View source for People's Liberation Army

{{Short description|Combined military forces of the People's Republic of China}}
{{Other uses|Military of China (disambiguation)|Chinese Army (disambiguation)|People's Liberation Army (disambiguation)|Chinese Red Army}}
{{Pp-semi-vandalism|small=yes}}
{{Use dmy dates|date=December 2019}}
{{EngvarB |date = November 2015}}
{{Infobox national military
| name = Chinese People's Liberation Army
| native_name = 
| image = [[File:China Emblem PLA.svg|180px]]
| alt = 
| caption = Emblem of the People's Liberation Army
| image2 = [[File:People's Liberation Army Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|180px]]
| alt2 = 
| caption2 = [[Flag of the People's Liberation Army]]<br />The characters are "八一", referencing [[Nanchang uprising|August 1]].
| motto = {{lang|zh-Hans-CN|为人民服务}}<br />("[[Serve the People]]")
| founded = {{Start date and age|df=yes|1927|8|1}}
| current_form = {{Start date and age|df=yes|1947|10|10}}<ref name=NRAPLA>{{cite web|url=http://m.cnwest.com/sxxw/a/2020/08/01/18969370.html|title=【延安记忆】"中国人民解放军"称谓由此开始|date=2020-08-01|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200822221319/http://m.cnwest.com/sxxw/a/2020/08/01/18969370.html|archive-date=2020-08-22|url-status=live|access-date=2020-08-22}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://photo.chinamil.com.cn/tsjs/2017-10/10/content_7780489.htm|title=1947年10月10日，《中国人民解放军宣言》发布|publisher=中国军网|date=2017-10-10|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200822211432/http://photo.chinamil.com.cn/tsjs/2017-10/10/content_7780489.htm|archive-date=2020-08-22|url-status=live|access-date=2020-08-22}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url = http://taihangsummit.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%85%B1%E4%BA%A7%E5%85%9A%E9%A2%86%E5%AF%BC%E7%9A%84%E7%BA%A2%E5%86%9B%E6%94%B9%E7%BC%96%E4%B8%BA%E5%85%AB%E8%B7%AF%E5%86%9B%E7%9A%84%E8%83%8C%E6%99%AF%E5%92%8C%E6%94%B9%E7%BC%96/ |title = 中国共产党领导的红军改编为八路军的背景和改编情况 – 太行英雄网 |access-date = 7 January 2022 |archive-date = 7 January 2022 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220107174949/http://taihangsummit.com/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E5%85%B1%E4%BA%A7%E5%85%9A%E9%A2%86%E5%AF%BC%E7%9A%84%E7%BA%A2%E5%86%9B%E6%94%B9%E7%BC%96%E4%B8%BA%E5%85%AB%E8%B7%AF%E5%86%9B%E7%9A%84%E8%83%8C%E6%99%AF%E5%92%8C%E6%94%B9%E7%BC%96/ |url-status = live }}</ref>
| branches = '''Services'''<br>
{{Plain list|
# {{Army|China|name=Ground Force|size=23px}}
# {{Navy|China|name=Navy|size=23px}}
# {{Air force|China|name=Air Force|size=23px}}
# {{Flagicon image|Rocket Force Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|size=23px}} [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|Rocket Force]]
}}
'''Arms'''<br>
{{Plain list|
# [[File:Flag of the People's Liberation Army.svg|23x17px|border]] [[People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force|Aerospace Force]]
# [[File:Flag of the People's Liberation Army.svg|23x17px|border]] [[People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force|Cyberspace Force]]
# [[File:Flag of the People's Liberation Army.svg|23x17px|border]] [[People's Liberation Army Information Support Force|Information Support Force]]
# [[File:Flag of the People's Liberation Army.svg|23x17px|border]] [[People's Liberation Army Joint Logistics Support Force|Joint Logistics Support Force]]
}}
| headquarters = August First Building, [[Fuxing Road, Beijing|Fuxing Road]], [[Haidian, Beijing|Haidian]], [[Beijing]]
| website = {{Official URL}}
| commander-in-chief = [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]]
{{Infobox |child = yes
|label1 = [[Supreme Military Command of the People's Republic of China|CMC leadership]]
|data1 = '''[[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|Chairman]]:'''<br />{{Flagicon image|Flag of the Chinese Communist Party.svg}}{{Flagdeco|China}} [[Xi Jinping]]<br />'''[[Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission|Vice Chairmen]]''':<br />
{{Flagdeco|China|army}} [[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force|General]]  [[Zhang Youxia]]
{{Flagdeco|China|army}} [[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force|General]]  [[He Weidong]]
}}
| commander-in-chief_title = Governing body
| chief minister = {{Flagdeco|China|navy}} [[Jiang (rank)|Admiral]] [[Dong Jun]]
| chief minister_title = [[Minister of National Defense (China)|Minister of National Defense]]
| minister = {{Flagdeco|China|navy}} [[Jiang (rank)|Admiral]] [[Miao Hua]]
| minister_title = Director of the [[Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission|Political Work Department]]
| chief_of_staff = {{Flagdeco|China|army}} [[Jiang (rank)|General]] [[Liu Zhenli (general)|Liu Zhenli]]
| chief_of_staff_title = Chief of the [[Joint Staff Department (China)|Joint Staff Department]]
| commander = {{Flagicon image|Rocket Force Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg}} [[Jiang (rank)|General]] [[Zhang Shengmin]]
| commander_title = Secretary of [[Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission|Discipline Inspection Commission]]
<!-- Manpower -->| age = 18
| conscription = Yes (hybrid system of conscripts and volunteers)<ref name=":4" />
| manpower_data = 
| manpower_age = 
| available = 
| available_f = 
| fit = 
| fit_f = 
| reaching = 
| reaching_f = 
| active = 2,035,000 (2022){{Sfn|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2022|p=255}}
| ranked = 1st
| reserve = 510,000 (2022){{sfn|The International Institute for Strategic Studies|2022|p=255}}
| deployed = <!-- Financial -->
| amount = US$296 billion (2023)<ref name="SIPRI-2020">{{Cite web|date=April 2024|title=Trends in Military Expenditure 2023|url=https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2404_fs_milex_2023.pdf#page=2|access-date=22 April 2024|publisher=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]|archive-date=15 May 2024|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240515230851/https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2404_fs_milex_2023.pdf#page=2|url-status=live}}</ref><br />([[List of countries by military expenditures|ranked 2nd]])
| percent_GDP = 1.7% (2023)<ref name="SIPRI-2020"/>
| domestic_suppliers = {{blist
| [[China National Aero-Technology Import & Export Corporation]]
| [[China Electronics Technology Group]]
| [[Norinco]]
| [[China Precision Machinery Import-Export Corporation]]
| [[Aviation Industry Corporation of China]]
| [[China State Shipbuilding Corporation]]
| [[China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation]]
| [[China Aerospace Science and Technology Corporation]]
| [[China Aerospace Science and Industry Corporation]]
| [[China South Industries Group Corporation]]
| [[China Electronics Technology Group]]
| [[China National Nuclear Corporation]]
}}
| foreign_suppliers = {{Plain list|
* {{Flag|Russia}}
* {{Flag|France}}
* {{Flag|Ukraine}} 
}}
Historical: {{Unbulleted list|{{USSR}}<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3139603/how-china-grew-buyer-major-arms-trade-player |title=China's arms trade: which countries does it buy from and sell to? |website=South China Morning Post |first=Maryann |last=Xue |date=4 July 2021 |access-date=26 May 2022 |archive-date=26 May 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220526161751/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3139603/how-china-grew-buyer-major-arms-trade-player |url-status=live }}</ref>}}
| imports = {{Currency|14.858 billion|US$|passthrough=yes|linked=no}}<br>(2010–2021)<ref name="SIPRI"/>
| exports = {{Currency|18.121 billion|US$|passthrough=yes|linked=no}}<br>(2010–2021)<ref name="SIPRI">{{cite web|url=https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php|title=TIV of arms imports/exports from China, 2010–2021|date=7 February 2022|work=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]|access-date=26 January 2023|archive-date=21 June 2023|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230621145309/https://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/values.php|url-status=live}}</ref> 
<!-- Related articles -->| history = {{Plain list|
* [[History of the People's Liberation Army|History of the PLA]]
* [[Modernization of the People's Liberation Army|Modernization of the PLA]]
* [[List of Chinese wars and battles|Historical Chinese wars and battles]]
* [[List of wars involving the People's Republic of China|Military engagements]]
}}
| ranks = {{Plain list|
* [[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force|Army ranks]]
* [[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Navy|Navy ranks]]
* [[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Air Force|Air force ranks]]
}}
}}
{{Infobox Chinese
| title = Chinese People's Liberation Army
| t = 中國人民解放軍
| s = 中国人民解放军
| l = "China People Liberation Army"
| p = Zhōngguó Rénmín Jiěfàngjūn
| tp = Jhong-guó Rén-mín Jiě-fàng-jyun
| w = {{tone superscript|Chung1-kuo2 Jen2-min2 Chieh3-fang4-chün1}}
| y = Jūng-gwok Yàhn-màhn Gáai-fong-gwān
| j = zung1 gwok3 jan4 man4 gaai2 fong3 gwan1
| bpmf = ㄓㄨㄥ ㄍㄨㄛˊ ㄖㄣˊ ㄇㄧㄣˊ ㄐㄧㄝˇ ㄈㄤˋ ㄐㄩㄣ
| mi = {{IPAc-cmn|zh|ong|1|.|g|uo|2|-|r|en|2|.|m|in|2|-|j|ie|3|.|f|ang|2|.|jun|1}}
| ci = {{IPAc-yue|z|ung|1|-|gw|ok|3|-|j|an|4|-|m|an|4|-|g|aai|2|-|f|ong|3|-|gw|an|1}}
| order = st
}}
{{PRC military sidebar}}
{{Politics of China |expanded = Military }}

The '''People's Liberation Army''' ('''PLA''') is the military of the [[Chinese Communist Party]] (CCP) and the [[People's Republic of China]] (PRC). It consists of four [[Military branch|services]]—[[People's Liberation Army Ground Force|Ground Force]], [[People's Liberation Army Navy|Navy]], [[People's Liberation Army Air Force|Air Force]], and [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|Rocket Force]]—and four arms—[[People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force|Aerospace Force]], [[People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force|Cyberspace Force]], [[People's Liberation Army Information Support Force|Information Support Force]], and [[People's Liberation Army Joint Logistics Support Force|Joint Logistics Support Force]]. It is led by the [[Central Military Commission (China)|Central Military Commission]] (CMC) with its [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|chairman]] as [[Supreme Military Command of the People's Republic of China|commander-in-chief]].

The PLA can trace its origins during the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republican era]] to the left-wing units of the [[National Revolutionary Army]] (NRA) of the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT) when they broke away in 1927 in an [[Nanchang Uprising|uprising]] against the [[nationalist government]] as the [[Chinese Red Army]], before being reintegrated into the NRA as units of [[New Fourth Army]] and [[Eighth Route Army]] during the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]]. The two NRA communist units were reconstituted as the PLA in 1947.<ref name="Benton-1999" /> Since 1949, the PLA has used nine different military strategies, which it calls "strategic guidelines". The most important came in 1956, 1980, and 1993.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019">{{Cite book |last=Fravel |first=M. Taylor |title=Active Defense: China's Military Strategy since 1949 |date=2019 |volume=2 |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |isbn=978-0-691-18559-0 |doi=10.2307/j.ctv941tzj |jstor=j.ctv941tzj |author-link=Taylor Fravel |s2cid=159282413}}</ref> Politically, the PLA and the paramilitary [[People's Armed Police]] (PAP) have the largest delegation in the [[National People's Congress]] (NPC); the joint delegation currently has 281 deputies—over 9% of the total—all of whom are CCP members.

The PLA is not a traditional nation-state military. It is a part, and the armed wing, of the CCP and controlled by the party, not by the state. The PLA's primary mission is the defense of the party and its interests. The PLA is the guarantor of the party's survival and rule, and the party prioritizes [[Civilian control of the military in communist states|maintaining control]] and the loyalty of the PLA. According to Chinese law, the party has leadership over the armed forces and the CMC exercises supreme military command; the party and state CMCs are practically a single body by membership. Since 1989, the [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP general secretary]] has also been the CMC Chairman; this grants significant political power as the only member of the [[Politburo Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party|Politburo Standing Committee]] with direct responsibilities for the armed forces. The [[Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China|Ministry of National Defense]] has no command authority; it is the PLA's interface with state and foreign entities and insulates the PLA from external influence.

Today, the majority of military units around the country are assigned to one of five [[Theater commands of the People's Liberation Army|theatre commands]] by geographical location. The PLA is [[List of countries by number of military and paramilitary personnel|the world's largest military force]] (not including paramilitary or [[People's Liberation Army Reserve Force|reserve forces]]) and has the second largest defence budget in the world. China's military expenditure was US$296&nbsp;billion in 2023, accounting for [[List of countries with highest military expenditures|12 percent of the world's defence expenditures]]. It is also one of the fastest modernizing militaries in the world, and has been termed as a potential military superpower, with significant regional defence and rising global [[power projection]] capabilities.<ref>{{cite web |title=Global military spending remains high at $1.7 trillion |url=https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2018/global-military-spending-remains-high-17-trillion |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180527073110/https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2018/global-military-spending-remains-high-17-trillion |archive-date=27 May 2018 |access-date=2018-10-13 |publisher=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |date=2 May 2018 |language=en}}</ref><ref name="Studies2020">{{cite book |author=International Institute for Strategic Studies |author-link=International Institute for Strategic Studies |title=The Military Balance |date=2020 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-0367466398 |location=London |page= |doi=10.1080/04597222.2020.1707967 |ref=IISS2020}}</ref>{{Rp|page=259}}

In addition to wartime arrangements, the PLA is also involved in the peacetime operations of other components of the armed forces. This is particularly visible in [[Territorial disputes of the People's Republic of China|maritime territorial disputes]] where the navy is heavily involved in the planning, coordination and execution of operations by the PAP's [[China Coast Guard]].{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=148}}

== Mission ==
The PLA's primary mission is the defense of the CCP and its interests.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|pp=13–14}} It is the guarantor of the party's survival and rule,{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|pp=13–14}}{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=521}} and the party prioritizes [[Civilian control of the military in communist states|maintaining control]] and the loyalty of the PLA.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=521}} 

In 2004, [[paramount leader]] [[Hu Jintao]] stated the mission of the PLA as:<ref>{{cite web |url = https://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT332.pdf |title = The PLA Navy's ''New Historic Missions'': Expanding Capabilities for a Re-emergent Maritime Power |access-date = 1 April 2011 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110428051927/http://www.rand.org/pubs/testimonies/2009/RAND_CT332.pdf |archive-date = 28 April 2011 |url-status = live }}</ref>
* The insurance of CCP leadership
* The protection of the sovereignty, territorial integrity, internal security and national development of the People's Republic of China
* Safeguarding the country's interests
* Maintaining and safeguarding [[world peace]].
China describes its military posture as [[active defense]], defined in a 2015 state [[white paper]] as "We will not attack unless we are attacked, but we will surely counterattack if attacked."<ref name=":13">{{Cite book |last=Garlick |first=Jeremy |title=Advantage China: Agent of Change in an Era of Global Disruption |date=2024 |publisher=[[Bloomsbury Academic]] |isbn=978-1-350-25231-8 |pages=}}</ref>{{Rp|page=41}}

== History ==
{{Main|History of the People's Liberation Army}}

=== Early history ===
{{Further|Chinese Civil War|Second Sino-Japanese War}}

The CCP founded its military wing on 1 August 1927 during the [[Nanchang uprising]], beginning the [[Chinese Civil War]]. Communist elements of the [[National Revolutionary Army]] rebelled under the leadership of [[Zhu De]], [[He Long]], [[Ye Jianying]], [[Zhou Enlai]], and other leftist elements of the [[Kuomintang]] (KMT), after the [[Shanghai massacre]] in 1927.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Carter |first=James |date=4 August 2021 |title=The Nanchang Uprising and the birth of the PLA |url=https://thechinaproject.com/2021/08/04/the-nanchang-uprising-and-the-birth-of-the-pla/ |website=The China Project |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=7 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221107180237/https://thechinaproject.com/2021/08/04/the-nanchang-uprising-and-the-birth-of-the-pla/ |url-status=live }}</ref> They were then known as the [[Chinese Workers' and Peasants' Red Army]], or simply the Red Army.<ref>{{Cite web |date=17 June 2004 |title=History of the PLA's Ground Force Organisational Structure and Military Regions |url=https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/history-plas-ground-force-organisational-structure-and-military-regions |website=[[Royal United Services Institute]] |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=11 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221111215039/https://rusi.org/explore-our-research/publications/commentary/history-plas-ground-force-organisational-structure-and-military-regions/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 1934 and 1935, the Red Army survived several campaigns led against it by [[Chiang Kai-Shek]]'s KMT and engaged in the [[Long March]].<ref name="Bianco">{{Cite book |last=Bianco |first=Lucien |title=Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915–1949 |title-link=Origins of the Chinese Revolution, 1915–1949 |date=1971 |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-8047-0827-2 |page=68 |language=en |author-link=Lucien Bianco}}</ref>

During the [[Second Sino-Japanese War]] from 1937 to 1945, the CCP's military forces were nominally integrated into the National Revolutionary Army of the [[Republic of China (1912–1949)|Republic of China]] forming two main units, the [[Eighth Route Army]] and the [[New Fourth Army]].<ref name="Benton-1999">{{Cite book |last=Benton |first=Gregor |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=ayLTpS8iujQC |title=New Fourth Army: Communist Resistance Along the Yangtze and the Huai, 1938–1941 |date=1999 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-21992-2 |page=396 |language=en |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=15 January 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230115051955/https://books.google.com/books?id=ayLTpS8iujQC |url-status=live }}</ref> During this time, these two military groups primarily employed [[guerrilla warfare|guerrilla tactics]], generally avoiding large-scale battles with the Japanese, at the same time consolidating by recruiting KMT troops and paramilitary forces behind Japanese lines into their forces.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Zedong |first=Mao |title=On Guerilla Warfare: Mao Tse-Tung On Guerilla Warfare |title-link=On Guerrilla Warfare |date=2017 |publisher=Martino Fine Books |isbn=978-1-68422-164-6 |language=en |author-link=Mao Zedong}}</ref>

After the [[Surrender of Japan|Japanese surrender]] in 1945, the CCP continued to use the National Revolutionary Army unit structures until the decision was made in February 1947 to merge the Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army, renaming the new million-strong force the People's Liberation Army (PLA).<ref name="Benton-1999" /> The reorganization was completed by late 1948. The PLA eventually won the Chinese Civil War, establishing the [[People's Republic of China]] in 1949.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Chinese Revolution of 1949 |url=https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev |website=[[United States Department of State]], Office of the Historian |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=19 May 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170519004017/https://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/chinese-rev |url-status=live }}</ref> It then underwent a drastic reorganization, with the establishment of the [[People's Liberation Army Air Force|Air Force]] leadership structure in November 1949, followed by the [[People's Liberation Army Navy|Navy]] leadership structure the following April.<ref>Ken Allen, [http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF182/CF182.ch9.pdf Chapter 9, "PLA Air Force Organization"] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070929102648/http://www.rand.org/pubs/conf_proceedings/CF182/CF182.ch9.pdf|date=2007-09-29}}, The PLA as Organization, ed. James C. Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2002), 349.</ref><ref name="中国人民解放军海军成立70周年多国海军活动新闻发布会在青岛举行">{{cite web |title=中国人民解放军海军成立70周年多国海军活动新闻发布会在青岛举行 |url=http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2019-04/20/content_4839865.htm |access-date=18 May 2020 |website=mod.gov.cn |publisher=[[Ministry of National Defence of the People's Republic of China]] |language=zh |archive-date=1 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221001160506/http://www.mod.gov.cn/power/2019-04/20/content_4839865.htm |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 1950, the leadership structures of the artillery, armored troops, air defence troops, public security forces, and worker–soldier militias were also established. The chemical warfare defence forces, the railroad forces, the communications forces, and the strategic forces, as well as other separate forces (like engineering and construction, logistics and medical services), were established later on.

