Mao Zedong: Difference between revisions
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After Mao Zedong won the Chinese civil war in 1949, his goal became the unification of the "five nationalities" under the big family, the People's Republic of China.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=208}}</ref> Aware of Mao's vision, the Tibetan government in Lhasa ([[Tibet]]) sent a representative, [[Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme|Ngapo Ngawang Jigme]] to [[Chamdo]], [[Kham]], a strategically high valued town near the border. Ngapo had orders to hold the position while reinforcements was coming from the Lhasa and fight off the Chinese.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=209}}</ref> On October 16, 1950, news came that the People's Liberation Army was advancing towards Chamdo and had also taken another strategic town named, Riwoche, which could block the route to Lhasa.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=211}}</ref> With new orders, Ngapo and his men retreated to a monastery where the People's Liberation Army finally surrounded and captured them,<ref name="Schaik 2011 212">{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=212}}</ref> though they were treated with respect.<ref name="Schaik 2011 212"/> Ngapo wrote to Lhasa suggesting a peaceful surrender instead of war.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=213}}</ref> During the negotiation, the Chinese negotiator laid the cards straight on the table, "It is up to you to choose whether Tibet would be liberated peacefully or by force. It is only a matter of sending a telegram to the PLA group to recommence their march to Lhasa."<ref>{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=214}}</ref> Ngapo accepted Mao’s "[[Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet|Seventeen-Point Agreement]]", which constituted Tibet as part of the People's Republic China, in return for which Tibet would be granted [[autonomy]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=215}}</ref> In the face of discouraging lack of support from the rest of the world, the [[14th Dalai Lama|Dalai Lama]] on August 1951, sent a telegram to Mao accepting the Seventeen-Point Agreement.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=218}}</ref> |
After Mao Zedong won the Chinese civil war in 1949, his goal became the unification of the "five nationalities" under the big family, the People's Republic of China.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=208}}</ref> Aware of Mao's vision, the Tibetan government in Lhasa ([[Tibet]]) sent a representative, [[Ngapoi Ngawang Jigme|Ngapo Ngawang Jigme]] to [[Chamdo]], [[Kham]], a strategically high valued town near the border. Ngapo had orders to hold the position while reinforcements was coming from the Lhasa and fight off the Chinese.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=209}}</ref> On October 16, 1950, news came that the People's Liberation Army was advancing towards Chamdo and had also taken another strategic town named, Riwoche, which could block the route to Lhasa.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=211}}</ref> With new orders, Ngapo and his men retreated to a monastery where the People's Liberation Army finally surrounded and captured them,<ref name="Schaik 2011 212">{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=212}}</ref> though they were treated with respect.<ref name="Schaik 2011 212"/> Ngapo wrote to Lhasa suggesting a peaceful surrender instead of war.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=213}}</ref> During the negotiation, the Chinese negotiator laid the cards straight on the table, "It is up to you to choose whether Tibet would be liberated peacefully or by force. It is only a matter of sending a telegram to the PLA group to recommence their march to Lhasa."<ref>{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=214}}</ref> Ngapo accepted Mao’s "[[Seventeen Point Agreement for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet|Seventeen-Point Agreement]]", which constituted Tibet as part of the People's Republic China, in return for which Tibet would be granted [[autonomy]].<ref>{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=215}}</ref> In the face of discouraging lack of support from the rest of the world, the [[14th Dalai Lama|Dalai Lama]] on August 1951, sent a telegram to Mao accepting the Seventeen-Point Agreement.<ref>{{Harvnb|Schaik|2011|p=218}}</ref> |
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==Mao and the |
==Mao and the Media== |
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Mao |
Mao Zedong's use of media is integral to his success and a testament to his ability to effectively utilise various forms of media{{Citation needed}}. He utilised almost every available option of media at his disposal as he manoeuvred throughout his career as a leader of Communist China{{citation needed}}. Mao Zedong is most prominently known for the adamant production and distribution of his ideals and beliefs. The books [http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/mao/selected-works/ Selected Works of Chairman Mao Zedong] or [[Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung]] were published by Foreign Languages Press, Peking and distributed on an almost inconceivably large scale.<ref name=GBarme>Barme, Geremie (1996). ‘’Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader’’, p. 5-9. M.E. Sharp Inc., Armonk, New York.</ref> |
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An example of the full intent and usage of |
An example of the full intent and usage of Mao Zedong's media campaigns is that at the peak of the cultural revolution it was believed that even wedding ceremonies needed to be "revolutionised". The newly wed couple were presented with copies of ''Selected Works of Mao Zedong'' or ''Quotations from Chairman Mao''.<ref name=GBarme/> |
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Mao went to great lengths in order to ensure that his beliefs and words could find their way into the hands and minds of all Chinese people. There were entire stockpiles of the four-volume ''Selected works of Mao Zedong'' in a variety of forms. There was a traditional clothbound limited edition, the traditional plastic covered |
Mao went to great lengths in order to ensure that his beliefs and words could find their way into the hands and minds of all Chinese people. There were entire stockpiles of the four-volume ''Selected works of Mao Zedong'' in a variety of forms. There was a traditional clothbound limited edition, the traditional plastic covered "little red book" (officially called the "Quotations of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung), small and large, and even limited edition versions with extra-large print produced for Mao’s "myopic coevals".<ref name=GBarme/> |
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Massive amounts of the Chinese State publishing budget was used up in producing Mao-period publications in the late 1970s. Many warehouses throughout the country were solely dedicated to storing the State authorised and initiated literature.<ref name=GBarme/> |
Massive amounts of the Chinese State publishing budget was used up in producing Mao-period publications in the late 1970s. Many warehouses throughout the country were solely dedicated to storing the State authorised and initiated literature.<ref name=GBarme/> |
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The emphasis placed on literature by Mao Zedong was exemplified in the famous storehouse known as |
The emphasis placed on literature by Mao Zedong was exemplified in the famous storehouse known as "bawanba". A special detachment of soldiers guarding the large storage facility, and an additional group of caretakers for the building methodically worked their way along the shelves and piles of the depot, book by book, in order to protect the printed text. Each publication was opened, leafed through for signs of mould and decay, and then repacked and rescheduled for the next maintenance cycle.<ref name=GBarme/> |
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Mao's understanding of the importance of media gives insight into his efforts to use and have on hand all ways to reach the Chinese people through media. In 1979 internal estimates ranged that during the Cultural Revolution 2.2 billion portraits of the Chairman Mao Zedong had been produced (3 portraits to every 1 person living in China at that time). In June 1979 there were over 450 million unsold copies of communist works by Mao and the Communist international community, comprising 24% of all books in China. This number included eight million sets of the Selected Works of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung and over two billion copies of his speeches and writings in easily digestible single volumes.<ref name=GBarme/> By the end of the 10-year long Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution it was noted by the national book store, Xinhua, that more than forty billion volumes of Mao Zedong's works were printed and distributed; equivalent to about 15 copies of each of Mao's books for every child, woman, and man in China.<ref name=GBarme/> |
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Mao Zedong had utilised and understood the media and the power it held since his days as a revolutionary on the run. Almost immediately following the establishment of the Chinese Communist party Mao embarked on literacy campaigns, educational programs and cultural projects throughout the entirety of China. Mandarin was proclaimed as the national spoken language and linguists were subsequently dispatched to solidify a simplified written Chinese language.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 87-88">Karl, Rebecca (2010). ‘’Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World'', p. 87-88. Duke University Press, United States.</ref> |
Mao Zedong had utilised and understood the media and the power it held since his days as a revolutionary on the run. Almost immediately following the establishment of the Chinese Communist party Mao embarked on literacy campaigns, educational programs and cultural projects throughout the entirety of China. Mandarin was proclaimed as the national spoken language and linguists were subsequently dispatched to solidify a simplified written Chinese language.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 87-88">Karl, Rebecca (2010). ‘’Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World'', p. 87-88. Duke University Press, United States.</ref> |
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Such efforts were intended to facilitate nationwide literacy rates.<ref>Karl, 87</ref> |
Such efforts were intended to facilitate nationwide literacy rates.<ref>Karl, 87</ref> Mao Zedong's establishment of a foundation within the Chinese people to receive various forms of media proved useful to his efforts later on in his leadership roles.{{citation needed}} |
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He requested the aid of non-communist intellectuals versed in the various forms of writing, art and media.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 87-88"/> Mao had mobile drama troupes sent across the land in order to bring culture and initial forms of Chinese Communist Party propaganda.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 87-88"/> Mao also utilised film in his early introductions of media to the people; he sent mobile film groups to transport projectors, screens and film equipment, on shoulders and ox carts, to some of the furthest corners of the Chinese population. The intent was to teach peasants how to watch moving pictures and how to understand the newly emerging forms of narratives and accompanying media.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 87-88"/> |
He requested the aid of non-communist intellectuals versed in the various forms of writing, art and media.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 87-88"/> Mao had mobile drama troupes sent across the land in order to bring culture and initial forms of Chinese Communist Party propaganda.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 87-88"/> Mao also utilised film in his early introductions of media to the people; he sent mobile film groups to transport projectors, screens and film equipment, on shoulders and ox carts, to some of the furthest corners of the Chinese population. The intent was to teach peasants how to watch moving pictures and how to understand the newly emerging forms of narratives and accompanying media.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 87-88"/> |
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===Hu Feng Affair=== |
===Hu Feng Affair=== |
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The [[Hu Feng]] Affair exemplifies Mao’s relationship with various forms of media. Hu Feng, a seasoned literary critic, had been in a literary dialogue with communist figures since the 1930s.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 87-88"/> |
The [[Hu Feng]] Affair exemplifies Mao’s relationship with various forms of media. Hu Feng, a seasoned literary critic, had been in a literary dialogue with communist figures since the 1930s.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 87-88"/> Mao Zedong's personal interest in the situation emerged in the form of a personally written preface to published anti-Hu Feng materials where he wrote that sentiments such as Hu Feng's were anti-revolutionary and were in fact a facade. Mao also used the publication to not only denounce such individuals but assert that the "task of distinguishing and purging bad persons can be done only by relying on the integration of correct leadership on the part of the leading origins and a high degree of consciousness among the broad masses... all these things are lessons for us. We are taking the Hu Feng affair seriously, because we want to use it to educate the broad masses of the people, first of all those literate working cadres and the intellectuals".<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 87-88"/> |
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The Hu Feng affair established a precedent for use of media as a weapon to shape opinions. |
The Hu Feng affair established a precedent for use of media as a weapon to shape opinions.{{citation needed}} |
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===The Hundred Blooming Flowers=== |
===The Hundred Blooming Flowers=== |
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Mao also chose to use the media as a surface level process for critiquing the Communist systems. Mao published |
Mao also chose to use the media as a surface level process for critiquing the Communist systems. Mao published "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" in February, 1957.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 95-97">Karl, Rebecca (2010). ‘’Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World'', p. 95-97. Duke University Press, United States.</ref> This publication called upon the people’s movement of China to evaluate the effectiveness of the Communist Party and subsequent Party methods. Mao’s call for critique was directed towards the intellectual populace that was seemingly nervous after the Hu Feng affair. Mao’s invitation to speak out was an opportunity for the Chinese peoples to use various forms of media, but most were hesitant to do so.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 95-97"/> Newspapers were some of the first to timidly publish varying critiques; eventually it was perceived a safe venue and forum for voicing unfair party methods, inefficiency, poor planning and inadequate attention to everyday life.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 95-97"/> Although articles did not always place blame on specific individuals, the authors often did identify themselves to their work. The works varied between newspapers, pamphlets and wall-posters, and the majority of the criticism was founded in the acceptance of the socialist system but attempted to make suggestions to improve the system rather than undermine or overthrow.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 95-97"/> The criticism revolved around the people's view that the Chinese Communist Party had abandoned its revolutionary principles and was transforming Party Cadres into a privileged social class, but any criticism could very easily be interpreted as seemingly counter-revolutionary.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 95-97"/> |
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On June 8, 1957, Mao published an editorial in the Chinese Communist Party’s ''The People’s Daily''. Mao declared that |
On June 8, 1957, Mao published an editorial in the Chinese Communist Party’s ''The People’s Daily''. Mao declared that "poisonous weeds" had grown among the "fragrant flowers" within the one hundred blooming flowers of people’s criticism. Mao subsequently used the newspapers to identify individuals responsible for certain criticisms as right-wingers and counter-revolutionaries who abused the invitation given to the people to use their voice.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 95-97"/> The ramifications for intellectuals who participated in criticism spanned from being harassed, labeled as rightists, or worse, counter revolutionists. Some intellectuals were subject to house arrest and forced to write confessions and self criticisms of their crimes, and others were banned from living within urban residencies and or sent for re-education. A few were executed or harassed to death.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 95-97"/> |
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===Hai Rui=== |
===Hai Rui=== |
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Mao was quoted in an article within ''Peoples Daily'' newspaper in his idea of “Revolutionary Big-Character Posters are ‘Magic Mirrors’ That Show Up All Monsters.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 121-124"/> A result of the Cultural Revolution, and the use of mass media surrounding Mao’s initiation of the revolution, was a spiraling use of media which identified educational systems as counter-revolutionary and advocate of bourgeois thought.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 121-124"/> |
Mao was quoted in an article within ''Peoples Daily'' newspaper in his idea of “Revolutionary Big-Character Posters are ‘Magic Mirrors’ That Show Up All Monsters.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 121-124"/> A result of the Cultural Revolution, and the use of mass media surrounding Mao’s initiation of the revolution, was a spiraling use of media which identified educational systems as counter-revolutionary and advocate of bourgeois thought.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 121-124"/> |
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=== |
===Mao Zedong's Use of Art=== |
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Under |
Under Chairman Mao Zedong's influence, the various forms of Chinese arts became a venue for mass media. Along with his use of Great Character Posters, Mao attempted, with moderate success, to synthesise realism with folk art in an attempt to realign art with the mass origins of the Chinese people.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 147-148">Karl, Rebecca (2010). ‘’Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World'', p. 147-148. Duke University Press, United States.</ref> By The 1970s many artists had been sent out of urbanised areas and into rural locations of China in order to facilitate the "re-discovery" of Chinese origins.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 147-148"/> Such art forms as opera were changed; they adopted the lyrics of revolutionary lyrics to pre-existing melodies.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 147-148"/> Ballet, although not of authentic Chinese culture, was changed in order to encompass revolutionary gestures and movements in defamiliarised forms.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 147-148"/> |
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Mao’s concentration in using art as a form of media is reflective of his initial efforts to establish a cultural base in the early 1950s. His belief that revolution was, in its own manner, a form of art is evident throughout many of his actions. Mao was quoted to have said to the French writer [[André Malraux]], that revolution is |
Mao’s concentration in using art as a form of media is reflective of his initial efforts to establish a cultural base in the early 1950s. His belief that revolution was, in its own manner, a form of art is evident throughout many of his actions. Mao was quoted to have said to the French writer [[André Malraux]], that revolution is "a drama of passion; we did not win the people over by appealing to reason, but by developing hope, trust, and fraternity".<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 147-148"/> |
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Mao knew, possibly more than most leaders at the time, the true impact that art could have on a revolution and the ability to have revolution saturated in the art. It is evident that to Mao |
Mao knew, possibly more than most leaders at the time, the true impact that art could have on a revolution and the ability to have revolution saturated in the art. It is evident that to Mao "revolution was art; art was revolution", and art as a form of mass media is possibly one of the most effective and long lasting impressions that can be left on a people, and was left on the Chinese people.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 147-148"/> |
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The effect, intended or not, of |
The effect, intended or not, of Mao's use of art as a form of mass media was one of the most effective forms of propaganda. The messages infiltrated the people's consciousness and emotional states, evoking a physical and emotional participation in revolutionary thought and activity.<ref name="Karl, Rebecca 2010 p. 147-148"/> |
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==See also== |
==See also== |
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Revision as of 17:19, 8 March 2014
Mao Zedong | |
|---|---|
| 毛泽东 | |
| File:Mao.jpg Official 1960–1966 portrait of Mao Zedong | |
| 1st Chairman of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China | |
| In office June 19, 1945 – September 9, 1976 | |
| 1st vice-chairman | Liu Shaoqi Lin Biao Zhou Enlai Hua Guofeng |
| Preceded by | Himself (as Central Politburo Chairman) |
| Succeeded by | Hua Guofeng |
| 1st Chairman of the Central Politburo of the Communist Party of China | |
| In office March 20, 1943 – April 24, 1969 | |
| Preceded by | Zhang Wentian (as Central Committee General Secretary) |
| Succeeded by | Himself (as Central Committee Chairman) |
| 1st Chairman of the CPC Central Military Commission | |
| In office August 23, 1945 – 1949 September 8, 1954 – September 9, 1976 | |
| Preceded by | Position created |
| Succeeded by | Hua Guofeng |
| 1st Chairman of the National Committee of the CPPCC | |
| In office September 21, 1949 – December 25, 1954 Honorary Chairman December 25, 1954 – September 9, 1976 | |
| Preceded by | Position created |
| Succeeded by | Zhou Enlai |
| 1st Chairman of the People's Republic of China | |
| In office September 27, 1954 – April 27, 1959 | |
| Premier | Zhou Enlai |
| Deputy | Zhu De |
| Preceded by | Position created |
| Succeeded by | Liu Shaoqi |
| Member of the National People's Congress | |
| In office September 15, 1954 – April 18, 1959 December 21, 1964 – September 9, 1976 | |
| Constituency | Beijing At-large |
| Personal details | |
| Born | December 26, 1893 Shaoshan, Hunan |
| Died | September 9, 1976 (aged 82) Beijing |
| Resting place | Chairman Mao Memorial Hall, Beijing |
| Nationality | Chinese |
| Political party | Communist Party of China |
| Spouse(s) | Luo Yixiu (1907–1910) Yang Kaihui (1920–1930) He Zizhen (1930–1937) Jiang Qing (1939–1976) |
| Children | 10 |
| Occupation | Revolutionary, statesman |
| Signature |  |
Template:Contains Chinese text
| Mao Zedong | |||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Simplified Chinese | 毛泽东 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Traditional Chinese | 毛澤東 | ||||||||||||||||||||
| Hanyu Pinyin | Máo Zédōng [mɑ̌ʊ tsɤ̌tʊ́ŋ] | ||||||||||||||||||||
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Mao Zedong, also transliterated as Mao Tse-tung , and commonly referred to as Chairman Mao (December 26, 1893 – September 9, 1976), was a Chinese communist revolutionary and a founding father of the People's Republic of China, which he governed as Chairman of the Communist Party of China from its establishment in 1949 until his death. His Marxist-Leninist theories, military strategies and political policies are collectively known as Maoism.
