Battle of Tora Bora

This article is about the 2001 battle. For the 2017 battle, see Battle of Tora Bora (2017).

Battle of Tora Bora
Part of the invasion of Afghanistan
Location of Tora Bora in Afghanistan, 34°07′N 70°13′E
Date November 30 – December 17, 2001 Location Pachir Wa Agam District, Nangarhar Province, Afghanistan Result US-led coalition victory Beginning of the Taliban insurgency Osama bin Laden escaped
Belligerents
United States United Kingdom Germany Islamic State of Afghanistan	Al-Qaeda 055 Brigade Turkistan Islamic Party
Commanders and leaders
Tommy Franks Dalton Fury Gary Berntsen Michael Boyce Reinhard Günzel Bismillah Khan Hazrat Ali Abdul Zahir Qadir Mohammed Zaman	Osama bin Laden Abdul Latif Nasir (POW) (alleged) Sufi Muhammad
Strength
70 U.S. 1st SFOD-D members 10 CIA SAD agents 10 5th Special Forces Group members 52 Special Boat Service members 10 Secret Intelligence Service agents Kommando Spezialkräfte other coalition forces (aircraft) 2,500 Afghan Northern Alliance fighters	~1,500-2,000
Casualties and losses
Coalition: None Afghan Northern Alliance: Unknown	220 killed, 60 captured

The Battle of Tora Bora was a military engagement that took place in the cave complex of Tora Bora, eastern Afghanistan, from November 30 – December 17, 2001, during the final stages of the United States invasion of Afghanistan. It was launched by the United States and its allies with the objective to capture or kill Osama bin Laden, the founder and leader of the militant organization al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda and bin Laden were suspected of being responsible for the September 11 attacks three months prior. Tora Bora (Template:Lang-ps; Black Cave) is located in the Spīn Ghar mountain range near the Khyber Pass. The U.S. stated that al-Qaeda had its headquarters there and that it was bin Laden's location at the time.

Background

In Operation Cyclone during the early 1980s, CIA officers had assisted the mujahideen fighters in extending and shoring up the caves to use for resistance during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The U.S. then supported their effort. Several years later, the Taliban formed and took control of most of the country, enforcing fundamentalist rule. Several cave areas were used in much earlier periods, as the difficult terrain formed a natural defensive position and had been used by tribal warriors fighting foreign invaders.

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom to dismantle the Taliban regime that had sheltered Osama bin Laden. To achieve this goal, the U.S. military joined forces with the Northern Alliance, a group of rebels who had long been waging a guerrilla war against the Taliban. Through a combination of air strikes and ground operations, the U.S. and its allies quickly gained the upper hand, seizing control of key Taliban strongholds and toppling the regime's grip on power. By November 13 2001, the Northern Alliance had captured the capital city of Kabul.

The CIA was closely tracking Osama bin Laden's movements, hoping to locate him and bring him to justice. On November 10, 2001, they spotted him and his entourage traveling around Jalalabad towards his training camp near Tora Bora mountain. The U.S. had expected bin Laden to make a last stand at Tora Bora, hoping to repeat his success against the Soviets in the Battle of Jaji in 1987. While the exact date of his arrival remains unknown, Vice President Dick Cheney revealed in a November 29, 2001 television interview that bin Laden was believed to be in the general area of Tora Bora, surrounded by a sizable force of loyal fighters.

The CIA lead in the Panjshir, Gary Berntsen, sent a detachment to team up with Afghan tribal militas around Jalalabad who opposed the Taliban. Together, they embarked on a grueling climb through the treacherous mountains, guided by the locals who knew the terrain. Finally, they reached a vantage point overlooking a valley dotted with villages and farms. The Afghans pointed to a military training camps, where hundreds of Al-Qaeda fighters could be spotted. The Americans took cover behind rocks and trees, while the Afghans stayed behind to guard their flanks. With the enemy in sight, the Americans made ready to call in airstrikes to take out the Al-Qaeda stronghold.

Battle

U.S air strikes on Tora Bora, November or December 2001

At the end of 2001, Al-Qaeda fighters were still holding out in the mountains of the Tora Bora region. Aerial bombardment ensued, including the use of large bombs known as daisy cutters.

On November 30, 2001, a formidable coalition of U.S. Special Forces, Joint Special Operations Command soldiers, and a detachment of CIA operatives codenamed "Jawbreaker" led by Gary Berntsen, joined forces with Afghan tribal militias, and began to call in airstrikes on the Al-Qaeda training camp.