In this early period, the People's Liberation Army overwhelmingly consisted of peasants.<ref name="Russo-2020" /> Its treatment of soldiers and officers was egalitarian<ref name="Russo-2020" /> and formal ranks were not adopted until 1955.<ref name="upi.com">{{Cite web |title=China's People's Liberation Army, the world's second largest conventional... |url=https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/06/25/Chinas-Peoples-Liberation-Army-the-worlds-second-largest-conventional/9105583214400/ |access-date=2022-12-04 |website=UPI |language=en |archive-date=4 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221204232316/https://www.upi.com/Archives/1988/06/25/Chinas-Peoples-Liberation-Army-the-worlds-second-largest-conventional/9105583214400/ |url-status=live }}</ref> As a result of its egalitarian organization, the early PLA overturned strict traditional hierarchies that governed the lives of peasants.<ref name="Russo-2020">{{Cite book |last=Russo |first=Alessandro |title=Cultural Revolution and revolutionary culture |date=2020 |publisher=[[Duke University Press]] |isbn=978-1-4780-1218-4 |location=Durham |pages=36–37 |oclc=1156439609}}</ref> As sociologist Alessandro Russo summarizes, the peasant composition of the PLA hierarchy was a radical break with Chinese societal norms and "overturned the strict traditional hierarchies in unprecedented forms of egalitarianism[.]"<ref name="Russo-2020" />

In the PRC's early years, the PLA was a dominant [[Foreign policy of China|foreign policy]] institution in the country.<ref name="Loh">{{Cite book |last=Loh |first=Dylan M.H. |title=China's Rising Foreign Ministry: Practices and Representations of Assertive Diplomacy |publisher=[[Stanford University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9781503638204}}</ref>{{Rp|page=17}}

=== Modernization and conflicts ===
{{Further|Korean War|Sino-Indian War|Sino-Soviet border conflict}}

[[File:PLA Enters Peking.jpg|thumb|PLA troops entering Beijing in 1949 during the [[Chinese Civil War]]]]
[[File:Chinese troops leaving Korea.jpg|thumb|Chinese troops gathered on a T-34/85 or a Type 58 medium tank leaving [[North Korea]] in 1958, 5 years after the Korean War ended with an armistice (a ceasefire) in 1953. The banner in the background of the picture bears a slogan (in Chinese) which declares "The Friendship And Unity of the North Korean And Chinese Peoples Are Always Steadfast And Strong!"]]
[[File:China 10th Anniversary Parade in Beijing 01.jpg|thumb|Marshal [[Lin Biao]] surveying the soldiers during the 10th-anniversary military parade in 1959.]]

During the 1950s, the PLA with Soviet assistance began to transform itself from a peasant army into a modern one.<ref>{{citation |url=http://libweb.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/read/chicom.pdf |title=Pamphlet number 30-51, Handbook on the Chinese Communist Army |publisher=Department of the Army |date=7 December 1960 |access-date=1 April 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110429013230/http://libweb.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/read/chicom.pdf |archive-date=29 April 2011 |url-status=dead }}</ref> Since 1949, China has used nine different military strategies, which the PLA calls "strategic guidelines".  The most important came in 1956, 1980, and 1993.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019"/> Part of this process was the reorganization that created thirteen military regions in 1955.{{Citation needed|date=November 2022}}

In November 1950, some units of the PLA under the name of the [[People's Volunteer Army]] intervened in the [[Korean War]] as United Nations forces under General [[Douglas MacArthur]] approached the [[Yalu River]].<ref name="Stewart-2015">{{Cite book |last=Stewart |first=Richard |url=https://history.army.mil/brochures/kw-chinter/chinter.htm |title=The Korean War: The Chinese Intervention |date=2015 |publisher=CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform |isbn=978-1-5192-3611-1 |language=en |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194350/https://history.army.mil/brochures/kw-chinter/chinter.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> Under the weight of this offensive, Chinese forces drove MacArthur's forces out of North Korea and captured [[Seoul]], but were subsequently pushed back south of Pyongyang north of the [[38th parallel north|38th Parallel]].<ref name="Stewart-2015" /> The war also catalyzed the rapid modernization of the PLAAF.<ref>{{Citation |last1=Cliff |first1=Roger |title=The Evolution of Chinese Air Force Doctrine |date=2011 |url= |work=Shaking the Heavens and Splitting the Earth |pages=33–46 |series=Chinese Air Force Employment Concepts in the 21st Century |publisher=[[RAND Corporation]] |isbn=978-0-8330-4932-2 |jstor=10.7249/mg915af.10 |last2=Fei |first2=John |last3=Hagen |first3=Jeff |last4=Hague |first4=Elizabeth |last5=Heginbotham |first5=Eric |last6=Stillion |first6=John}}</ref>

In 1962, the PLA ground force also fought India in the [[Sino-Indian War]].<ref>{{cite book |last1=Hoffman |first1=Steven A. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=_bjADwAAQBAJ&q=chinese+army+patrols+ladakh+april+1962&pg=PA103 |title=India and the China Crisis |date=1990 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-30172-6 |location=Berkeley |pages=101–104 |access-date=1 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211009120905/https://books.google.com/books?id=_bjADwAAQBAJ&q=chinese%2Barmy%2Bpatrols%2Bladakh%2Bapril%2B1962&pg=PA103 |archive-date=9 October 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite book |last1=Van Tronder |first1=Gerry |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=JrTNDwAAQBAJ&q=sino-indian+war+patrols+at+Ladakh+april+30+1962&pg=PT12 |title=Sino-Indian War: Border Clash: October–November 1962 |date=2018 |publisher=Pen and Sword Military |isbn=978-1-5267-2838-8 |access-date=1 October 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210625205658/https://books.google.com/books?id=JrTNDwAAQBAJ&q=sino-indian+war+patrols+at+Ladakh+april+30+1962&pg=PT12 |archive-date=25 June 2021 |url-status=live}}</ref> In [[Nathu La and Cho La clashes|a series of border clashes in 1967]] with Indian troops, the PLA suffered heavy numerical and tactical losses.<ref name="Chellaney2" /><ref name="Praagh">{{Cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TbpU0HngYhoC&pg=PA301 |title=Greater Game: India's Race with Destiny and China |last=Van Praagh |first=David |date=2003 |publisher=McGill-Queen's Press – MQUP |isbn=978-0773525887 |page=301 |language=en |quote=(Indian) ''jawans'' trained and equipped for high-altitude combat used US provided artillery, deployed on higher ground than that of their adversaries, to decisive tactical advantage at Nathu La and Cho La near the Sikkim-Tibet border. |access-date=6 August 2021 |archive-date=25 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181225173405/https://books.google.com/books?id=TbpU0HngYhoC&pg=PA301 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Hoontrakul">{{citation |first=Ponesak |last=Hoontrakul |chapter=Asia's Evolving Economic Dynamism and Political Pressures |editor1=P. Hoontrakul |editor2=C. Balding |editor3=R. Marwah |title=The Global Rise of Asian Transformation: Trends and Developments in Economic Growth Dynamics |chapter-url=https://books.google.com/books?id=RrKYBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA37 |year=2014 |publisher=Palgrave Macmillan US |isbn=978-1-137-41236-2 |page=37 |quote=Cho La incident (1967) – Victorious: India / Defeated : China |access-date=6 August 2021 |archive-date=25 December 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181225173404/https://books.google.com/books?id=RrKYBgAAQBAJ&pg=PA37%20 |url-status=live }}</ref>

Before the [[Cultural Revolution]], military region commanders tended to remain in their posts for long periods. The longest-serving military region commanders were [[Xu Shiyou]] in the [[Nanjing Military Region]] (1954–74), [[Yang Dezhi]] in the [[Jinan Military Region]] (1958–74), [[Chen Xilian]] in the [[Shenyang Military Region]] (1959–73), and [[Han Xianchu]] in the Fuzhou Military Region (1960–74).<ref name="autogenerated436">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |url=https://archive.org/details/historyofmodernc0000lixi |title=A History of the Modern Chinese Army |date=2007 |publisher=[[University Press of Kentucky]] |doi=10.2307/j.ctt2jcq4k |isbn=978-0-8131-2438-4 |jstor=j.ctt2jcq4k}}</ref>

In the early days of the Cultural Revolution, the PLA abandoned the use of the military ranks that it had adopted in 1955.<ref name="upi.com"/>

The establishment of a professional military force equipped with modern weapons and doctrine was the last of the [[Four Modernizations]] announced by Zhou Enlai and supported by [[Deng Xiaoping]].<ref name="Ebrey">{{cite web |author=Ebrey, Patricia Buckley |title=Four Modernizations Era |url=http://depts.washington.edu/chinaciv/graph/9confour.htm |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20101007221511/http://depts.washington.edu/chinaciv/graph/9confour.htm |archive-date=October 7, 2010<!-- 22:15:11 --> |access-date=October 20, 2012 |work=A Visual Sourcebook of Chinese Civilization |publisher=University of Washington}}</ref><ref name="ScienceTechnology">{{cite news |author=人民日报 |date=31 January 1963 |script-title=zh:在上海举行的科学技术工作会议上周恩来阐述科学技术现代化的重大意义 |language=zh |trans-title=Science and Technology in Shanghai at the conference on Zhou Enlai explained the significance of modern science and technology |pages=1 |newspaper=People's Daily |publisher=Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party |url=http://rmrbw.net/read.php?tid=302475&fpage=14 |url-status=dead |access-date=October 21, 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160214201234/http://rmrbw.net/read.php?tid=302475 |archive-date=February 14, 2016}}</ref> In keeping with Deng's mandate to reform, the PLA has demobilized millions of men and women since 1978 and has introduced modern methods in such areas as [[military recruitment|recruitment]] and manpower, [[military strategy|strategy]], and [[military education and training|education and training]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Mason |first=David |date=1984 |title=China's Four Modernizations: Blueprint for Development or Prelude to Turmoil? |url= |journal=[[Asian Affairs]] |volume=11 |issue=3 |pages=47–70 |doi=10.1080/00927678.1984.10553699 |issn=0092-7678 |jstor=30171968}}</ref> In 1979, the PLA fought [[Vietnam]] over a border skirmish in the [[Sino-Vietnamese War]] where both sides claimed victory.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Vincent |first=Travils |date=9 February 2022 |title=Why Won't Vietnam Teach the History of the Sino-Vietnamese War? |work=[[The Diplomat]] |url=https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/why-wont-vietnam-teach-about-the-sino-vietnamese-war/ |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=18 February 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220218003020/https://thediplomat.com/2022/02/why-wont-vietnam-teach-about-the-sino-vietnamese-war/ |url-status=live }}</ref> However, western analysts agree that Vietnam handily outperformed the PLA.<ref name="autogenerated436"/>

During the [[Sino-Soviet split]], strained relations between China and the Soviet Union resulted in bloody border clashes and mutual backing of each other's adversaries.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Fravel |first=M. Taylor |date=2007 |title=Power Shifts and Escalation: Explaining China's Use of Force in Territorial Disputes |journal=[[International Security]] |volume=32 |issue=3 |pages=44–83 |doi=10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.44 |issn=0162-2889 |jstor=30130518 |s2cid=57559936}}</ref> China and Afghanistan had neutral relations with each other during the King's rule.<ref name="AfCh1981">''China and Afghanistan'', Gerald Segal, Asian Survey, Vol. 21, No. 11 (Nov., 1981), University of California Press</ref> When the pro-Soviet Afghan Communists seized power in Afghanistan in 1978, relations between China and the Afghan communists quickly turned hostile.<ref name="Hilali-2001" /> The Afghan pro-Soviet communists supported China's enemies in Vietnam and blamed China for supporting Afghan anticommunist militants.<ref name="Hilali-2001">{{Cite journal |last=Hilali |first=A.Z |date=September 2001 |title=China's response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan |journal=[[Central Asian Survey]] |language=en |volume=20 |issue=3 |pages=323–351 |doi=10.1080/02634930120095349 |s2cid=143657643 |issn=0263-4937}}</ref> China responded to the [[Soviet–Afghan War|Soviet invasion of Afghanistan]] by supporting the [[Afghan mujahidin]] and ramping up their military presence near Afghanistan in Xinjiang.<ref name="Hilali-2001" /> China acquired military equipment from the United States to defend itself from Soviet attacks.<ref name=":7">{{cite book |author=Starri |first=S. Frederick |author-link=S. Frederick Starr |title=Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland |title-link=Xinjiang: China's Muslim Borderland |publisher=M.E. Sharpe |year=2004 |isbn=0765613182 |editor= |edition= |pages=157–158}}</ref>

The PLA Ground Force trained and supported the Afghan Mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War, moving its training camps for the mujahideen from Pakistan into China itself.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Szczudlik-Tatar |first=Justyna |date=October 2014 |title=China's Evolving Stance on Afghanistan: Towards More Robust Diplomacy with "Chinese Characteristics" |url=https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/184324/PISM%20Strategic%20File%20no%2022%20(58).pdf |journal=Strategic File |publisher=Polish Institute of International Affairs |volume=58 |issue=22 |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=29 August 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230829133903/https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/184324/PISM%20Strategic%20File%20no%2022%20(58).pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> Hundreds of millions of dollars worth of anti-aircraft missiles, rocket launchers, and machine guns were given to the Mujahideen by the Chinese.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Galster |first=Steve |date=9 October 2001 |title=Volume II: Afghanistan: Lessons from the Last War |url=https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html |website=National Security Archive, [[George Washington University]] |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=6 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210906203727/https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB57/essay.html |url-status=live }}</ref> Chinese military advisors and army troops were also present with the Mujahideen during training.<ref name=":7" />

=== Since 1980 ===
{{See also|North China Military Exercise}}

In 1981, the PLA conducted its largest [[North China Military Exercise|military exercise in North China]] since the founding of the People's Republic.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019" /><ref name="Godwin-2019">{{Cite book |last=Godwin |first=Paul H. B. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=EiCeDwAAQBAJ&q=North+China+Military+Exercise+1981&pg=PT26 |title=The Chinese Defense Establishment: Continuity And Change In The 1980s |date=2019 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-000-31540-0 |language=en |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=11 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240211032245/https://books.google.com/books?id=EiCeDwAAQBAJ&q=North+China+Military+Exercise+1981&pg=PT26#v=onepage&q=North%20China%20Military%20Exercise%201981&f=false |url-status=live }}</ref>

In the late 1980s, the central government had increasing expenditures and limited revenue.<ref name=":03">{{Cite book |last=Lin |first=Shuanglin |title=China's Public Finance: Reforms, Challenges, and Options |publisher=[[Cambridge University Press]] |year=2022 |isbn=978-1-009-09902-8 |edition= |location=New York, NY}}</ref>{{Rp|page=43}} The central government encouraged its agencies and encouraged local governments to expand their services and pursue revenues.<ref name=":03" />{{Rp|page=43}} The PLA established businesses including hotels and restaurants.<ref name=":03" />{{Rp|page=43}} The PLA gained more autonomy and permission to engage in commercial activities in exchange for a reduced role in political affairs and limited budgets;{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=523}} the military was downsized to free resources for [[economic development]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Zissis |first=Carin |date=5 December 2006 |title=Modernizing the People's Liberation Army of China |url=https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/modernizing-peoples-liberation-army-china |website=[[Council on Foreign Relations]] |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194350/https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/modernizing-peoples-liberation-army-china |url-status=live }}</ref> The lack of oversight, ineffective self-regulation, and [[Jiang Zemin]]'s and [[Hu Jintao]]'s lack of close personal ties to the PLA,{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=523}} led to systemic corruption that persisted through the late-2010s.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=51}} Jiang's attempt to divest the PLA of its commercial interests was only partly successful as many were still run by close associates of PLA officers.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=523}} Corruption lowered readiness and proficiency,{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=520}} was a barrier to modernization and professionalization,{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=526}} and eroded party control.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=521}} The 2010s anti-corruption campaigns and military reforms under [[Xi Jinping]] from the early-2010s were in part executed to address these problems.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|pp=51-52}}{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=531}}

Following the [[People's Liberation Army at the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre|PLA's suppression]] of the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]], ideological correctness was temporarily revived as the dominant theme in Chinese military affairs.<ref>{{Cite news |date=30 April 2009 |title=PLA's "Absolute Loyalty" to the Party in Doubt |url=https://jamestown.org/program/plas-absolute-loyalty-to-the-party-in-doubt/ |website=[[The Jamestown Foundation]] |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=13 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221113113012/https://jamestown.org/program/plas-absolute-loyalty-to-the-party-in-doubt/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Reform and modernization have today resumed their position as the PLA's primary objectives, although the armed forces' political loyalty to the CCP has remained a leading concern.<ref>{{Cite news |date=20 August 2018 |title=Xi Jinping insists on PLA's absolute loyalty to Communist Party |work=[[The Economic Times]] |url=https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/xi-jinping-insists-on-plas-absolute-loyalty-to-communist-party/articleshow/65471728.cms?from=mdr |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=15 March 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230315132848/https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/xi-jinping-insists-on-plas-absolute-loyalty-to-communist-party/articleshow/65471728.cms?from=mdr |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Chan |first=Minnie |date=23 September 2022 |title=China's military told to 'resolutely do what the party asks it to do' |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3193454/chinas-military-told-resolutely-do-what-party-asks-it-do |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=19 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231019060837/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3193454/chinas-military-told-resolutely-do-what-party-asks-it-do |url-status=live }}</ref>

