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{{United States Armed Forces sidebar}}
{{United States Armed Forces sidebar}}


The '''United States Special Operations Command''' ('''USSOCOM''' or '''SOCOM''') is the [[unified combatant command]] charged with overseeing the various [[Special forces|special operations]] component commands of the [[USASOC|Army]], [[MARSOC|Marine Corps]], [[NAVSPECWARCOM|Navy]], and [[AFSOC|Air Force]] of the [[United States Armed Forces]]. The command is part of the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] and is the only unified combatant command created by an [[Act of Congress]]. USSOCOM is headquartered at [[MacDill Air Force Base]] in [[Tampa, Florida|Tampa]], Florida.
The '''United States Special Operations Command''' ('''USSOCOM''' or '''SOCOM''') is the [[unified combatant command]] charged with overseeing the various [[Special forces|special operations]] component commands of the [[United States Army Special Operations Command|Army]], [[United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command|Marine Corps]], [[United States Naval Special Warfare Command|Navy]], and [[Air Force Special Operations Command|Air Force]] of the [[United States Armed Forces]]. The command is part of the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] and is the only unified combatant command created by an [[Act of Congress]]. USSOCOM is headquartered at [[MacDill Air Force Base]] in [[Tampa, Florida|Tampa]], Florida.


The idea of an American unified special operations command had its origins in the aftermath of [[Operation Eagle Claw]], the disastrous attempted rescue of [[Iran hostage crisis|hostages]] at the [[Den of Espionage|American embassy]] in Iran in 1980. The ensuing investigation, chaired by [[Admiral (United States)|Admiral]] [[James L. Holloway III]], the retired [[Chief of Naval Operations]], cited lack of [[Command and control (military)|command and control]] and inter-service coordination as significant factors in the failure of the mission.{{r|Adm Holloway bio}} Since its activation on 16 April 1987, U.S. Special Operations Command has participated in many [[Military operation|operations]], from the 1989 [[United States invasion of Panama|invasion]] of [[Panama]] to the [[War on Terror]].{{r|NYT Bang Panama}}{{r|NYT Regime thought}}
The idea of an American unified special operations command had its origins in the aftermath of [[Operation Eagle Claw]], the disastrous attempted rescue of [[Iran hostage crisis|hostages]] at the [[Embassy of the United States, Tehran|American embassy]] in Iran in 1980. The ensuing investigation, chaired by [[Admiral (United States)|Admiral]] [[James L. Holloway III]], the retired [[Chief of Naval Operations]], cited lack of [[command and control]] and inter-service coordination as significant factors in the failure of the mission.{{r|Adm Holloway bio}} Since its activation on 16 April 1987, U.S. Special Operations Command has participated in many [[Military operation|operations]], from the 1989 [[United States invasion of Panama|invasion]] of [[Panama]] to the [[War on terror|War on Terror]].{{r|NYT Bang Panama}}{{r|NYT Regime thought}}


USSOCOM is involved with clandestine activity, such as [[Direct action (military)|direct action]], [[special reconnaissance]], [[counter-terrorism]], [[foreign internal defense]], [[unconventional warfare (United States)|unconventional warfare]], [[psychological warfare]], [[civil affairs]], and [[counter-narcotics]] operations. Each branch has a distinct Special Operations Command that is capable of running its own operations, but when the different special operations forces need to work together for an operation, USSOCOM becomes the joint component command of the operation, instead of a SOC of a specific branch.{{r|posture statement}}
USSOCOM is involved with clandestine activity, such as [[Direct action (military)|direct action]], [[special reconnaissance]], [[Counterterrorism|counter-terrorism]], [[foreign internal defense]], [[unconventional warfare (United States)|unconventional warfare]], [[psychological warfare]], [[civil affairs]], and [[War on drugs|counter-narcotics]] operations. Each branch has a distinct Special Operations Command that is capable of running its own operations, but when the different special operations forces need to work together for an operation, USSOCOM becomes the joint component command of the operation, instead of a SOC of a specific branch.{{r|posture statement}}


==History==
==History==
The unwieldy command and control structure of separate U.S. military special operations forces (SOF), which led to the failure of [[Operation Eagle Claw]] in 1980, highlighted the need within the [[US Department of Defense]] for reform and reorganization. The [[US Army Chief of Staff]], General [[Edward C. Meyer|Edward C. "Shy" Meyer]], had already helped create the U.S. [[Delta Force]] in 1977.{{r|Delta elite force}} Following Eagle Claw, he called for a further restructuring of special operations capabilities. Although unsuccessful at the joint level, Meyer nevertheless went on to consolidate [[USASOC|Army SOF]] units under the new 1st Special Operations Command in 1982.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.army.mil/article/230463/u_s_army_special_operations_command_30th_anniversary|title=U.S. Army Special Operations Command 30th Anniversary|website=www.army.mil}}</ref>
The unwieldy command and control structure of separate U.S. military special operations forces (SOF), which led to the failure of [[Operation Eagle Claw]] in 1980, highlighted the need within the [[United States Department of Defense|US Department of Defense]] for reform and reorganization. The [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|US Army Chief of Staff]], General [[Edward C. Meyer|Edward C. "Shy" Meyer]], had already helped create the U.S. [[Delta Force]] in 1977.{{r|Delta elite force}} Following Eagle Claw, he called for a further restructuring of special operations capabilities. Although unsuccessful at the joint level, Meyer nevertheless went on to consolidate [[United States Army Special Operations Command|Army SOF]] units under the new 1st Special Operations Command in 1982.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.army.mil/article/230463/u_s_army_special_operations_command_30th_anniversary|title=U.S. Army Special Operations Command 30th Anniversary|website=www.army.mil}}</ref>


[[File:Barry Goldwater.jpg|thumb|[[Senator Barry Goldwater]], former Chairman of the [[Senate Armed Services Committee]]]]
[[File:Barry Goldwater.jpg|thumb|[[Senator Barry Goldwater]], former Chairman of the [[Senate Armed Services Committee]]]]


By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the [[US Congress]] of the need for military reforms. In June, the [[Senate Armed Services Committee]] (SASC) began a two-year-long study of the Defense Department, which included an examination of SOF spearheaded by Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] ([[US Republican Party|R]]-AZ). With concern mounting on [[Capitol Hill]], the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; this agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF.{{r|BIT}}{{r|hr5109}} The Joint Special Operations Agency thus did little to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies, and therefore was deemed insufficient. Within the Defense Department, there were a few staunch SOF supporters. [[Noel Koch]], Principal Deputy Assistant [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] for International Security Affairs, and his deputy, [[Lynn Rylander]], both advocated SOF reforms.{{r|socomch}}
By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the [[United States Congress|US Congress]] of the need for military reforms. In June, the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Senate Armed Services Committee]] (SASC) began a two-year-long study of the Defense Department, which included an examination of SOF spearheaded by Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] ([[Republican Party (United States)|R]]-AZ). With concern mounting on [[Capitol Hill]], the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; this agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF.{{r|BIT}}{{r|hr5109}} The Joint Special Operations Agency thus did little to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies, and therefore was deemed insufficient. Within the Defense Department, there were a few staunch SOF supporters. [[Noel Koch]], Principal Deputy Assistant [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] for International Security Affairs, and his deputy, [[Lynn Rylander]], both advocated SOF reforms.{{r|socomch}}


At the same time, a few on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul [[United States Special Operations Forces]]. They included Senators [[Sam Nunn]] ([[US Democratic Party|D]]-GA) and [[William Cohen]] (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the [[United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness]]. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country's capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem.{{r|socomch}} Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with [[low-intensity conflict]]s.{{r|BIT}}
At the same time, a few on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul [[United States special operations forces|United States Special Operations Forces]]. They included Senators [[Sam Nunn]] ([[US Democratic Party|D]]-GA) and [[William Cohen]] (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the [[United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness]]. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country's capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem.{{r|socomch}} Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with [[low-intensity conflict]]s.{{r|BIT}}


In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure, entitled "Defense Organization: The Need For Change."{{r|S.CON.RES.80}} [[James R. Locher III]], the principal author of this study, also examined past special operations and speculated on the most likely future threats. This influential document led to the 1986 [[Goldwater-Nichols Act]].{{r|H.R.3622}}{{r|reorg JCS}} By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform bills in both houses of Congress. On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced the Senate bill, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others, which called for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office in the Defense Department to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for low-intensity conflict and special operations.{{r|S.2453}} Representative Daniel's proposal went even further—he wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the [[US Secretary of Defense]]; this would keep Joint Chiefs and the Services out of the SOF budget process.{{r|hr5109}}
In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure, entitled "Defense Organization: The Need For Change."{{r|S.CON.RES.80}} [[James R. Locher III]], the principal author of this study, also examined past special operations and speculated on the most likely future threats. This influential document led to the 1986 [[Goldwater–Nichols Act|Goldwater-Nichols Act]].{{r|H.R.3622}}{{r|reorg JCS}} By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform bills in both houses of Congress. On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced the Senate bill, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others, which called for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office in the Defense Department to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for low-intensity conflict and special operations.{{r|S.2453}} Representative Daniel's proposal went even further—he wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the [[US Secretary of Defense]]; this would keep Joint Chiefs and the Services out of the SOF budget process.{{r|hr5109}}


Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986. Admiral [[William J. Crowe Jr.]], [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]], led [[the Pentagon]]'s opposition to the bills. As an alternative, he proposed a new Special Operations Forces command led by a [[three-star general]]. This proposal was not well received on Capitol Hill—Congress wanted a [[four-star general]] in charge to give SOF more influence. A number of retired military officers and others testified in favor of the need for reform.{{r|socomch}} By most accounts, retired Army Major General [[Richard Scholtes]] gave the most compelling reasons for the change. Scholtes, who commanded the joint special operations task force during [[Operation Urgent Fury]], explained how conventional force leaders misused SOF during the operation, not allowing them to use their unique capabilities, which resulted in high SOF casualties.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kukielski|first=Philip|date=June 2021|title=USSOCOM: The Astounding Story of Its Origin.|url=https://aircommando.org/portfolio-view/acj-vol-10-1/|journal=Air Commando Journal|volume=10| issue = 1|pages=45–49}}</ref> After his formal testimony, Scholtes met privately with a small number of Senators to elaborate on the problems that he had encountered in [[Grenada]].{{r|NYT Taubman}}
Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986. Admiral [[William J. Crowe Jr.]], [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]], led [[the Pentagon]]'s opposition to the bills. As an alternative, he proposed a new Special Operations Forces command led by a [[three-star general]]. This proposal was not well received on Capitol Hill—Congress wanted a [[four-star general]] in charge to give SOF more influence. A number of retired military officers and others testified in favor of the need for reform.{{r|socomch}} By most accounts, retired Army Major General [[Richard Scholtes]] gave the most compelling reasons for the change. Scholtes, who commanded the joint special operations task force during [[United States invasion of Grenada|Operation Urgent Fury]], explained how conventional force leaders misused SOF during the operation, not allowing them to use their unique capabilities, which resulted in high SOF casualties.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kukielski|first=Philip|date=June 2021|title=USSOCOM: The Astounding Story of Its Origin.|url=https://aircommando.org/portfolio-view/acj-vol-10-1/|journal=Air Commando Journal|volume=10| issue = 1|pages=45–49}}</ref> After his formal testimony, Scholtes met privately with a small number of Senators to elaborate on the problems that he had encountered in [[Grenada]].{{r|NYT Taubman}}


Both the House and Senate passed SOF reform bills, and these went to a conference committee for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The bill called for a unified combatant command headed by a four-star general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]], and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called "SOF checkbook").{{r|SOLIC}}{{r|SOF transition Giles}} The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. This was interpreted as Congress forcing the hand of the DOD and the [[Reagan administration]] regarding what it saw as the past failures and emerging threats. The DOD and the administration were responsible for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently passed two additional bills to ensure implementation.{{r|socomch}} The legislation promised to improve SOF in several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11 provided SOF with control over its own resources, better enabling it to modernize the force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice cooperation: a single commander for all SOF promoted interoperability among the same command forces. The establishment of a four-star commander-in-chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict eventually gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of the Defense Department.{{r|SOLIC}}
Both the House and Senate passed SOF reform bills, and these went to a conference committee for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The bill called for a unified combatant command headed by a four-star general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]], and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called "SOF checkbook").{{r|SOLIC}}{{r|SOF transition Giles}} The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. This was interpreted as Congress forcing the hand of the DOD and the [[Presidency of Ronald Reagan|Reagan administration]] regarding what it saw as the past failures and emerging threats. The DOD and the administration were responsible for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently passed two additional bills to ensure implementation.{{r|socomch}} The legislation promised to improve SOF in several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11 provided SOF with control over its own resources, better enabling it to modernize the force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice cooperation: a single commander for all SOF promoted interoperability among the same command forces. The establishment of a four-star commander-in-chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict eventually gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of the Defense Department.{{r|SOLIC}}


[[File:GEN James Lindsay 1986.jpg|thumb|left|[[General James Lindsay]], the first Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command]]
[[File:GEN James Lindsay 1986.jpg|thumb|left|[[General James Lindsay]], the first Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command]]


However, implementing the provisions and mandates of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 was neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to arise was the appointment of an [[Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict]], whose principal duties included monitorship of special operations activities and the low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. Congress increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but the Department of Defense still did not fill this new billet. In December 1987, Congress directed [[Secretary of the Army]] [[John O. Marsh]] to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until the Senate approved a suitable replacement. Not until 18 months after the legislation passed did Ambassador [[Charles Whitehouse]] assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC).{{r|NYT Lewis}}
However, implementing the provisions and mandates of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 was neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to arise was the appointment of an [[Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict|Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict]], whose principal duties included monitorship of special operations activities and the low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. Congress increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but the Department of Defense still did not fill this new billet. In December 1987, Congress directed [[United States Secretary of the Army|Secretary of the Army]] [[John Otho Marsh Jr.|John O. Marsh]] to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until the Senate approved a suitable replacement. Not until 18 months after the legislation passed did Ambassador [[Charles S. Whitehouse|Charles Whitehouse]] assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC).{{r|NYT Lewis}}


Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM provided its own measure of excitement. A quick solution to manning and basing a brand new unified command was to abolish an existing command. [[United States Readiness Command]] (USREDCOM), with an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viable mission in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era, and its commander-in-chief, General [[James J. Lindsay|James Lindsay]], had had some special operations experience. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] that USREDCOM be disestablished to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM. President [[Ronald Reagan]] approved the establishment of the new command on 13 April 1987. The Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on 16 April 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be the first Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). The Senate accepted him without debate.{{r|socomch}}
Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM provided its own measure of excitement. A quick solution to manning and basing a brand new unified command was to abolish an existing command. [[United States Strike Command|United States Readiness Command]] (USREDCOM), with an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viable mission in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era, and its commander-in-chief, General [[James J. Lindsay|James Lindsay]], had had some special operations experience. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] that USREDCOM be disestablished to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM. President [[Ronald Reagan]] approved the establishment of the new command on 13 April 1987. The Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on 16 April 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be the first Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). The Senate accepted him without debate.{{r|socomch}}


===Operation Earnest Will===
===Operation Earnest Will===
USSOCOM's first tactical operation involved [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (United States)|160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)]] ("Night Stalkers") aviators, SEALs, and [[Special Boat Teams]] (SBT) working together during Operation Earnest Will in September 1987. During [[Operation Earnest Will]], the United States ensured that neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships could safely transit the [[Persian Gulf]] during the [[Iran–Iraq War]]. Iranian attacks on tankers prompted [[Kuwait]] to ask the United States in December 1986 to register 11 Kuwaiti tankers as American ships so that they could be escorted by the U.S. Navy. President Reagan agreed to the Kuwaiti request on 10 March 1987, hoping it would deter Iranian attacks.{{r|socomch}} The protection offered by U.S. naval vessels, however, did not stop [[Iran]], which used mines and small boats to harass the convoys steaming to and from Kuwait. In late July 1987, Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, commander of the Middle East Force, requested NSW assets. Special Boat Teams deployed with six Mark III Patrol Boats and two SEAL platoons in August.{{r|socomch}} The Middle East Force decided to convert two oil servicing barges, Hercules and Wimbrown VII, into mobile sea bases. The mobile sea bases allowed SOF in the northern [[Persian Gulf]] to thwart clandestine [[Iran]]ian mining and small boat attacks.
USSOCOM's first tactical operation involved [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (United States)|160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)]] ("Night Stalkers") aviators, SEALs, and [[Special Boat Teams]] (SBT) working together during Operation Earnest Will in September 1987. During [[Operation Earnest Will]], the United States ensured that neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships could safely transit the [[Persian Gulf]] during the [[Iran–Iraq War]]. Iranian attacks on tankers prompted [[Kuwait]] to ask the United States in December 1986 to register 11 Kuwaiti tankers as American ships so that they could be escorted by the U.S. Navy. President Reagan agreed to the Kuwaiti request on 10 March 1987, hoping it would deter Iranian attacks.{{r|socomch}} The protection offered by U.S. naval vessels, however, did not stop [[Iran]], which used mines and small boats to harass the convoys steaming to and from Kuwait. In late July 1987, Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, commander of the Middle East Force, requested NSW assets. Special Boat Teams deployed with six Mark III Patrol Boats and two SEAL platoons in August.{{r|socomch}} The Middle East Force decided to convert two oil servicing barges, Hercules and Wimbrown VII, into mobile sea bases. The mobile sea bases allowed SOF in the northern [[Persian Gulf]] to thwart clandestine [[Iran]]ian mining and small boat attacks.


On 21 September, Nightstalkers flying MH-60 and [[MH-6|Little Birds]] took off from the frigate [[USS Jarrett (FFG-33)|USS ''Jarrett'']] to track an Iranian ship, ''[[Iran Ajr]]''. The Nightstalkers observed ''Iran Ajr'' turn off her lights and begin laying mines. After receiving permission to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. As ''Iran Ajr'''s crew began to push mines over the side, the helicopters resumed firing until the crew abandoned the ship. Special Boat Teams provided security while a SEAL team boarded the vessel at first light and discovered nine mines on the vessel's deck, as well as a logbook revealing areas where previous mines had been laid. The logbook implicated Iran in mining international waters.{{r|socomch}}
On 21 September, Nightstalkers flying MH-60 and [[MD Helicopters MH-6 Little Bird|Little Birds]] took off from the frigate [[USS Jarrett|USS ''Jarrett'']] to track an Iranian ship, ''[[Iran Ajr]]''. The Nightstalkers observed ''Iran Ajr'' turn off her lights and begin laying mines. After receiving permission to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. As ''Iran Ajr'''s crew began to push mines over the side, the helicopters resumed firing until the crew abandoned the ship. Special Boat Teams provided security while a SEAL team boarded the vessel at first light and discovered nine mines on the vessel's deck, as well as a logbook revealing areas where previous mines had been laid. The logbook implicated Iran in mining international waters.{{r|socomch}}


[[File:Operation Nimble Archer DN-SC-88-01042.jpg|thumb|left|One of two [[Iran]]ian oil platforms set ablaze after shelling by American [[destroyers]]]]
[[File:Operation Nimble Archer DN-SC-88-01042.jpg|thumb|left|One of two [[Iran]]ian oil platforms set ablaze after shelling by American [[destroyers]]]]
Within a few days, the Special Operations forces had determined the [[Iran]]ian pattern of activity; the Iranians hid during the day near oil and gas platforms in Iranian waters and at night they headed toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. With this knowledge, SOF launched three Little Bird helicopters and two patrol craft to the buoy. The Little Bird helicopters arrived first and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored near the buoy. After a short but intense firefight, the helicopters sank all three boats. Three days later, in mid-October, an Iranian Silkworm missile hit the tanker ''[[MV Sea Isle City|Sea Isle City]]'' near the oil terminal outside [[Kuwait City]]. Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the missile attack.{{r|socomch}}{{r|OEWDP}} During [[Operation Nimble Archer]], four [[destroyers]] shelled two oil platforms in the Rostam oil field. After the shelling, a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit planted explosives on one of the platforms to destroy it. The SEALs next boarded and searched a third-platform {{convert|2|mi|0}} away. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence purposes.
Within a few days, the Special Operations forces had determined the [[Iran]]ian pattern of activity; the Iranians hid during the day near oil and gas platforms in Iranian waters and at night they headed toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. With this knowledge, SOF launched three Little Bird helicopters and two patrol craft to the buoy. The Little Bird helicopters arrived first and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored near the buoy. After a short but intense firefight, the helicopters sank all three boats. Three days later, in mid-October, an Iranian Silkworm missile hit the tanker ''[[MV Sea Isle City|Sea Isle City]]'' near the oil terminal outside [[Kuwait City]]. Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the missile attack.{{r|socomch}}{{r|OEWDP}} During [[Operation Nimble Archer]], four [[Destroyer|destroyers]] shelled two oil platforms in the Rostam oil field. After the shelling, a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit planted explosives on one of the platforms to destroy it. The SEALs next boarded and searched a third-platform {{convert|2|mi|0}} away. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence purposes.


On 14 April 1988, {{convert|65|mi|sigfig=2}} east of [[Bahrain]], the frigate [[USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58)|USS ''Samuel B. Roberts'']] hit a mine, blowing an immense hole in its hull.{{r|NHH}} Ten sailors were injured. During [[Operation Praying Mantis]] the U.S. retaliated fiercely, attacking the Iranian frigate ''Sahand'' and oil platforms in the Sirri and Sassan oil fields.{{r|OEWDP}} After U.S. warships bombarded the Sirri platform and set it ablaze, a UH-60 with a SEAL platoon flew toward the platform but was unable to get close enough because of the roaring fire. Secondary explosions soon wrecked the platform.{{r|socomch}} Thereafter, Iranian attacks on neutral ships dropped drastically. On 18 July, Iran accepted the United Nations cease-fire; on 20 August 1988, the Iran–Iraq War ended. The remaining SEALs, patrol boats, and helicopters then returned to the United States.{{r|socomch}} Special operations forces provided critical skills necessary to help CENTCOM gain control of the northern Persian Gulf and balk Iran's small boats and minelayers. The ability to work at night proved vital because Iranian units used darkness to conceal their actions. Additionally, because of Earnest Will operational requirements, USSOCOM would acquire new weapons systems—the patrol coastal ships and the [[Mark V Special Operations Craft]].{{r|socomch}}
On 14 April 1988, {{convert|65|mi|sigfig=2}} east of [[Bahrain]], the frigate [[USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58)|USS ''Samuel B. Roberts'']] hit a mine, blowing an immense hole in its hull.{{r|NHH}} Ten sailors were injured. During [[Operation Praying Mantis]] the U.S. retaliated fiercely, attacking the Iranian frigate ''Sahand'' and oil platforms in the Sirri and Sassan oil fields.{{r|OEWDP}} After U.S. warships bombarded the Sirri platform and set it ablaze, a UH-60 with a SEAL platoon flew toward the platform but was unable to get close enough because of the roaring fire. Secondary explosions soon wrecked the platform.{{r|socomch}} Thereafter, Iranian attacks on neutral ships dropped drastically. On 18 July, Iran accepted the United Nations cease-fire; on 20 August 1988, the Iran–Iraq War ended. The remaining SEALs, patrol boats, and helicopters then returned to the United States.{{r|socomch}} Special operations forces provided critical skills necessary to help CENTCOM gain control of the northern Persian Gulf and balk Iran's small boats and minelayers. The ability to work at night proved vital because Iranian units used darkness to conceal their actions. Additionally, because of Earnest Will operational requirements, USSOCOM would acquire new weapons systems—the patrol coastal ships and the [[Mark V Special Operations Craft]].{{r|socomch}}


===Somalia===
===Somalia===
Special Operations Command first became involved in [[Somalia]] in 1992 as part of [[Operation Provide Relief]]. C-130s circled over Somali airstrips during the delivery of relief supplies. Special Forces medics accompanied many relief flights into the airstrips throughout southern Somalia to assess the area. They were the first U.S. soldiers in Somalia, arriving before U.S. forces who supported the expanded relief operations of Restore Hope.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYT somalia step}}{{r|NYTttt}} The first teams into Somalia was CIA [[Special Activities Division]] paramilitary officers with elements of [[Joint Special Operations Command|JSOC]]. They conducted very high-risk advanced force operations prior to the entry of the follow-on forces. The first casualty of the conflict came from this team and was a Paramilitary officer and former Delta Force operator named [[Larry Freedman]]. Freedman was awarded the [[Intelligence Star]] for ''"extraordinary heroism"'' for his actions.{{r|Gup 2000}}
Special Operations Command first became involved in [[Somalia]] in 1992 as part of [[Operation Provide Relief]]. C-130s circled over Somali airstrips during the delivery of relief supplies. Special Forces medics accompanied many relief flights into the airstrips throughout southern Somalia to assess the area. They were the first U.S. soldiers in Somalia, arriving before U.S. forces who supported the expanded relief operations of Restore Hope.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYT somalia step}}{{r|NYTttt}} The first teams into Somalia was CIA [[Special Activities Center|Special Activities Division]] paramilitary officers with elements of [[Joint Special Operations Command|JSOC]]. They conducted very high-risk advanced force operations prior to the entry of the follow-on forces. The first casualty of the conflict came from this team and was a Paramilitary officer and former Delta Force operator named [[Larry Freedman]]. Freedman was awarded the [[Intelligence Star]] for ''"extraordinary heroism"'' for his actions.{{r|Gup 2000}}


The earliest missions during [[Operation Restore Hope]] were conducted by Navy SEALs. The SEALs performed several hydrographic reconnaissance missions to find suitable landing sites for [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]]. On 7 December, the SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where they found suitable landing sites, assessed the area for threats, and concluded that the port could support offloading ships. This was a tough mission because the SEALs swam against a strong current which left many of them overheated and exhausted. Furthermore, they swam through raw sewage in the harbor, which made them sick.{{r|socomch}} When the first SEALs hit the shore the following night, they were surprised to meet members of the news media. The first Marines came ashore soon thereafter, and the press redirected their attention to them. Later, the SEALs provided personal security for [[George H. W. Bush|President George Bush]] during a visit to Somalia.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYTttt}} In December 1992, Special Forces assets in Kenya moved to Somalia and joined Operation Restore Hope. January 1993, a Special Forces command element deployed to Mogadishu as the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR) that would command and control all special operations for Restore Hope. JSOFOR's mission was to make initial contact with indigenous factions and leaders; provide information for force protection; and provide reports on the area for future relief and security operations. Before redeploying in April, JSOFOR elements drove over {{convert|26000|mi|sigfig=2}}, captured 277 weapons, and destroyed over {{convert|45,320|lb|kg}} of explosives.{{r|socomch}}
The earliest missions during [[Unified Task Force|Operation Restore Hope]] were conducted by Navy SEALs. The SEALs performed several hydrographic reconnaissance missions to find suitable landing sites for [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]]. On 7 December, the SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where they found suitable landing sites, assessed the area for threats, and concluded that the port could support offloading ships. This was a tough mission because the SEALs swam against a strong current which left many of them overheated and exhausted. Furthermore, they swam through raw sewage in the harbor, which made them sick.{{r|socomch}} When the first SEALs hit the shore the following night, they were surprised to meet members of the news media. The first Marines came ashore soon thereafter, and the press redirected their attention to them. Later, the SEALs provided personal security for [[George H. W. Bush|President George Bush]] during a visit to Somalia.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYTttt}} In December 1992, Special Forces assets in Kenya moved to Somalia and joined Operation Restore Hope. January 1993, a Special Forces command element deployed to Mogadishu as the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR) that would command and control all special operations for Restore Hope. JSOFOR's mission was to make initial contact with indigenous factions and leaders; provide information for force protection; and provide reports on the area for future relief and security operations. Before redeploying in April, JSOFOR elements drove over {{convert|26000|mi|sigfig=2}}, captured 277 weapons, and destroyed over {{convert|45,320|lb|kg}} of explosives.{{r|socomch}}


[[File:75th Ranger Regiment Bravo Company 3rd Batallion Somalia 1993.jpg|left|thumb|250px|Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion of the [[75th Ranger Regiment (United States)|75th Ranger Regiment]] in Somalia, 1993]]
[[File:75th Ranger Regiment Bravo Company 3rd Batallion Somalia 1993.jpg|left|thumb|250px|Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion of the [[75th Ranger Regiment (United States)|75th Ranger Regiment]] in Somalia, 1993]]