Born the son of a wealthy farmer in Shaoshan, Hunan, Mao adopted a Chinese nationalist and anti-imperialist outlook in early life, particularly influenced by the events of the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 and May Fourth Movement of 1919. Mao converted to Marxism-Leninism while working at Peking University and became a founding member of the Communist Party of China (CPC), leading the Autumn Harvest Uprising in 1927. During the Chinese Civil War between the Kuomingtang (KMT) and the CPC, Mao helped to found the Red Army, led the Jiangxi Soviet's radical land policies and ultimately became head of the CPC during the Long March. Although the CPC temporarily allied with the KMT under the United Front during the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–45), after Japan's defeat China's civil war resumed and in 1949 Mao's forces defeated the Nationalists who withdrew to Taiwan.
On October 1, 1949 Mao proclaimed the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC), a one-party socialist state controlled by the CPC. In the following years Mao solidified his control through land reforms and through a psychological victory in the Korean War, and through campaigns against landlords, people he termed "counterrevolutionaries", and other perceived enemies of the state. In 1957 he launched a campaign known as the Great Leap Forward that aimed to rapidly transform China's economy from an agrarian economy to an industrial one. This campaign, along with natural disasters that occurred at the time, led to the Great Chinese Famine. In 1966, he initiated the Cultural Revolution, a program to weed out supposed counter-revolutionary elements in Chinese society that lasted 10 years and was marked by violent class struggle, widespread destruction of cultural artefacts and unprecedented elevation of Mao's personality cult and which is officially regarded as a "severe setback" for the PRC.[1] In 1972, he welcomed American president Richard Nixon in Beijing, signalling a policy of opening China.
A very controversial figure, Mao is regarded as one of the most important individuals in modern world history.[2] Mao is officially held in high regard in the People's Republic of China, by both the people and the government. Supporters regard him as a great leader and credit him with numerous accomplishments including modernizing China and building it into a world power, promoting the status of women, improving education and health care, providing universal housing, and increasing life expectancy as China's population grew from around 550 to over 900 million during the period of his leadership.[3][4][4][5] Maoists furthermore promote his role as theorist, statesman, poet, and visionary.[6] In contrast, critics, inlcuding many historians, have characterized him as a dictator who oversaw systematic human rights abuses, and whose rule is estimated to have contributed to the deaths of 40–70 million people through starvation, forced labor and executions, ranking his tenure as the top incidence of democide in human history.[7][8][9]
Early life
Youth and the Xinhai Revolution: 1893–1911
Mao was born on December 26, 1893 in Shaoshan village, Shaoshan, Hunan.[10] His father, Mao Yichang, was an impoverished peasant who had become one of the wealthiest farmers in Shaoshan. Zedong described his father as a stern disciplinarian, who would beat him and his three siblings, the boys Zemin and Zetan, and an adopted girl, Zejian.[11] Yichang's wife, Wen Qimei, was a devout Buddhist who tried to temper her husband's strict attitude.[12] Zedong too became a Buddhist, but abandoned this faith in his mid-teenage years.[12] Aged 8, Mao was sent to Shaoshan Primary School. Learning the value systems of Confucianism, he later admitted that he didn't enjoy the classical Chinese texts preaching Confucian morals, instead favouring popular novels like Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Water Margin.[13] Aged 13, Mao finished primary education, and his father had him married to the 17-year-old Luo Yigu, uniting their land-owning families. Mao refused to recognise her as his wife, becoming a fierce critic of arranged marriage and temporarily moving away. Luo was locally disgraced and died in 1910.[14]
Working on his father's farm, Mao read voraciously,[15] developing a "political consciousness" from Zheng Guanying's booklet which lamented the deterioration of Chinese power and argued for the adoption of representative democracy.[16] Interested in history, Mao was inspired by the military prowess and nationalistic fervour of George Washington and Napoleon Bonaparte.[17] His political views were shaped by Gelaohui-led protests which erupted following a famine in Hunanese capital Changsha; Mao supported the protester's demands, but the armed forces suppressed the dissenters and executed their leaders.[18] The famine spread to Shaoshan, where starving peasants seized his father's grain; disapproving of their actions as morally wrong, Mao nevertheless claimed sympathy for their situation.[19] Aged 16, Mao moved to a higher primary school in nearby Dongshan,[20] where he was bullied for his peasant background.[21]
In 1911, Mao began middle school in Changsha.[22] Revolutionary sentiment was strong in the city, with widespread animosity towards Emperor Puyi's absolute monarchy and many advocating republicanism. The republicans' figurehead was Sun Yat-sen, an American-educated Christian who led the Tongmenghui society.[23] In Changsha, Mao was influenced by Sun's newspaper, The People's Independence (Minli bao),[24] and called for Sun to become president in a school essay.[25] As a symbol of rebellion against the Manchu monarch, Mao and a friend cut off their queue pigtails, a sign of subservience to the emperor.[26]
Inspired by Sun's republicanism, the army rose up across southern China, sparking the Xinhai Revolution. Changsha's governor fled, leaving the city in republican control.[27] Supporting the revolution, Mao joined the rebel army as a private soldier, but was not involved in fighting. The northern provinces remained loyal to the emperor, and hoping to avoid a civil war, Sun—proclaimed "provisional president" by his supporters—compromised with the monarchist general Yuan Shikai. The monarchy would be abolished, creating the Republic of China, but the monarchist Yuan would become president. The revolution over, Mao resigned from the army in 1912, after six months of being a soldier.[28] Around this time, Mao discovered socialism from a newspaper article; proceeding to read pamphlets by Jiang Kanghu, the student founder of the Chinese Socialist Party, Mao remained interested yet unconvinced by the idea.[29]
Fourth Normal School of Changsha: 1912–19
Mao enrolled and dropped out of a police academy, a soap-production school, a law school, an economics school, and the government-run Changsha Middle School.[30] Studying independently, he spent much time in Changsha's library, reading core works of classical liberalism such as Adam Smith's The Wealth of Nations and Montesquieu's The Spirit of the Laws, as well as the works of western scientists and philosophers such as Darwin, Mill, Rousseau, and Spencer.[31] Viewing himself as an intellectual, years later he admitted that at this time he thought himself better than working people.[32] Inspired by Friedrich Paulsen, the liberal emphasis on individualism led Mao to believe that strong individuals were not bound by moral codes but should strive for the greater good; that the end justifies the means.[33] Seeing no use in his son's intellectual pursuits, Mao's father cut off his allowance, forcing him to move into a hostel for the destitute.[34]
Desiring to become a teacher, Mao enrolled at the Fourth Normal School of Changsha, which soon merged with the First Normal School of Changsha, widely seen as the best school in Hunan.[35] Befriending Mao, professor Yang Changji urged him to read a radical newspaper, New Youth (Xin qingnian), the creation of his friend Chen Duxiu, a dean at Peking University. Although a Chinese nationalist, Chen argued that China must look to the west to cleanse itself of superstition and autocracy.[36] Mao published his first article in New Youth in April 1917, instructing readers to increase their physical strength to serve the revolution.[37] He joined the Society for the Study of Wang Fuzhi (Chuan-shan Hsüeh-she), a revolutionary group founded by Changsha literati who wished to emulate the philosopher Wang Fuzhi.[38]
In his first school year, Mao befriended an older student, Xiao Yu; together they went on a walking tour of Hunan, begging and writing literary couplets to obtain food.[39] A popular student, in 1915 Mao was elected secretary of the Students Society. Forging an Association for Student Self-Government, he led protests against school rules.[40] In spring 1917, he was elected to command the students' volunteer army, set up to defend the school from marauding soldiers.[41] Increasingly interested in the techniques of war, he took a keen interest in World War I, and also began to develop a sense of solidarity with workers.[42] Mao undertook feats of physical endurance with Xiao Yu and Cai Hesen, and with other young revolutionaries they formed the Renovation of the People Study Society in April 1918 to debate Chen Duxiu's ideas. Desiring personal and societal transformation, the Society gained 70–80 members, many of whom would later join the Communist Party.[43] Mao graduated in June 1919, being ranked third in the year.[44]
Early revolutionary activity
Beijing, Anarchism, and Marxism: 1917–19
Mao moved to Beijing, where his mentor Yang Changji had taken a job at Peking University.[45] Yang thought Mao exceptionally "intelligent and handsome",[46] securing him a job as assistant to the university librarian Li Dazhao, an early Chinese communist.[47] Li authored a series of New Youth articles on the October Revolution in Russia, during which the communist Bolshevik Party under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin had seized power. Lenin was an advocate of the socio-political theory of Marxism, first developed by the German sociologists Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, and Li's articles brought an understanding of Marxism to the Chinese revolutionary movement.[48] Becoming "more and more radical", Mao was influenced by Peter Kropotkin's anarchism but joined Li's Study Group and "developed rapidly toward Marxism" during the winter of 1919.[49]
Paid a low wage, Mao lived in a cramped room with seven other Hunanese students, but believed that Beijing's beauty offered "vivid and living compensation".[50] At the university, Mao was widely snubbed due to his rural accent and lowly position. By joining the university's Philosophy and Journalism Societies, he attended lectures and seminars by the likes of Chen Duxiu, Hu Shi, and Qian Xuantong.[51] Mao's time in Beijing ended in the spring of 1919, when he travelled to Shanghai with friends departing for France,[52] before returning to Shaoshan, where his mother was terminally ill; she died in October 1919, with her husband dying in January 1920.[53]
Student rebellions: 1919–20
China had fallen victim to the expansionist policies of the Empire of Japan, who had conquered large areas of Chinese-controlled territory with the support of France, the UK and the US at the Treaty of Versailles. Under the control of the warlord Duan Qirui, the Chinese Beiyang Government had accepted Japanese dominance, agreeing to their Twenty-One Demands despite popular opposition.[54] In May 1919, the May Fourth Movement erupted in Beijing, with Chinese patriots rallying against the Japanese and Duan's government. Duan's troops were sent in to crush the protests, but unrest spread throughout China.[55] In Changsha, Mao had gained employment teaching history at the Xiuye Primary School.[56] He began organizing protests against the pro-Duan Governor of Hunan Province, Zhang Jingyao, popularly known as "Zhang the Venomous" due to his corrupt and violent rule.[57] In late May, Mao co-founded the Hunanese Student Association with He Shuheng and Deng Zhongxia, organizing a student strike for June and in July 1919 began production of a weekly radical magazine, Xiang River Review (Xiangjiang pinglun). Using vernacular language that would be understandable to the majority of China's populace, he advocated the need for a "Great Union of the Popular Masses", strengthened trade unions able to wage non-violent revolution; his ideas were not Marxist, but heavily influenced by Kropotkin's concept of mutual aid.[58]
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Zhang banned the Student Association, but Mao continued publishing after assuming editorship of liberal magazine New Hunan (Xin Hunan) and offering articles in popular local newspaper Justice (Ta Kung Po). Several of these articles advocated feminist views, calling for the liberation of women in Chinese society; Mao was influenced by his forced arranged-marriage.[59] In December 1919, Mao helped organise a general strike in Hunan, securing some concessions, but Mao and other student leaders felt threatened by Zhang, and Mao returned to Beijing, visiting the terminally ill Yang Changji.[60] Mao found that his articles had achieved a level of fame among the revolutionary movement, and set about soliciting support in overthrowing Zhang.[61] Coming across newly translated Marxist literature by Thomas Kirkup, Karl Kautsky, and Marx and Engels—notably The Communist Manifesto—he came under their increasing influence, but was still eclectic in his views.[62]
Mao visited Tianjin, Jinan, and Qufu,[63] before moving to Shanghai, where he worked as a laundryman and met Chen Duxiu, noting that Chen's adoption of Marxism "deeply impressed me at what was probably a critical period in my life". In Shanghai, Mao met an old teacher of his, Yi Peiji, a revolutionary and member of the Kuomintang (KMT), or Chinese Nationalist Party, which was gaining increasing support and influence. Yi introduced Mao to General Tan Yankai, a senior KMT member who held the loyalty of troops stationed along the Hunanese border with Guangdong. Tan was plotting to overthrow Zhang, and Mao aided him by organizing the Changsha students. In June 1920, Tan led his troops into Changsha, while Zhang fled. In the subsequent reorganization of the provincial administration, Mao was appointed headmaster of the junior section of the First Normal School. Now receiving a large income, he married Yang Kaihui in the winter of 1920.[64]
Founding the Communist Party of China: 1921–22
The Communist Party of China was founded by Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao in the French concession of Shanghai in 1921 as a study society and informal network. Mao set up a Changsha branch, also establishing a branch of the Socialist Youth Corps. Opening a bookstore under the control of his new Cultural Book Society, its purpose was to propagate revolutionary literature throughout Hunan.[65] Helping to organise workers' strikes in the winter of 1920–21,[66] he was involved in the movement for Hunan autonomy, hoping that a Hunanese constitution would increase civil liberties in the province, making his revolutionary activity easier; although the movement was successful, in later life, he denied any involvement.[67] By 1921, small Marxist groups existed in Shanghai, Beijing, Changsha, Wuhan, Canton and Jinan, and it was decided to hold a central meeting, which began in Shanghai on July 23, 1921. The first session of the National Congress of the Communist Party of China was attended by 13 delegates, Mao included, and met in a girls' school that was closed for the summer. After the authorities sent a police spy to the congress, the delegates moved to a boat on South Lake near Chiahsing to escape detection. Although Soviet and Comintern delegates attended, the first congress ignored Lenin's advice to accept a temporary alliance between the communists and the "bourgeois democrats" who also advocated national revolution; instead they stuck to the orthodox Marxist belief that only the urban proletariat could lead a socialist revolution.[68]
Now party secretary for Hunan, Mao was stationed in Changsha, from which he went on a Communist recruitment drive.[69] In August 1921, he founded the Self-Study University, through which readers could gain access to revolutionary literature, housed in the premises of the Society for the Study of Wang Fuzhi.[69] Taking part in the YMCA mass education movement to fight illiteracy, he opened a Changsha branch, though replaced the usual textbooks with revolutionary tracts in order to spread Marxism among the students.[70] He continued organizing the labour movement to strike against the administration of Hunan Governor Zhao Hengti, particularly following the execution of two anarchists.[71] In July 1922, the Second Congress of the Communist Party took place in Shanghai, though Mao lost the address and couldn't attend. Adopting Lenin's advice, the delegates agreed to an alliance with the "bourgeois democrats" of the KMT for the good of the "national revolution". Communist Party members joined the KMT, hoping to push its politics leftward.[72] Mao enthusiastically agreed with this decision, arguing for an alliance across China's socio-economic classes; a vocal anti-imperialist, in his writings he lambasted the governments of Japan, UK and US, describing the latter as "the most murderous of hangmen".[73] Mao's strategy for the successful and famous Anyuan coal mines strikes (contrary to later Party historians) depended on both "proletarian" and "bourgeois" strategies. The success depended on innovative organizing by Liu Shaoqi and Li Lisan who not only mobilised the miners, but formed schools and cooperatives. They also engaged local intellectuals, gentry, military officers, merchants, Red Gang dragon heads and church clergy in support.[74]
Collaboration with the Kuomintang: 1922–27
At the Third Congress of the Communist Party in Shanghai in June 1923, the delegates reaffirmed their commitment to working with the KMT against the Beiyang government and imperialists. Supporting this position, Mao was elected to the Party Committee, taking up residence in Shanghai. [75] Attending the First KMT Congress, held in Guangzhou in early 1924, Mao was elected an alternate member of the KMT Central Executive Committee, and put forward four resolutions to decentralise power to urban and rural bureaus. His enthusiastic support for the KMT earned him the suspicion of some communists.[76] In late 1924, Mao returned to Shaoshan to recuperate from an illness. Discovering that the peasantry were increasingly restless due to the upheaval of the past decade, some had seized land from wealthy landowners to found communes; this convinced him of the revolutionary potential of the peasantry, an idea advocated by the KMT but not the communists.[77] As a result, he was appointed to run the KMT's Peasant Movement Training Institute, also becoming Director of its Propaganda Department and editing its Political Weekly (Zhengzhi zhoubao) newsletter.[78][79] Through the Peasant Movement Training Institute, Mao took an active role in organizing the revolutionary Hunanese peasants and preparing them for militant activity, taking them through military training exercises and getting them to study various left-wing texts.[80] In the winter of 1925, Mao fled to Canton after his revolutionary activities attracted the attention of Zhao's regional authorities.[81]
The communists dominated the left wing of the KMT, struggling for power with the party's right wing. When party leader Sun Yat-sen died in May 1925, he was succeeded by a rightist, Chiang Kai-shek, who initiated moves to marginalise the position of the communists.[82] Mao nevertheless supported Chiang's decision to overthrow the Beiyang government and their foreign imperialist allies using the National Revolutionary Army, who embarked on the Northern Expedition in 1926.[83] In the wake of this expedition, peasants rose up, appropriating the land of the wealthy landowners, whom were in many cases killed. Such uprisings angered senior KMT figures, who were themselves landowners, emphasizing the growing class and ideological divide within the revolutionary movement.[84]
"Revolution is not a dinner party, nor an essay, nor a painting, nor a piece of embroidery; it cannot be so refined, so leisurely and gentle, so temperate, kind, courteous, restrained and magnanimous. A revolution is an insurrection, an act of violence by which one class overthrows another."
