a-bih-pripremljen-plan-za-ostanak-dragana-covica-u-predsjednistvu-bih-142368/ |access-date=26 May 2019 }}</ref> (in the opinion of the former [[Ministry of the Interior (Croatia)|Minister of the Interior of Croatia]], [[Vlaho Orepić]], published in the autumn of 2019, Milijan Brkić, while not holding any [[Cabinet of Andrej Plenković|position in the government]], was the ''de facto'' coordinator of [[Croatian security and intelligence system|Croatia's secret services]];<ref>''INTERVJU Vlaho Orepić: ‘Hrvatski predsjednik mora koordinirati tajnim službama, a ne da to rade M.Brkić i slični’.'' / ''[[Nacional (weekly)|Nacional]]'', 1 October 2019, # 1119, p. 21.</ref> Milijan Brkić was also widely viewed as the [[kingmaker]] in the [[Croatian Democratic Union]] (HDZ), one of the [[List of political parties in Croatia|country's two major political parties]],<ref>''24SataExpress'', 25 October 2019, # 485, p. 25.</ref> as well as head of the informal "para-intelligence" grouping within the HDZ that had sought to undermine the Plenković administration, the country's judicial institutions, and individual state officials<ref>''[[Nacional (weekly)|Nacional]]'', 22 October 2019, # 1122, p. 10, 11–12.</ref> and had infiltrated Croatia's state institutions such as the [[Ministry of the Interior (Croatia)|Ministry of the Interior]] and the [[Military Security and Intelligence Agency (Croatia)|Military Security and Intelligence Agency]],<ref>''7Dnevno'', 22 May 2020, p. 13. // Iva Međugorac. [https://www.dnevno.hr/7dnevno/ciscenje-vasinih-kadrova-plenkovic-se-rjesava-svih-brkicevih-ljudi-1474249/ ''Čišćenje Vasinih kadrova iz službi: Plenković se rješava svih Brkićevih ljudi''].</ref> the activity of the latter having come to resemble, under his influence, that of "a [[mafia]]-type organisation", according to the agency's employees′ accusations published in early 2021<ref>''[https://www.nacional.hr/milanovic-i-plenkovic-stite-sefa-vojnih-spijuna-koji-je-nezakonito-prisluskivao-casnika/ Milanović i Plenković štite šefa vojnih špijuna koji je nezakonito prisluškivao časnika].'' / ''[[Nacional (weekly)|Nacional]]'', 9 March 2021 (paper edition), # 1194, p. 12–13.</ref>). Following the 2018 Bosnian election, at which the [[Croats of Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnian Croat]] candidate and leader of the [[Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia and Herzegovina]] (HDZ BiH) party, [[Dragan Čović]], failed to get elected [[List of Croat members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina|Croat member]] of the [[Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina|BiH Presidency]], Dragan Čović became a political ally of the [[Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina|Bosnian Serb]] leader and Member of the Presidency, [[Milorad Dodik]], who is known to enjoy support of Russia's leadership in his attempts to undermine the BiH statehood.<ref>''[[Jutarnji list]]'', 7 March 2020, # 7743, p. 54–55. // Vlado Vurušić, Robert Bajruši. [https://www.jutarnji.hr/magazin/savez-koji-moze-srusiti-bih-lider-bosanskih-srba-i-uvrijedeni-voda-bosanskih-hrvata-djeluju-zajedno-protiv-sarajeva-obojica-na-stetu-svojih-naroda/10061611/ DODIK I ČOVIĆ: SAVEZ KOJI MOŽE SRUŠITI BiH Lider bosanskih Srba i uvrijeđeni vođa bosanskih Hrvata djeluju zajedno protiv Sarajeva, obojica na štetu svojih naroda]</ref> According to Croatian political observer Boris Rašeta, Russia's influence in Croatia had been steadily in the ascendant and, prior to Andrej Plenković's chairmanship of the HDZ, the party's leadership had enjoyed strong support in the Kremlin.