Beginning in the 1980s, the PLA tried to transform itself from a land-based power centered on a vast ground force to a smaller, more mobile, high-tech one capable of mounting operations beyond its borders.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019" /> The motivation for this was that a massive land invasion by Russia was no longer seen as a major threat, and the new threats to China are seen to be a declaration of independence by [[Taiwan]], possibly with assistance from the United States, or a confrontation over the [[Spratly Islands]].<ref name="autogenerated2005">The Political System of the People's Republic of China. Chief Editor Pu Xingzu, Shanghai, 2005, Shanghai People's Publishing House. {{ISBN|7-208-05566-1}}, Chapter 11 The State Military System.</ref>

In 1985, under the leadership of the [[Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party]] and the CMC, the PLA changed from being constantly prepared to "hit early, strike hard and to fight a nuclear war" to developing the military in an era of peace.<ref name="M. Taylor Fravel 2019" /> The PLA reoriented itself to modernization, improving its fighting ability, and becoming a world-class force. Deng Xiaoping stressed that the PLA needed to focus more on quality rather than on quantity.<ref name="autogenerated2005"/>

The decision of the Chinese government in 1985 to reduce the size of the military by one million was completed by 1987. Staffing in military leadership was cut by about 50 percent. During the Ninth Five Year Plan (1996–2000) the PLA was reduced by a further 500,000. The PLA had also been expected to be reduced by another 200,000 by 2005. The PLA has focused on increasing mechanization and informatization to be able to fight a high-intensity war.<ref name="autogenerated2005"/>

[[File:Chinese honor guard in column 070322-F-0193C-014.JPEG|thumb|upright=1.25|The [[Beijing Garrison Honor Guard Battalion|PLA Honor Guard]] in Beijing, 2007]]

Former CMC chairman Jiang in 1990 called on the military to "meet political standards, be militarily competent, have a good working style, adhere strictly to discipline, and provide vigorous logistic support" ({{zh |s = 政治合格、军事过硬、作风优良、纪律严明、保障有力 |p = zhèngzhì hégé, jūnshì guòyìng, zuòfēng yōuliáng, jìlǜ yánmíng, bǎozhàng yǒulì }}).<ref>News of the Communist Party of China, [http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/67481/69242/69244/4690367.html Hyperlink] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061013101243/http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/67481/69242/69244/4690367.html |date=13 October 2006 }}. Retrieved 28 March 2007.</ref> The 1991 [[Gulf War]] provided the Chinese leadership with a stark realization that the PLA was an oversized, almost-obsolete force.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Farley |first=Robert |date=1 September 2021 |title=China Has Not Forgotten the Lessons of the Gulf War |work=[[National Interest]] |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/china-has-not-forgotten-lessons-gulf-war-192949 |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=11 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221111091521/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/china-has-not-forgotten-lessons-gulf-war-192949 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last=Scobell |first=Andrew |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA553490.pdf |title=Chinese Lessons from Other Peoples' Wars |date=2011 |publisher=Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College |isbn=978-1-58487-511-6 |language=en |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194350/https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA553490.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> The USA's sending of two aircraft carrier groups to the vicinity of Taiwan during the [[Third Taiwan Strait Crisis]] prompted Jiang to order a ten-year PLA modernization program.<ref name=":054">{{Cite book |last=Lampton |first=David M. |title=Living U.S.-China Relations: From Cold War to Cold War |date=2024 |publisher=[[Rowman & Littlefield]] |isbn=978-1-5381-8725-8 |location=Lanham, MD |pages=225 |author-link=David M. Lampton}}</ref>

The possibility of a militarized Japan has also been a continuous concern to the Chinese leadership since the late 1990s.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Sasaki |first=Tomonori |date=23 September 2010 |title=China Eyes the Japanese Military: China's Threat Perception of Japan since the 1980s |url=https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/china-eyes-the-japanese-military-chinas-threat-perception-of-japan-since-the-1980s/4C3D00214448677422255F228609C395 |journal=The China Quarterly |language=en |volume=203 |pages=560–580 |doi=10.1017/S0305741010000597 |s2cid=153828298 |issn=1468-2648 |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194349/https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/china-eyes-the-japanese-military-chinas-threat-perception-of-japan-since-the-1980s/4C3D00214448677422255F228609C395 |url-status=live }}</ref> In addition, China's military leadership has been reacting to and learning from the successes and failures of the [[United States Armed Forces]] during the [[Kosovo War]],<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Sakaguchi |first1=Yoshiaki |last2=Mayama |first2=Katsuhiko |date=1999 |title=Significance of the War in Kosovo for China and Russia |url=http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e2001_1.pdf |journal=NIDS Security Reports |issue=3 |pages=1–23 |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=14 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220814012122/http://www.nids.mod.go.jp/english/publication/kiyo/pdf/bulletin_e2001_1.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> the [[United States invasion of Afghanistan|2001 invasion of Afghanistan]],<ref>{{Cite news |last=Sun |first=Yun |date=8 April 2020 |title=China's Strategic Assessment of Afghanistan |work=War on the Rocks |url=https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-afghanistan/ |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194347/https://warontherocks.com/2020/04/chinas-strategic-assessment-of-afghanistan/ |url-status=live }}</ref> the [[2003 invasion of Iraq]],<ref name="Chase-2007">{{Cite journal |last=Chase |first=Michael S. |date=19 September 2007 |title=China's Assessment of the War in Iraq: America's "Deepest Quagmire" and the Implications for Chinese National Security |url=https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-assessment-of-the-war-in-iraq-americas-deepest-quagmire-and-the-implications-for-chinese-national-security/ |journal=China Brief |publisher=[[The Jamestown Foundation]] |volume=7 |issue=17 |via= |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194353/https://jamestown.org/program/chinas-assessment-of-the-war-in-iraq-americas-deepest-quagmire-and-the-implications-for-chinese-national-security/ |url-status=live }}</ref> and the [[Iraqi insurgency (2003–2011)|Iraqi insurgency]].<ref name="Chase-2007" /> All these lessons inspired China to transform the PLA from a military based on quantity to one based on quality. Chairman Jiang Zemin officially made a "[[revolution in military affairs]]" (RMA) part of the official national military strategy in 1993 to [[Modernization of the People's Liberation Army|modernize the Chinese armed forces]].<ref name="Ji-1999">{{Cite journal |last=Ji |first=You |date=1999 |title=The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China's Strategic Thinking |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798464 |journal=Contemporary Southeast Asia |volume=21 |issue=3 |pages=344–364 |doi=10.1355/CS21-3B |doi-broken-date=13 November 2024 |jstor=25798464 |issn=0129-797X |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194351/https://www.jstor.org/stable/25798464 |url-status=live }}</ref>

A goal of the RMA is to transform the PLA into a force capable of winning what it calls "local wars under high-tech conditions" rather than a massive, numbers-dominated ground-type war.<ref name="Ji-1999" /> Chinese military planners call for short decisive campaigns, limited in both their geographic scope and their political goals. In contrast to the past, more attention is given to [[reconnaissance]], mobility, and deep reach. This new vision has shifted resources towards the navy and air force. The PLA is also actively preparing for [[space warfare]] and [[cyber-warfare]].<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Wortzel |first=Larry M. |date=2007 |title=The Chinese People's Liberation Army and Space Warfare |journal=Space Policy |publisher=[[American Enterprise Institute]] |jstor=resrep03013 |jstor-access=free}}</ref><ref>{{Cite journal |last=Hjortdal |first=Magnus |date=2011 |title=China's Use of Cyber Warfare: Espionage Meets Strategic Deterrence |journal=[[Journal of Strategic Security]] |volume=4 |issue=2 |pages=1–24 |doi=10.5038/1944-0472.4.2.1 |issn=1944-0464 |jstor=26463924 |s2cid=145083379|doi-access=free }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last1=Jinghua |first1=Lyu |title=What Are China's Cyber Capabilities and Intentions? |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/01/what-are-china-s-cyber-capabilities-and-intentions-pub-78734 |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[Carnegie Endowment for International Peace]] |language=en |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194358/https://carnegieendowment.org/2019/04/01/what-are-china-s-cyber-capabilities-and-intentions-pub-78734 |url-status=live }}</ref>

In 2002, the PLA began holding military exercises with militaries from other countries.<ref name="Shinn-2023">{{Cite book |last1=Shinn |first1=David H. |title=China's Relations with Africa: a New Era of Strategic Engagement |last2=Eisenman |first2=Joshua |date=2023 |publisher=[[Columbia University Press]] |isbn=978-0-231-21001-0 |location=New York |author-link=David H. Shinn}}</ref>{{Rp|page=242}} From 2018 to 2023, more than half of these exercises have focused on military training other than war, generally antipiracy or antiterrorism exercises involving combatting non-state actors.<ref name="Shinn-2023" />{{Rp|page=242}} In 2009, the PLA held its first military exercise in Africa, a humanitarian and medical training practice conducted in Gabon.<ref name="Shinn-2023" />{{Rp|page=242}}

For the past 10 to 20 years, the PLA has acquired some advanced weapons systems from Russia, including [[Sovremenny-class destroyer|Sovremenny class destroyers]],<ref>{{Cite web |last=Osborn |first=Kris |date=2022-03-21 |title=China Modernizes Its Russian-Built Destroyers With New Weapons |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-modernizes-its-russian-built-destroyers-new-weapons-201352 |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[The National Interest]] |language=en |archive-date=4 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230204091606/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-modernizes-its-russian-built-destroyers-new-weapons-201352 |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Sukhoi Su-27]]<ref>{{Cite web |last=Gao |first=Charlie |date=2021-01-01 |title=How China Got Their Own Russian-Made Su-27 "Flanker" Jets |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/how-china-got-their-own-russian-made-su-27-%E2%80%9Cflanker%E2%80%9D-jets-175617 |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[The National Interest]] |language=en |archive-date=5 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221205160448/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/how-china-got-their-own-russian-made-su-27-%E2%80%9Cflanker%E2%80%9D-jets-175617 |url-status=live }}</ref> and [[Sukhoi Su-30]] aircraft,<ref>{{Cite web |last=Kadam |first=Tanmay |date=26 September 2022 |title=2 Russian Su-30 Fighters, The Backbone Of Indian & Chinese Air Force, Knocked Out By Ukraine – Kiev Claims |url=https://eurasiantimes.com/2-russian-su-30-fighters-the-backbone-of-indian-chinese-air-force-knocked-out-by-ukraine-kiev-claims/ |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=The Eurasian Times |language=en-US |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194347/https://eurasiantimes.com/2-russian-su-30-fighters-the-backbone-of-indian-chinese-air-force-knocked-out-by-ukraine-kiev-claims/ |url-status=live }}</ref> and [[Kilo-class submarine|Kilo-class]] diesel-electric submarines.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Larson |first=Caleb |date=2021-05-11 |title=China's Deadly Kilo-Class Submarines Are From Russia With Love |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/chinas-deadly-kilo-class-submarines-are-russia-love-184940 |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[The National Interest]] |language=en |archive-date=4 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230204232241/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/chinas-deadly-kilo-class-submarines-are-russia-love-184940 |url-status=live }}</ref> It has also started to produce several new classes of destroyers and frigates including the [[Type 052D destroyer|Type 052D]] class guided-missile destroyer.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Vavasseur |first=Xavier |date=21 August 2022 |title=Five Type 052D Destroyers Under Construction In China |work=Naval News |url=https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/08/five-type-052d-destroyers-under-construction-in-china/ |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=25 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220825171507/https://www.navalnews.com/naval-news/2022/08/five-type-052d-destroyers-under-construction-in-china/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Wertheim |first=Eric |date=January 2020 |title=China's Luyang III/Type 052D Destroyer Is a Potent Adversary |work=[[United States Naval Institute]] |url=https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/january/chinas-luyang-iiitype-052d-destroyer-potent-adversary |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=10 June 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230610103513/https://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2020/january/chinas-luyang-iiitype-052d-destroyer-potent-adversary |url-status=live }}</ref> In addition, the PLAAF has designed its very own [[Chengdu J-10]] fighter aircraft<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Rogoway |first1=Tyler |last2=Helfrich |first2=Emma |date=18 July 2022 |title=China's J-10 Fighter Spotted In New 'Big Spine' Configuration (Updated) |work=The Warzone |url=https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/chinas-j-10-fighter-spotted-in-new-big-spine-configuration |access-date=12 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194349/https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/chinas-j-10-fighter-spotted-in-new-big-spine-configuration |url-status=live }}</ref> and a new stealth fighter, the [[Chengdu J-20]].<ref>{{Cite web |last=Osborn |first=Kris |date=2022-10-04 |title=China Boosts J-20 Fighter Production to Counter U.S. Stealth Fighters |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-boosts-j-20-fighter-production-counter-us-stealth-fighters-205178 |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[The National Interest]] |language=en |archive-date=1 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221201112242/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-boosts-j-20-fighter-production-counter-us-stealth-fighters-205178 |url-status=live }}</ref> The PLA launched the new [[Type 094 submarine|Jin class]] nuclear submarines on 3 December 2004 capable of launching nuclear warheads that could strike targets across the Pacific Ocean<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Funaiole |first=Matthew P. |date=4 August 2021 |title=A Glimpse of Chinese Ballistic Missile Submarines |url=https://www.csis.org/analysis/glimpse-chinese-ballistic-missile-submarines |access-date= |website=[[Center for Strategic & International Studies]] |language=en |archive-date=7 October 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231007114240/https://www.csis.org/analysis/glimpse-chinese-ballistic-missile-submarines |url-status=live }}</ref> and have three aircraft carriers, with the latest, the Fujian, launched in 2022.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Lendon |first=Brad |date=2022-06-25 |title=Never mind China's new aircraft carrier, these are the ships the US should worry about |url=https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/25/asia/china-navy-aircraft-carrier-analysis-intl-hnk-ml-dst/index.html |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[CNN]] |language=en |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194347/https://www.cnn.com/2022/06/25/asia/china-navy-aircraft-carrier-analysis-intl-hnk-ml-dst/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2022-07-19 |title=Fujian aircraft carrier doesn't have radar, weapon systems yet, photos show |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3185845/chinas-fujian-aircraft-carrier-doesnt-have-radar-and-weapon |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=South China Morning Post |language=en |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194359/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3185845/chinas-fujian-aircraft-carrier-doesnt-have-radar-and-weapon |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=Hendrix |first=Jerry |date=2022-07-06 |title=The Ominous Portent of China's New Carrier |url=https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/07/the-ominous-portent-of-chinas-new-carrier/ |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[National Review]] |language=en-US |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194350/https://www.nationalreview.com/2022/07/the-ominous-portent-of-chinas-new-carrier/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

From 2014 to 2015, the PLA deployed 524 medical staff on a rotational basis to combat the [[Western African Ebola virus epidemic|Ebola virus outbreak]] in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Guinea-Bissau.<ref name="Shinn-2023" />{{Rp|page=245}} As of 2023, this was the PLA's largest medical assistance mission in another country.<ref name="Shinn-2023" />{{Rp|page=245}}

China [[2015 People's Republic of China military reform|re-organized its military from 2015 to 2016]]. In 2015, the PLA formed new units including the PLA Ground Force, the PLA Rocket Force and the PLA Strategic Support Force.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/photo-reports/2016-01/01/content_6840110.htm |title=China establishes Rocket Force and Strategic Support Force – China Military Online<!-- Bot generated title --> |access-date=2 January 2016 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160410043139/http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/photo-reports/2016-01/01/content_6840110.htm |archive-date=10 April 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref> In 2016, the CMC replaced the four traditional military departments with a number of new bodies.<ref name=":Duan">{{Cite book |last=Duan |first=Lei |title=China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment |publisher=[[Leiden University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9789087284411 |editor-last=Fang |editor-first=Qiang |pages= |chapter=Towards a More Joint Strategy: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms and Militia Reconstruction |jstor=jj.15136086 |editor-last2=Li |editor-first2=Xiaobing}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=288–289}} China replaced its system of seven military regions with newly established Theater Commands: [[Northern Theater Command|Northern]], [[Southern Theater Command|Southern]], [[Western Theater Command|Western]], [[Eastern Theater Command|Eastern]], and [[Central Theater Command|Central]].<ref name=":Duan" />{{Rp|page=289}} In the prior system, operations were segmented by military branch and region.<ref name=":Duan" />{{Rp|page=289}} In contrast, each Theater Command is intended to function as a unified entity with joint operations across different military branches.<ref name=":Duan" />{{Rp|page=289}}

The PLA on 1 August 2017 marked its 90th anniversary.<ref>{{Cite web |date=2017-03-15 |title=Exclusive: Massive parade tipped for PLA's 90th birthday |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2079193/massive-parade-tipped-plas-90th-birthday |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |language=en |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194347/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2079193/massive-parade-tipped-plas-90th-birthday |url-status=live }}</ref> Before the big anniversary it mounted its biggest parade yet and the first outside of Beijing, held in the [[Zhurihe Training Base]] in the [[Northern Theater Command]] (within the Inner Mongolia Autonomous Region).<ref>{{Cite news |last=Buckley |first=Chris |date=2017-07-30 |title=China Shows Off Military Might as Xi Jinping Tries to Cement Power |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/30/world/asia/china-military-parade-xi-jinping.html |access-date=2021-10-12 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=7 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211007084938/https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/30/world/asia/china-military-parade-xi-jinping.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