— Mao, February 1927.[85]
In March 1927, Mao appeared at the Third Plenum of the KMT Central Executive Committee in Wuhan, which sought to strip General Chiang of his power by appointing Wang Jingwei leader. There, Mao played an active role in the discussions regarding the peasant issue, defending a set of "Regulations for the Repression of Local Bullies and Bad Gentry", which advocated the death penalty or life imprisonment for anyone found guilty of counter-revolutionary activity, arguing that in a revolutionary situation, "peaceful methods cannot suffice".[86][87] In April 1927, Mao was appointed to the KMT's five-member Central Land Committee, urging peasants to refuse to pay rent. Mao led another group to put together a "Draft Resolution on the Land Question", which called for the confiscation of land belonging to "local bullies and bad gentry, corrupt officials, militarists and all counter-revolutionary elements in the villages". Proceeding to carry out a "Land Survey", he stated that anyone owning over 30 mou (four and a half acres), constituting 13% of the population, were uniformly counter-revolutionary. He accepted that there was great variation in revolutionary enthusiasm across the country, and that a flexible policy of land redistribution was necessary.[88] Presenting his conclusions at the Enlarged Land Committee meeting, many expressed reservations, some believing that it went too far, and others not far enough. Ultimately, his suggestions were only partially implemented.[89]
Civil War
The Nanchang and Autumn Harvest Uprisings: 1927
Fresh from the success of the Northern Expedition to overthrow the warlords, Chiang turned on the communists, who by now numbered in the tens of thousands across China. Ignoring the orders of the Wuhan-based KMT government, he marched on Shanghai, a city controlled by communist militias. Although the communists welcomed Chiang's arrival, he turned on them, massacring 5000 with the aid of the Green Gang.[87][90] Chiang's army then marched on Wuhan, but was prevented from taking the city by communist General Ye Ting and his troops.[91] Chiang's allies also attacked communists; in Beijing, 19 leading communists were killed by Zhang Zuolin, while in Changsha, He Jian's forces machine gunned hundreds of peasant militiamen.[92][93] That May, tens of thousands of communists and their sympathisers were killed by nationalists, with the CPC losing approximately 15,000 of its 25,000 members.[93]
"'Eagles cleave the air,
Fish glide in the limpid deep;
Under freezing skies a million
creatures contend in freedom.
Brooding over this immensity,
I ask, on this boundless land
Who rules over man's destiny?"
— Excerpt from Mao's
poem "Changsha", September 1927.[94]
The CPC continued supporting the Wuhan KMT government, a position Mao initially supported,[93] but he had changed his mind by the time of the CPC's Fifth Congress, deciding to stake all hope on the peasant militia.[95] The question was rendered moot when the Wuhan government expelled all communists from the KMT on 15 July.[95] The CPC founded the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army of China, better known as the "Red Army", to battle Chiang. A battalion led by General Zhu De was ordered to take the city of Nanchang on 1 August 1927 in what became known as the Nanchang Uprising; initially successful, they were forced into retreat after five days, marching south to Shantou, and from there being driven into the wilderness of Fujian.[95] Appointed commander-in-chief of the Red Army, Mao led four regiments against Changsha in the Autumn Harvest Uprising, hoping to spark peasant uprisings across Hunan. On the eve of the attack, Mao composed a poem—the earliest of his to survive—titled "Changsha". His plan was to attack the KMT-held city from three directions on 9 September, but the Fourth Regiment deserted to the KMT cause, attacking the Third Regiment. Mao's army made it to Changsha, but could not take it; by 15 September, he accepted defeat, with 1000 survivors marching east to the Jinggang Mountains of Jiangxi.[94][96]
In their biography of Mao, Mao: the unknown story, Jung Chang and Jon Halliday dispute this version of events.[97] Chang and Halliday claim that the 'uprising' was in fact sabotaged by Mao to allow him to snare a force of Nationalist mutineers from Nanchang who were crossing over to the CCP, prevent them from defecting to any other CCP leader, and enhance his own personal power within the CCP. They claim that Mao's three-day delay in seeing the other leaders of the Hunan uprising, scheduled for 15 August but delayed by Mao until 18 August, was to allow Mao to check that the mutineers would still be passing close by and that if Mao had not had the opportunity of adding this force to his own forces within the CCP he would not have gone to south Hunan.[98]
Chang and Halliday also claim that Mao lobbied to 'narrow down' the uprising and talked the other leaders (including Russian diplomats at the Soviet consulate in Changsha who, Chang and Halliday claim, had been controlling much of the CCP activity) into striking only at Changsha. This, they say, was in order to allow Mao to also gain control of a force of 1,700 peasant rebels and defectors from the Nationalist army who were near Changsha. Chang and Halliday point out that once Mao had gained control of these men, he then moved to a position 100 km east of Changsha at Wenjiashi and was there on 11 September, the uprising's launch date, far from his troops, and that on 14 September, before the troops had reached Changsha or met heavy resistance, Mao ordered them to abandon the assault on Changsha and converge on his position. Chang and Halliday report a view sent to Moscow by the secretary of the Soviet Consulate in Changsha that the retreat was 'the most despicable treachery and cowardice.'[98]
Chang and Halliday allege that Mao later fabricated the version of events (which is still that taught by the CCP) in order to hide the fact that far from leading a peasant uprising, he hijacked it for his own personal ends, sabotaged the organisation, and departed with the new troops before the attack on Changsha had begun.[98]
Base in Jinggangshan: 1927–1928
Hiding in Shanghai, the CPC Central Committee expelled Mao from their rank and from the Hunan Provincial Committee, punishment for his "military opportunism", for his focus on rural activity, and for being too lenient with "bad gentry". They nevertheless adopted three policies he had long championed: the immediate formation of soviets, the confiscation of all land without exemption, and the rejection of the KMT. Mao's response was to ignore them.[99] Setting up base in Jinggangshan City, an area of the Jinggang Mountains, Mao united five villages as a self-governing state, supporting the confiscation of land from rich landlords, who were "re-educated" and sometimes executed. He ensured that no massacres took place in the region, pursuing a more lenient approach than that advocated by the Central Committee.[100] Proclaiming that "Even the lame, the deaf and the blind could all come in useful for the revolutionary struggle", he boosted the army's numbers,[101] incorporating two groups of bandits into his army, building a force of around 1,800 troops.[102] He laid down rules for his soldiers: prompt obedience to orders, all confiscations were to be turned over to the government, and nothing was to be confiscated from poorer peasants. In doing so, he molded his men into a disciplined, efficient fighting force.[101]
"When the enemy advances, we retreat.
When the enemy retreats, we advance.
When the enemy rests, we harass him.
When the enemy avoids a battle, we attack."
In spring 1928, the Central Committee ordered Mao's troops to southern Hunan, hoping to spark peasant uprisings. Mao was skeptical, but complied. Reaching Hunan, they were attacked by the KMT and fled after heavy losses. Meanwhile, KMT troops had invaded Jinggangshan, leaving them without a base.[105] Wandering the countryside, Mao's forces came across a CPC regiment led by General Zhu De and Lin Biao; they united, attempting to retake Jinggangshan. Initially successful, the KMT counter-attacked, pushing the CPC back; over the next few weeks, they fought an entrenched guerrilla war in the mountains.[103][106] Central Committee again ordered Mao to march to south Hunan, but he refused, remaining at his base. Contrastingly, Zhu complied, leading his armies away; the KMT attacked Mao's base, and although his troops fended them off for 25 days, Mao left the camp at night to find reinforcements. Reuniting with the decimated Zhu's army, they returned to Jinggangshan and retook the base. Joined by a defecting KMT regiment and Peng Dehuai's Fifth Red Army, the mountainous area was unable to grow enough crops to feed everyone, leading to food shortages throughout the winter.[107][108]
Jiangxi Soviet Republic of China: 1929–1934
In January 1929, Mao and Zhu evacuated the base and took their armies south, to the area around Tonggu and Xinfeng in Jiangxi, which they consolidated as a new base.[109] Together having 2000 men, with a further 800 provided by Peng, the evacuation led to a drop in morale, and many troops became disobedient and began thieving; this worried Li Lisan and the Central Committee, who saw Mao's army as lumpenproletariat unable to share in proletariat class consciousness.[110][111] In keeping with orthodox Marxist thought, Li believed that only the urban proletariat could lead a successful revolution, and saw little need for Mao's peasant guerrillas; he ordered Mao to disband his army into units to be sent out to spread the revolutionary message. Mao replied that while concurring with Li's theoretical position, he would not disband his army or abandon his base.[111][112] Both Li and Mao saw the Chinese revolution as the key to world revolution, believing that a CPC victory would spark the overthrow of global imperialism and capitalism. In this, they disagreed with the official line of the Soviet government and Comintern. Officials in Moscow desired greater control over the CPC, removing Li from power by calling him to Russia for an inquest into his errors.[113][114][115] They replaced him with Soviet-educated Chinese communists, known as the "28 Bolsheviks", two of whom, Bo Gu and Zhang Wentian, took control of the Central Committee. Mao disagreed with the new leadership, believing they grasped little of the Chinese situation, and soon emerged as their key rival.[114][116]
In February 1930, Mao created the Southwest Jiangxi Provincial Soviet Government in the region under his control,[117] in November suffering emotional trauma after his wife and sister were captured and beheaded by KMT general He Jian.[108][114][118] He then married He Zizhen, an 18-year-old revolutionary who bore him five children over the following nine years.[115][119] Facing internal problems, members of the Jiangxi Soviet accused him of being too moderate, and hence anti-revolutionary. In December, they tried to overthrow Mao, resulting in the Futian incident; putting down the rebels, Mao's loyalists tortured many and executed between 2000 and 3000 dissenters.[120][121][122] Seeing it as a secure area, the CPC Central Committee moved to Jiangxi, which in November was proclaimed to be the Soviet Republic of China, an independent Communist-governed state. Although proclaimed Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, Mao's power was diminished, with control of the Red Army being allocated to Zhou Enlai; Mao meanwhile recovered from tuberculosis.[123][124]
Attempting to defeat the Communists, the KMT armies adopted a policy of encirclement and annihilation; outnumbered, Mao responded with guerrilla tactics influenced by the works of ancient military strategists like Sun Tzu, but Zhou and the new leadership replaced this approach with a policy of open confrontation and conventional warfare. In doing so the Red Army successfully defeated the first and second encirclements.[125][126] Angered at his armies' failure, Chiang Kaishek personally arrived to lead the operation; also facing setbacks, he retreated to deal with the further Japanese incursions into China.[123][127] Victorious, the Red Army expanded its area of control, eventually encompassing a population of 3 million.[126] Mao proceeded with his land reform program, in November 1931 announcing the start of a "land verification project" which was expanded in June 1933, also orchestrating education programs and implementing measures to increase female political participation.[128] Viewing the Communists as a greater threat than the Japanese, Chiang returned to Jiangxi, initiating the fifth encirclement campaign, involving the construction of a concrete and barbed wire "wall of fire" around the state, accompanied by aerial bombardment, to which Zhou's tactics proved ineffective. Trapped inside, morale among the Red Army dropped as food and medicine became scarce, and the leadership decided to evacuate.[129]
The Long March: 1934–1935
On 14 October 1934, the Red Army broke through the KMT line on the Jiangxi Soviet's south-west corner at Xinfeng with 85,000 soldiers and 15,000 party cadres and embarked on the "Long March". In order to make the escape, many of the wounded and the ill, as well as women and children, were left behind, defended by a group of guerrilla fighters whom the KMT massacred.[130][131] The 100,000 who escaped headed to southern Hunan, first crossing the Xiang River after heavy fighting,[131][132] and then the Wu River, in Guizhou where they took Zunyi in January 1935. Temporarily resting in the city, they held a conference; here, Mao was elected to a position of leadership, becoming Chairman of the Politburo, and de facto leader of both Party and Red Army, in part because his candidacy was supported by Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin. Insisting that they operate as a guerrilla force, he laid out a destination: the Shenshi Soviet in Shaanxi, Northern China, from where the Communists could focus on fighting the Japanese. Mao believed that in focusing on the anti-imperialist struggle, the Communists would earn the trust of the Chinese people, who in turn would renounce the KMT.[133]
From Zunyi, Mao led his troops to Loushan Pass, where they faced armed opposition but successfully crossed the river. Chiang flew into the area to lead his armies against Mao, but the Communists outmanoeuvred him and crossed the Jinsha River.[134] Faced with the more difficult task of crossing the Tatu River, they managed it by fighting a battle over the Luding Bridge in May, taking Luding.[135] Marching through the mountain ranges around Ma'anshan,[136] in Moukung, Western Szechuan they encountered the 50,000-strong CPC Fourth Front Army of Zhang Guotao, together proceeding to Maoerhkai and then Gansu. However, Zhang and Mao disagreed over what to do; the latter wished to proceed to Shaanxi, while Zhang wanted to flee east to Tibet or Sikkim, far from the KMT threat. It was agreed that they would go their separate ways, with Zhu De joining Zhang.[137] Mao's forces proceeded north, through hundreds of miles of Grasslands, an area of quagmire where they were attacked by Manchu tribesman and where many soldiers succumbed to famine and disease.[138][139] Finally reaching Shaanxi, they fought off both the KMT and an Islamic cavalry militia before crossing over the Min Mountains and Mount Liupan and reaching the Shenshi Soviet; only 7-8000 had survived.[139][140] The Long March cemented Mao's status as the dominant figure in the party. In November 1935, he was named chairman of the Military Commission. From this point onward, Mao was the Communist Party's undisputed leader, even though he would not become party chairman until 1943.[141]
Many if not most of the events as later described by Mao and which now form the official story of the Communist Party of China, as told above, are seen as outright lies by historians such as Jung Chang. During the decade spent researching the book, Mao: The Unknown Story,[142] for instance, Chang found evidence that there was no battle at Luding and that the CCP crossed the bridge unopposed. Chang interviewed an eye witness to the crossing of the Dadu (Tatu) River at Luding, Mrs Zhu De, then 93 years old, who recalled no deaths, save for two people who fell from the bridge at Luding while repairing it. Chang also points out the contradictions in the version of events as told by the CCP, which said the bridge was taken by a suicide attack by 22 men, but that these men were also present at a ceremony following the crossing of the bridge.[143]
Chang and Halliday also dispute the Communist Party of China's official version by claiming that far from the Long March being a masterful piece of strategy by the CCP, it was in fact devised by Chiang Kai Shek, leader of the KMT. Chiang's aim was to give the CCP an easy route to follow through warlord controlled areas. Hemmed in by Nationalist troops on three sides, the CCP was forced to follow the route dictated by the KMT. The aim of this was to allow KMT forces to follow the reds into warlord controlled areas such as Sichuan and win over warlords scared of the sudden arrival of the communist force. The only glitch in this plan came when Mao refused to follow the easy route into Sichuan where he was to meet up with a red army much larger than his own and led by a more senior CCP member, Chang Kuo Tao. Mao recognised the threat Chang posed to his rising position in the CCP and doubled back to give himself time to further cement his political power, causing the needless deaths of thousands of his own troops.[143]
Chang and Halliday also point out that Mao and other top CCP leaders did not walk the Long March, but were carried on litters – Mao himself told his staff that being carried on the Long March gave him much time to read – with the litter bearers' knees being worn to the bone when forced to carry Mao up mountains.[143]
Alliance with the Kuomintang: 1935–1940
Arriving at the Yan'an Soviet during October 1935, Mao's troops settled in Pao An. Remaining there till spring 1936, they developed links with local communities, redistributed and farmed the land, offered medical treatment and began literacy programs.[139][144][145] Mao now commanded 15,000 soldiers, boosted by the arrival of He Long's men from Hunan and the armies of Zhu Den and Zhang Guotao, returning from Tibet.[144] In February 1936 they established the North West Anti-Japanese Red Army University in Yan'an, through which they trained increasing numbers of new recruits.[146] In January 1937 they began the "anti-Japanese expedition", sending groups of guerrilla fighters into Japanese-controlled territory to undertake sporadic attacks,[147][148] while in May 1937, a Communist Conference was held in Yan'an to discuss the situation.[149] Western reporters also arrived in the "Border Region" (as the Soviet had been renamed); most notable were Edgar Snow, who used his experiences as a basis for Red Star Over China, and Agnes Smedley, whose accounts brought international attention to Mao's cause.[150]
On the Long March, Mao's wife He Zizen had been injured from a shrapnel wound to the head, and so traveled to Moscow for medical treatment; Mao proceeded to divorce her and marry an actress, Jiang Qing.[119][151] Mao moved into a cave-house and spent much of his time reading, tending his garden and theorizing.[152] He came to believe that the Red Army alone was unable to defeat the Japanese, and that a Communist-led "government of national defense" should be formed with the KMT and other "bourgeois nationalist" elements to achieve this goal.[153] Although despising Chiang Kai-shek as a "traitor to the nation",[154] on May 5 he telegrammed the Military Council of the Nanking National Government proposing a military alliance, a course of action advocated by Stalin.[155] Although Chiang intended to ignore Mao's message and continue the civil war, he was arrested by one of his own generals, Zhang Xueliang, in Xi'an, leading to the Xi'an Incident; Zhang forced Chiang to discuss the issue with the Communists, resulting in the formation of a United Front with concessions on both sides on December 25, 1937.[156]
The Japanese had taken both Shanghai and Nanking—resulting in the Nanking Massacre, an atrocity Mao never spoke of all his life—pushing the Kuomintang government inland to Chungking.[157] The Japanese's brutality led increasing numbers of Chinese joining the fight, with the Red Army growing from 50,000 to 500,000.[158][159] In August 1938, the Red Army formed the New Fourth Army and the Eighth Route Army, which were nominally under the command of Chiang's National Revolutionary Army.[160] In August 1940, the Red Army initiated the Hundred Regiments Campaign, in which 400,000 troops attacked the Japanese simultaneously in five provinces; a military success, it resulted in the death of 20,000 Japanese, the disruption of railways and the loss of a coal mine.[159][161] From his base in Yan'an, Mao authored several texts for his troops, including Philosophy of Revolution, which offered an introduction to the Marxist theory of knowledge, Protracted Warfare, which dealt with guerrilla and mobile military tactics, and New Democracy, which laid forward ideas for China's future.[162]
Resuming civil war: 1940–1949
In 1944, the Americans sent a special diplomatic envoy, called the Dixie Mission, to the Communist Party of China. According to Edwin Moise, in Modern China: A History 2nd Edition:
Most of the Americans were favourably impressed. The CPC seemed less corrupt, more unified, and more vigorous in its resistance to Japan than the KMT. United States fliers shot down over North China ... confirmed to their superiors that the CPC was both strong and popular over a broad area. In the end, the contacts with the USA developed with the CPC led to very little.