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'{{Short description|Unified combatant command of the United States Armed Forces responsible for special operations}} {{Distinguish|United States Southern Command}} {{Good article}} {{Use dmy dates|date=March 2016}} {{Infobox military unit | unit_name = United States Special Operations Command | image = United States Special Operations Command Insignia.svg | image_size = 200px | caption = United States Special Operations Command Emblem | start_date = {{start date and age|1987|04|16}}<br/>({{Age in years and months|1987|04|16}} ago){{r|2013 SOCOM Fact book}} | dates = | country = {{flag|United States}} | type = [[Unified combatant command]]<br />[[Special forces|Special operations forces]] | role = Functional combatant command | size = Entire command: more than 70,000{{r|2020 SOCOM Fact book}}<ref>[https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/socom-pivots-toward-great-power-competition/ Paul McCleary (21 May 2019) SOCOM Pivots Toward Great Power Competition] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190525023014/https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/socom-pivots-toward-great-power-competition/ |date=25 May 2019 }} reports SOCOM strength to be 70,000</ref><br />Headquarters staff: 2,500{{r|2020 SOCOM Fact book}} | command_structure = [[United States Department of Defense]] | commander1 = [[General (United States)|General]] [[Bryan P. Fenton]], [[United States Army|USA]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.socom.mil/about/commanders-biography|title=Commander, USSOCOM, General Bryan P. Fenton|access-date=2023-04-30|website=U.S. Special Operations Command}}</ref> | commander1_label = Commander | commander2 = [[Vice admiral (United States)|Vice Admiral]] [[Collin P. Green]], [[United States Navy|USN]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.socom.mil/about/deputy-commanders-biography|title=Deputy Commander, USSOCOM, Vice Admiral Collin P. Green|access-date=2023-04-30|website=U.S. Special Operations Command}}</ref> | commander2_label = Deputy Commander | commander3 = [[Lieutenant general (United States)|Lieutenant General]] [[Francis L. Donovan]], [[United States Marine Corps|USMC]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.socom.mil/about/vice-commanders-biography|title=Vice Commander, USSOCOM, Lieutenant General Francis L. Donovan|access-date=2023-04-30|website=U.S. Special Operations Command}}</ref> | commander3_label = Vice Commander | commander4 = [[Command Sergeant Major|Command Sergeant Major]] [[Shane W. Shorter]], [[United States Army|USA]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.socom.mil/about/commanders-biography/senior-enlisted-leaders-biography|title=Senior Enlisted Leader, USSOCOM, Command Sergeant Major Shane W. Shorter|access-date=2023-04-30|website=U.S. Special Operations Command}}</ref> | commander4_label = Senior Enlisted Leader | garrison = [[MacDill Air Force Base]]<br />[[Florida]], U.S. | garrison_label = Headquarters | nickname = USSOCOM, SOCOM | battles = [[Operation Earnest Will]]<br/>[[United States invasion of Panama|Invasion of Panama]]<br/>[[Gulf War]]<br/>[[Unified Task Force]]<br/> [[Operation Gothic Serpent]] * [[Battle of Mogadishu (1993)|Battle of Mogadishu]] [[Operation Uphold Democracy]]<br/> [[War on Terror]] * [[War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)|War in Afghanistan]] * [[Iraq War]] * [[Operation Inherent Resolve]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/23/world/middleeast/us-commandos-iraq-isis.html|title=U.S. Soldier Dies in Raid to Free Prisoners of ISIS in Iraq|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=22 October 2015|access-date=24 October 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151024031745/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/23/world/middleeast/us-commandos-iraq-isis.html|archive-date=24 October 2015|url-status=live}}</ref> | website = {{url|https://www.socom.mil|www.socom.mil}} }} {{United States Armed Forces sidebar}} The '''United States Special Operations Command''' ('''USSOCOM''' or '''SOCOM''') is the [[unified combatant command]] charged with overseeing the various [[Special forces|special operations]] component commands of the [[USASOC|Army]], [[MARSOC|Marine Corps]], [[NAVSPECWARCOM|Navy]], and [[AFSOC|Air Force]] of the [[United States Armed Forces]]. The command is part of the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] and is the only unified combatant command created by an [[Act of Congress]]. USSOCOM is headquartered at [[MacDill Air Force Base]] in [[Tampa, Florida|Tampa]], Florida. The idea of an American unified special operations command had its origins in the aftermath of [[Operation Eagle Claw]], the disastrous attempted rescue of [[Iran hostage crisis|hostages]] at the [[Den of Espionage|American embassy]] in Iran in 1980. The ensuing investigation, chaired by [[Admiral (United States)|Admiral]] [[James L. Holloway III]], the retired [[Chief of Naval Operations]], cited lack of [[Command and control (military)|command and control]] and inter-service coordination as significant factors in the failure of the mission.{{r|Adm Holloway bio}} Since its activation on 16 April 1987, U.S. Special Operations Command has participated in many [[Military operation|operations]], from the 1989 [[United States invasion of Panama|invasion]] of [[Panama]] to the [[War on Terror]].{{r|NYT Bang Panama}}{{r|NYT Regime thought}} USSOCOM is involved with clandestine activity, such as [[Direct action (military)|direct action]], [[special reconnaissance]], [[counter-terrorism]], [[foreign internal defense]], [[unconventional warfare (United States)|unconventional warfare]], [[psychological warfare]], [[civil affairs]], and [[counter-narcotics]] operations. Each branch has a distinct Special Operations Command that is capable of running its own operations, but when the different special operations forces need to work together for an operation, USSOCOM becomes the joint component command of the operation, instead of a SOC of a specific branch.{{r|posture statement}} ==History== The unwieldy command and control structure of separate U.S. military special operations forces (SOF), which led to the failure of [[Operation Eagle Claw]] in 1980, highlighted the need within the [[US Department of Defense]] for reform and reorganization. The [[US Army Chief of Staff]], General [[Edward C. Meyer|Edward C. "Shy" Meyer]], had already helped create the U.S. [[Delta Force]] in 1977.{{r|Delta elite force}} Following Eagle Claw, he called for a further restructuring of special operations capabilities. Although unsuccessful at the joint level, Meyer nevertheless went on to consolidate [[USASOC|Army SOF]] units under the new 1st Special Operations Command in 1982.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.army.mil/article/230463/u_s_army_special_operations_command_30th_anniversary|title=U.S. Army Special Operations Command 30th Anniversary|website=www.army.mil}}</ref> [[File:Barry Goldwater.jpg|thumb|[[Senator Barry Goldwater]], former Chairman of the [[Senate Armed Services Committee]]]] By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the [[US Congress]] of the need for military reforms. In June, the [[Senate Armed Services Committee]] (SASC) began a two-year-long study of the Defense Department, which included an examination of SOF spearheaded by Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] ([[US Republican Party|R]]-AZ). With concern mounting on [[Capitol Hill]], the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; this agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF.{{r|BIT}}{{r|hr5109}} The Joint Special Operations Agency thus did little to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies, and therefore was deemed insufficient. Within the Defense Department, there were a few staunch SOF supporters. [[Noel Koch]], Principal Deputy Assistant [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] for International Security Affairs, and his deputy, [[Lynn Rylander]], both advocated SOF reforms.{{r|socomch}} At the same time, a few on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul [[United States Special Operations Forces]]. They included Senators [[Sam Nunn]] ([[US Democratic Party|D]]-GA) and [[William Cohen]] (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the [[United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness]]. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country's capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem.{{r|socomch}} Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with [[low-intensity conflict]]s.{{r|BIT}} In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure, entitled "Defense Organization: The Need For Change."{{r|S.CON.RES.80}} [[James R. Locher III]], the principal author of this study, also examined past special operations and speculated on the most likely future threats. This influential document led to the 1986 [[Goldwater-Nichols Act]].{{r|H.R.3622}}{{r|reorg JCS}} By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform bills in both houses of Congress. On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced the Senate bill, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others, which called for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office in the Defense Department to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for low-intensity conflict and special operations.{{r|S.2453}} Representative Daniel's proposal went even further—he wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the [[US Secretary of Defense]]; this would keep Joint Chiefs and the Services out of the SOF budget process.{{r|hr5109}} Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986. Admiral [[William J. Crowe Jr.]], [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]], led [[the Pentagon]]'s opposition to the bills. As an alternative, he proposed a new Special Operations Forces command led by a [[three-star general]]. This proposal was not well received on Capitol Hill—Congress wanted a [[four-star general]] in charge to give SOF more influence. A number of retired military officers and others testified in favor of the need for reform.{{r|socomch}} By most accounts, retired Army Major General [[Richard Scholtes]] gave the most compelling reasons for the change. Scholtes, who commanded the joint special operations task force during [[Operation Urgent Fury]], explained how conventional force leaders misused SOF during the operation, not allowing them to use their unique capabilities, which resulted in high SOF casualties.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kukielski|first=Philip|date=June 2021|title=USSOCOM: The Astounding Story of Its Origin.|url=https://aircommando.org/portfolio-view/acj-vol-10-1/|journal=Air Commando Journal|volume=10| issue = 1|pages=45–49}}</ref> After his formal testimony, Scholtes met privately with a small number of Senators to elaborate on the problems that he had encountered in [[Grenada]].{{r|NYT Taubman}} Both the House and Senate passed SOF reform bills, and these went to a conference committee for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The bill called for a unified combatant command headed by a four-star general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]], and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called "SOF checkbook").{{r|SOLIC}}{{r|SOF transition Giles}} The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. This was interpreted as Congress forcing the hand of the DOD and the [[Reagan administration]] regarding what it saw as the past failures and emerging threats. The DOD and the administration were responsible for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently passed two additional bills to ensure implementation.{{r|socomch}} The legislation promised to improve SOF in several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11 provided SOF with control over its own resources, better enabling it to modernize the force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice cooperation: a single commander for all SOF promoted interoperability among the same command forces. The establishment of a four-star commander-in-chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict eventually gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of the Defense Department.{{r|SOLIC}} [[File:GEN James Lindsay 1986.jpg|thumb|left|[[General James Lindsay]], the first Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command]] However, implementing the provisions and mandates of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 was neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to arise was the appointment of an [[Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict]], whose principal duties included monitorship of special operations activities and the low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. Congress increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but the Department of Defense still did not fill this new billet. In December 1987, Congress directed [[Secretary of the Army]] [[John O. Marsh]] to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until the Senate approved a suitable replacement. Not until 18 months after the legislation passed did Ambassador [[Charles Whitehouse]] assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC).{{r|NYT Lewis}} Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM provided its own measure of excitement. A quick solution to manning and basing a brand new unified command was to abolish an existing command. [[United States Readiness Command]] (USREDCOM), with an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viable mission in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era, and its commander-in-chief, General [[James J. Lindsay|James Lindsay]], had had some special operations experience. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] that USREDCOM be disestablished to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM. President [[Ronald Reagan]] approved the establishment of the new command on 13 April 1987. The Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on 16 April 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be the first Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). The Senate accepted him without debate.{{r|socomch}} ===Operation Earnest Will=== [[File:MH-60 Blackhawk landing on Hercules.JPG|thumb|MH-60 landing on Hercules]] USSOCOM's first tactical operation involved [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (United States)|160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)]] ("Night Stalkers") aviators, SEALs, and [[Special Boat Teams]] (SBT) working together during Operation Earnest Will in September 1987. During [[Operation Earnest Will]], the United States ensured that neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships could safely transit the [[Persian Gulf]] during the [[Iran–Iraq War]]. Iranian attacks on tankers prompted [[Kuwait]] to ask the United States in December 1986 to register 11 Kuwaiti tankers as American ships so that they could be escorted by the U.S. Navy. President Reagan agreed to the Kuwaiti request on 10 March 1987, hoping it would deter Iranian attacks.{{r|socomch}} The protection offered by U.S. naval vessels, however, did not stop [[Iran]], which used mines and small boats to harass the convoys steaming to and from Kuwait. In late July 1987, Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, commander of the Middle East Force, requested NSW assets. Special Boat Teams deployed with six Mark III Patrol Boats and two SEAL platoons in August.{{r|socomch}} The Middle East Force decided to convert two oil servicing barges, Hercules and Wimbrown VII, into mobile sea bases. The mobile sea bases allowed SOF in the northern [[Persian Gulf]] to thwart clandestine [[Iran]]ian mining and small boat attacks. On 21 September, Nightstalkers flying MH-60 and [[MH-6|Little Birds]] took off from the frigate [[USS Jarrett (FFG-33)|USS ''Jarrett'']] to track an Iranian ship, ''[[Iran Ajr]]''. The Nightstalkers observed ''Iran Ajr'' turn off her lights and begin laying mines. After receiving permission to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. As ''Iran Ajr'''s crew began to push mines over the side, the helicopters resumed firing until the crew abandoned the ship. Special Boat Teams provided security while a SEAL team boarded the vessel at first light and discovered nine mines on the vessel's deck, as well as a logbook revealing areas where previous mines had been laid. The logbook implicated Iran in mining international waters.{{r|socomch}} [[File:Operation Nimble Archer DN-SC-88-01042.jpg|thumb|left|One of two [[Iran]]ian oil platforms set ablaze after shelling by American [[destroyers]]]] Within a few days, the Special Operations forces had determined the [[Iran]]ian pattern of activity; the Iranians hid during the day near oil and gas platforms in Iranian waters and at night they headed toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. With this knowledge, SOF launched three Little Bird helicopters and two patrol craft to the buoy. The Little Bird helicopters arrived first and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored near the buoy. After a short but intense firefight, the helicopters sank all three boats. Three days later, in mid-October, an Iranian Silkworm missile hit the tanker ''[[MV Sea Isle City|Sea Isle City]]'' near the oil terminal outside [[Kuwait City]]. Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the missile attack.{{r|socomch}}{{r|OEWDP}} During [[Operation Nimble Archer]], four [[destroyers]] shelled two oil platforms in the Rostam oil field. After the shelling, a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit planted explosives on one of the platforms to destroy it. The SEALs next boarded and searched a third-platform {{convert|2|mi|0}} away. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence purposes. On 14 April 1988, {{convert|65|mi|sigfig=2}} east of [[Bahrain]], the frigate [[USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58)|USS ''Samuel B. Roberts'']] hit a mine, blowing an immense hole in its hull.{{r|NHH}} Ten sailors were injured. During [[Operation Praying Mantis]] the U.S. retaliated fiercely, attacking the Iranian frigate ''Sahand'' and oil platforms in the Sirri and Sassan oil fields.{{r|OEWDP}} After U.S. warships bombarded the Sirri platform and set it ablaze, a UH-60 with a SEAL platoon flew toward the platform but was unable to get close enough because of the roaring fire. Secondary explosions soon wrecked the platform.{{r|socomch}} Thereafter, Iranian attacks on neutral ships dropped drastically. On 18 July, Iran accepted the United Nations cease-fire; on 20 August 1988, the Iran–Iraq War ended. The remaining SEALs, patrol boats, and helicopters then returned to the United States.{{r|socomch}} Special operations forces provided critical skills necessary to help CENTCOM gain control of the northern Persian Gulf and balk Iran's small boats and minelayers. The ability to work at night proved vital because Iranian units used darkness to conceal their actions. Additionally, because of Earnest Will operational requirements, USSOCOM would acquire new weapons systems—the patrol coastal ships and the [[Mark V Special Operations Craft]].{{r|socomch}} ===Somalia=== Special Operations Command first became involved in [[Somalia]] in 1992 as part of [[Operation Provide Relief]]. C-130s circled over Somali airstrips during the delivery of relief supplies. Special Forces medics accompanied many relief flights into the airstrips throughout southern Somalia to assess the area. They were the first U.S. soldiers in Somalia, arriving before U.S. forces who supported the expanded relief operations of Restore Hope.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYT somalia step}}{{r|NYTttt}} The first teams into Somalia was CIA [[Special Activities Division]] paramilitary officers with elements of [[Joint Special Operations Command|JSOC]]. They conducted very high-risk advanced force operations prior to the entry of the follow-on forces. The first casualty of the conflict came from this team and was a Paramilitary officer and former Delta Force operator named [[Larry Freedman]]. Freedman was awarded the [[Intelligence Star]] for ''"extraordinary heroism"'' for his actions.{{r|Gup 2000}} The earliest missions during [[Operation Restore Hope]] were conducted by Navy SEALs. The SEALs performed several hydrographic reconnaissance missions to find suitable landing sites for [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]]. On 7 December, the SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where they found suitable landing sites, assessed the area for threats, and concluded that the port could support offloading ships. This was a tough mission because the SEALs swam against a strong current which left many of them overheated and exhausted. Furthermore, they swam through raw sewage in the harbor, which made them sick.{{r|socomch}} When the first SEALs hit the shore the following night, they were surprised to meet members of the news media. The first Marines came ashore soon thereafter, and the press redirected their attention to them. Later, the SEALs provided personal security for [[George H. W. Bush|President George Bush]] during a visit to Somalia.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYTttt}} In December 1992, Special Forces assets in Kenya moved to Somalia and joined Operation Restore Hope. January 1993, a Special Forces command element deployed to Mogadishu as the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR) that would command and control all special operations for Restore Hope. JSOFOR's mission was to make initial contact with indigenous factions and leaders; provide information for force protection; and provide reports on the area for future relief and security operations. Before redeploying in April, JSOFOR elements drove over {{convert|26000|mi|sigfig=2}}, captured 277 weapons, and destroyed over {{convert|45,320|lb|kg}} of explosives.{{r|socomch}} [[File:75th Ranger Regiment Bravo Company 3rd Batallion Somalia 1993.jpg|left|thumb|250px|Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion of the [[75th Ranger Regiment (United States)|75th Ranger Regiment]] in Somalia, 1993]] In August 1993, Secretary of Defense [[Les Aspin]] directed the deployment of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to Somalia in response to attacks made by General [[Mohamed Farrah Aidid]]'s supporters upon U.S. and UN forces. The JSOTF, named Task Force (TF) Ranger was charged with a mission named [[Operation Gothic Serpent]] to capture Aidid. This was an especially arduous mission, for Aidid had gone underground, after several [[Lockheed AC-130]] air raids and UN assaults on his strongholds.{{r|socomch}}{{r|BHD}}{{r|BoG}} While Marines from the 24th MEU provided an interim QRF (Force Recon Det and helicopters from HMM-263), the task force arrived in the country and began training exercises. The Marines were asked to take on the Aidid snatch mission, but having the advantage of being in the area for more than two months, decided after mission analysis that the mission was a "no-go" due to several factors, centered around the inability to rescue the crew of a downed helicopter (re: the indigenous forces technique of using RPGs against helicopters and blocking the narrow streets in order to restrict the movement of a ground rescue force). This knowledge was not passed on to the Rangers, due to the Marines operating from the USS Wasp and the Rangers remaining on land. TF Ranger was made up of operators from [[Delta Force]], [[75th Ranger Regiment]], [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (United States)|160th SOAR]], SEALs from the [[Naval Special Warfare Development Group]], and Air Force special tactics units.{{r|socomch}}{{r|BHD}} During August and September 1993, the task force conducted six missions into [[Mogadishu]], all of which were successes. Although Aidid remained free, the effect of these missions seriously limited his movements.{{r|BoG}} On 3 October, TF Ranger launched its seventh mission, this time into Aidid's stronghold the [[Bakara Market]] to capture two of his key lieutenants. The mission was expected to take only one or two hours.{{r|BHD}} Helicopters carried an assault and a ground convoy of security teams launched in the late afternoon from the TF Ranger compound at Mogadishu airport. The TF came under increasingly heavy fire, more intense than during previous missions. The assault team captured 24 Somalis including Aidid's lieutenants and were loading them onto the convoy trucks when a [[UH-60 Black Hawk|MH-60 Blackhawk]] was hit by a [[rocket-propelled grenade]] (RPG).{{r|socomch}}{{r|BoG}} A small element from the security forces, as well as an [[MH-6]] assault helicopter and an MH-60 carrying a fifteen-man combat search and rescue (CSAR) team, rushed to the crash site.{{r|socomch}}{{r|BHD}}{{r|BoG}} The [[Battle of Mogadishu (1993)|battle]] became increasingly worse. An RPG struck another MH-60, crashing less than {{convert|1|mi|1}} to the south of the first downed helicopter. The task force faced overwhelming Somali mobs that overran the crash sites, causing a dire situation.{{r|BHD}} A Somali mob overran the second site and, despite a heroic defense, killed everyone except the pilot, whom they took prisoner. Two defenders of this crash site, [[Gary Gordon|Master Sergeant Gary Gordon]] and [[Randy Shughart|Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart]], were posthumously awarded the [[Medal of Honor]].{{r|socomch}}{{r|BHD}}{{r|BoG}} About this time, the mission's quick reaction force (QRF) also tried to reach the second crash site. This force too was pinned by the Somali fire and required the fire support of two [[AH-6]] helicopters before it could break contact and make its way back to the base.{{r|socomch}} [[File:Battle of mogadishu map of city.png|thumb|Map of the main battle sites during the [[Battle of Mogadishu (1993)|Battle of Mogadishu]]]] The assault and security elements moved on foot towards the first crash area, passing through heavy fire, and occupied buildings south and southwest of the downed helicopter. They fought to establish defensive positions so as not to be pinned down by the very heavy enemy fire while treating their wounded and worked to free the pilot's body from the downed helicopter. With the detainees loaded on trucks, the ground convoy force attempted to reach the first crash site. Unable to find it amongst the narrow, winding alleyways, the convoy came under devastating small arms and RPG fire. The convoy had to return to base after suffering numerous casualties and sustaining substantial damage to their vehicles.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/legacy-black-hawk-down-180971000/|title=The Legacy of Black Hawk Down|first=Mark|last=Bowden|website=Smithsonian Magazine}}</ref> Reinforcements, consisting of elements from the QRF, [[10th Mountain Division]] soldiers, Rangers, SEALs, [[Pakistan Army]] tanks and [[Malaysian Army|Malaysian]] [[armored personnel carriers]], finally arrived at 1:55&nbsp;am on 4 October. The combined force worked until dawn to free the pilot's body, receiving RPG and small arms fire throughout the night.{{r|socomch}} All the casualties were loaded onto the armored personnel carriers, and the remainder of the force was left behind and had no choice but to move out on foot.{{r|BHD}} AH-6 gunships raked the streets with fire to support the movement. The main force of the convoy arrived at the [[Pakistan Army|Pakistani]] Stadium-compound for the QRF-at 6:30&nbsp;am,{{r|BHD}} thus concluding one of the bloodiest and fiercest urban firefights since the [[Vietnam War]]. Task Force Ranger experienced a total of 17 killed in action and 106 wounded. Various estimates placed Somali casualties above 1,000.{{r|BHD}} Although Task Force Ranger's few missions were successes, the overall outcome of Operation Gothic Serpent was deemed a failure because of the Task Force's failure to complete their stated mission, capturing [[Mohamed Farrah Aidid]].{{r|BHD}} Most U.S. forces pulled out of Somalia by March 1994. The withdrawal from Somalia was completed in March 1995.{{r|socomch}} Even though Operation Gothic Serpent failed, USSOCOM still made significant contributions to operations in Somalia. SOF performed reconnaissance and surveillance missions, assisted with humanitarian relief, protected American forces, and conducted riverine patrols. Additionally, they ensured the safe landing of the Marines and safeguarded the arrival of merchant ships carrying food.{{r|socomch}}{{r|OEWDP}} ===Iraq=== USSOCOM's [[10th Special Forces Group]], elements of [[JSOC]], and CIA/SAD Paramilitary Officers linked up again and were the first to enter Iraq prior to the invasion. Their efforts organized the Kurdish [[Peshmerga]] to defeat [[Ansar Al Islam]] in Northern Iraq before the invasion. This battle was for control of a territory in Northeastern Iraq that was completely occupied by Ansar Al Islam, an ally of Al Qaeda. This was a very significant battle and led to the death of a substantial number of terrorists and the uncovering of a chemical weapons facility at Sargat. These terrorists would have been in the subsequent insurgency had they not been eliminated during this battle. Sargat was the only facility of its type discovered in the Iraq war. This battle may have been the [[Battle of Tora Bora|Tora Bora]] of Iraq, but it was a sound defeat for Al Qaeda and their ally Ansar Al Islam.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.wearethemighty.com/articles/the-special-forces-operation-viking-hammer/|title=The Special Forces op that supported the 2003 invasion of Iraq|date=19 March 2021}}</ref> This combined team then led the Peshmerga against Saddam's Northern Army. This effort kept Saddam's forces in the north and denied the ability to redeploy to contest the invasion force coming from the south. This effort may have saved the lives of hundreds if not thousands of coalition servicemen and women.{{r|PoA}} At the launch of the [[Iraq War]], dozens of 12-member [[Special Forces]] teams infiltrated southern and western Iraq to hunt for [[Scud]] missiles and pinpoint bombing targets. Scores of [[Navy SEALs]] seized oil terminals and pumping stations on the southern coast.{{r|NYT Dao}} [[Air Force combat controllers]] flew combat missions in [[Lockheed MC-130|MC-130H Combat Talon IIs]] and established austere desert airstrips to begin the flow of soldiers and supplies deep into Iraq. It was notably different from the [[Persian Gulf war]] of 1991, where Special Operations forces were mostly kept participating. But it would not be a replay of Afghanistan, where [[Army Special Forces]] and Navy SEALs led the fighting. After their star turn in Afghanistan, many special operators were disappointed to play a supporting role in Iraq. Many special operators felt restricted by cautious commanders.{{r|NYTaSOF}} From that point, USSOCOM has since killed or captured hundreds of insurgents and [[Al-Qaeda]] terrorists. It has conducted several foreign internal defense missions successfully training the [[Iraqi security forces]].{{r|Kruzel}}{{r|NYT Gordon}} ===Afghanistan=== United States Special Operations Command played a pivotal role in fighting the former [[Taliban]] government in [[Afghanistan]] in 2001{{r|Kozaryn}} and toppling it thereafter, as well as combating the insurgency and capturing [[Saddam Hussein]] in Iraq. USSOCOM in 2004 was developing plans to have an expanded and more complex role in the global campaign against terrorism,{{r|reach of war}} and that role continued to emerge before and after the [[killing of Osama bin Laden]] in Pakistan in 2011.{{r|WP01}} In 2010, "of about 13,000 Special Operations forces deployed overseas, about 9,000 [were] evenly divided between Iraq and Afghanistan."{{r|WP01}} [[File:Special Forces Medic in Afghanistan.jpg|thumb|A Special Forces soldier from [[7th Special Forces Group (United States)|7th SFG(A)]] gives an [[Afghans|Afghan]] boy a coloring book in [[Kandahar Province]] during a meeting with local leaders, 12 September 2002]] In the initial stages of the [[War in Afghanistan (2001–present)|War in Afghanistan]], USSOCOM forces linked up with CIA Paramilitary Officers from [[Special Activities Division]] to defeat the Taliban without the need for large-scale conventional forces.{{r|Lehman}} This was one of the biggest successes of the global [[War on Terrorism]].{{r|Time Waller}} These units linked up several times during this war and engaged in several furious battles with the enemy. One such battle happened during [[Operation Anaconda]], the mission to squeeze the life out of a Taliban and Al-Qaeda stronghold dug deep into the [[Shah-i-Kot Valley]] and [[Arma Mountains]] of eastern Afghanistan. The operation was seen as one of the heaviest and bloodiest fights in the War in Afghanistan.{{r|Time Anaconda}} The battle on an Afghan mountaintop called [[Takur Ghar]] featured special operations forces from all 4 services and the CIA. Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, Air Force Combat Controllers, and Pararescuemen fought against entrenched Al-Qaeda fighters atop a {{convert|10000|ft|m|adj=on}} mountain. Subsequently, the entrenched Taliban became targets of every asset in the sky. According to an executive summary, the [[Battle of Takur Ghar]] was the most intense firefight American special operators have been involved in since 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed in [[Battle of Mogadishu (1993)|Mogadishu]], Somalia, in 1993.{{r|Takur Ghar}}{{r|Takur Ghar summary}}{{r|Roberts Ridge}} During [[Operation Red Wings]] on 28 June 2005, four Navy SEALs, pinned down in a firefight, radioed for help. A Chinook helicopter, carrying 16 service members, responded but was shot down. All members of the rescue team and three of four SEALs on the ground died. It was the worst loss of life in Afghanistan since the invasion in 2001. The Navy SEAL [[Marcus Luttrell]] alone survived.{{r|Lone Survivor}}{{r|Sole Survivor}} Team leader [[Michael P. Murphy]] was awarded the [[Medal of Honor]] for his actions in the battle.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://taskandpurpose.com/history/michael-murphy-operation-red-wings/|title=On June 28, 2005, Navy SEAL Lt. Michael Murphy was killed in Afghanistan after demonstrating extreme heroism and leadership while he and his three SEAL teammates were under attack by the Taliban. Two years later, he was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.|date=28 June 2020}}</ref> ===Global presence=== [[File:Members of the U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, assigned to the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron.jpg|thumb|U.S. Air Force Special Tactics Commandos training in Jordan]] In 2010, special operations forces were deployed in 75 countries, compared with about 60 at the beginning of 2009.{{r|WP01}} In 2011, SOC spokesman Colonel Tim Nye (Army{{r|ArmyTimes Naylor}}) was reported to have said that the number of countries with SOC presence will likely reach 120 and that joint training exercises will have been carried out in most or all of those countries during the year. One study identified joint-training exercises in Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Germany, Indonesia, Mali, Norway, Panama, and Poland in 2010 and also, through mid-year 2011, in the Dominican Republic, Jordan, Romania, Senegal, South Korea, and Thailand, among other nations. In addition, SOC forces executed the high-profile [[killing of Osama bin Laden]] in Pakistan in 2011.{{Citation needed|date=December 2021}} In November 2009 ''[[The Nation]]'' reported on a covert JSOC/[[Blackwater USA|Blackwater]] anti-terrorist operation in Pakistan.<ref>Jeremy Scahill, [http://www.thenation.com/article/secret-us-war-pakistan "The Secret U.S. War in Pakistan"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120302151837/http://www.thenation.com/article/secret-us-war-pakistan |date=2 March 2012 }}, ''The Nation'', 23 November 2009.</ref> In 2010, [[White House]] [[counterterrorism]] director [[John O. Brennan]] said that the United States "will not merely respond after the fact" of a terrorist attack but will "take the fight to al-Qaeda and its extremist affiliates whether they plot and train in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and beyond." Olson said, "In some places, in deference to host-country sensitivities, we are lower in profile. In every place, Special Operations forces activities are coordinated with the U.S. ambassador and are under the operational control of the four-star regional commander."{{r|WP01}} The conduct of actions by SOC forces outside of Iraq and Afghan war zones has been the subject of internal U.S. debate, including between representatives of the [[George W. Bush|Bush]] administration such as [[John B. Bellinger III]], on one hand, and the [[Barack Obama|Obama]] administration on another. The United Nations in 2010 also "questioned the administration's authority under international law to conduct such raids, particularly when they kill innocent civilians. One possible legal justification – the permission of the country in question – is complicated in places such as Pakistan and Yemen, where the governments privately agree but do not publicly acknowledge approving the attacks," as one report put it.{{r|WP01}} ==Subordinate commands== ===Joint Special Operations Command=== {{main|Joint Special Operations Command}} [[File:Seal of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).svg|thumb|175px|The Joint Special Operations Command insignia]] [[Joint Special Operations Command]] (JSOC){{r|NYT Risen}} is a component command of the USSOCOM and is charged to study special operations requirements and techniques to ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special operations exercises and training, and develop Joint Special Operations Tactics.{{r|2013 SOCOM Fact book}} It was established in 1980 on the recommendation of [[Charles Alvin Beckwith|Col. Charlie Beckwith]], in the aftermath of the failure of [[Operation Eagle Claw]].<ref>Emerson 1988, p. 26.</ref> '''Units''' * The U.S. Army's [[1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta]], popularly known as Delta Force, is the first of the two counter-terrorism, [[Special Mission Unit|special mission units]] that fall under the Joint Special Operations Command.{{r|NYTsw}} Modeled after the British [[Special Air Service]], Delta Force is regarded as one of the premier special operations forces in the world.{{r|IDF}} Delta also includes a stringent training and selection process. Delta recruits primarily from the most proficient and highly skilled soldiers of the [[United States Army Special Operations Command|U.S. Army Special Operations Command]], although it encompasses the capability of recruiting throughout the U.S. Armed Forces.{{r|BHD}}{{r|IDF}} Recruits must pass a rigid selection course before beginning training, known as the Operators' Training Course (OTC). Delta has received training from numerous U.S. government agencies and other tiers one SOF and has created a curriculum based on this training and techniques that it has developed.{{r|IDF}} Delta conducts clandestine and covert special operations all over the world.{{r|IDF}} It has the capability to conduct myriad special operations missions but specializes in counter-terrorism and hostage rescue operations.{{r|BHD}}{{r|NYTsw}}{{r|NYTsomblu}} * The [[Intelligence Support Activity]] (ISA, The Activity) is the support branch of JSOC and USSOCOM. Its primary missions are to provide Human Intelligence ([[HUMINT]]) and Signal Intelligence ([[SIGINT]]) mainly for Delta and DEVGRU's operations.{{r|NYTsw}}{{r|Smith 2007}} Before the establishing of the [[Strategic Support Branch]] in 2001, the ISA required the permission of the [[CIA]] to conduct covert operations, which considerably lessened its effectiveness in its support of JSOC operations as a whole.