In December 2023, [[Reuters]] reported a military leadership purge after high-ranking generals were ousted from the [[National People's Congress]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=December 31, 2023 |title=Chinese military purge exposes weakness, could widen |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/sweeping-chinese-military-purge-exposes-weakness-could-widen-2023-12-30/ |access-date=July 22, 2024 |work=[[Reuters]]}}</ref> Prior to 2017, over sixty generals were investigated and sacked.<ref>{{Cite news |date=2017-10-22 |title=Charting China's 'great purge' under Xi |language=en-GB |work=[[BBC News]] |url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41670162 |access-date=2024-01-01 |archive-date=6 June 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210606041942/https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-41670162 |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Overseas deployments and peacekeeping operations ===
{{Further|List of countries with overseas military bases#China|People's Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti}}
In addition to its [[People's Liberation Army Support Base in Djibouti|Support Base in Djibouti]], the PLA operates a base in Tajikistan and a [[listening station]] in Cuba.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Yan |first=Sophia |date=2024-07-10 |title=China constructing secret military base in Tajikistan to crush threat from Taliban |url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/07/10/china-secret-military-base-tajikistan-taliban-afghanistan/ |access-date=2024-07-10 |work=[[The Daily Telegraph]] |language=en-GB |issn=0307-1235 |archive-date=22 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240722173910/https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2024/07/10/china-secret-military-base-tajikistan-taliban-afghanistan/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last= |first= |date=July 1, 2024 |title=Secret Signals: Decoding China's Intelligence Activities in Cuba |url=https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240702051639/https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-cuba-spy-sigint/ |archive-date=2024-07-02 |access-date=2024-07-02 |website=[[Center for Strategic and International Studies]] |language=en}}</ref> The [[Espacio Lejano Station]] in Argentina is operated by a unit of a PLA.<ref name=":23">{{Cite news |last=Garrison |first=Cassandra |date=2019-01-31 |title=China's military-run space station in Argentina is a 'black box' |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-argentina-china-insight-idUSKCN1PP0I2 |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220125031112/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-space-argentina-china-insight-idUSKCN1PP0I2 |archive-date=2022-01-25 |access-date=2022-01-25 |work=[[Reuters]] |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=October 4, 2022 |title=Eyes on the Skies: China's Growing Space Footprint in South America |url=https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221005034621/https://features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space/ |archive-date=2022-10-05 |access-date=2022-10-04 |website=[[Center for Strategic and International Studies]] |language=en}}</ref> The PLAN has also undertaken rotational deployments of its warships at the [[Ream Naval Base]] in Cambodia.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Cheang |first1=Sopheng |last2=David |first2=Rising |date=2024-05-08 |title=Chinese warships have been docked in Cambodia for 5 months, but government says it's not permanent |url=https://apnews.com/article/cambodia-china-naval-base-warships-ream-d4571e2ca53e682ce17c121312443b52 |access-date=2024-07-10 |website=[[Associated Press]] |language=en |archive-date=9 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240709235517/https://apnews.com/article/cambodia-china-naval-base-warships-ream-d4571e2ca53e682ce17c121312443b52 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=July 4, 2024 |title=Chinese warships rotate at Cambodia's Ream naval base |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/cambodia/china-warships-ream-07042024025936.html |access-date=July 10, 2024 |work=[[Radio Free Asia]]}}</ref>

The People's Republic of China has sent the PLA to various hotspots as part of China's role as a prominent member of the United Nations.<ref>{{Cite web |last=Gowan |first=Richard |date=2020-09-14 |title=China's pragmatic approach to UN peacekeeping |url=https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-pragmatic-approach-to-un-peacekeeping/ |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[Brookings Institution]] |language=en-US |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194349/https://www.brookings.edu/articles/chinas-pragmatic-approach-to-un-peacekeeping/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Such units usually include engineers and logistical units and members of the paramilitary [[People's Armed Police]] and have been deployed as part of peacekeeping operations in [[Lebanon]],<ref name="Rowland-2022" /><ref>{{Cite report |url=https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2018/03/PRC-Peacekeeping-Backgrounder.pdf |title=China's Role in UN Peacekeeping |date=March 2018 |publisher=Institute for Security & Development Policy |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=5 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221005235516/https://isdp.eu/content/uploads/2018/03/PRC-Peacekeeping-Backgrounder.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> the [[Republic of the Congo]],<ref name="Rowland-2022">{{Cite report |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/WF_088_Rowland_Chinese_Security_Cooperation_Activities.pdf |title=Chinese Security Cooperation Activities: Trends and Implications for US Policy |last=Rowland |first=Daniel T. |date=September 2022 |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200840/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Papers/WF_088_Rowland_Chinese_Security_Cooperation_Activities.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> [[Sudan]],<ref>Daniel M. Hartnett, 2012-03-13, [http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2012/MEMO-PLA-PKO_final.pdf China's First Deployment of Combat Forces to a UN. Peacekeeping Mission—South Sudan] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20121014025306/http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2012/MEMO-PLA-PKO_final.pdf |date=14 October 2012 }}, United States-China Economic and Security Review Commission</ref> [[Ivory Coast]],<ref>Bernard Yudkin Geoxavier, 2012-09-18, [http://yalejournal.org/2012/09/china-as-peacekeeper-an-updated-perspective-on-humanitarian-intervention/ China as Peacekeeper: An Updated Perspective on Humanitarian Intervention] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130131054018/http://yalejournal.org/2012/09/china-as-peacekeeper-an-updated-perspective-on-humanitarian-intervention/ |date=31 January 2013 }}, Yale Journal of International Affairs</ref> [[Haiti]],<ref>{{Cite news |date=1 February 2005 |title=Chinese Peacekeepers to Haiti: Much Attention, More Confusion |work=[[Royal United Services Institute]] |url=https://rusi.org/publication/chinese-peacekeepers-haiti-much-attention-more-confusion |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=11 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240211032250/https://rusi.org/publication/chinese-peacekeepers-haiti-much-attention-more-confusion |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Nichols |first=Michelle |date=14 July 2022 |title=China pushes for U.N. arms embargo on Haiti criminal gangs |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/china-pushes-un-arms-embargo-haiti-criminal-gangs-2022-07-14/ |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200844/https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/china-pushes-un-arms-embargo-haiti-criminal-gangs-2022-07-14/ |url-status=live }}</ref> and more recently, [[Mali War|Mali]] and [[United Nations Mission in South Sudan|South Sudan]].<ref name="Rowland-2022" /><ref>{{Cite web |last=Dyrenforth |first=Thomas |date=2021-08-19 |title=Beijing's Blue Helmets: What to Make of China's Role in UN Peacekeeping in Africa |url=https://mwi.usma.edu/beijings-blue-helmets-what-to-make-of-chinas-role-in-un-peacekeeping-in-africa/ |access-date=2022-11-12 |website=[[Modern War Institute]] |language=en-US |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112194350/https://mwi.usma.edu/beijings-blue-helmets-what-to-make-of-chinas-role-in-un-peacekeeping-in-africa/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Engagements ===
{{See also|List of wars involving the People's Republic of China}}

* 1927–1950: [[Chinese Civil War]]<ref>{{cite book |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=8WYSAAAAQBAJ |title=Historical Dictionary of the Chinese Civil War |publisher=The Scarecrow Press, Inc. |year=2013 |isbn=978-0810878730 |editor1-last=Lew |editor1-first=Christopher R. |location=Lanham, Maryland |page=3 |editor2-last=Leung |editor2-first=Pak-Wah |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=11 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230411192241/https://books.google.com/books?id=8WYSAAAAQBAJ |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 1937–1945: [[Second Sino-Japanese War]]<ref name="Paine2012">{{cite book |last=Paine |first=S. C. M. |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=bAYgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 |title=The Wars for Asia, 1911–1949 |date=2012 |publisher=Cambridge University Press |isbn=978-1-139-56087-0 |page=123 |access-date=28 November 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221012012418/https://books.google.com/books?id=bAYgAwAAQBAJ&pg=PA123 |archive-date=12 October 2022 |url-status=live}}</ref>
* 1949: [[Amethyst incident|Yangtze incident]] against British warships on the Yangtze River<ref>{{cite web |title=Security Check Required |url=http://www.britains-smallwars.com/RRGP/AMETHYST.htm |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150414010949/http://www.britains-smallwars.com/RRGP/AMETHYST.htm |archive-date=14 April 2015 |access-date=1 May 2016}}</ref>
* 1949: [[Incorporation of Xinjiang into the People's Republic of China]]<ref>{{cite web |title=Sinkiang and Sino-Soviet Relations |url=http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2008/P1953.pdf |access-date=14 March 2017 |archive-date=5 June 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110605043232/http://www.rand.org/pubs/papers/2008/P1953.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 1950: [[Annexation of Tibet by the People's Republic of China]]<ref>Shakya 1999 p. 32 (6 Oct);  {{harvp|Goldstein|1997|p=45}} (7 Oct).</ref>
* 1950–1953: [[Korean War]] under the banner of the Chinese [[People's Volunteer Army]]<ref>{{Cite book |last1=Ryan |first1=Mark A. |title=Chinese warfighting: The PLA experience since 1949 |last2=Finkelstein |first2=David M. |last3=McDevitt |first3=Michael A. |date=2003 |publisher=M.E. Sharpe |isbn=0-7656-1087-6 |location=Armonk, NY |page=125}}</ref>
* 1954–1955: [[First Taiwan Strait Crisis]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Rushkoff |first=Bennett C. |date=1981 |title=Eisenhower, Dulles and the Quemoy-Matsu Crisis, 1954–1955 |journal=[[Political Science Quarterly]] |volume=96 |issue=3 |pages=465–480 |doi=10.2307/2150556 |issn=0032-3195 |jstor=2150556}}</ref>
* 1955–1970: [[Vietnam War]]<ref name="Zhai">{{Cite book |last=Zhai |first=Qiang |title=China and the Vietnam wars, 1950–1975 |publisher=University of North Carolina Press |year=2000 |isbn=978-0807825327 |location=Chapel Hill |oclc=41564973}}</ref>
* 1958: [[Second Taiwan Strait Crisis]] at [[Quemoy]] and [[Matsu (islands)|Matsu]]<ref name="1958 crisis">{{cite book |url=https://archive.org/details/The1958TaiwanStraitsCrisisADocumentedHistory/page/n183 |title=The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis_ A Documented History |date=1975}}</ref>
* 1962: [[Sino-Indian War]]<ref>{{Cite book |last=Lintner |first=Bertil |title=China's India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World |date=2018 |publisher=[[Oxford University Press]] |isbn=978-0-19-909163-8 |language=en |oclc=1034558154 |author-link=Bertil Lintner}}</ref>
* 1967: [[Nathu La and Cho La clashes|Border skirmishes]] with India<ref name="Chellaney2">{{Cite book |last=Brahma Chellaney |author-link=Brahma Chellaney |url=https://archive.org/details/asianjuggernautr0000chel |title=Asian Juggernaut: The Rise of China, India, and Japan |date=2006 |publisher=[[HarperCollins]] |isbn=978-8172236502 |page=195 |language=en |quote=Indeed, Beijing's acknowledgement of Indian control over Sikkim seems limited to the purpose of facilitating trade through the vertiginous Nathu-la Pass, the scene of bloody artillery duels in September 1967 when Indian troops beat back attacking Chinese forces.}}</ref>
* 1969: [[Sino-Soviet border conflict]]<ref>{{cite web |title=Некоторые малоизвестные эпизоды пограничного конфликта на о. Даманском |url=http://warfor.me/nekotoryie-maloizvestnyie-epizodyi-pogranichnogo-konflikta-na-o-damanskom/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180311140855/http://warfor.me/nekotoryie-maloizvestnyie-epizodyi-pogranichnogo-konflikta-na-o-damanskom/ |archive-date=11 March 2018 |access-date=10 March 2018 |work=Военное оружие и армии Мира}}</ref>
* 1974: [[Battle of the Paracel Islands]] with [[South Vietnam]]<ref>Carl O. Schustser. [http://www.historynet.com/battle-paracel-islands.htm "Battle for Paracel Islands".] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220120162438/https://www.historynet.com/battle-paracel-islands.htm |date=20 January 2022 }}</ref>
* 1979: [[Sino-Vietnamese War]]<ref name="auto2">{{cite book |last=Elleman |first=Bruce A. |url=https://archive.org/details/modernchinesewar00elle |title=Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795–1989 |publisher=Routledge |year=2001 |isbn=0415214742 |page=[https://archive.org/details/modernchinesewar00elle/page/n309 297] |url-access=limited}}</ref>
* 1979–1990: [[Sino-Vietnamese conflicts (1979–1991)|Sino-Vietnamese conflicts]]<ref name="CarlyleAThayer">Carlyle A. Thayer, "Security Issues in Southeast Asia: The Third Indochina War", Conference on Security and Arms Control in the North Pacific, Australian National University, Canberra, August 1987.</ref>
* 1988: [[Johnson South Reef Skirmish]] with Vietnam<ref name="koo9-154">{{Cite book |last=Koo |first=Min Gyo |title=Island Disputes and Maritime Regime Building in East Asia |date=2010 |publisher=Springer New York |isbn=978-0-387-89669-4 |series=The Political Economy of the Asia Pacific |location=New York, NY |pages=154 |doi=10.1007/978-0-387-89670-0}}</ref>
* 1989: [[People's Liberation Army at the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre|Enforcement of martial law in Beijing]] during the [[1989 Tiananmen Square protests and massacre]]<ref>{{Cite news |last=McFadden |first=Robert D. |date=5 June 1989 |title=The West Condemns the Crackdown |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/05/world/the-west-condemns-the-crackdown.html |access-date=25 May 2021 |issn=0362-4331 |archive-date=3 May 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190503230905/https://www.nytimes.com/1989/06/05/world/the-west-condemns-the-crackdown.html |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 1990: [[Barin uprising]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Dreyer |first=June Teufel |date=2005 |title=China's Vulnerability to Minority Separatism |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/30172869 |journal=Asian Affairs |volume=32 |issue=2 |pages=69–85 |doi=10.3200/AAFS.32.2.69-86 |jstor=30172869 |s2cid=153883722 |issn=0092-7678 |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200845/https://www.jstor.org/stable/30172869 |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 1995–1996: [[Third Taiwan Strait Crisis]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Qimao |first=Chen |date=1996 |title=The Taiwan Strait Crisis: Its Crux and Solutions |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/2645635 |journal=Asian Survey |volume=36 |issue=11 |pages=1055–1066 |doi=10.2307/2645635 |jstor=2645635 |issn=0004-4687 |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200843/https://www.jstor.org/stable/2645635 |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 2007–present: [[UNIFIL]] peacekeeping operations in [[Lebanon]]<ref name="Rowland-2022" />
* 2009–present: [[Piracy in Somalia|Anti-piracy operations]] in the [[Gulf of Aden]]<ref>{{Cite journal |last=Henry |first=Jérôme |date=November 2016 |title=China's Military Deployments in the Gulf of Aden: Anti-Piracy and Beyond |url=https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/chinas_military_deployments_in_the_gulf_of_aden_anti-piracy_and_beyond_0.pdf |journal=Notes de l'Ifri |issue=89 |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=13 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221113165347/https://www.ifri.org/sites/default/files/atoms/files/chinas_military_deployments_in_the_gulf_of_aden_anti-piracy_and_beyond_0.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 2014: Search and rescue efforts for [[Malaysia Airlines Flight 370]]<ref>{{Cite news |last=Torode |first=Greg |date=13 March 2014 |title=A nervous region eyes robust Chinese response to missing Malaysian plane |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-airlines-china-response-anal/a-nervous-region-eyes-robust-chinese-response-to-missing-malaysian-plane-idUSBREA2C0XE20140313 |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200842/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-malaysia-airlines-china-response-anal/a-nervous-region-eyes-robust-chinese-response-to-missing-malaysian-plane-idUSBREA2C0XE20140313 |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 2014: [[UN]] peacekeeping operations in [[Mali War|Mali]]<ref>{{Cite web |title=Troop and police contributors |url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors |access-date=2021-10-29 |website=United Nations Peacekeeping |language=en |archive-date=30 June 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190630060533/https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 2015: [[UNMISS]] peacekeeping operations in [[South Sudan]]<ref name="UNwho">{{cite web |title=UNMISS Fact Sheet |url=https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmiss |access-date=22 December 2017 |publisher=UNMISS |archive-date=23 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210423064759/https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/mission/unmiss |url-status=live }}</ref>
* 2020–2021: [[2020–2021 China–India skirmishes|China–India skirmishes]]<ref name="Tellis-2020">{{Cite report |url=https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Himalayan-Border-Standoffs.pdf |title=Hustling in the Himalayas: The Sino-Indian Border Confrontation |last=Tellis |first=Ashley J. |date=June 2020 |quote=These efforts to bring new territorial enclaves under Chinese control are occurring simultaneously at several different locations, such as on the northern bank of the Pangong Tso, at Hot Springs, and in the Galwan Valley, places that all lie astride the LAC in eastern Ladakh |access-date=29 June 2020 |website=Carnegie Endowment for International Peace |archive-date=18 February 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210218135503/https://carnegieendowment.org/files/Tellis_Himalayan-Border-Standoffs.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>
As of at least early 2024, China has not fought a war since 1979 and has only fought relatively minor conflicts since.<ref name=":13" />{{Rp|page=72}}

== Organization ==
[[File:China's military leadership organizational chart - page 46 - Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China (2023).png|thumb|Organizational chart of the People's Liberation Army]]
[[File:ChinaDOD.jpg|thumb|The CMC is ceremonially housed in the [[Ministry of National Defense of the People's Republic of China|Ministry of National Defense]] compound ("August 1st Building")]]
The PLA is a component of the armed forces of China, which also includes the PAP, the reserves, and the [[Militia (China)|militia]].{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=50}} The armed forces are controlled by the CCP under the doctrine of "[[Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun|the Party must always control the gun]]".({{Lang-zh|c=党指挥枪|p=Dǎng zhǐhuī qiāng}}){{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=521}} The PLA and the PAP have the largest delegation in the [[National People's Congress]] (NPC), which are elected by servicemember election committees of top-level military subdivisions, including the PLA's theater commands and service branches.<ref name=":102">{{Cite web |last=Wei |first=Changhao |date=2022-03-29 |title=Explainer: How Seats in China's National People's Congress Are Allocated |url=https://npcobserver.com/2022/03/explainer-how-seats-in-chinas-national-peoples-congress-are-allocated/ |access-date=2024-03-10 |website=NPC Observer |language=en-US |archive-date=10 March 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240310192345/https://npcobserver.com/2022/03/explainer-how-seats-in-chinas-national-peoples-congress-are-allocated/ |url-status=live }}</ref> At the [[14th National People's Congress]]; the joint delegation has 281 deputies—over 9% of the total—all of whom are CCP members.<ref>{{Cite news |date=25 February 2024 |title=中华人民共和国第十四届全国人民代表大会代表名单 |trans-title=List of Deputies to the 14th National People's Congress of the People's Republic of China |url=http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0225/c1001-32630907.html |access-date=23 July 2024 |work=[[People's Daily]] |archive-date=26 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230426071927/http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2023/0225/c1001-32630907.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Central Military Commission ===
{{Main|Central Military Commission (China)}}
The PLA is governed by the Central Military Commission (CMC); under the arrangement of "[[one institution with two names]]", there exists a state CMC and a Party CMC, although both commissions have identical personnel, organization and function, and effectively work as a single body.<ref name="Liu-2022">{{Cite news |last=Liu |first=Zhen |date=18 October 2022 |title=What is China's Central Military Commission and why is it so powerful? |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3196360/what-chinas-central-military-commission-and-why-it-so-powerful |access-date=18 September 2023 |archive-date=20 September 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230920032753/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3196360/what-chinas-central-military-commission-and-why-it-so-powerful |url-status=live }}</ref> The only difference in membership between the two occurs for a few months every five years, during the period between a [[National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|Party National Congress]], when Party CMC membership changes, and the next ensuing National People's Congress, when the state CMC changes.<ref>The Political System of the People's Republic of China. Chief Editor Pu Xingzu, Shanghai, 2005, Shanghai People's Publishing House. {{ISBN|7-208-05566-1}} Chapter 11, the State Military System, pp. 369–392.</ref>