After the end of World War II, the U.S. continued their military assistance to Chiang Kai-shek and his KMT government forces against the People's Liberation Army (PLA) led by Mao Zedong in the civil war for control of China. Likewise, the Soviet Union gave quasi-covert support to Mao by their occupation of north east China, which allowed the PLA to move in en masse and took large supplies of arms left by the Japanese's Kwantung Army.[citation needed]
In 1948, under direct orders from Mao, the People's Liberation Army starved out the Kuomintang forces occupying the city of Changchun. At least 160,000 civilians are believed to have perished during the siege, which lasted from June until October. PLA lieutenant colonel Zhang Zhenglu, who documented the siege in his book White Snow, Red Blood, compared it to Hiroshima: "The casualties were about the same. Hiroshima took nine seconds; Changchun took five months."[163] On January 21, 1949, Kuomintang forces suffered great losses in battles against Mao's forces. In the early morning of December 10, 1949, PLA troops laid siege to Chengdu, the last KMT-held city in mainland China, and Chiang Kai-shek evacuated from the mainland to Taiwan.[citation needed]
Leadership of China
The People's Republic of China was established on October 1, 1949. It was the culmination of over two decades of civil and international wars. From 1943 to 1976, Mao was the Chairman of the Communist Party of China. During this period, Mao was called Chairman Mao (毛主席, Máo Zhǔxí) or the Great Leader Chairman Mao (伟大领袖毛主席, Wěidà Lǐngxiù Máo Zhǔxí). Mao famously announced: "We (the Chinese people) have stood up."[164]
Mao took up residence in Zhongnanhai, a compound next to the Forbidden City in Beijing, and there he ordered the construction of an indoor swimming pool and other buildings. Mao's physician Li Zhisui described him as conducting business either in bed or by the side of the pool, preferring not to wear formal clothes unless absolutely necessary.[165] Li's book, The Private Life of Chairman Mao, is regarded as controversial, especially by those sympathetic to Mao.[166]
In October 1950, Mao made the decision to send the People's Volunteer Army into Korea and fight against the United Nations forces led by the U.S. Historical records showed that Mao directed the PVA campaigns in the Korean War to the minute details.[167]
Along with land reform, during which significant numbers of landlords and well-to-do peasants were beaten to death at mass meetings organised by the Communist Party as land was taken from them and given to poorer peasants,[168] there was also the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries,[169] which involved public executions targeting mainly former Kuomintang officials, businessmen accused of "disturbing" the market, former employees of Western companies and intellectuals whose loyalty was suspect.[170] The U.S. State department in 1976 estimated that there may have been a million killed in the land reform, and 800,000 killed in the counterrevolutionary campaign.[171]
Mao himself claimed that a total of 700,000 people were killed in attacks on "counter-revolutionaries" during the years 1950–52.[172] However, because there was a policy to select "at least one landlord, and usually several, in virtually every village for public execution",[173] the number of deaths range between 2 million[173][174] and 5 million.[175][176] In addition, at least 1.5 million people,[177] perhaps as many as 4 to 6 million,[178] were sent to "reform through labour" camps where many perished.[178] Mao played a personal role in organizing the mass repressions and established a system of execution quotas,[179] which were often exceeded.[169] He defended these killings as necessary for the securing of power.[180]
Starting in 1951, Mao initiated two successive movements in an effort to rid urban areas of corruption by targeting wealthy capitalists and political opponents, known as the three-anti/five-anti campaigns. While the three-anti campaign was a focused purge of government, industrial and party officials, the five-anti campaign set its sights slightly broader, targeting capitalist elements in general.[181] Workers denounced their bosses, spouses turned on their spouses, and children informed on their parents; the victims were often humiliated at struggle sessions, a method designed to intimidate and terrify people to the maximum. Mao insisted that minor offenders be criticised and reformed or sent to labour camps, "while the worst among them should be shot." These campaigns took several hundred thousand additional lives, the vast majority via suicide.[182]
In Shanghai, suicide by jumping from tall buildings became so commonplace that residents avoided walking on the pavement near skyscrapers for fear that suicides might land on them.[183] Some biographers have pointed out that driving those perceived as enemies to suicide was a common tactic during the Mao-era. For example, in his biography of Mao, Philip Short notes that in the Yan'an Rectification Movement, Mao gave explicit instructions that "no cadre is to be killed," but in practice allowed security chief Kang Sheng to drive opponents to suicide and that "this pattern was repeated throughout his leadership of the People's Republic."[7]
Following the consolidation of power, Mao launched the First Five-Year Plan (1953–58). The plan aimed to end Chinese dependence upon agriculture in order to become a world power. With the Soviet Union's assistance, new industrial plants were built and agricultural production eventually fell to a point where industry was beginning to produce enough capital that China no longer needed the USSR's support. The success of the First-Five Year Plan was to encourage Mao to instigate the Second Five-Year Plan, the Great Leap Forward, in 1958. Mao also launched a phase of rapid collectivization. The CPC introduced price controls as well as a Chinese character simplification aimed at increasing literacy. Large-scale industrialization projects were also undertaken.
Programs pursued during this time include the Hundred Flowers Campaign, in which Mao indicated his supposed willingness to consider different opinions about how China should be governed. Given the freedom to express themselves, liberal and intellectual Chinese began opposing the Communist Party and questioning its leadership. This was initially tolerated and encouraged. After a few months, Mao's government reversed its policy and persecuted those, totalling perhaps 500,000,[citation needed] who criticised, as well as those who were merely alleged to have criticised, the party in what is called the Anti-Rightist Movement. Authors such as Jung Chang have alleged that the Hundred Flowers Campaign was merely a ruse to root out "dangerous" thinking.[184]
Li Zhisui, Mao's physician, suggested that Mao had initially seen the policy as a way of weakening those within his party who opposed him and was surprised by the extent of criticism and the fact that it began to be directed at his own leadership.[185] It was only then that he used it as a method of identifying and subsequently persecuting those critical of his government. The Hundred Flowers movement led to the condemnation, silencing, and death of many citizens, also linked to Mao's Anti-Rightist Movement, with death tolls possibly in the millions.[citation needed]
Great Leap Forward
In January 1958, Mao Zedong launched the second Five-Year Plan, known as the Great Leap Forward, a plan intended as an alternative model for economic growth to the Soviet model focusing on heavy industry that was advocated by others in the party. Under this economic program, the relatively small agricultural collectives which had been formed to date were rapidly merged into far larger people's communes, and many of the peasants were ordered to work on massive infrastructure projects and on the production of iron and steel. Some private food production was banned; livestock and farm implements were brought under collective ownership.
Under the Great Leap Forward, Mao and other party leaders ordered the implementation of a variety of unproven and unscientific new agricultural techniques by the new communes. Combined with the diversion of labour to steel production and infrastructure projects, these projects combined with cyclical natural disasters led to an approximately 15% drop in grain production in 1959 followed by a further 10% decline in 1960 and no recovery in 1961.[186]
In an effort to win favour with their superiors and avoid being purged, each layer in the party hierarchy exaggerated the amount of grain produced under them. Based upon the fabricated success, party cadres were ordered to requisition a disproportionately high amount of the true harvest for state use, primarily in the cities and urban areas but also for export. The net result, which was compounded in some areas by drought and in others by floods, left rural peasants with little food for themselves and many millions starved to death in the largest famine known as the Great Chinese Famine. This famine was a direct cause of the death of some 30 million Chinese peasants between 1959 and 1962 and about the same number of births were lost or postponed.[187] Further, many children who became emaciated and malnourished during years of hardship and struggle for survival died shortly after the Great Leap Forward came to an end in 1962.[186]
The extent of Mao's knowledge of the severity of the situation has been disputed. Mao's physician believed that he may have been unaware of the extent of the famine, partly due to a reluctance to criticise his policies and decisions and the willingness of his staff to exaggerate or outright fake reports regarding food production.[188] Upon learning of the extent of the starvation, Mao vowed to stop eating meat, an action followed by his staff.[189]
Hong Kong-based historian Frank Dikötter, who conducted extensive archival research on the Great Leap Forward in local and regional Chinese government archives,[190] challenged the notion that Mao did not know about the famine until it was too late:
The idea that the state mistakenly took too much grain from the countryside because it assumed that the harvest was much larger than it was is largely a myth—at most partially true for the autumn of 1958 only. In most cases the party knew very well that it was starving its own people to death. At a secret meeting in the Jinjiang Hotel in Shanghai dated March 25, 1959, Mao specifically ordered the party to procure up to one third of all the grain, much more than had ever been the case. At the meeting he announced that "When there is not enough to eat, people starve to death. It is better to let half of the people die so that the other half can eat their fill." [191]
In Hungry Ghosts, Jasper Becker notes that Mao was dismissive of reports he received of food shortages in the countryside and refused to change course, believing that peasants were lying and that rightists and kulaks were hoarding grain. He refused to open state granaries,[192] and instead launched a series of "anti-grain concealment" drives that resulted in numerous purges and suicides.[193] Other violent campaigns followed in which party leaders went from village to village in search of hidden food reserves, and not only grain, as Mao issued quotas for pigs, chickens, ducks and eggs. Many peasants accused of hiding food were tortured and beaten to death.[194]
In contrast, socialist journals such as the Monthly Review have disputed the reliability of the figures commonly cited, the qualitative evidence of a "massive death toll", and Mao's complicity in those deaths which occurred.[195]
Whatever the case, the Great Leap Forward caused Mao to lose esteem among many of the top party cadres and was eventually forced to abandon the policy in 1962, while losing some political power to moderate leaders, perhaps most notably Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping in the process. However, Mao, supported by national propaganda, claimed that he was only partly to blame. As a result, he was able to remain Chairman of the Communist Party, with the Presidency transferred to Liu Shaoqi.
The Great Leap Forward was a tragedy for the vast majority of the Chinese. Although the steel quotas were officially reached, almost all of the supposed steel made in the countryside was iron, as it had been made from assorted scrap metal in home-made furnaces with no reliable source of fuel such as coal. This meant that proper smelting conditions could not be achieved. According to Zhang Rongmei, a geometry teacher in rural Shanghai during the Great Leap Forward:
"We took all the furniture, pots, and pans we had in our house, and all our neighbours did likewise. We put everything in a big fire and melted down all the metal."
The worst of the famine was steered towards enemies of the state.[196] As Jasper Becker explains:
"The most vulnerable section of China's population, around five per cent, were those whom Mao called 'enemies of the people'. Anyone who had in previous campaigns of repression been labeled a 'black element' was given the lowest priority in the allocation of food. Landlords, rich peasants, former members of the nationalist regime, religious leaders, rightists, counter-revolutionaries and the families of such individuals died in the greatest numbers."[197]
Consequences
At the Lushan Conference in July/August 1959, several leaders expressed concern that the Great Leap Forward had not proved as successful as planned. The most direct of these was Minister of Defence and Korean War General Peng Dehuai. Following Peng's criticism of the Great Leap Forward, Mao orchestrated a purge of Peng and his supporters, stifling criticism of the Great Leap policies. Senior officials who reported the truth of the famine to Mao were branded as "right opportunists."[198] A campaign against right opportunism was launched and resulted in party members and ordinary peasants being sent to camps where many would subsequently die in the famine. Years later the CPC would conclude that 6 million people were wrongly punished in the campaign.[199]
The number of deaths by starvation during the Great Leap Forward is deeply controversial. Until the mid-1980s, when official census figures were finally published by the Chinese Government, little was known about the scale of the disaster in the Chinese countryside, as the handful of Western observers allowed access during this time had been restricted to model villages where they were deceived into believing that the Great Leap Forward had been a great success. There was also an assumption that the flow of individual reports of starvation that had been reaching the West, primarily through Hong Kong and Taiwan, must have been localised or exaggerated as China was continuing to claim record harvests and was a net exporter of grain through the period. Because Mao wanted to pay back early to the Soviets debts totalling 1.973 billion yuan from 1960 to 1962,[200] exports increased by 50%, and fellow Communist regimes in North Korea, North Vietnam and Albania were provided grain free of charge.[192]
Censuses were carried out in China in 1953, 1964 and 1982. The first attempt to analyse this data to estimate the number of famine deaths was carried out by American demographer Dr. Judith Banister and published in 1984. Given the lengthy gaps between the censuses and doubts over the reliability of the data, an accurate figure is difficult to ascertain. Nevertheless, Banister concluded that the official data implied that around 15 million excess deaths incurred in China during 1958–61, and that based on her modelling of Chinese demographics during the period and taking account of assumed under-reporting during the famine years, the figure was around 30 million. The official statistic is 20 million deaths, as given by Hu Yaobang.[201] Yang Jisheng, a former Xinhua News Agency reporter who had privileged access and connections available to no other scholars, estimates a death toll of 36 million.[200] Frank Dikötter estimates that there were at least 45 million premature deaths attributable to the Great Leap Forward from 1958 to 1962.[202] Various other sources have put the figure at between 20 and 46 million.[203]
On the international front, the period was dominated by the further isolation of China. The Sino-Soviet split resulted in Nikita Khrushchev's withdrawal of all Soviet technical experts and aid from the country. The split was triggered by arguments over the control and direction of world communism and other disputes pertaining to foreign policy.[citation needed] Most of the problems regarding communist unity resulted from the death of Joseph Stalin in March 1953 and his replacement by Khrushchev. Only Albania under the leadership of Enver Hoxha openly sided with China against the Soviets, which began an alliance between the two countries which would last until the Sino-Albanian split after Mao's death in 1976.