<ref>{{cite news |date=10 February 2019 |title=Ruska cipela u balkanskim vratima |work=[[Al Jazeera Balkans]]|url=http://balkans.aljazeera.net/vijesti/ruska-cipela-u-balkanskim-vratima |access-date=3 May 2020 }}</ref> Special friendly relationship with Russia's leadership fostered by [[Milan Bandić]], the [[List of mayors of Zagreb|mayor]] of [[Zagreb]] (2005–2021), given multiple criminal investigations against him in Croatia, prompted Croatian press to speculate in the spring of 2020 that he was in a position to reckon on claiming [[Right of asylum|political asylum]] in Russia to avoid subsequent extradition from his patrimonial [[Bosnia and Herzegovina|BiH]].<ref>''Skrivena čežnja Milana Bandića: Ruska putovnica za hitan uzmak. Zlu ne trebalo...'' // ''24sataExpress'', 30 April 2020, pp. 10–13.</ref> In early September 2020, the outgoing Russian Ambassador to Croatia (2015—2020), [[Anvar Azimov]], told a [[Far-right politics|far-right]] Croatian weekly<ref>Andrea Milat. [https://balkaninsight.com/2019/02/01/moment-of-truth-reality-bites-for-notorious-news-brand-01-31-2019/ Moment of Truth: Reality Bites for Notorious News Brand]</ref> that his best friends in Croatia had been former president [[Stjepan Mesić|Stipe Mesić]] and mayor Milan Bandić and the three men addressed one another "brother" (''brat''); Azimov also said he had had meetings with Bandić "nearly each week" whereas Mesić, according to Azimov, had been awaiting him inside the Russian embassy the day Azimov arrived in Zagreb.<ref>''Posljednja ispovijest ruskog veleposlanika u Hrvatskoj: Najbliži prijatelji su mi Mesić i Bandić: [[Zoran Milanović|Milanović]] mi je na ruskom jeziku recitirao Puškina i Jesenjina, on je mudar, iskusan i izbalansiran.'' // ''7Dnevno'', # 353, 4 September 2020, p 26.</ref> According to Croatian political observers, the relationship between mayor Bandić and the HDZ-led government in the latter half of the 2010s grew into a political "[[symbiosis]]" that even survived the [[2020 Croatian parliamentary election|2020 parliamentary election]] in which [[Bandić Milan 365 - Labour and Solidarity Party|Bandić's party]] fared poorly.<ref>Ivan Pandžić, Emirat Asipi. ''Tajne veze Mikija&Plenkija i plavuša koje se premijer užasava'' // ''24sataExpress'', 19 February 2021, pp. 11–14.</ref> Stipe Mesić went on participating actively in Croatia′s official foreign policy into 2021.<ref>{{cite news | language = hr | url = https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/milanovic-primio-izetbegovica-s-njima-je-bio-i-mesic/2307228.aspx | title =Milanović primio Izetbegovića, s njima je bio i Mesić | publisher = [[Index.hr]] | date = 28 September 2021 }}</ref> According to the statistics of the [[Ministry of the Interior (Croatia)|Croatian Ministry of the Interior]] published in early 2019, in the period from 2000 until 2017, sixty-six Russian nationals had been granted [[Croatian nationality law|Croatian citizenship]] in the expedited procedure as provided for by Article 12 of the Law on Croatian Citizenship; some of these persons are believed to be members of [[Vladimir Putin]]′s inner circle of friends.<ref>[https://www.jutarnji.hr/globus/Globus-politika/globusov-istrazivacki-specijal-kako-se-trguje-hrvatskim-drzavljanstvom-od-2000-do-2017-na-povlasten-nacin-domovnicu-i-putovnicu-dobila-784-stranca/8479016/ GLOBUSOV ISTRAŽIVAČKI SPECIJAL: KAKO SE TRGUJE HRVATSKIM DRŽAVLJANSTVOM Od 2000. do 2017. na povlašten način domovnicu i putovnicu dobila 784 stranca.] 12 March 2019.</ref><ref>[https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/cime-je-zasluzio-domovnicu-putinov-maser-dobio-hrvatsko-drzavljanstvo-po-vidosevicevoj-molbi/8675798/ ČIME JE ZASLUŽIO DOMOVNICU? Putinov maser dobio hrvatsko državljanstvo po Vidoševićevoj molbi]. ''[[Večernji list]]'', 1 April 2019.