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'{{Infobox military unit | unit_name = United States Army Air Corps | image = [[Image:USAAC Roundel.svg|200px|Army Air Corps aircraft roundel]] | caption = | dates = July 2, 1926 – June 20, 1941 | country = {{flag|United States}} | allegiance = | branch = [[United States Army]] | type = | role = | size = 14,650 men, 1,646 aircraft (1932)<br />16,863 men, 855 aircraft (1936)<br />152,125 men, 6,777 aircraft (1941) | command_structure = | current_commander = | garrison = | ceremonial_chief = | colonel_of_the_regiment = | nickname = | patron = | motto = | colors = | march = | mascot = | battles = | notable_commanders = Maj.Gen. [[Henry H. Arnold]] | anniversaries = }} The '''United States Army Air Corps''' (USAAC) was a forerunner of the [[United States Air Force]]. Created on July 2, 1926 as part of the [[United States Army]], it was also the predecessor of the [[United States Army Air Forces]] (USAAF), established in 1941. Although abolished as an organization in 1942, the Air Corps (AC) remained as a [[United States Army#Basic branches|branch of the Army]] until 1947. The Air Corps was created by the [[United States Congress]] from the [[United States Army Air Service|Air Service]] largely as a compromise between advocates of a separate air arm and those of the Army high command who viewed the aviation arm as an auxiliary branch to support the ground forces. Although its members worked to promote the concept of airpower and an autonomous air force between 1926 and 1941, as a branch of the Army (similar to the [[United States Army Signal Corps|Signal Corps]] or [[Quartermaster Corps]]) its primary purpose by Army policy remained support of ground forces rather than independent operations. On March 1, 1935, still struggling with the issue of a separate air arm, the Army activated the General Headquarters Air Force (GHQ Air Force), a command element conceived in 1924 and inactive since its creation in 1933, for centralized control of aviation combat units within the continental United States. GHQ Air Force reported directly to the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|Chief of Staff of the Army]] until November 19, 1940, when it became subordinate to Army General Headquarters (Army GHQ) after that headquarters was activated. The separation of the Air Corps from control of its combat units caused [[United States Army Air Corps#Problems with unity of command|problems of unity of command]] that became more acute as the Air Corps enlarged in preparation for World War II. This was resolved by the creation of the Army Air Forces on June 20, 1941, when both the Air Corps and GHQ Air Force (renamed Air Force Combat Command) became subordinate to a new higher echelon. The Air Corps ceased to be an administrative organization on March 9, 1942. It remained as a branch of the Army until 1947, however, and the overwhelming majority of personnel assigned to the AAF were members of the Air Corps. ==Lineage of the United States Air Force== * [[Aeronautical Division, U.S. Signal Corps]]&nbsp;&nbsp;1 August 1907–July 18, 1914 * [[Aviation Section, U.S. Signal Corps]]&nbsp;&nbsp;18 July 1914–May 20, 1918 * [[Division of Military Aeronautics]]&nbsp;&nbsp;20 May 1918–May 24, 1918 * [[United States Army Air Service|Air Service, U.S. Army]]&nbsp;&nbsp;24 May 1918–July 2, 1926 * '''U.S. Army Air Corps'''&nbsp;&nbsp;2 July 1926–June 20, 1941<nowiki>*</nowiki> * [[United States Army Air Forces|U.S. Army Air Forces]]&nbsp;&nbsp;20 June 1941–September 18, 1947<nowiki>*</nowiki> * [[United States Air Force]]&nbsp;&nbsp;18 September 1947–present <nowiki>*</nowiki> The '''Air Corps''' became a subordinate element of the '''Army Air Forces''' on 20 June 1941, and was abolished as an administrative organization on 9 March 1942. It continued to exist as a combat arm of the Army (similar to the infantry, armor, or artillery) until disestablished by the [[U.S. Congress]] with the creation of the U.S. Air Force in October 1947. &nbsp;&nbsp; ==Creation of the Air Corps== The [[United States Army Air Service|Air Service]] had a brief but turbulent history. Created during [[World War I]] by [[executive order]], it gained permanent legislative authority in 1920 as a combatant arm of the line of the [[United States Army]]. There followed a six-year struggle between adherents of airpower and the supporters of the traditional military services about the value of an independent Air Force. The doctrinal differences were intensified by struggles for funds caused by the skimpy budgets, as much an impetus for independence as any other factor.<ref>.<ref>Tate, Dr. James P. (1998). ''The Army and its Air Corps: Army Policy Toward Aviation 1919-1941'', Air University Press, pp. 176-180.</ref> [[Image:USAAC,1930.jpg|thumb|Army Air Corps aerial maneuvers over Burbank, California, 1930]] The Lassiter Board, a group of [[General Staff]] officers, recommended to the [[United States Secretary of War|Secretary of War]] in 1923 that the [[U.S. Army Air Service|Air Service]] be augmented by a force of bombardment and pursuit units ("General Headquarters Air Force") to carry out independent missions under the command of an Army general headquarters in time of war, and many of its recommendations became Army regulations. The War Department acknowledged the necessity of improving its Air Service and desired to implement the Lassiter Board's recommendations, which it termed "Major Project No. 4", but the Coolidge administration proved a major obstacle, choosing to economize by radically cutting military budgets, particularly the Army's.<ref>Tate (1998), p. 30. The Coolidge administration boasted of cutting the War Department's budget by 75%.</ref> The Lampert Committee of the [[United States House of Representatives|House of Representatives]] went far beyond this modest proposal in its report to the House in December 1925. After eleven months of extensive hearings, the committee proposed a unified air force independent of the Army and Navy, plus a department of defense to coordinate the three armed services.<ref>Maurer Maurer (1987). ''Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919-1939'', Officer of Air Force History, Washington, D.C. ISBN 1410213919, pp. 72-73.</ref> Another board, headed by [[Dwight Morrow]], had already reached an opposite conclusion in only two and one-half months. Appointed in September 1925 by [[U.S. president|President]] [[Calvin Coolidge]], ostensibly to study the "best means of developing and applying aircraft in national defense" but in actuality to minimize the political impact of the pending court-martial of [[Billy Mitchell]] (and to preempt the findings of the Lampert Committee), the Morrow Board issued its report two weeks before the Lampert Committee's. In accordance with the views of the President, it declared that no threat of air attack was likely to exist to the United States, rejected the idea of a department of defense and a separate department of air, but recommended several minor reforms including that the Air Service be renamed the Air Corps to allow it more prestige, that it be given special representation on the General Staff, and that an Assistant Secretary of War for Aviation be appointed.<ref>Maurer (1987),pp. 73-74.