Stalin had established himself as the successor of "correct" Marxist thought well before Mao controlled the Communist Party of China, and therefore Mao never challenged the suitability of any Stalinist doctrine (at least while Stalin was alive). Upon the death of Stalin, Mao believed (perhaps because of seniority) that the leadership of the "correct" Marxist doctrine would fall to him. The resulting tension between Khrushchev (at the head of a politically and militarily superior government), and Mao (believing he had a superior understanding of Marxist ideology) eroded the previous patron-client relationship between the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the CPC.[citation needed] In China, the formerly favourable Soviets were now denounced as "revisionists" and listed alongside "American imperialism" as movements to oppose.[citation needed]
Partly surrounded by hostile American military bases (in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan), China was now confronted with a new Soviet threat from the north and west. Both the internal crisis and the external threat called for extraordinary statesmanship from Mao, but as China entered the new decade the statesmen of the People's Republic were in hostile confrontation with each other.[citation needed]
At a large Communist Party conference in Beijing in January 1962, called the "Conference of the Seven Thousand," State Chairman Liu Shaoqi denounced the Great Leap Forward as responsible for widespread famine.[204] The overwhelming majority of delegates expressed agreement, but Defense Minister Lin Biao staunchly defended Mao.[204] A brief period of liberalization followed while Mao and Lin plotted a comeback.[204] Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping rescued the economy by disbanding the people's communes, introducing elements of private control of peasant smallholdings and importing grain from Canada and Australia to mitigate the worst effects of famine.[citation needed]
Cultural Revolution
Mao was concerned with the nature of post-1959 China. He saw that the revolution had replaced the old elite with a new one. He was concerned that those in power were becoming estranged from the people they were supposed to serve. Mao believed that a revolution of culture would unseat and unsettle the "ruling class" and keep China in a state of "perpetual revolution" that, theoretically, would serve the interests of the majority, not a tiny elite.[205] Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping, then the State Chairman and General Secretary, respectively, had favoured the idea that Mao should be removed from actual power but maintain his ceremonial and symbolic role, with the party upholding all of his positive contributions to the revolution. They attempted to marginalise Mao by taking control of economic policy and asserting themselves politically as well. Many claim that Mao responded to Liu and Deng's movements by launching the Cultural Revolution in 1966. Some scholars, such as Mobo Gao, claim the case for this is perhaps overstated.[206] Others, such as Frank Dikötter, hold that Mao launched the Cultural Revolution to wreak revenge on those who had dared to challenge him over the Great Leap Forward.[207]
Believing that certain liberal bourgeois elements of society continued to threaten the socialist framework, groups of young people known as the Red Guards struggled against authorities at all levels of society and even set up their own tribunals. Chaos reigned in much of the nation, and millions were persecuted, including a famous philosopher, Chen Yuen. During the Cultural Revolution, the schools in China were closed and the young intellectuals living in cities were ordered to the countryside to be "re-educated" by the peasants, where they performed hard manual labour and other work.
The Revolution led to the destruction of much of China's traditional cultural heritage and the imprisonment of a huge number of Chinese citizens, as well as creating general economic and social chaos in the country. Millions of lives were ruined during this period, as the Cultural Revolution pierced into every part of Chinese life, depicted by such Chinese films as To Live, The Blue Kite and Farewell My Concubine. It is estimated that hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, perished in the violence of the Cultural Revolution.[203]
When Mao was informed of such losses, particularly that people had been driven to suicide, he is alleged to have commented: "People who try to commit suicide — don't attempt to save them! . . . China is such a populous nation, it is not as if we cannot do without a few people."[208] The authorities allowed the Red Guards to abuse and kill opponents of the regime. Said Xie Fuzhi, national police chief: "Don't say it is wrong of them to beat up bad persons: if in anger they beat someone to death, then so be it."[209] As a result, in August and September 1966, there were 1,772 people murdered in Beijing alone.[210]
It was during this period that Mao chose Lin Biao, who seemed to echo all of Mao's ideas, to become his successor. Lin was later officially named as Mao's successor. By 1971, however, a divide between the two men became apparent. Official history in China states that Lin was planning a military coup or an assassination attempt on Mao. Lin Biao died in a plane crash over the air space of Mongolia, presumably on his way to flee China, probably anticipating his arrest. The CPC declared that Lin was planning to depose Mao, and posthumously expelled Lin from the party. At this time, Mao lost trust in many of the top CPC figures. The highest-ranking Soviet Bloc intelligence defector, Lt. Gen. Ion Mihai Pacepa described his conversation with Nicolae Ceauşescu who told him about a plot to kill Mao Zedong with the help of Lin Biao organised by the KGB.[211]
In 1969, Mao declared the Cultural Revolution to be over, although the official history of the People's Republic of China marks the end of the Cultural Revolution in 1976 with Mao's death. In the last years of his life, Mao was faced with declining health due to either Parkinson's disease or, according to his physician, amyotrophic lateral sclerosis,[212] as well as lung ailments due to smoking and heart trouble. Some also attributed Mao's decline in health to the betrayal of Lin Biao. Mao remained passive as various factions within the Communist Party mobilised for the power struggle anticipated after his death.
This period is often looked at in official circles in China and in the West as a great stagnation or even of reversal for China. While many—an estimated 100 million—did suffer,[213] some scholars, such as Lee Feigon and Mobo Gao, claim there were many great advances, and in some sectors the Chinese economy continued to outperform the west.[214] They hold that the Cultural Revolution period laid the foundation for the spectacular growth that continues in China. During the Cultural Revolution, China exploded its first H-Bomb (1967), launched the Dong Fang Hong satellite (January 30, 1970), commissioned its first nuclear submarines and made various advances in science and technology. Healthcare was free, and living standards in the countryside continued to improve.[214]
Death and aftermath
 | This section's tone or style may not reflect the encyclopedic tone used on Wikipedia. (April 2012) |
Mao had been in poor health for several years and had declined visibly for at least six months prior to his death. A heavy smoker and drinker during most of his adult life, he had multiple lung and heart ailments during his later years. There are unconfirmed reports that he possibly had Parkinson's disease or Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis, also known as Lou Gehrig's disease. Mao's last public appearance—and the last known photograph of him alive—was on May 27, 1976, where he met the visiting Pakistani Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto during the latter's one-day visit to Beijing. The Chairman suffered two major heart attacks in early 1976 before a third struck on September 5, rendering him an invailid. Mao Zedong died nearly four days later at 00:10 hours on September 9, 1976. The party delayed the announcement of his death until 16:00 later that day, when a radio message broadcast across the nation broke the news while appealing for party unity.[215] His embalmed, CCP flag-draped body lay in state at the Great Hall of the People for one week. During that period, millions of Chinese—the majority crying openly or otherwise displaying some kind of sadness—and many foreign dignitaries (including numerous grief-stricken heads of state) filed past Mao to pay their last respects. As the clock struck 15:00 Beijing time on September 18, a somber cacophony of guns, sirens, whistles and horns were spontaneously blown in observance of a three-minute silence. At the same time, those who heard the sustained noise ceased all activity. The final service on that day was concluded by Hua Guofeng's 20-minute-long eulogy atop Tiananmen Gate, packed with and surrounded by millions of people. Mao's body was later permanently interred a spectacular mausoleum, even though he had wished to be cremated and had been one of the first high-ranking officials to sign the "Proposal that all Central Leaders be Cremated after Death" in November 1956.[203]
As anticipated after Mao's death, there was a power struggle for control of China. On one side was the left wing led by the Gang of Four, who wanted to continue the policy of revolutionary mass mobilization. On the other side was the right wing opposing these policies. Among the latter group, the right wing restorationists, led by Chairman Hua Guofeng, advocated a return to central planning along the Soviet model, whereas the right wing reformers, led by Deng Xiaoping, wanted to overhaul the Chinese economy based on market-oriented policies and to de-emphasize the role of Maoist ideology in determining economic and political policy. Eventually, the reformers won control of the government. Deng Xiaoping, with clear seniority over Hua Guofeng, defeated Hua in a bloodless power struggle a few years later.
Legacy
Mao remains a controversial figure and there is little agreement over his legacy both in China and abroad. Supporters generally credit him with and praise him for having unified China and for ending the previous decades of civil war. He is also credited for having improved the status of women in China and for improving literacy and education. His policies caused the deaths of tens of millions of people during his 27-year reign, more than any other Twentieth Century leader, however supporters point out that in spite of this, life expectancy improved during his reign. His supporters claim that he rapidly industrialised China; however, others have claimed that his policies, particularly the controversially named 'Great Leap Forward' and the Cultural Revolution, were impediments to industrialization and modernization. His supporters claim that his policies laid the groundwork for China's later rise to become an economic superpower, while others claim that his policies delayed economic development and that China's economy only underwent its rapid growth after Mao's policies had been widely abandoned. Mao's revolutionary tactics continue to be used by insurgents, and his political ideology continues to be embraced by many communist organizations around the world.
In mainland China, Mao is still revered by many supporters of the Communist Party and respected by the majority of the general population as the "Founding Father of modern China", credited for giving "the Chinese people dignity and self-respect."[216] Mobo Gao in his 2008 book The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution, credits Mao for raising the average life expectancy from 35 in 1949 to 63 by 1975, bringing "unity and stability to a country that had been plagued by civil wars and foreign invasions", and laying the foundation for China to "become the equal of the great global powers".[3] Gao also lauds Mao for carrying out massive land reform, promoting the status of women, improving popular literacy, and positively "transform(ing) Chinese society beyond recognition."[3]
However, Mao has many Chinese critics, both those who live inside and outside China. Opposition to Mao is subject to restriction and censorship in mainland China, but is especially strong elsewhere, where he is often reviled as a brutish ideologue. In the West, his name is generally associated with tyranny and his economic theories are widely discredited—though to some political activists he remains a symbol against capitalism, imperialism and western influence. Even in China, key pillars of his economic theory have been largely dismantled by market reformers like Deng Xiaoping and Zhao Ziyang, who succeeded him as leaders of the Communist Party.
Though the Chinese Communist Party, which Mao led to power, has rejected in practice the economic fundamentals of much of Mao's ideology, it retains for itself many of the powers established under Mao's reign: it controls the Chinese army, police, courts and media and does not permit multi-party elections at the national or local level, except in Hong Kong. Thus it is difficult to gauge the true extent of support for the Chinese Communist Party and Mao's legacy within mainland China. For its part, the Chinese government continues to officially regard Mao as a national hero. In 2008, China opened the Mao Zedong Square to visitors in his hometown of central Hunan Province to mark the 115th anniversary of his birth.[217]
There continue to be disagreements on Mao's legacy. Former Party official Su Shachi, has opined that "he was a great historical criminal, but he was also a great force for good."[216] In a similar vein, journalist Liu Binyan has described Mao as "both monster and a genius."[216] Some historians argue that Mao Zedong was "one of the great tyrants of the twentieth century", and a dictator comparable to Adolf Hitler and Joseph Stalin,[218][219] with a death toll surpassing both.[7][9] In The Black Book of Communism, Jean Louis Margolin writes that "Mao Zedong was so powerful that he was often known as the Red Emperor ... the violence he erected into a whole system far exceeds any national tradition of violence that we might find in China."[220] Mao was frequently likened to China's First Emperor Qin Shi Huang, notorious for burying alive hundreds of scholars, and personally enjoyed the comparison.[221] During a speech to party cadre in 1958, Mao said he had far outdone Qin Shi Huang in his policy against intellectuals: "He buried 460 scholars alive; we have buried forty-six thousand scholars alive ... You [intellectuals] revile us for being Qin Shi Huangs. You are wrong. We have surpassed Qin Shi Huang a hundredfold."[222] As a result of such tactics, critics have pointed out that:
The People's Republic of China under Mao exhibited the oppressive tendencies that were discernible in all the major absolutist regimes of the twentieth century. There are obvious parallels between Mao's China, Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia. Each of these regimes witnessed deliberately ordered mass 'cleansing' and extermination.[219]
Others, such as Philip Short, reject such comparisons in Mao: A Life, arguing that whereas the deaths caused by Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia were largely systematic and deliberate, the overwhelming majority of the deaths under Mao were unintended consequences of famine.[223] Short noted that landlord class were not exterminated as a people due to Mao's belief in redemption through thought reform.[223] He instead compared Mao with 19th-century Chinese reformers who challenged China's traditional beliefs in the era of China's clashes with Western colonial powers. Short argues, "Mao's tragedy and his grandeur were that he remained to the end in thrall to his own revolutionary dreams ... He freed China from the straitjacket of its Confucian past, but the bright Red future he promised turned out to be a sterile purgatory.[223]
Mao's English interpreter Sidney Rittenberg wrote in his memoir The Man Who Stayed Behind that whilst Mao "was a great leader in history", he was also "a great criminal because, not that he wanted to, not that he intended to, but in fact, his wild fantasies led to the deaths of tens of millions of people."[224] Li Rui, Mao's personal secretary, goes further and claims he was dismissive of the suffering and death caused by his policies: "Mao's way of thinking and governing was terrifying. He put no value on human life. The deaths of others meant nothing to him."[225]
In their 832-page biography, Mao: The Unknown Story, Jung Chang and Jon Halliday take a very critical view of Mao's life and influence. For example, they note that Mao was well aware that his policies would be responsible for the deaths of millions; While discussing labour-intensive projects such as waterworks and making steel, Mao said to his inner circle in November 1958: "Working like this, with all these projects, half of China may well have to die. If not half, one-third, or one-tenth—50 million—die."[226]
Thomas Bernstein of Columbia University argues that this quotation is taken out of context, claiming:
The Chinese original, however, is not quite as shocking. In the speech, Mao talks about massive earthmoving irrigation projects and numerous big industrial ones, all requiring huge numbers of people. If the projects, he said, are all undertaken simultaneously "half of China's population unquestionably will die; and if it's not half, it'll be a third or ten percent, a death toll of 50 million people." Mao then pointed to the example of Guangxi provincial Party secretary, Chén Mànyuǎn (陈漫远) who had been dismissed in 1957 for failing to prevent famine in the previous year, adding: "If with a death toll of 50 million you didn't lose your jobs, I at least should lose mine; whether I should lose my head would also be in question. Anhui wants to do so much, which is quite all right, but make it a principle to have no deaths."[227]
Chang and Halliday take literally Mao's penchant for talking about mass death in highly irresponsible, provocative, callous and reckless ways, exemplified by his famous remark that in a nuclear war, half of China's population would perish but the rest would survive and rebuild. In 1958, when ruminating about the dialectics of life and death, he thought that deaths were beneficial, for without them, there could be no renewal.[citation needed] Imagine, he asked, what a disaster it would be if Confucius were still alive.[citation needed] "When people die there ought to be celebrations."[citation needed] In December 1958 he remarked that "destruction (mièwáng 灭亡, also extinction) [of people] has advantages. One can make fertiliser. You say you can't, but actually you can, but you must be spiritually prepared."[citation needed] The authors note that these kinds of remarks could well have justified the indifference of lower-level cadres to peasants deaths.[citation needed]
Jasper Becker and Frank Dikötter offer a similarly abysmal appraisal as Chang and Holliday. Becker notes, "archive material gathered by Dikötter ... confirms that far from being ignorant or misled about the famine, the Chinese leadership were kept informed about it all the time. And he exposes the extent of the violence used against the peasants":[228]
Mass killings are not usually associated with Mao and the Great Leap Forward, and China continues to benefit from a more favourable comparison with Cambodia or the Soviet Union. But as fresh and abundant archival evidence shows, coercion, terror and systematic violence were the foundation of the Great Leap, and between 1958 to 1962, by a rough approximation, some 6 to 8 per cent of those who died were tortured to death or summarily killed—amounting to at least 3 million victims.
Countless others were deliberately deprived of food and consequently starved to death. Many more vanished because they were too old, weak or sick to work—and hence unable to earn their keep. People were killed selectively because they had the wrong class background, because they dragged their feet, because they spoke out or simply because they were not liked, for whatever reason, by the man who wielded the ladle in the canteen.
Dikötter argues that CPC leaders "glorified violence and were inured to massive loss of life. And all of them shared an ideology in which the end justified the means. In 1962, having lost millions of people in his province, Li Jingquan compared the Great Leap Forward to the Long March in which only one in ten had made it to the end: 'We are not weak, we are stronger, we have kept the backbone.'"[229]
Regarding the large-scale irrigation projects, Dikötter stresses that, in spite of Mao being in a good position to see the human cost, they continued unabated for several years, and ultimately claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of exhausted villagers. He also notes that "In a chilling precursor of Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, villagers in Qingshui and Gansu called these projects the 'killing fields'."[230]
The United States placed a trade embargo on the People's Republic as a result of its involvement in the Korean War, lasting until Richard Nixon decided that developing relations with the PRC would be useful in dealing with the Soviet Union.
The television series Biography stated: "[Mao] turned China from a feudal backwater into one of the most powerful countries in the World ... The Chinese system he overthrew was backward and corrupt; few would argue the fact that he dragged China into the 20th century. But at a cost in human lives that is staggering."[216]
Mao's military writings continue to have a large amount of influence both among those who seek to create an insurgency and those who seek to crush one, especially in manners of guerrilla warfare, at which Mao is popularly regarded as a genius.[citation needed] As an example, the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) followed Mao's examples of guerrilla warfare to considerable political and military success even in the 21st century.[citation needed] Mao's major contribution to the military science is his theory of People's War, with not only guerrilla warfare but more importantly, Mobile Warfare methodologies. Mao had successfully applied Mobile Warfare in the Korean War, and was able to encircle, push back and then halt the UN forces in Korea, despite the clear superiority of UN firepower.[citation needed] Mao also gave the impression that he might even welcome a nuclear war.[231] Soviet historians have written that Mao believed his country could survive a nuclear war, even if it lost 300 million people.[232]
"Let us imagine how many people would die if war breaks out. There are 2.7 billion people in the world, and a third could be lost. If it is a little higher, it could be half ... I say that if the worst came to the worst and one-half dies, there will still be one-half left, but imperialism would be razed to the ground and the whole world would become socialist. After a few years there would be 2.7 billion people again"[233]
But historians dispute the sincerity of Mao's words. Robert Service says that Mao "was deadly serious,"[234] while Frank Dikötter claims that "He was bluffing ... the sabre-rattling was to show that he, not Khrushchev, was the more determined revolutionary."[233]
Mao's poems and writings are frequently cited by both Chinese and non-Chinese. The official Chinese translation of President Barack Obama's inauguration speech used a famous line from one of Mao's poems.[235] John McCain misattributed a campaign quote to Mao several times during his 2008 presidential election bid, saying "Remember the words of Chairman Mao: 'It's always darkest before it's totally black.'"