</ref><ref>[https://www.nacional.hr/misterij-posjeta-hrvatske-predsjednice-sipanskom-imanju-putinova-masera/ MISTERIJ posjeta hrvatske predsjednice šipanskom imanju ‘Putinova masera’]. ''[[Nacional (weekly)|Nacional]]'', 19 December 2017.</ref> On 1 April 2019, Russia's [[Sberbank of Russia|Sberbank]] announced it had formally acquired ownership of ″about 40 per cent of the net assets of [[Fortenova Group]]".<ref>[https://www.e-disclosure.ru/portal/event.aspx?EventId=bnvxP-CV41ka-Am3AquxCqbg-B-B ПАО Сбербанк: Сведения, оказывающие, по мнению эмитента, существенное влияние на стоимость его эмиссионных ценных бумаг]. Interfax, 2 April 2019.</ref><ref>[https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/sberbank-preuzeo-kontrolu-nad-40-posto-novog-agrokora/2075415.aspx Sberbank preuzeo kontrolu nad 40 posto novog Agrokora]</ref> The latter was set up as part of the debt-for-equity swap deal agreed upon between the government-appointed extraordinary administration of the demised [[Agrokor]], the biggest privately owned company in the Balkans founded by [[Ivica Todorić]], and its creditors such as Sberbank and [[VTB Bank]].<ref>[http://hr.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a382285/Fortanova-CEO-Poletaev-meets-PM-Plenkovic-to-talk-company-plans.html Fortanova CEO Poletaev meets PM Plenkovic to talk company plans]. [[N1 (TV channel)|N1]], 3 April 2019.</ref><ref name="reuterssber">[https://www.reuters.com/article/croatia-fortenova/sberbank-says-committed-to-croatias-former-agrokor-group-idUSL8N21L2R0 Sberbank says "committed" to Croatia's former Agrokor group]. Reuters, 3 April 2019.</ref> The deal was viewed by experts as having given Vladimir Putin ″indirect leverage on the Croatian economy and on the largest firm in the former Yugoslavia″,<ref>Dr Theodore Karasik. [https://www.euronews.com/2019/01/22/if-croatia-joins-the-eurozone-it-would-give-russia-its-greatest-weapon-in-europe-view If Croatia joins the Eurozone, it would give Russia its greatest weapon in Europe]. Euronews, 22 January 2019.</ref> Croatia’s Centre for Development Cooperation writing that "Russia ha[d] bought itself a NATO country".<ref>[http://ceras.hr/2018/07/04/how-russia-bought-itself-a-nato-country/ How Russia Bought Itself a NATO Country]</ref><ref>Nafeez Ahmed. [https://medium.com/insurge-intelligence/how-senior-trump-insiders-weaponised-russias-energy-war-on-europe-be8d324a113e White House admits knowing that Trump lobbyists helped Gazprom conquer an entire Balkan state: US and Russian corporations connected to the American President’s inner circle are tying Putin’s gas noose round Europe’s neck]</ref> Sberbank's pointman for Agrokor had been Maxim Poletaev, whose wife, Yelena, was granted Croatian citizenship in 2015.<ref>[https://www.vecernji.hr/vijesti/zasto-je-mrak-taritas-zeni-maksima-poletajeva-2015-pomogla-da-dobije-hrvatsko-drzavljanstvo-1306571 Zašto je Mrak-Taritaš ženi Maksima Poletajeva 2015. pomogla da dobije hrvatsko državljanstvo: Supruga Maksima Poletajeva državljanstvo je dobila 2015. jer je to “Hrvatskoj u interesu”]. [[Večernji list]], 14 March 2019.</ref><ref>[https://dnevnik.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/od-danas-na-trzistu-posluje-fortenova-grupa-podsjecamo-tko-su-novi-vlasnici---555360.html Fortenova grupa u vlasništvu je šarolikog društva, evo tko sve ima udjele u bivšem Todorićevu carstvu]. Dnevnik.hr, 1 April 2019.</ref> Maxim Poletaev became chairman of Fortenova's board of directors.<ref name="reuterssber" /> By having PPD acquire 6,4 per cent of Fortenova Group in early 2020, Russian business achieved majority control of the company.