</ref> In early 1926 the Military Affairs Committee of the Congress rejected all bills set forth before it on both sides of the issue. They fashioned a compromise in which the findings of the Morrow Board were enacted as law, while providing the air arm a "five-year plan" for expansion and development. Maj. Gen. [[Mason Patrick]], the Chief of Air Service, had proposed that it be made a semi-independent service within the War Department along the lines of the Marine Corps within the Navy Department, but this was rejected; only the cosmetic name change was accepted.<ref>Tate (1998), pp. 45-47. Gen. Patrick's proposal of an Air Corps equivalent to the Marine Corps was characterized by Brig. Gen. [[Fox Conner]] (and not for the last time by General Staff opponents of Air Corps independence) as a "promotion scheme".</ref> The legislation changed the name of the Air Service to the Air Corps, "thereby strengthening the conception of military aviation as an offensive, striking arm rather than an auxiliary service." The Air Corps Act (44 Stat. 780) became law on 2 July 1926. The act created an additional Assistant Secretary of War to help foster military aeronautics, and it established an air section in each division of the General Staff for a period of three years. Other provisions required that all flying units be commanded by rated personnel and that flight pay be continued. Two additional brigadier generals would serve as assistant chiefs of the Air Corps. Patrick became Chief of the Air Corps. The Air Corps retained the "[[Prop and Wings]]" as its branch insignia through its disestablishment in 1947.<ref>Maurer (1987), p. 74.</ref> The position of the air arm within the Department of War remained essentially the same as before, that is, the flying units were under the operational control of the various ground forces [[corps]] commands and not the Air Corps, which remained responsible only for procurement of aircraft, maintenance of bases, supply, and training. Even the new position of Assistant Secretary of War for Air, held by [[F. Trubee Davison]] from 1926 to 1932, was of little help in promoting autonomy for the air arm. ===Five-year expansion program=== The Air Corps Act gave authorization to carry out a five-year expansion program. However, the lack of funding caused the beginning of the five-year expansion program to be delayed until 1 July 1927. Gen. Patrick proposed an increase to 63 tactical squadrons (from an existing 32) to maintain the program of the Lassiter Board already in effect, but Chief of Staff Gen. [[John Hines]] rejected the recommendation in favor of a plan drawn up by ground force Brig. Gen. [[Hugh Drum]] that proposed 52 squadrons.<ref>Maurer (1987), p. 196.</ref><ref>Tate (1998), pp. 138-140. The General Staff viewed the "five-year plan" as an opponent of the Army in general and fought it bitterly, citing it as a destructive force at every opportunity. General Drum also chaired the 1933 Drum Board, created specifically to oppose (and revise) plans and appropriation requests submitted by Chief of Air Corps Foulois that were not to the General Staff's liking.</ref> The act authorized expansion to 1,800 airplanes, 1,650 officers, and 15,000 enlisted men, to be reached in regular increments over a five-year period. But neither of the modest increases in airplanes or officers was reached until 1938 because adequate funds were never appropriated in the budget, and the coming of the [[Great Depression]] forced reductions in pay and modernization across the board in the Army.<ref>Maurer (1987), p. 200.</ref> Organizationally the Air Corps did double from seven to fifteen groups, but all were seriously understrength in aircraft and pilots.<ref>Maurer (1987), p. 216.</ref> ([[US Army Air Service#Groups of the Air Service|Origin of first seven groups shown here]]) <center>'''Air Corps Groups added 1927-1937'''</center> {| table align=center class="wikitable" ! !! !! !! |-style="background: khaki" | align=center|'''Group''' ||align=center|'''Station''' ||align=center|'''Date activated'''||align=center|'''Aircraft type''' |- |[[18th Operations Group|18th Pursuit Group]]||align=center|[[Wheeler Field]], [[Hawaii]]||20 January 1927|| [[PW-9]] |- |[[7th Operations Group|7th Bombardment Group]]|| align=center|[[Rockwell Field]], [[California]]|| 1 June 1928|| [[Keystone LB-6|LB-7]], [[Keystone B-3A|B-3A]] |- |[[12th Observation Group]]¹|| align=center|[[Brooks Air Force Base|Brooks Field]], [[Texas]]||1 Oct 1930|| [[Thomas-Morse O-19|O-19]] |- |[[20th Operations Group|20th Pursuit Group]]||align=center|[[Mather Air Force Base|Mather Field]], [[California]]|| 15 November 1930|| [[Boeing P-12| P-12]] |- |[[8th Operations Group|8th Pursuit Group]]|| align=center|[[Langley Air Force Base|Langley Field]], [[Virginia]]|| 1 April 1931||[[Curtiss P-6 Hawk|P-6]] |- |[[17th Pursuit Group]]²||align=center|[[March Air Force Base|March Field]], [[California]]|| 1 July 1931||[[P-12]] |- |[[19th Bomb Group]]|| [[Rockwell Field]], [[California]]|| 24 June 1932|| [[Martin B-10|B-10]] |- |[[16th Pursuit Group]]|| align=center|[[Albrook Air Force Base|Albrook Field, Canal Zone]]|| 1 December 1932|| [[P-12]] |- |[[10th Transport Group]]|| align=center|[[Wright-Patterson Air Force Base|Patterson Field]], [[Ohio]]|| 20 May 1937|| [[Bellanca Aircruiser|C-27]] [[Douglas DC-2|C-33]] |} <center>¹Disbanded on 20 May 1937</center> <center>²Redesignated 17th Attack Group (1935), 17th Bomb Group (1939)</center> As units of the Air Corps increased in number, so did higher command echelons. The 2nd Wing was activated in 1922 as part of the Air Service, and then renamed the 2nd Bombardment Wing in 1929 when the 1st Bombardment Wing was also activated, envisioning a bombardment wing of each coast and an attack wing protecting the Mexican border.<ref>Maurer (1987), p. 197.</ref> This third wing, the 3rd Attack Wing, was activated in 1932, at which time the 1st Bomb Wing was redesignated the 1st Pursuit Wing. The three wings became the foundation of General Headquarters Air Force upon its activation in 1935. In 1927 the Air Corps adopted a new color scheme for painting its aircraft, heretofore painted [[olive drab]]. The wings and tails of aircraft were painted [[chrome yellow]], with the words "U.S. ARMY" displayed in large black lettering on the undersurface of the lower wings. Tail rudders were painted with a vertical dark blue band and 13 alternating red-and-white horizontal stripes. In the early 1930's the painting of fuselages olive drab was changed to blue, and this motif continued until late 1937, when all new aircraft (now all-metal) were left unpainted.<ref>Maurer (1987), pp. 213 and 365.</ref> ===Aircraft and personnel=== [[Image:060421-F-1234P-024.jpg|thumb|right| B-6A of 1st Bomb Squadron, 9th BG, 1935]] Most pursuit fighters before 1935 were of the [[Curtiss]] [[P-1 Hawk]] (1926–1930) and [[Boeing P-12]] (1929–1935) families, and before the 1934 introduction of the all-metal monoplane, most front-line bombers were canvas-and-wood variants of the [[radial engine]]d [[Keystone LB-6]] (60 LB-5A, LB-6 and LB-7 bombers) and [[Keystone B-3A|B-3A]] (127 B-3A, B-4A, B-5, and B-6A bombers) designs.<ref>The primary difference between the types is the twin-finned tail of the former, and the single vertical stabilizer of the latter design, which gave it marginally superior performance.</ref> Between 1927 and 1934, the [[Curtiss Falcon|Curtiss O-1]] was the most numerous of the 19 different types and series of observation craft and its A-3 variant the most numerous of the attack planes that fulfilled the observation/close support role designated by the General Staff as the primary mission of the Air Corps.<ref>Maurer (1987), pp. 214-215.