The ideology of Maoism has influenced many communists, mainly in the Third World, including revolutionary movements such as Cambodia's Khmer Rouge,[236] Peru's Shining Path, and the Nepalese revolutionary movement. Under the influence of Mao's agrarian socialism and Cultural Revolution, Cambodia's Pol Pot conceived of his disastrous Year Zero policies which purged the nation of its teachers, artists and intellectuals and emptied its cities, resulting in the Cambodian Genocide.[237]
The Revolutionary Communist Party, USA also claims Marxism-Leninism-Maoism as its ideology, as do other Communist Parties around the world which are part of the Revolutionary Internationalist Movement. China itself has moved sharply away from Maoism since Mao's death, and most people outside of China who describe themselves as Maoist regard the Deng Xiaoping reforms to be a betrayal of Maoism, in line with Mao's view of "Capitalist roaders" within the Communist Party.[citation needed]
As the Chinese government instituted free market economic reforms starting in the late 1970s and as later Chinese leaders took power, less recognition was given to the status of Mao. This accompanied a decline in state recognition of Mao in later years in contrast to previous years when the state organised numerous events and seminars commemorating Mao's 100th birthday. Nevertheless, the Chinese government has never officially repudiated the tactics of Mao. Deng Xiaoping, who was opposed to the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution, has to a certain extent rejected Mao's legacy, famously saying that Mao was "70% right and 30% wrong".
In the mid-1990s, Mao Zedong's picture began to appear on all new renminbi (人民幣) currency from the People's Republic of China. This was officially instituted as an anti-counterfeiting measure as Mao's face is widely recognised in contrast to the generic figures that appear in older currency. On March 13, 2006, a story in the People's Daily reported that a proposal had been made to print the portraits of Sun Yat-sen and Deng Xiaoping.[238]
In 2006, the government in Shanghai issued a new set of high school history textbooks which omit Mao, with the exception of a single mention in a section on etiquette. Students in Shanghai now only learn about Mao in junior high school.[239]
Public image
Mao gave contradicting statements on the subject of personality cults. In 1955, as a response to the Khrushchev Report that criticised Joseph Stalin, Mao stated that personality cults are "poisonous ideological survivals of the old society", and reaffirmed China's commitment to collective leadership.[240] But at the 1958 Party congress in Chengdu, Mao expressed support for the personality cults of people whom he labelled as genuinely worthy figures; not those that expressed "blind worship".[241]
In 1962, Mao proposed the Socialist Education Movement (SEM) in an attempt to educate the peasants to resist the "temptations" of feudalism and the sprouts of capitalism that he saw re-emerging in the countryside from Liu's economic reforms.[citation needed] Large quantities of politicised art were produced and circulated — with Mao at the center. Numerous posters, badges and musical compositions referenced Mao in the phrase "Chairman Mao is the red sun in our hearts" (毛主席是我们心中的红太阳, Máo Zhǔxí Shì Wǒmen Xīnzhōng De Hóng Tàiyáng)[242] and a "Savior of the people" (人民的大救星, Rénmín De Dà Jiùxīng).[242][243]
In October 1966, Mao's Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, which was known as the Little Red Book was published. Party members were encouraged to carry a copy with them and possession was almost mandatory as a criterion for membership. Over the years, Mao's image became displayed almost everywhere, present in homes, offices and shops. His quotations were typographically emphasised by putting them in boldface or red type in even the most obscure writings. Music from the period emphasised Mao's stature, as did children's rhymes. The phrase "Long Live Chairman Mao for ten thousand years" was commonly heard during the era.[244]
Mao also has a presence in China and around the world in popular culture, where his face adorns everything from t-shirts to coffee cups. Mao's granddaughter, Kong Dongmei, defended the phenomenon, stating that "it shows his influence, that he exists in people's consciousness and has influenced several generations of Chinese people's way of life. Just like Che Guevara's image, his has become a symbol of revolutionary culture."[224] Since 1950, over 40 million people have visited Mao's birthplace in Shaoshan, Hunan.[245]
Genealogy
Ancestors
His ancestors were:
- Máo Yíchāng (毛贻昌, born Xiangtan October 15, 1870, died Shaoshan January 23, 1920), father, courtesy name Máo Shùnshēng (毛顺生) or also known as Mao Jen-sheng
- Wén Qīmèi(文七妹, born Xiangxiang 1867, died October 5, 1919), mother. She was illiterate and a devout Buddhist. She was a descendant of Wen Tianxiang.
- Máo Ēnpǔ (毛恩普, born May 22, 1846, died November 23, 1904), paternal grandfather
- Luó Shì (罗氏), paternal grandmother
- Máo Zǔrén (毛祖人), paternal great-grandfather
Wives
Mao Zedong had four wives who conceived a total of 10 children. These were:
- Luo Yixiu: (罗一秀, October 20, 1889 – 1910) of Shaoshan: married 1907 to 1910
- Yang Kaihui: (杨开慧, 1901–1930) of Changsha: married 1921 to 1927, executed by the KMT in 1930; mother to Mao Anying, Mao Anqing, and Mao Anlong
- He Zizhen: (贺子珍, 1910–1984) of Jiangxi: married May 1928 to 1939; mother to Mao Anhong, Li Min, and four other children
- Jiang Qing: (江青, 1914–1991), married 1939 to Mao's death; mother to Li Na
Siblings
He had several siblings:
- Mao Zemin (毛泽民, 1895–1943), younger brother, executed by a warlord
- Mao Zetan (毛泽覃, 1905–1935), younger brother, executed by the KMT
- Mao Zejian (毛泽建, 1905–1929), adopted sister, executed by the KMT
- Mao Zedong's parents altogether had five sons and two daughters. Two of the sons and both daughters died young, leaving the three brothers Mao Zedong, Mao Zemin, and Mao Zetan. Like all three of Mao Zedong's wives, Mao Zemin and Mao Zetan were communists. Like Yang Kaihui, both Zemin and Zetan were killed in warfare during Mao Zedong's lifetime.
Note that the character zé (泽) appears in all of the siblings' given names. This is a common Chinese naming convention.
From the next generation, Zemin's son, Mao Yuanxin, was raised by Mao Zedong's family. He became Mao Zedong's liaison with the Politburo in 1975. In Li Zhisui's The Private Life of Chairman Mao, Mao Yuanxin played a role in the final power-struggles.[246]
Children
Mao Zedong had a total of ten children,[247] including:
- Mao Anying (毛岸英, 1922–1950): son to Yang, married to Liú Sīqí (刘思齐), who was born Liú Sōnglín (刘松林), killed in action during the Korean War
- Mao Anqing (毛岸青, 1923–2007): son to Yang, married to Shao Hua (邵华), grandson Mao Xinyu (毛新宇), great-grandson Mao Dongdong
- Mao Anlong (1927–1931): son to Yang, died during the Chinese Civil War
- Mao Anhong (1932-1935?): son to He, left to Mao's younger brother Zetan and then to one of Zetan's guards when he went off to war, was never heard of again
- Li Min (李敏, b. 1936): daughter to He, married to Kǒng Lìnghuá (孔令华), son Kǒng Jìníng (孔继宁), daughter Kǒng Dōngméi (孔冬梅)
- Li Na (李讷, Pinyin: Lĭ Nà, b. 1940): daughter to Jiang (whose birth given name was Li, a name also used by Mao while evading the KMT), married to Wáng Jǐngqīng (王景清), son Wáng Xiàozhī (王效芝)
Mao's first and second daughters were left to local villagers because it was too dangerous to raise them while fighting the Kuomintang and later the Japanese. Their youngest daughter (born in early 1938 in Moscow after Mao separated) and one other child (born 1933) died in infancy. Two English researchers who retraced the entire Long March route in 2002–2003[248] located a woman whom they believe might well be one of the missing children abandoned by Mao to peasants in 1935. Ed Jocelyn and Andrew McEwen hope a member of the Mao family will respond to requests for a DNA test.[249]
Personal life
Mao's private life was very secretive at the time of his rule. However, after Mao's death, his personal physician Li Zhisui published The Private Life of Chairman Mao, a memoir which mentions some aspects of Mao's private life, such as chain-smoking cigarettes, rare bathing or dental habits, laziness, addiction to sleeping pills and large number of sexual partners.[250]
Having grown up in Hunan, Mao spoke Mandarin with a marked Hunanese accent.[251] Ross Terrill noted Mao was a "son of the soil ... rural and unsophisticated" in origins,[252] while Clare Hollingworth asserted he was proud of his "peasant ways and manners", having a strong Hunanese accent and providing "earthy" comments on sexual matters.[251] Lee Feigon noted that Mao's "earthiness" meant that he remained connected to "everyday Chinese life."[253]
Mao's private doctor has reported on his personal hygiene. He never brushed his teeth, preferring to rinse out his mouth with tea and chew the leaves. By the time of his death, his gums were severely infected and his teeth were coated with green film, with several of them coming loose. Rather than bathe, he had a servant rub him down with a hot towel; according to at least one account, he went a quarter-century without taking a bath.[254]
Biographer Peter Carter described Mao as having "an attractive personality" who could for much of the time be a "moderate and balanced man", but noted that he could also be ruthless, and showed no mercy to his opponents.[121] This description was echoed by Sinologist Stuart Schram, who emphasised Mao's ruthlessness, but who also noted that he showed no sign of taking pleasure in torture or killing in the revolutionary cause.[118] Lee Feigon considered Mao "draconian and authoritarian" when threatened, but opined that he was not the "kind of villain that his mentor Stalin was".[255] Alexander Pantsov and Steven I. Levine claimed that Mao was a "man of complex moods", who "tried his best to bring about prosperity and gain international respect" for China, being "neither a saint nor a demon."[256] They noted that in early life, he strived to be "a strong, wilful, and purposeful hero, not bound by any moral chains", and that he "passionately desired fame and power".[257] Carter noted that throughout his life, Mao had the ability to gain people's trust, and that as such he gathered around him "an extraordinarily wide range of friends" in his early years.[258]
Writings and calligraphy
Mao was a prolific writer of political and philosophical literature.[259] He is the attributed author of Quotations From Chairman Mao Tse-Tung, known in the West as the "Little Red Book" and in Cultural Revolution China as the "Red Treasure Book" (红宝书): this is a collection of short extracts from his speeches and articles, edited by Lin Biao and ordered topically. Mao wrote several other philosophical treatises, both before and after he assumed power. These include:
- On Guerrilla Warfare (《游击战》); 1937
- On Practice (《实践论》); 1937
- On Contradiction (《矛盾论》); 1937
- On Protracted War (《论持久战》); 1938
- In Memory of Norman Bethune (《纪念白求恩》); 1939
- On New Democracy (《新民主主义论》); 1940
- Talks at the Yan'an Forum on Literature and Art (《在延安文艺座谈会上的讲话》); 1942
- Serve the People (《为人民服务》); 1944
- The Foolish Old Man Who Removed the Mountains (《愚公移山》); 1945
- On the Correct Handling of the Contradictions Among the People (《正确处理人民内部矛盾问题》); 1957
Mao was also a skilled Chinese calligrapher with a highly personal style. In China, Mao was considered a master calligrapher during his lifetime.[260] His calligraphy can be seen today throughout mainland China.[261] His work gave rise to a new form of Chinese calligraphy called "Mao-style" or Maoti, which has gained increasing popularity since his death. There currently exist various competitions specializing in Mao-style calligraphy.[262]
Literary works
As did most Chinese intellectuals of his generation, Mao's education began with Chinese classical literature. Mao told Edgar Snow in 1936 that he had started the study of the Confucian Analects and Four Books at a village school when he was eight, but that the books he most enjoyed reading were the Water Margin, Journey to the West, Romance of Three Kingdoms, and Dream of the Red Chamber.[263] Mao published poems in classical forms starting in his youth and his abilities as a poet contributed to his image in China after he came to power in 1949. . His style was influenced by the great Tang Dynasty poets Li Bai and Li He.[264]
Some of his most well-known poems are: Changsha (1925), The Double Ninth (1929.10), Loushan Pass (1935), The Long March (1935), Snow (1936), The PLA Captures Nanjing (1949), Reply to Li Shuyi (1957.05.11), and Ode to the Plum Blossom (1961.12).
Portrayal in film and television
Mao has been portrayed in film and television numerous times. Some notable actors include: Han Shi, the first actor ever to have portrayed Mao, in a 1978 drama Dielianhua and later again in a 1980 film Cross the Dadu River;[265] Gu Yue, who had portrayed Mao 84 times on screen throughout his 27-year career and had won the Best Actor title at the Hundred Flowers Awards in 1990 and 1993;[266][267] Liu Ye, who played a young Mao in The Founding of a Party (2011);[268] Tang Guoqiang, who has frequently portrayed Mao in more recent times, in the films The Long March (1996) and The Founding of a Republic (2009), and the television series Huang Yanpei (2010), among others.[269] Mao is a principal character in American composer John Adam's opera Nixon in China (1987).