<ref name="RUSKIOBRUČ" /> ===Since 2020=== [[Miroslav Škoro]]′s [[Miroslav Škoro Homeland Movement|political movement]] (DPMŠ) that emerged at the end of 2010s and was hailed as Croatia's [[Third Way]] party was reported to be financed by and have strong personal connections to, PPD and its owner, Pavao Vujnovac.<ref>''[[Jutarnji list]]'', 24 May 2020, # 7819, p. 13. // ''Čovjek iza Miroslava Škore''.</ref><ref name="skorijenimauruskomplinu">{{cite web|url=https://net.hr/danas/hrvatska/projekt-skoro-na-ruski-pogon-ovo-su-financijeri-za-koje-kazu-da-odlucuju-umjesto-skore-milijarde-s-korijenima-u-ruskom-plinu/ |author=Đurđica Klancir |title=PROJEKT ŠKORO NA RUSKI POGON: Ovo su financijeri za koje kažu da odlučuju umjesto Škore – milijarde, s korijenima u ruskom plinu…|publisher=net.hr|date=22 May 2020}}</ref><ref name="RUSKIeksponent">{{cite web|url=https://danica.hr/je-li-miroslav-skoro-eksponent-ruskih-i-madarskih-interesa-u-hrvatskoj/ |author=Robert Mihaljević (editor) |title=Je li Miroslav Škoro eksponent ruskih i mađarskih interesa u Hrvatskoj|publisher=danica.hr|date=28 February 2020}}</ref> The DPMŠ-led coalition came in third in the [[2020 Croatian parliamentary election|Croatian parliamentary election]] held in July 2020. Following the valedictory visit that Russian ambassador to Croatia [[Anvar Azimov]] paid [[Ministry of Defence (Croatia)|Croatian minister of defence]] [[Mario Banožić]] in early September 2020, the Croatian ministry of defence published a statement that said, "The minister of defence and the Russian ambassador have agreed that the two countries enjoy good and friendly relations".<ref name="defminvaled">{{cite web|url=https://www.morh.hr/ministar-banozic-primio-veleposlanika-ruske-federacije-azimova-u-oprostajni-posjet/ |author=Ministry of Defence of Croatia |author-link=Ministry of Defence (Croatia) |title=Ministar Banožić primio veleposlanika Ruske Federacije Azimova u oproštajni posjet |publisher=[[Ministry of Defence (Croatia)|Ministry of Defence of Croatia]] |date=4 September 2020}}</ref> The Croatian [[Security and Intelligence Agency (Croatia)|Security and Intelligence Agency]]′s annual unclassified report for 2019 published a few days later stated that the Croatian ministry of defence, along with other government institutions, had been one of the targets of a series of sophisticated state-sponsored [[Cybercrime|cyber attacks]] ([[advanced persistent threat]]s); while the agency did not name the perpetrator, Croatian press cited Russia's intelligence services (FSB and [[GRU (G.U.)|GRU]]) as being the culprits.<ref>''[[Jutarnji list]]'', 21 September 2020, p. 7. // Krešimir Žabec. ''Lani su ruske tajne službe pokušale hakirati MORH i MVP''.</ref><ref name="soasays">{{cite web|url=https://www.total-croatia-news.com/news/46772-state-of-security |title=SOA Says State of Security Stable in Croatia |work=[[Croatian News Agency]]|date=21 September 2020}}</ref> President Zoran Milanović's verbal attacks on the Plenković government as well as criticism of the U.S.′ policies voiced by him in the autumn of 2020 earned him praise from Russia's pro-government media.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/predsjednik-je-izjavio-kako-je-inicijativa-tri-mora-hrvatskoj-nepotrebna-i-stetna-je-li-u-pravu-15027503 |title=Predsjednik je izjavio kako je Inicijativa tri mora Hrvatskoj nepotrebna i štetna. Je li u pravu? |language=hr |publisher=[[Jutarnji list]] |date=2020-10-24 |access-date=2021-01-04}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://vz.ru/politics/2020/10/21/1066378.html |title=Россия получила поддержку от неожиданной страны ЕС |language=ru |publisher=[[Vzglyad (newspaper)|Vzglyad]] |date=2020-10-21 |access-date=2021-01-04}}</ref> Russian foreign minister [[Sergey Lavrov]]′s visit to Croatia that was to take place in late October 2020 was cancelled without any formal announcement and explanation from the Russia side, whereas his planned visit to Serbia was made longer.