</ref> Transport aircraft of the first ten years of the Air Corps were of largely [[trimotor]] design, such as the [[Fokker F.VII|Atlantic-Fokker C-2]] and the [[Ford trimotor|Ford C-3]], and were procured in such small numbers (66 total) that they were doled out one airplane to a base. As their numbers and utility declined, they were replaced by a series of 50 twin-engine and single-engine small transports, and used for staff duties. Pilot training was conducted between 1927 and 1937 in the [[Consolidated PT-3]] trainer, followed by the [[Boeing-Stearman Model 75|Stearman PT-13]] and variants after 1937. By 1933 the Air Corps expanded to a tactical strength of 50 squadrons: 21 pursuit, 13 observation, 12 bombardment, and 4 attack. All were understrength in aircraft and men, particularly officers, which resulted in most being commanded by junior officers (commonly first lieutenants) instead of by majors as authorized.<ref>Maurer (1987), pp. 216-219.</ref> The last open-cockpit fighter used by the USAAC, the [[P-26 Peashooter|P-26]], came into service in 1933 and bridged the gap between the biplane and more modern fighters. The Air Corps was called upon in early 1934 to deliver the mail in the wake of the [[Air Mail scandal]], involving the [[United States Postmaster General|postmaster general]] and heads of the [[airline]]s. Despite an embarrassing performance that resulted in a number of crashes and fatalities, the investigating boards that followed recommended organizational and modernization changes that again set the Air Corps on the path to autonomy and eventual separation from the Army. A force of 2,320 aircraft was recommended by one board,<ref>The Drum Board, which derived the figure as the number necessary to maintain 2,072 "serviceable" planes--the requirements for [[United States color-coded war plans|War Plan Orange-Red]], its worst-case scenario.</ref> and authorized by Congress in June 1936, but appropriations to build up the force were denied by the administration until 1939, when the probability of war became apparent. Instead, the Air Corps inventory actually declined to 855 total aircraft in 1936, a year after the creation of GHQ Air Force, which by itself was recommended to have a strength of 980.<ref>Shiner, Lt.Col. John F. (1997) "The Heyday of the GHQ Air Force, 1935-1939", ''Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force'', Vol.1 1907-1950. USAF. ISBN 0-16-049009-X, p. 136, 120, for the GHQAF figure.</ref> ==Doctrinal development and battles== ===Strategic bombardment in roles and missions=== {| class="toccolours" style="float: left; margin-left: 1em; margin-right: 2em; font-size: 85%; background:#c6dbf7; color:black; width:30em; max-width: 40%;" cellspacing="5" | style="text-align: left;" | "The Naval Air Force will be based on the fleet and move with it as an important element in solving the primary missions confronting the fleet. The Army Air Forces will be land-based and employed as an essential element to the Army in the performance of its mission to defend the coasts at home and in our overseas possessions, thus assuring the fleet absolute freedom of action without any responsibility for coast defense." |- | style="text-align: left;" | Gen. Douglas MacArthur, Adm. William V. Pratt, 7 January 1931<ref>Tate, p. 78.</ref> |} In March 1928, commenting on the lack of survivability in combat of his unit's [[Keystone LB-7]] and [[Martin NBS-1]] bombers, Lt. Col. Hugh J. Knerr, commander of the [[2d Operations Group|2nd Bombardment Group]] at [[Langley Air Force Base|Langley Field]], [[Virginia]], recommended that the Air Corps adopt two types of all-metal monoplane bombers, a short-range day bomber and a long-range night bomber. Instructors at the [[Air Corps Tactical School]], also then at Langley, took the concept one step further in March 1930 by recommending that the types instead be ''light'' and ''heavy'', the latter capable of long range carrying a heavy bomb load.<ref>Tate (1998), p. 161.</ref> The Air Corps in January 1931 "got its foot in the door" for developing a mission for which only it would have capability, while at the same time creating a need for technological advancement of its equipment. [[Chief of Naval Operations]] Admiral [[William V. Pratt]] was desirous of having general assent to his proposition that all naval aviation including land-based aircraft was by definition tied to carrier-based fleet operations. Pratt reached an agreement with new Army Chief of Staff [[Douglas MacArthur]] that the Air Corps would assume responsibility for coastal defense (traditionally a primary function of the Army but only a secondary, war-time function of the Navy) beyond the range of the Army's Coast Artillery guns, ending the Navy's apparent duplication of effort in coastal air operations. The agreement never had authority other than personal agreement between the two heads of service. Though the Navy repudiated the statement when Adm. Pratt retired in 1934, the Air Corps clung to the mission, and provided itself with the basis for development of long range bombers and creating new doctrine to employ them.<ref>Shiner, "The Coming of the GHQ Air Force", p. 116.</ref><ref>Tate (1998), pp. 64-79.</ref> The formulation of theories of [[strategic bombing]] gave new impetus to the argument for an independent air force. Strategic or long-range bombardment was intended to destroy an enemy nation's industry and war-making potential, and only an independent service would have a free hand to do so. But despite what it perceived as "obstruction" from the War Department, much of which was attributable to a shortage of funds, the Air Corps made great strides during the 1930s. A doctrine emerged that stressed precision bombing of industrial targets by heavily armed long-range aircraft. This doctrine resulted because of several factors. The Air Corps Tactical School moved in July 1931 to [[Maxwell Air Force Base|Maxwell Field]], [[Alabama]], where it taught a 36-week course for junior and mid-career officers that included military aviation theory. The Bombardment Section, under the direction of its chief, Major [[Harold L. George]], became influential in the development of doctrine and its dissemination throughout the Air Corps. Nine of its instructors became known throughout the Air Corps as the "[[Bomber Mafia]]", eight of whom (including George) went on to be generals during World War II. Conversely, pursuit tacticians, primarily Capt. [[Claire Chennault]], Chief of the school's Pursuit Section, found their influence waning because of repeated performance failures of pursuit aviation. Finally, the doctrine represented the Air Corps' attempt to develop autonomy from the General Staff, which enforced subordination of the air arm by limiting it to support of ground forces and defense of United States territory. ===Technological advances in bombers=== [[Image:Boeing Y1B-9 test flight USAF p29.jpg|right|thumb|Test flight of the Boeing Y1B-9 bomber in 1932. At the time it was faster than any existing pursuit plane.]] New bomber types under development clearly outperformed new pursuit types, particularly in speed and altitude. In both 1932 and 1933, large-scale maneuvers found fighters unable to climb to altitude quickly enough to intercept attacking [[Boeing Y1B-9|Y1B-9]] and [[Martin B-10|B-10]] prototypes, a failure so complete that Brig. Gen. [[Oscar Westover]], following the 1933 maneuvers, actually proposed elimination of pursuits altogether.<ref>Bowman, Martin W., ''USAAF Handbook 1939-1945'', ISBN 0-8117-1822-0, p. 7.