{{r|NYTsw}}{{r|WP Gellman}}{{r|NYTSU}} * The U.S. Navy's [[Naval Special Warfare Development Group]] (DEVGRU, SEAL Team Six) is the second of the two counter-terrorism, special mission units that fall under the Joint Special Operations Command.{{r|NYTsw}} DEVGRU is the U.S. Navy's counterpart to Delta, specializing in maritime counter-terrorism. DEVGRU recruits the most proficient operators from [[United States Naval Special Warfare Command|Naval Special Warfare]], specifically the [[United States Navy SEALs|U.S. Navy SEALs]]. Like Delta, DEVGRU can conduct a variety of special operations missions but trains primarily for maritime counter-terrorism and hostage rescue operations. DEVGRU has gained prolific notoriety in recent years, due to high-profile hostage rescue operations and their role in [[Operation Neptune Spear|the killing of Osama Bin Laden]]. {{r|BHD}}{{r|NYTsw}} * The Air Force [[24th Special Tactics Squadron]] (24th STS) is the [[Air Force Special Operations Command|AFSOC]] component of JSOC. The 24th STS consists of specially selected AFSOC personnel, including [[United States Air Force Pararescue|Pararescuemen]], [[United States Air Force Combat Control Team|Combat Controllers]], and [[United States Air Force Tactical Air Control Party|TACPs]]. These special operators usually serve with Delta Force and DEVGRU, because of the convenience of the 24th STS's ability to synchronize and control the different elements of airpower and enhance air operations deep in enemy territory; as well as, in the case of Pararescuemen, providing needed medical assistance.{{r|BHD}} * The [[Joint Communications Unit]] (JCU) is a technical unit of the United States Special Operations Command charged to standardize and ensure interoperability of communication procedures and equipment of the Joint Special Operations Command and its subordinate units. The JCU was activated at Ft. Bragg, NC in 1980, after the failure of Operation Eagle Claw. The JCU has earned the reputation of "DoD's Finest Communicators".<ref>[http://www.jcu.mil "Home"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180401055659/http://www.jcu.mil// |date=1 April 2018 }}. [[Joint Communications Unit]]. United States Special Operations Command. United States Department of Defense ([[Tampa, Florida]]). Retrieved December 28, 2018.</ref> Portions of JSOC units have made up the constantly changing special operations task force, operating in the [[U.S. Central Command]] area of operations. The [[Task Force 11]], [[Task Force 121]], [[Task Force 6-26]] and [[Task Force 145]] are creations of the Pentagon's post-11 September campaign against terrorism, and it quickly became the model for how the military would gain intelligence and battle insurgents in the future. Originally known as Task Force 121, it was formed in the summer of 2003 when the military merged two existing Special Operations units, one hunting [[Osama bin Laden]] in and around Afghanistan, and the other tracking [[Sadaam Hussein]] in Iraq.{{r|NYT Schmitt 2006}}{{r|NYT Sanger}} <ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsf/20210416.aspx|title=Special Operations: Call In A Specialist For Instant Relief|website=www.strategypage.com}}</ref> ===Special Operations Command – Joint Capabilities=== Special Operations Command – Joint Capabilities (SOC-JC) was transferred to USSOCOM from the soon-to-be disestablished [[United States Joint Forces Command]] in 2011. {{r|jfcom transition}} Its primary mission was to train conventional and SOF commanders and their staffs to support USSOCOM international engagement training requirements, and support the implementation of capability solutions in order to improve strategic and operational Warfighting readiness and joint interoperability. SOC-JC must also be prepared to support the deployed Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) Headquarters (HQ). The [[Government Accountability Office]] wrote that SOC-JC was disestablished in 2013, and positions were to be zeroed out in 2014.<ref>{{Cite book|title = DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS: DOD Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach for Managing Resources Devoted to the Functional Combatant Commands|publisher = Government Accountability Office|date = June 2014|location = Washington DC|pages = 45|url = http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664443.pdf|access-date = 29 January 2016|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160909050606/http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664443.pdf|archive-date = 9 September 2016|url-status = live}}</ref> ===Army Special Operations Command === {{main|United States Army Special Operations Command}} [[File:US Army Special Operations Command SSI.svg|thumb|95px|USASOC [[Shoulder sleeve insignia|SSI]]]] On 1 December 1989, the [[United States Army Special Operations Command]] (USASOC) activated as the 16th major Army command. These special operations forces have been America's spearhead for unconventional warfare for more than 40 years. USASOC commands such units as the well known Special Forces (SF, or the "[[Special Forces (United States Army)|Green Berets]]"), the [[United States Army Rangers|Rangers]], and such relatively unknown units as two psychological operations groups, a special aviation regiment, a civil affairs brigade, and a special sustainment brigade. These are one of the USSOCOM's main weapons for waging unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency. The significance of these units is emphasized as conventional conflicts are becoming less prevalent as insurgent and guerrilla warfare increases.{{r|USASOC overview}}{{r|NYT Schmitt}}<ref name="USASOC">[http://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/USASOCHQFactSheet.html Army Special Operations Forces Fact Book 2018] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161019193907/http://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/USASOCHQFactSheet.html |date=19 October 2016 }}, USASOC official website, dated 2018, last accessed 28 July 2019</ref><ref>[[:File:528th Special Operations Sustainment Brigade Organizational Chart 2020.jpg|528th Special Operations Sustainment Brigade Organizational Chart 2020]], 528th Sustainment Brigade History Handbook Published by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command History Office Fort Bragg, North Carolina 2020, by Chris Howard ARSOF Support Historian, dated 5 December 2020, last accessed 12 December 2020</ref> {|class="wikitable" |- !Name !! Headquarters !! Structure and purpose |- |width=225|[[File:US Army Special Forces SSI.png|25px|left]] [[1st Special Forces Command (Airborne)]] |[[Fort Bragg]], [[North Carolina]] |The [[File:US Army 1st Special Forces Command Flash.png|15px]] 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) manages seven special forces groups—the [[File:1sfg.png|15px]] [[1st Special Forces Group (United States)|1st Special Forces Group (Airborne)]], [[File:3sfg.svg|15px]] [[3rd Special Forces Group (United States)|3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne)]], [[File:5th SFG Beret Flash.png|15px]] [[5th Special Forces Group (United States)|5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)]], [[File:7th Special Forces Group.svg|15px]] [[7th Special Forces Group (United States)|7th Special Forces Group (Airborne)]], [[File:USA - 10th Special Forces Flash.svg|15px]] [[10th Special Forces Group (United States)|10th Special Forces Group (Airborne)]], [[File:19sfg.svg|15px]] [[19th Special Forces Group|19th Special Forces Group (Airborne)]] ([[Army National Guard|ARNG]]) and [[File:20sfg.svg|21px]][[20th Special Forces Group|20th Special Forces Group (Airborne)]] (ARNG)—that are designed to deploy and execute nine doctrinal missions: [[unconventional warfare (United States)|unconventional warfare]], [[foreign internal defense]], [[direct action (military)|direct action]], [[counter-insurgency]], [[special reconnaissance]], [[counter-terrorism]], [[information operations]], [[counterproliferation]] of [[weapon of mass destruction]], and [[security force assistance]]; each special forces group consists of three to four battalions with a group support company and headquarters company. The command also manages two [[Psychological operations (United States)|psychological operations]] groups—the [[File:US Army 4th Military Information Support Group Flash.png|15px]] [[4th Psychological Operations Group|4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne)]] and [[File:US Army 8th Military Information Support Group Flash.png|15px]] [[8th Psychological Operations Group|8th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne)]]—tasked to work with foreign nations to induce or reinforce behavior favorable to U.S. objectives; each psychological operations group consists of three to four battalions, most of which are geographically aligned. The command also manages the [[File:95CivilAffairsBdeFlash.jpg|15px]] [[95th Civil Affairs Brigade|95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne)]] which enables military commanders and [[U.S. ambassadors]] to achieve national objectives by countering adversary control and improving a partner's control over populations via five geographically focused battalions and the [[File:US Army 528th Support Battalion Flash.png|15px]] [[528th Sustainment Brigade (United States)|528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne)]] that provides combat service support, combat medical support, and intelligence via multiple support operations teams and three battalions. |- |[[File:US Army Special Operations Command SSI.svg|25px|left]] [[Delta Force|1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta]] |Ft. Bragg, North Carolina |Elite special operations and counter-terrorism unit under the control of [[File:JSOC flash.png|15px]] [[Joint Special Operations Command]]. |- |[[File:75 Ranger Regiment Shoulder Sleeve Insignia.svg|25px|left]] [[75th Ranger Regiment (United States)|75th Ranger Regiment]] |[[Fort Benning]], [[Georgia (U.S. state)|Georgia]] |In addition to a regimental headquarters, a Special Troops Battalion, and a military intelligence battalion, the [[File:75thrangerflash.svg|15px]] 75th Ranger Regiment consists of three maneuver battalions of elite airborne infantry specializing in large-scale, joint forcible entry operations while simultaneously executing precision targeting operations raids across the globe. Additional capabilities include [[special reconnaissance]], [[air assault]], and direct action raids seizing key terrain such as airfields, destroying strategic facilities, and capturing or killing the enemies of the Nation. The Regiment also helps develop the equipment, technologies, training, and readiness that bridge the gap between special operations and conventional combat maneuver organizations. |- |[[File:U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command SSI (2013-2015).png|25px|left]] [[U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command (USASOAC)|Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Airborne)]] |Ft. Bragg, North Carolina |The [[File:USASOAC Flash.png|15px]] Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Airborne) organizes, mans, trains, resources and equips Army special operations aviation units to provide responsive, special operations aviation support to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) consisting of five units and the [[File:US Army 160th SOAR Flash.svg|15px]] [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (United States)|160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)]]. |- |[[File:JFKSWCS SSI.gif|25px|left]] [[John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School]] |Ft. Bragg, North Carolina |The [[File:USAJFKSWCS flash.gif|15px]] SWCS selects and trains Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations soldiers consisting of five distinct units and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine: [[File:US Army Special Warfare Training Group Flash.png|15px]] 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne)—which focuses on entry level training—, [[File:US Army 2nd Special Warfare Training Group Flash.png|15px]] 2nd Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne)—which focuses on advanced training—, [[File:US Army Special Warfare Medical Group Flash.png|15px]] Special Warfare Medical Group (Airborne)—which is part of the Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center—, [[File:US Army Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute Flash.png|15px]] Special Forces [[Warrant officer (United States)|Warrant Officer]] Institute, and [[File:US Army Special Warfare NCO Academy Flash.png|15px]] David K. Thuma [[Non-commissioned officer|Noncommissioned Officers]] [[Enlisted Professional Military Education#Army|Academy]]. |} '''Units:''' [[File:US soldiers on horseback 2001 Afghanistan.jpg|thumb|Special Forces soldiers from Task Force Dagger and Commander Abdul Rashid Dostum on horseback in the Dari-a-Souf Valley, Afghanistan, circa October 2001—celebrated in the movie ''[[12 Strong]]'']] * [[United States Army Special Forces]] (SF) aka Green Berets perform several doctrinal missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action, and counter-terrorism. These missions make Special Forces unique in the U.S. military because they are employed throughout the three stages of the operational continuum: peacetime, conflict, and war.{{r|CSSF}} Foreign internal defense operations, SF's main peacetime mission, are designed to help friendly developing nations by working with their military and police forces to improve their technical skills, understanding of human rights issues, and help with humanitarian and civic action projects. Special Forces unconventional warfare capabilities provide a viable military option for a variety of operational taskings that are inappropriate or infeasible for conventional forces. Special Forces are the U.S. military's premiere unconventional warfare force.{{r|2002 Shanker}} Foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare missions are the bread and butter of Special Forces soldiers. For this reason, SF candidates are trained extensively in weapons, engineering, communications, and medicine. SF soldiers are taught to be warriors first and teachers second because they must be able to train their team and be able to train their allies during an FID or UW mission.{{r|CSSF}}{{r|WRPNYT}} Often SF units are required to perform additional, or collateral, activities outside their primary missions. These collateral activities are coalition warfare/support, combat search and rescue, security assistance, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian de-mining, and counter-drug operations.{{r|USASF mission}} * The [[Delta Force|1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta]] (1st SFOD-D), commonly referred to as Delta Force, Combat Applications Group/"CAG", "The Unit", Army Compartmented Element, or within JSOC as Task Force Green,<ref name="RelentStrike">{{cite book|last1=Naylor|first1=Sean|title=Relentless Strike|chapter=Chapter 4}}</ref> is an elite [[Special Mission Unit]] of the [[United States Army]], under the organization of the USASOC but is controlled by the [[Joint Special Operations Command]] (JSOC). It is used for hostage rescue and counterterrorism, as well as [[direct action (military)|direct action]] and [[reconnaissance]] against [[high-value target]]s. 1st SFOD-D and its [[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]] counterpart, [[United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group|DEVGRU, "SEAL Team 6"]], perform many of the most highly complex and dangerous missions in the U.S. military. These units are also often referred to as "Tier One" and [[Special Mission Unit|special mission units]] by the U.S. government. * The [[75th Ranger Regiment (United States)|75th Ranger Regiment]] (U.S. Army Rangers) is the premier light-infantry unit of the [[United States Army]] and is headquartered at [[Fort Benning]], [[Georgia (U.S. state)|Georgia]]. The 75th Ranger Regiment's mission is to plan and conduct special missions in support of U.S. policy and objectives.{{r|75th ranger website}} The Rangers are a flexible and rapid-deployable force. Each battalion can deploy anywhere in the world within 18 hours of notice. The Army places much importance on the 75th Ranger Regiment and its training; it possesses the capabilities to conduct conventional and most special operations missions. Rangers are capable of infiltrating by land, sea, or air and [[Direct action (military)|direct action]] operations such as conducting raids or assaulting buildings or airfields.{{r|75th ranger website2}} [[File:22nd STS and 160th SOAR helocast training.jpg|thumb|The [[22nd Special Tactics Squadron|22nd STS's]] Red Team jumps out of an [[MH-47]]G Chinook from the 160th SOAR during [[helocast]] alternate insertion and extraction training]] * The [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (United States)|160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment]] (Night Stalkers) headquartered at [[Fort Campbell]], [[Kentucky]] provides aviation support to units within USSOCOM. The Regiment consists of [[MH-6]] and [[AH-6]] light helicopters, [[Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk|MH-60]] helicopters and [[MH-47]] heavy assault helicopters. The capabilities of the 160th SOAR (A) have been evolving since the early 1980s. Its focus on night operations resulted in the nickname, "Night Stalkers."{{r|160th fact sheet}} The primary mission of the Night Stalkers is to conduct overt or covert infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of special operations forces across a wide range of environmental conditions.{{r|160th MH-60 fact sheet}} * [[4th Psychological Operations Group]] (Airborne) and [[8th Psychological Operations Group]] (Airborne) Soldiers use persuasion to influence perceptions and encourage desired behavior.{{r|PSYOP recruiting}}{{r|PSYOP tsunami}} PSYOP soldiers support national objectives at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of operations. Strategic psychological operations advance broad or long-term objectives; global in nature, they may be directed toward large audiences or at key communicators. Operational psychological operations are conducted on a smaller scale. 4th POG(A) is employed by theater commanders to target groups within the theater of operations. 4th POG(A) purpose can range from gaining support for U.S. operations to preparing the battlefield for combat. Tactical psychological operations are more limited, used by commanders to secure immediate and near-term goals. In this environment, these force-enhancing activities serve as a means to lower the morale and efficiency of enemy forces.{{r|PSYOP fact sheet}} * [[95th Civil Affairs Brigade (United States)|95th Civil Affairs Brigade]] (Airborne) specialists identify critical requirements needed by local citizens in war or disaster situations. They also locate civilian resources to support military operations, help minimize civilian interference with operations, support national assistance activities, plan and execute noncombatant evacuation, support counter-drug operations and establish and maintain liaison with civilian aid agencies and other non-governmental organizations. In support of special operations, these culturally oriented, linguistically capable Soldiers may also be tasked to provide functional expertise for foreign internal defense operations, unconventional warfare operations and direct action missions.{{r|95th fact sheet}} * [[528th Sustainment Brigade (United States)|528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne)]] (SO) (A) has a difficult mission supporting USASOC. In their respective fields, signal, intelligence, medical, and support soldiers provide communications, focused intelligence, medical Role II support, supplies, maintenance, equipment, and expertise allowing ARSOF to "shoot, move and communicate" on a continuous basis. Because USASOC often uses ARSOF-unique items, soldiers assigned to these units are taught to operate and maintain a vast array of specialized equipment not normally used by their conventional counterparts. The 528th also provides the USASOC with centralized and integrated material management of property, equipment maintenance, logistical automation and repair parts and supplies.{{r|SOSCOM}} * [[John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School|John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center]] (USAJFKSWCS) trains USSOCOM and Army Special Operations Forces through development and evaluation of special operations concepts, doctrines and training.{{r|USAJFKSWCS}} === Marine Forces Special Operations Command === {{main|United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command}} [[File:Seal of Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC).svg|thumb|175px|[[United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command]] emblem]] [[File:AlphaDASR.jpg|thumb|[[Direct action (military)|DA]]/[[Special Reconnaissance|SR]] Operators from 1st SOB (Special Operations Battalion) respond to enemy fire in Afghanistan.]] In October 2005, the [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] directed the formation of [[United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command]], the Marine component of United States Special Operations Command. It was determined that the [[United States Marine Corps|Marine Corps]] would initially form a unit of approximately 2500 to serve with USSOCOM. On February 24, 2006 MARSOC activated at [[Camp Lejeune]], North Carolina. MARSOC initially consisted of a small staff and the Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU), which had been formed to conduct foreign internal defense. FMTU is now designated as the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group (MSOAG).{{r|2006 Kenyon}} As a service component of USSOCOM, [[MARSOC]] is tasked by the Commander USSOCOM to train, organize, equip, and deploy responsive U.S. Marine Corps special operations forces worldwide, in support of combatant commanders and other agencies. MARSOC has been directed to conduct foreign internal defense, direct action, and special reconnaissance. MARSOC has also been directed to develop a capability in unconventional warfare, counter-terrorism, and information operations. MARSOC deployed its first units in August 2006, six months after the group's initial activation. MARSOC reached full operational capability in October 2008.{{r|MARSOC}} '''Units''' * [[Marine Raider Regiment]] (Marine Raiders) consists of a Headquarters Company and three Marine Raider Battalions, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd. The Regiment provides tailored military combat-skills training and advisor support for identified foreign forces in order to enhance their tactical capabilities and to prepare the environment as directed by USSOCOM as well as the capability to form the nucleus of a Joint Special Operations Task Force. Marines and Sailors of the MRR train, advise and assist friendly host nation forces – including naval and maritime military and paramilitary forces – to enable them to support their governments' internal security and stability, to counter-subversion and to reduce the risk of violence from internal and external threats. MRR deployments are coordinated by MARSOC, through USSOCOM, in accordance with engagement priorities for Overseas Contingency Operations. * [[Marine Raider Support Group]] (MRSG) trains, equips, structures, and provides specially qualified Marine forces, including, operational logistics, intelligence, Military Working Dogs, Firepower Control Teams, and communications support in order to sustain worldwide special operations missions as directed by Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Special Operations Command (COMMARFORSOC). * [[Marine Raider Training Center]] (MRTC) performs the screening, recruiting, training, assessment and doctrinal development functions for MARSOC. It includes two subordinate Special Missions Training Branches (SMTBs), one on each coast. ===Naval Special Warfare Command=== {{main|United States Naval Special Warfare Command}} [[File:NAVSPECWARCOM.logo.gif|thumb|175px|[[United States Naval Special Warfare Command]] emblem]] The [[United States Naval Special Warfare Command]] (NAVSPECWARCOM, NAVSOC, or NSWC) was commissioned April 16, 1987, at [[Naval Amphibious Base Coronado]] in San Diego as the Naval component to the United States Special Operations Command. Naval Special Warfare Command provides vision, leadership, doctrinal guidance, resources and oversight to ensure component special operations forces are ready to meet the operational requirements of combatant commanders.{{r|NAVSOC}} Today, [[United States Navy SEALs|SEAL Teams]] and [[Special Boat Teams]] comprise the elite combat units of Naval Special Warfare. These teams are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a variety of missions to include direct action, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare and support psychological and civil affairs operations. Their highly trained operators are deployed worldwide in support of [[National Command Authority (United States)|National Command Authority]] objectives, conducting operations with other conventional and special operations forces. '''Units''' [[File:SEALS wearing diving gear.JPG|thumb|right|SEALs emerge from the water during a demonstration.]] [[File:U.S. Navy special warfare combatant-craft crewmen (SWCC), Special Boat Team 22 conducts training 16 AUG 09.jpg|right|thumb|A special warfare combatant-craft crewmen from Special Boat Team 22 fires a [[GAU-17]] from a [[Special Operations Craft – Riverine (SOC-R)]].]] * [[United States Navy SEALs]] have distinguished themselves as an individually reliable, collectively disciplined and highly skilled special operations force. The most important trait that distinguishes Navy SEALs from all other military forces is that SEALs are maritime special operations, as they strike from and return to the sea. SEALs (SEa, Air, Land) take their name from the elements in and from which they operate. SEALs are experts in direct action and special reconnaissance missions. Their stealth and clandestine methods of operation allow them to conduct multiple missions against targets that larger forces cannot approach undetected. Because of the dangers inherent in their missions, prospective SEALs go through what is considered by many military experts to be the toughest training regime in the world.{{r|SEAL website}}{{r|Couch 2001}} * [[SEAL Team Six|Naval Special Warfare Development Group]] (DEVGRU), referred to as SEAL Team Six, the name of its predecessor which was officially disbanded in 1987. * [[SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams]] are SEAL teams with an added underwater delivery capability who use the SDV MK VIII and the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS), submersibles that provide NSW with an unprecedented capability that combines the attributes of clandestine underwater mobility and the combat swimmer.{{r|insert/extract}}{{r|2002 Tiron}} * [[Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen]] (SWCC) operate and maintain state-of-the-art vessels and high-tech equipment to conduct coastal patrol and interdiction and support special operations missions. Focusing on infiltration and exfiltration of SEALs and other SOF, SWCCs provide dedicated rapid mobility in shallow water areas where larger ships cannot operate. They also bring to the table a unique SOF capability: Maritime Combatant Craft Aerial Delivery System—the ability to deliver combat craft via parachute drop.{{r|2013 SOCOM Fact book}} Like SEALs, SWCCs must have excellent physical fitness, highly motivated, combat-focused and responsive in high-stress situations.{{r|SEAL SWCC}} ===Air Force Special Operations Command=== {{main|Air Force Special Operations Command}} [[File:Shield of the United States Air Force Special Operations Command.svg|thumb|175px|[[Air Force Special Operations Command]] emblem]] [[File:AC-130U training.jpg|thumb|An [[AC-130U Spooky]] from the [[4th Special Operations Squadron]]]] [[File:21st STS JTACs CAS training mission at Nevada Test and Training Range2.jpg|thumb|[[Combat Controllers]] from the 21st Special Tactics Squadron conducting [[close air support]] training with [[A-10]] pilots in Nevada]] [[Air Force Special Operations Command]] was established on May 22, 1990, with headquarters at [[Hurlburt Field]], Florida. AFSOC is one of the 10 Air Force [[List of Major Commands of the United States Air Force|Major Commands]] or MAJCOMs, and the Air Force component of United States Special Operations Command. It holds operational and administrative oversight of subordinate special operations wings and groups in the regular Air Force, [[Air Force Reserve Command]] and the [[Air National Guard]]. AFSOC provides Air Force special operations forces for worldwide deployment and assignment to regional unified commands. The command's SOF are composed of highly trained, rapidly deployable airmen, conducting global special operations missions ranging from the precision application of firepower via [[airstrikes]] or [[close air support]], to infiltration, exfiltration, resupply and refueling of SOF operational elements.{{r|Gunship}} AFSOC's unique capabilities include airborne radio and television broadcast for psychological operations, as well as aviation foreign internal defense instructors to provide other governments military expertise for their internal development. The command's core missions include battlefield air operations; agile combat support; aviation foreign internal defense; information operations; precision aerospace fires; psychological operations; specialized air mobility; specialized refueling; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.{{r|NYTaSOF}}{{r|AFSOC}}{{r|NYT Meyers}} '''Components''' * [[Combat Controller]]s (CCT) are ground combat forces specialized in a traditional [[Pathfinders (military)|pathfinder]] role while having a heavy emphasis on simultaneous [[air traffic control]], [[fire support]] (via [[airstrikes]], [[close air support]] and [[C4ISTAR|command, control, and communications]] in covert or austere environments.{{r|CCT factsheet}}{{r|CCT job}} * [[Pararescue]]men (PJ) are the only Department of Defense specialty specifically trained and equipped to conduct conventional and unconventional [[combat search and rescue|personnel recovery operations]]. A PJ's primary function is as a personnel recovery specialist with emergency trauma medical capabilities in humanitarian and combat environments. * [[United States Air Force Special Reconnaissance|Special Reconnaissance]] (SR) conduct long-range interdiction, surveillance and intelligence gathering. A subset of their responsibilities is to assess and interpret weather and environmental intelligence from forward-deployed locations, working alongside special operations forces. '''Organization''' * The [[1st Special Operations Wing]] (1 SOW) is located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Its mission focus is unconventional warfare: counter-terrorism, combat search and rescue, personnel recovery, psychological operations, aviation assistance to developing nations, "deep battlefield" resupply, interdiction, and close air support. The wing's core missions include aerospace surface interface, agile combat support, combat aviation advisory operations, information operations, personnel recovery/recovery operations, precision aerospace fires, psychological operations dissemination, specialized aerospace mobility, and specialized aerial refueling.{{r|1st SOW factsheet}} Among its aircraft is the [[Lockheed MC-130|MC-130 Combat Talon II]], a low-level terrain-following special missions transport that can evade radar detection and slip into enemy territory at a {{convert|200|ft|m|adj=on}} altitude for infiltration/exfiltration missions, even in zero visibility, dropping off or recovering men or supplies with pinpoint accuracy. It also operates the [[AC-130 Spooky]] and [[AC-130|Spectre]] gunships that provide highly accurate airborne gunfire for close air support of conventional and special operations forces on the ground.{{r|NYTsw}} * The [[24th Special Operations Wing]] (24 SOW) is located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. It is composed of the 720th Special Tactics Group, 724th Special Tactics Group, Special Tactics Training Squadron and 16 recruiting locations across the United States.{{r|STW}}{{r|24th SOW factsheet}} The [[Special Tactics Squadrons]], under the 720th STG and 724th STG, are made up of Special Tactics Officers, [[Combat Controllers]], [[Combat Rescue Officer]]s, [[Pararescuemen]], [[Air Force Special Operations Weather Technician|Special Operations Weather Officers and Airmen]], Air Liaison Officers, [[United States Air Force Tactical Air Control Party|Tactical Air Control Party operators]], and a number of combat support airmen which comprise 58 [[Air Force Specialty Code|Air Force specialties]].{{r|24th SOW factsheet}} * The [[27th Special Operations Wing]] (27 SOW) is located at [[Cannon AFB]], [[New Mexico]]. Its primary mission includes infiltration, exfiltration and re-supply of special operations forces; air refueling of special operations rotary wing and tiltrotor aircraft; and precision fire support. These capabilities support a variety of special operations missions including direct action, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, personnel recovery, psychological operations and information operations.{{r|27th SOW}} * The [[193d Special Operations Wing]] (193 SOW) is an [[Air National Guard]] (ANG) unit, operationally gained by AFSOC, and located at [[Harrisburg International Airport]]/Air National Guard Station (former [[Olmsted Air Force Base]]), [[Pennsylvania]]. Under Title 32 USC, the 193 SOW performs state missions for the Governor of Pennsylvania as part of the [[Pennsylvania Air National Guard]]. Under Title 10 USC, the 193 SOW is part of the Air Reserve Component (ARC) of the United States Air Force. Its primary wartime and contingency operations mission as an AFSOC-gained unit is psychological operations (PSYOP). The 193 SOW is unique in that it is the only unit in the U.S. Air Force to fly and maintain the Lockheed [[Lockheed EC-130|EC-130J Commando Solo]] aircraft. * The [[919th Special Operations Wing]] (919 SOW) is an Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) unit, operationally gained by AFSOC, and located at [[Eglin AFB]] Auxiliary Field #3/[[Duke Field]], Florida. The 919 SOW flies and maintains the MC-130E Combat Talon I and MC-130P Combat Shadow special operations aircraft designed for covert operations. * The [[352d Special Operations Wing]] (352 SOW) at [[RAF Mildenhall]], United Kingdom serves as the core to the United States [[European Command]]'s standing Joint Special Operations Air Component headquarters. The squadron provides support for three flying squadrons, one special tactics squadron and one maintenance squadron for exercise, logistics, and war planning; aircrew training; communications; aerial delivery; medical; intelligence; security and force protection; weather; information technologies and transformation support and current operations.{{r|352nd factsheet}} * The [[353d Special Operations Group]] (353 SOG) is the focal point for all U.S. Air Force special operations activities throughout the [[United States Pacific Command]] (USPACOM) theater. Headquartered at [[Kadena AB]], [[Okinawa]], Japan the group is prepared to conduct a variety of high-priority, low-visibility missions. Its mission is air support of joint and allied special operations forces in the Pacific. It maintains a worldwide mobility commitment, participates in Pacific theater exercises as directed and supports humanitarian and relief operations.{{r|353rd factsheet}} * The [[United States Air Force Special Operations School]] (USAFSOS) at [[Hurlburt Field]], Florida is a primary support unit of the Air Force Special Operations Command. The USAFSOS prepares special operations Airmen to successfully plan, organize, and execute global special operations by providing indoctrination and education for AFSOC, other USSOCOM components, and joint/interagency/ coalition partners.{{r|USAFSOS factsheet}} === Order of battle === [[File:US Special Operations Command.png|thumb|center|1020px|Special Operations Command order of battle April 2020 (click to enlarge)]] ==List of commanders== [[File:U.S. Special Operations Command Holds a Change of Command Ceremony 220830-M-HH844-0305.jpg|thumb|U.S. Secretary of Defense [[Lloyd Austin]] (''far left''), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [[Mark A. Milley]] (''center left''), incoming combatant commander [[Bryan P. Fenton]] (''center right'') and outgoing commander [[Richard D. Clarke|Richard D. Clarke Jr.]] (''far right'') at the USSOCOM change of command ceremony on 30 August 2022.]] The commander of U.S. Special Operations Command is a statutory office ({{USC|10|167}}), and is held by a [[Four-star rank|four-star]] [[General (United States)|general]], or if the commander is a Navy officer, a four-star [[Admiral (United States)|admiral]]. {| class="wikitable sortable" |- ! rowspan=2| {{abbr|No.|Number}} ! colspan=2| Commander ! colspan=3| Term ! rowspan=2| Service branch |- ! Portrait ! Name ! Took office ! Left office ! Term length |- {{Officeholder table | order = 1 | military_rank = General | image = GEN James Lindsay 1986.jpg | officeholder = [[James J. Lindsay]] | officeholder_sort = Lindsay, James J. | born_year = 1932 | died_year = | term_start = 16 April 1987 | term_end = 27 June 1990 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|1987|4|16|1990|6|27}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 2 | military_rank = General | image = Carl W Stiner.jpg | officeholder = [[Carl Stiner|Carl W. Stiner]] | officeholder_sort = Stiner, Carl W. | born_year = 1936 | died_year = 2022 | term_start = 27 June 1990 | term_end = 20 May 1993 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|1990|6|27|1993|5|20}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 3 | military_rank = General | image = Wayne Downing.jpg | officeholder = [[Wayne A. Downing]] | officeholder_sort = Downing, Wayne A. | born_year = 1940 | died_year = 2007 | term_start = 20 May 1993 | term_end = 29 February 1996 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|1993|5|20|1996|2|29}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 4 | military_rank = General | image = Henry Shelton official portrait.jpg | officeholder = [[Henry H. Shelton]] | officeholder_sort = Shelton, Henry H. | born_year = 1942 | died_year = | term_start = 29 February 1996 | term_end = 25 September 1997 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|1996|2|29|1997|9|25}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = - | military_rank = Rear Admiral | image = Raymond C. Smith Jr 1992.jpg | officeholder = [[Raymond C. Smith|Raymond C. Smith Jr.]] | officeholder_sort = Smith, Raymond C. Jr. | born_year = | died_year = | term_start = 25 September 1997 | term_end = 5 November 1997 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|1997|9|25|1997|11|5}} | defence_branch = [[File:Emblem of the United States Navy.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]] | acting = y }} {{Officeholder table | order = 5 | military_rank = General | image = Peter Schoomaker.jpg | officeholder = [[Peter J. Schoomaker]] | officeholder_sort = Schoomaker, Peter | born_year = 1946 | died_year = | term_start = 5 November 1997 | term_end = 27 October 2000 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|1997|11|5|2000|10|27}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 6 | military_rank = General | image = Holland cr.jpg | officeholder = [[Charles R. Holland]] | officeholder_sort = Holland, Charles R. | born_year = 1948 | died_year = | term_start = 27 October 2000 | term_end = 2 September 2003 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2000|10|27|2003|9|2}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Air Force.