<ref name="lavrovipak">{{cite web|url=https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/30912820.html |title=Lavrov ipak ne dolazi u Zagreb |work=[[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty]]|date=26 October 2020}}</ref> Russian media suggested the reason for calling off the previously announced<ref name="tasslavrov">{{cite web|url=https://tass.ru/politika/9720271 |title=Лавров 27 октября посетит Хорватию |work=[[TASS]] |date=14 October 2020}}</ref> stop in Zagreb within Lavrov's tour of the Balkans was Croatian prime minister Andrej Plenković's refusal to receive the Russian minister.<ref name="RussFMcancels">{{cite web|url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/short_news/russian-fm-cancels-visit-to-zagreb/ |author=Zeljko Trkanjec |title=Russian FM cancels visit to Zagreb |work= EURACTIV.hr |date=26 October 2020}}</ref> However, the Croatian prime minister's office and the [[Gordan Grlić-Radman|Croatian foreign minister]] dismissed such allegations saying the visit was postponed at the Russian side's request due to the [[COVID-19 pandemic in Croatia|epidemiological situation]] at the Russian Embassy in Zagreb.<ref name="jutlistodg">{{cite web|url=https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/lavrovljev-posjet-odgoden-zbog-covida-nije-upitno-da-ce-novi-susret-biti-dogovoren-15028188 |title=GORDAN GRLIĆ RADMAN': Lavrovljev posjet odgođen zbog covida, nije upitno da će novi susret biti dogovoren' |work=[[Croatian News Agency]]|publisher=[[Jutarnji list]]|date=27 October 2020}}</ref><ref name="jutlistodbac">{{cite web|url=https://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/vlada-odbacuje-nagadanja-o-odgodi-lavrovljeva-posjeta-razlog-je-covid-u-ruskoj-ambasadi-15027964 |title=Vlada odbacuje nagađanja o odgodi Lavrovljeva posjeta: 'Razlog je covid u ruskoj ambasadi' |author=Vlado Vurušić|publisher=[[Jutarnji list]]|date=26 October 2020}}</ref> During Lavrov's visit to Zagreb that finally took place in mid-December 2020, Croatian foreign minister [[Gordan Grlić-Radman]] praised his Russian counterpart as a poet whose poems had been published shortly prior.<ref name="rialavrovpoet">{{cite web|url=https://ria.ru/20201216/suvenir-1589494454.html |title=Лаврову в Загребе подарили сувенир из брачского камня |work=[[RIA Novosti]] |date=16 December 2020}}</ref><ref name="indexdušu">{{cite web|url=https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/radman-nakon-sastanka-s-lavrovom-otkrio-sam-njegovu-toplu-dusu-citali-smo-poeziju/2239226.aspx |title=Radman nakon sastanka s Lavrovom: Otkrio sam njegovu toplu dušu, čitali smo poeziju |work=[[Index.hr]] |date=16 December 2020}}</ref> Several weeks later, Russian ambassador Andrey Nesterenko in an interview referred to Grlić-Radman as "Lavrov′s friend"<ref>''[[Nacional (weekly)|Nacional]]'', 16 March 2021, # 1195, p. 35.</ref> The floating [[Krk LNG terminal|LNG terminal]] in [[Omišalj]] that began operations on 1 January 2021 had been hailed as a way for Croatia to ease its dependence on [[Natural gas in Russia|natural gas imported from Russia]] as well as bring greater gas diversity and competition to Central and Eastern Europe.