</ref> The successful development of the [[Martin B-10]] and subsequent orders after 1935 for more than 150 (including its B-12 variant) continued the hegemony of the bomber within the AAC. The B-10 featured innovations that became standard for the next decade: an all-metal monoplane, closed cockpits, rotating gun turrets, retractable landing gear, internal bomb bay, and full engine cowlings. The superiority of bombers resulted in a 1934 feasibility study for a 35-ton 4-engined bomber (the [[Boeing XB-15]]) that, while found to be unsuitable for combat because of inadequate engine size, led to the design of the Model 299, later to become the [[B-17 Flying Fortress]], whose first flight was in July 1935. In June 1936 the Air Corps requested 11 B-15s and 50 B-17s for reinforcing hemispheric defense forces in Hawaii, Alaska, and Panama. The request was rejected on the basis that there were no strategic requirements for aircraft of such capabilities.<ref>Cate, James L. (1945). USAF Historical Study 112: ''The History of the Twentieth Air Force: Genesis''. Air Force Historical research Agency, p. 17.</ref> ===Official resistance to Air Corps doctrine=== The Army and Navy, both cognizant of the growing movement within the Air Corps for independence, cooperated to resist it. On 11 September 1935, the Joint Board, at the behest of the Navy and the concurrence of Gen. MacArthur, issued a "Joint Action Statement" that reasserted the limited role of the Air Corps as merely an auxiliary to the "mobile Army" in all its missions, including coastal defense.<ref>Cate, p. 15.</ref> The edict was issued with the intent of shoving an upstart Air Corps back into its place. However, the bomber advocates interpreted its language to mean that the Air Corps could conduct long range reconnaissance, attack approaching fleets, reinforce distant bases, and attack enemy air bases, all in furtherance of its mission to prevent an air attack on America.<ref>Cate, p. 16.</ref> The lack of inter-service cooperation on coastal defense fostered by the Joint Board agreement continued until culminating in the [[Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor]]. A month later (15 October 1935), the General Staff sought to mitigate criticism of the statement by releasing a revision of Air Corps manual TR 440-15 ''Employment of the Air Forces of the Army''.<ref>First issued in 1923 as Air Service Training Regulation TR 440-15 ''Fundamental Principles for the Employment of the Air Service''.</ref> The training regulation had been under review for a year after MacArthur ordered its revision, to restate "the Air Corps's place in the scheme of national defense and...(to do away with)...misconceptions and interbranch prejudices."<ref>Tate (1988), p. 166.</ref> While terming the revision a "compromise" with airpower advocates, the General Staff cited the conclusions of the Baker and Drum Boards,<ref>Tate (1998). The Drum Board was a panel of five generals formed in August 1933 by the General Staff to oppose recommendations by Air Corps planners for development and expansion to meet defense needs (pp. 138-139), while the Baker Board was formed after the Air Mail scandal and had as its military members (who controlled the agenda) the five generals of the Drum Board (pp. 143-145).</ref> and reasserted its long-held position (and that of the Secretary of War [[George Dern|George H. Dern]])<ref>Tate (1998), p. 143. Secretary Dern's characterization in February 1934 of the Air Corps' role as: "subordinated like all other elements, to whatever team it happens to accompany," leaves no doubt as to the Army's position about its purpose.</ref> that auxiliary support of the ground forces was the primary mission of the Air Corps.<ref>Tate (1998), p. 167.</ref> TR 440-15 did acknowledge some doctrinal principles asserted by the ACTS (including the necessity of destroying an enemy's air forces and concentrating air forces against primary objectives) and recognized that future wars would probably entail some missions "beyond the sphere of influence of the Ground Forces" (strategic bombardment), but it also completely ignored prioritization of such targets, weakening its effectiveness as doctrine.<ref name="ASWWI">{{cite web | last = | first = | authorlink = | coauthors =Craven and Cate | url = http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/I/AAF-I-2.html| title = Plans and Early Operations: Chapter 2 The Army Air Arm Between Two Wars, 1919-39| work =Army Air Forces in World War II | publisher = Hyper-War| accessdate = 3 November 2010}}</ref> The Air Corps in general assented to the changes, as it did to other compromises of the period, as acceptable for the moment.<ref>Shiner, ''The Hey Day of the GHQ Air Force, 1935-1939'', p. 150.</ref> In 1937 the War Department, seeking to stifle procurement of the B-17, decided that it would develop and order only twin-engined "medium" bombers in fiscal years 1939 and 1940, and refused funding for further experimental development of a very long range bomber. In collaboration with the Navy, it placed a moratorium on the long range bomber program in June 1938 by issuing a Joint Board ruling that it could foresee no use for a long range bomber in future conflict.<ref>Cate, p. 17.</ref> However the moratorium would last only a year, as it went against not only the trends of technological development, but against the geopolitical realities of coming war.<ref>Cate, pp. 17-18.</ref> Between 1930 and 1938 the Air Corps had obtained a mission in coastal defense that justified both the creation of a centralized strike force and the development of four-engined bombers, and was [[lobbying]] for another mission, strategic bombardment, with which it could persuasively argue for independence from the Army.<ref>Shiner, ''Winged Shield, Winged Sword'', p. 133.</ref> ==GHQ Air Force==<!-- This section is linked from [[B-17 Flying Fortress]] --> A major step toward creation of a separate air force occurred on 1 March 1935 with the activation of a centralized operational air force, commanded by an aviator and answering to the [[Chief of Staff of the United States Army|Chief of Staff]] of the Army. Called '''General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force''', the organization had existed in Army planning since 1924 as a subordinate element of an Army General Headquarters that would be activated to control all Army units in case of war mobilization.<ref>Correll, John T. "GHQ Air Force", ''AIR FORCE Magazine'', September 2008, Vol. 91 No. 9, p.63.</ref> In anticipation of military intervention Cuba in 1933,<ref>A coup styled "the revolt of the sergeants" seized the Cuban military and replaced a provisional government sponsored by the Roosevelt Administration with a junta. Although Roosevelt was disposed to intervention only as a last resort, warnings that he intended to intervene under the Treaty of 1903 were made to the revolutionaries.</ref> the headquarters had been created on 1 October but not staffed.<ref>Maurer (1987). P. 298. Four ground force field army headquarters were established at the same time.</ref> Among the recommendations of the [[Air Mail scandal#Changes in the Air Corps|Baker Board]], established in the wake of the Air Mail scandal, was that the Air Corps be increased to the 2,320 aircraft-strength proposed by the Drum Board in 1933 and that GHQ Air Force be set up as a permanent peacetime tactical organization, both to ameliorate the pressures for a separate air force and to exploit emerging capabilities in airpower.<ref>Correll, "GHQ Air Force", pp.63-64.