Mao and Tibet
After Mao Zedong won the Chinese civil war in 1949, his goal became the unification of the "five nationalities" under the big family, the People's Republic of China.[270] Aware of Mao's vision, the Tibetan government in Lhasa (Tibet) sent a representative, Ngapo Ngawang Jigme to Chamdo, Kham, a strategically high valued town near the border. Ngapo had orders to hold the position while reinforcements was coming from the Lhasa and fight off the Chinese.[271] On October 16, 1950, news came that the People's Liberation Army was advancing towards Chamdo and had also taken another strategic town named, Riwoche, which could block the route to Lhasa.[272] With new orders, Ngapo and his men retreated to a monastery where the People's Liberation Army finally surrounded and captured them,[273] though they were treated with respect.[273] Ngapo wrote to Lhasa suggesting a peaceful surrender instead of war.[274] During the negotiation, the Chinese negotiator laid the cards straight on the table, "It is up to you to choose whether Tibet would be liberated peacefully or by force. It is only a matter of sending a telegram to the PLA group to recommence their march to Lhasa."[275] Ngapo accepted Mao’s "Seventeen-Point Agreement", which constituted Tibet as part of the People's Republic China, in return for which Tibet would be granted autonomy.[276] In the face of discouraging lack of support from the rest of the world, the Dalai Lama on August 1951, sent a telegram to Mao accepting the Seventeen-Point Agreement.[277]
Mao and the Media
Mao Zedong's use of media is integral to his success and a testament to his ability to effectively utilise various forms of media[citation needed]. He utilised almost every available option of media at his disposal as he manoeuvred throughout his career as a leader of Communist China[citation needed]. Mao Zedong is most prominently known for the adamant production and distribution of his ideals and beliefs. The books Selected Works of Chairman Mao Zedong or Quotations from Chairman Mao Tse-Tung were published by Foreign Languages Press, Peking and distributed on an almost inconceivably large scale.[278] An example of the full intent and usage of Mao Zedong's media campaigns is that at the peak of the cultural revolution it was believed that even wedding ceremonies needed to be "revolutionised". The newly wed couple were presented with copies of Selected Works of Mao Zedong or Quotations from Chairman Mao.[278]
Mao went to great lengths in order to ensure that his beliefs and words could find their way into the hands and minds of all Chinese people. There were entire stockpiles of the four-volume Selected works of Mao Zedong in a variety of forms. There was a traditional clothbound limited edition, the traditional plastic covered "little red book" (officially called the "Quotations of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung), small and large, and even limited edition versions with extra-large print produced for Mao’s "myopic coevals".[278] Massive amounts of the Chinese State publishing budget was used up in producing Mao-period publications in the late 1970s. Many warehouses throughout the country were solely dedicated to storing the State authorised and initiated literature.[278]
The emphasis placed on literature by Mao Zedong was exemplified in the famous storehouse known as "bawanba". A special detachment of soldiers guarding the large storage facility, and an additional group of caretakers for the building methodically worked their way along the shelves and piles of the depot, book by book, in order to protect the printed text. Each publication was opened, leafed through for signs of mould and decay, and then repacked and rescheduled for the next maintenance cycle.[278]
Mao's understanding of the importance of media gives insight into his efforts to use and have on hand all ways to reach the Chinese people through media. In 1979 internal estimates ranged that during the Cultural Revolution 2.2 billion portraits of the Chairman Mao Zedong had been produced (3 portraits to every 1 person living in China at that time). In June 1979 there were over 450 million unsold copies of communist works by Mao and the Communist international community, comprising 24% of all books in China. This number included eight million sets of the Selected Works of Chairman Mao Tse-Tung and over two billion copies of his speeches and writings in easily digestible single volumes.[278] By the end of the 10-year long Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution it was noted by the national book store, Xinhua, that more than forty billion volumes of Mao Zedong's works were printed and distributed; equivalent to about 15 copies of each of Mao's books for every child, woman, and man in China.[278]
Mao Zedong had utilised and understood the media and the power it held since his days as a revolutionary on the run. Almost immediately following the establishment of the Chinese Communist party Mao embarked on literacy campaigns, educational programs and cultural projects throughout the entirety of China. Mandarin was proclaimed as the national spoken language and linguists were subsequently dispatched to solidify a simplified written Chinese language.[279] Such efforts were intended to facilitate nationwide literacy rates.[280] Mao Zedong's establishment of a foundation within the Chinese people to receive various forms of media proved useful to his efforts later on in his leadership roles.[citation needed]
He requested the aid of non-communist intellectuals versed in the various forms of writing, art and media.[279] Mao had mobile drama troupes sent across the land in order to bring culture and initial forms of Chinese Communist Party propaganda.[279] Mao also utilised film in his early introductions of media to the people; he sent mobile film groups to transport projectors, screens and film equipment, on shoulders and ox carts, to some of the furthest corners of the Chinese population. The intent was to teach peasants how to watch moving pictures and how to understand the newly emerging forms of narratives and accompanying media.[279]
Hu Feng Affair
The Hu Feng Affair exemplifies Mao’s relationship with various forms of media. Hu Feng, a seasoned literary critic, had been in a literary dialogue with communist figures since the 1930s.[279] Mao Zedong's personal interest in the situation emerged in the form of a personally written preface to published anti-Hu Feng materials where he wrote that sentiments such as Hu Feng's were anti-revolutionary and were in fact a facade. Mao also used the publication to not only denounce such individuals but assert that the "task of distinguishing and purging bad persons can be done only by relying on the integration of correct leadership on the part of the leading origins and a high degree of consciousness among the broad masses... all these things are lessons for us. We are taking the Hu Feng affair seriously, because we want to use it to educate the broad masses of the people, first of all those literate working cadres and the intellectuals".[279] The Hu Feng affair established a precedent for use of media as a weapon to shape opinions.[citation needed]
The Hundred Blooming Flowers
Mao also chose to use the media as a surface level process for critiquing the Communist systems. Mao published "On the Correct Handling of Contradictions Among the People" in February, 1957.[281] This publication called upon the people’s movement of China to evaluate the effectiveness of the Communist Party and subsequent Party methods. Mao’s call for critique was directed towards the intellectual populace that was seemingly nervous after the Hu Feng affair. Mao’s invitation to speak out was an opportunity for the Chinese peoples to use various forms of media, but most were hesitant to do so.[281] Newspapers were some of the first to timidly publish varying critiques; eventually it was perceived a safe venue and forum for voicing unfair party methods, inefficiency, poor planning and inadequate attention to everyday life.[281] Although articles did not always place blame on specific individuals, the authors often did identify themselves to their work. The works varied between newspapers, pamphlets and wall-posters, and the majority of the criticism was founded in the acceptance of the socialist system but attempted to make suggestions to improve the system rather than undermine or overthrow.[281] The criticism revolved around the people's view that the Chinese Communist Party had abandoned its revolutionary principles and was transforming Party Cadres into a privileged social class, but any criticism could very easily be interpreted as seemingly counter-revolutionary.[281]
On June 8, 1957, Mao published an editorial in the Chinese Communist Party’s The People’s Daily. Mao declared that "poisonous weeds" had grown among the "fragrant flowers" within the one hundred blooming flowers of people’s criticism. Mao subsequently used the newspapers to identify individuals responsible for certain criticisms as right-wingers and counter-revolutionaries who abused the invitation given to the people to use their voice.[281] The ramifications for intellectuals who participated in criticism spanned from being harassed, labeled as rightists, or worse, counter revolutionists. Some intellectuals were subject to house arrest and forced to write confessions and self criticisms of their crimes, and others were banned from living within urban residencies and or sent for re-education. A few were executed or harassed to death.[281]
Hai Rui
Preceding the Cultural Revolution a play critique about the Chinese historical character Hai Rui was circulated; the criticism labelled the previously popular Chinese moral hero as in sync with counter revolutionist thought.[282] The article, believed to have been written by a Shanghai-based literary critic, Yao Wenyuan, stirred minimal attention and debate about the historical efficacy of the character in China. It turns out, however that the play critique was planted by Jiang Qing, Mao’s wife. She was believed to have done so per Mao’s directions.[282] The importance of the play criticizing article arose after Mao returned from his travels to rural China. He used the article as a basis to opening against the current Chinese Communist Party establishment. Mao used the article as a fore to dispose of the playwright, Vice President of Beijing, Wu Han, an excuse to criticise and purge members of the Communist Party for their failure to understand and deal with the criticisms correctly, and, most notably, to initiate the Cultural Revolution.[283] Mao, yet again, used a newspaper, Liberation Daily, to demand a purge of the “bourgeois elements” from certain cultural circles as well as “right opportunists” from within the Chinese Communist Party. In his article he identified the two major targets for the Cultural Revolution; Chinese intellectuals and Party Cadre’s were to be assessed and scrutinised. The major location for the Cultural Revolution would be held within the urbanised areas of China.[283]
Cultural Revolution’s effect on Mao’s media
Although character posters were not a new technique in China, the Cultural Revolution displayed a surge in rising form of mass media. The posters that were used by Mao, the Chinese Communist Party, and citizens proved to be a very effective tool. The posters provided varying frms of political communication and warfare that could be anonymous, signed, or fabricated to belong to varying authors.[283] Signs, which could be commissioned by anyone who had paper, ink and a brush at their disposal, could easily create a spiraling of political upheaval and impact. The use of the character poster during the Cultural Revolution provide swift, leveling of accusations without any form of proof.[283] It was nearly impossible to effectively combat insidious rumours of reputation and revolutionary standing before it cut down whoever the target may have been.[283]
Mao and the Chinese Cultural Revolutionists were able to seize rights of speech away from those who normally controlled media.[283] Mao was quoted in an article within Peoples Daily newspaper in his idea of “Revolutionary Big-Character Posters are ‘Magic Mirrors’ That Show Up All Monsters.[283] A result of the Cultural Revolution, and the use of mass media surrounding Mao’s initiation of the revolution, was a spiraling use of media which identified educational systems as counter-revolutionary and advocate of bourgeois thought.[283]
Mao Zedong's Use of Art
Under Chairman Mao Zedong's influence, the various forms of Chinese arts became a venue for mass media. Along with his use of Great Character Posters, Mao attempted, with moderate success, to synthesise realism with folk art in an attempt to realign art with the mass origins of the Chinese people.[284] By The 1970s many artists had been sent out of urbanised areas and into rural locations of China in order to facilitate the "re-discovery" of Chinese origins.[284] Such art forms as opera were changed; they adopted the lyrics of revolutionary lyrics to pre-existing melodies.[284] Ballet, although not of authentic Chinese culture, was changed in order to encompass revolutionary gestures and movements in defamiliarised forms.[284] Mao’s concentration in using art as a form of media is reflective of his initial efforts to establish a cultural base in the early 1950s. His belief that revolution was, in its own manner, a form of art is evident throughout many of his actions. Mao was quoted to have said to the French writer André Malraux, that revolution is "a drama of passion; we did not win the people over by appealing to reason, but by developing hope, trust, and fraternity".[284] Mao knew, possibly more than most leaders at the time, the true impact that art could have on a revolution and the ability to have revolution saturated in the art. It is evident that to Mao "revolution was art; art was revolution", and art as a form of mass media is possibly one of the most effective and long lasting impressions that can be left on a people, and was left on the Chinese people.[284] The effect, intended or not, of Mao's use of art as a form of mass media was one of the most effective forms of propaganda. The messages infiltrated the people's consciousness and emotional states, evoking a physical and emotional participation in revolutionary thought and activity.[284]
See also
- Mao suit
- Chairman Mao badge
- Mao's Little Red Book
- Poetry of Mao Zedong
- Mausoleum of Mao Zedong
- Mao Tse-tung: Ruler of Red China
- The Private Life of Chairman Mao
- Mao: The Unknown Story
- Mao's Great Famine
- Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine
- Mao Xinyu
References
Footnotes
- ^ "Resolution on Certain Questions in the History of Our Party Since the Founding of the People's Republic of China," (Adopted by the Sixth Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on June 27, 1981 Resolution on CPC History (1949-81). (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1981). p. 32.
- ^ "Mao Zedong". The Oxford Companion to Politics of the World. Retrieved August 23, 2008.
- ^ a b c Gao 2008, p. 81
- ^ a b The Cambridge Illustrated History of China, by Patricia Buckley Ebrey, Cambridge University Press, 2010, ISBN 0-521-12433-6, pp. 327
- ^ Atlas of World History, by Patrick Karl O'Brien, Oxford University Press US, 2002, ISBN 0-19-521921-X, pp 254, link
- ^ Short 2001, p. 630 "Mao had an extraordinary mix of talents: he was visionary, statesman, political and military strategist of cunning intellect, a philosopher and poet."
- ^ a b c Short 2001, p. 631
- ^ Rummel, R. J. China's Bloody Century: Genocide and Mass Murder Since 1900 Transaction Publishers, 1991. ISBN 0-88738-417-X p. 205: In light of recent evidence, Rummel has increased Mao's democide toll to 77 million; Daniel Jonah Goldhagen. Worse Than War: Genocide, Eliminationism, and the Ongoing Assault on Humanity. PublicAffairs, 2009. ISBN 1-58648-769-8 p. 53: "... the Chinese communists' murdering of a mind-boggling number of people, perhaps between 50 million and 70 million Chinese, and an additional 1.2 million Tibetans."
- ^ a b Fenby, J (2008). Modern China: The Fall and Rise of a Great Power, 1850 to the Present. Ecco Press. p. 351. ISBN 0-06-166116-3.
Mao's responsibility for the extinction of anywhere from 40 to 70 million lives brands him as a mass killer greater than Hitler or Stalin, his indifference to the suffering and the loss of humans breathtaking
- ^ [[#CITEREF|]].
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 19–20; Terrill 1980, pp. 4–5, 15; Feigon 2002, pp. 13–14; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 13–17.
- ^ a b Schram 1966, p. 20; Terrill 1980, p. 11; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 14, 17.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 20–21; Terrill 1980, p. 8; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 15, 20
- ^ Terrill 1980, p. 12; Feigon 2002, p. 23, Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 25–28
- ^ Feigon 2002, p. 15; Terrill 1980, pp. 10–11
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 23; Terrill 1980, pp. 12–13; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 21
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 25; Terrill 1980, pp. 20–21; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 29
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 22; Terrill 1980, p. 13; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 17–18
- ^ Terrill 1980, p. 14; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 18
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 22; Feigon 2002, p. 15; Terrill 1980, p. 18; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 28
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 26; Terrill 1980, p. 19; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 28–30
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 26; Terrill 1980, pp. 22–23; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 30
- ^ Carter 1976, pp. 18–19; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 32–34
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 27;Terrill 1980, p. 22; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 33
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 26–27; Terrill 1980, pp. 22–24; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 33
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 26; Terrill 1980, p. 23; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 33
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 30–32; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 32–35
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 34; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 34–35
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 34–35; Terrill 1980, pp. 23–24
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 35–36; Terrill 1980, pp. 22, 25; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 35.
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 36; Terrill 1980, p. 26; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 35–36.
- ^ Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 36–37.
- ^ Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 40–41.
- ^ Carter 1976, p. 26; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 36.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 36–37; Terrill 1980, p. 27; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 37.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 38–39
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 41; Terrill 1980, p. 32; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 42.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 40–41; Terrill 1980, pp. 30–31.
- ^ Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 43; see also Hsiao Yu (Xiao Yu). Mao Tse-Tung and I Were Beggars. ([Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press, 1959).
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 42–43; Terrill 1980, p. 32; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 48.
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 43; Terrill 1980, p. 32; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 49–50.
- ^ Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 49–50.
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 44; Terrill 1980, p. 33; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 50–52.
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 45; Terrill 1980, p. 34; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 52.
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 48; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 47, 56–57.
- ^ Feigon 2002, p. 18; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 39.
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 48; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 59.
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 47; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 59–62.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 48–49; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 62–64.
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 48; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 57–58.
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 48; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 62, 66.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 50–52; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 66.
- ^ Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 66–67.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 51–52; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 68–69.
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 52; Feigon 2002, pp. 21–22; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 69–70.
- ^ Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 68.
- ^ Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 76.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 53–54; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 71–76.
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 55; Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 76–77.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 55–56; Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 79.
- ^ Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 80.
- ^ Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 81–83.
- ^ Pantsov & Levine 2012, p. 84.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 56–57.
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 63; Feigon 2002, pp. 23, 28
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 64
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 63–64; Feigon 2002, pp. 23–24, 28, 30
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 64–66.
- ^ a b Schram 1966, p. 68
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 68–69
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 69.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 69–70}.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 73–74; Feigon 2002, p. 33
- ^ Elizabeth J. Perry,"Anyuan: Mining China's Revolutionary Tradition," The Asia-Pacific Journal 11.1 (January 14, 2013), reprinting Ch 2 of Elizabeth J. Perry. Anyuan: Mining China's Revolutionary Tradition. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012. ISBN 978-0-520-27189-0.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 74–76
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 76–82
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 78.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 85, 87;
- ^ Feigon 2002, p. 36
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 82, 90–91
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 83
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 84, 89.
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 87, 92–93; Feigon 2002, p. 39
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 95
- ^ "Mao Zedong on War and Revolution". Quotations from Mao Zedong on War and Revolution. Columbia University. Retrieved November 12, 2011.; Feigon 2002, p. 41
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 98
- ^ a b Feigon 2002, p. 42
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 99–100
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 100
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 106; Carter 1976, pp. 61–62
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 112
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 106–109, 112–113
- ^ a b c Carter 1976, p. 62
- ^ a b Carter 1976, p. 64
- ^ a b c Carter 1976, p. 63
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 122–125; Feigon 2002, pp. 46–47
- ^ Jung Chang and Jon Halliday; Mao: The unknown story, 2005, Random House
- ^ a b c Chang, Halliday; Mao, Chapt.5
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 125; Carter 1976, p. 68
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 130; Carter 1976, pp. 67–68; Feigon 2002, p. 48
- ^ a b Carter 1976, p. 69
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 126–127; Carter 1976, pp. 66–67
- ^ a b Carter 1976, p. 70
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 159; Feigon 2002, p. 47
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 131; Carter 1976, pp. 68–69
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 128, 132
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 133–137; Carter 1976, pp. 70–71
- ^ a b Feigon 2002, p. 50.
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 138; Carter 1976, pp. 71–72
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 138, 141
- ^ a b Carter 1976, p. 72
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 139
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 146–149
- ^ a b c Carter 1976, p. 75
- ^ a b Feigon 2002, p. 51
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 149–151
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 149
- ^ a b Schram 1966, p. 153
- ^ a b Schram 1966, p. 208
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 152
- ^ a b Carter 1976, p. 76
- ^ Feigon 2002, pp. 51–53
- ^ a b Carter 1976, p. 77
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 154–155; Feigon 2002, pp. 54–55
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 155–161
- ^ a b Carter 1976, p. 78
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 161–165; Feigon 2002, pp. 53–54
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 166−168; Feigon 2002, p. 55
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 175−177; Carter 1976, pp. 80−81; Feigon 2002, pp. 56−57
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 180; Carter 1976, pp. 81−82
- ^ a b Feigon 2002, p. 57
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 180−181; Carter 1976, p. 83
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 181; Carter 1976, pp. 84−86; Feigon 2002, p. 58
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 183; Carter 1976, pp. 86−87
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 184−186; Carter 1976, pp. 88−90; Feigon 2002, pp. 59−60
- ^ Carter 1976, pp. 90−91
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 186; Carter 1976, pp. 91−92; Feigon 2002, p. 60
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 187−188; Carter 1976, pp. 92−93
- ^ a b c Feigon 2002, p. 61
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 188; Carter 1976, p. 93
- ^ Barnouin, Barbara and Yu Changgen. Zhou Enlai: A Political Life. Hong Kong: Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2006. ISBN 962-996-280-2. Retrieved March 12, 2011. p.62
- ^ Chang, Jung and Jon Halliday; Mao: The Unknown Story, Jonathan Cape, 2005
- ^ a b c Chang, Halliday; Mao, Ch. 13
- ^ a b Schram 1966, p. 193
- ^ Carter 1976, pp. 94−96
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 206−207
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 20
- ^ Carter 1976, p. 101
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 202
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 209−210
- ^ Carter 1976, p. 95
- ^ Carter 1976, pp. 95−96
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 194
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 196
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 197
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 198−200; Carter 1976, pp. 98−99; Feigon 2002, pp. 64−65
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 211; Carter 1976, pp. 100−101
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 205
- ^ a b Carter 1976, p. 105
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 204; Feigon 2002, p. 66
- ^ Schram 1966, p. 217
- ^ Schram 1966, pp. 211−216; Carter 1976, pp. 101−10
- ^ Jacobs, Andrew (October 2, 2009). "China Is Wordless on Traumas of Communists' Rise". The New York Times. Retrieved October 2, 2009.