<ref name="bloombergset">{{cite web|url=https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-21/croatia-set-to-import-first-lng-cargo-from-u-s-for-new-terminal |title=Croatia Set to Import First U.S. LNG Cargo for New Terminal |work=[[Bloomberg News|Bloomberg]] |date=21 December 2020}}</ref><ref name="reuterskicks">{{cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/croatia-lng-idUSL8N2JC0FN |title=Croatia kicks off LNG terminal in north Adriatic |work=[[Reuters]] |date=1 January 2021}}</ref> On 25 January 2022, against the backdrop of a [[2021–2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis|renewed flare-up of confronation]] between Russia and the West over Ukraine, Croatia′s president Zoran Milanović told the press that the [[Russo-Ukrainian War|crisis over Ukraine]] was due to the U.S.′ foreign policy and domestic politics; he also said that an "arrangement to meet Russia′s security interests" ought to be found and that he guaranteed that no Croatian troops would be dispatched in case of an escalation.<ref>{{cite web|title=Croatia to recall all troops from NATO in case of Russia-Ukraine conflict|url=https://tass.com/world/1392873 |publisher=[[TASS]]|date=25 January 2022|access-date=25 January 2022}}</ref><ref name="indexmil">{{Cite web|title=VIDEO Milanović: Ja sam zapovjednik vojske, hrvatski vojnici neće ići u Ukrajinu|url=https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/video-milanovic-ja-sam-zapovjednik-vojske-hrvatski-vojnici-nece-ici-u-ukrajinu/2334864.aspx|date=2022-01-25|publisher=[[Index.hr]]|language=hr}}</ref> On the same day, prime minister Plenković reacted to those statements by saying that on hearing those he thought it was being said "by some Russian official"; he also offered apologies to Ukraine and reiterated that Croatia supported Ukraine′s territorial integrity.<ref name="indexplen">{{Cite web|title=VIDEO Plenković o Milanovićevoj izjavi o Ukrajini i Rusiji: Ispričavam se Ukrajincima|url=https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/video-plenkovic-o-milanovicevim-izjavama-nestvarno-ispricavam-se-ukrajincima/2335005.aspx|date=2022-01-25|publisher=[[Index.hr]]|language=hr}}</ref> [[''Politico'']] commented on Milanović′s statements by writing: "In the midst of the Ukraine crisis comes a surprise military maneuver — a Croatian confusion operation."<ref name="politicoconf">{{Cite web|title=Croatia sows confusion with threat to pull NATO troops over Ukraine crisis |url=https://www.politico.eu/article/croatia-withdraw-military-from-nato-conflict-ukraine-russia/?utm_source=Twitter&utm_medium=social&utm_campaign=RSS_Syndication |date=2022-01-25|publisher=[[Politico]]}}</ref> ==Economic ties== According to [[Croatian National Bank]]'s data, Russia has invested €390.5 million in Croatia between 1993 and 2016, while Croatia invested €101 million in Russia in the same period.<ref name="index.hr"/> Croatia exports mainly food, drugs, shaving products, flasks for metal foundry and telecommunications equipment, while Russia exports oil, oil and petroleum gases, accounting 90 percent of imports from Russia to Croatia, mineral and chemical fertilizers, aluminum wrought and boilers for steam production.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.hgk.hr/sektor-centar/sektor-medjunarodni/iznimno-veliko-zanimanje-hrvatskih-tvrtki-za-suradnju-s-ruskim-kompanijama-2 |title=Iznimno veliko zanimanje hrvatskih tvrtki za suradnju s ruskim kompanijama « Hrvatska gospodarska komora |publisher=Hgk.hr |date=2012-06-15 |access-date=2016-05-01 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130109131559/http://www.hgk.hr/sektor-centar/sektor-medjunarodni/iznimno-veliko-zanimanje-hrvatskih-tvrtki-za-suradnju-s-ruskim-kompanijama-2/ |archive-date=2013-01-09 |url-status=dead }}</ref> In 2008, according to Croatia's official statistics, trade between the countries totalled at 3.38bln US dollars.