</ref> In the absence of a general headquarters (i.e. peacetime), GHQ Air Force would report to the General Staff. The War Plans Division of the Army reacted to the recommendations of the Baker Board by insisting that men and modern equipment for seven army divisions be procured before any increase in the Air Corps was begun, and opposed any immediate attempt to bring the Air Corps up to the 1,800 plane-strength first authorized in 1926, for fear of antagonizing the Navy.<ref>Tate (1998), p. 146. Brig. Gen. Charles Kilbourne, who had been at the core of the General Staff's disputes with the Air Corps and authored the revision of TR 440-15, issued these suggestions. He also freely espoused his opinion that expansion of the Air Corps was primarily a "selfish" means of promotion for aviators at the expense of the rest of the Army. The figure of 1,800 aircraft authorized by the Air Corps Act of 1926 had never been reached because of opposition to the "five-year plan", but was deemed "acceptable" to implementation of War Plan Red-Orange. The Air Corps, based on studies of joint exercises held at [[Key West, Florida]], found the number dangerously inadequate, concluding that 4,459 aircraft was the minimum needed to defend the United States against air attack in the event of War Plan Red-Orange.</ref> President [[Franklin D. Roosevelt]] approved an open-ended program to increase strength to 2,320 aircraft (albeit without any proviso for funding) in August 1934, and Secretary Dern approved the activation of GHQ Air Force in December 1934.<ref>Tate (1998), pp. 146 and 150.</ref> GHQ Air Force took control of all combat air units in the United States from the jurisdiction of [[corps area]] commanders, where it had resided since 1920, and organized them operationally into a strike force of three wings. Administratively it organized the forces into four geographical districts (that later became the first four numbered air forces) that paralleled the four field army headquarters created in 1933. The General Staff perceived its creation as a means of lessening Air Corps autonomy, not increasing it, however, and GHQ Air Force was a "coordinate component" along with the Air Corps, and not subject to its control. However all its members, along with members of units stationed overseas and under the control of local ground commanders, remained part of the Air Corps. This dual status and division of authority hampered the development of Air Corps for the next six years, as it had the Air Service during World War I, and was not overcome until the necessity of expanding the force occurred with the onset of World War II. The GHQ Air Force remained small in comparison to European air forces. On its first day of existence, the command consisted of 60 bombers, 42 attack aircraft, 146 pursuits, and 24 transports, only 40% of strength in the [[TO&E|tables of organization]].<ref>Maurer (1987), p. 330.</ref> Lines of authority were also difficult as GHQ Air Force controlled only combat flying units within the continental United States, with the Air Corps still responsible for training, aircraft development, doctrine, and supply, and the ground forces corps area commanders still controlling their installations and the support personnel manning them. The commander of GHQ Air Force, Maj. Gen. [[Frank Maxwell Andrews|Frank M. Andrews]], clashed philosophically with Westover, who became Chief of Air Corps on 22 December 1935, over the direction in which the air arm was heading, adding to the difficulties, with Andrews in favor of autonomy and Westover espousing subordination to the Army chain of command. In January 1936, the AAC contracted with [[Boeing]] for thirteen [[Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress|Y1B-17 Flying Fortress]] prototypes, enough to equip one squadron for operational testing and a thirteenth aircraft for stress testing, with deliveries made from January to August 1937. The cost of the aircraft disturbed War Department Secretary [[Harry Woodring]], who denied requests for further purchases, so that although the air arm embraced strategic bombing as its primary doctrine after the creation of GHQ Air Force, by 1938 there were still only thirteen on hand. On 18 March 1938 Secretary Woodring approved a plan that included increasing the size of the heavy bomber force to 144 aircraft, but approval was reversed in July following the moratorium against the long-range bomber program issued by the Joint Board.<ref>Tate (1998), p. 169. The Woodring Plan, based on the "Balanced Air Corps Program" developed after a two-year study by the War Department, was an aircraft replacement program that called for a combat force of 1,094 aircraft: 144 four-engined bombers, 266 two-engined bombers, 259 attack aircraft, and 425 pursuits, to begin in FY 1940. It was supported by both Andrews and Westover.</ref> Army Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. [[Malin Craig]] also reversed plans for five squadrons of B-17s (67 airplanes) to be purchased with carryover funds.<ref>Shiner, "The Heyday of the GHQ Air Force, 1935-1939", p. 146.</ref> [[Image:B-17s flyby Rex.jpg|thumb|right|Interception of the ''Rex''. The navigator for the mission was 1st Lt. [[Curtis LeMay]].]] The moratorium also resulted from the enmity of the Navy incurred by the Air Corps on 12 May 1938 when it widely publicized the [[Interception of the Rex|interception of the Italian ocean liner ''Rex'']] by three B-17s while it was 610 miles off-shore of [[New York City]].<ref>John T. Correll, "Rendezvous With the ''Rex''", ''AIR FORCE Magazine'' December 2008, Vol. 91 No. 12, p. 56. The distance is commonly stated in error as 725 miles. The ''Rex'' was actually that distance offshore on her last position report as the B-17s were taxiing for takeoff.</ref> Possibly under pressure from the Navy, General Craig placed a 100-mile limit on all future off-shore flights by the Army, and the services together issued a joint statement reasserting that the mission of the Air Corps in coastal defense was only for supporting the Navy if called upon to do so. Westover, who stridently opposed cancellation of the Woodring program, was killed in an air crash on 21 September 1938 and was succeeded by Maj. Gen. [[Henry H. Arnold]].<ref>Tate (1998), p. 169.</ref> Even with the doctrine of strategic bombardment as its priority, the Air Corps belatedly sought to modernize its tactical combat force under GHQ Air Force, bringing into service the [[Northrop A-17]] and [[Douglas B-18 Bolo]] in 1936, the [[Seversky P-35]] in 1937, and the [[Curtiss P-36]] in 1938. However all of these aircraft were obsolete by the time they came into service, and development of more modern airplanes continued. By October 1940, over a year before the United States was drawn into the war, every piston-driven single-engine fighter used by the USAAF in World War II was in flight test except the P-47. However, the press of the enormous tasks confronting the Air Corps and the primacy of strategic bombing doctrine meant that development of a long-range capability for these new single-engined fighters was not undertaken until combat losses to bombers forced the issue. ====Problems with unity of command==== General Arnold, at the direction of President Roosevelt in January 1939, oversaw an expansion of the Air Corps that saw it double in size from 15 to 30 groups by the end of 1940. The separation of the combat organization (GHQ Air Force) from the logistic organization (Air Corps) created serious problems of coordination. In March 1939, with the replacement of Gen. Andrews as commander of GHQ Air Force by Maj. Gen. [[Delos Emmons|Delos C. Emmons]], Arnold was also nominally assigned to "supervise" the tactical force, but divisions were not entirely resolved. On 5 October 1940, Arnold drew up a proposal for creating an air staff, unifying the air arm under one commander, and giving it autonomy with the ground and supply forces—a plan which was eventually adopted in March 1942—and submitted it to Chief of Staff [[George C. Marshall]], but it was immediately opposed by the General Staff in all respects.