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Air Force|U.S. Air Force]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 7 | military_rank = General | image = GEN Bryan Brown official portrait.jpg | officeholder = [[Bryan D. Brown]] | officeholder_sort = Brown, Bryan D. | born_year = 1948 | died_year = | term_start = 2 September 2003 | term_end = 9 July 2007 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2003|9|2|2007|7|9}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 8 | military_rank = Admiral | image = ADM Eric T. Olson.jpg | officeholder = [[Eric T. Olson]] | officeholder_sort = Olson, Eric T. | born_year = 1952 | died_year = | term_start = 9 July 2007 | term_end = 8 August 2011 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2007|7|9|2011|8|8}} | defence_branch = [[File:Emblem of the United States Navy.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 9 | military_rank = Admiral | image = ADM William H. McRaven 2012.jpg | officeholder = [[William H. McRaven]] | officeholder_sort = McRaven, William H. | born_year = 1955 | died_year = | term_start = 8 August 2011 | term_end = 28 August 2014 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2011|8|8|2014|8|28}} | defence_branch = [[File:Emblem of the United States Navy.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 10 | military_rank = General | image = Votel official photo USSOCOM.jpg | officeholder = [[Joseph Votel|Joseph L. Votel]] | officeholder_sort = Votel, Joseph L. | born_year = 1958 | died_year = | term_start = 28 August 2014 | term_end = 30 March 2016 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2014|8|28|2016|3|30}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 11 | military_rank = General | image = General Raymond A. Thomas III (USSOCOM).jpg | officeholder = [[Raymond A. Thomas]] | officeholder_sort = Thomas, Raymond A. | born_year = 1958 | died_year = | term_start = 30 March 2016 | term_end = 29 March 2019 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2016|3|30|2019|3|29}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 12 | military_rank = General | image = Gen. Richard D. Clarke, Jr. (2).jpg | officeholder = [[Richard D. Clarke]] | officeholder_sort = Clarke, Richard D. | born_year = 1962 | died_year = | term_start = 29 March 2019 | term_end = 30 August 2022 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2019|3|29|2022|8|30}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 13 | military_rank = General | image = Lt. Gen. Bryan P. Fenton (2).jpg | officeholder = [[Bryan P. Fenton]] | officeholder_sort = Fenton, Bryan P. | born_year = 1965 | died_year = | term_start = 30 August 2022 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2022|8|30}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} |} ==USSOCOM medal== [[File:USSOCOM Medal BAR.svg|thumb|USSOCOM Medal Ribbon Bar]] The United States Special Operations Command Medal was introduced in 1994 to recognize individuals for outstanding contributions to, and in support of, special operations. Some notable recipients include; * [[Lieutenant General (United States)|Lieutenant General]] [[Samuel V. Wilson]] * [[Colonel]] [[Ralph Puckett]] * [[Senior Chief Petty Officer|SCPO]] [[Chris Beck (Navy SEAL)|Chris Beck]] Since it was created, there have been more than 50 recipients, only six of whom were not American, including; * [[General]] [[Benoît Puga]] (France) *† [[Captain (armed forces)|Kaptein]] [[Gunnar Sønsteby]], 2008 (Norway)<ref name="Jensen">Jensen, Finn Robert; Gunnar "Kjakan" Sønsteby Om samhold og innsatsvilje; Pantagruel forlag; Oslo; 2008</ref> *† [[Generał broni]] [[Włodzimierz Potasiński]], 2010 (Poland)<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20121209185746/http://www.shadowspear.com/vb/threads/united-states-special-operations-command-medal-to-lt-gen-w%C5%82odzimierz-potasi%C5%84ski.6197/ USSOCOM Medal recipients]</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.wojskaspecjalne.mil.pl/45,more,129-ussocom_commander_visits_polsocom.html?ln=en |title=NEWS &#124; USSOCOM Commander visits POLSOCOM &#124; Dowództwo Wojsk Specjalnych |publisher=Wojskaspecjalne.mil.pl |date=2010-05-14 |access-date=2013-04-22 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20120805211914/http://www.wojskaspecjalne.mil.pl/45,more,129-ussocom_commander_visits_polsocom.html?ln=en |archive-date=5 August 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> * [[Generał dywizji]] [[Piotr Patalong]], 2014 (Poland)<ref>{{cite web |url=http://mon.gov.pl/aktualnosci/artykul/najnowsze/2014-10-29-medal-dowodztwa-operacji-specjalnych-usa-dla-polskiego-generala/ |title=Medal USSOCOM dla polskiego generała |publisher=mon.gov.pl |date=2014-10-29 |access-date=2014-10-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141029164646/http://mon.gov.pl/aktualnosci/artykul/najnowsze/2014-10-29-medal-dowodztwa-operacji-specjalnych-usa-dla-polskiego-generala/ |archive-date=29 October 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref> * [[Generał brygady]] [[Jerzy Gut]], 2014 (Poland)<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/pl/z-zycia-wojska/30655,amerykanskie-dowodztwo-operacji-specjalnych-docenilo-polskiego-generala.html |title=Amerykańskie Dowództwo Operacji Specjalnych doceniło polskiego generała |publisher=wojsko-polskie.l |date=2014-06-03 |access-date=2014-06-03 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140606204407/http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/pl/z-zycia-wojska/30655,amerykanskie-dowodztwo-operacji-specjalnych-docenilo-polskiego-generala.html |archive-date=6 June 2014 |url-status=dead }}</ref> * [[Jungjang|Jungjang (Lieutenant General)]] [[Chun In-bum]], 2016 (Republic of Korea)<ref>{{Cite web|date=2016-06-15|title=[단독] 전인범 전 특전사령관, 한국군 최초 미군 통합특전사 훈장|url=https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/view.php?key=20160615010007077|access-date=2020-11-14|website=종합일간지 : 신문/웹/모바일 등 멀티 채널로 국내외 실시간 뉴스와 수준 높은 정보를 제공|language=ko}}</ref> († [[wikt:posthumous|posthumously]]) ==References== ===Citations=== {{Reflist|30em|refs= <ref name="2020 SOCOM Fact book">{{cite book |author=SOCOM Public Affairs |title=SOCOM Fact Book 2020 |url=https://www.socom.mil/FactBook/2020%20Fact%20Book.pdf |year=2020 |publisher=SOCOM Public Affairs }}</ref> <ref name="2013 SOCOM Fact book">{{cite book|author=SOCOM Public Affairs|title=SOCOM Fact Book 2013|url=https://www.socom.mil/FactBook/2013%20Fact%20Book.pdf|year=2013|publisher=SOCOM Public Affairs|access-date=14 February 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170710221940/https://www.socom.mil/FactBook/2013%20Fact%20Book.pdf|archive-date=10 July 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> <ref name="NYT Regime thought">{{cite news|first=Thom|last=Shanker|title=Regime Thought War Unlikely, Iraqis Tell U.S|work=The New York Times|date=12 February 2004}}</ref> <ref name="NYT Bang Panama">{{cite news|first=Larry|last=Rother|title=With a Bang, Panama Is Erasing House of Horrors|work=The New York Times|date=6 December 1996}}</ref> <ref name="Adm Holloway bio">{{cite web|title=Biography of Admiral James L. Holloway III, US Navy (Ret.)|date=June 2006|url=http://www.history.navy.mil/bios/holloway_j.htm|access-date=21 March 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090825040049/http://www.history.navy.mil/bios/holloway_j.htm|archive-date=25 August 2009|url-status=live}}</ref> <ref name="posture statement">{{cite web|title=USSOCOM Posture Statement|publisher=USSOCOM|year=2007|url=http://www.socom.mil/Docs/USSOCOM_Posture_Statement_2007.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080227010822/http://www.socom.mil/Docs/USSOCOM_Posture_Statement_2007.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=27 February 2008|access-date=12 February 2008}}</ref> <ref name="Delta elite force">''Delta: America's Elite Counterterrorist Force''. Terry Griswold, D. M. Giangreco. 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Kozaryn|first=Linda|title=U.S. Special Operations Forces Change "Face of War"|work=American Forces Press Service|date=14 December 2001}}</ref> <ref name="reach of war">{{cite news |first =Eric Schmitt |last =Thom Shanker |title =The Reach of War: Military; Special Warriors Have Growing Ranks and Growing Pains in Taking Key Antiterror Role |url =https://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/02/world/reach-war-military-special-warriors-have-growing-ranks-growing-pains-taking-key.html |work =The New York Times |date =2 August 2004 |access-date =11 March 2008 |archive-url =https://web.archive.org/web/20101027173816/http://www.nytimes.com/2004/08/02/world/reach-war-military-special-warriors-have-growing-ranks-growing-pains-taking-key.html |archive-date =27 October 2010 |url-status =live }}</ref> <ref name=PoA>Plan of Attack, Bob Woodward, 2004</ref> <ref name="NYT Dao">{{cite news|last=Dao|first=James|title=The Commandos; Navy Seals Easily Seize 2 Oil Sites|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=22 March 2003}}</ref> <ref name=NYTaSOF>{{cite news|first=James|last=Dao|title=Aftereffects: Special Operations Forces; War Plan Drew U.S. Commandos From Shadows|work=The New York Times|date=28 April 2003 }}</ref> <ref name=Kruzel>{{cite news|first=John|last=Kruzel |title=Navy SEALs share war stories from Anbar province|work=American Forces Press Service|date=26 May 2007}}</ref> <ref name="NYT Gordon">{{cite news|first=Michael|last=R. 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Haney |first=Eric |title=Inside Delta Force: The Story of America's Elite Counterterrorist Unit |publisher=Delta |date=August 2005 |isbn=0-385-33936-4}}</ref> <ref name="USASOC overview">{{cite web|url=http://www.soc.mil/sofinfo/story.html |title=USASOC overview |access-date=8 January 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080116044716/http://www.soc.mil/sofinfo/story.html |archive-date=16 January 2008 }}</ref> <ref name="NYT Schmitt">{{cite news |last1=Schmitt |first1=Eric |first2=Michael R. |last2=Gordon |title=A Nation Challenged: The Military: Top Air Chief Sent |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=21 September 2001 }}</ref> <ref name=NYTsomblu>{{cite news |first=Mark |last=Mazzetti |title=Pentagon Sees Move in Somalia as Blueprint |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=13 January 2007 |author-link=Mark Mazzetti }}</ref> <ref name="Smith 2007">{{cite book |last=Smith |first=Michael |title=Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America's Most Secret Special Operations Team |publisher=St. Martin's Press |year=2007 |location=New York, New York |isbn=978-0-312-36272-0}}</ref> <ref name="WP Gellman">{{cite news |last=Gellman |first=Barton |title=Secret Unit Expands Rumsfeld's Domain |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |date=23 January 2005 }}</ref> <ref name=NYTSU>{{cite news |last1=Gerth |first1=Jeff |first2=Philip |last2=Taubman |title=U.s. military creates secret units for use in sensitive tasks abroad |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=8 June 1984 }}</ref> <ref name="NYT Schmitt 2006">{{cite news |last=Schmitt |first=Eric |title=In Secret Unit's 'Black Room,' a Grim Portrait of U.S. Abuse |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=19 March 2006}}</ref> <ref name="NYT Sanger">{{cite news |last=E. Sanger |first=David |title=New U.S. Effort Steps Up Hunt For bin Laden |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=29 February 2004 }}</ref> <ref name="jfcom transition">[http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2011/pa050211.html SOCJFCOM transitions to USSOCOM and becomes Special Operations Command – Joint Capabilities] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110725002415/http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2011/pa050211.html |date=25 July 2011 }}, 2 May 2011</ref> <ref name="75th ranger website">{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/75thrr/75th_home.htm |title= 75th Ranger Regiment website |access-date=12 February 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080127071358/http://www.soc.mil/75thrr/75th_home.htm <!-- Bot retrieved archive --> |archive-date=27 January 2008}}</ref> <ref name="75th ranger website2">{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/75thrr/75thrrfs.html |title= 75th Ranger Regiment website |access-date=12 February 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080208083040/http://www.soc.mil/75thrr/75thrrfs.html <!-- Bot retrieved archive --> |archive-date=8 February 2008}}</ref> <ref name="2002 Shanker">{{cite news |last=Shanker |first=Thom |title=A Nation Challenged: Battlefield; Conduct of War Is Redefined By Success of Special Forces |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=21 January 2002}}</ref> <ref name=CSSF>{{cite book |last=Couch |first=Dick |title=Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior |publisher=Three Rivers Press |date=March 2007 |isbn=978-0-307-33939-3}}</ref> <ref name="USASF mission">{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/SF/mission.htm |title=USASF mission |access-date=8 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071211221352/http://www.soc.mil/SF/mission.htm <!--Added by H3llBot--> |archive-date=11 December 2007}}</ref> <ref name=WRPNYT>{{cite news |last1=Schmitt |first1=Eric |first2=Thom |last2=Shanker |title=U.S. Plan Widens Role in Training Pakistani Forces in Qaeda Battle |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=2 March 2008}}</ref> <ref name="160th fact sheet">{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/160soar/soar_home.htm |title=Night Stalkers fact sheet |access-date=8 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071217230457/http://www.soc.mil/160soar/soar_home.htm <!--Added by H3llBot--> |archive-date=17 December 2007}}</ref> <ref name="160th MH-60 fact sheet">{{cite web|url=http://www.soc.mil/160soar/Blkhawk.html |title=160th SOAR,MH-60 Black Hawk Helicopter Fact Sheet |access-date=12 February 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080308135218/http://www.soc.mil/160soar/Blkhawk.html |archive-date=8 March 2008 }}</ref> <ref name="PSYOP fact sheet">{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/psyop/psyop_default.htm |title=PSYOP fact sheet |access-date=12 February 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080203103530/http://www.soc.mil/psyop/psyop_default.htm <!--Added by H3llBot--> |archive-date=3 February 2008}}</ref> <ref name="PSYOP recruiting">{{cite web |url=http://www.bragg.army.mil/psyop/psyopintro.htm |title=PSYOP Recruiting website |access-date=12 February 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080204120503/http://www.bragg.army.mil/psyop/psyopintro.htm |archive-date=4 February 2008}}</ref> <ref name="PSYOP tsunami">{{cite press release|title=Army Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations Soldiers Deploy in Support of Tsunami Relief Efforts |publisher=Department of Defense |date=7 January 2005 |url=http://www.defenselink.mil/home/articles/2005-01/a010705tj1.html |access-date=14 March 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080218230824/http://www.defenselink.mil/home/articles/2005-01/a010705tj1.html |archive-date=18 February 2008 }}</ref> <ref name="95th fact sheet">{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/ca/ca_default.htm |title=95th Civil Affairs Fact Sheet |access-date=21 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080119211325/http://www.soc.mil/ca/ca_default.htm <!--Added by H3llBot--> |archive-date=19 January 2008}}</ref> <ref name=SOSCOM>{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/soscom/soscom_default.htm |title=SOSCOM Home Page |access-date=12 February 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080119210555/http://www.soc.mil/soscom/soscom_default.htm |archive-date=19 January 2008}}</ref> <ref name=USAJFKSWCS>{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swcs_default.htm |title=USAJFKSWCS |access-date=19 February 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080119211345/http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swcs_default.htm |archive-date=19 January 2008}}</ref> <ref name=NAVSOC>{{cite web |url=https://www.navsoc.navy.mil/ |title=NAVSOC info website |access-date=8 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080214064830/http://www.navsoc.navy.mil/ |archive-date=14 February 2008 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all }}</ref> <ref name="SEAL website">{{cite web|url=http://199.208.208.41/seal/introduction.aspx |title=Official U.S. Navy SEAL Info Website |access-date=11 January 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071230024817/http://199.208.208.41/seal/introduction.aspx |archive-date=30 December 2007 }}</ref> <ref name="Couch 2001">{{cite book |last=Couch |first=Dick |title=The Warrior Elite: The Forging of SEAL Class 228 |publisher=Crown |date=October 2001 |isbn=0-609-60710-3}}</ref> <ref name="insert/extract">{{cite web |url=http://www.navyseals.com/insertion-extraction |title=Navy SEALs insertion/extraction page |access-date=11 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121129231150/http://www.navyseals.com/insertion-extraction |archive-date=29 November 2012 |url-status=dead }}</ref> <ref name="2002 Tiron">{{cite news |last=Tiron |first=Roxana |title=New Mini-Sub Gives SEALs Extra Speed, Range, Payload |work=National Defense Magazine |date=February 2002}}</ref> <ref name="SEAL SWCC">{{cite web|url=http://www.seal.navy.mil/swcc/introduction.aspx |title=Official U.S. Navy SWCC Info Website |access-date=11 January 2008 }}{{dead link|date=May 2016|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref> <ref name=Gunship>{{cite news|last=Steven Lee Meyers|first=Thom Shanker|title=A Nation Challenged: The Offensive; Special Operations Gunship Being Used Against Taliban|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=16 October 2001}}</ref> <ref name=AFSOC>{{cite web|url=http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/ |title=AFSOC |access-date=11 January 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071231203327/http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/ |archive-date=31 December 2007 }}</ref> <ref name="NYT Meyers">{{cite news |last1=Meyers |first1=Steven Lee |first2=Thom |last2=Shanker |title=A Nation Challenged: Air War; Pilots Told to Fire at Will in Some Zones |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=17 October 2001 }}</ref> <ref name="CCT factsheet">{{cite web |url=http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=174 |title=Combat Control Fact Sheet |work=Air Force Special Operations Command |publisher=United States Air Force |access-date=13 January 2013|archive-url=https://archive.today/20130221025433/http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=174|archive-date=21 February 2013}}</ref> <ref name="CCT job">{{cite web |url=http://www.airforce.com/careers/detail/combat-control-males-only/ |title=Combat Control career description |access-date=12 January 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140405090814/http://www.airforce.com/careers/detail/combat-control-males-only/ |archive-date=5 April 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref> <ref name="1st SOW factsheet">{{cite web |title=1st SOW Fact Sheet |publisher=AFSOC |url=http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3485 |access-date=20 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130220171620/http://www.hurlburt.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3485 |archive-date=20 February 2013 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all }}</ref> <ref name="27th SOW">{{cite press release|title=N.M. Delegation Welcomes 27th Special Ops. Wing to Cannon |date=29 August 2007 |url=http://bingaman.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=281393 |access-date=21 March 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080327040154/http://bingaman.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=281393 |archive-date=27 March 2008 }}</ref> <ref name=STW>{{cite web |url=http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123305724 |title=Air Force launches first special tactics wing |date=2012-06-13 |access-date=January 15, 2013|archive-url=https://archive.today/20121212040616/http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123305724|archive-date=December 12, 2012}}</ref> <ref name="24th SOW factsheet">{{cite web|url=http://www.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=19566 |title=24th SOW Factsheet |access-date=January 15, 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130225031628/http://www.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=19566 |archive-date=25 February 2013 }}</ref> <ref name="352nd factsheet">{{cite web |title=352nd Fact Sheet |publisher=AFSOC |url=http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=224 |access-date=21 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081210124023/http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=224 |archive-date=10 December 2008 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all }}</ref> <ref name="353rd factsheet">{{cite web |title=353rd SOG Fact Sheet |publisher=AFSOC |url=http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=225 |access-date=21 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081210130902/https://www2.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=225 |archive-date=10 December 2008 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all }}</ref> <ref name="USAFSOS factsheet">{{cite web |url=http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=186 |title=USAFOS Fact Sheet |access-date=21 January 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080109132212/http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=186 |archive-date=9 January 2008}}</ref> <ref name="2006 Kenyon">{{cite news |last=Kenyon |first=Henry |title=Marine Corps Special Operations Command Hits the Beach |work=Signal Magazine |date=May 2006 |url=http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_Template.asp?articleid=1123&zoneid=182 |access-date=10 April 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071025164903/http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_Template.asp?articleid=1123&zoneid=182 |archive-date=25 October 2007 |url-status=live }}</ref> <ref name=MARSOC>{{cite web|url=http://www.marsoc.usmc.mil/ |title=MARSOC |access-date=8 January 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080209214300/http://www.marsoc.usmc.mil/ |archive-date=9 February 2008 }}</ref> }} <!--not used <ref name="TWP Woodward">{{cite news|last=Woodward|first=Bob|title=Secret CIA Units Playing A Central Combat Role|work=The Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/CIA18.html|date=18 November 2001|access-date=8 July 2012}}</ref> <ref name="exec secrets">{{cite book|last=Daugherty|first=William J.|title=Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency|publisher=University Press of Kentucky|date=2 June 2006|location=Lexington|isbn=0-8131-9161-0}}</ref> <ref name="Jawbreaker berntsen">{{cite book|last=Berntsen|first=Gary|first2=Ralph |last2=Pezzulo |title=Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander|publisher=Three Rivers Press|date=24 October 2006|location=New York|isbn=0-307-35106-8}}</ref> --> ===Bibliography=== {{Refbegin}} * {{cite book |last=Briscoe |first=Charles |title=Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan |publisher=Combat Studies Institute Press |year=2001}} * {{cite book |last=Couch |first=Dick |title=Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior |publisher=Three Rivers Press |date=March 2007 |isbn=978-0-307-33939-3}} * {{cite book |last=Couch |first=Dick |title=Down Range: Navy SEALs in the War on Terrorism |publisher=Three Rivers Press |year=2006 |location=New York, New York |isbn=1-4000-8101-7 |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/downrangenavysea0000couc }} * {{cite web |last=Kelley |first=Stephen Andrew |title=Better Lucky Than Good: Operation Earnest Will as Gunboat Diplomacy |publisher=Naval Postgraduate School |date=June 2007 |url=http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/kelley07.pdf |access-date =12 May 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090318120640/http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/kelley07.pdf |archive-date=18 March 2009}} * {{cite book |last1=Luttrell |first1=Marcus |first2=Patrick |last2=Robinson |title=Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10 |publisher=Little, Brown and Company |date=June 2007 |isbn=978-0-316-06759-1 |url=https://archive.org/details/lonesurvivoreyew00lutt }} * {{cite book |last=Pirnie |first=Bruce R. |title=Assessing Requirements for Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief |publisher=RAND Corporation |date=August 1998 |isbn=0-8330-2594-5}} * {{cite book |last=Pushies |first=Fred |title=U.S. Air Force Special Ops |publisher=MBI Publishing Company |year=2007 |location=Osceola, Wisconsin |isbn=978-0-7603-0733-5}} * {{cite book |last=Smith |first=Michael |title=Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America's Most Secret Special Operations Team |publisher=St. Martin's Press |year=2007 |location=New York, New York |isbn=978-0-312-36272-0}} * {{cite book |last=Sweetman |first=Jack |title=Great American Naval Battles |publisher=Naval Institute Press |date=March 1999 |isbn=1-55750-794-5}} * {{cite book |last=David Tucker |first=Christopher J. Lamb |title=United States Special Operations Forces |publisher=Columbia University Press |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-231-13190-2}} * {{cite book |last=Wise |first=Harold Lee |title=Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988 |publisher=US Naval Institute Press |date=May 2007 |isbn=978-1-59114-970-5}} ==== Web ==== * USDOD. [https://web.archive.org/web/20040117084621/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ U.S. DOD Dictionary of Military Terms]. United States of America: U.S. Department of Defense. 5 June 2003. * USDOD. [https://web.archive.org/web/20040117084621/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ U.S. DOD Dictionary of Military Terms: Joint Acronyms and Abbreviations]. United States of America: U.S. Department of Defense. 5 June 2003. * {{cite news|last=Talmadge |first=Eric |title=New US Submarines Trade Nukes for SEALs |agency=Associated Press |date=27 February 2008 |url=http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Feb27/0,4670,StealthatSea,00.html |publisher=Fox News |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080308233658/http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Feb27/0,4670,StealthatSea,00.html |archive-date=8 March 2008 }} * {{cite news |last=Eric Schmitt |first=Michael R. Gordon |title=Leak on Cross-Border Chases From Iraq |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=4 February 2008 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/04/washington/04rules.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=Army+Rangers&st=nyt&oref=slogin }} * {{cite news |last=von Zielbauer |first=Paul |title=Criminal Charges Are Expected Against Marines, Official Says |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=27 April 2007 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/world/asia/27abuse.html?scp=1&sq=MARSOC&st=nyt }} * {{cite news |last=Graham |first=Bradley |title=Elite Marine Unit to Help Fight Terrorism |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110102069.html |access-date=27 May 2010 |date=2 November 2005 }} {{Refend}} ==External links== {{Commons category}} * [https://web.archive.org/web/20181024195712/https://www.socom.mil/ U.S. Special Operations Command] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20010331022307/http://www.soc.mil/ U.S. Army Special Operations Command] * [http://www.marsoc.marines.mil/ U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20130514123218/https://www.navsoc.navy.mil/ U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20071231203327/http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/ Air Force Special Operations Command] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20110529013300/http://www.defense.gov//news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63635 Department of Defense] * [https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20120913145325/https://jsou.socom.mil/Pages/Default.aspx Joint Special Operations University] <!--spacing, please do not remove--> <!--Portal listing is done in the order of precedence--> {{US Special Operations Forces}} {{Unified Combatant Command of the United States armed forces}} {{DOD agencies navbox}} {{US military navbox}} {{Authority control}} [[Category:Special operations commands of the United States Armed Forces|*]] [[Category:Military counterterrorist organizations]] [[Category:Military units and formations established in 1987]] [[Category:Military units and formations in Florida]] [[Category:Unified combatant commands of the U.S. Department of Defense]]'
New page wikitext, after the edit (new_wikitext)
'{{Short description|Unified combatant command of the United States Armed Forces responsible for special operations}} {{Distinguish|United States Southern Command}} {{Good article}} {{Use dmy dates|date=March 2016}} {{Infobox military unit | unit_name = United States Special Operations Command | image = United States Special Operations Command Insignia.svg | image_size = 200px | caption = United States Special Operations Command Emblem | start_date = {{start date and age|1987|04|16}}<br/>({{Age in years and months|1987|04|16}} ago){{r|2013 SOCOM Fact book}} | dates = | country = {{flag|United States}} | type = [[Unified combatant command]]<br />[[Special forces|Special operations forces]] | role = Functional combatant command | size = Entire command: more than 70,000{{r|2020 SOCOM Fact book}}<ref>[https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/socom-pivots-toward-great-power-competition/ Paul McCleary (21 May 2019) SOCOM Pivots Toward Great Power Competition] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190525023014/https://breakingdefense.com/2019/05/socom-pivots-toward-great-power-competition/ |date=25 May 2019 }} reports SOCOM strength to be 70,000</ref><br />Headquarters staff: 2,500{{r|2020 SOCOM Fact book}} | command_structure = [[United States Department of Defense]] | commander1 = [[General (United States)|General]] [[Bryan P. Fenton]], [[United States Army|USA]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.socom.mil/about/commanders-biography|title=Commander, USSOCOM, General Bryan P. Fenton|access-date=2023-04-30|website=U.S. Special Operations Command}}</ref> | commander1_label = Commander | commander2 = [[Vice admiral (United States)|Vice Admiral]] [[Collin P. Green]], [[United States Navy|USN]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.socom.mil/about/deputy-commanders-biography|title=Deputy Commander, USSOCOM, Vice Admiral Collin P. Green|access-date=2023-04-30|website=U.S. Special Operations Command}}</ref> | commander2_label = Deputy Commander | commander3 = [[Lieutenant general (United States)|Lieutenant General]] [[Francis L. Donovan]], [[United States Marine Corps|USMC]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.socom.mil/about/vice-commanders-biography|title=Vice Commander, USSOCOM, Lieutenant General Francis L. Donovan|access-date=2023-04-30|website=U.S. Special Operations Command}}</ref> | commander3_label = Vice Commander | commander4 = [[Command Sergeant Major|Command Sergeant Major]] [[Shane W. Shorter]], [[United States Army|USA]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.socom.mil/about/commanders-biography/senior-enlisted-leaders-biography|title=Senior Enlisted Leader, USSOCOM, Command Sergeant Major Shane W. Shorter|access-date=2023-04-30|website=U.S. Special Operations Command}}</ref> | commander4_label = Senior Enlisted Leader | garrison = [[MacDill Air Force Base]]<br />[[Florida]], U.S. | garrison_label = Headquarters | nickname = USSOCOM, SOCOM | battles = [[Operation Earnest Will]]<br/>[[United States invasion of Panama|Invasion of Panama]]<br/>[[Gulf War]]<br/>[[Unified Task Force]]<br/> [[Operation Gothic Serpent]] * [[Battle of Mogadishu (1993)|Battle of Mogadishu]] [[Operation Uphold Democracy]]<br/> [[War on Terror]] * [[War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)|War in Afghanistan]] * [[Iraq War]] * [[Operation Inherent Resolve]]<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/23/world/middleeast/us-commandos-iraq-isis.html|title=U.S. Soldier Dies in Raid to Free Prisoners of ISIS in Iraq|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=22 October 2015|access-date=24 October 2015|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151024031745/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/23/world/middleeast/us-commandos-iraq-isis.html|archive-date=24 October 2015|url-status=live}}</ref> | website = {{url|https://www.socom.mil|www.socom.mil}} }} {{United States Armed Forces sidebar}} The '''United States Special Operations Command''' ('''USSOCOM''' or '''SOCOM''') is the [[unified combatant command]] charged with overseeing the various [[Special forces|special operations]] component commands of the [[United States Army Special Operations Command|Army]], [[United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command|Marine Corps]], [[United States Naval Special Warfare Command|Navy]], and [[Air Force Special Operations Command|Air Force]] of the [[United States Armed Forces]]. The command is part of the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] and is the only unified combatant command created by an [[Act of Congress]]. USSOCOM is headquartered at [[MacDill Air Force Base]] in [[Tampa, Florida|Tampa]], Florida. The idea of an American unified special operations command had its origins in the aftermath of [[Operation Eagle Claw]], the disastrous attempted rescue of [[Iran hostage crisis|hostages]] at the [[Embassy of the United States, Tehran|American embassy]] in Iran in 1980. The ensuing investigation, chaired by [[Admiral (United States)|Admiral]] [[James L. Holloway III]], the retired [[Chief of Naval Operations]], cited lack of [[command and control]] and inter-service coordination as significant factors in the failure of the mission.{{r|Adm Holloway bio}} Since its activation on 16 April 1987, U.S. Special Operations Command has participated in many [[Military operation|operations]], from the 1989 [[United States invasion of Panama|invasion]] of [[Panama]] to the [[War on terror|War on Terror]].{{r|NYT Bang Panama}}{{r|NYT Regime thought}} USSOCOM is involved with clandestine activity, such as [[Direct action (military)|direct action]], [[special reconnaissance]], [[Counterterrorism|counter-terrorism]], [[foreign internal defense]], [[unconventional warfare (United States)|unconventional warfare]], [[psychological warfare]], [[civil affairs]], and [[War on drugs|counter-narcotics]] operations. Each branch has a distinct Special Operations Command that is capable of running its own operations, but when the different special operations forces need to work together for an operation, USSOCOM becomes the joint component command of the operation, instead of a SOC of a specific branch.{{r|posture statement}} ==History== The unwieldy command and control structure of separate U.S. military special operations forces (SOF), which led to the failure of [[Operation Eagle Claw]] in 1980, highlighted the need within the [[United States Department of Defense|US Department of Defense]] for reform and reorganization. The [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|US Army Chief of Staff]], General [[Edward C. Meyer|Edward C. "Shy" Meyer]], had already helped create the U.S. [[Delta Force]] in 1977.{{r|Delta elite force}} Following Eagle Claw, he called for a further restructuring of special operations capabilities. Although unsuccessful at the joint level, Meyer nevertheless went on to consolidate [[United States Army Special Operations Command|Army SOF]] units under the new 1st Special Operations Command in 1982.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.army.mil/article/230463/u_s_army_special_operations_command_30th_anniversary|title=U.S. Army Special Operations Command 30th Anniversary|website=www.army.mil}}</ref> [[File:Barry Goldwater.jpg|thumb|[[Senator Barry Goldwater]], former Chairman of the [[Senate Armed Services Committee]]]] By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the [[United States Congress|US Congress]] of the need for military reforms. In June, the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Senate Armed Services Committee]] (SASC) began a two-year-long study of the Defense Department, which included an examination of SOF spearheaded by Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] ([[Republican Party (United States)|R]]-AZ). With concern mounting on [[Capitol Hill]], the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; this agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF.{{r|BIT}}{{r|hr5109}} The Joint Special Operations Agency thus did little to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies, and therefore was deemed insufficient. Within the Defense Department, there were a few staunch SOF supporters. [[Noel Koch]], Principal Deputy Assistant [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] for International Security Affairs, and his deputy, [[Lynn Rylander]], both advocated SOF reforms.{{r|socomch}} At the same time, a few on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul [[United States special operations forces|United States Special Operations Forces]]. They included Senators [[Sam Nunn]] ([[US Democratic Party|D]]-GA) and [[William Cohen]] (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the [[United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness]]. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country's capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem.{{r|socomch}} Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with [[low-intensity conflict]]s.{{r|BIT}} In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure, entitled "Defense Organization: The Need For Change."{{r|S.CON.RES.80}} [[James R. Locher III]], the principal author of this study, also examined past special operations and speculated on the most likely future threats. This influential document led to the 1986 [[Goldwater–Nichols Act|Goldwater-Nichols Act]].{{r|H.R.3622}}{{r|reorg JCS}} By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform bills in both houses of Congress. On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced the Senate bill, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others, which called for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office in the Defense Department to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for low-intensity conflict and special operations.{{r|S.2453}} Representative Daniel's proposal went even further—he wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the [[US Secretary of Defense]]; this would keep Joint Chiefs and the Services out of the SOF budget process.{{r|hr5109}} Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986. Admiral [[William J. Crowe Jr.]], [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]], led [[the Pentagon]]'s opposition to the bills. As an alternative, he proposed a new Special Operations Forces command led by a [[three-star general]]. This proposal was not well received on Capitol Hill—Congress wanted a [[four-star general]] in charge to give SOF more influence. A number of retired military officers and others testified in favor of the need for reform.{{r|socomch}} By most accounts, retired Army Major General [[Richard Scholtes]] gave the most compelling reasons for the change. Scholtes, who commanded the joint special operations task force during [[United States invasion of Grenada|Operation Urgent Fury]], explained how conventional force leaders misused SOF during the operation, not allowing them to use their unique capabilities, which resulted in high SOF casualties.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kukielski|first=Philip|date=June 2021|title=USSOCOM: The Astounding Story of Its Origin.|url=https://aircommando.org/portfolio-view/acj-vol-10-1/|journal=Air Commando Journal|volume=10| issue = 1|pages=45–49}}</ref> After his formal testimony, Scholtes met privately with a small number of Senators to elaborate on the problems that he had encountered in [[Grenada]].