<ref name="ria2010" /> Due to [[International sanctions during the Ukrainian crisis|mutual sanctions]] between the European Union and Russia introduced in 2014, the trade between Russia and Croatia declined in 2015 for 40%. According to the [[Federal Customs Service of Russia]], the trade turnover between Croatia and Russia amounted $1.23 billion with Russian exports decreasing by 35%, amounting $988.4 million, and Croatian exports amounting $238 million, decreasing by 43.7%.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.zagreb.mid.ru/ruscro2.html|title=Посольство России в Хорватии|website=www.zagreb.mid.ru|access-date=2018-06-05|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160821125127/http://www.zagreb.mid.ru/ruscro2.html|archive-date=2016-08-21|url-status=dead}}</ref> In 2016, trade between two countries amounted c. $810 million.<ref name="ria2017">[https://ria.ru/spravka/20171018/1506486262.html Межгосударственные отношения России и Хорватии] [[RIA Novosti]], 18 October 2017.</ref> In 2017, trade between two countries amounted $807 million, and in the first half of 2018 rose by 64%.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.index.hr/vijesti/clanak/predsjednica-pozvala-putina-u-hrvatsku-predstavila-mu-inicijativu-tri-mora/1001800.aspx|title=Predsjednica pozvala Putina u Hrvatsku, predstavila mu Inicijativu tri mora}}</ref> In March 2017, more than a third of the debt incurred by [[Agrokor]], Croatia's largest privately owned company that was put into state-run administration in April, was said to be held by Russia's two biggest banks, the state-owned [[Sberbank of Russia|Sberbank]] and [[VTB Bank]]. The Russian ambassador to Croatia Anvar Azimov's public threat to Agrokor in February 2017 was seen by Croatian and regional analysts as a sign that Agrokor's problems had a geopolitical dimension and were being instrumentalized by Russia to expand its influence and exert pressure.<ref name="bloombunravel">[https://www.bloomberg.com/politics/articles/2017-03-23/it-took-60-days-to-unravel-what-balkan-tycoon-built-in-41-years Tycoon’s Balkan Empire Unravels in 60 Days of Market Panic] [[Bloomberg L.P.|Bloomberg]], 23 March 2017.</ref><ref>[https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-03-23/russia-looms-over-balkan-giant-s-fight-to-survive-quicktake-q-a Russia Looms Over Balkan Giant's Fight to Survive: QuickTake Q&A] [[Bloomberg L.P.|Bloomberg]], 23 March 2017.</ref><ref name="CRNEPROGNOZE">[http://www.jutarnji.hr/vijesti/hrvatska/jesu-li-rusi-znali-za-crne-prognoze-o-agrokoru-vec-kod-kupnje-mercatora-tri-su-slovenska-ekonomista-upozorila-koncern-ce-za-3-godine-dozivjeti-slom/5845315/ JESU LI RUSI ZNALI ZA CRNE PROGNOZE O AGROKORU? Već kod kupnje Mercatora tri su slovenska ekonomista upozorila: koncern će za 3 godine doživjeti slom] [[Jutarnji list]], 1 April 2017 ([[:sl:Borut Šuklje|Borut Šuklje]]: „Jer, odgovor na to pitanje daje i najbitniji odgovor, zašto se to s Agrokorom dogodilo baš sada i što je stvarni razlog potpuno neobičnog nastupa najviše rangiranog i povezanog ruskog ambasadora Anvara Sarvanoviča Azimova. Govorim o njegovu komentiranju poslovnih ili bankarskih odnosa između banke i klijenta i decidiranom stavu da neće dati nove kredite. Ambasadorov nastup nije bio slučajan, to je bilo dobro pripremljeno i tempirano izlaganje. Poslije tog nastupa, sa svim oznakama države, i na ambasadorovoj uniformi i u prostoriji gdje je održao izlaganje, bankarsko pitanje kreditnih linija postalo je političko pitanje, koje s kreditima kao takvim više nema neke značajne veze. Sada je to postalo više nego privredno ili financijsko pitanje, a to je pitanje geostrateških odnosa u regiji.