On December 1, Berntsen made a daring request to Franks to send in a battalion of 800 rangers. The plan was to block off the mountain passes into Pakistan and cut off Osama bin Laden's escape, however the request was denied by Franks. Berntsen would later complain that the failure to deploy the Rangers at Tora Bora and overreliance on the Afghan militias had allowed bin Laden to escape.

On December 3, Hazarat Ali, one of the Northern Alliance commanders, announced that the push to capture the mountain stronghold would begin. However, Hazarat Ali's failure to properly communicate the plan of attack to the other commanders left hundreds of ill-prepared men scrambling to reach the mountain's peak. Villages and towns erupted with activity as fighters gathered whatever supplies they could lay their hands on and hurried towards the looming peak to engage the Al-Qaeda fighters.

On December 5, Afghan Northern Alliance fighters wrested control of the low ground below the mountain caves from Al-Qaeda fighters. The Jawbreaker team and Special Forces teams equipped with laser designators called in Air Force bombers to take out targets; non-stop heavy air strikes including laser-guided bombs and missiles lasted for 72 hours.

The Al-Qaeda fighters withdrew to higher fortified positions and dug in for the battle. A team of elite Delta Force soldiers led by Dalton Fury arrived on the scene. They blended in with the Afghan militias by donning traditional clothing, growing bushy beards, and carrying the same types of weapons as their local counterparts.

A savvy CIA operative managed to pick up a radio from a dead Al-Qaeda fighter, allowing the U.S. forces to eavesdrop on their communications. And as fate would have it, the voice on the other end was none other than that of Osama bin Laden himself.

As Fury later recalled, there was "no doubt" that it was bin Laden on the other end of that radio. In fact, the CIA operative Jalal, who had spent seven years studying bin Laden's voice, confirmed it beyond a shadow of a doubt.

Two British SBS Commandos from M Sqn were embedded with A Sqn Delta, one of whom continued to work for JSOC, albeit in a different capacity. During the hours of darkness, the Al-Qaeda fighters would light fires, which would reveal their specific location and aid laser-designated targeting for air-launched weapons.

The Afghan Northern Alliance fighters continued a steady advance through the difficult terrain, backed by airstrikes and U.S. and British Special Forces.

Osama bin Laden narrowly escaped a deadly U.S. bomb on December 9. The bunker that the infamous terrorist was believed to be hiding in was struck by a powerful explosion, but by sheer chance, he wasn't there at the time. It's said that bin Laden had a premonition of danger when he dreamed of a scorpion crawling into one of the trenches his men had dug for him. Without hesitation, he had fled the bunker just one day before the attack, narrowly avoiding his fate.

On December 12, Al-Qaeda forces, facing defeat, negotiated a truce with a local Afghan militia commander to give them time to surrender their weapons. In retrospect, however, some critics believe that the truce was a device to allow important Al-Qaeda figures, including Osama bin Laden, to escape.

...a severe and fierce bombardment began...not one second passed without warplanes hovering over our heads...[America] exhausted all efforts to blow up and annihilate this tiny spot – wiping it out altogether...Despite all this, we blocked their daily attacks, sending them back defeated, bearing their dead and wounded. And not once did American forces dare storm our position, what clearer proof of their cowardice, fear, and lies concerning the myth of their alleged power is there?!

Osama bin Laden, 2002

The tension was palpable as news of the ceasefire reached the ears of the seasoned veteran Gary Berntsen. He knew that the Al-Qaeda fighters couldn't be trusted and that their supposed "surrender" had to be a feint.

Furious at the mere suggestion of a ceasefire, Berntsen grabbed the phone and screamed, "No cease-fire! No negotiation! We continue airstrikes!".

Dalton Fury has accounted that the Americans were only half-heartedly honoring the truce, even bombing Al-Qaeda positions at 5 AM, a full three hours before it was set to expire.

And if that weren't enough, an American pilot took things a step further, protesting the proposed surrender by drawing a giant "8" in the sky, followed by the word "ON." A powerful message that the Americans were itching to get back into the fight the second the truce expired.

On December 13, the fighting flared again, possibly initiated by a rear guard buying time for the main force's escape through the White Mountains into the tribal areas of Pakistan. Tribal forces backed by U.S. special operations troops and air support pressed ahead against fortified al-Qaeda positions in caves and bunkers scattered throughout the mountainous region.

Twelve British SBS commandos, and one British Royal Signals Specialist from 63 Signals squadron (now known as 18 [UKSF] Signal Regiment), accompanied the U.S. special operations forces in attacking the cave complex at Tora Bora. Special Forces Operators of the German KSK took part in the battle as well. They were reportedly responsible for protecting the flanks in the mountains and conducted reconnaissance missions.