{{r|NYT Taubman}} Both the House and Senate passed SOF reform bills, and these went to a conference committee for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The bill called for a unified combatant command headed by a four-star general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]], and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called "SOF checkbook").{{r|SOLIC}}{{r|SOF transition Giles}} The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. This was interpreted as Congress forcing the hand of the DOD and the [[Presidency of Ronald Reagan|Reagan administration]] regarding what it saw as the past failures and emerging threats. The DOD and the administration were responsible for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently passed two additional bills to ensure implementation.{{r|socomch}} The legislation promised to improve SOF in several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11 provided SOF with control over its own resources, better enabling it to modernize the force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice cooperation: a single commander for all SOF promoted interoperability among the same command forces. The establishment of a four-star commander-in-chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict eventually gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of the Defense Department.{{r|SOLIC}} [[File:GEN James Lindsay 1986.jpg|thumb|left|[[General James Lindsay]], the first Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command]] However, implementing the provisions and mandates of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 was neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to arise was the appointment of an [[Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict|Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict]], whose principal duties included monitorship of special operations activities and the low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. Congress increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but the Department of Defense still did not fill this new billet. In December 1987, Congress directed [[United States Secretary of the Army|Secretary of the Army]] [[John Otho Marsh Jr.|John O. Marsh]] to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until the Senate approved a suitable replacement. Not until 18 months after the legislation passed did Ambassador [[Charles S. Whitehouse|Charles Whitehouse]] assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC).{{r|NYT Lewis}} Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM provided its own measure of excitement. A quick solution to manning and basing a brand new unified command was to abolish an existing command. [[United States Strike Command|United States Readiness Command]] (USREDCOM), with an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viable mission in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era, and its commander-in-chief, General [[James J. Lindsay|James Lindsay]], had had some special operations experience. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] that USREDCOM be disestablished to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM. President [[Ronald Reagan]] approved the establishment of the new command on 13 April 1987. The Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on 16 April 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be the first Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). The Senate accepted him without debate.{{r|socomch}} ===Operation Earnest Will=== [[File:MH-60 Blackhawk landing on Hercules.JPG|thumb|MH-60 landing on Hercules]] USSOCOM's first tactical operation involved [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (United States)|160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)]] ("Night Stalkers") aviators, SEALs, and [[Special Boat Teams]] (SBT) working together during Operation Earnest Will in September 1987. During [[Operation Earnest Will]], the United States ensured that neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships could safely transit the [[Persian Gulf]] during the [[Iran–Iraq War]]. Iranian attacks on tankers prompted [[Kuwait]] to ask the United States in December 1986 to register 11 Kuwaiti tankers as American ships so that they could be escorted by the U.S. Navy. President Reagan agreed to the Kuwaiti request on 10 March 1987, hoping it would deter Iranian attacks.{{r|socomch}} The protection offered by U.S. naval vessels, however, did not stop [[Iran]], which used mines and small boats to harass the convoys steaming to and from Kuwait. In late July 1987, Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, commander of the Middle East Force, requested NSW assets. Special Boat Teams deployed with six Mark III Patrol Boats and two SEAL platoons in August.{{r|socomch}} The Middle East Force decided to convert two oil servicing barges, Hercules and Wimbrown VII, into mobile sea bases. The mobile sea bases allowed SOF in the northern [[Persian Gulf]] to thwart clandestine [[Iran]]ian mining and small boat attacks. On 21 September, Nightstalkers flying MH-60 and [[MD Helicopters MH-6 Little Bird|Little Birds]] took off from the frigate [[USS Jarrett|USS ''Jarrett'']] to track an Iranian ship, ''[[Iran Ajr]]''. The Nightstalkers observed ''Iran Ajr'' turn off her lights and begin laying mines. After receiving permission to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. As ''Iran Ajr'''s crew began to push mines over the side, the helicopters resumed firing until the crew abandoned the ship. Special Boat Teams provided security while a SEAL team boarded the vessel at first light and discovered nine mines on the vessel's deck, as well as a logbook revealing areas where previous mines had been laid. The logbook implicated Iran in mining international waters.{{r|socomch}} [[File:Operation Nimble Archer DN-SC-88-01042.jpg|thumb|left|One of two [[Iran]]ian oil platforms set ablaze after shelling by American [[destroyers]]]] Within a few days, the Special Operations forces had determined the [[Iran]]ian pattern of activity; the Iranians hid during the day near oil and gas platforms in Iranian waters and at night they headed toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. With this knowledge, SOF launched three Little Bird helicopters and two patrol craft to the buoy. The Little Bird helicopters arrived first and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored near the buoy. After a short but intense firefight, the helicopters sank all three boats. Three days later, in mid-October, an Iranian Silkworm missile hit the tanker ''[[MV Sea Isle City|Sea Isle City]]'' near the oil terminal outside [[Kuwait City]]. Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the missile attack.{{r|socomch}}{{r|OEWDP}} During [[Operation Nimble Archer]], four [[Destroyer|destroyers]] shelled two oil platforms in the Rostam oil field. After the shelling, a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit planted explosives on one of the platforms to destroy it. The SEALs next boarded and searched a third-platform {{convert|2|mi|0}} away. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence purposes. On 14 April 1988, {{convert|65|mi|sigfig=2}} east of [[Bahrain]], the frigate [[USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58)|USS ''Samuel B. Roberts'']] hit a mine, blowing an immense hole in its hull.{{r|NHH}} Ten sailors were injured. During [[Operation Praying Mantis]] the U.S. retaliated fiercely, attacking the Iranian frigate ''Sahand'' and oil platforms in the Sirri and Sassan oil fields.{{r|OEWDP}} After U.S. warships bombarded the Sirri platform and set it ablaze, a UH-60 with a SEAL platoon flew toward the platform but was unable to get close enough because of the roaring fire. Secondary explosions soon wrecked the platform.{{r|socomch}} Thereafter, Iranian attacks on neutral ships dropped drastically. On 18 July, Iran accepted the United Nations cease-fire; on 20 August 1988, the Iran–Iraq War ended. The remaining SEALs, patrol boats, and helicopters then returned to the United States.{{r|socomch}} Special operations forces provided critical skills necessary to help CENTCOM gain control of the northern Persian Gulf and balk Iran's small boats and minelayers. The ability to work at night proved vital because Iranian units used darkness to conceal their actions. Additionally, because of Earnest Will operational requirements, USSOCOM would acquire new weapons systems—the patrol coastal ships and the [[Mark V Special Operations Craft]].{{r|socomch}} ===Somalia=== Special Operations Command first became involved in [[Somalia]] in 1992 as part of [[Operation Provide Relief]]. C-130s circled over Somali airstrips during the delivery of relief supplies. Special Forces medics accompanied many relief flights into the airstrips throughout southern Somalia to assess the area. They were the first U.S. soldiers in Somalia, arriving before U.S. forces who supported the expanded relief operations of Restore Hope.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYT somalia step}}{{r|NYTttt}} The first teams into Somalia was CIA [[Special Activities Center|Special Activities Division]] paramilitary officers with elements of [[Joint Special Operations Command|JSOC]]. They conducted very high-risk advanced force operations prior to the entry of the follow-on forces. The first casualty of the conflict came from this team and was a Paramilitary officer and former Delta Force operator named [[Larry Freedman]]. Freedman was awarded the [[Intelligence Star]] for ''"extraordinary heroism"'' for his actions.{{r|Gup 2000}} The earliest missions during [[Unified Task Force|Operation Restore Hope]] were conducted by Navy SEALs. The SEALs performed several hydrographic reconnaissance missions to find suitable landing sites for [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]]. On 7 December, the SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where they found suitable landing sites, assessed the area for threats, and concluded that the port could support offloading ships. This was a tough mission because the SEALs swam against a strong current which left many of them overheated and exhausted. Furthermore, they swam through raw sewage in the harbor, which made them sick.{{r|socomch}} When the first SEALs hit the shore the following night, they were surprised to meet members of the news media. The first Marines came ashore soon thereafter, and the press redirected their attention to them. Later, the SEALs provided personal security for [[George H. W. Bush|President George Bush]] during a visit to Somalia.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYTttt}} In December 1992, Special Forces assets in Kenya moved to Somalia and joined Operation Restore Hope. January 1993, a Special Forces command element deployed to Mogadishu as the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR) that would command and control all special operations for Restore Hope. JSOFOR's mission was to make initial contact with indigenous factions and leaders; provide information for force protection; and provide reports on the area for future relief and security operations. Before redeploying in April, JSOFOR elements drove over {{convert|26000|mi|sigfig=2}}, captured 277 weapons, and destroyed over {{convert|45,320|lb|kg}} of explosives.{{r|socomch}} [[File:75th Ranger Regiment Bravo Company 3rd Batallion Somalia 1993.jpg|left|thumb|250px|Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion of the [[75th Ranger Regiment (United States)|75th Ranger Regiment]] in Somalia, 1993]] In August 1993, Secretary of Defense [[Les Aspin]] directed the deployment of a Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) to Somalia in response to attacks made by General [[Mohamed Farrah Aidid]]'s supporters upon U.S. and UN forces. The JSOTF, named Task Force (TF) Ranger was charged with a mission named [[Operation Gothic Serpent]] to capture Aidid. This was an especially arduous mission, for Aidid had gone underground, after several [[Lockheed AC-130]] air raids and UN assaults on his strongholds.{{r|socomch}}{{r|BHD}}{{r|BoG}} While Marines from the 24th MEU provided an interim QRF (Force Recon Det and helicopters from HMM-263), the task force arrived in the country and began training exercises. The Marines were asked to take on the Aidid snatch mission, but having the advantage of being in the area for more than two months, decided after mission analysis that the mission was a "no-go" due to several factors, centered around the inability to rescue the crew of a downed helicopter (re: the indigenous forces technique of using RPGs against helicopters and blocking the narrow streets in order to restrict the movement of a ground rescue force). This knowledge was not passed on to the Rangers, due to the Marines operating from the USS Wasp and the Rangers remaining on land. TF Ranger was made up of operators from [[Delta Force]], [[75th Ranger Regiment]], [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (United States)|160th SOAR]], SEALs from the [[Naval Special Warfare Development Group]], and Air Force special tactics units.{{r|socomch}}{{r|BHD}} During August and September 1993, the task force conducted six missions into [[Mogadishu]], all of which were successes. Although Aidid remained free, the effect of these missions seriously limited his movements.{{r|BoG}} On 3 October, TF Ranger launched its seventh mission, this time into Aidid's stronghold the [[Bakara Market]] to capture two of his key lieutenants. The mission was expected to take only one or two hours.{{r|BHD}} Helicopters carried an assault and a ground convoy of security teams launched in the late afternoon from the TF Ranger compound at Mogadishu airport. The TF came under increasingly heavy fire, more intense than during previous missions. The assault team captured 24 Somalis including Aidid's lieutenants and were loading them onto the convoy trucks when a [[UH-60 Black Hawk|MH-60 Blackhawk]] was hit by a [[rocket-propelled grenade]] (RPG).{{r|socomch}}{{r|BoG}} A small element from the security forces, as well as an [[MH-6]] assault helicopter and an MH-60 carrying a fifteen-man combat search and rescue (CSAR) team, rushed to the crash site.{{r|socomch}}{{r|BHD}}{{r|BoG}} The [[Battle of Mogadishu (1993)|battle]] became increasingly worse. An RPG struck another MH-60, crashing less than {{convert|1|mi|1}} to the south of the first downed helicopter. The task force faced overwhelming Somali mobs that overran the crash sites, causing a dire situation.{{r|BHD}} A Somali mob overran the second site and, despite a heroic defense, killed everyone except the pilot, whom they took prisoner. Two defenders of this crash site, [[Gary Gordon|Master Sergeant Gary Gordon]] and [[Randy Shughart|Sergeant First Class Randall Shughart]], were posthumously awarded the [[Medal of Honor]].{{r|socomch}}{{r|BHD}}{{r|BoG}} About this time, the mission's quick reaction force (QRF) also tried to reach the second crash site. This force too was pinned by the Somali fire and required the fire support of two [[AH-6]] helicopters before it could break contact and make its way back to the base.{{r|socomch}} [[File:Battle of mogadishu map of city.png|thumb|Map of the main battle sites during the [[Battle of Mogadishu (1993)|Battle of Mogadishu]]]] The assault and security elements moved on foot towards the first crash area, passing through heavy fire, and occupied buildings south and southwest of the downed helicopter. They fought to establish defensive positions so as not to be pinned down by the very heavy enemy fire while treating their wounded and worked to free the pilot's body from the downed helicopter. With the detainees loaded on trucks, the ground convoy force attempted to reach the first crash site. Unable to find it amongst the narrow, winding alleyways, the convoy came under devastating small arms and RPG fire. The convoy had to return to base after suffering numerous casualties and sustaining substantial damage to their vehicles.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/legacy-black-hawk-down-180971000/|title=The Legacy of Black Hawk Down|first=Mark|last=Bowden|website=Smithsonian Magazine}}</ref> Reinforcements, consisting of elements from the QRF, [[10th Mountain Division]] soldiers, Rangers, SEALs, [[Pakistan Army]] tanks and [[Malaysian Army|Malaysian]] [[armored personnel carriers]], finally arrived at 1:55&nbsp;am on 4 October. The combined force worked until dawn to free the pilot's body, receiving RPG and small arms fire throughout the night.{{r|socomch}} All the casualties were loaded onto the armored personnel carriers, and the remainder of the force was left behind and had no choice but to move out on foot.{{r|BHD}} AH-6 gunships raked the streets with fire to support the movement. The main force of the convoy arrived at the [[Pakistan Army|Pakistani]] Stadium-compound for the QRF-at 6:30&nbsp;am,{{r|BHD}} thus concluding one of the bloodiest and fiercest urban firefights since the [[Vietnam War]]. Task Force Ranger experienced a total of 17 killed in action and 106 wounded. Various estimates placed Somali casualties above 1,000.{{r|BHD}} Although Task Force Ranger's few missions were successes, the overall outcome of Operation Gothic Serpent was deemed a failure because of the Task Force's failure to complete their stated mission, capturing [[Mohamed Farrah Aidid]].{{r|BHD}} Most U.S. forces pulled out of Somalia by March 1994. The withdrawal from Somalia was completed in March 1995.{{r|socomch}} Even though Operation Gothic Serpent failed, USSOCOM still made significant contributions to operations in Somalia. SOF performed reconnaissance and surveillance missions, assisted with humanitarian relief, protected American forces, and conducted riverine patrols. Additionally, they ensured the safe landing of the Marines and safeguarded the arrival of merchant ships carrying food.{{r|socomch}}{{r|OEWDP}} ===Iraq=== USSOCOM's [[10th Special Forces Group]], elements of [[JSOC]], and CIA/SAD Paramilitary Officers linked up again and were the first to enter Iraq prior to the invasion. Their efforts organized the Kurdish [[Peshmerga]] to defeat [[Ansar Al Islam]] in Northern Iraq before the invasion. This battle was for control of a territory in Northeastern Iraq that was completely occupied by Ansar Al Islam, an ally of Al Qaeda. This was a very significant battle and led to the death of a substantial number of terrorists and the uncovering of a chemical weapons facility at Sargat. These terrorists would have been in the subsequent insurgency had they not been eliminated during this battle. Sargat was the only facility of its type discovered in the Iraq war. This battle may have been the [[Battle of Tora Bora|Tora Bora]] of Iraq, but it was a sound defeat for Al Qaeda and their ally Ansar Al Islam.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.wearethemighty.com/articles/the-special-forces-operation-viking-hammer/|title=The Special Forces op that supported the 2003 invasion of Iraq|date=19 March 2021}}</ref> This combined team then led the Peshmerga against Saddam's Northern Army. This effort kept Saddam's forces in the north and denied the ability to redeploy to contest the invasion force coming from the south. This effort may have saved the lives of hundreds if not thousands of coalition servicemen and women.{{r|PoA}} At the launch of the [[Iraq War]], dozens of 12-member [[Special Forces]] teams infiltrated southern and western Iraq to hunt for [[Scud]] missiles and pinpoint bombing targets. Scores of [[Navy SEALs]] seized oil terminals and pumping stations on the southern coast.{{r|NYT Dao}} [[Air Force combat controllers]] flew combat missions in [[Lockheed MC-130|MC-130H Combat Talon IIs]] and established austere desert airstrips to begin the flow of soldiers and supplies deep into Iraq. It was notably different from the [[Persian Gulf war]] of 1991, where Special Operations forces were mostly kept participating. But it would not be a replay of Afghanistan, where [[Army Special Forces]] and Navy SEALs led the fighting. After their star turn in Afghanistan, many special operators were disappointed to play a supporting role in Iraq. Many special operators felt restricted by cautious commanders.{{r|NYTaSOF}} From that point, USSOCOM has since killed or captured hundreds of insurgents and [[Al-Qaeda]] terrorists. It has conducted several foreign internal defense missions successfully training the [[Iraqi security forces]].{{r|Kruzel}}{{r|NYT Gordon}} ===Afghanistan=== United States Special Operations Command played a pivotal role in fighting the former [[Taliban]] government in [[Afghanistan]] in 2001{{r|Kozaryn}} and toppling it thereafter, as well as combating the insurgency and capturing [[Saddam Hussein]] in Iraq. USSOCOM in 2004 was developing plans to have an expanded and more complex role in the global campaign against terrorism,{{r|reach of war}} and that role continued to emerge before and after the [[killing of Osama bin Laden]] in Pakistan in 2011.{{r|WP01}} In 2010, "of about 13,000 Special Operations forces deployed overseas, about 9,000 [were] evenly divided between Iraq and Afghanistan."{{r|WP01}} [[File:Special Forces Medic in Afghanistan.jpg|thumb|A Special Forces soldier from [[7th Special Forces Group (United States)|7th SFG(A)]] gives an [[Afghans|Afghan]] boy a coloring book in [[Kandahar Province]] during a meeting with local leaders, 12 September 2002]] In the initial stages of the [[War in Afghanistan (2001–present)|War in Afghanistan]], USSOCOM forces linked up with CIA Paramilitary Officers from [[Special Activities Division]] to defeat the Taliban without the need for large-scale conventional forces.{{r|Lehman}} This was one of the biggest successes of the global [[War on Terrorism]].{{r|Time Waller}} These units linked up several times during this war and engaged in several furious battles with the enemy. One such battle happened during [[Operation Anaconda]], the mission to squeeze the life out of a Taliban and Al-Qaeda stronghold dug deep into the [[Shah-i-Kot Valley]] and [[Arma Mountains]] of eastern Afghanistan. The operation was seen as one of the heaviest and bloodiest fights in the War in Afghanistan.{{r|Time Anaconda}} The battle on an Afghan mountaintop called [[Takur Ghar]] featured special operations forces from all 4 services and the CIA. Navy SEALs, Army Rangers, Air Force Combat Controllers, and Pararescuemen fought against entrenched Al-Qaeda fighters atop a {{convert|10000|ft|m|adj=on}} mountain. Subsequently, the entrenched Taliban became targets of every asset in the sky. According to an executive summary, the [[Battle of Takur Ghar]] was the most intense firefight American special operators have been involved in since 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed in [[Battle of Mogadishu (1993)|Mogadishu]], Somalia, in 1993.{{r|Takur Ghar}}{{r|Takur Ghar summary}}{{r|Roberts Ridge}} During [[Operation Red Wings]] on 28 June 2005, four Navy SEALs, pinned down in a firefight, radioed for help. A Chinook helicopter, carrying 16 service members, responded but was shot down. All members of the rescue team and three of four SEALs on the ground died. It was the worst loss of life in Afghanistan since the invasion in 2001. The Navy SEAL [[Marcus Luttrell]] alone survived.{{r|Lone Survivor}}{{r|Sole Survivor}} Team leader [[Michael P. Murphy]] was awarded the [[Medal of Honor]] for his actions in the battle.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://taskandpurpose.com/history/michael-murphy-operation-red-wings/|title=On June 28, 2005, Navy SEAL Lt. Michael Murphy was killed in Afghanistan after demonstrating extreme heroism and leadership while he and his three SEAL teammates were under attack by the Taliban. Two years later, he was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.|date=28 June 2020}}</ref> ===Global presence=== [[File:Members of the U.S. Air Force Special Operations Command, assigned to the 23rd Special Tactics Squadron.jpg|thumb|U.S. Air Force Special Tactics Commandos training in Jordan]] In 2010, special operations forces were deployed in 75 countries, compared with about 60 at the beginning of 2009.{{r|WP01}} In 2011, SOC spokesman Colonel Tim Nye (Army{{r|ArmyTimes Naylor}}) was reported to have said that the number of countries with SOC presence will likely reach 120 and that joint training exercises will have been carried out in most or all of those countries during the year. One study identified joint-training exercises in Belize, Brazil, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Germany, Indonesia, Mali, Norway, Panama, and Poland in 2010 and also, through mid-year 2011, in the Dominican Republic, Jordan, Romania, Senegal, South Korea, and Thailand, among other nations. In addition, SOC forces executed the high-profile [[killing of Osama bin Laden]] in Pakistan in 2011.{{Citation needed|date=December 2021}} In November 2009 ''[[The Nation]]'' reported on a covert JSOC/[[Blackwater USA|Blackwater]] anti-terrorist operation in Pakistan.<ref>Jeremy Scahill, [http://www.thenation.com/article/secret-us-war-pakistan "The Secret U.S. War in Pakistan"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120302151837/http://www.thenation.com/article/secret-us-war-pakistan |date=2 March 2012 }}, ''The Nation'', 23 November 2009.</ref> In 2010, [[White House]] [[counterterrorism]] director [[John O. Brennan]] said that the United States "will not merely respond after the fact" of a terrorist attack but will "take the fight to al-Qaeda and its extremist affiliates whether they plot and train in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and beyond." Olson said, "In some places, in deference to host-country sensitivities, we are lower in profile. In every place, Special Operations forces activities are coordinated with the U.S. ambassador and are under the operational control of the four-star regional commander."{{r|WP01}} The conduct of actions by SOC forces outside of Iraq and Afghan war zones has been the subject of internal U.S. debate, including between representatives of the [[George W. Bush|Bush]] administration such as [[John B. Bellinger III]], on one hand, and the [[Barack Obama|Obama]] administration on another. The United Nations in 2010 also "questioned the administration's authority under international law to conduct such raids, particularly when they kill innocent civilians. One possible legal justification – the permission of the country in question – is complicated in places such as Pakistan and Yemen, where the governments privately agree but do not publicly acknowledge approving the attacks," as one report put it.{{r|WP01}} ==Subordinate commands== ===Joint Special Operations Command=== {{main|Joint Special Operations Command}} [[File:Seal of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC).svg|thumb|175px|The Joint Special Operations Command insignia]] [[Joint Special Operations Command]] (JSOC){{r|NYT Risen}} is a component command of the USSOCOM and is charged to study special operations requirements and techniques to ensure interoperability and equipment standardization, plan and conduct special operations exercises and training, and develop Joint Special Operations Tactics.{{r|2013 SOCOM Fact book}} It was established in 1980 on the recommendation of [[Charles Alvin Beckwith|Col. Charlie Beckwith]], in the aftermath of the failure of [[Operation Eagle Claw]].<ref>Emerson 1988, p. 26.</ref> '''Units''' * The U.S. Army's [[1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta]], popularly known as Delta Force, is the first of the two counter-terrorism, [[Special Mission Unit|special mission units]] that fall under the Joint Special Operations Command.{{r|NYTsw}} Modeled after the British [[Special Air Service]], Delta Force is regarded as one of the premier special operations forces in the world.{{r|IDF}} Delta also includes a stringent training and selection process. Delta recruits primarily from the most proficient and highly skilled soldiers of the [[United States Army Special Operations Command|U.S. Army Special Operations Command]], although it encompasses the capability of recruiting throughout the U.S. Armed Forces.{{r|BHD}}{{r|IDF}} Recruits must pass a rigid selection course before beginning training, known as the Operators' Training Course (OTC). Delta has received training from numerous U.S. government agencies and other tiers one SOF and has created a curriculum based on this training and techniques that it has developed.{{r|IDF}} Delta conducts clandestine and covert special operations all over the world.{{r|IDF}} It has the capability to conduct myriad special operations missions but specializes in counter-terrorism and hostage rescue operations.{{r|BHD}}{{r|NYTsw}}{{r|NYTsomblu}} * The [[Intelligence Support Activity]] (ISA, The Activity) is the support branch of JSOC and USSOCOM. Its primary missions are to provide Human Intelligence ([[HUMINT]]) and Signal Intelligence ([[SIGINT]]) mainly for Delta and DEVGRU's operations.{{r|NYTsw}}{{r|Smith 2007}} Before the establishing of the [[Strategic Support Branch]] in 2001, the ISA required the permission of the [[CIA]] to conduct covert operations, which considerably lessened its effectiveness in its support of JSOC operations as a whole.{{r|NYTsw}}{{r|WP Gellman}}{{r|NYTSU}} * The U.S. Navy's [[Naval Special Warfare Development Group]] (DEVGRU, SEAL Team Six) is the second of the two counter-terrorism, special mission units that fall under the Joint Special Operations Command.{{r|NYTsw}} DEVGRU is the U.S. Navy's counterpart to Delta, specializing in maritime counter-terrorism. DEVGRU recruits the most proficient operators from [[United States Naval Special Warfare Command|Naval Special Warfare]], specifically the [[United States Navy SEALs|U.S. Navy SEALs]]. Like Delta, DEVGRU can conduct a variety of special operations missions but trains primarily for maritime counter-terrorism and hostage rescue operations. DEVGRU has gained prolific notoriety in recent years, due to high-profile hostage rescue operations and their role in [[Operation Neptune Spear|the killing of Osama Bin Laden]]. {{r|BHD}}{{r|NYTsw}} * The Air Force [[24th Special Tactics Squadron]] (24th STS) is the [[Air Force Special Operations Command|AFSOC]] component of JSOC. The 24th STS consists of specially selected AFSOC personnel, including [[United States Air Force Pararescue|Pararescuemen]], [[United States Air Force Combat Control Team|Combat Controllers]], and [[United States Air Force Tactical Air Control Party|TACPs]]. These special operators usually serve with Delta Force and DEVGRU, because of the convenience of the 24th STS's ability to synchronize and control the different elements of airpower and enhance air operations deep in enemy territory; as well as, in the case of Pararescuemen, providing needed medical assistance.{{r|BHD}} * The [[Joint Communications Unit]] (JCU) is a technical unit of the United States Special Operations Command charged to standardize and ensure interoperability of communication procedures and equipment of the Joint Special Operations Command and its subordinate units. The JCU was activated at Ft. Bragg, NC in 1980, after the failure of Operation Eagle Claw. The JCU has earned the reputation of "DoD's Finest Communicators".<ref>[http://www.jcu.mil "Home"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180401055659/http://www.jcu.mil// |date=1 April 2018 }}. [[Joint Communications Unit]]. United States Special Operations Command. United States Department of Defense ([[Tampa, Florida]]). Retrieved December 28, 2018.</ref> Portions of JSOC units have made up the constantly changing special operations task force, operating in the [[U.S. Central Command]] area of operations. The [[Task Force 11]], [[Task Force 121]], [[Task Force 6-26]] and [[Task Force 145]] are creations of the Pentagon's post-11 September campaign against terrorism, and it quickly became the model for how the military would gain intelligence and battle insurgents in the future. Originally known as Task Force 121, it was formed in the summer of 2003 when the military merged two existing Special Operations units, one hunting [[Osama bin Laden]] in and around Afghanistan, and the other tracking [[Sadaam Hussein]] in Iraq.{{r|NYT Schmitt 2006}}{{r|NYT Sanger}} <ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htsf/20210416.aspx|title=Special Operations: Call In A Specialist For Instant Relief|website=www.strategypage.com}}</ref> ===Special Operations Command – Joint Capabilities=== Special Operations Command – Joint Capabilities (SOC-JC) was transferred to USSOCOM from the soon-to-be disestablished [[United States Joint Forces Command]] in 2011. {{r|jfcom transition}} Its primary mission was to train conventional and SOF commanders and their staffs to support USSOCOM international engagement training requirements, and support the implementation of capability solutions in order to improve strategic and operational Warfighting readiness and joint interoperability. SOC-JC must also be prepared to support the deployed Special Operations Joint Task Force (SOJTF) Headquarters (HQ). The [[Government Accountability Office]] wrote that SOC-JC was disestablished in 2013, and positions were to be zeroed out in 2014.<ref>{{Cite book|title = DEFENSE HEADQUARTERS: DOD Needs to Reevaluate Its Approach for Managing Resources Devoted to the Functional Combatant Commands|publisher = Government Accountability Office|date = June 2014|location = Washington DC|pages = 45|url = http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664443.pdf|access-date = 29 January 2016|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160909050606/http://www.gao.gov/assets/670/664443.pdf|archive-date = 9 September 2016|url-status = live}}</ref> ===Army Special Operations Command === {{main|United States Army Special Operations Command}} [[File:US Army Special Operations Command SSI.svg|thumb|95px|USASOC [[Shoulder sleeve insignia|SSI]]]] On 1 December 1989, the [[United States Army Special Operations Command]] (USASOC) activated as the 16th major Army command. These special operations forces have been America's spearhead for unconventional warfare for more than 40 years. USASOC commands such units as the well known Special Forces (SF, or the "[[Special Forces (United States Army)|Green Berets]]"), the [[United States Army Rangers|Rangers]], and such relatively unknown units as two psychological operations groups, a special aviation regiment, a civil affairs brigade, and a special sustainment brigade. These are one of the USSOCOM's main weapons for waging unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency. The significance of these units is emphasized as conventional conflicts are becoming less prevalent as insurgent and guerrilla warfare increases.{{r|USASOC overview}}{{r|NYT Schmitt}}<ref name="USASOC">[http://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/USASOCHQFactSheet.html Army Special Operations Forces Fact Book 2018] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20161019193907/http://www.soc.mil/USASOCHQ/USASOCHQFactSheet.html |date=19 October 2016 }}, USASOC official website, dated 2018, last accessed 28 July 2019</ref><ref>[[:File:528th Special Operations Sustainment Brigade Organizational Chart 2020.jpg|528th Special Operations Sustainment Brigade Organizational Chart 2020]], 528th Sustainment Brigade History Handbook Published by the U.S. Army Special Operations Command History Office Fort Bragg, North Carolina 2020, by Chris Howard ARSOF Support Historian, dated 5 December 2020, last accessed 12 December 2020</ref> {|class="wikitable" |- !Name !! Headquarters !! Structure and purpose |- |width=225|[[File:US Army Special Forces SSI.png|25px|left]] [[1st Special Forces Command (Airborne)]] |[[Fort Bragg]], [[North Carolina]] |The [[File:US Army 1st Special Forces Command Flash.png|15px]] 1st Special Forces Command (Airborne) manages seven special forces groups—the [[File:1sfg.png|15px]] [[1st Special Forces Group (United States)|1st Special Forces Group (Airborne)]], [[File:3sfg.svg|15px]] [[3rd Special Forces Group (United States)|3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne)]], [[File:5th SFG Beret Flash.png|15px]] [[5th Special Forces Group (United States)|5th Special Forces Group (Airborne)]], [[File:7th Special Forces Group.svg|15px]] [[7th Special Forces Group (United States)|7th Special Forces Group (Airborne)]], [[File:USA - 10th Special Forces Flash.svg|15px]] [[10th Special Forces Group (United States)|10th Special Forces Group (Airborne)]], [[File:19sfg.svg|15px]] [[19th Special Forces Group|19th Special Forces Group (Airborne)]] ([[Army National Guard|ARNG]]) and [[File:20sfg.svg|21px]][[20th Special Forces Group|20th Special Forces Group (Airborne)]] (ARNG)—that are designed to deploy and execute nine doctrinal missions: [[unconventional warfare (United States)|unconventional warfare]], [[foreign internal defense]], [[direct action (military)|direct action]], [[counter-insurgency]], [[special reconnaissance]], [[counter-terrorism]], [[information operations]], [[counterproliferation]] of [[weapon of mass destruction]], and [[security force assistance]]; each special forces group consists of three to four battalions with a group support company and headquarters company. The command also manages two [[Psychological operations (United States)|psychological operations]] groups—the [[File:US Army 4th Military Information Support Group Flash.png|15px]] [[4th Psychological Operations Group|4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne)]] and [[File:US Army 8th Military Information Support Group Flash.png|15px]] [[8th Psychological Operations Group|8th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne)]]—tasked to work with foreign nations to induce or reinforce behavior favorable to U.S. objectives; each psychological operations group consists of three to four battalions, most of which are geographically aligned. The command also manages the [[File:95CivilAffairsBdeFlash.jpg|15px]] [[95th Civil Affairs Brigade|95th Civil Affairs Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne)]] which enables military commanders and [[U.S. ambassadors]] to achieve national objectives by countering adversary control and improving a partner's control over populations via five geographically focused battalions and the [[File:US Army 528th Support Battalion Flash.png|15px]] [[528th Sustainment Brigade (United States)|528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne)]] that provides combat service support, combat medical support, and intelligence via multiple support operations teams and three battalions. |- |[[File:US Army Special Operations Command SSI.svg|25px|left]] [[Delta Force|1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta]] |Ft. Bragg, North Carolina |Elite special operations and counter-terrorism unit under the control of [[File:JSOC flash.png|15px]] [[Joint Special Operations Command]]. |- |[[File:75 Ranger Regiment Shoulder Sleeve Insignia.svg|25px|left]] [[75th Ranger Regiment (United States)|75th Ranger Regiment]] |[[Fort Benning]], [[Georgia (U.S. state)|Georgia]] |In addition to a regimental headquarters, a Special Troops Battalion, and a military intelligence battalion, the [[File:75thrangerflash.svg|15px]] 75th Ranger Regiment consists of three maneuver battalions of elite airborne infantry specializing in large-scale, joint forcible entry operations while simultaneously executing precision targeting operations raids across the globe. Additional capabilities include [[special reconnaissance]], [[air assault]], and direct action raids seizing key terrain such as airfields, destroying strategic facilities, and capturing or killing the enemies of the Nation. The Regiment also helps develop the equipment, technologies, training, and readiness that bridge the gap between special operations and conventional combat maneuver organizations. |- |[[File:U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command SSI (2013-2015).png|25px|left]] [[U.S. Army Special Operations Aviation Command (USASOAC)|Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Airborne)]] |Ft. Bragg, North Carolina |The [[File:USASOAC Flash.png|15px]] Army Special Operations Aviation Command (Airborne) organizes, mans, trains, resources and equips Army special operations aviation units to provide responsive, special operations aviation support to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF) consisting of five units and the [[File:US Army 160th SOAR Flash.svg|15px]] [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (United States)|160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)]]. |- |[[File:JFKSWCS SSI.gif|25px|left]] [[John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School]] |Ft. Bragg, North Carolina |The [[File:USAJFKSWCS flash.gif|15px]] SWCS selects and trains Army Special Forces, Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations soldiers consisting of five distinct units and the Directorate of Training and Doctrine: [[File:US Army Special Warfare Training Group Flash.png|15px]] 1st Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne)—which focuses on entry level training—, [[File:US Army 2nd Special Warfare Training Group Flash.png|15px]] 2nd Special Warfare Training Group (Airborne)—which focuses on advanced training—, [[File:US Army Special Warfare Medical Group Flash.png|15px]] Special Warfare Medical Group (Airborne)—which is part of the Joint Special Operations Medical Training Center—, [[File:US Army Special Forces Warrant Officer Institute Flash.png|15px]] Special Forces [[Warrant officer (United States)|Warrant Officer]] Institute, and [[File:US Army Special Warfare NCO Academy Flash.png|15px]] David K. Thuma [[Non-commissioned officer|Noncommissioned Officers]] [[Enlisted Professional Military Education#Army|Academy]]. |} '''Units:''' [[File:US soldiers on horseback 2001 Afghanistan.jpg|thumb|Special Forces soldiers from Task Force Dagger and Commander Abdul Rashid Dostum on horseback in the Dari-a-Souf Valley, Afghanistan, circa October 2001—celebrated in the movie ''[[12 Strong]]'']] * [[United States Army Special Forces]] (SF) aka Green Berets perform several doctrinal missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, special reconnaissance, direct action, and counter-terrorism. These missions make Special Forces unique in the U.S. military because they are employed throughout the three stages of the operational continuum: peacetime, conflict, and war.