<ref name="goss">Goss, William A., "Origins of the Army Air Forces", ''The Army Air Forces in World War II Vol. Six: Men and Planes'' (Craven, Wesley F. and Cate, James L. editors, 1945, 1984). University of Chicago Press, ISBN 0-912799-03-X, p. 18.</ref> Instead, the two organizations were separated again by a directive from Marshall on 19 November 1940. GHQ Army was activated (over five years after the activation of GHQ Air Force) and GHQ AF placed under it.<ref>Correll, "GHQ Air Force", p.66.</ref> Its logistical and training structure remained under direct control of the chief of staff and its airfields under corps commanders. However Arnold had joined the [[General Staff]] as acting "Deputy Chief of Staff for Air" on 11 November 1940, a position that enabled him to coordinate the two sections of the air arm until the organizational problems were repaired. Even so, Maj. Gen. [[George Brett (military)|George H. Brett]], acting Chief of Air Corps in Arnold's absence, denounced the plan as "disastrous in war".<ref name="goss"/> The problems of lack of unity of command were further exacerbated by the assignment of GHQ Air Force to Army GHQ. General Emmons, who had begun his tour junior to Arnold, was promoted to [[lieutenant general]] to make him equal to the commanders of the field armies also controlled by Army GHQ. This forced him to report to and act under an inferior in rank (both Arnold and Brett were [[major general]]s). On 20 June 1941, to end the divisions, the War Department revised Army Regulation 95-5 to create the [[U.S. Army Air Forces|Army Air Forces]] with the Air Corps and GHQAF (the latter redesignated as Combat Command) as its major components, authorized an Air Staff to manage planning and execution of expansion of the air arm, and named Arnold as Chief of the Army Air Forces. During [[World War II]] the role of the Air Corps changed again. On 9 March 1942, with the issuance of War Department Circular 59, the Air Corps was further subordinated to the USAAF as a combatant arm (as [[Infantry]] and [[Field Artillery]] were subordinate combatant arms of the Army Ground Forces, which replaced Army General Headquarters) and the office of Chief of the Air Corps was abolished. The Congress did not disestablish the Army Air Corps until 26 July 1947, with the passage of the National Security Act of 1947 (61 Stat. 502). Most members of the Army Air Forces, however, also remained members of the Air Corps. In May 1945, 88 per cent of officers serving in the Army Air Forces were commissioned in the Air Corps, while 82 per cent of enlisted members assigned to AAF units and bases had the Air Corps as their combat arm branch.<ref>{{cite journal | last = Correll| first = John T.| year = 2009| month = July| title = But What About the Air Corps?|journal = Air Force Magazine, Journal of the Air Force Association}}, p. 64-65.</ref> ==Modernization and expansion of the force== ===New aircraft=== [[Image:C-39-transport.jpg|thumb|right|Douglas C-39 transport]] The Air Corps tested and employed a profusion of pursuit, observation, and bomber aircraft during its 15-year history. The advent of the all-metal monoplane, enclosed cockpits, retractable landing gear, enclosed bomb bays, and the emergence of strategic bombardment doctrine led to many designs in the mid and late 1930s that were still in use when the United States entered [[World War II]]. Among the key technology items developed were oxygen and cabin pressurization systems, engine [[supercharger]]s (systems essential for high-altitude combat), advanced [[radio]] communication systems, such as [[VHF]] radios, and the [[Norden bombsight]]. As a further consequence of the Air Mail scandal, the Baker Board reviewed the performance of Air Corps aircraft and recognized that civilian aircraft were far superior to planes developed solely to Air Corps specifications. Following up on its recommendation, the Air Corps purchased and tested a [[Douglas DC-2]] as the XC-32, which subsequently became the flying headquarters of Gen. Andrews. The XC-32 so exceeded Air Corps specifications that 17 were purchased to equip the first operational transport unit, the 10th Transport Group, activated in June 1937 at [[Wright-Patterson Air Force Base|Patterson Field]] in [[Ohio]]. In 1939 the Air Corps recognized the importance of modern air transports and purchased 35 DC-2/[[Douglas DC-3|DC-3]] hybrids, designated the C-39, the forerunner of the tens of thousands of [[C-47 Skytrain]]s that served in World War II. Notable fighters developed during the late 1930s and early 1940s were the [[P-39 Airacobra]] (first flown April 1938), [[P-40 Tomahawk]] (October 1938), [[P-38 Lightning]] (January 1939), [[P-51 Mustang]] (October 1940), and [[P-47 Thunderbolt]] (May 1941). Bombers developed during this period were the [[A-20 Havoc]] (first flown October 1938), [[B-25 Mitchell]] (January 1939), [[B-24 Liberator]] (December 1939), and [[B-26 Marauder]] (November 1940). Except for the B-24, P-47, and P-51, all of these had production deliveries that began before June 1941. Three other long-range bombers began development during this period, though only mock-ups were produced before World War II: [[B-29 Superfortress]] (study begun in 1938), [[B-32 Dominator]] (June 1940), and [[B-36 Peacemaker]] (April 1941). {{Main|Military aircraft of the United States}} ===Expansion of the Air Corps=== In a special message to Congress on 12 January 1939, President Roosevelt advised that the threat of a new war made the recommendations of the Baker Board inadequate for American defense and requested approval of a 6,000-plane Air Corps.<ref>[http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/WorldWar2/fdr2.htm Message of President Roosevelt to the Congress, 12 January 1939] The entire message is reproduced here.</ref> On 3 April 1939, Congress allocated the $300 million requested by Roosevelt for expansion of the Air Corps, half of which was dedicated to purchasing planes to raise the inventory from 2,500 to 5,500 airplanes, and the other half for new personnel, training facilities, and bases.<ref>Williams, Edwin L., Jr. (1953). USAF Historical Study No. 84: ''Legislative History of the AAF and USAF, 1941-1951'' Air Force Historical research Agency, p. 12. Public Law 18, 76th Congress, 1st Session.</ref> In June the Kilmer Board recommended several types of bombers needed to fulfill the Air Corps mission that included aircraft having tactical radii of both 3,000 miles (modified in 1940 to 4,000) and 2,000 miles. Chief of Staff Gen. Craig, long an impediment to Air Corps ambitions, was about to retire, and the General Staff reversed itself and concurred in the requirements, ending the brief moratorium on bomber development and paving the way for work on the B-29.<ref>Cate, p. 18.