The U.S. focus increased on the Tora Bora. Local tribal militias, paid and organized by Special Forces and CIA SAD paramilitary, numbering over 2,000 strong, continued to mass for an attack as heavy bombing continued on suspected Al-Qaeda positions.

It is at about this point, on December 15, that bin Laden is conventionally believed to have escaped Tora Bora. The U.S. forces found themselves facing a frustrating obstacle: the tribal militias lacked the motivation to engage in the fight wholeheartedly. To them, Al-Qaeda was a group of fellow muslims, and with the battle taking place during Ramadan, the fighters would retire every evening to break their fast and spend time with their families off the mountain. This might have led to missed opportunities capturing bin Laden.

There are several different theories of how exactly bin Laden got away at this point. As the situation became increasingly precarious due to continued U.S. bombardment and with the Al-Qaeda fighters running low on food supplies, two groups of Al-Qaeda fighters descended the southern slopes toward Pakistan. They bribed local tribes in the area to elude Pakistani blocking forces. Malkasian has hinted that bin Laden may have escaped with one of these two groups.

But there's another version by Peter Bergen stating that bin Laden had already escaped towards Jalalabad on December 12 during the truce that had been negotiated that day. It is said that bin Laden took advantage of the truce that night and used the cover of the darkness to sneak out of the mountain range and make his way to the house of an ally in Jalalabad, where he spent the night. The next day, he rode north on horseback to the heavily forested mountains of Kunar, where he disappeared into a remote place with no paved roads, so hidden and obscure that even the most detailed of maps couldn't locate it.

Regardless of when and how exactly bin Laden got away, the failure to capture the terrorist leader at Tora Bora meant that the U.S. had squandered its best opportunity to capture the Al-Qaeda leader during the first year of the War on Terror.

It was reported that U.S forces found small outposts and a few minor training camps. Journalist Matthew Forney, covering the battle, described being allowed access to see "rough bunkers" deep in the mountains, which he considered "remarkable."

By December 17, 2001, the last cave complex had been taken and their defenders overrun. U.S forces continued searching the area into January, but did not find any signs of bin Laden or the Al-Qaeda leadership. Former CIA officer Gary Berntsen led the CIA team tasked with locating bin Laden. He said that al-Qaeda detainees had reported that bin Laden escaped into Pakistan via an easterly route to Parachinar. Berntsen believed that bin Laden could have been captured during the battle if the U.S military had committed more troops early in the battle.

Ranger deployment

CIA intelligence had indicated that bin Laden and the al-Qaeda leadership were trapped in the caves early in the battle, and Berntsen had wanted to send less than 1,000 American Army Rangers to eliminate them, which he believed would have ended the War on Terror very quickly. However, the request was turned down by the Bush Administration, which had argued that the Pakistanis would capture bin Laden if he attempted to flee into Pakistan.

Former CIA agent Gary Schroen has agreed with Berntsen's opinion in a 2005 interview, in which he cited the opportunity to take out bin Laden and the senior Al-Qaeda leadership early on in the conflict by deploying the Rangers. However historian Carter Malkasian, a former adviser to American military commanders in Afghanistan, has argued that bin Laden always had a good chance of escaping the caves and that the Rangers would not have been able to completely seal off the mountain range.

Bin Laden's whereabouts

After the failure to capture Osama bin Laden at Tora Bora, the Bush administration initially denied any evidence of his presence in the battle. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld argued that the threat posed by Islamist extremism went beyond one individual, and there was no certainty about bin Laden's presence. Vice President Dick Cheney avoided addressing the matter entirely, choosing to never mention or talk about the battle's occurence.

In an October 2004 opinion article in The New York Times, General Tommy Franks, who was the general commander of U.S forces in Afghanistan at the time, wrote,

We don't know to this day whether Mr. bin Laden was at Tora Bora in December 2001. Some intelligence sources said he was; others indicated he was in Pakistan at the time ... Tora Bora was teeming with Taliban and Qaeda operatives ... but Mr. bin Laden was never within our grasp.

In spring 2005, the Pentagon released a document to The Associated Press. The document admitted that Pentagon investigators believed that bin Laden had indeed escaped at Tora Bora. This was the first time such information had been made public.

Many enemy fighters fled through the rough terrain and into tribal areas of Pakistan to the south and east. Allied forces estimated that around 200 of the al-Qaeda fighters were killed during the battle, along with an unknown number of anti-Taliban tribal fighters. No coalition deaths were reported. Bin Laden would not be seen until 2004 when a video of him surfaced on the Qatar-based Al Jazeera network

In 2009, the United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations led an investigation into the Battle of Tora Bora. They concluded that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and General Tommy Franks had not committed enough troops during the battle to secure the area around Tora Bora. They believed that Osama bin Laden had likely been at Tora Bora and his escape prolonged the war in Afghanistan.