The CMC is composed of a [[Chairman of the Central Military Commission (China)|chairman]], [[Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission|vice chairpersons]] and regular members. The chairman of the CMC is the commander-in-chief of the PLA, with the post generally held by the [[paramount leader]] of China; since 1989, the post has generally been held together with the [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP general secretary]].{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=521}}<ref name="Liu-2022" /><ref>{{cite web |title=Xi Jinping Has a New Title: Commander-in-Chief of the People's Liberation Army |url=https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/xi-jinping-has-a-new-title-commander-in-chief-of-the-peoples-liberation-army/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211006042951/https://thediplomat.com/2016/04/xi-jinping-has-a-new-title-commander-in-chief-of-the-peoples-liberation-army/ |archive-date=6 October 2021 |access-date=2021-09-30 |website=[[The Diplomat]]}}</ref> Unlike in other countries, the [[Ministry of National Defense (China)|Ministry of National Defense]] and its [[Minister of National Defense (China)|Minister]] do not have command authority, largely acting as diplomatic liaisons of the CMC, insulating the PLA from external influence.{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=101}} However, the Minister has always been a member of the CMC.<ref name="Liu-2022" />

{{center|'''The Membership of the Central Military Commission'''}}

; Chairman:
* [[Xi Jinping]] (also [[General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party|General Secretary]], [[President of China|President]] and [[Commander-in-chief]] of Joint Battle Command)

; Vice Chairmen:
* General [[Zhang Youxia]] 
* General [[He Weidong]]

; Members
* Chief of the [[Joint Staff Department (China)|Joint Staff Department]] (JSD) – General [[Liu Zhenli (general)|Liu Zhenli]]
* Director of the [[Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission|Political Work Department]] – Admiral [[Miao Hua]]
* Secretary of the [[Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission|Commission for Discipline Inspection]] – General [[Zhang Shengmin]]

Previously, the PLA was governed by four general departments; the General Political, the General Logistics, the General Armament, and the General Staff Departments. These were abolished in 2016 under the [[2015 People's Republic of China military reform|military reforms]] undertaken by Xi Jinping, replaced with 15 new functional departments directly reporting to the CMC:<ref name="Lague-2019">{{Cite news |last1=Lague |first1=David |last2=Lim |first2=Benjamin Kang |date=23 April 2019 |title=How China is replacing America as Asia's military titan |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-xi/ |access-date=10 January 2020 |archive-date=21 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210121184056/https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/china-army-xi/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

# [[General Office of the Central Military Commission|General Office]]
# [[Joint Staff Department (China)|Joint Staff Department]]
# [[Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission|Political Work Department]]
# [[Logistic Support Department of the Central Military Commission|Logistic Support Department]]
# [[Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission|Equipment Development Department]]
# [[Training and Administration Department of the Central Military Commission|Training and Administration Department]]
# [[National Defense Mobilization Department of the Central Military Commission|National Defense Mobilization Department]]
# [[Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission|Discipline Inspection Commission]]
# [[Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Central Military Commission|Politics and Legal Affairs Commission]]
# [[Science and Technology Commission of the Central Military Commission|Science and Technology Commission]]
# [[Office for Strategic Planning of the Central Military Commission|Office for Strategic Planning]]
# [[Office for Reform and Organizational Structure]]
# [[Office for International Military Cooperation of the Central Military Commission|Office for International Military Cooperation]]
# [[Audit Office of the Central Military Commission|Audit Office]]
# [[Agency for Offices Administration of the Central Military Commission|Agency for Offices Administration]]

Included among the 15 departments are three commissions. The CMC Discipline Inspection Commission is charged with rooting out corruption.

=== Political leadership ===
The CCP maintains absolute control over the PLA.{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|pp=84–85}} It requires the PLA to undergo political education, instilling [[Ideology of the Chinese Communist Party|CCP ideology]] in its members.<ref name=":2" /> Additionally, China maintains a [[political commissar]] system.<ref name=":0">{{Cite news |last1=Torode |first1=Greg |last2=Tian |first2=Yew Lun |date=2023-09-20 |title=Li Shangfu: Who is China's missing defence minister and how important is he? |language=en |work=[[Reuters]] |url=https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-military-hierarchy-under-spotlight-after-defence-minister-disappears-2023-09-18/ |access-date=2023-09-24 |archive-date=24 September 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230924210237/https://www.reuters.com/world/china/chinas-military-hierarchy-under-spotlight-after-defence-minister-disappears-2023-09-18/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Regiment-level and higher units maintain CCP committees and political commissars ({{zh|c=政治委员 or 政委}}).<ref name=":0" /><ref name=":1">{{Cite web |title=军事制度 |trans-title=Military System |url=http://www1.china.com.cn/ch-zhengzhi/zhengzhi7.htm |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070613170026/http://www1.china.com.cn/ch-zhengzhi/zhengzhi7.htm |archive-date=13 June 2007 |access-date=7 November 2023 |website=[[China Internet Information Center]]}}</ref> Additionally, battalion-level and company-level units respectively maintain political directors and political instructors.<ref name=":3">{{Cite web |last1=Allen |first1=Kenneth |last2=Chao |first2=Brian |last3=Kinsella |first3=Ryan |date=4 March 2013 |title=China's Military Political Commissar System in Comparative Perspective |url=https://www.jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-political-commissar-system-in-comparative-perspective |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201021223644/https://www.jamestown.org/program/chinas-military-political-commissar-system-in-comparative-perspective/ |archive-date=21 October 2020 |access-date=7 November 2023 |website=[[Jamestown Foundation]]}}</ref> The political workers are officially equal to commanders in status.<ref name=":2">{{Cite news |date=6 November 2023 |title=Xi Jinping is obsessed with political loyalty in the PLA |url=https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/11/06/xi-jinping-is-obsessed-with-political-loyalty-in-the-pla |url-access=subscription |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231107161451/https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/11/06/xi-jinping-is-obsessed-with-political-loyalty-in-the-pla |archive-date=7 November 2023 |access-date=2023-11-07 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613}}</ref> The political workers are officially responsible for the implementation of party committee decisions, instilling and maintaining party discipline, providing political education, and working with other components of the political work system.<ref name=":3" />

As a rule, the political worker serves as the party committee secretary while the commander serves as the deputy secretary.<ref name=":3" /> Key decisions in the PLA are generally made in the CCP committees throughout the military.<ref name=":2" /> Due to the CCP's absolute leadership, non-CCP [[List of political parties in China|political parties]], groups and organizations except the [[Communist Youth League of China]] are not allowed to establish organizations or have members in the PLA. Additionally, only the CCP is allowed to appoint the leading cadres at all levels of the PLA.<ref name=":1" />

=== Grades ===
{{main|Grades of the armed forces of China}}
Grades determine the [[command hierarchy]] from the CMC to the platoon level. Entities command lower-graded entities, and coordinate with like-graded entities.{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=16}} Since 1988, all organizations, billets, and officers in the PLA have a grade.{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=18}}

[[Civil–military relations]] within the wider state bureaucracy is also influenced by grades. The grading systems used by the armed forces and the government are parallel, making it easier for military entities to identify the civilian entities they should coordinate with.{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=16}}

An officer's authority, eligibility for billets, pay, and retirement age is determined by grade.{{sfn|Kaufman|Mackenzie|2009|pp=73-74}}{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=16}} Career progression includes lateral transfers between billets of the same grade, but which are not considered promotions.{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=17}}{{sfn|Kaufman|Mackenzie|2009|p=73}} An officer retiring to the civil service has their grade translated to the civil grade system;{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=16}} their grade continues to progress and draw retirement benefits through the civil system rather than the armed forces.{{sfn|Kaufman|Mackenzie|2009|p=74}}

Historically, an officer's grade — or position ({{zh|s=职务等级|p=zhiwu dengji}}<ref name="jt_wuthnow_saunders_2021-03-16">{{Cite web |last1=Wuthnow |first1=Joel |last2=Saunders |first2=Phillip C. |date=16 March 2021 |title=A New Step Forward in PLA Professionalization |url=https://jamestown.org/program/a-new-step-forward-in-pla-professionalization/ |access-date=22 June 2024 |website=The Jamestown Foundation |language=en |archive-date=22 June 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240622160617/https://jamestown.org/program/a-new-step-forward-in-pla-professionalization/ |url-status=live }}</ref>) — was more important than their ''[[Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force|rank]]'' ({{zh|s=军衔|p=junxian}}<ref name="jt_wuthnow_saunders_2021-03-16"/>).{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=16}} Historically, time-in-grade and time-in-rank requirements<ref name="jamestown_allen_2010-07-22">{{Cite web |last1=Allen |first1=Kenneth |title=Assessing the PLA's Promotion Ladder to CMC Member Based on Grades vs. Ranks – Part 1 |url=https://jamestown.org/program/assessing-the-plas-promotion-ladder-to-cmc-member-based-on-grades-vs-ranks-part-1/ |access-date=2024-05-12 |language=en-US |archive-date=2024-05-11 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240511105015/https://jamestown.org/program/assessing-the-plas-promotion-ladder-to-cmc-member-based-on-grades-vs-ranks-part-1/ |website=The Jamestown Foundation |date=22 July 2010 |url-status=live }}</ref> and promotions were not synchronized;{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=17}} multiple ranks were present in each grade{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=19}} with all having the same authority.{{sfn|Kaufman|Mackenzie|2009|p=74}} Rank was mainly a visual aid to roughly determine relative position when interacting with Chinese and foreign personnel.{{sfn|Pollpeter|Allen|2012|p=16}} PLA etiquette preferred addressing personnel by position rather than by rank.{{sfn|Kaufman|Mackenzie|2009|p=77}} Reforms to a more rank-centric system began in 2021.<ref name="jt_wuthnow_saunders_2021-03-16"/> In 2023, a revised grade structure associated one rank per grade, with some ranks spanning multiple grades.<ref name="dalate_cs_grades">{{Cite web |title=中国公务员的级别和职级 |trans-title=Chinese civil service grades and ranks |url=http://www.dltdjw.gov.cn/ywgz/gwygl/202303/t20230309_3357858.html |date=9 March 2023 |access-date=2024-06-14 |website=Dalate Banner Party Building Network |archive-date=2024-06-14 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240614215401/http://www.dltdjw.gov.cn/ywgz/gwygl/202303/t20230309_3357858.html |url-status=live |language=zh }}</ref>

=== Operational control ===
[[File:Map of Theatres of PLA en.svg|thumb|right|upright=1.6|The five theatre  commands of the PLA<ref>{{cite web |url = https://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-02/03/content_6888459.htm |title = Considerations for replacing Military Area Commands with Theater Commands |website = english.chinamil.com.cn |access-date = 13 January 2019 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180223031932/http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-02/03/content_6888459.htm |archive-date = 23 February 2018 |url-status = live }}</ref>]]
{{Main|Theater command (China)}}
Operational control of combat units is divided between the service headquarters and domestic geographically based [[Theater command (China)|theatre commands]].

Theatre commands are multi-service ("joint") organizations that are broadly responsible for [[Military strategy|strategy]], [[Military operation plan|plans]], [[Military tactics|tactics]], and [[Military policy|policy]] specific to their assigned [[area of responsibility]]. In wartime, they will likely have full control of subordinate units; in peacetime, units also report to their service headquarters.{{sfn|ATP 7-100.3: Chinese Tactics|2021|p=2-4}} Force-building is the responsibility of the services and the CMC.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=235}} The five theatre commands, in order of stated significance are:{{sfn|ATP 7-100.3: Chinese Tactics|2021|pp=2-5 - 2-6}}

* [[Eastern Theater Command]]
* [[Southern Theater Command]]
* [[Western Theater Command]]
* [[Northern Theater Command]]
* [[Central Theater Command]]

The service headquarters retain operational control in some areas within China and outside of China. For example, army headquarters controls or is responsible for the Beijing Garrison, the [[Tibet Military District]], the [[Xinjiang Military District]],{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=355}} and border and coastal defences. The counterpiracy patrols in the Gulf of Aden are controlled by navy headquarters.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=715}} The JSD nominally controls operations beyond China's periphery,{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=714}} but in practice this seems to apply only to army operations.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=137}}

Services and theater commands have the same grade. The overlap of areas or units of responsibility may create disputes requiring CMC arbitration.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=137}}

As part of the 2015 reforms, military regions were replaced by theatre commands in 2016.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=61}} Military regions were − uinlike the theatre commands − army-centric{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=146}} peacetime administrative organizations,{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=234}} and joint wartime commands were created on-demand by the army-dominated General Staff Department.{{sfn|Saunders et al.|2019|p=234}}

=== Organization table ===
{{familytree/start}}
{{familytree | | | | | | | | | | | | |jw| | | | | | | | |jw = '''Central Military Commission'''}}
{{familytree | |,|-|-|-|-|-|v|-|-|-|-|-|+|-|-|-|-|-|v|-|-|-|-|-|.| }}
{{familytree |ju| | | |yx| | | |yt| | | |yz| | | |yy|ju = '''Departments''' |yx = '''Commissions''' |yt = '''Offices'''|yz = '''Arms'''|yy = '''Research institutes'''}}
{{familytree |ju| | | |yx| | | |yt| | | |yz| | | |yy|ju = [[General Office of the Central Military Commission|General Office]] |yx = [[Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Central Military Commission|Discipline Inspection Commission]] |yt = [[Office for Strategic Planning of the Central Military Commission|Office for Strategic Planning]]|yz = [[People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force|Aerospace Force]]|yy = [[PLA Academy of Military Science|Academy of Military Science]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | |yx| | | |yt| | | |yz| | | |yy|ju = [[Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission|Joint Staff Department]] |yx = [[Political and Legal Affairs Commission of the Central Military Commission|Politics and Legal Affairs Commission]] |yt = [[Office for Reform and Organizational Structure]]|yz = [[People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force|Cyberspace Force]]|yy = [[PLA National Defence University|National Defence University]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | |yx| | | |yt| | | |yz| | | |yy|ju = [[Political Work Department of the Central Military Commission|Political Work Department]] |yx = [[Science and Technology Commission of the Central Military Commission|Science and Technology Commission]] |yt = [[Office for International Military Cooperation of the Central Military Commission|Office for International Military Cooperation]]|yz = [[People's Liberation Army Information Support Force|Information Support Force]]|yy = [[National University of Defense Technology]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | |!| | | | |yt| | | |yz| | | | |!|ju = [[Logistic Support Department of the Central Military Commission|Logistic Support Department]] |yt = [[Audit Office of the Central Military Commission|Audit Office]]|yz = [[People's Liberation Army Joint Logistics Support Force|Joint Logistics Support Force]]<ref>{{Cite web |url=http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/13/content_7257668.htm |title=China establishes Joint Logistic Support Force - China Military |access-date=17 January 2021 |archive-date=22 January 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210122051958/http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2016-09/13/content_7257668.htm |url-status=dead }}</ref>}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | |!| | | | |yt| | | | |!| | | | | |!| |ju = [[Equipment Development Department of the Central Military Commission|Equipment Development Department]] |yt = [[Agency for Offices Administration of the Central Military Commission|Agency for Offices Administration]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | |!| | | | | |!| | | | | |!| | | | | |!| |ju = [[Training and Administration Department of the Central Military Commission|Training and Administration Department]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | |!| | | | | |!| | | | | |!| | | | | |!| |ju = [[National Defense Mobilization Department of the Central Military Commission|National Defense Mobilization Department]]}}
{{familytree | |)|-|-|-|-|-|^|-|-|-|-|-|^|-|-|-|-|-|^|-|-|-|-|-|(| }}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = '''[[Theater commands of the People's Liberation Army|Theatre commands]]''' |yt = '''Service Branches'''}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = [[Eastern Theater Command]] |yt = [[People's Liberation Army Ground Force|PLA Ground Force]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = [[Western Theater Command]] |yt = [[People's Liberation Army Navy|PLA Navy]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = [[Southern Theater Command]] |yt = [[People's Liberation Army Air Force|PLA Air Force]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| |ju = [[Northern Theater Command]] |yt = [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|PLA Rocket Force]]}}
{{familytree |ju| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |!| |ju = [[Central Theater Command]]}}
{{familytree | |`|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|v|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|-|'| }}
{{familytree | | | | | | | | | | | | |yt| | | | | | | | |yt = '''People's Liberation Army'''}}
{{familytree/end}}

=== State-owned enterprises ===
Multiple state-owned enterprises have established internal [[Militia (China)|People's Armed Forces]] Departments run by the People's Liberation Army.<ref>{{Cite web |date=October 3, 2023 |title=Big Chinese state-owned enterprises setting up army-linked militias |url=https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/enterprises-militias-10032023164620.html |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231006081810/https://www.rfa.org/english/news/china/enterprises-militias-10032023164620.html |archive-date=2023-10-06 |access-date=2023-10-07 |website=[[Radio Free Asia]] |language=en}}</ref><ref name=":02">{{Cite web |last=Liu |first=Natalie |date=2023-11-07 |title=Why is China Highlighting Militias in State Owned Enterprises? |url=https://www.voanews.com/a/why-is-china-highlighting-militias-in-state-owned-enterprises-/7346238.html |access-date=2023-11-09 |website=[[Voice of America]] |language=en |quote=According to Chinese media, units have been established this year in at least 23 SOEs nationwide, nine of them in Wuhan. |archive-date=9 November 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231109012910/https://www.voanews.com/a/why-is-china-highlighting-militias-in-state-owned-enterprises-/7346238.html |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |last=He |first=Laura |date=2024-02-21 |title=Major companies in China are setting up their own volunteer armies |url=https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/21/business/china-corporate-militias-resurgence-int-hnk/index.html |access-date=2024-02-22 |website=[[CNN]] |language=en |archive-date=22 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240222041734/https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/21/business/china-corporate-militias-resurgence-int-hnk/index.html |url-status=live }}</ref> The internal units are expected "to work together with grassroots organizations to collect intelligence and information, dissolve and/or eliminate security concerns at the budding stage," according to the ''[[People's Liberation Army Daily]]''.<ref name=":02" />

===Academic Institutions===
{{Main|Academic institutions of the armed forces of China}}
There are two academic institutions directly subordinate to the CMC, the [[People's Liberation Army National Defense University|National Defense University]] and the [[National University of Defense Technology]], and they are considered the two top military education institutions in China. There are also 35 institutions affiliated to the PLA's branches and arms, and 7 institutions affiliated to the People's Armed Police.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Allen |first1=Kenneth |last2=Chen |first2=Minzhi |date=2019 |title=The People's Liberation Army's 37 Academic Institutions |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Other-Topics/2020-06-11%20PLA%20Academic_Institutions.pdf |access-date=2024-05-14 |website=Air University |archive-date=3 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240703122915/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/Other-Topics/2020-06-11%20PLA%20Academic_Institutions.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