“)</ref><ref>[http://hr.n1info.com/a185913/Vijesti/Ivo-Banac-Bilo-bi-vrlo-lose-da-Putin-postane-vlasnik-Jamnice.html "Bilo bi vrlo loše da Putin postane vlasnik Jamnice"] interview of [[Ivo Banac]], 20 April 2017.</ref><ref>[http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/agrokor-crisis-may-give-russia-balkan-breakthrough--09-29-2017 Agrokor Crisis May Give Russia ‘Balkan Breakthrough’: Russia may try to its use the huge debts that the failing Croatian giant owes it to mightily strengthen its presence in the Balkans, a Slovenian expert, Borut Suklje, told BIRN.] [[Balkan Insight]], 2 October 2017.</ref> At an extradition hearing in the London court on 7 November 2017, Agrokor's owner [[Ivica Todorić]]’s lawyer stated that the criminal case against his client was linked to “perceived Russian influence” and ″ar[ose] in part from the involvement of Russian banks and financing.”<ref name="reutersfightsextr">[https://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-croatia-agrokor-todoric/agrokor-owner-fights-extradition-from-uk-to-croatia-over-alleged-fraud-idUKKBN1D71PJ Agrokor owner fights extradition from UK to Croatia over alleged fraud] Reuters, 7 November 2017.</ref> ==Tourism== In 2012, over 203,000 Russian citizens visited Croatia.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.tportal.hr/vijesti/svijet/240041/Zbog-viza-broj-ruskih-turista-pada-za-cetvrtinu.html#.UQ7qRfJdDTo |title=Zbog viza broj ruskih turista pada za četvrtinu |publisher=tportal.hr |date=2013-01-29 |access-date=2016-05-01}}</ref> After Croatia joined the EU in 2013, it was forced to introduce visas for Russian, Ukrainian and Turkish nationals, which consequentially led to the decline in arrivals of Russian tourists. In 2016, according to the Russian statistics, the number totaled upward of 55,000 persons.<ref name="ria2017" /> ==Resident diplomatic missions== * Croatia has an embassy in [[Moscow]]. * Russia has an embassy in [[Zagreb]]. ==See also== *[[Russia–European Union relations]] ==Notes== {{Reflist|20em}} ==Sources== * {{cite book | last = Enciklopedija Jugoslavije | author-link = Encyclopedia of Yugoslavia | title = Enciklopedija Jugoslavije, Vol. 7 // Sovjetsko-jugoslovenski odnosi | language = sh | publisher = [[Miroslav Krleža Institute of Lexicography|Jugoslovenski leksikografski zavod]] | location = Zagreb, [[Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]] | year = 1968 }} ==External links== {{Commons category|Relations of Croatia and Russia|Croatia–Russia relations}} * [http://www.mid.ru/ns-reuro.nsf/strana?OpenView&Start=30&Count=30&Expand=39#39 Documents on the Croatia–Russia relationship from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs] {{in lang|ru}} * [https://archive.today/20130107185002/http://www.mvpei.hr/CustomPages/enwiki/static/HRV//templates/_frt_bilateralni_odnosi_po_drzavama_en.asp?id=156 List of international treaties and international acts signed between the Republic of Croatia and the Russian Federation] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20090412090136/http://www.croatia.mid.ru/ Embassy of Russia in Zagreb] {{in lang|hr|ru}} * [http://ru.mfa.hr/?mv=1630&mh=284 Embassy of Croatia in Moscow] {{in lang|hr|ru}} * [http://www.croatia.org/crown/articles/9573/1/Croatia---Russia-historical-and-cultural-relations.html Croatian Russian historical and cultural relations] {{Foreign relations of Croatia}} {{Foreign relations of Russia|Europe}} {{DEFAULTSORT:Croatia-Russia relations}} [[Category:Croatia–Russia relations| ]] [[Category:Bilateral relations of Croatia|Russia]] [[Category:Bilateral relations of Russia]] [[Category:Political history of Croatia]]'