Delta Force commander's account

The first US team to enter the Tora Bora mountain range

The former Delta Force officer Thomas Greer, using the pen name "Dalton Fury", who was the ground force commander at Tora Bora, wrote that bin Laden escaped into Pakistan on or around December 16, 2001. Fury gives three reasons for why he believes bin Laden was able to escape: (1) the US mistakenly thought that Pakistan was effectively guarding the border area, (2) NATO allies refused to allow the use of air-dropped GATOR mines, which might have kept bin Laden and his forces inside the Tora Bora area, and (3) over-reliance on native Afghan military forces as the main force deployed against bin Laden and his fighters. Fury theorized that, because the battle took place over the holy religious month of Ramadan, the Afghan forces would leave the battlefield in the evenings to break fast, giving al-Qaeda a chance to regroup, reposition, or escape.

In an October 2008 interview on 60 Minutes, Fury said that his Delta Force team and CIA Paramilitary Officers traveled to Tora Bora after the CIA had identified bin Laden's location. Fury's team proposed an operation to attack bin Laden's suspected position from the rear, over the 14,000 foot-high mountain separating Tora Bora from Pakistan. He said unidentified officials at higher headquarters rejected his proposal. Fury suggested dropping GATOR mines in the passes leading away from Tora Bora, but this was also denied. Fury and his team approached the suspected position from the front and were within 2,000 meters, but withdrew because of uncertainty over the number of al-Qaeda fighters and a lack of support from allied Afghan troops.

Delta force operators disguised as Afghan civilians

A short time later, the Afghan military forces declared a ceasefire with al-Qaeda. In his 2008 book, Kill bin Laden, Fury described the following. His team planned to advance again on the al-Qaeda forces, but after the cease-fire, Afghan soldiers drew their weapons on the US soldiers. After 12 hours of negotiations, the Afghans stood down, but bin Laden and his bodyguards had left. Fury reports that his team intercepted and interpreted radio calls by bin Laden in the afternoon of December 13, 2001. He said to his fighters, "the time is now, arm your women and children against the infidel." Then, after a few hours of bombing, bin Laden broke radio silence again, saying: "Our prayers were not answered. Times are dire and bad. We did not get support from the apostate nations who call themselves our Muslim brothers. Things might have been different." Fury said that Bin Laden's final words to his fighters that night were "I'm sorry for getting you involved in this battle if you can no longer resist, you may surrender with my blessing."

During his interview on 60 Minutes to discuss his book, Fury said that his team saw a group whom they believed to be bin Laden and his bodyguards entering a cave. The team called down several bombing attacks on the site, and believed that they had killed bin Laden. Six months later, US and Canadian forces returned and checked several caves in the area, finding remains of al-Qaeda fighters, but not of bin Laden. Fury thought that bin Laden was injured during the bombing of the cave, but was hidden, given medical care, and assisted out of the area into Pakistan by allied local Afghans.

Guantanamo captives' accounts of the battle

U.S. authorities have justified the continued detention of several dozen Afghan Guantanamo captives by the suspicion they had participated in the battle of Tora Bora, had been present during the battle, or had passed through the area of the battle before or after it concluded, or helped Osama bin Laden to escape.

In September 2007, Ayman Saeed Abdullah Batarfi, a Yemeni medical doctor held as an enemy combatant by the United States, was reported to have described the conditions during the battle:

"Most of all the total guns in the Tora Bora area was 16 Kalashnikovs and there are 200 people." He also said, "He [Osama bin Laden] came for a day to visit the area and we talked to him and we wanted to leave this area. He said he didn't know where to go himself and the second day he escaped and was gone."

Aftermath

British and American special forces soldiers and officers wore native Shalwar kameez dress to find Osama bin Laden in Tora Bora, 2001.

Following Tora Bora, UK and U.S. forces and their Afghan allies consolidated their position in the country. The Taliban and al-Qaeda forces did not give up and went into hiding. A Loya jirga or grand council of major Afghan factions, tribal leaders, and former exiles, an interim Afghan government, was established in Kabul under Hamid Karzai. Mullah Saifur Rehman, a Taliban fugitive in Paktia province, began rebuilding some of his militia forces in support of the anti-US fighters. They totaled over 1,000 by the beginning of Operation Anaconda in March 2002. The insurgents planned to use the region as a base for launching guerrilla attacks and possibly a major offensive in the style of the mujahedin during the 1980s.