</ref> Over the winter of 1938-1939, General Arnold transferred a group of experienced officers to his headquarters as an unofficial air staff to lay out a plan that would increase the Air Corps to 50,000 men by June 1941. The expansion program of the Air Corps was characterized by repeated upward revision of goals for increasing the numbers of combat units, aircraft production, training new personnel, and constructing new bases. New combat groups were created by detaching cadres from existing groups to provide the core of the new units, with the older groups providing the basis for an average of three new groups.<ref>Jerry White, USAF Historical Study 61: ''Combat Crew and Training Units in the AAF, 1939-45''. Air Force Historical Research Agency.</ref> The initial ''25-Group Program'' for air defense of the hemisphere, developed in April 1939, called for 50,000 men. Its ten new groups were activated on 1 February 1940. Following the successful [[Battle of France|German invasion of France and the Low Countries]] in May 1940, the ''54-Group Program'' followed, although funding approval could not keep pace and an inclusive ''41-Group Program'' was actually implemented, with the additional groups activated on 15 January 1941.<ref>Robert Futrell, ''USAF Historical Study No. 69: ''Development of AAF Base Facilities in the United States, 1939-1945'', pp. 23-24.</ref> An ''84-Group Program'', with an eventual goal of 400,000 men by 30 June 1942, was begun in March 1941, although not publicly announced until 23 October 1941.<ref>The original goals of the final "hemispheric defense program" were 84 combat groups; 7,799 tactical aircraft; 30,000 new pilots annually; and 100,000 new technical personnel annually.</ref><ref>Craven, Wesley F., and Cate, James L. (editors, 1945, 1984). ''The Army Air Forces in World War II Vol. One: Plans & Early Operations, January 1939 to August 1942'', p. 105-106.</ref> When war broke out in September 1939 the plan was already halfway to its goal in manpower, but with only 800 first-line combat aircraft. The Air Corps had 17 major installations and four depots, and most of its 76 airfields were co-located at civil airports or were small fields on Army posts.<ref>Futrell, ''Development of AAF Base Facilities in the United States, 1939-1945'', pp. 2-7. The 21 major bases were [[Langley Air Force Base|Langley]], [[Mitchel Field|Mitchel]], [[March Air Force Base|March]], [[Scott Air Force Base|Scott]], [[Selfridge Air Force Base|Selfridge]], [[Barksdale Air Force Base|Barksdale]], [[Hamilton Air Force Base|Hamilton]], [[Moffett Field|Moffett]], [[Bolling Air Force Base|Bolling]], [[McChord Air Force Base|McChord]], [[Kelly Air Force Base|Kelly]], [[Brooks Air Force Base|Brooks]], [[Randolph Air Force Base|Randolph]], [[Chanute Air Force Base|Chanute]], [[Lowry Air Force Base|Lowry]], [[Maxwell Air Force Base|Maxwell]], and [[Wright-Patterson Air Force Base|Wright Fields]], and the [[San Antonio]], Middletown, Fairfield, and [[Sacramento]] Air Depots.</ref> The acceleration of the expansion programs resulted in an Air Corps of 156 airfields and nearly 100,000 men by the end of 1940. Twenty civilian flight schools and eight technical training schools were contracted to provide additional training facilities, and on 10 August 1940, [[Pan American Airways]] was contracted to provide meteorological and navigation training at [[Coral Gables, Florida]], until military schools could be established.<ref>Futrell, ''''Development of AAF Base Facilities in the United States, 1939-1945'', p. 26.</ref> Procurement of aircraft remained a significant problem for the Air Corps until the eve of war, because of diversion of production to the Allies. On 16 May 1940, with the fall of France imminent, President Roosevelt delivered an address to Congress calling for a supplemental appropriation of nearly a billion dollars and the manufacture of 50,000 aircraft a year for the armed forces (36,500 of them for the Air Corps). 18 months later the AAF still had only 3,304 combat aircraft (only 1,024 overseas), and 7,024 non-combat aircraft, of which 6,594 were trainers.<ref>Tate 91998), p. 173.</ref> At this stage, public opinion support of airpower reached unprecedented highs, but General Arnold made a decision to postpone any attempts to exploit the opportunity to push for an independent Air Force. Assured of a free hand by the [[U.S. Army Chief of Staff]], General [[George C. Marshall]], Arnold thought that it would "be a serious mistake to change the existing setup" in the midst of the crucial expansion effort. ==Organization of the Air Corps== ===Army Air Corps, March 1, 1935=== :<small>SOURCES: Maurer Maurer, ''Aviation in the U.S. Army, 1919-1939'' (Appendix 5), and ''Air Force Combat Units of World War II'', both USAF Historical Research Center</small> Except for the addition of reconnaissance (formerly observation) squadrons to the three bombardment groups in September 1936 and the May 1937 exchange of the 12th Observation Group (disbanded) for the [[10th Troop Carrier Group|10th Transport Group]] (activated), the organization of the Air Corps shown here remained essentially unchanged until activation of its first expansion groups on 1 February 1940. [[Image:P26a.jpg|thumb|right| [[P-26 Peashooter|P-26A]] of 34th Pursuit Squadron, 17th PG 1934-1936]] ====General Headquarters Air Force==== (Maj. Gen. [[Frank M. Andrews]], [[Langley Air Force Base|Langley Field]], [[Virginia]]) :'''21st Airship Group, [[Scott Air Force Base|Scott Field]], [[Illinois]]''' ::9th Airship Squadron, Scott Field ::19th Airship Squadron, Langley Field ;[[1st Bombardment Wing (World War II)|1st Wing]] (Brig. Gen. [[Henry H. Arnold]], [[March Air Force Base|March Field]], California) :[[7th Bomb Wing#Components|7th Bombardment Group]], [[Hamilton Air Force Base|Hamilton Field]], California ::[[9th Bomb Squadron|9th]], [[11th Bomb Squadron|11th]], & [[31st Test and Evaluation Squadron|31st Bombardment Squadrons]] :[[17th Training Group|17th Attack Group]], March Field, California ::[[34th Bomb Squadron|34th]], [[73d Special Operations Squadron|73rd]], & [[95th Reconnaissance Squadron|95th Attack Squadrons]] :[[19th Bombardment Group]], March Field, California ::[[23d Bomb Squadron|23rd]], [[U.S. Air Force Thunderbirds|30th]], [[32d Air Refueling Squadron|32nd]], & [[72d Bombardment Squadron]]s (23rd & 72nd BS based in [[Hawaii]]) [[Image:060511-F-1234S-027.jpg|thumb|right|Martin B-12A (variant of the [[Martin B-10|B-10]]) of 31st Bomb Squadron, 7th BG, Hamilton Field, California]] ;[[2d Bombardment Wing (World War II)|2nd Wing]] (Brig. Gen. H. Conger Pratt, [[Langley Air Force Base|Langley Field]], [[Virginia]]) ::[[37th Bomb Squadron|37th Attack Squadron]] (attached to 8th Pursuit Group) :[[1st Operations Group|1st Pursuit Group]], [[Selfridge Field]], [[Michigan]] ::[[17th Weapons Squadron|17th]], [[27th Fighter Squadron|27th]] & [[94th Fighter Squadron|94th Pursuit Squadrons]] :[[2d Operations Group|2nd Bombardment Group]], Langley Field, Virginia ::[[20th Bomb Squadron|20th]], [[49th Test and Evaluation Squadron|49th]], 54th, and [[96th Bomb Squadron|96th Bombardment Squadrons]] (54th detached to Air Corps Tactical School) :[[8th Pursuit Group]], Langley Field, Virginia ::[[33d Special Operations Squadron|33rd]], [[35th Fighter Squadron|35th]] & [[36th Fighter Squadron|36th Pursuit Squadrons]] ([[37th Bomb Squadron|37th Attack Squadron]] attached) :[[9th Bomb Group|9th Bombardment Group]], [[Mitchel Field]], [[New York]] ::[[1st Reconnaissance Squadron|1st]], [[5th Reconnaissance Squadron|5th]], [[14th Bombardment Squadron|14th]] & [[99th Reconnaissance Squadron|99th