{{r|CSSF}} Foreign internal defense operations, SF's main peacetime mission, are designed to help friendly developing nations by working with their military and police forces to improve their technical skills, understanding of human rights issues, and help with humanitarian and civic action projects. Special Forces unconventional warfare capabilities provide a viable military option for a variety of operational taskings that are inappropriate or infeasible for conventional forces. Special Forces are the U.S. military's premiere unconventional warfare force.{{r|2002 Shanker}} Foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare missions are the bread and butter of Special Forces soldiers. For this reason, SF candidates are trained extensively in weapons, engineering, communications, and medicine. SF soldiers are taught to be warriors first and teachers second because they must be able to train their team and be able to train their allies during an FID or UW mission.{{r|CSSF}}{{r|WRPNYT}} Often SF units are required to perform additional, or collateral, activities outside their primary missions. These collateral activities are coalition warfare/support, combat search and rescue, security assistance, peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, humanitarian de-mining, and counter-drug operations.{{r|USASF mission}} * The [[Delta Force|1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta]] (1st SFOD-D), commonly referred to as Delta Force, Combat Applications Group/"CAG", "The Unit", Army Compartmented Element, or within JSOC as Task Force Green,<ref name="RelentStrike">{{cite book|last1=Naylor|first1=Sean|title=Relentless Strike|chapter=Chapter 4}}</ref> is an elite [[Special Mission Unit]] of the [[United States Army]], under the organization of the USASOC but is controlled by the [[Joint Special Operations Command]] (JSOC). It is used for hostage rescue and counterterrorism, as well as [[direct action (military)|direct action]] and [[reconnaissance]] against [[high-value target]]s. 1st SFOD-D and its [[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]] counterpart, [[United States Naval Special Warfare Development Group|DEVGRU, "SEAL Team 6"]], perform many of the most highly complex and dangerous missions in the U.S. military. These units are also often referred to as "Tier One" and [[Special Mission Unit|special mission units]] by the U.S. government. * The [[75th Ranger Regiment (United States)|75th Ranger Regiment]] (U.S. Army Rangers) is the premier light-infantry unit of the [[United States Army]] and is headquartered at [[Fort Benning]], [[Georgia (U.S. state)|Georgia]]. The 75th Ranger Regiment's mission is to plan and conduct special missions in support of U.S. policy and objectives.{{r|75th ranger website}} The Rangers are a flexible and rapid-deployable force. Each battalion can deploy anywhere in the world within 18 hours of notice. The Army places much importance on the 75th Ranger Regiment and its training; it possesses the capabilities to conduct conventional and most special operations missions. Rangers are capable of infiltrating by land, sea, or air and [[Direct action (military)|direct action]] operations such as conducting raids or assaulting buildings or airfields.{{r|75th ranger website2}} [[File:22nd STS and 160th SOAR helocast training.jpg|thumb|The [[22nd Special Tactics Squadron|22nd STS's]] Red Team jumps out of an [[MH-47]]G Chinook from the 160th SOAR during [[helocast]] alternate insertion and extraction training]] * The [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (United States)|160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment]] (Night Stalkers) headquartered at [[Fort Campbell]], [[Kentucky]] provides aviation support to units within USSOCOM. The Regiment consists of [[MH-6]] and [[AH-6]] light helicopters, [[Sikorsky UH-60 Black Hawk|MH-60]] helicopters and [[MH-47]] heavy assault helicopters. The capabilities of the 160th SOAR (A) have been evolving since the early 1980s. Its focus on night operations resulted in the nickname, "Night Stalkers."{{r|160th fact sheet}} The primary mission of the Night Stalkers is to conduct overt or covert infiltration, exfiltration, and resupply of special operations forces across a wide range of environmental conditions.{{r|160th MH-60 fact sheet}} * [[4th Psychological Operations Group]] (Airborne) and [[8th Psychological Operations Group]] (Airborne) Soldiers use persuasion to influence perceptions and encourage desired behavior.{{r|PSYOP recruiting}}{{r|PSYOP tsunami}} PSYOP soldiers support national objectives at the tactical, operational and strategic levels of operations. Strategic psychological operations advance broad or long-term objectives; global in nature, they may be directed toward large audiences or at key communicators. Operational psychological operations are conducted on a smaller scale. 4th POG(A) is employed by theater commanders to target groups within the theater of operations. 4th POG(A) purpose can range from gaining support for U.S. operations to preparing the battlefield for combat. Tactical psychological operations are more limited, used by commanders to secure immediate and near-term goals. In this environment, these force-enhancing activities serve as a means to lower the morale and efficiency of enemy forces.{{r|PSYOP fact sheet}} * [[95th Civil Affairs Brigade (United States)|95th Civil Affairs Brigade]] (Airborne) specialists identify critical requirements needed by local citizens in war or disaster situations. They also locate civilian resources to support military operations, help minimize civilian interference with operations, support national assistance activities, plan and execute noncombatant evacuation, support counter-drug operations and establish and maintain liaison with civilian aid agencies and other non-governmental organizations. In support of special operations, these culturally oriented, linguistically capable Soldiers may also be tasked to provide functional expertise for foreign internal defense operations, unconventional warfare operations and direct action missions.{{r|95th fact sheet}} * [[528th Sustainment Brigade (United States)|528th Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne)]] (SO) (A) has a difficult mission supporting USASOC. In their respective fields, signal, intelligence, medical, and support soldiers provide communications, focused intelligence, medical Role II support, supplies, maintenance, equipment, and expertise allowing ARSOF to "shoot, move and communicate" on a continuous basis. Because USASOC often uses ARSOF-unique items, soldiers assigned to these units are taught to operate and maintain a vast array of specialized equipment not normally used by their conventional counterparts. The 528th also provides the USASOC with centralized and integrated material management of property, equipment maintenance, logistical automation and repair parts and supplies.{{r|SOSCOM}} * [[John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School|John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center]] (USAJFKSWCS) trains USSOCOM and Army Special Operations Forces through development and evaluation of special operations concepts, doctrines and training.{{r|USAJFKSWCS}} === Marine Forces Special Operations Command === {{main|United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command}} [[File:Seal of Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC).svg|thumb|175px|[[United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command]] emblem]] [[File:AlphaDASR.jpg|thumb|[[Direct action (military)|DA]]/[[Special Reconnaissance|SR]] Operators from 1st SOB (Special Operations Battalion) respond to enemy fire in Afghanistan.]] In October 2005, the [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] directed the formation of [[United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command]], the Marine component of United States Special Operations Command. It was determined that the [[United States Marine Corps|Marine Corps]] would initially form a unit of approximately 2500 to serve with USSOCOM. On February 24, 2006 MARSOC activated at [[Camp Lejeune]], North Carolina. MARSOC initially consisted of a small staff and the Foreign Military Training Unit (FMTU), which had been formed to conduct foreign internal defense. FMTU is now designated as the Marine Special Operations Advisor Group (MSOAG).{{r|2006 Kenyon}} As a service component of USSOCOM, [[MARSOC]] is tasked by the Commander USSOCOM to train, organize, equip, and deploy responsive U.S. Marine Corps special operations forces worldwide, in support of combatant commanders and other agencies. MARSOC has been directed to conduct foreign internal defense, direct action, and special reconnaissance. MARSOC has also been directed to develop a capability in unconventional warfare, counter-terrorism, and information operations. MARSOC deployed its first units in August 2006, six months after the group's initial activation. MARSOC reached full operational capability in October 2008.{{r|MARSOC}} '''Units''' * [[Marine Raider Regiment]] (Marine Raiders) consists of a Headquarters Company and three Marine Raider Battalions, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd. The Regiment provides tailored military combat-skills training and advisor support for identified foreign forces in order to enhance their tactical capabilities and to prepare the environment as directed by USSOCOM as well as the capability to form the nucleus of a Joint Special Operations Task Force. Marines and Sailors of the MRR train, advise and assist friendly host nation forces – including naval and maritime military and paramilitary forces – to enable them to support their governments' internal security and stability, to counter-subversion and to reduce the risk of violence from internal and external threats. MRR deployments are coordinated by MARSOC, through USSOCOM, in accordance with engagement priorities for Overseas Contingency Operations. * [[Marine Raider Support Group]] (MRSG) trains, equips, structures, and provides specially qualified Marine forces, including, operational logistics, intelligence, Military Working Dogs, Firepower Control Teams, and communications support in order to sustain worldwide special operations missions as directed by Commander, U.S. Marine Forces Special Operations Command (COMMARFORSOC). * [[Marine Raider Training Center]] (MRTC) performs the screening, recruiting, training, assessment and doctrinal development functions for MARSOC. It includes two subordinate Special Missions Training Branches (SMTBs), one on each coast. ===Naval Special Warfare Command=== {{main|United States Naval Special Warfare Command}} [[File:NAVSPECWARCOM.logo.gif|thumb|175px|[[United States Naval Special Warfare Command]] emblem]] The [[United States Naval Special Warfare Command]] (NAVSPECWARCOM, NAVSOC, or NSWC) was commissioned April 16, 1987, at [[Naval Amphibious Base Coronado]] in San Diego as the Naval component to the United States Special Operations Command. Naval Special Warfare Command provides vision, leadership, doctrinal guidance, resources and oversight to ensure component special operations forces are ready to meet the operational requirements of combatant commanders.{{r|NAVSOC}} Today, [[United States Navy SEALs|SEAL Teams]] and [[Special Boat Teams]] comprise the elite combat units of Naval Special Warfare. These teams are organized, trained, and equipped to conduct a variety of missions to include direct action, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare and support psychological and civil affairs operations. Their highly trained operators are deployed worldwide in support of [[National Command Authority (United States)|National Command Authority]] objectives, conducting operations with other conventional and special operations forces. '''Units''' [[File:SEALS wearing diving gear.JPG|thumb|right|SEALs emerge from the water during a demonstration.]] [[File:U.S. Navy special warfare combatant-craft crewmen (SWCC), Special Boat Team 22 conducts training 16 AUG 09.jpg|right|thumb|A special warfare combatant-craft crewmen from Special Boat Team 22 fires a [[GAU-17]] from a [[Special Operations Craft – Riverine (SOC-R)]].]] * [[United States Navy SEALs]] have distinguished themselves as an individually reliable, collectively disciplined and highly skilled special operations force. The most important trait that distinguishes Navy SEALs from all other military forces is that SEALs are maritime special operations, as they strike from and return to the sea. SEALs (SEa, Air, Land) take their name from the elements in and from which they operate. SEALs are experts in direct action and special reconnaissance missions. Their stealth and clandestine methods of operation allow them to conduct multiple missions against targets that larger forces cannot approach undetected. Because of the dangers inherent in their missions, prospective SEALs go through what is considered by many military experts to be the toughest training regime in the world.{{r|SEAL website}}{{r|Couch 2001}} * [[SEAL Team Six|Naval Special Warfare Development Group]] (DEVGRU), referred to as SEAL Team Six, the name of its predecessor which was officially disbanded in 1987. * [[SEAL Delivery Vehicle Teams]] are SEAL teams with an added underwater delivery capability who use the SDV MK VIII and the Advanced SEAL Delivery System (ASDS), submersibles that provide NSW with an unprecedented capability that combines the attributes of clandestine underwater mobility and the combat swimmer.{{r|insert/extract}}{{r|2002 Tiron}} * [[Special Warfare Combatant-craft Crewmen]] (SWCC) operate and maintain state-of-the-art vessels and high-tech equipment to conduct coastal patrol and interdiction and support special operations missions. Focusing on infiltration and exfiltration of SEALs and other SOF, SWCCs provide dedicated rapid mobility in shallow water areas where larger ships cannot operate. They also bring to the table a unique SOF capability: Maritime Combatant Craft Aerial Delivery System—the ability to deliver combat craft via parachute drop.{{r|2013 SOCOM Fact book}} Like SEALs, SWCCs must have excellent physical fitness, highly motivated, combat-focused and responsive in high-stress situations.{{r|SEAL SWCC}} ===Air Force Special Operations Command=== {{main|Air Force Special Operations Command}} [[File:Shield of the United States Air Force Special Operations Command.svg|thumb|175px|[[Air Force Special Operations Command]] emblem]] [[File:AC-130U training.jpg|thumb|An [[AC-130U Spooky]] from the [[4th Special Operations Squadron]]]] [[File:21st STS JTACs CAS training mission at Nevada Test and Training Range2.jpg|thumb|[[Combat Controllers]] from the 21st Special Tactics Squadron conducting [[close air support]] training with [[A-10]] pilots in Nevada]] [[Air Force Special Operations Command]] was established on May 22, 1990, with headquarters at [[Hurlburt Field]], Florida. AFSOC is one of the 10 Air Force [[List of Major Commands of the United States Air Force|Major Commands]] or MAJCOMs, and the Air Force component of United States Special Operations Command. It holds operational and administrative oversight of subordinate special operations wings and groups in the regular Air Force, [[Air Force Reserve Command]] and the [[Air National Guard]]. AFSOC provides Air Force special operations forces for worldwide deployment and assignment to regional unified commands. The command's SOF are composed of highly trained, rapidly deployable airmen, conducting global special operations missions ranging from the precision application of firepower via [[airstrikes]] or [[close air support]], to infiltration, exfiltration, resupply and refueling of SOF operational elements.{{r|Gunship}} AFSOC's unique capabilities include airborne radio and television broadcast for psychological operations, as well as aviation foreign internal defense instructors to provide other governments military expertise for their internal development. The command's core missions include battlefield air operations; agile combat support; aviation foreign internal defense; information operations; precision aerospace fires; psychological operations; specialized air mobility; specialized refueling; and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance.{{r|NYTaSOF}}{{r|AFSOC}}{{r|NYT Meyers}} '''Components''' * [[Combat Controller]]s (CCT) are ground combat forces specialized in a traditional [[Pathfinders (military)|pathfinder]] role while having a heavy emphasis on simultaneous [[air traffic control]], [[fire support]] (via [[airstrikes]], [[close air support]] and [[C4ISTAR|command, control, and communications]] in covert or austere environments.{{r|CCT factsheet}}{{r|CCT job}} * [[Pararescue]]men (PJ) are the only Department of Defense specialty specifically trained and equipped to conduct conventional and unconventional [[combat search and rescue|personnel recovery operations]]. A PJ's primary function is as a personnel recovery specialist with emergency trauma medical capabilities in humanitarian and combat environments. * [[United States Air Force Special Reconnaissance|Special Reconnaissance]] (SR) conduct long-range interdiction, surveillance and intelligence gathering. A subset of their responsibilities is to assess and interpret weather and environmental intelligence from forward-deployed locations, working alongside special operations forces. '''Organization''' * The [[1st Special Operations Wing]] (1 SOW) is located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. Its mission focus is unconventional warfare: counter-terrorism, combat search and rescue, personnel recovery, psychological operations, aviation assistance to developing nations, "deep battlefield" resupply, interdiction, and close air support. The wing's core missions include aerospace surface interface, agile combat support, combat aviation advisory operations, information operations, personnel recovery/recovery operations, precision aerospace fires, psychological operations dissemination, specialized aerospace mobility, and specialized aerial refueling.{{r|1st SOW factsheet}} Among its aircraft is the [[Lockheed MC-130|MC-130 Combat Talon II]], a low-level terrain-following special missions transport that can evade radar detection and slip into enemy territory at a {{convert|200|ft|m|adj=on}} altitude for infiltration/exfiltration missions, even in zero visibility, dropping off or recovering men or supplies with pinpoint accuracy. It also operates the [[AC-130 Spooky]] and [[AC-130|Spectre]] gunships that provide highly accurate airborne gunfire for close air support of conventional and special operations forces on the ground.{{r|NYTsw}} * The [[24th Special Operations Wing]] (24 SOW) is located at Hurlburt Field, Florida. It is composed of the 720th Special Tactics Group, 724th Special Tactics Group, Special Tactics Training Squadron and 16 recruiting locations across the United States.{{r|STW}}{{r|24th SOW factsheet}} The [[Special Tactics Squadrons]], under the 720th STG and 724th STG, are made up of Special Tactics Officers, [[Combat Controllers]], [[Combat Rescue Officer]]s, [[Pararescuemen]], [[Air Force Special Operations Weather Technician|Special Operations Weather Officers and Airmen]], Air Liaison Officers, [[United States Air Force Tactical Air Control Party|Tactical Air Control Party operators]], and a number of combat support airmen which comprise 58 [[Air Force Specialty Code|Air Force specialties]].{{r|24th SOW factsheet}} * The [[27th Special Operations Wing]] (27 SOW) is located at [[Cannon AFB]], [[New Mexico]]. Its primary mission includes infiltration, exfiltration and re-supply of special operations forces; air refueling of special operations rotary wing and tiltrotor aircraft; and precision fire support. These capabilities support a variety of special operations missions including direct action, unconventional warfare, special reconnaissance, counter-terrorism, personnel recovery, psychological operations and information operations.{{r|27th SOW}} * The [[193d Special Operations Wing]] (193 SOW) is an [[Air National Guard]] (ANG) unit, operationally gained by AFSOC, and located at [[Harrisburg International Airport]]/Air National Guard Station (former [[Olmsted Air Force Base]]), [[Pennsylvania]]. Under Title 32 USC, the 193 SOW performs state missions for the Governor of Pennsylvania as part of the [[Pennsylvania Air National Guard]]. Under Title 10 USC, the 193 SOW is part of the Air Reserve Component (ARC) of the United States Air Force. Its primary wartime and contingency operations mission as an AFSOC-gained unit is psychological operations (PSYOP). The 193 SOW is unique in that it is the only unit in the U.S. Air Force to fly and maintain the Lockheed [[Lockheed EC-130|EC-130J Commando Solo]] aircraft. * The [[919th Special Operations Wing]] (919 SOW) is an Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC) unit, operationally gained by AFSOC, and located at [[Eglin AFB]] Auxiliary Field #3/[[Duke Field]], Florida. The 919 SOW flies and maintains the MC-130E Combat Talon I and MC-130P Combat Shadow special operations aircraft designed for covert operations. * The [[352d Special Operations Wing]] (352 SOW) at [[RAF Mildenhall]], United Kingdom serves as the core to the United States [[European Command]]'s standing Joint Special Operations Air Component headquarters. The squadron provides support for three flying squadrons, one special tactics squadron and one maintenance squadron for exercise, logistics, and war planning; aircrew training; communications; aerial delivery; medical; intelligence; security and force protection; weather; information technologies and transformation support and current operations.{{r|352nd factsheet}} * The [[353d Special Operations Group]] (353 SOG) is the focal point for all U.S. Air Force special operations activities throughout the [[United States Pacific Command]] (USPACOM) theater. Headquartered at [[Kadena AB]], [[Okinawa]], Japan the group is prepared to conduct a variety of high-priority, low-visibility missions. Its mission is air support of joint and allied special operations forces in the Pacific. It maintains a worldwide mobility commitment, participates in Pacific theater exercises as directed and supports humanitarian and relief operations.{{r|353rd factsheet}} * The [[United States Air Force Special Operations School]] (USAFSOS) at [[Hurlburt Field]], Florida is a primary support unit of the Air Force Special Operations Command. The USAFSOS prepares special operations Airmen to successfully plan, organize, and execute global special operations by providing indoctrination and education for AFSOC, other USSOCOM components, and joint/interagency/ coalition partners.{{r|USAFSOS factsheet}} === Order of battle === [[File:US Special Operations Command.png|thumb|center|1020px|Special Operations Command order of battle April 2020 (click to enlarge)]] ==List of commanders== [[File:U.S. Special Operations Command Holds a Change of Command Ceremony 220830-M-HH844-0305.jpg|thumb|U.S. Secretary of Defense [[Lloyd Austin]] (''far left''), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff [[Mark A. Milley]] (''center left''), incoming combatant commander [[Bryan P. Fenton]] (''center right'') and outgoing commander [[Richard D. Clarke|Richard D. Clarke Jr.]] (''far right'') at the USSOCOM change of command ceremony on 30 August 2022.]] The commander of U.S. Special Operations Command is a statutory office ({{USC|10|167}}), and is held by a [[Four-star rank|four-star]] [[General (United States)|general]], or if the commander is a Navy officer, a four-star [[Admiral (United States)|admiral]]. {| class="wikitable sortable" |- ! rowspan=2| {{abbr|No.|Number}} ! colspan=2| Commander ! colspan=3| Term ! rowspan=2| Service branch |- ! Portrait ! Name ! Took office ! Left office ! Term length |- {{Officeholder table | order = 1 | military_rank = General | image = GEN James Lindsay 1986.jpg | officeholder = [[James J. Lindsay]] | officeholder_sort = Lindsay, James J. | born_year = 1932 | died_year = | term_start = 16 April 1987 | term_end = 27 June 1990 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|1987|4|16|1990|6|27}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 2 | military_rank = General | image = Carl W Stiner.jpg | officeholder = [[Carl Stiner|Carl W. Stiner]] | officeholder_sort = Stiner, Carl W. | born_year = 1936 | died_year = 2022 | term_start = 27 June 1990 | term_end = 20 May 1993 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|1990|6|27|1993|5|20}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 3 | military_rank = General | image = Wayne Downing.jpg | officeholder = [[Wayne A. Downing]] | officeholder_sort = Downing, Wayne A. | born_year = 1940 | died_year = 2007 | term_start = 20 May 1993 | term_end = 29 February 1996 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|1993|5|20|1996|2|29}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 4 | military_rank = General | image = Henry Shelton official portrait.jpg | officeholder = [[Henry H. Shelton]] | officeholder_sort = Shelton, Henry H. | born_year = 1942 | died_year = | term_start = 29 February 1996 | term_end = 25 September 1997 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|1996|2|29|1997|9|25}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = - | military_rank = Rear Admiral | image = Raymond C. Smith Jr 1992.jpg | officeholder = [[Raymond C. Smith|Raymond C. Smith Jr.]] | officeholder_sort = Smith, Raymond C. Jr. | born_year = | died_year = | term_start = 25 September 1997 | term_end = 5 November 1997 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|1997|9|25|1997|11|5}} | defence_branch = [[File:Emblem of the United States Navy.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]] | acting = y }} {{Officeholder table | order = 5 | military_rank = General | image = Peter Schoomaker.jpg | officeholder = [[Peter J. Schoomaker]] | officeholder_sort = Schoomaker, Peter | born_year = 1946 | died_year = | term_start = 5 November 1997 | term_end = 27 October 2000 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|1997|11|5|2000|10|27}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 6 | military_rank = General | image = Holland cr.jpg | officeholder = [[Charles R. Holland]] | officeholder_sort = Holland, Charles R. | born_year = 1948 | died_year = | term_start = 27 October 2000 | term_end = 2 September 2003 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2000|10|27|2003|9|2}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Air Force.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Air Force|U.S. Air Force]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 7 | military_rank = General | image = GEN Bryan Brown official portrait.jpg | officeholder = [[Bryan D. Brown]] | officeholder_sort = Brown, Bryan D. | born_year = 1948 | died_year = | term_start = 2 September 2003 | term_end = 9 July 2007 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2003|9|2|2007|7|9}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 8 | military_rank = Admiral | image = ADM Eric T. Olson.jpg | officeholder = [[Eric T. Olson]] | officeholder_sort = Olson, Eric T. | born_year = 1952 | died_year = | term_start = 9 July 2007 | term_end = 8 August 2011 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2007|7|9|2011|8|8}} | defence_branch = [[File:Emblem of the United States Navy.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 9 | military_rank = Admiral | image = ADM William H. McRaven 2012.jpg | officeholder = [[William H. McRaven]] | officeholder_sort = McRaven, William H. | born_year = 1955 | died_year = | term_start = 8 August 2011 | term_end = 28 August 2014 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2011|8|8|2014|8|28}} | defence_branch = [[File:Emblem of the United States Navy.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Navy|U.S. Navy]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 10 | military_rank = General | image = Votel official photo USSOCOM.jpg | officeholder = [[Joseph Votel|Joseph L. Votel]] | officeholder_sort = Votel, Joseph L. | born_year = 1958 | died_year = | term_start = 28 August 2014 | term_end = 30 March 2016 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2014|8|28|2016|3|30}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 11 | military_rank = General | image = General Raymond A. Thomas III (USSOCOM).jpg | officeholder = [[Raymond A. Thomas]] | officeholder_sort = Thomas, Raymond A. | born_year = 1958 | died_year = | term_start = 30 March 2016 | term_end = 29 March 2019 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2016|3|30|2019|3|29}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 12 | military_rank = General | image = Gen. Richard D. Clarke, Jr. (2).jpg | officeholder = [[Richard D. Clarke]] | officeholder_sort = Clarke, Richard D. | born_year = 1962 | died_year = | term_start = 29 March 2019 | term_end = 30 August 2022 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2019|3|29|2022|8|30}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} {{Officeholder table | order = 13 | military_rank = General | image = Lt. Gen. Bryan P. Fenton (2).jpg | officeholder = [[Bryan P. Fenton]] | officeholder_sort = Fenton, Bryan P. | born_year = 1965 | died_year = | term_start = 30 August 2022 | timeinoffice = {{ayd|2022|8|30}} | defence_branch = [[File:Military service mark of the United States Army.svg|75px]]<br>[[United States Army|U.S. Army]] }} |} ==USSOCOM medal== [[File:USSOCOM Medal BAR.svg|thumb|USSOCOM Medal Ribbon Bar]] The United States Special Operations Command Medal was introduced in 1994 to recognize individuals for outstanding contributions to, and in support of, special operations. Some notable recipients include; * [[Lieutenant General (United States)|Lieutenant General]] [[Samuel V. Wilson]] * [[Colonel]] [[Ralph Puckett]] * [[Senior Chief Petty Officer|SCPO]] [[Chris Beck (Navy SEAL)|Chris Beck]] Since it was created, there have been more than 50 recipients, only six of whom were not American, including; * [[General]] [[Benoît Puga]] (France) *† [[Captain (armed forces)|Kaptein]] [[Gunnar Sønsteby]], 2008 (Norway)<ref name="Jensen">Jensen, Finn Robert; Gunnar "Kjakan" Sønsteby Om samhold og innsatsvilje; Pantagruel forlag; Oslo; 2008</ref> *† [[Generał broni]] [[Włodzimierz Potasiński]], 2010 (Poland)<ref>[https://web.archive.org/web/20121209185746/http://www.shadowspear.com/vb/threads/united-states-special-operations-command-medal-to-lt-gen-w%C5%82odzimierz-potasi%C5%84ski.6197/ USSOCOM Medal recipients]</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.wojskaspecjalne.mil.pl/45,more,129-ussocom_commander_visits_polsocom.html?ln=en |title=NEWS &#124; USSOCOM Commander visits POLSOCOM &#124; Dowództwo Wojsk Specjalnych |publisher=Wojskaspecjalne.mil.pl |date=2010-05-14 |access-date=2013-04-22 |archive-url=https://archive.today/20120805211914/http://www.wojskaspecjalne.mil.pl/45,more,129-ussocom_commander_visits_polsocom.html?ln=en |archive-date=5 August 2012 |url-status=live }}</ref> * [[Generał dywizji]] [[Piotr Patalong]], 2014 (Poland)<ref>{{cite web |url=http://mon.gov.pl/aktualnosci/artykul/najnowsze/2014-10-29-medal-dowodztwa-operacji-specjalnych-usa-dla-polskiego-generala/ |title=Medal USSOCOM dla polskiego generała |publisher=mon.gov.pl |date=2014-10-29 |access-date=2014-10-29 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141029164646/http://mon.gov.pl/aktualnosci/artykul/najnowsze/2014-10-29-medal-dowodztwa-operacji-specjalnych-usa-dla-polskiego-generala/ |archive-date=29 October 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref> * [[Generał brygady]] [[Jerzy Gut]], 2014 (Poland)<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/pl/z-zycia-wojska/30655,amerykanskie-dowodztwo-operacji-specjalnych-docenilo-polskiego-generala.html |title=Amerykańskie Dowództwo Operacji Specjalnych doceniło polskiego generała |publisher=wojsko-polskie.l |date=2014-06-03 |access-date=2014-06-03 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140606204407/http://www.wojsko-polskie.pl/pl/z-zycia-wojska/30655,amerykanskie-dowodztwo-operacji-specjalnych-docenilo-polskiego-generala.html |archive-date=6 June 2014 |url-status=dead }}</ref> * [[Jungjang|Jungjang (Lieutenant General)]] [[Chun In-bum]], 2016 (Republic of Korea)<ref>{{Cite web|date=2016-06-15|title=[단독] 전인범 전 특전사령관, 한국군 최초 미군 통합특전사 훈장|url=https://www.asiatoday.co.kr/view.php?key=20160615010007077|access-date=2020-11-14|website=종합일간지 : 신문/웹/모바일 등 멀티 채널로 국내외 실시간 뉴스와 수준 높은 정보를 제공|language=ko}}</ref> († [[wikt:posthumous|posthumously]]) ==References== ===Citations=== {{Reflist|30em|refs= <ref name="2020 SOCOM Fact book">{{cite book |author=SOCOM Public Affairs |title=SOCOM Fact Book 2020 |url=https://www.socom.mil/FactBook/2020%20Fact%20Book.pdf |year=2020 |publisher=SOCOM Public Affairs }}</ref> <ref name="2013 SOCOM Fact book">{{cite book|author=SOCOM Public Affairs|title=SOCOM Fact Book 2013|url=https://www.socom.mil/FactBook/2013%20Fact%20Book.pdf|year=2013|publisher=SOCOM Public Affairs|access-date=14 February 2013|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170710221940/https://www.socom.mil/FactBook/2013%20Fact%20Book.pdf|archive-date=10 July 2017|url-status=live|df=dmy-all}}</ref> <ref name="NYT Regime thought">{{cite news|first=Thom|last=Shanker|title=Regime Thought War Unlikely, Iraqis Tell U.S|work=The New York Times|date=12 February 2004}}</ref> <ref name="NYT Bang Panama">{{cite news|first=Larry|last=Rother|title=With a Bang, Panama Is Erasing House of Horrors|work=The New York Times|date=6 December 1996}}</ref> <ref name="Adm Holloway bio">{{cite web|title=Biography of Admiral James L. 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Haney |first=Eric |title=Inside Delta Force: The Story of America's Elite Counterterrorist Unit |publisher=Delta |date=August 2005 |isbn=0-385-33936-4}}</ref> <ref name="USASOC overview">{{cite web|url=http://www.soc.mil/sofinfo/story.html |title=USASOC overview |access-date=8 January 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080116044716/http://www.soc.mil/sofinfo/story.html |archive-date=16 January 2008 }}</ref> <ref name="NYT Schmitt">{{cite news |last1=Schmitt |first1=Eric |first2=Michael R. |last2=Gordon |title=A Nation Challenged: The Military: Top Air Chief Sent |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=21 September 2001 }}</ref> <ref name=NYTsomblu>{{cite news |first=Mark |last=Mazzetti |title=Pentagon Sees Move in Somalia as Blueprint |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=13 January 2007 |author-link=Mark Mazzetti }}</ref> <ref name="Smith 2007">{{cite book |last=Smith |first=Michael |title=Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America's Most Secret Special Operations Team |publisher=St. Martin's Press |year=2007 |location=New York, New York |isbn=978-0-312-36272-0}}</ref> <ref name="WP Gellman">{{cite news |last=Gellman |first=Barton |title=Secret Unit Expands Rumsfeld's Domain |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |date=23 January 2005 }}</ref> <ref name=NYTSU>{{cite news |last1=Gerth |first1=Jeff |first2=Philip |last2=Taubman |title=U.s. military creates secret units for use in sensitive tasks abroad |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=8 June 1984 }}</ref> <ref name="NYT Schmitt 2006">{{cite news |last=Schmitt |first=Eric |title=In Secret Unit's 'Black Room,' a Grim Portrait of U.S. Abuse |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=19 March 2006}}</ref> <ref name="NYT Sanger">{{cite news |last=E. Sanger |first=David |title=New U.S. Effort Steps Up Hunt For bin Laden |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=29 February 2004 }}</ref> <ref name="jfcom transition">[http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2011/pa050211.html SOCJFCOM transitions to USSOCOM and becomes Special Operations Command – Joint Capabilities] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110725002415/http://www.jfcom.mil/newslink/storyarchive/2011/pa050211.html |date=25 July 2011 }}, 2 May 2011</ref> <ref name="75th ranger website">{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/75thrr/75th_home.htm |title= 75th Ranger Regiment website |access-date=12 February 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080127071358/http://www.soc.mil/75thrr/75th_home.htm <!-- Bot retrieved archive --> |archive-date=27 January 2008}}</ref> <ref name="75th ranger website2">{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/75thrr/75thrrfs.html |title= 75th Ranger Regiment website |access-date=12 February 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080208083040/http://www.soc.mil/75thrr/75thrrfs.html <!-- Bot retrieved archive --> |archive-date=8 February 2008}}</ref> <ref name="2002 Shanker">{{cite news |last=Shanker |first=Thom |title=A Nation Challenged: Battlefield; Conduct of War Is Redefined By Success of Special Forces |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=21 January 2002}}</ref> <ref name=CSSF>{{cite book |last=Couch |first=Dick |title=Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior |publisher=Three Rivers Press |date=March 2007 |isbn=978-0-307-33939-3}}</ref> <ref name="USASF mission">{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/SF/mission.htm |title=USASF mission |access-date=8 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071211221352/http://www.soc.mil/SF/mission.htm <!--Added by H3llBot--> |archive-date=11 December 2007}}</ref> <ref name=WRPNYT>{{cite news |last1=Schmitt |first1=Eric |first2=Thom |last2=Shanker |title=U.S. Plan Widens Role in Training Pakistani Forces in Qaeda Battle |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=2 March 2008}}</ref> <ref name="160th fact sheet">{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/160soar/soar_home.htm |title=Night Stalkers fact sheet |access-date=8 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071217230457/http://www.soc.mil/160soar/soar_home.htm <!