== Service branches ==
The PLA consists of four [[Military branch|services]] ([[People's Liberation Army Ground Force|Ground Force]], [[People's Liberation Army Navy|Navy]], [[People's Liberation Army Air Force|Air Force]], and [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|Rocket Force]]) and four arms ([[People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force|Aerospace Force]], [[People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force|Cyberspace Force]], [[People's Liberation Army Information Support Force|Information Support Force]], and [[People's Liberation Army Joint Logistics Support Force|Joint Logistics Support Force]]).<ref name=":6" />

=== Services ===
The PLA maintains four services ({{Zh|s=军种|p=jūnzhǒng}}): the Ground Force, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Rocket Force. Following the 200,000 and 300,000 personnel reduction announced in 2003 and 2005 respectively, the total strength of the PLA has been reduced from 2.5&nbsp;million to around 2&nbsp;million.<ref>{{Cite news |last1=Wong |first1=Edward |last2=Perlez |first2=Jane |last3=Buckley |first3=Chris |date=2 September 2015 |title=China Announces Cuts of 300,000 Troops at Military Parade Showing Its Might |language=en-US |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/world/asia/beijing-turns-into-ghost-town-as-it-gears-up-for-military-parade.html |url-status=live |url-access=limited |access-date=10 January 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150902221802/http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/03/world/asia/beijing-turns-into-ghost-town-as-it-gears-up-for-military-parade.html |archive-date=2 September 2015 |issn=0362-4331}}</ref> The reductions came mainly from non-combat ground forces, which would allow more funds to be diverted to naval, air, and strategic missile forces. This shows China's shift from ground force prioritization to emphasizing air and naval power with high-tech equipment for offensive roles over [[Territorial disputes of the People's Republic of China|disputed territories]], particularly in the [[Territorial disputes in the South China Sea|South China Sea]].<ref name="areas">[http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0000911699 China plans military reform to enhance its readiness] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140102191059/http://the-japan-news.com/news/article/0000911699 |date=2 January 2014 }} – The-Japan-news.com</ref>

==== Ground Force ====
[[File:ZTZ-99A tank 20170902.jpg|thumb|A [[Type 99 tank|Type 99A]] main battle tank in service with the PLAGF]]
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Ground Force}}

The PLA Ground Force (PLAGF) is the largest of the PLA's five services with 975,000 active duty personnel, approximately half of the PLA's total manpower of around 2 million personnel.<ref name="Studies2020" />{{Rp|page=260}} The PLAGF is organized into twelve active duty group armies sequentially numbered from the [[71st Group Army]] to the [[83rd Group Army]] which are distributed to each of the PRC's five theatre commands, receiving two to three group armies per command. In wartime, numerous PLAGF [[Military reserve force|reserve]] and [[paramilitary]] units may be mobilized to augment these active group armies. The PLAGF [[People's Liberation Army Reserve Force|reserve]] component comprises approximately 510,000 personnel divided into thirty infantry and twelve anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) divisions. The PLAGF is led by Commander [[Liu Zhenli (general)|Liu Zhenli]] and Political Commissar [[Qin Shutong]].<ref>{{cite news |author1=Jia Nan ({{lang|zh|贾楠}}) |date=5 July 2021 |script-title=zh:4人晋升上将！ |language=zh |work=Sina |url=https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2021-07-05/doc-ikqcfnca5103262.shtml |access-date=6 July 2021 |archive-date=9 July 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210709184318/https://news.sina.com.cn/c/2021-07-05/doc-ikqcfnca5103262.shtml |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Navy ====
[[File:Maritime Interdiction Operations at RIMPAC 2016 160718-N-CA112-003.jpg|thumb|A PLAN [[destroyer]] conducting maritime interdiction operations at [[Exercise RIMPAC#RIMPAC 2016|RIMPAC 2016]]]]
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Navy}}

Until the early 1990s, the PLA Navy (PLAN) performed a subordinate role to the [[People's Liberation Army Ground Force|PLA Ground Force]] (PLAGF). Since then it has undergone rapid modernisation. The 300,000 strong PLAN is organized into three major fleets: the [[North Sea Fleet]] headquartered at [[Qingdao]], the [[East Sea Fleet]] headquartered at [[Ningbo]], and the [[South Sea Fleet]] headquartered in [[Zhanjiang]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Chi-yuk |first=Choi |date=27 May 2013 |title=PLA Navy's three fleets meet in South China Sea for rare show of force |work=[[South China Morning Post]] |url=http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-05/03/content_8022441.htm |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200844/http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018-05/03/content_8022441.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> Each fleet consists of a number of [[surface ship]], [[submarine]], [[naval air force]], [[coastal defence and fortification|coastal defence]], and [[marine (military)|marine]] units.<ref>{{Cite report |url=https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/China_Media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Print_Low_Res.pdf?ver=2015-12-02-081233-733 |title=The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century |date=2 December 2015 |publisher=[[Office of Naval Intelligence]] |location=Washington, D.C. |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200842/https://www.oni.navy.mil/Portals/12/Intel%20agencies/China_Media/2015_PLA_NAVY_PUB_Print_Low_Res.pdf?ver=2015-12-02-081233-733 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Studies2020" />{{Rp|page=261}}

The navy includes a 25,000 strong [[People's Liberation Army Marine Corps|Marine Corps]] (organised into seven brigades), a 26,000 strong [[People's Liberation Army Naval Air Force|Naval Aviation Force]] operating several hundred attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft.<ref name="Studies2020" />{{Rp|pages=263–264}} As part of its overall programme of naval modernisation, the PLAN is in the stage of developing a [[blue water navy]].<ref>{{Cite news |last=Farley |first=Robert |date=10 November 2021 |title=Does China Qualify as Having a True Blue Water Navy? |work=[[The National Interest]] |url=https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/does-china-qualify-having-true-blue-water-navy-195958 |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=11 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240211032859/https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/does-china-qualify-having-true-blue-water-navy-195958 |url-status=live }}</ref> In November 2012, then Party General Secretary Hu Jintao reported to the CCP's [[18th National Congress of the Chinese Communist Party|18th National Congress]] his desire to "enhance our capacity for exploiting marine resource and build China into a strong maritime power".<ref>{{cite web|url = https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/07/03/china-launches-two-destroyers/|title = China launches two destroyers with tech similar to US Navy's Aegis system|date = 3 July 2018|access-date = 6 July 2018|archive-date = 15 February 2022|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220215065312/https://www.defensenews.com/global/asia-pacific/2018/07/03/china-launches-two-destroyers/|url-status = live}}</ref> According to the United States [[United States Department of Defense|Department of Defense]], the PLAN has numerically the largest navy in the world.<ref>{{Cite book |last= |first= |url=https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF |title=Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China 2020 Annual Report to Congress |date=2021-07-09 |publisher=[[U.S. Department of Defense]] |language=en |access-date=13 November 2022 |archive-date=9 July 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220709194903/https://media.defense.gov/2021/Nov/03/2002885874/-1/-1/0/2021-CMPR-FINAL.PDF |url-status=live }}</ref> The PLAN is led by Commander [[Dong Jun]] and Political Commissar [[Yuan Huazhi]].<ref>{{cite news |date=6 September 2021 |script-title=zh:习近平今再晋升5名上将 |language=zh |work=rfi.fr |url=https://www.rfi.fr/cn/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/20210906-%E4%B9%A0%E8%BF%91%E5%B9%B3%E4%BB%8A%E5%86%8D%E6%99%8B%E5%8D%875%E5%90%8D%E4%B8%8A%E5%B0%86 |access-date=7 September 2021 |archive-date=7 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210907020926/https://www.rfi.fr/cn/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD/20210906-%E4%B9%A0%E8%BF%91%E5%B9%B3%E4%BB%8A%E5%86%8D%E6%99%8B%E5%8D%875%E5%90%8D%E4%B8%8A%E5%B0%86 |url-status=live }}</ref>

==== Air Force ====
[[File:J-20 at Airshow China 2016.jpg|thumb|A [[Chengdu J-20]] [[Fifth-generation jet fighter|5th generation]] stealth fighter]]
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Air Force}}

The 395,000 strong People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) was organized into five Theatre Command Air Forces (TCAF) and 24 air divisions.<ref>{{Cite journal |last=International Institute for Strategic Studies |author-link=International Institute for Strategic Studies |year=2018 |title=Chapter Six: Asia |journal=The Military Balance |language=en |publisher=[[Routledge]] |volume=118 |issue=1 |pages=261–265 |doi=10.1080/04597222.2018.1416982 |issn=0459-7222}}</ref>{{Rp|pages=249–259}} {{As of|2024}}, the system has been changed into 11 [[Grades of the People's Liberation Army|Corps Deputy-grade]] "Bases" controlling air brigades.<ref name=":10" /> Divisions have been mostly converted to brigades,<ref name=":10">{{Cite book |last=Trevethan |first=Lawrence |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1082606.pdf |title="Brigadization" of the PLA Air Force |date=2018 |website=Defense Technical Information Center |publisher=China Aerospace Studies Institute (CASI) |isbn=978-1718721159 |pages=1–3 |access-date=2024-05-16 |archive-date=3 September 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230903134547/https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/AD1082606.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>  although some (specifically the Bomber divisions, and some of the special mission units)<ref>{{Cite book |last=International Institute for Strategic Studies |author-link=International Institute for Strategic Studies |title=The Military Balance 2024 |date=2024-02-12 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1-003-48583-4 |edition=1 |location=London |pages=261–265 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781003485834}}</ref> remain operational as divisions. The largest operational units within the Aviation Corps is the air division, which has 2 to 3 aviation regiments, each with 20 to 36 aircraft. An Air Brigade has from 24 to 50 aircraft.<ref>{{Cite web |title=The Dragon's Wing: The People's Liberation Army Air Force's Strategy > Air University (AU) > Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs Article Display |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3111108/the-dragons-wing-the-peoples-liberation-army-air-forces-strategy/ |access-date=2024-05-16 |website=www.airuniversity.af.edu |archive-date=22 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220822012050/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/JIPA/Display/Article/3111108/the-dragons-wing-the-peoples-liberation-army-air-forces-strategy/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

The surface-to-air missile (SAM) Corps is organized into SAM [[division (military)|divisions]] and [[brigade]]s. There are also three airborne [[15th Airborne Corps|divisions]] manned by the PLAAF. [[J-XX]] and XXJ are names applied by Western intelligence agencies to describe programs by the People's Republic of China to develop one or more [[Fifth generation jet fighter|fifth-generation]] [[fighter aircraft]].<ref name="JDW">Chang 2002</ref><ref name="miltech">Coniglio 2006, P.44</ref> The PLAAF is led by Commander [[Chang Dingqiu]] and Political Commissar [[Guo Puxiao]].<ref>{{cite news |author1=Marcus, Clay |author2=Rod, Lee |date=24 September 2021 |title=Star General Chang Dingqiu Takes Command of China's Air Force |work=[[The Diplomat]] |url=https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/star-general-chang-dingqiu-takes-command-of-chinas-air-force/ |access-date=9 October 2021 |archive-date=27 September 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210927091518/https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/star-general-chang-dingqiu-takes-command-of-chinas-air-force/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |date=22 January 2022 |title=[军事报道]张又侠在出席中央军委纪委扩大会议时强调 坚决贯彻全面从严治党战略方针 深入做好新时代军队纪检监察工作 |language=zh |trans-title=[Military Report] Zhang Youxia, when attending the enlarged meeting of the Disciplinary Commission of the Central Military Commission, emphasized that we must resolutely implement the strategic policy of strictly governing the party in an all-round way and do a good job in the military discipline inspection and supervision work in the new era. |work=<nowiki>[[China Central Television]</nowiki> |url=https://tv.cctv.com/2022/01/22/VIDEGvAYf6VkuhyfCN3YHBPZ220122.shtml |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220122134924/https://tv.cctv.com/2022/01/22/VIDEGvAYf6VkuhyfCN3YHBPZ220122.shtml |archive-date=22 January 2022}}</ref>

==== Rocket Force ====
[[File:China Announces Troop Cuts at WWII Parade (screenshot) 20159180736.JPG|thumb|DF-21Ds at the [[2015 China Victory Day Parade|2015 Victory Parade]]]]
{{Main|People's Liberation Army Rocket Force}}

The People's Liberation Army Rocket Force (PLARF) is the main strategic missile force of the PLA and consists of at least 120,000 personnel.<ref name="Studies2020" />{{Rp|page=259}} It controls China's [[nuclear weapon|nuclear]] and conventional [[strategic missile]]s.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Lee |first1=Roderick |last2=Béraud-Sudreau |first2=Lucie |last3=Brewster |first3=David |last4=Cairns |first4=Christopher |last5=Ellis |first5=R. Evan |last6=Herlevi |first6=April |last7=Nantulya |first7=Paul |last8=Nouwens |first8=Meia |last9=Pincus |first9=Rebecca |last10=Wuthnow |first10=Joel |date=2022 |title=PLA Rocket Force as a Service: New Team Player or Increasingly Irrelevant? |journal=Enabling a More Externally Focused and Operational Pla – 2020 Pla Conference Papers |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep42811.12 |pages=133–154 |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200840/https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep42811.12 |url-status=live }}</ref> China's total nuclear arsenal size is estimated to be between 100 and 400 thermonuclear warheads. The PLARF is organized into bases sequentially numbered from 61 through 67, wherein the first six are operational and allocated to the nation's theatre commands while Base 67 serves as the PRC's central [[nuclear weapon]]s storage facility.<ref>{{Cite journal |last1=Kristensen |first1=Hans M. |last2=Korda |first2=Matt |date=2021-11-02 |title=Chinese nuclear weapons, 2021 |journal=Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists |language=en |volume=77 |issue=6 |pages=318–336 |doi=10.1080/00963402.2021.1989208 |bibcode=2021BuAtS..77f.318K |s2cid=244118657 |issn=0096-3402|doi-access= }}</ref> The PLARF is led by Command [[Li Yuchao]] and Political Commissar [[Xu Zhongbo]].<ref>{{Cite report |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLARF/2022-10-24%20PLARF%20Organization.pdf |title=PLA Rocket Force Organization |last=Xiu |first=Ma |date=24 October 2022 |publisher=[[China Aerospace Studies Institute]] |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=24 October 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221024133250/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/CASI/documents/Research/PLARF/2022-10-24%20PLARF%20Organization.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Arms ===
The PLA maintains four arms ({{Zh|s=兵种|p=}}): the [[People's Liberation Army Aerospace Force|Aerospace Force]], the [[People's Liberation Army Cyberspace Force|Cyberspace Force]], the [[People's Liberation Army Information Support Force|Information Support Force]], and the [[People's Liberation Army Joint Logistics Support Force|Joint Logistics Support Force]]. The four-arm system was established on 19 April 2024.<ref name=":6">{{Cite web |title=Chinese PLA embraces a new system of services and arms: Defence spokesperson - China Military |url=http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/16302105.html#:~:text=There%20are%20four%20services%2C%20namely%20the%20Army%2C%20the%20Navy%2C%20the%20Air%20Force%20and%20the%20Rocket%20Force%2C%20and%20four%20arms%2C%20including%20the%20Aerospace%20Force%2C%20the%20Cyberspace%20Force%2C%20the%20Information%20Support%20Force%20and%20the%20Joint%20Logistics%20Support%20Force. |access-date=2024-04-20 |website=eng.chinamil.com.cn |archive-date=20 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240420125715/http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/CHINA_209163/TopStories_209189/16302105.html#:~:text=There%20are%20four%20services%2C%20namely%20the%20Army%2C%20the%20Navy%2C%20the%20Air%20Force%20and%20the%20Rocket%20Force%2C%20and%20four%20arms%2C%20including%20the%20Aerospace%20Force%2C%20the%20Cyberspace%20Force%2C%20the%20Information%20Support%20Force%20and%20the%20Joint%20Logistics%20Support%20Force. |url-status=live }}</ref>

== Personnel ==
=== Recruitment and terms of service ===
{{Main|Conscription in China}}

The PLA began as an all-volunteer force. In 1955, as part of an effort to modernize the PLA, the first ''Military Service Law'' created a system of compulsory [[military service]].<ref name=":4">{{Cite web |last=Allen |first=Kenneth |date=January 14, 2022 |title=The Evolution of the PLA's Enlisted Force: Conscription and Recruitment (Part One) |url=https://jamestown.org/program/the-evolution-of-the-plas-enlisted-force-conscription-and-recruitment-part-one/ |access-date=2024-02-11 |website=[[Jamestown Foundation]] |language=en-US |quote=Following the setback of the Cultural Revolution, in the late 1970s, the PLA embarked on an ambitious program to modernize many aspects of the military, including education, training, and recruitment. Conscripts and volunteers were combined into a single system that allowed conscripts who fulfilled their service obligation to stay in the military as volunteer soldiers for a total of 16 years. |archive-date=16 April 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230416185858/https://jamestown.org/program/the-evolution-of-the-plas-enlisted-force-conscription-and-recruitment-part-one/ |url-status=live }}</ref> Since the late 1970s, the PLA has been a hybrid force that combines conscripts and volunteers.<ref name=":4" /><ref>{{Cite news |date=November 6, 2023 |title=China is struggling to recruit enough highly skilled troops |url=https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/11/06/china-is-struggling-to-recruit-enough-highly-skilled-troops |url-access=subscription |access-date=2024-02-11 |newspaper=[[The Economist]] |issn=0013-0613 |quote=In the late 1970s it adopted the current hybrid system of volunteers and conscripts. |archive-date=10 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240210060539/https://www.economist.com/special-report/2023/11/06/china-is-struggling-to-recruit-enough-highly-skilled-troops |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name=":5">{{Cite web |last1=Allen |first1=Kenneth W. |last2=Corbett |first2=Thomas |last3=Taylor A. |first3=Lee |last4=Xiu |first4=Ma |date=November 3, 2022 |title=Personnel of the People's Liberation Army |url=https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Personnel_Peoples_Liberation_Army.pdf |access-date=2024-02-11 |website=[[United States–China Economic and Security Review Commission]] |page=23 |archive-date=16 December 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231216095328/https://www.uscc.gov/sites/default/files/2022-11/Personnel_Peoples_Liberation_Army.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> Conscripts who fulfilled their service obligation can stay in the military as volunteer soldiers for a total of 16 years.<ref name=":4" /><ref name=":5" /> [[De jure]], military service with the PLA is obligatory for all Chinese citizens. However, mandatory military service has not been enacted in China since 1949.<ref>{{cite web |last=Wang |first=Amber |date=30 April 2022 |title=The new rules China hopes will build more professional soldiers |url=https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3176096/new-rules-china-hopes-will-build-more-professional-soldiers |website=[[South China Morning Post]] |access-date=15 April 2024 |archive-date=22 July 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240722173807/https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3176096/new-rules-china-hopes-will-build-more-professional-soldiers |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="times_2301">{{cite magazine |date=6 January 2023 |title=Taiwan Is Extending Conscription. Here's How Its Military Compares to Other Countries |url=https://time.com/6245036/taiwan-conscription-military-comparison/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230108050220/https://time.com/6245036/taiwan-conscription-military-comparison/ |archive-date=8 January 2023 |access-date=8 January 2023 |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]]}}</ref>