- ^ Cheek T, ed. (2002). Mao Zedong and China's Revolutions: A Brief History with Documents. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. p. 125. ISBN 0-312-25626-4.
The phrase is often mistakenly said to have been delivered during the speech from the Gate of Heavenly Peace, but was first used on September 21, at the First Plenary Session of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference, then repeated on several occasions
- ^ Li 1994, p. xi
- ^ See for example, DeBorja, Q.M. and Xu L. Dong (eds) (1996). Manufacturing History: Sex, Lies and Random House's Memoirs of Mao's Physician. New York: China Study Group. p. 48.
{{cite book}}:|last=has generic name (help) - ^ Burkitt, Laurie; Scobell, Andrew; Wortzel, Larry M. (July 2003). The lessons of history: The Chinese people's Liberation Army at 75 (PDF). Strategic Studies Institute. pp. 340–341. ISBN 1-58487-126-1.
- ^ Short 2001, pp. 436–437
- ^ a b Kuisong 2008
- ^ Steven W. Mosher. China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality. Basic Books, 1992. ISBN 0-465-09813-4 pp 72, 73
- ^ Stephen Rosskamm Shalom. Deaths in China Due to Communism. Center for Asian Studies Arizona State University, 1984. ISBN 0-939252-11-2 pg 24
- ^ Spence 1999[page needed]. Mao got this number from a report submitted by Xu Zirong, Deputy Public Security Minister, which stated 712,000 counterrevolutionaries were executed, 1,290,000 were imprisoned, and another 1,200,000 were "subjected to control.": see Kuisong 2008.
- ^ a b Twitchett, Denis (June 26, 1987). The Cambridge history of China. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-24336-X. Retrieved August 23, 2008.
{{cite book}}: Unknown parameter|coauthors=ignored (|author=suggested) (help) - ^ Maurice Meisner. Mao's China and After: A History of the People's Republic, Third Edition. Free, Press, 1999. ISBN 0-684-85635-2 p. 72: "... the estimate of many relatively impartial observers that there were 2,000,000 people executed during the first three years of the People's Republic is probably as accurate a guess as one can make on the basis of scanty information."
- ^ Steven W. Mosher. China Misperceived: American Illusions and Chinese Reality. Basic Books, 1992. ISBN 0-465-09813-4 pg 74: "... a figure that Fairbank has cited as the upper range of "sober" estimates."
- ^ Feigon 2002, p. 96: "By 1952 they had extended land reform throughout the countryside, but in the process somewhere between two and five million landlords had been killed."
- ^ Short 2001, p. 436
- ^ a b Valentino 2004, pp. 121–122
- ^ Changyu, Li. "Mao's "Killing Quotas." Human Rights in China (HRIC). September 26, 2005, at Shandong University" (PDF). Retrieved June 21, 2009.
- ^ Brown, Jeremy. "Terrible Honeymoon: Struggling with the Problem of Terror in Early 1950s China".
- ^ John Fairbank and Merle Goldman, China: A New History, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2002), 349.
- ^ Short 2001, p. 437
- ^ "High Tide of Terror". Time. March 5, 1956. Retrieved May 11, 2009.
- ^ Chang & Halliday 2005, p. 410
- ^ Li 1994, pp. 198, 200, 468–469
- ^ a b Spence 1999[page needed]
- ^ Attention: This template ({{cite pmid}}) is deprecated. To cite the publication identified by PMID 10600969, please use {{cite journal}} with
|pmid= 10600969instead. - ^ Li 1994, pp. 283–4, 295
- ^ Li 1994, p. 340
- ^ Dikötter, Frank (15 December 15, 2010). "Mao's Great Leap to Famine". International Herald Tribune.
{{cite news}}: Check date values in:|date=(help) - ^ Frank Dikötter, Mao's Great Famine, Key Arguments
- ^ a b Becker 1998, p. 81
- ^ Becker 1998, p. 86
- ^ Becker 1998, p. 93
- ^ Did Mao Really Kill Millions in the Great Leap Forward? by Joseph Ball, Monthly Review, September 21, 2006
- ^ Valentino 2004, p. 128
- ^ Becker 1998, p. 103
- ^ Becker 1998, pp. 92–93
- ^ Valentino 2004, p. 127
- ^ a b Mark O'Neill. A hunger for the truth: A new book, banned on the mainland, is becoming the definitive account of the Great Famine. South China Morning Post, July 6, 2008.
- ^ Short 2001, p. 761
- ^ Akbar, Arifa (September 17, 2010). "Mao's Great Leap Forward 'killed 45 million in four years'". The Independent. London. Retrieved September 20, 2010.; Dikötter 2010, p. 333
- ^ a b "Source List and Detailed Death Tolls for the Twentieth Century Hemoclysm". Historical Atlas of the Twentieth Century. Retrieved August 23, 2008.
- ^ a b c Chang & Halliday 2005, pp. 568, 579
- ^ Feigon 2002, p. 140
- ^ For a full treatment of this idea, see Gao 2008
- ^ Jonathan Mirsky. Livelihood Issues. Literary Review
- ^ MacFarquhar 2006, p. 110
- ^ MacFarquhar 2006, p. 125
- ^ MacFarquhar 2006, p. 124
- ^ Ion Mihai Pacepa (November 28, 2006). "The Kremlin's Killing Ways". National Review. Retrieved August 23, 2008.
- ^ Li 1994, p. 581
- ^ Chirot 1996, p. 198
- ^ a b Gao 2008[page needed]; Feigon 2002[page needed]
- ^ http://www.nytimes.com/learning/general/onthisday/big/0909.html#article
- ^ a b c d Biography (TV series) Mao Tse Tung: China's Peasant Emperor A&E Network 2005, ASIN B000AABKXG [time needed]
- ^ "Chairman Mao square opened on his 115th birth anniversary". China Daily. December 25, 2008. Retrieved January 2, 2013.; "Mao Zedong still draws crowds on 113th birth anniversary". People's Daily. December 27, 2006. Retrieved January 2, 2013.
- ^ MacFarquhar 2006, p. 471: "Together with Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler, Mao appears destined to go down in history as one of the great tyrants of the twentieth century"
- ^ a b Michael Lynch. Mao (Routledge Historical Biographies). Routledge, 2004. p. 230
- ^ Stéphane Courtois, Jean-Louis Margolin, et al. The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression. Harvard University Press, 1999. ISBN 0-674-07608-7 p. 465–466
- ^ MacFarquhar & Schoenhals, 2006, p. 428.
- ^ Mao Zedong sixiang wan sui! (1969), p. 195. Referenced in Governing China: From Revolution to Reform (Second Edition) by Kenneth Lieberthal. W.W. Norton & Co., 2003. ISBN 0-393-92492-0 p. 71.
- ^ a b c Short 2001, p. 632
- ^ a b Granddaughter Keeps Mao's Memory Alive in Bookshop by Maxim Duncan, Reuters, September 28, 2009
- ^ Jonathan Watts. "China must confront dark past, says Mao confidant" The Guardian, June 2, 2005
- ^ Chang & Halliday 2005, p. 458 [Chang's source (p.725): *Mao CCRM, vol. 13, pp. 203–4 (E: MacFarquhar et al., pp. 494–5)].
- ^ Bernstein, Thomas III (July 2006). "Mao Zedong and the Famine of 1959–1960: A Study in Wilfulness". The China Quarterly. 186: 421–445. doi:10.1017/S0305741006000221.
- ^ Jasper Becker. Systematic genocide. The Spectator, September 25, 2010.
- ^ Dikötter 2010, p. 299
- ^ Dikötter 2010, p. 33
- ^ "Mao Tse-Tung: Father of Chinese Revolution". The New York Times. September 10, 1976
- ^ "Mao Reportedly Sought to A-Bomb U.S. Troops". Los Angeles Times. February 23, 1988.
- ^ a b Dikötter 2010, p. 13
- ^ Robert Service. Comrades!: A History of World Communism. Harvard University Press, 2007. p. 321. ISBN 0-674-02530-X
- ^ "奥巴马就职演说 引毛泽东诗词". People's Daily. January 22, 2009. Retrieved July 15, 2009. [dead link]
- ^ Robert Jackson Alexander. International Maoism in the developing world. Praeger, 1999. p 200.; Jackson, Karl D (March 17, 1992). Cambodia, 1975–1978: Rendezvous with Death. Princeton University Press. p. 219. ISBN 0-691-02541-X.
- ^ Biography (TV series): Pol Pot; A&E Network, 2003.
- ^ "Portraits of Sun Yat-sen, Deng Xiaoping proposed adding to RMB notes". People's Daily. March 13, 2006. Retrieved August 23, 2008.
- ^ Kahn, Joseph (September 2, 2006). "Where's Mao? Chinese Revise History Books". The New York Times. Retrieved February 28, 2007.
- ^ Meisner, Maurice (2007). Mao Zedong: A Political and Intellectual Portrait. Polity. p. 133.
- ^ "Cult of Mao". library.thinkquest.org. Retrieved August 23, 2008.
This remark of Mao seems to have elements of truth but it is false. He confuses the worship of truth with a personality cult, despite there being an essential difference between them. But this remark played a role in helping to promote the personality cult that gradually arose in the CCP.
- ^ a b Chapter 5: "Mao Badges – Visual Imagery and Inscriptions" in: Helen Wang: Chairman Mao badges: symbols and Slogans of the Cultural Revolution (British Museum Research Publication 169). The Trustees of the British Museum, 2008. ISBN 978-0-86159-169-5.
- ^ In "The East is Red" (东方红), an anthem that was popular during the Cultural Revolution. See lyrics and English translation at ChinaPoet.net or Sogou.net. Retrieved August 24, 2009.
- ^ Lu, Xing (2004). Rhetoric of the Chinese Cultural Revolution: the impact on Chinese thought, Culture, and Communication. Univ of South Carolina Press. p. 65. ISBN 1-57003-543-1.
- ^ 韶山升起永远不落的红太阳
- ^ Li 1994, p. 659
- ^ Spence 1999[page needed]
- ^ "Stepping into history". China Daily. November 23, 2003. Retrieved August 23, 2008.
- ^ The Long March, by Ed Jocelyn and Andrew McEwen. Constable 2006
- ^ Li, 1994.
- ^ a b Hollingworth 1985, pp. 29–30
- ^ Terrill 1980, p. 19
- ^ Feigon 2002, p. 26
- ^ Li Zhi-Sui (2011). The Private Life of Chairman Mao. Random House. p. 166. ISBN 9780307791399.
- ^ Feigon 2002, p. 53
- ^ Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 5−6
- ^ Pantsov & Levine 2012, pp. 42, 66
- ^ Carter 1976, p. 42
- ^ "Mao Zedong Thought – Part 1". Retrieved April 30, 2011.
- ^ "100 years<!- Bot generated title ->". Retrieved August 23, 2008.
- ^ Yen, Yuehping (2005). Calligraphy and Power in Contemporary Chinese Society. Routledge. p. 2.
- ^ "首届毛体书法邀请赛精品纷呈". People (in Chinese). September 11, 2006.
- ^ Willis Barnstone, The Poems of Mao Zedong (1972; rpr. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008 ISBN 0520935004), p. 3-4.
- ^ Ng Yong-sang. “The Poetry of Mao Tse-tung.” China Quarterly 13 (1963): 60–73.
- ^ "Being Mao Zedong". Global Times. July 4, 2011. Retrieved March 15, 2013.
- ^ "Famous actor playing Mao Zedong dies". People's Daily. July 5, 2005. Retrieved March 15, 2013.
- ^ "Actor famous for playing Mao Zedong dies of miocardial infarction". People's Daily. July 5, 2005. Retrieved March 15, 2013.
- ^ Liu, Wei (June 3, 2011). "The reel Mao". China Daily European Weekly. Retrieved March 15, 2013.
- ^ Xiong, Qu (November 26, 2011). "Actors expect prosperity of Chinese culture". CCTV News. Retrieved March 15, 2013.
- ^ Schaik 2011, p. 208
- ^ Schaik 2011, p. 209
- ^ Schaik 2011, p. 211
- ^ a b Schaik 2011, p. 212
- ^ Schaik 2011, p. 213
- ^ Schaik 2011, p. 214
- ^ Schaik 2011, p. 215
- ^ Schaik 2011, p. 218
- ^ a b c d e f g Barme, Geremie (1996). ‘’Shades of Mao: The Posthumous Cult of the Great Leader’’, p. 5-9. M.E. Sharp Inc., Armonk, New York.
- ^ a b c d e f Karl, Rebecca (2010). ‘’Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World, p. 87-88. Duke University Press, United States.
- ^ Karl, 87
- ^ a b c d e f g Karl, Rebecca (2010). ‘’Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World, p. 95-97. Duke University Press, United States.
- ^ a b Karl, Rebecca (2010). ‘’Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World, p. 118-120. Duke University Press, United States.
- ^ a b c d e f g h Karl, Rebecca (2010). ‘’Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World, p. 121-124. Duke University Press, United States.
- ^ a b c d e f g Karl, Rebecca (2010). ‘’Mao Zedong and China in the Twentieth-Century World, p. 147-148. Duke University Press, United States.
Bibliography
- Carter, Peter (1976). Mao. London: Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0192731401.
- Chang, Jung; Halliday, Jon (2005). Mao: The Unknown Story. London: Jonathan Cape. ISBN 978-0-224-07126-0.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Davin, Delia (2013). Mao: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford UP. ISBN 9780191654039.
- Dikötter, Frank (2010). Mao's Great Famine: The History of China's Most Devastating Catastrophe, 1958–62. London: Walker & Company. ISBN 0-8027-7768-6.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Feigon, Lee (2002). Mao: A Reinterpretation. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. ISBN 978-1-56663-458-8.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Gao, Mobo (2008). The Battle for China's Past: Mao and the Cultural Revolution. London: Pluto Press. ISBN 978-0-7453-2780-8.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Hollingworth, Clare (1985). Mao and the Men Against Him. London: Jonathan Cape. ISBN 978-0224017602.
- Li, Zhisui (1994). The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Memoirs of Mao's Personal Physician. London: Random House. ISBN 978-0679764434.
- MacFarquhar, Roderick; Schoenhals, Michael (2006). Mao's Last Revolution. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0674027480.
- Pantsov, Alexander V.; Levine, Steven I. (2012). Mao: The Real Story. New York and London: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-1-4516-5447-9.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Schaik, Sam (2011). Tibet A History. New Haven: Yale University Press Publications. ISBN 978-0-300-15404-7.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Schram, Stuart (1966). Mao Tse-Tung. London: Simon & Schuster. ISBN 978-0-14-020840-5.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Short, Philip (2001). Mao: A Life. Owl Books. ISBN 978-0-8050-6638-8.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Terrill, Ross (1980). Mao: A Biography. Simon and Schuster.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help), which is superseded by Ross Terrill. Mao: A Biography. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1999. ISBN 0-8047-2921-2 (pbk. alk. paper). - Becker, Jasper (1998). Hungry Ghosts: Mao's Secret Famine. Holt Paperbacks. ISBN 0-8050-5668-8.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Valentino, Benjamin A. (2004). Final Solutions: Mass Killing and Genocide in the Twentieth Century. Cornell University Press. ISBN 0-8014-3965-5.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Chirot, Daniel (1996). Modern tyrants: the power and prevalence of evil in our age. Princeton University Press. ISBN 0-691-02777-3.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - Spence, Jonathan (1999). Mao Zedong. Penguin Lives. New York: Viking Press. ISBN 978-0-670-88669-2. OCLC 41641238.
{{cite book}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help); Unknown parameter|laydate=ignored (help); Unknown parameter|laysummary=ignored (help) - Kuisong, Yang (March 2008). "Reconsidering the Campaign to Suppress Counterrevolutionaries" (PDF). The China Quarterly (193): 102–121.
{{cite journal}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help) - "Biography" (2005). Mao Tse Tung: China's Peasant Emperor (Television production). A&E Network. ASIN B000AABKXG. Retrieved January 18, 2013.
{{cite AV media}}: Invalid|ref=harv(help)
- Schoppa, R. Keith. Twentieth Century China: A History in Documents. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004.
External links
Media from Commons
Quotations from Wikiquote
Texts from Wikisource
- General
- Asia Source biography
- ChineseMao.com: Extensive resources about Mao Zedong
- CNN profile
- Collected Works of Mao at the Maoist Internationalist Movement
- Mao quotations
- Mao Zedong Reference Archive at marxists.org
- Oxford Companion to World Politics: Mao Zedong
- Spartacus Educational biography
- Bio of Mao at the official Communist Party of China web site
- Commentary
- Discusses the life, military influence and writings of Chairman Mao ZeDong.
- What Maoism Has Contributed
- China must confront dark past, says Mao confidant
- Mao was cruel – but also laid the ground for today's China
- Comrade Mao - 44 Chinese posters of the 1950s - 70s
- On the Role of Mao Zedong
- Propaganda paintings showing Mao as the great leader of China
- Remembering Mao's Victims
- Mao Tse Tung: Leader, Killer, Icon
- Mao's Great Leap to Famine
- Finding the Facts About Mao's Victims
- Remembering China's Great Helmsman
- Did Mao Really Kill Millions in the Great Leap Forward?
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