U.S. forces established their main base at Bagram Air Base just north of Kabul. They used Kandahar International Airport as an important base for accepting and distributing supplies and personnel. Several outposts were established in eastern provinces to hunt for Taliban and Al-Qaeda fugitives. The number of U.S. troops operating in the country would eventually grow to more than 10,000 as efforts against the Taliban and al-Qaeda were increased.

In 2009, a U.S. Senate report concluded that the failure to capture bin Laden "[laid] the foundation for today's protracted Afghan insurgency and inflaming the internal strife now endangering Pakistan." Al-Qaeda forces began regrouping in the Shahi-Kot mountains of Paktia Province throughout January and February 2002.

CIA team deputy chief (right) meeting with Afghan mercenaries in Tora Bora, 2001

In December 2009, New Republic published Peter Bergen's "The Battle for Tora Bora" In his critique of the battle, Bergen reconstructed the U.S. allies engagement at Tora Bora. He said that General Tommy Franks, then U.S. Army chief, refused to deploy 800 Army Rangers from nearby bases to assault the complex of caves where bin Laden was supposedly hiding. Bergen characterized this as "one of the greatest military blunders in recent US history". Bergen says that the US failure to capture bin Laden at the time provided energy to the Taliban. It regrouped and became stronger after U.S. officials diverted forces for the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 and war there.

U.S. intelligence agencies continued to track bin Laden. On May 2, 2011, President Barack Obama announced the death of Osama bin Laden, who was living in a compound in the city of Abbottabad, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province, Pakistan. He was killed by a US Navy SEAL raid on the urban compound.

Tora Bora "fortress"

Tora Bora was variously described by the Western media to be an impregnable cave fortress housing 2000 men complete with a hospital, a hydroelectric power plant, offices, a hotel, arms and ammunition stores, roads large enough to drive a tank into, and elaborate tunnel and ventilation systems. Both the British and American press published elaborate plans of the base. When presented with such plans in an NBC interview on Meet the Press, Donald Rumsfeld, the US Secretary of Defense, said, "This is serious business, there's not one of those, there are many of those".

When Tora Bora was eventually captured by the U.S., British and Afghan troops, no traces of the supposed 'fortress' were found despite painstaking searches in the surrounding areas. Tora Bora turned out to be a system of small natural caves housing at most, 200 fighters. While arms and ammunition stores were found, there were no traces of the advanced facilities claimed to exist.

In an interview published by the Public Broadcasting Service, a Staff Sergeant from the U.S. Special Forces Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) 572, who had been in the Battle of Tora Bora described the caves:

Again, with the caves, they weren't these crazy mazes or labyrinths of caves that they described. Most of them were natural caves. Some were supported with some pieces of wood maybe about the size of a 10-foot by 24-foot room, at the largest. They weren't real big. I know they made a spectacle out of that, and how are we going to be able to get into them? We worried about that too, because we see all these reports. Then it turns out, when you actually go up there, there's really just small bunkers, and a lot of different ammo storage is up there.

— Jeff, Staff Sgt. ODA 572

See also

• War in Afghanistan (1978–present)
• British Special Forces
• CIA's Special Activities Division
• Operation Anaconda
• Osama Bin Laden
  • Death of Osama Bin Laden
• U.S. Army's Delta Force
• War in Afghanistan (2001–2021)
• Battle of Baghuz Fawqani — The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant's last stand in Syria

References

Bibliography

• Bergen, Peter L. (August 3, 2021). The Rise and Fall of Osama bin Laden: The Biography. Simon & Schuster.
• Malkasian, Carter (June 15, 2021). The American War in Afghanistan: A History (1st ed.). Oxford University Press.

Further reading

• Jawbreaker: The attack on bin Laden and al-Qaeda, Gary Berntsen, Three Rivers Press ISBN 0-307-35106-8, Published December 24, 2006 (paperback).
• Online map and picture The Washington Post. December 10, 2008.
• The Long Hunt for Osama Peter Bergen, The Atlantic Monthly. Oct. 2004
• Tora Bora John Bowman, CBC News Online. Dec. 2001
• The Tora Bora Fortress Myth? Edward Epstein, The Times. November 29, 2001
• Lost at Tora Bora Mary Anne Weaver, The New York Times. September 11, 2005
• How bin Laden got away Phillip Smucker, The Christian Science Monitor. March 4, 2002
• Michael R. Gordon (December 23, 2001). "A NATION CHALLENGED: SURVIVORS; On Tora Bora, Horror Rained On Al Qaeda". New York Times. Retrieved February 1, 2008.
• Bergen, Peter (December 30, 2009). "The Battle for Tora Bora". The New Republic. Archived from the original on May 8, 2013. Retrieved July 15, 2013.