===Women and ethnic minorities===
{{anchor|Women in the People's Liberation Army}}
{{anchor|Ethnic minorities in the People's Liberation Army}}
[[File:Военная делегация из Китая посетила Военную академию Генерального штаба ВС РФ.png|thumb|Female Colonel of the [[People's Liberation Army Joint Logistics Support Force|Joint Logistics Support Force]].]]
Women participated extensively in [[unconventional warfare]], including in combat positions, in the [[Chinese Red Army]] during the [[Chinese Communist Revolution|revolutionary period]], Chinese Civil War (1927–1949) and the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945).<ref name="lixiaolin_1993">{{cite journal |last=Li |first=Xiaolin |title=Chinese Women in the People's Liberation Army: Professionals or Quasi-Professionals? |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=20 |issue=1 |date=1993 |pages=69–83 |doi=10.1177/0095327X9302000105 |jstor=45346560 |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/45346560 }}</ref><ref name="kania_2016">{{cite journal |url=https://jamestown.org/program/holding-half-sky-part-1-evolution-womens-roles-pla/ |title=Holding Up Half the Sky? (Part 1)—The Evolution of Women's Roles in the PLA |journal=China Brief |volume=16 |issue=15 |date=4 October 2016 |first=Elsa |last=Kania |access-date=1 April 2024 |archive-date=1 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240401171605/https://jamestown.org/program/holding-half-sky-part-1-evolution-womens-roles-pla/ |url-status=live }}</ref> After the establishment of the People's Republic of China, along with the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s transition toward the conventional military organization, the role of women in the armed forces gradually reduced to support, medical, and logistics roles.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /> It was considered a prestigious choice for women to join the military. Serving in the military opens up opportunities for education, training, higher status, and relocation to cities after completing the service. During the Cultural Revolution, military service was regarded as a privilege and a method to avoid [[Down to the Countryside Movement|political campaign and coresion]].<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" />

In the 1980s, the PLA underwent large-scale demobilization amid the [[Chinese economic reform]], and women were discharged back to civilian society for economic development while the exclusion of women in the military expanded.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /> In the 1990s, the PLA revived the recruitment of female personnel in regular [[military formation]]s but primarily focused on non-combat roles at specialized positions.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /> Most women were trained in areas such as academic/engineering, [[Combat medic|medics]], [[Military communications|communications]], intelligence, cultural work, and administrative work, as these positions conform to the traditional gender roles. Women in the PLA were more likely to be cadets and officers instead of enlisted soldiers because of their specializations.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /> The military organization still preserved some female combat units as public exemplars of social equality.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /><ref name="kania_2016" />

Both enlisted and cadet women personnel underwent the same [[Military recruit training|basic training]] as their male counterparts in the PLA, but many of them serve in predominantly female [[Military organization|organizations]]. Due to ideological reasons, the regulation governing the segregation of sex in the PLA is prohibited, but a quasi-segregated arrangement for women's organizations is still applied through considerations of convenience.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /> Women were likelier to hold commanding positions in female-heavy organizations such as medical, logistic, research, and political work units, but sometimes in combat units during peacetime.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /> In PLAAF, women traditionally pilot transport aircraft or serve as crew members.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2841996/females-in-the-pla-air-force/#:~:text=Historically%2C%20females%20in%20the%20PLAAF,units%2C%20and%20the%20Airborne%20Corps. |title=Females in the PLA Air Force |website=China Aerospace Studies Institute |date=15 November 2021 |first=Kenneth |last=W. Allen |access-date=1 April 2024 |archive-date=1 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240401164601/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/CASI/Display/Article/2841996/females-in-the-pla-air-force/#:~:text=Historically%2C%20females%20in%20the%20PLAAF,units%2C%20and%20the%20Airborne%20Corps. |url-status=live }}</ref> There had been a small number of high-ranking female officials in the PLA since 1949, but the advancement of position had remained relatively uncommon.<ref name="lixiaolin_1993" /><ref name="kania_2016" /> In the 2010s, women were increasingly serving in combat roles, in mixed-gender organizations alongside their male counterparts, and to the same physical standard.<ref name="kania_2016" />

The military actively promotes opportunities for women in the military, such as celebrating [[International Women's Day]] for the members of the armed forces, publicizing the number of firsts for female officers and enlisted personnel, including deployments with peacekeeping forces or serving on PLA Navy's first aircraft carrier, announcing female military achievements in state media, and promoting female special forces through news reports or popular media.<ref name="kania_2016" /> PLA does not publish detailed gender composition of its armed forces, but the [[Jamestown Foundation]] estimated approximately 5% of the active military force in China is female.<ref name="kaniaallen_2016">{{cite journal |url=https://jamestown.org/program/holding-half-sky-part-2-evolution-womens-roles-pla/ |title=Holding Up Half the Sky? (Part 2)—The Evolution of Women's Roles in the PLA |journal=China Brief |volume=16 |issue=16 |date=26 October 2016 |first1=Elsa |last1=Kania |first2=Kenneth |last2=Allen |access-date=1 April 2024 |archive-date=1 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240401171607/https://jamestown.org/program/holding-half-sky-part-2-evolution-womens-roles-pla/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

National unity and territorial integrity are central themes of the Chinese Communist Revolution. The Chinese Red Army and the succeeding PLA actively recruited [[Ethnic minorities in China|ethnic minorities]]. During the Chinese Civil War, Mongol cavalry units were formed. During the Korean War, as many as 50,000 ethnic Koreans in China volunteered to join the PLA. PLA's recruitment of minorities generally correlates to state policies. During the early years, minorities were given preferential treatment, with special attention given to recruitment and training. In the 1950s, ethnic Mongols accounted for 52% of all officers in [[Inner Mongolia]] military region. During the [[Great Leap Forward]] and Cultural Revolution, armed forces emphasized "socialist culture", assimilation policies, and the construction of common identities between soldiers of different ethnicities.<ref name="Heaton_1977">{{cite journal |first=Heaton |last=William R. |title=The Minorities and the Military in China |journal=Armed Forces & Society |volume=3 |issue=2 |date=1977 |pages=325–342 |doi=10.1177/0095327X7700300211 |jstor=45346013 |url=http://www.jstor.org/stable/45346013. }}</ref>

For ethnic minority cadets and officials, overall development follows national policies. Typically, minority officers hold officer positions in their home regions. Examples included over 34% of the battalion and regimental cadres in [[Yi people|Yi]] autonomous region militia were of the Yi ethnicity, and 45% of the militia cadres in Tibetan local militia were of Tibetan ethnicity. Ethnical minorities achieved high-ranking positions in the PLA, and the percentage of appointments appears to follow the ratio of the Chinese population composition.<ref name="Heaton_1977" /> Prominent figures included ethnic Mongol general [[Ulanhu]], who served in high-ranking roles in the Inner Mongolian region and as vice president of China, and ethnic [[Uyghurs|Uyghur]] [[Saifuddin Azizi]], a [[Lieutenant General]] who served in the [[CCP Central Committee]].<ref name="Heaton_1977" /> There were a few instances of ethnic distrust within the PLA, with one prominent example being the defection of [[Margub Iskhakov]], an ethnic [[Muslim]] [[Tatars|Tatar]] PLA general, to the [[Soviet Union]] in the 1960s. However, his defection largely contributed to his disillusion with the failed Great Leap Forward policies, instead of his ethnic background.<ref name="ziyang_2017">{{cite web |url=https://asiatimes.com/2017/09/racism-always-determine-pla-promotions/ |title=Ethnicity factors strongly in PLA promotions |website=Asia Times |date=9 September 2017 |first=Zi |last=Yang |access-date=1 April 2024 |archive-date=1 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240401164602/https://asiatimes.com/2017/09/racism-always-determine-pla-promotions/ |url-status=live }}</ref> In modern times, ethnic representation is most visible among junior-ranking officers. Only a few minorities reach the highest-ranking positions.<ref name="ziyang_2017" />

===Rank structure ===
{{Main|Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Ground Force|Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Navy|Ranks of the People's Liberation Army Air Force|People's Liberation Army rank insignia}}

====Officers====
{| style="border:1px solid #8888aa; background:#f7f8ff; padding:5px; font-size:95%; margin:0 12px 12px 0;"
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OF/Blank}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OF/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Navies/OF/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OF/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OF/People's Republic of China (PLARF)}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OF/People's Republic of China (PLASSF)}}
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====Other ranks====
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{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OR/Blank}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Armies/OR/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Navies/OR/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OR/People's Republic of China}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OR/People's Republic of China (PLARF)}}
{{Ranks and Insignia of Non NATO Air Forces/OR/People's Republic of China (PLASSF)}}
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== Weapons and equipment ==
According to the [[United States Department of Defense]], China is developing kinetic-energy weapons, high-powered lasers, high-powered [[microwave|microwave weapon]]s, [[Particle beam#Military|particle-beam weapon]]s, and [[electromagnetic pulse]] weapons with its increase of military fundings.<ref>The Standard, 5 March 2008, Volume 1, No. 134, Major jump in military spending, Alarm raised over cyber, space advance, ''the Pentagon said in a report. … "The PLA is also exploring satellite jammers, kinetic-energy weapons, high-powered lasers, high-powered microwave weapons, particle-beam weapons, and electromagnetic pulse weapons for counterspace application", it said, adding it was not clear if the cyber intrusions were backed by the military.''</ref>

The PLA has said of reports that its modernisation is dependent on sales of advanced technology from American allies, senior leadership have stated "Some have politicized China's normal commercial cooperation with foreign countries, damaging our reputation." These contributions include advanced European diesel engines for Chinese warships, military helicopter designs from Eurocopter, French anti-submarine sonars and helicopters,<ref>{{cite news |url = http://in.reuters.com/article/us-breakout-submarines-special-report-idINBRE9BI0PD20131219 |title = Chinese military's secret to success: European engineering |last1 = Lague |first1 = David |date = 19 December 2013 |work = Reuters |access-date = 20 December 2013 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20131220211323/http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/12/19/us-breakout-submarines-special-report-idINBRE9BI0PD20131219 |archive-date = 20 December 2013 |url-status = dead }}</ref> Australian technology for the [[Houbei class missile boat]],<ref>Lague, David. [https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-military-technology-idUSBRE84U1HG20120531 "Insight: From a ferry, a Chinese fast-attack boat."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211116153056/https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-military-technology-idUSBRE84U1HG20120531 |date=16 November 2021 }} Reuters, 31 May 2012.</ref> and Israeli supplied American missile, laser and aircraft technology.<ref name="G">{{cite web |title = U.S. up in arms over Sino-Israeli ties |url = http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FL21Ak01.html |date = 21 December 2004 |work = [[Asia Times]] |access-date = 11 June 2008 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20080516232241/http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/FL21Ak01.html |archive-date = 16 May 2008 |url-status = unfit }}</ref>

According to the [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]'s data, China became the world's third largest exporter of major arms in 2010–14, an increase of 143 percent from the period 2005–2009.<ref>{{cite web |title = The United States leads upward trend in arms exports, Asian and Gulf states arms imports up, says SIPRI |url = http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/at-march-2015 |website = sipri.org |date = 16 March 2015 |publisher = [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] (SIPRI) |access-date = 18 March 2015 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20160409121211/http://www.sipri.org/media/pressreleases/2015/at-march-2015 |archive-date = 9 April 2016 |url-status = live }}</ref> SIPRI also calculated that China surpassed Russia to become the world's second largest arms exporter by 2020.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/new-sipri-data-reveals-scale-chinese-arms-industry|title=New SIPRI data reveals scale of Chinese arms industry|date=27 January 2020|website=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]|access-date=27 January 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200127055352/https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2020/new-sipri-data-reveals-scale-chinese-arms-industry|archive-date=27 January 2020|url-status=live}}</ref>

China's share of global arms exports hence increased from 3 to 5 percent. China supplied major arms to 35 states in 2010–14. A significant percentage (just over 68 percent) of Chinese exports went to three countries: Pakistan, Bangladesh and Myanmar. China also exported major arms to 18 African states. Examples of China's increasing global presence as an arms supplier in 2010–14 included deals with Venezuela for armoured vehicles and transport and trainer aircraft, with Algeria for three frigates, with Indonesia for the supply of hundreds of anti-ship missiles and with Nigeria for the supply of several unmanned combat aerial vehicles.<ref name="auto"/>

Following rapid advances in its arms industry, China has become less dependent on arms imports, which decreased by 42 percent between 2005–09 and 2010–14. Russia accounted for 61 percent of Chinese arms imports, followed by France with 16 percent and Ukraine with 13 per cent. Helicopters formed a major part of Russian and French deliveries, with the French designs produced under licence in China.<ref name="auto"/>

Over the years, China has struggled to design and produce effective engines for combat and transport vehicles. It continued to import large numbers of engines from Russia and Ukraine in 2010–14 for indigenously designed combat, advanced trainer and transport aircraft, and naval ships. It also produced British-, French- and German-designed engines for combat aircraft, naval ships and armoured vehicles, mostly as part of agreements that have been in place for decades.<ref name="auto">{{cite web |title=Trends in International Arms Transfer, 2014 |url=http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=495 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150319023856/http://books.sipri.org/product_info?c_product_id=495 |archive-date=19 March 2015 |access-date=18 March 2015 |website=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |publisher= |ref=SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2015}}</ref>

In August 2021, China tested a nuclear-capable [[Hypersonic flight|hypersonic missile]] that circled the globe before speeding towards its target.<ref>{{cite news |title=Biden airs hypersonic missile fears as probable ambassador labels China 'untrustworthy' |url=https://www.dw.com/en/biden-airs-hypersonic-missile-fears-as-probable-ambassador-labels-china-untrustworthy/a-59568428 |work=Deutsche Welle |date=20 October 2021 |access-date=24 October 2021 |archive-date=28 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211028041828/https://www.dw.com/en/biden-airs-hypersonic-missile-fears-as-probable-ambassador-labels-china-untrustworthy/a-59568428 |url-status=live }}</ref> The ''Financial Times'' reported that "the test showed that China had made astounding progress on hypersonic weapons and was far more advanced than U.S. officials realized."<ref>{{cite news |title=China successfully tested hypersonic weapon in August: report |url=https://www.space.com/china-hypersonic-weapon-test-august |work=[[Space.com]] |date=17 October 2021 |access-date=24 October 2021 |archive-date=24 October 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211024180017/https://www.space.com/china-hypersonic-weapon-test-august |url-status=live }}</ref> During the [[Exercise Zapad-81]] in 2021 with Russian forces, most of the gear were novel Chinese arms such as the [[Shaanxi KJ-500|KJ-500 airborne early warning and control aircraft]], [[Chengdu J-20|J-20]] and [[Shenyang J-16|J-16 fighters]], [[Xi'an Y-20|Y-20 transport planes]], and surveillance and combat drones.<ref>[[Bonny Lin]], Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, ''et.al.'' China Power Project. (2023). "How Deep Are China-Russia Military Ties?". [https://chinapower.csis.org/china-russia-military-cooperation-arms-sales-exercises/ Center for Strategic and International Studies website] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230807132132/https://chinapower.csis.org/china-russia-military-cooperation-arms-sales-exercises/ |date=7 August 2023 }} Retrieved 7 August 2023.</ref> Another joint forces exercise took place in August 2023 near Alaska.<ref>Michael R. Gordon and Nancy A. Youssef. (6 Aug 2023). "Russia and China Sent Large Naval Patrol Near Alaska".  [https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-and-china-sent-large-naval-patrol-near-alaska-127de28b Wall Street Journal website] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230807132130/https://www.wsj.com/articles/russia-and-china-sent-large-naval-patrol-near-alaska-127de28b |date=7 August 2023 }} Retrieved 7 August 2023.</ref>

On 24 September 2024, the PLARF performed its first intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) test over the Pacific Ocean since the early 1980s.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Davidson |first=Helen |date=2024-09-25 |title=China test launches intercontinental ballistic missile for first time in decades |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/sep/25/china-missile-test-icbm-pla-rocket-force |access-date=2024-09-25 |work=[[The Guardian]] |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=2024-09-25 |title=China conducts rare public test launch of intercontinental ballistic missile |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/china/china-icbm-test-ballistic-missile-launch-b2618502.html |access-date=2024-09-25 |website=[[The Independent]] |language=en |archive-date=25 September 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240925222921/https://www.independent.co.uk/asia/china/china-icbm-test-ballistic-missile-launch-b2618502.html |url-status=live }}</ref>

=== Cyberwarfare ===
{{Main|Cyberwarfare by China}}

There is a belief in the Western military doctrines that the PLA have already begun engaging countries using cyber-warfare.<ref>{{cite news |last=Gorman |first=Siobhan |date=8 April 2009 |title=Electricity Grid in U.S. Penetrated By Spies |work=[[The Wall Street Journal]] |url=https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123914805204099085 |url-status=live |access-date=1 April 2011 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150108232759/http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB123914805204099085 |archive-date=8 January 2015}}</ref> There has been a significant increase in the number of presumed Chinese military initiated cyber events from 1999 to the present day.<ref>{{citation |first = Bryan |last = Krekel |title = Capability of the People's Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network Exploitation |publisher = [[Northrop Grumman]] |year = 2009 |url = http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Report_16Oct2009.pdf |url-status = dead |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20110203052113/http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/NorthropGrumman_PRC_Cyber_Paper_FINAL_Approved%20Report_16Oct2009.pdf |archive-date = 3 February 2011 }}</ref>

Cyberwarfare has gained recognition as a valuable technique because it is an asymmetric technique that is a part of [[Chinese information operations and information warfare|information operations and information warfare]]. As is written by two PLAGF Colonels, [[Qiao Liang (writer)|Qiao Liang]] and [[Wang Xiangsui]] in the book ''[[Unrestricted Warfare]]'', "Methods that are not characterized by the use of the force of arms, nor by the use of military power, nor even by the presence of casualties and bloodshed, are just as likely to facilitate the successful realization of the war's goals, if not more so.<ref>{{citation |last1=Qiao |first1=Liang |last2=Wang |first2 = Xiangsui |title = Unrestricted Warfare |year=1999 |url = http://www.terrorism.com/documents/unrestricted.pdf |publisher = PLA Literature and Arts Publishing House via [[Foreign Broadcast Information Service]] |url-status=dead |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20000815214700/http://www.terrorism.com/documents/unrestricted.pdf |archive-date = 15 August 2000 }}</ref>