Bombardment Squadrons]] [[Image:A-12-33-229-3dwing.jpg|thumb|right| [[A-12 Shrike]] of the 13th Attack Squadron, 3rd AG, Barksdale Field, Louisiana]] ;[[98th Bombardment Wing (World War II)|3rd Wing]] (Col. Gerald C. Brant, [[Barksdale Air Force Base|Barksdale Field]], [[Louisiana]]) :[[3d Wing|3rd Attack Group]], Barksdale Field, Louisiana ::[[8th Special Operations Squadron|8th]], [[13th Bomb Squadron|13th]], & [[90th Fighter Squadron|90th Attack Squadrons]] (51st Attack Squadron detached to Air Corps Tactical School) :[[20th Pursuit Group]], Barksdale Field, Louisiana ::[[55th Fighter Squadron|55th]], [[77th Fighter Squadron|77th]] & [[79th Fighter Squadron|79th Pursuit Squadrons]] ([[87th Flying Training Squadron|87th Pursuit Squadron]] detached to Air Corps Tactical School) [[Image:stearman.e75.g-bswc.longshot.arp.jpg|thumb|right|PT-13, Air Corps primary trainer]] [[Image:Douglas O-46.jpg|thumb|right| [[Douglas O-46|O-46A]] At Wright Field]] ====Other flying units==== ;Advanced Flying School, [[Kelly Air Force Base|Kelly Field]], [[Texas]] ::40th Attack, [[429th Bombardment Squadron|41st Observation]], [[42d Attack Squadron|42nd Bombardment]], [[43d Fighter Squadron|43d Pursuit Squadrons]]<ref>These four squadrons were inactivated on 1 September 1936 and replaced by the 61st through 64th School Squadrons inclusive.</ref> ::39th School Squadron ;Air Corps Technical School, [[Chanute Air Force Base|Chanute Field]], [[Illinois]] ::[[48th Flying Training Squadron|48th Pursuit Squadron]] ;[[Air Corps Tactical School]], [[Maxwell Air Force Base|Maxwell Field]], [[Alabama]]) ::51st Attack, [[54th Airlift Flight|54th Bombardment]], [[43d Electronic Combat Squadron|86th Observation]], [[87th Flying Training Squadron|87th Pursuit Squadrons]] ;Primary Flying School, [[Randolph Air Force Base|Randolph Field]], Texas ::46th, 47th, 52nd, and 53rd School Squadrons ;Rockwell Air Depot, [[Rockwell Field]], [[California]] ::[[4th Transport Squadron]] (Activated 8 July 1935) ;Second Corps Area, United States Army, [[Mitchel Field]], [[New York]] :: [[97th Observation Squadron]] ;Sixth Corps Area, United States Army, [[Scott Air Force Base|Scott Field]], [[Illinois]] :: [[15th Observation Squadron]] (Attached) ;Eighth Corps Area, United States Army, [[Fort Sam Houston]], [[Texas]] : [[12th Observation Group]], [[Brooks Field]], [[Texas]] :: [[12th Observation Squadron]] :: [[22d Observation Squadron]] :: [[88th Observation Squadron]] ;Ninth Corps Area, United States Army, [[Crissy Field]], [[California]] ::[[91st Observation Squadron]] [[Image:Boeing P-12E USAF.jpg|thumb|right| [[Boeing P-12|P-12E]] of 6th Pursuit Squadron, 18th PG 1935-1938, Wheeler Field, Hawaii]] ====Overseas units==== : [[4th Composite Group]], [[Clark Air Force Base|Clark Field]], [[Luzon]] ::[[2d Air Refueling Squadron|2nd Observation]], [[3d Flying Training Squadron|3d Pursuit]] & [[28th Bomb Squadron|28th Bombardment Squadrons]] ;18th Composite Wing (Lt. Col. [[Delos Emmons]], [[Fort Shafter]], [[Hawaii]]) :[[5th Bomb Wing#Components|5th Composite Group]], [[Ford Island|Luke Field]], Hawaii ::[[26th Space Aggressor Squadron|26th Attack]], [[394th Combat Training Squadron|4th]] & [[50th Education Squadron|50th Observation Squadron]]s ([[23d Bomb Squadron|23d]], [[72d Test and Evaluation Squadron|72d BS]] attached) :[[18th Wing|18th Pursuit Group]], [[Wheeler Field]], Hawaii ::[[6th Night Fighter Squadron|6th]], [[19th Fighter Squadron|19th Pursuit Squadrons]] ;19th Composite Wing (Lt. Col. William C. McChord, [[Albrook Air Force Base|Albrook Field]], [[Panama Canal Zone]]) :[[6th Composite Group]], Albrook Field, Canal Zone ::[[25th Space Range Squadron|25th Bombardment]], [[397th Bombardment Squadron|7th]] & [[430th Bombardment Squadron|44th Observation Squadrons]] :[[16th Pursuit Group]], Albrook Field, Canal Zone ::[[24th Fighter Squadron|24th]], [[29th Fighter-Interceptor Squadron|29th]], [[74th Bombardment Squadron|74th]] & [[78th Reconnaissance Squadron|78th Pursuit Squadrons]] ===Annual strength=== <center>Strength as of 30 June of each year</center> {| table align=center class="wikitable" ! !! !! !! !! !! !! !! |-style="background: khaki" | align=center|'''Year'''||align=center|'''Strength''' ||||align=center|'''Year''' ||align=center|'''Strength''' ||||align=center|'''Year''' ||align=center|'''Strength''' |- | align=center|'''1927'''||align=center|9,979||||align=center|'''1932'''||align=center|14,650||||align=center|'''1937'''||align=center|18,572 |- |align=center|'''1928'''||align=center|10,518||||align=center|'''1933'''||align=center|14,817||||align=center|'''1938'''||align=center|20,196 |- |align=center|'''1929'''||align=center|12,080||||align=center|'''1934'''||align=center|15,621||||align=center|'''1939'''||align=center|22,387 |- |align=center|'''1930'''||align=center|13,305||||align=center|'''1935'''||align=center|15,945||||align=center|'''1940'''||align=center|51,185 |- |align=center|'''1931'''||align=center|14,485||||align=center|'''1936'''||align=center|16,863||||align=center|'''1941'''||align=center|152,125 |} [[Image:052504-O-0000G-002.jpg|right|thumb|Generals [[Benjamin Delahauf Foulois|Benjamin D. Foulois]] (left), [[James E. Fechet]] and H. Conger Pratt.]] ===Chiefs of the Air Corps=== *Maj. Gen. [[Mason Patrick|Mason M. Patrick]], 2 July 1926&ndash;December 13, 1927 *Maj. Gen. [[James E. Fechet]], 14 December 1927&ndash;December 19, 1931 *Maj. Gen. [[Benjamin Foulois|Benjamin D. Foulois]], 20 December 1931&ndash;December 21, 1935 *Maj. Gen. [[Oscar Westover]], 22 December 1935&ndash;September 21, 1938 *Maj. Gen. [[Henry H. Arnold]], 29 September 1938&ndash;June 20, 1941 *Maj. Gen. [[George Brett (military)|George H. Brett]], 20 June 1941&ndash;March 9, 1942 ==See also== {{Portal|United States Air Force}} *[[Air Corps Tactical School]] *[[List of military aircraft of the United States]] *[[United States Army Air Service]] *[[United States Army Air Forces]] *[[Question Mark (airplane)]] ==References== {{Reflist}} ==Sources== *[https://www.airforcehistory.hq.af.mil/PopTopics/Evolution.htm U.S. Air Force Historical Studies Office] *Bowman, Martin W., "Background to War", ''USAAF Handbook 1939-1945'', ISBN 0-8117-1822-0 *Maurer, Maurer, ''[http://military.evendon.com#WW2 Air Force Combat Units of World War II]'', Office of Air Force history (1961). ISBN 0-40512-194-6 *Shiner, John F., ''Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force'' (1997), ISBN 0-16-049009-X **Vol. I, Chap. 4, "The Coming of the GHQ Air Force, 1925-1935" **Vol. I, Chap. 5, "The Heyday of the GHQ Air Force, 1935-1939" *[http://www.afa.org/magazine/almanacs.asp 2006 Almanac, ''Air Force Magazine: Journal of the Air Force Association'', May 2006, Volume 89 Number 5] {{Aviation lists}} {{US Air Force navbox}} {{S-start}} {{Succession box |before=[[United States Army Air Service|Air Service, United States Army]] |title=United States Army Air Corps |years=1926-1941 |after=[[United States Army Air Forces]]}} {{S-end}} {{Use dmy dates|date=August 2010}} [[Category:Army aviation units and formations]] [[Category:Military history of the United States 1900-1999]] [[Category:History of the United States Army|Air Corps]] [[Category:United States Army aviation|Air Corps]] [[Category:History of the United States Air Force|Air Corps]] [[de:United States Army Air Corps]] [[es:Cuerpo Aéreo del Ejército de los Estados Unidos]] [[fr:United States Army Air Corps]] [[it:United States Army Air Corps]] [[ja:アメリカ陸軍航空隊]] [[no:United States Army Air Corps]] [[pl:United States Army Air Corps]]'