--Added by H3llBot--> |archive-date=17 December 2007}}</ref> <ref name="160th MH-60 fact sheet">{{cite web|url=http://www.soc.mil/160soar/Blkhawk.html |title=160th SOAR,MH-60 Black Hawk Helicopter Fact Sheet |access-date=12 February 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080308135218/http://www.soc.mil/160soar/Blkhawk.html |archive-date=8 March 2008 }}</ref> <ref name="PSYOP fact sheet">{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/psyop/psyop_default.htm |title=PSYOP fact sheet |access-date=12 February 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080203103530/http://www.soc.mil/psyop/psyop_default.htm <!--Added by H3llBot--> |archive-date=3 February 2008}}</ref> <ref name="PSYOP recruiting">{{cite web |url=http://www.bragg.army.mil/psyop/psyopintro.htm |title=PSYOP Recruiting website |access-date=12 February 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080204120503/http://www.bragg.army.mil/psyop/psyopintro.htm |archive-date=4 February 2008}}</ref> <ref name="PSYOP tsunami">{{cite press release|title=Army Civil Affairs, Psychological Operations Soldiers Deploy in Support of Tsunami Relief Efforts |publisher=Department of Defense |date=7 January 2005 |url=http://www.defenselink.mil/home/articles/2005-01/a010705tj1.html |access-date=14 March 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080218230824/http://www.defenselink.mil/home/articles/2005-01/a010705tj1.html |archive-date=18 February 2008 }}</ref> <ref name="95th fact sheet">{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/ca/ca_default.htm |title=95th Civil Affairs Fact Sheet |access-date=21 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080119211325/http://www.soc.mil/ca/ca_default.htm <!--Added by H3llBot--> |archive-date=19 January 2008}}</ref> <ref name=SOSCOM>{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/soscom/soscom_default.htm |title=SOSCOM Home Page |access-date=12 February 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080119210555/http://www.soc.mil/soscom/soscom_default.htm |archive-date=19 January 2008}}</ref> <ref name=USAJFKSWCS>{{cite web |url=http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swcs_default.htm |title=USAJFKSWCS |access-date=19 February 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080119211345/http://www.soc.mil/swcs/swcs_default.htm |archive-date=19 January 2008}}</ref> <ref name=NAVSOC>{{cite web |url=https://www.navsoc.navy.mil/ |title=NAVSOC info website |access-date=8 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080214064830/http://www.navsoc.navy.mil/ |archive-date=14 February 2008 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all }}</ref> <ref name="SEAL website">{{cite web|url=http://199.208.208.41/seal/introduction.aspx |title=Official U.S. Navy SEAL Info Website |access-date=11 January 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071230024817/http://199.208.208.41/seal/introduction.aspx |archive-date=30 December 2007 }}</ref> <ref name="Couch 2001">{{cite book |last=Couch |first=Dick |title=The Warrior Elite: The Forging of SEAL Class 228 |publisher=Crown |date=October 2001 |isbn=0-609-60710-3}}</ref> <ref name="insert/extract">{{cite web |url=http://www.navyseals.com/insertion-extraction |title=Navy SEALs insertion/extraction page |access-date=11 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121129231150/http://www.navyseals.com/insertion-extraction |archive-date=29 November 2012 |url-status=dead }}</ref> <ref name="2002 Tiron">{{cite news |last=Tiron |first=Roxana |title=New Mini-Sub Gives SEALs Extra Speed, Range, Payload |work=National Defense Magazine |date=February 2002}}</ref> <ref name="SEAL SWCC">{{cite web|url=http://www.seal.navy.mil/swcc/introduction.aspx |title=Official U.S. Navy SWCC Info Website |access-date=11 January 2008 }}{{dead link|date=May 2016|bot=medic}}{{cbignore|bot=medic}}</ref> <ref name=Gunship>{{cite news|last=Steven Lee Meyers|first=Thom Shanker|title=A Nation Challenged: The Offensive; Special Operations Gunship Being Used Against Taliban|work=[[The New York Times]]|date=16 October 2001}}</ref> <ref name=AFSOC>{{cite web|url=http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/ |title=AFSOC |access-date=11 January 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071231203327/http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/ |archive-date=31 December 2007 }}</ref> <ref name="NYT Meyers">{{cite news |last1=Meyers |first1=Steven Lee |first2=Thom |last2=Shanker |title=A Nation Challenged: Air War; Pilots Told to Fire at Will in Some Zones |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=17 October 2001 }}</ref> <ref name="CCT factsheet">{{cite web |url=http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=174 |title=Combat Control Fact Sheet |work=Air Force Special Operations Command |publisher=United States Air Force |access-date=13 January 2013|archive-url=https://archive.today/20130221025433/http://www.af.mil/information/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=174|archive-date=21 February 2013}}</ref> <ref name="CCT job">{{cite web |url=http://www.airforce.com/careers/detail/combat-control-males-only/ |title=Combat Control career description |access-date=12 January 2013 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140405090814/http://www.airforce.com/careers/detail/combat-control-males-only/ |archive-date=5 April 2014 |url-status=live }}</ref> <ref name="1st SOW factsheet">{{cite web |title=1st SOW Fact Sheet |publisher=AFSOC |url=http://www2.hurlburt.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3485 |access-date=20 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130220171620/http://www.hurlburt.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=3485 |archive-date=20 February 2013 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all }}</ref> <ref name="27th SOW">{{cite press release|title=N.M. Delegation Welcomes 27th Special Ops. Wing to Cannon |date=29 August 2007 |url=http://bingaman.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=281393 |access-date=21 March 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080327040154/http://bingaman.senate.gov/news/record.cfm?id=281393 |archive-date=27 March 2008 }}</ref> <ref name=STW>{{cite web |url=http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123305724 |title=Air Force launches first special tactics wing |date=2012-06-13 |access-date=January 15, 2013|archive-url=https://archive.today/20121212040616/http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123305724|archive-date=December 12, 2012}}</ref> <ref name="24th SOW factsheet">{{cite web|url=http://www.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=19566 |title=24th SOW Factsheet |access-date=January 15, 2013 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130225031628/http://www.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=19566 |archive-date=25 February 2013 }}</ref> <ref name="352nd factsheet">{{cite web |title=352nd Fact Sheet |publisher=AFSOC |url=http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=224 |access-date=21 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081210124023/http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=224 |archive-date=10 December 2008 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all }}</ref> <ref name="353rd factsheet">{{cite web |title=353rd SOG Fact Sheet |publisher=AFSOC |url=http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=225 |access-date=21 January 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081210130902/https://www2.afsoc.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=225 |archive-date=10 December 2008 |url-status=dead |df=dmy-all }}</ref> <ref name="USAFSOS factsheet">{{cite web |url=http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=186 |title=USAFOS Fact Sheet |access-date=21 January 2008|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080109132212/http://www.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=186 |archive-date=9 January 2008}}</ref> <ref name="2006 Kenyon">{{cite news |last=Kenyon |first=Henry |title=Marine Corps Special Operations Command Hits the Beach |work=Signal Magazine |date=May 2006 |url=http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_Template.asp?articleid=1123&zoneid=182 |access-date=10 April 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071025164903/http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/templates/SIGNAL_Article_Template.asp?articleid=1123&zoneid=182 |archive-date=25 October 2007 |url-status=live }}</ref> <ref name=MARSOC>{{cite web|url=http://www.marsoc.usmc.mil/ |title=MARSOC |access-date=8 January 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080209214300/http://www.marsoc.usmc.mil/ |archive-date=9 February 2008 }}</ref> }} <!--not used <ref name="TWP Woodward">{{cite news|last=Woodward|first=Bob|title=Secret CIA Units Playing A Central Combat Role|work=The Washington Post|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/CIA18.html|date=18 November 2001|access-date=8 July 2012}}</ref> <ref name="exec secrets">{{cite book|last=Daugherty|first=William J.|title=Executive Secrets: Covert Action and the Presidency|publisher=University Press of Kentucky|date=2 June 2006|location=Lexington|isbn=0-8131-9161-0}}</ref> <ref name="Jawbreaker berntsen">{{cite book|last=Berntsen|first=Gary|first2=Ralph |last2=Pezzulo |title=Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda: A Personal Account by the CIA's Key Field Commander|publisher=Three Rivers Press|date=24 October 2006|location=New York|isbn=0-307-35106-8}}</ref> --> ===Bibliography=== {{Refbegin}} * {{cite book |last=Briscoe |first=Charles |title=Weapon of Choice: ARSOF in Afghanistan |publisher=Combat Studies Institute Press |year=2001}} * {{cite book |last=Couch |first=Dick |title=Chosen Soldier: The Making of a Special Forces Warrior |publisher=Three Rivers Press |date=March 2007 |isbn=978-0-307-33939-3}} * {{cite book |last=Couch |first=Dick |title=Down Range: Navy SEALs in the War on Terrorism |publisher=Three Rivers Press |year=2006 |location=New York, New York |isbn=1-4000-8101-7 |url-access=registration |url=https://archive.org/details/downrangenavysea0000couc }} * {{cite web |last=Kelley |first=Stephen Andrew |title=Better Lucky Than Good: Operation Earnest Will as Gunboat Diplomacy |publisher=Naval Postgraduate School |date=June 2007 |url=http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/kelley07.pdf |access-date =12 May 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090318120640/http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/research/theses/kelley07.pdf |archive-date=18 March 2009}} * {{cite book |last1=Luttrell |first1=Marcus |first2=Patrick |last2=Robinson |title=Lone Survivor: The Eyewitness Account of Operation Redwing and the Lost Heroes of SEAL Team 10 |publisher=Little, Brown and Company |date=June 2007 |isbn=978-0-316-06759-1 |url=https://archive.org/details/lonesurvivoreyew00lutt }} * {{cite book |last=Pirnie |first=Bruce R. |title=Assessing Requirements for Peacekeeping, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief |publisher=RAND Corporation |date=August 1998 |isbn=0-8330-2594-5}} * {{cite book |last=Pushies |first=Fred |title=U.S. Air Force Special Ops |publisher=MBI Publishing Company |year=2007 |location=Osceola, Wisconsin |isbn=978-0-7603-0733-5}} * {{cite book |last=Smith |first=Michael |title=Killer Elite: The Inside Story of America's Most Secret Special Operations Team |publisher=St. Martin's Press |year=2007 |location=New York, New York |isbn=978-0-312-36272-0}} * {{cite book |last=Sweetman |first=Jack |title=Great American Naval Battles |publisher=Naval Institute Press |date=March 1999 |isbn=1-55750-794-5}} * {{cite book |last=David Tucker |first=Christopher J. Lamb |title=United States Special Operations Forces |publisher=Columbia University Press |year=2007 |isbn=978-0-231-13190-2}} * {{cite book |last=Wise |first=Harold Lee |title=Inside the Danger Zone: The U.S. Military in the Persian Gulf, 1987–1988 |publisher=US Naval Institute Press |date=May 2007 |isbn=978-1-59114-970-5}} ==== Web ==== * USDOD. [https://web.archive.org/web/20040117084621/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ U.S. DOD Dictionary of Military Terms]. United States of America: U.S. Department of Defense. 5 June 2003. * USDOD. [https://web.archive.org/web/20040117084621/http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/ U.S. DOD Dictionary of Military Terms: Joint Acronyms and Abbreviations]. United States of America: U.S. Department of Defense. 5 June 2003. * {{cite news|last=Talmadge |first=Eric |title=New US Submarines Trade Nukes for SEALs |agency=Associated Press |date=27 February 2008 |url=http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Feb27/0,4670,StealthatSea,00.html |publisher=Fox News |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080308233658/http://www.foxnews.com/wires/2008Feb27/0,4670,StealthatSea,00.html |archive-date=8 March 2008 }} * {{cite news |last=Eric Schmitt |first=Michael R. Gordon |title=Leak on Cross-Border Chases From Iraq |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=4 February 2008 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/04/washington/04rules.html?_r=1&scp=3&sq=Army+Rangers&st=nyt&oref=slogin }} * {{cite news |last=von Zielbauer |first=Paul |title=Criminal Charges Are Expected Against Marines, Official Says |work=[[The New York Times]] |date=27 April 2007 |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/04/27/world/asia/27abuse.html?scp=1&sq=MARSOC&st=nyt }} * {{cite news |last=Graham |first=Bradley |title=Elite Marine Unit to Help Fight Terrorism |newspaper=[[The Washington Post]] |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/11/01/AR2005110102069.html |access-date=27 May 2010 |date=2 November 2005 }} {{Refend}} ==External links== {{Commons category}} * [https://web.archive.org/web/20181024195712/https://www.socom.mil/ U.S. Special Operations Command] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20010331022307/http://www.soc.mil/ U.S. Army Special Operations Command] * [http://www.marsoc.marines.mil/ U.S. Marine Corps Forces Special Operations Command] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20130514123218/https://www.navsoc.navy.mil/ U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20071231203327/http://www2.afsoc.af.mil/ Air Force Special Operations Command] * [https://web.archive.org/web/20110529013300/http://www.defense.gov//news/newsarticle.aspx?id=63635 Department of Defense] * [https://wayback.archive-it.org/all/20120913145325/https://jsou.socom.mil/Pages/Default.aspx Joint Special Operations University] <!--spacing, please do not remove--> <!--Portal listing is done in the order of precedence--> {{US Special Operations Forces}} {{Unified Combatant Command of the United States armed forces}} {{DOD agencies navbox}} {{US military navbox}} {{Authority control}} [[Category:Special operations commands of the United States Armed Forces|*]] [[Category:Military counterterrorist organizations]] [[Category:Military units and formations established in 1987]] [[Category:Military units and formations in Florida]] [[Category:Unified combatant commands of the U.S. Department of Defense]]'
Unified diff of changes made by edit (edit_diff)
'@@ -38,30 +38,30 @@ {{United States Armed Forces sidebar}} -The '''United States Special Operations Command''' ('''USSOCOM''' or '''SOCOM''') is the [[unified combatant command]] charged with overseeing the various [[Special forces|special operations]] component commands of the [[USASOC|Army]], [[MARSOC|Marine Corps]], [[NAVSPECWARCOM|Navy]], and [[AFSOC|Air Force]] of the [[United States Armed Forces]]. The command is part of the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] and is the only unified combatant command created by an [[Act of Congress]]. USSOCOM is headquartered at [[MacDill Air Force Base]] in [[Tampa, Florida|Tampa]], Florida. +The '''United States Special Operations Command''' ('''USSOCOM''' or '''SOCOM''') is the [[unified combatant command]] charged with overseeing the various [[Special forces|special operations]] component commands of the [[United States Army Special Operations Command|Army]], [[United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command|Marine Corps]], [[United States Naval Special Warfare Command|Navy]], and [[Air Force Special Operations Command|Air Force]] of the [[United States Armed Forces]]. The command is part of the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] and is the only unified combatant command created by an [[Act of Congress]]. USSOCOM is headquartered at [[MacDill Air Force Base]] in [[Tampa, Florida|Tampa]], Florida. -The idea of an American unified special operations command had its origins in the aftermath of [[Operation Eagle Claw]], the disastrous attempted rescue of [[Iran hostage crisis|hostages]] at the [[Den of Espionage|American embassy]] in Iran in 1980. The ensuing investigation, chaired by [[Admiral (United States)|Admiral]] [[James L. Holloway III]], the retired [[Chief of Naval Operations]], cited lack of [[Command and control (military)|command and control]] and inter-service coordination as significant factors in the failure of the mission.{{r|Adm Holloway bio}} Since its activation on 16 April 1987, U.S. Special Operations Command has participated in many [[Military operation|operations]], from the 1989 [[United States invasion of Panama|invasion]] of [[Panama]] to the [[War on Terror]].{{r|NYT Bang Panama}}{{r|NYT Regime thought}} +The idea of an American unified special operations command had its origins in the aftermath of [[Operation Eagle Claw]], the disastrous attempted rescue of [[Iran hostage crisis|hostages]] at the [[Embassy of the United States, Tehran|American embassy]] in Iran in 1980. The ensuing investigation, chaired by [[Admiral (United States)|Admiral]] [[James L. Holloway III]], the retired [[Chief of Naval Operations]], cited lack of [[command and control]] and inter-service coordination as significant factors in the failure of the mission.{{r|Adm Holloway bio}} Since its activation on 16 April 1987, U.S. Special Operations Command has participated in many [[Military operation|operations]], from the 1989 [[United States invasion of Panama|invasion]] of [[Panama]] to the [[War on terror|War on Terror]].{{r|NYT Bang Panama}}{{r|NYT Regime thought}} -USSOCOM is involved with clandestine activity, such as [[Direct action (military)|direct action]], [[special reconnaissance]], [[counter-terrorism]], [[foreign internal defense]], [[unconventional warfare (United States)|unconventional warfare]], [[psychological warfare]], [[civil affairs]], and [[counter-narcotics]] operations. Each branch has a distinct Special Operations Command that is capable of running its own operations, but when the different special operations forces need to work together for an operation, USSOCOM becomes the joint component command of the operation, instead of a SOC of a specific branch.{{r|posture statement}} +USSOCOM is involved with clandestine activity, such as [[Direct action (military)|direct action]], [[special reconnaissance]], [[Counterterrorism|counter-terrorism]], [[foreign internal defense]], [[unconventional warfare (United States)|unconventional warfare]], [[psychological warfare]], [[civil affairs]], and [[War on drugs|counter-narcotics]] operations. Each branch has a distinct Special Operations Command that is capable of running its own operations, but when the different special operations forces need to work together for an operation, USSOCOM becomes the joint component command of the operation, instead of a SOC of a specific branch.{{r|posture statement}} ==History== -The unwieldy command and control structure of separate U.S. military special operations forces (SOF), which led to the failure of [[Operation Eagle Claw]] in 1980, highlighted the need within the [[US Department of Defense]] for reform and reorganization. The [[US Army Chief of Staff]], General [[Edward C. Meyer|Edward C. "Shy" Meyer]], had already helped create the U.S. [[Delta Force]] in 1977.{{r|Delta elite force}} Following Eagle Claw, he called for a further restructuring of special operations capabilities. Although unsuccessful at the joint level, Meyer nevertheless went on to consolidate [[USASOC|Army SOF]] units under the new 1st Special Operations Command in 1982.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.army.mil/article/230463/u_s_army_special_operations_command_30th_anniversary|title=U.S. Army Special Operations Command 30th Anniversary|website=www.army.mil}}</ref> +The unwieldy command and control structure of separate U.S. military special operations forces (SOF), which led to the failure of [[Operation Eagle Claw]] in 1980, highlighted the need within the [[United States Department of Defense|US Department of Defense]] for reform and reorganization. The [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|US Army Chief of Staff]], General [[Edward C. Meyer|Edward C. "Shy" Meyer]], had already helped create the U.S. [[Delta Force]] in 1977.{{r|Delta elite force}} Following Eagle Claw, he called for a further restructuring of special operations capabilities. Although unsuccessful at the joint level, Meyer nevertheless went on to consolidate [[United States Army Special Operations Command|Army SOF]] units under the new 1st Special Operations Command in 1982.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.army.mil/article/230463/u_s_army_special_operations_command_30th_anniversary|title=U.S. Army Special Operations Command 30th Anniversary|website=www.army.mil}}</ref> [[File:Barry Goldwater.jpg|thumb|[[Senator Barry Goldwater]], former Chairman of the [[Senate Armed Services Committee]]]] -By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the [[US Congress]] of the need for military reforms. In June, the [[Senate Armed Services Committee]] (SASC) began a two-year-long study of the Defense Department, which included an examination of SOF spearheaded by Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] ([[US Republican Party|R]]-AZ). With concern mounting on [[Capitol Hill]], the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; this agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF.{{r|BIT}}{{r|hr5109}} The Joint Special Operations Agency thus did little to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies, and therefore was deemed insufficient. Within the Defense Department, there were a few staunch SOF supporters. [[Noel Koch]], Principal Deputy Assistant [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] for International Security Affairs, and his deputy, [[Lynn Rylander]], both advocated SOF reforms.{{r|socomch}} +By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the [[United States Congress|US Congress]] of the need for military reforms. In June, the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Senate Armed Services Committee]] (SASC) began a two-year-long study of the Defense Department, which included an examination of SOF spearheaded by Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] ([[Republican Party (United States)|R]]-AZ). With concern mounting on [[Capitol Hill]], the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; this agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF.{{r|BIT}}{{r|hr5109}} The Joint Special Operations Agency thus did little to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies, and therefore was deemed insufficient. Within the Defense Department, there were a few staunch SOF supporters. [[Noel Koch]], Principal Deputy Assistant [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] for International Security Affairs, and his deputy, [[Lynn Rylander]], both advocated SOF reforms.{{r|socomch}} -At the same time, a few on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul [[United States Special Operations Forces]]. They included Senators [[Sam Nunn]] ([[US Democratic Party|D]]-GA) and [[William Cohen]] (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the [[United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness]]. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country's capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem.{{r|socomch}} Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with [[low-intensity conflict]]s.{{r|BIT}} +At the same time, a few on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul [[United States special operations forces|United States Special Operations Forces]]. They included Senators [[Sam Nunn]] ([[US Democratic Party|D]]-GA) and [[William Cohen]] (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the [[United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness]]. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country's capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem.{{r|socomch}} Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with [[low-intensity conflict]]s.{{r|BIT}} -In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure, entitled "Defense Organization: The Need For Change."{{r|S.CON.RES.80}} [[James R. Locher III]], the principal author of this study, also examined past special operations and speculated on the most likely future threats. This influential document led to the 1986 [[Goldwater-Nichols Act]].{{r|H.R.3622}}{{r|reorg JCS}} By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform bills in both houses of Congress. On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced the Senate bill, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others, which called for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office in the Defense Department to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for low-intensity conflict and special operations.{{r|S.2453}} Representative Daniel's proposal went even further—he wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the [[US Secretary of Defense]]; this would keep Joint Chiefs and the Services out of the SOF budget process.{{r|hr5109}} +In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure, entitled "Defense Organization: The Need For Change."{{r|S.CON.RES.80}} [[James R. Locher III]], the principal author of this study, also examined past special operations and speculated on the most likely future threats. This influential document led to the 1986 [[Goldwater–Nichols Act|Goldwater-Nichols Act]].{{r|H.R.3622}}{{r|reorg JCS}} By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform bills in both houses of Congress. On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced the Senate bill, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others, which called for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office in the Defense Department to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for low-intensity conflict and special operations.{{r|S.2453}} Representative Daniel's proposal went even further—he wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the [[US Secretary of Defense]]; this would keep Joint Chiefs and the Services out of the SOF budget process.{{r|hr5109}} -Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986. Admiral [[William J. Crowe Jr.]], [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]], led [[the Pentagon]]'s opposition to the bills. As an alternative, he proposed a new Special Operations Forces command led by a [[three-star general]]. This proposal was not well received on Capitol Hill—Congress wanted a [[four-star general]] in charge to give SOF more influence. A number of retired military officers and others testified in favor of the need for reform.{{r|socomch}} By most accounts, retired Army Major General [[Richard Scholtes]] gave the most compelling reasons for the change. Scholtes, who commanded the joint special operations task force during [[Operation Urgent Fury]], explained how conventional force leaders misused SOF during the operation, not allowing them to use their unique capabilities, which resulted in high SOF casualties.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kukielski|first=Philip|date=June 2021|title=USSOCOM: The Astounding Story of Its Origin.|url=https://aircommando.org/portfolio-view/acj-vol-10-1/|journal=Air Commando Journal|volume=10| issue = 1|pages=45–49}}</ref> After his formal testimony, Scholtes met privately with a small number of Senators to elaborate on the problems that he had encountered in [[Grenada]].{{r|NYT Taubman}} +Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986. Admiral [[William J. Crowe Jr.]], [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]], led [[the Pentagon]]'s opposition to the bills. As an alternative, he proposed a new Special Operations Forces command led by a [[three-star general]]. This proposal was not well received on Capitol Hill—Congress wanted a [[four-star general]] in charge to give SOF more influence. A number of retired military officers and others testified in favor of the need for reform.{{r|socomch}} By most accounts, retired Army Major General [[Richard Scholtes]] gave the most compelling reasons for the change. Scholtes, who commanded the joint special operations task force during [[United States invasion of Grenada|Operation Urgent Fury]], explained how conventional force leaders misused SOF during the operation, not allowing them to use their unique capabilities, which resulted in high SOF casualties.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kukielski|first=Philip|date=June 2021|title=USSOCOM: The Astounding Story of Its Origin.|url=https://aircommando.org/portfolio-view/acj-vol-10-1/|journal=Air Commando Journal|volume=10| issue = 1|pages=45–49}}</ref> After his formal testimony, Scholtes met privately with a small number of Senators to elaborate on the problems that he had encountered in [[Grenada]].{{r|NYT Taubman}} -Both the House and Senate passed SOF reform bills, and these went to a conference committee for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The bill called for a unified combatant command headed by a four-star general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]], and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called "SOF checkbook").{{r|SOLIC}}{{r|SOF transition Giles}} The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. This was interpreted as Congress forcing the hand of the DOD and the [[Reagan administration]] regarding what it saw as the past failures and emerging threats. The DOD and the administration were responsible for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently passed two additional bills to ensure implementation.{{r|socomch}} The legislation promised to improve SOF in several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11 provided SOF with control over its own resources, better enabling it to modernize the force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice cooperation: a single commander for all SOF promoted interoperability among the same command forces. The establishment of a four-star commander-in-chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict eventually gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of the Defense Department.{{r|SOLIC}} +Both the House and Senate passed SOF reform bills, and these went to a conference committee for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The bill called for a unified combatant command headed by a four-star general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]], and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called "SOF checkbook").{{r|SOLIC}}{{r|SOF transition Giles}} The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. This was interpreted as Congress forcing the hand of the DOD and the [[Presidency of Ronald Reagan|Reagan administration]] regarding what it saw as the past failures and emerging threats. The DOD and the administration were responsible for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently passed two additional bills to ensure implementation.{{r|socomch}} The legislation promised to improve SOF in several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11 provided SOF with control over its own resources, better enabling it to modernize the force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice cooperation: a single commander for all SOF promoted interoperability among the same command forces. The establishment of a four-star commander-in-chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict eventually gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of the Defense Department.{{r|SOLIC}} [[File:GEN James Lindsay 1986.jpg|thumb|left|[[General James Lindsay]], the first Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command]] -However, implementing the provisions and mandates of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 was neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to arise was the appointment of an [[Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict]], whose principal duties included monitorship of special operations activities and the low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. Congress increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but the Department of Defense still did not fill this new billet. In December 1987, Congress directed [[Secretary of the Army]] [[John O. Marsh]] to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until the Senate approved a suitable replacement. Not until 18 months after the legislation passed did Ambassador [[Charles Whitehouse]] assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC).{{r|NYT Lewis}} +However, implementing the provisions and mandates of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 was neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to arise was the appointment of an [[Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict|Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict]], whose principal duties included monitorship of special operations activities and the low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. Congress increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but the Department of Defense still did not fill this new billet. In December 1987, Congress directed [[United States Secretary of the Army|Secretary of the Army]] [[John Otho Marsh Jr.|John O. Marsh]] to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until the Senate approved a suitable replacement. Not until 18 months after the legislation passed did Ambassador [[Charles S. Whitehouse|Charles Whitehouse]] assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC).{{r|NYT Lewis}} -Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM provided its own measure of excitement. A quick solution to manning and basing a brand new unified command was to abolish an existing command. [[United States Readiness Command]] (USREDCOM), with an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viable mission in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era, and its commander-in-chief, General [[James J. Lindsay|James Lindsay]], had had some special operations experience. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] that USREDCOM be disestablished to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM. President [[Ronald Reagan]] approved the establishment of the new command on 13 April 1987. The Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on 16 April 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be the first Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). The Senate accepted him without debate.{{r|socomch}} +Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM provided its own measure of excitement. A quick solution to manning and basing a brand new unified command was to abolish an existing command. [[United States Strike Command|United States Readiness Command]] (USREDCOM), with an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viable mission in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era, and its commander-in-chief, General [[James J. Lindsay|James Lindsay]], had had some special operations experience. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] that USREDCOM be disestablished to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM. President [[Ronald Reagan]] approved the establishment of the new command on 13 April 1987. The Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on 16 April 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be the first Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). The Senate accepted him without debate.{{r|socomch}} ===Operation Earnest Will=== @@ -69,15 +69,15 @@ USSOCOM's first tactical operation involved [[160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (United States)|160th Special Operations Aviation Regiment (Airborne)]] ("Night Stalkers") aviators, SEALs, and [[Special Boat Teams]] (SBT) working together during Operation Earnest Will in September 1987. During [[Operation Earnest Will]], the United States ensured that neutral oil tankers and other merchant ships could safely transit the [[Persian Gulf]] during the [[Iran–Iraq War]]. Iranian attacks on tankers prompted [[Kuwait]] to ask the United States in December 1986 to register 11 Kuwaiti tankers as American ships so that they could be escorted by the U.S. Navy. President Reagan agreed to the Kuwaiti request on 10 March 1987, hoping it would deter Iranian attacks.{{r|socomch}} The protection offered by U.S. naval vessels, however, did not stop [[Iran]], which used mines and small boats to harass the convoys steaming to and from Kuwait. In late July 1987, Rear Admiral Harold J. Bernsen, commander of the Middle East Force, requested NSW assets. Special Boat Teams deployed with six Mark III Patrol Boats and two SEAL platoons in August.{{r|socomch}} The Middle East Force decided to convert two oil servicing barges, Hercules and Wimbrown VII, into mobile sea bases. The mobile sea bases allowed SOF in the northern [[Persian Gulf]] to thwart clandestine [[Iran]]ian mining and small boat attacks. -On 21 September, Nightstalkers flying MH-60 and [[MH-6|Little Birds]] took off from the frigate [[USS Jarrett (FFG-33)|USS ''Jarrett'']] to track an Iranian ship, ''[[Iran Ajr]]''. The Nightstalkers observed ''Iran Ajr'' turn off her lights and begin laying mines. After receiving permission to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. As ''Iran Ajr'''s crew began to push mines over the side, the helicopters resumed firing until the crew abandoned the ship. Special Boat Teams provided security while a SEAL team boarded the vessel at first light and discovered nine mines on the vessel's deck, as well as a logbook revealing areas where previous mines had been laid. The logbook implicated Iran in mining international waters.{{r|socomch}} +On 21 September, Nightstalkers flying MH-60 and [[MD Helicopters MH-6 Little Bird|Little Birds]] took off from the frigate [[USS Jarrett|USS ''Jarrett'']] to track an Iranian ship, ''[[Iran Ajr]]''. The Nightstalkers observed ''Iran Ajr'' turn off her lights and begin laying mines. After receiving permission to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. As ''Iran Ajr'''s crew began to push mines over the side, the helicopters resumed firing until the crew abandoned the ship. Special Boat Teams provided security while a SEAL team boarded the vessel at first light and discovered nine mines on the vessel's deck, as well as a logbook revealing areas where previous mines had been laid. The logbook implicated Iran in mining international waters.{{r|socomch}} [[File:Operation Nimble Archer DN-SC-88-01042.jpg|thumb|left|One of two [[Iran]]ian oil platforms set ablaze after shelling by American [[destroyers]]]] -Within a few days, the Special Operations forces had determined the [[Iran]]ian pattern of activity; the Iranians hid during the day near oil and gas platforms in Iranian waters and at night they headed toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. With this knowledge, SOF launched three Little Bird helicopters and two patrol craft to the buoy. The Little Bird helicopters arrived first and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored near the buoy. After a short but intense firefight, the helicopters sank all three boats. Three days later, in mid-October, an Iranian Silkworm missile hit the tanker ''[[MV Sea Isle City|Sea Isle City]]'' near the oil terminal outside [[Kuwait City]]. Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the missile attack.{{r|socomch}}{{r|OEWDP}} During [[Operation Nimble Archer]], four [[destroyers]] shelled two oil platforms in the Rostam oil field. After the shelling, a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit planted explosives on one of the platforms to destroy it. The SEALs next boarded and searched a third-platform {{convert|2|mi|0}} away. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence purposes. +Within a few days, the Special Operations forces had determined the [[Iran]]ian pattern of activity; the Iranians hid during the day near oil and gas platforms in Iranian waters and at night they headed toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. With this knowledge, SOF launched three Little Bird helicopters and two patrol craft to the buoy. The Little Bird helicopters arrived first and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored near the buoy. After a short but intense firefight, the helicopters sank all three boats. Three days later, in mid-October, an Iranian Silkworm missile hit the tanker ''[[MV Sea Isle City|Sea Isle City]]'' near the oil terminal outside [[Kuwait City]]. Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the missile attack.{{r|socomch}}{{r|OEWDP}} During [[Operation Nimble Archer]], four [[Destroyer|destroyers]] shelled two oil platforms in the Rostam oil field. After the shelling, a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit planted explosives on one of the platforms to destroy it. The SEALs next boarded and searched a third-platform {{convert|2|mi|0}} away. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence purposes. On 14 April 1988, {{convert|65|mi|sigfig=2}} east of [[Bahrain]], the frigate [[USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG-58)|USS ''Samuel B. Roberts'']] hit a mine, blowing an immense hole in its hull.{{r|NHH}} Ten sailors were injured. During [[Operation Praying Mantis]] the U.S. retaliated fiercely, attacking the Iranian frigate ''Sahand'' and oil platforms in the Sirri and Sassan oil fields.{{r|OEWDP}} After U.S. warships bombarded the Sirri platform and set it ablaze, a UH-60 with a SEAL platoon flew toward the platform but was unable to get close enough because of the roaring fire. Secondary explosions soon wrecked the platform.{{r|socomch}} Thereafter, Iranian attacks on neutral ships dropped drastically. On 18 July, Iran accepted the United Nations cease-fire; on 20 August 1988, the Iran–Iraq War ended. The remaining SEALs, patrol boats, and helicopters then returned to the United States.{{r|socomch}} Special operations forces provided critical skills necessary to help CENTCOM gain control of the northern Persian Gulf and balk Iran's small boats and minelayers. The ability to work at night proved vital because Iranian units used darkness to conceal their actions. Additionally, because of Earnest Will operational requirements, USSOCOM would acquire new weapons systems—the patrol coastal ships and the [[Mark V Special Operations Craft]].{{r|socomch}} ===Somalia=== -Special Operations Command first became involved in [[Somalia]] in 1992 as part of [[Operation Provide Relief]]. C-130s circled over Somali airstrips during the delivery of relief supplies. Special Forces medics accompanied many relief flights into the airstrips throughout southern Somalia to assess the area. They were the first U.S. soldiers in Somalia, arriving before U.S. forces who supported the expanded relief operations of Restore Hope.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYT somalia step}}{{r|NYTttt}} The first teams into Somalia was CIA [[Special Activities Division]] paramilitary officers with elements of [[Joint Special Operations Command|JSOC]]. They conducted very high-risk advanced force operations prior to the entry of the follow-on forces. The first casualty of the conflict came from this team and was a Paramilitary officer and former Delta Force operator named [[Larry Freedman]]. Freedman was awarded the [[Intelligence Star]] for ''"extraordinary heroism"'' for his actions.{{r|Gup 2000}} +Special Operations Command first became involved in [[Somalia]] in 1992 as part of [[Operation Provide Relief]]. C-130s circled over Somali airstrips during the delivery of relief supplies. Special Forces medics accompanied many relief flights into the airstrips throughout southern Somalia to assess the area. They were the first U.S. soldiers in Somalia, arriving before U.S. forces who supported the expanded relief operations of Restore Hope.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYT somalia step}}{{r|NYTttt}} The first teams into Somalia was CIA [[Special Activities Center|Special Activities Division]] paramilitary officers with elements of [[Joint Special Operations Command|JSOC]]. They conducted very high-risk advanced force operations prior to the entry of the follow-on forces. The first casualty of the conflict came from this team and was a Paramilitary officer and former Delta Force operator named [[Larry Freedman]]. Freedman was awarded the [[Intelligence Star]] for ''"extraordinary heroism"'' for his actions.{{r|Gup 2000}} -The earliest missions during [[Operation Restore Hope]] were conducted by Navy SEALs. The SEALs performed several hydrographic reconnaissance missions to find suitable landing sites for [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]]. On 7 December, the SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where they found suitable landing sites, assessed the area for threats, and concluded that the port could support offloading ships. This was a tough mission because the SEALs swam against a strong current which left many of them overheated and exhausted. Furthermore, they swam through raw sewage in the harbor, which made them sick.{{r|socomch}} When the first SEALs hit the shore the following night, they were surprised to meet members of the news media. The first Marines came ashore soon thereafter, and the press redirected their attention to them. Later, the SEALs provided personal security for [[George H. W. Bush|President George Bush]] during a visit to Somalia.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYTttt}} In December 1992, Special Forces assets in Kenya moved to Somalia and joined Operation Restore Hope. January 1993, a Special Forces command element deployed to Mogadishu as the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR) that would command and control all special operations for Restore Hope. JSOFOR's mission was to make initial contact with indigenous factions and leaders; provide information for force protection; and provide reports on the area for future relief and security operations. Before redeploying in April, JSOFOR elements drove over {{convert|26000|mi|sigfig=2}}, captured 277 weapons, and destroyed over {{convert|45,320|lb|kg}} of explosives.{{r|socomch}} +The earliest missions during [[Unified Task Force|Operation Restore Hope]] were conducted by Navy SEALs. The SEALs performed several hydrographic reconnaissance missions to find suitable landing sites for [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]]. On 7 December, the SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where they found suitable landing sites, assessed the area for threats, and concluded that the port could support offloading ships. This was a tough mission because the SEALs swam against a strong current which left many of them overheated and exhausted. Furthermore, they swam through raw sewage in the harbor, which made them sick.{{r|socomch}} When the first SEALs hit the shore the following night, they were surprised to meet members of the news media. The first Marines came ashore soon thereafter, and the press redirected their attention to them. Later, the SEALs provided personal security for [[George H. W. Bush|President George Bush]] during a visit to Somalia.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYTttt}} In December 1992, Special Forces assets in Kenya moved to Somalia and joined Operation Restore Hope. January 1993, a Special Forces command element deployed to Mogadishu as the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR) that would command and control all special operations for Restore Hope. JSOFOR's mission was to make initial contact with indigenous factions and leaders; provide information for force protection; and provide reports on the area for future relief and security operations. Before redeploying in April, JSOFOR elements drove over {{convert|26000|mi|sigfig=2}}, captured 277 weapons, and destroyed over {{convert|45,320|lb|kg}} of explosives.{{r|socomch}} [[File:75th Ranger Regiment Bravo Company 3rd Batallion Somalia 1993.jpg|left|thumb|250px|Bravo Company, 3rd Battalion of the [[75th Ranger Regiment (United States)|75th Ranger Regiment]] in Somalia, 1993]] '
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[ 0 => 'The '''United States Special Operations Command''' ('''USSOCOM''' or '''SOCOM''') is the [[unified combatant command]] charged with overseeing the various [[Special forces|special operations]] component commands of the [[United States Army Special Operations Command|Army]], [[United States Marine Forces Special Operations Command|Marine Corps]], [[United States Naval Special Warfare Command|Navy]], and [[Air Force Special Operations Command|Air Force]] of the [[United States Armed Forces]]. The command is part of the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] and is the only unified combatant command created by an [[Act of Congress]]. USSOCOM is headquartered at [[MacDill Air Force Base]] in [[Tampa, Florida|Tampa]], Florida.', 1 => 'The idea of an American unified special operations command had its origins in the aftermath of [[Operation Eagle Claw]], the disastrous attempted rescue of [[Iran hostage crisis|hostages]] at the [[Embassy of the United States, Tehran|American embassy]] in Iran in 1980. The ensuing investigation, chaired by [[Admiral (United States)|Admiral]] [[James L. Holloway III]], the retired [[Chief of Naval Operations]], cited lack of [[command and control]] and inter-service coordination as significant factors in the failure of the mission.{{r|Adm Holloway bio}} Since its activation on 16 April 1987, U.S. Special Operations Command has participated in many [[Military operation|operations]], from the 1989 [[United States invasion of Panama|invasion]] of [[Panama]] to the [[War on terror|War on Terror]].{{r|NYT Bang Panama}}{{r|NYT Regime thought}}', 2 => 'USSOCOM is involved with clandestine activity, such as [[Direct action (military)|direct action]], [[special reconnaissance]], [[Counterterrorism|counter-terrorism]], [[foreign internal defense]], [[unconventional warfare (United States)|unconventional warfare]], [[psychological warfare]], [[civil affairs]], and [[War on drugs|counter-narcotics]] operations. Each branch has a distinct Special Operations Command that is capable of running its own operations, but when the different special operations forces need to work together for an operation, USSOCOM becomes the joint component command of the operation, instead of a SOC of a specific branch.{{r|posture statement}}', 3 => 'The unwieldy command and control structure of separate U.S. military special operations forces (SOF), which led to the failure of [[Operation Eagle Claw]] in 1980, highlighted the need within the [[United States Department of Defense|US Department of Defense]] for reform and reorganization. The [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|US Army Chief of Staff]], General [[Edward C. Meyer|Edward C. "Shy" Meyer]], had already helped create the U.S. [[Delta Force]] in 1977.{{r|Delta elite force}} Following Eagle Claw, he called for a further restructuring of special operations capabilities. Although unsuccessful at the joint level, Meyer nevertheless went on to consolidate [[United States Army Special Operations Command|Army SOF]] units under the new 1st Special Operations Command in 1982.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.army.mil/article/230463/u_s_army_special_operations_command_30th_anniversary|title=U.S. Army Special Operations Command 30th Anniversary|website=www.army.mil}}</ref>', 4 => 'By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the [[United States Congress|US Congress]] of the need for military reforms. In June, the [[United States Senate Committee on Armed Services|Senate Armed Services Committee]] (SASC) began a two-year-long study of the Defense Department, which included an examination of SOF spearheaded by Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] ([[Republican Party (United States)|R]]-AZ). With concern mounting on [[Capitol Hill]], the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; this agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF.{{r|BIT}}{{r|hr5109}} The Joint Special Operations Agency thus did little to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies, and therefore was deemed insufficient. Within the Defense Department, there were a few staunch SOF supporters. [[Noel Koch]], Principal Deputy Assistant [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] for International Security Affairs, and his deputy, [[Lynn Rylander]], both advocated SOF reforms.{{r|socomch}}', 5 => 'At the same time, a few on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul [[United States special operations forces|United States Special Operations Forces]]. They included Senators [[Sam Nunn]] ([[US Democratic Party|D]]-GA) and [[William Cohen]] (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the [[United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness]]. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country's capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem.{{r|socomch}} Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with [[low-intensity conflict]]s.{{r|BIT}}', 6 => 'In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure, entitled "Defense Organization: The Need For Change."{{r|S.CON.RES.80}} [[James R. Locher III]], the principal author of this study, also examined past special operations and speculated on the most likely future threats. This influential document led to the 1986 [[Goldwater–Nichols Act|Goldwater-Nichols Act]].{{r|H.R.3622}}{{r|reorg JCS}} By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform bills in both houses of Congress. On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced the Senate bill, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others, which called for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office in the Defense Department to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for low-intensity conflict and special operations.{{r|S.2453}} Representative Daniel's proposal went even further—he wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the [[US Secretary of Defense]]; this would keep Joint Chiefs and the Services out of the SOF budget process.{{r|hr5109}}', 7 => 'Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986. Admiral [[William J. Crowe Jr.]], [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]], led [[the Pentagon]]'s opposition to the bills. As an alternative, he proposed a new Special Operations Forces command led by a [[three-star general]]. This proposal was not well received on Capitol Hill—Congress wanted a [[four-star general]] in charge to give SOF more influence. A number of retired military officers and others testified in favor of the need for reform.{{r|socomch}} By most accounts, retired Army Major General [[Richard Scholtes]] gave the most compelling reasons for the change. Scholtes, who commanded the joint special operations task force during [[United States invasion of Grenada|Operation Urgent Fury]], explained how conventional force leaders misused SOF during the operation, not allowing them to use their unique capabilities, which resulted in high SOF casualties.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kukielski|first=Philip|date=June 2021|title=USSOCOM: The Astounding Story of Its Origin.|url=https://aircommando.org/portfolio-view/acj-vol-10-1/|journal=Air Commando Journal|volume=10| issue = 1|pages=45–49}}</ref> After his formal testimony, Scholtes met privately with a small number of Senators to elaborate on the problems that he had encountered in [[Grenada]].{{r|NYT Taubman}}', 8 => 'Both the House and Senate passed SOF reform bills, and these went to a conference committee for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The bill called for a unified combatant command headed by a four-star general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]], and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called "SOF checkbook").{{r|SOLIC}}{{r|SOF transition Giles}} The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. This was interpreted as Congress forcing the hand of the DOD and the [[Presidency of Ronald Reagan|Reagan administration]] regarding what it saw as the past failures and emerging threats. The DOD and the administration were responsible for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently passed two additional bills to ensure implementation.{{r|socomch}} The legislation promised to improve SOF in several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11 provided SOF with control over its own resources, better enabling it to modernize the force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice cooperation: a single commander for all SOF promoted interoperability among the same command forces. The establishment of a four-star commander-in-chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict eventually gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of the Defense Department.{{r|SOLIC}}', 9 => 'However, implementing the provisions and mandates of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 was neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to arise was the appointment of an [[Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict|Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict]], whose principal duties included monitorship of special operations activities and the low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. Congress increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but the Department of Defense still did not fill this new billet. In December 1987, Congress directed [[United States Secretary of the Army|Secretary of the Army]] [[John Otho Marsh Jr.|John O. Marsh]] to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until the Senate approved a suitable replacement. Not until 18 months after the legislation passed did Ambassador [[Charles S. Whitehouse|Charles Whitehouse]] assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC).{{r|NYT Lewis}}', 10 => 'Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM provided its own measure of excitement. A quick solution to manning and basing a brand new unified command was to abolish an existing command. [[United States Strike Command|United States Readiness Command]] (USREDCOM), with an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viable mission in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era, and its commander-in-chief, General [[James J. Lindsay|James Lindsay]], had had some special operations experience. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] that USREDCOM be disestablished to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM. President [[Ronald Reagan]] approved the establishment of the new command on 13 April 1987. The Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on 16 April 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be the first Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). The Senate accepted him without debate.{{r|socomch}}', 11 => 'On 21 September, Nightstalkers flying MH-60 and [[MD Helicopters MH-6 Little Bird|Little Birds]] took off from the frigate [[USS Jarrett|USS ''Jarrett'']] to track an Iranian ship, ''[[Iran Ajr]]''. The Nightstalkers observed ''Iran Ajr'' turn off her lights and begin laying mines. After receiving permission to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. As ''Iran Ajr'''s crew began to push mines over the side, the helicopters resumed firing until the crew abandoned the ship. Special Boat Teams provided security while a SEAL team boarded the vessel at first light and discovered nine mines on the vessel's deck, as well as a logbook revealing areas where previous mines had been laid. The logbook implicated Iran in mining international waters.{{r|socomch}}', 12 => 'Within a few days, the Special Operations forces had determined the [[Iran]]ian pattern of activity; the Iranians hid during the day near oil and gas platforms in Iranian waters and at night they headed toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. With this knowledge, SOF launched three Little Bird helicopters and two patrol craft to the buoy. The Little Bird helicopters arrived first and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored near the buoy. After a short but intense firefight, the helicopters sank all three boats. Three days later, in mid-October, an Iranian Silkworm missile hit the tanker ''[[MV Sea Isle City|Sea Isle City]]'' near the oil terminal outside [[Kuwait City]]. Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the missile attack.{{r|socomch}}{{r|OEWDP}} During [[Operation Nimble Archer]], four [[Destroyer|destroyers]] shelled two oil platforms in the Rostam oil field. After the shelling, a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit planted explosives on one of the platforms to destroy it. The SEALs next boarded and searched a third-platform {{convert|2|mi|0}} away. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence purposes.', 13 => 'Special Operations Command first became involved in [[Somalia]] in 1992 as part of [[Operation Provide Relief]]. C-130s circled over Somali airstrips during the delivery of relief supplies. Special Forces medics accompanied many relief flights into the airstrips throughout southern Somalia to assess the area. They were the first U.S. soldiers in Somalia, arriving before U.S. forces who supported the expanded relief operations of Restore Hope.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYT somalia step}}{{r|NYTttt}} The first teams into Somalia was CIA [[Special Activities Center|Special Activities Division]] paramilitary officers with elements of [[Joint Special Operations Command|JSOC]]. They conducted very high-risk advanced force operations prior to the entry of the follow-on forces. The first casualty of the conflict came from this team and was a Paramilitary officer and former Delta Force operator named [[Larry Freedman]]. Freedman was awarded the [[Intelligence Star]] for ''"extraordinary heroism"'' for his actions.{{r|Gup 2000}}', 14 => 'The earliest missions during [[Unified Task Force|Operation Restore Hope]] were conducted by Navy SEALs. The SEALs performed several hydrographic reconnaissance missions to find suitable landing sites for [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]]. On 7 December, the SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where they found suitable landing sites, assessed the area for threats, and concluded that the port could support offloading ships. This was a tough mission because the SEALs swam against a strong current which left many of them overheated and exhausted. Furthermore, they swam through raw sewage in the harbor, which made them sick.{{r|socomch}} When the first SEALs hit the shore the following night, they were surprised to meet members of the news media. The first Marines came ashore soon thereafter, and the press redirected their attention to them. Later, the SEALs provided personal security for [[George H. W. Bush|President George Bush]] during a visit to Somalia.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYTttt}} In December 1992, Special Forces assets in Kenya moved to Somalia and joined Operation Restore Hope. January 1993, a Special Forces command element deployed to Mogadishu as the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR) that would command and control all special operations for Restore Hope. JSOFOR's mission was to make initial contact with indigenous factions and leaders; provide information for force protection; and provide reports on the area for future relief and security operations. Before redeploying in April, JSOFOR elements drove over {{convert|26000|mi|sigfig=2}}, captured 277 weapons, and destroyed over {{convert|45,320|lb|kg}} of explosives.{{r|socomch}}' ]
Lines removed in edit (removed_lines)
[ 0 => 'The '''United States Special Operations Command''' ('''USSOCOM''' or '''SOCOM''') is the [[unified combatant command]] charged with overseeing the various [[Special forces|special operations]] component commands of the [[USASOC|Army]], [[MARSOC|Marine Corps]], [[NAVSPECWARCOM|Navy]], and [[AFSOC|Air Force]] of the [[United States Armed Forces]]. The command is part of the [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]] and is the only unified combatant command created by an [[Act of Congress]]. USSOCOM is headquartered at [[MacDill Air Force Base]] in [[Tampa, Florida|Tampa]], Florida.', 1 => 'The idea of an American unified special operations command had its origins in the aftermath of [[Operation Eagle Claw]], the disastrous attempted rescue of [[Iran hostage crisis|hostages]] at the [[Den of Espionage|American embassy]] in Iran in 1980. The ensuing investigation, chaired by [[Admiral (United States)|Admiral]] [[James L. Holloway III]], the retired [[Chief of Naval Operations]], cited lack of [[Command and control (military)|command and control]] and inter-service coordination as significant factors in the failure of the mission.{{r|Adm Holloway bio}} Since its activation on 16 April 1987, U.S. Special Operations Command has participated in many [[Military operation|operations]], from the 1989 [[United States invasion of Panama|invasion]] of [[Panama]] to the [[War on Terror]].{{r|NYT Bang Panama}}{{r|NYT Regime thought}}', 2 => 'USSOCOM is involved with clandestine activity, such as [[Direct action (military)|direct action]], [[special reconnaissance]], [[counter-terrorism]], [[foreign internal defense]], [[unconventional warfare (United States)|unconventional warfare]], [[psychological warfare]], [[civil affairs]], and [[counter-narcotics]] operations. Each branch has a distinct Special Operations Command that is capable of running its own operations, but when the different special operations forces need to work together for an operation, USSOCOM becomes the joint component command of the operation, instead of a SOC of a specific branch.{{r|posture statement}}', 3 => 'The unwieldy command and control structure of separate U.S. military special operations forces (SOF), which led to the failure of [[Operation Eagle Claw]] in 1980, highlighted the need within the [[US Department of Defense]] for reform and reorganization. The [[US Army Chief of Staff]], General [[Edward C. Meyer|Edward C. "Shy" Meyer]], had already helped create the U.S. [[Delta Force]] in 1977.{{r|Delta elite force}} Following Eagle Claw, he called for a further restructuring of special operations capabilities. Although unsuccessful at the joint level, Meyer nevertheless went on to consolidate [[USASOC|Army SOF]] units under the new 1st Special Operations Command in 1982.<ref>{{Cite web|url=https://www.army.mil/article/230463/u_s_army_special_operations_command_30th_anniversary|title=U.S. Army Special Operations Command 30th Anniversary|website=www.army.mil}}</ref>', 4 => 'By 1983, there was a small but growing sense in the [[US Congress]] of the need for military reforms. In June, the [[Senate Armed Services Committee]] (SASC) began a two-year-long study of the Defense Department, which included an examination of SOF spearheaded by Senator [[Barry Goldwater]] ([[US Republican Party|R]]-AZ). With concern mounting on [[Capitol Hill]], the Department of Defense created the Joint Special Operations Agency on 1 January 1984; this agency, however, had neither operational nor command authority over any SOF.{{r|BIT}}{{r|hr5109}} The Joint Special Operations Agency thus did little to improve SOF readiness, capabilities, or policies, and therefore was deemed insufficient. Within the Defense Department, there were a few staunch SOF supporters. [[Noel Koch]], Principal Deputy Assistant [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] for International Security Affairs, and his deputy, [[Lynn Rylander]], both advocated SOF reforms.{{r|socomch}}', 5 => 'At the same time, a few on Capitol Hill were determined to overhaul [[United States Special Operations Forces]]. They included Senators [[Sam Nunn]] ([[US Democratic Party|D]]-GA) and [[William Cohen]] (R-ME), both members of the Armed Services Committee, and Representative Dan Daniel (D-VA), the chairman of the [[United States House Armed Services Subcommittee on Readiness]]. Congressman Daniel had become convinced that the U.S. military establishment was not interested in special operations, that the country's capability in this area was second rate, and that SOF operational command and control was an endemic problem.{{r|socomch}} Senators Nunn and Cohen also felt strongly that the Department of Defense was not preparing adequately for future threats. Senator Cohen agreed that the U.S. needed a clearer organizational focus and chain of command for special operations to deal with [[low-intensity conflict]]s.{{r|BIT}}', 6 => 'In October 1985, the Senate Armed Services Committee published the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military structure, entitled "Defense Organization: The Need For Change."{{r|S.CON.RES.80}} [[James R. Locher III]], the principal author of this study, also examined past special operations and speculated on the most likely future threats. This influential document led to the 1986 [[Goldwater-Nichols Act]].{{r|H.R.3622}}{{r|reorg JCS}} By spring 1986, SOF advocates had introduced reform bills in both houses of Congress. On 15 May, Senator Cohen introduced the Senate bill, co-sponsored by Senator Nunn and others, which called for a joint military organization for SOF and the establishment of an office in the Defense Department to ensure adequate funding and policy emphasis for low-intensity conflict and special operations.{{r|S.2453}} Representative Daniel's proposal went even further—he wanted a national special operations agency headed by a civilian who would bypass the Joint Chiefs and report directly to the [[US Secretary of Defense]]; this would keep Joint Chiefs and the Services out of the SOF budget process.{{r|hr5109}}', 7 => 'Congress held hearings on the two bills in the summer of 1986. Admiral [[William J. Crowe Jr.]], [[Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff]], led [[the Pentagon]]'s opposition to the bills. As an alternative, he proposed a new Special Operations Forces command led by a [[three-star general]]. This proposal was not well received on Capitol Hill—Congress wanted a [[four-star general]] in charge to give SOF more influence. A number of retired military officers and others testified in favor of the need for reform.{{r|socomch}} By most accounts, retired Army Major General [[Richard Scholtes]] gave the most compelling reasons for the change. Scholtes, who commanded the joint special operations task force during [[Operation Urgent Fury]], explained how conventional force leaders misused SOF during the operation, not allowing them to use their unique capabilities, which resulted in high SOF casualties.<ref>{{Cite journal|last=Kukielski|first=Philip|date=June 2021|title=USSOCOM: The Astounding Story of Its Origin.|url=https://aircommando.org/portfolio-view/acj-vol-10-1/|journal=Air Commando Journal|volume=10| issue = 1|pages=45–49}}</ref> After his formal testimony, Scholtes met privately with a small number of Senators to elaborate on the problems that he had encountered in [[Grenada]].{{r|NYT Taubman}}', 8 => 'Both the House and Senate passed SOF reform bills, and these went to a conference committee for reconciliation. Senate and House conferees forged a compromise. The bill called for a unified combatant command headed by a four-star general for all SOF, an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, a coordinating board for low-intensity conflict within the [[United States National Security Council|National Security Council]], and a new Major Force Program (MFP-11) for SOF (the so-called "SOF checkbook").{{r|SOLIC}}{{r|SOF transition Giles}} The final bill, attached as a rider to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act, amended the Goldwater-Nichols Act and was signed into law in October 1986. This was interpreted as Congress forcing the hand of the DOD and the [[Reagan administration]] regarding what it saw as the past failures and emerging threats. The DOD and the administration were responsible for implementing the law, and Congress subsequently passed two additional bills to ensure implementation.{{r|socomch}} The legislation promised to improve SOF in several respects. Once implemented, MFP-11 provided SOF with control over its own resources, better enabling it to modernize the force. Additionally, the law fostered interservice cooperation: a single commander for all SOF promoted interoperability among the same command forces. The establishment of a four-star commander-in-chief and an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict eventually gave SOF a voice in the highest councils of the Defense Department.{{r|SOLIC}}', 9 => 'However, implementing the provisions and mandates of the Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1987 was neither rapid nor smooth. One of the first issues to arise was the appointment of an [[Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict]], whose principal duties included monitorship of special operations activities and the low-intensity conflict activities of the Department of Defense. Congress increased the number of assistant secretaries of defense from 11 to 12, but the Department of Defense still did not fill this new billet. In December 1987, Congress directed [[Secretary of the Army]] [[John O. Marsh]] to carry out the ASD (SO/LIC) duties until the Senate approved a suitable replacement. Not until 18 months after the legislation passed did Ambassador [[Charles Whitehouse]] assume the duties of ASD (SO/LIC).{{r|NYT Lewis}}', 10 => 'Meanwhile, the establishment of USSOCOM provided its own measure of excitement. A quick solution to manning and basing a brand new unified command was to abolish an existing command. [[United States Readiness Command]] (USREDCOM), with an often misunderstood mission, did not appear to have a viable mission in the post-Goldwater-Nichols era, and its commander-in-chief, General [[James J. Lindsay|James Lindsay]], had had some special operations experience. On 23 January 1987, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended to the [[United States Secretary of Defense|Secretary of Defense]] that USREDCOM be disestablished to provide billets and facilities for USSOCOM. President [[Ronald Reagan]] approved the establishment of the new command on 13 April 1987. The Department of Defense activated USSOCOM on 16 April 1987 and nominated General Lindsay to be the first Commander in Chief Special Operations Command (USCINCSOC). The Senate accepted him without debate.{{r|socomch}}', 11 => 'On 21 September, Nightstalkers flying MH-60 and [[MH-6|Little Birds]] took off from the frigate [[USS Jarrett (FFG-33)|USS ''Jarrett'']] to track an Iranian ship, ''[[Iran Ajr]]''. The Nightstalkers observed ''Iran Ajr'' turn off her lights and begin laying mines. After receiving permission to attack, the helicopters fired guns and rockets, stopping the ship. As ''Iran Ajr'''s crew began to push mines over the side, the helicopters resumed firing until the crew abandoned the ship. Special Boat Teams provided security while a SEAL team boarded the vessel at first light and discovered nine mines on the vessel's deck, as well as a logbook revealing areas where previous mines had been laid. The logbook implicated Iran in mining international waters.{{r|socomch}}', 12 => 'Within a few days, the Special Operations forces had determined the [[Iran]]ian pattern of activity; the Iranians hid during the day near oil and gas platforms in Iranian waters and at night they headed toward the Middle Shoals Buoy, a navigation aid for tankers. With this knowledge, SOF launched three Little Bird helicopters and two patrol craft to the buoy. The Little Bird helicopters arrived first and were fired upon by three Iranian boats anchored near the buoy. After a short but intense firefight, the helicopters sank all three boats. Three days later, in mid-October, an Iranian Silkworm missile hit the tanker ''[[MV Sea Isle City|Sea Isle City]]'' near the oil terminal outside [[Kuwait City]]. Seventeen crewmen and the American captain were injured in the missile attack.{{r|socomch}}{{r|OEWDP}} During [[Operation Nimble Archer]], four [[destroyers]] shelled two oil platforms in the Rostam oil field. After the shelling, a SEAL platoon and a demolition unit planted explosives on one of the platforms to destroy it. The SEALs next boarded and searched a third-platform {{convert|2|mi|0}} away. Documents and radios were taken for intelligence purposes.', 13 => 'Special Operations Command first became involved in [[Somalia]] in 1992 as part of [[Operation Provide Relief]]. C-130s circled over Somali airstrips during the delivery of relief supplies. Special Forces medics accompanied many relief flights into the airstrips throughout southern Somalia to assess the area. They were the first U.S. soldiers in Somalia, arriving before U.S. forces who supported the expanded relief operations of Restore Hope.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYT somalia step}}{{r|NYTttt}} The first teams into Somalia was CIA [[Special Activities Division]] paramilitary officers with elements of [[Joint Special Operations Command|JSOC]]. They conducted very high-risk advanced force operations prior to the entry of the follow-on forces. The first casualty of the conflict came from this team and was a Paramilitary officer and former Delta Force operator named [[Larry Freedman]]. Freedman was awarded the [[Intelligence Star]] for ''"extraordinary heroism"'' for his actions.{{r|Gup 2000}}', 14 => 'The earliest missions during [[Operation Restore Hope]] were conducted by Navy SEALs. The SEALs performed several hydrographic reconnaissance missions to find suitable landing sites for [[United States Marine Corps|Marines]]. On 7 December, the SEALs swam into Mogadishu Harbor, where they found suitable landing sites, assessed the area for threats, and concluded that the port could support offloading ships. This was a tough mission because the SEALs swam against a strong current which left many of them overheated and exhausted. Furthermore, they swam through raw sewage in the harbor, which made them sick.{{r|socomch}} When the first SEALs hit the shore the following night, they were surprised to meet members of the news media. The first Marines came ashore soon thereafter, and the press redirected their attention to them. Later, the SEALs provided personal security for [[George H. W. Bush|President George Bush]] during a visit to Somalia.{{r|socomch}}{{r|NYTttt}} In December 1992, Special Forces assets in Kenya moved to Somalia and joined Operation Restore Hope. January 1993, a Special Forces command element deployed to Mogadishu as the Joint Special Operations Forces-Somalia (JSOFOR) that would command and control all special operations for Restore Hope. JSOFOR's mission was to make initial contact with indigenous factions and leaders; provide information for force protection; and provide reports on the area for future relief and security operations. Before redeploying in April, JSOFOR elements drove over {{convert|26000|mi|sigfig=2}}, captured 277 weapons, and destroyed over {{convert|45,320|lb|kg}} of explosives.{{r|socomch}}' ]
Whether or not the change was made through a Tor exit node (tor_exit_node)
false
Unix timestamp of change (timestamp)
'1687725169'
Retrieved from "https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Special:AbuseLog/35389185"