While China has long been suspected of [[cyber spying]], on 24 May 2011 the PLA announced the existence of having 'cyber capabilities'.<ref>Beech, Hannah. [https://world.time.com/2011/05/27/meet-chinas-newest-soldiers-an-online-blue-army/ "Meet China's Newest Soldiers: An Online Blue Army."] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240927020105/https://world.time.com/2011/05/27/meet-chinas-newest-soldiers-an-online-blue-army/ |date=27 September 2024 }}  ''Time'', 27 May 2011.</ref>

In February 2013, the media named "Comment Crew" as a hacker military faction for China's People's Liberation Army.<ref>{{cite news |url = https://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 |newspaper = The New York Times |first = David E. |last = Sanger |title = China's Army Is Seen as Tied to Hacking Against U.S |date = 18 February 2013 |access-date = 28 February 2017 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20170310124107/http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/19/technology/chinas-army-is-seen-as-tied-to-hacking-against-us.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 |archive-date = 10 March 2017 |url-status = live }}</ref> In May 2014, a Federal [[Grand Jury]] in the United States indicted five [[PLA Unit 61398|Unit 61398]] officers on criminal charges related to cyber attacks on private companies based in the United States after alleged investigations by the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]] who exposed their identities in collaboration with US intelligence agencies such as the CIA.<ref>[https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor "U.S. Charges Five Chinese Military Hackers for Cyber Espionage . . . "] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20151203185110/http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-five-chinese-military-hackers-cyber-espionage-against-us-corporations-and-labor |date=3 December 2015 }}, 19 May 2014, justice.gov</ref><ref>[https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-with-cyberspying.html "5 in China Army Face U.S. Charges of Cyberattacks"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170519141057/https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/20/us/us-to-charge-chinese-workers-with-cyberspying.html |date=19 May 2017 }}, 19 May 2014, NY Times</ref>

In February 2020, the United States government indicted members of China's People's Liberation Army for the [[2017 Equifax data breach]], which involved hacking into Equifax and plundering sensitive data as part of a massive heist that also included stealing trade secrets, though the CCP denied these claims.<ref name="cbs china deny">{{cite web | url = https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-denies-responsibility-in-equifax-breach-after-doj-charges-four-military-members/ | title = Data from Equifax credit hack could "end up on the black market," expert warns | date = February 11, 2020 | access-date = February 11, 2020 | work = [[CBS News]] | archive-date = 2 July 2020 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200702012248/https://www.cbsnews.com/news/china-denies-responsibility-in-equifax-breach-after-doj-charges-four-military-members/ | url-status = live }}</ref><ref name="WSJ Indicted">{{cite web | url = https://www.wsj.com/articles/four-members-of-china-s-military-indicted-for-massive-equifax-breach-11581346824 | title = Four Members of China's Military Indicted Over Massive Equifax Breach | date = February 11, 2020 | access-date = April 28, 2020 | work = [[The Wall Street Journal]] | archive-date = 29 May 2020 | archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20200529205316/https://www.wsj.com/articles/four-members-of-china-s-military-indicted-for-massive-equifax-breach-11581346824 | url-status = live }}</ref>

=== Nuclear capabilities ===
{{Main|China and weapons of mass destruction}}

[[File:Medium and Intercontinental Range Ballistic Missiles.png|thumb|upright=1.35|The range of [[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|the PLA Rocket Force's]] medium and intercontinental ballistic missiles (2006)]]

The first of [[List of nuclear weapons tests of China|China's nuclear weapons tests]] took place in 1964, and its [[Test No. 6|first hydrogen bomb test]] occurred in 1967 at [[Lop Nur]]. Tests continued until 1996, when the country signed the [[Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty]] (CTBT), but did not ratify it.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Borger |first=Julian |author-link=Julian Borger |date=2020-04-16 |title=China may have conducted low-level nuclear test, US claims |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/16/china-may-have-conducted-low-level-nuclear-test-us-report-claims |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230529174223/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/apr/16/china-may-have-conducted-low-level-nuclear-test-us-report-claims |archive-date=May 29, 2023 |access-date=2023-05-29 |work=[[The Guardian]] |language=en-GB |issn=0261-3077}}</ref>

The number of nuclear warheads in China's arsenal remains a state secret.<ref name=":9">{{Cite journal |last1=Kristensen |first1=Hans M. |author-link=Hans M. Kristensen |last2=Korda |first2=Matt |last3=Johns |first3=Eliana |last4=Knight |first4=Mackenzie |date=2024-01-02 |title=Chinese nuclear weapons, 2024 |journal=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] |language=en |volume=80 |issue=1 |pages=49–72 |doi=10.1080/00963402.2023.2295206 |issn=0096-3402 |doi-access=free|bibcode=2024BuAtS..80a..49K }}</ref> There are varying estimates of the size of China's arsenal. The ''[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]]'' and [[Federation of American Scientists]] estimated in 2024 that China has a stockpile of approximately 438 nuclear warheads,<ref name=":9" /><ref name=":32">{{Cite web |date=March 31, 2023 |title=Status of World Nuclear Forces |url=https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230529182756/https://fas.org/initiative/status-world-nuclear-forces/ |archive-date=May 29, 2023 |access-date=2023-05-29 |website=[[Federation of American Scientists]] |language=en-US}}</ref> while the [[United States Department of Defense]] put the estimate at more than 500 operational nuclear warheads,<ref name=":8">{{Cite news |last=Feng |first=Emily |date=October 19, 2023 |title=New Pentagon report claims China now has over 500 operational nuclear warheads |url=https://www.npr.org/2023/10/19/1207156597/new-pentagon-report-claims-china-now-has-over-500-operational-nuclear-warheads |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20231020031121/https://www.npr.org/2023/10/19/1207156597/new-pentagon-report-claims-china-now-has-over-500-operational-nuclear-warheads |archive-date=October 20, 2023 |access-date=October 19, 2023 |work=[[NPR]]}}</ref> making it the [[List of countries with nuclear weapons#Estimated worldwide nuclear stockpiles|third-largest]] in the world.

China's policy has traditionally been one of [[no first use]] while maintaining a deterrent retaliatory force targeted for [[countervalue]] targets.<ref name=":22">{{Cite journal |last1=Kristensen |first1=Hans M. |author-link=Hans M. Kristensen |last2=Korda |first2=Matt |last3=Reynolds |first3=Eliana |date=2023-03-04 |title=Chinese nuclear weapons, 2023 |journal=[[Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists]] |language=en |volume=79 |issue=2 |pages=108–133 |bibcode=2023BuAtS..79b.108K |doi=10.1080/00963402.2023.2178713 |issn=0096-3402 |doi-access=free}}</ref> According to a 2023 study by the [[National Defense University]], China's nuclear doctrine has historically leaned toward maintaining a secure [[Second strike|second-strike]] capability.<ref>{{Cite web |last1=Logan |first1=David C |last2=Saunders |first2=Philip C. |date=July 26, 2023 |title=Discerning the Drivers of China's Nuclear Force Development: Models, Indicators, and Data |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3471053/discerning-the-drivers-of-chinas-nuclear-force-development-models-indicators-an/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230930001818/https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/3471053/discerning-the-drivers-of-chinas-nuclear-force-development-models-indicators-an/ |archive-date=September 30, 2023 |access-date=2023-09-16 |website=[[National Defense University Press]] |language=en-US}}</ref>

=== Space ===
{{See also|ASAT program of China}}
Having witnessed the crucial role of space to United States military success in the [[Gulf War]], China continues to view space as a critical domain in both conflict and international [[strategic competition]].<ref name="Cheng-2012">{{Cite journal |last=Cheng |first=Dean |date=2012 |title=China's military role in space |url=https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-06_Issue-1/Cheng.pdf |journal=[[Strategic Studies Quarterly]] |volume=6 |issue=1 |pages=55–77 |via=[[Air University (United States Air Force)|Air University]] |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013057/https://www.airuniversity.af.edu/Portals/10/SSQ/documents/Volume-06_Issue-1/Cheng.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |date=July 2019 |title=China's National Defense in the New Era |url=https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/07/full-text-of-defense-white-paper-chinas-national-defense-in-the-new-era-english-chinese-versions/ |website=Andrew S. Erickson: China analysis from original sources |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013056/https://www.andrewerickson.com/2019/07/full-text-of-defense-white-paper-chinas-national-defense-in-the-new-era-english-chinese-versions/ |url-status=live }}</ref> The PLA operates a various satellite constellations performing [[Reconnaissance satellite|reconnaissance]], [[Satellite navigation|navigation]], [[Communications satellite|communication]], and [[Anti-satellite weapon|counterspace]] functions.<ref name="Clark">{{Cite web |last=Clark |first=Stephen |date=29 January 2021 |title=China launches military spy satellite trio into orbit |url=https://spaceflightnow.com/2021/01/29/china-launches-military-spy-satellite-trio-into-orbit/#:~:text=China%20uses%20the%20Yaogan%20name,are%20the%20Yaogan%2031%20satellites. |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221023185527/https://spaceflightnow.com/2021/01/29/china-launches-military-spy-satellite-trio-into-orbit/ |archive-date=23 October 2022 |website=Spaceflight Now}}</ref><ref name="op_china">{{cite news |date=27 December 2011 |title=China GPS rival Beidou starts offering navigation data |publisher=BBC |url=https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16337648 |url-status=live |access-date=20 June 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120203001904/http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16337648 |archive-date=3 February 2012}}</ref><ref name="Bruce-2021">{{Cite news |last=Bruce |first=Leo |date=26 November 2021 |title=China successfully launches tactical military communications satellite |work=[[NASA]] Spaceflight |url=https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/11/china-launches-military-satellite/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013109/https://www.nasaspaceflight.com/2021/11/china-launches-military-satellite/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Dickinson-2021a">{{Cite report |url=https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dickinson04.20.2021.pdf |title=United States Space Command Presentation to the Senate Armed Services Committee U.S. Senate |last=Dickinson |first=General James H. |date=21 April 2021 |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=26 August 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220826005031/https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Dickinson04.20.2021.pdf |url-status=live }}</ref> Planners at PLA's National Defense University project China's space actions as retaliatory or preventative, following conditions like an attack on a Chinese satellite, an attack on China, or the interruption of a PLA amphibious landing.<ref name=":Li">{{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |title=China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment |publisher=[[Leiden University Press]] |year=2024 |isbn=9789087284411 |editor-last=Fang |editor-first=Qiang |pages=266 |chapter=Beijing's Military Power and East Asian-Pacific Hot Spots |jstor=jj.15136086 |editor-last2=Li |editor-first2=Xiaobing}}</ref> According to this approach, PLA planners assume that the country must have the capacity for retaliation and second-strike capability against a powerful opponent.<ref name=":Li" /> PLA planners envision a limited space war and therefore seek to identify weak but critical nodes in other space systems.<ref name=":Li" />

Significant components of the PLA's space-based reconnaissance include Jianbing (vanguard) satellites with [[Front organization|cover names]] [[Yaogan]] ({{Zh|c=遥感|l=remote sensing|labels=no}}) and [[Gaofen]] ({{Zh|s=高分|labels=no|l=high resolution}}).<ref name="Clark"/><ref>{{Cite news |last=Jones |first=Andrew |date=22 November 2021 |title=China launches new Gaofen-11 high resolution spy satellite to match U.S. capabilities |work=[[SpaceNews]] |url=https://spacenews.com/china-launches-new-gaofen-11-high-resolution-spy-satellite-to-match-u-s-capabilities/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=11 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240211032728/https://spacenews.com/china-launches-new-gaofen-11-high-resolution-spy-satellite-to-match-u-s-capabilities/ |url-status=live }}</ref> These satellites collect [[Electro-optical sensor|electro-optical]] (EO) imagery to collect a literal representation of a [[Targeting (warfare)|target]], [[Synthetic-aperture radar|synthetic aperture radar]] (SAR) imagery to penetrate the cloudy climates of [[South China|southern China]],<ref name="Sino Defense-2007">{{Cite web |date=12 November 2007 |title=JianBing 5 (YaoGan WeiXing 1/3) Synthetic Aperture Radar |url=http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/spacecraft/jianbing5.asp |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080421185528/http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/spacecraft/jianbing5.asp |archive-date=21 April 2008 |access-date=18 May 2022 |website=Sino Defense}}</ref> and [[electronic intelligence]] (ELINT) to provide targeting intelligence on adversarial ships.<ref>{{Cite web |date=20 September 2016 |title=The Chinese Maritime Surveillance System |url=https://satelliteobservation.net/2016/09/20/the-chinese-maritime-surveillance-system/ |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220317214541/https://satelliteobservation.net/2016/09/20/the-chinese-maritime-surveillance-system/ |archive-date=17 March 2022 |website=SatelliteObservation.net}}</ref><ref name="Blizzard-2016">{{Cite journal |last=Blizzard |first=Timothy J. |year=2016 |title=The PLA, A2/AD and the ADF: Lessons for Future Maritime Strategy |url=https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465599 |journal=Security Challenges |volume=12 |issue=3 |pages=69–70 |jstor=26465599 |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013105/https://www.jstor.org/stable/26465599 |url-status=live }}</ref> The PLA also leverages a restricted, high-performance service of the country's BeiDou [[Positioning system|positioning, navigation, and timing]] (PNT) satellites for its forces and [[Intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance|intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance]] (ISR) platforms.<ref>{{cite web |year=2012 |title=Precise orbit determination of Beidou Satellites with precise positioning |url=http://earth.scichina.com:8080/sciDe/EN/abstract/abstract507876.shtml |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20130617060128/http://earth.scichina.com:8080/sciDe/EN/abstract/abstract507876.shtml |archive-date=17 June 2013 |access-date=26 June 2013 |work=Science China}}</ref><ref>{{Cite news |last=Dotson |first=John |date=15 July 2020 |title=The Beidou Satellite Network and the 'Space Silk Road' in Eurasia |url=https://jamestown.org/program/the-beidou-satellite-network-and-the-space-silk-road-in-eurasia/ |access-date=2020-07-16 |newspaper=Jamestown |language=en-US |archive-date=16 July 2020 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200716094445/http://jamestown.org/program/the-beidou-satellite-network-and-the-space-silk-road-in-eurasia/ |url-status=live }}</ref> For secure communications, the PLA uses the Zhongxing and Fenghuo series of satellites which enable secure data and voice transmission over [[C band (IEEE)|C-band]], [[Ku band|Ku-band]], and [[Ultra high frequency|UHF]].<ref name="Bruce-2021" /> PLA deployment of anti-satellite and counterspace satellites including those of the [[Shijian]] and [[Shiyan]] series have also brought significant concern from western nations.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Smith |first=Marcia |date=19 August 2013 |title=Surprise Chinese Satellite Maneuvers Mystify Western Experts |work=SpacePolicyOnline |url=https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/surprise-chinese-satelllite-maneuvers-mystify-western-experts/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=28 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221128213524/https://spacepolicyonline.com/news/surprise-chinese-satelllite-maneuvers-mystify-western-experts/ |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="Dickinson-2021a"/><ref name="Jones-2022">{{Cite news |last=Jones |first=Andrew |date=27 January 2022 |title=China's Shijian-21 towed dead satellite to a high graveyard orbit |work=[[SpaceNews]] |url=https://spacenews.com/chinas-shijian-21-spacecraft-docked-with-and-towed-a-dead-satellite/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=3 February 2023 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230203142431/https://spacenews.com/chinas-shijian-21-spacecraft-docked-with-and-towed-a-dead-satellite/ |url-status=live }}</ref>

The PLA also plays a significant role in the [[Chinese space program]].<ref name="Cheng-2012" /> To date, all the participants have been selected from members of the PLA Air Force.<ref name="Cheng-2012" /> China became the third country in the world to have sent a man into space by its own means with the flight of [[Yang Liwei]] aboard the [[Shenzhou 5]] spacecraft on 15 October 2003,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Yardley |first=Jim |date=15 October 2003 |title=China Sends a Man Into Orbit, Entering the U.S.–Russian Club |work=[[The New York Times]] |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/15/world/china-sends-a-man-into-orbit-entering-the-us-russian-club.html |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=19 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221119013057/https://www.nytimes.com/2003/10/15/world/china-sends-a-man-into-orbit-entering-the-us-russian-club.html |url-status=live }}</ref> the flight of [[Fei Junlong]] and [[Nie Haisheng]] aboard [[Shenzhou 6]] on 12 October 2005,<ref>{{Cite news |last=Mali |first=Tariq |date=18 October 2005 |title=Shenzhou 6 Taikonauts Achieve Firsts for China |work=[[SpaceNews]] |url=https://spacenews.com/shenzhou-6-taikonauts-achieve-firsts-china/ |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=11 February 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240211032741/https://spacenews.com/shenzhou-6-taikonauts-achieve-firsts-china/ |url-status=live }}</ref> and [[Zhai Zhigang]], [[Liu Boming (taikonaut)|Liu Boming]], and [[Jing Haipeng]] aboard [[Shenzhou 7]] on 25 September 2008.<ref>{{Cite news |last=Jones |first=Andrew |date=7 November 2021 |title=China's Shenzhou 13 crew takes its first spacewalk, the country's 1st by a female astronaut |work=[[Space.com]] |url=https://www.space.com/china-shenzhou-13-first-female-spacewalk |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=7 November 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20211107191224/https://www.space.com/china-shenzhou-13-first-female-spacewalk |url-status=live }}</ref>

The PLA started the development of an anti-ballistic and anti-satellite system in the 1960s, code named Project 640, including ground-based lasers and anti-satellite missiles.<ref>{{Cite book |last=Stokes |first=Mark A. |url=https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=monographs |title=China's Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United States |date=1999 |publisher=Diane Publishing |isbn=978-1-4289-1197-0 |language=en |access-date=19 November 2022 |archive-date=12 November 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221112034405/https://press.armywarcollege.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1148&context=monographs |url-status=live }}</ref> On 11 January 2007, China conducted a successful [[2007 Chinese anti-satellite missile test|test]] of an [[anti-satellite missile]], with an SC-19 class KKV.<ref name="channelnewsasia.com">[http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/253580/1/.html China plays down fears after satellite shot down] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20110929015038/http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/afp_asiapacific/view/253580/1/.html |date=29 September 2011 }}, [[Agence France-Presse|AFP]] via [[MediaCorp Channel NewsAsia|Channelnewsasia]], 20 January 2007</ref>

The PLA has tested two types of hypersonic space vehicles, the Shenglong Spaceplane and a new one built by [[Chengdu Aircraft Corporation]]. Only a few pictures have appeared since it was revealed in late 2007. Earlier, images of the High-enthalpy Shock Waves Laboratory [[wind tunnel]] of the [[Chinese Academy of Sciences|CAS]] Key Laboratory of high-temperature gas dynamics (LHD) were published in the Chinese media. Tests with speeds up to Mach 20 were reached around 2001.<ref>{{cite web |url=http://lhd.imech.cas.cn/kyzb/201307/t20130723_116736.html |title=氢氧爆轰驱动激波高焓风洞 |publisher=中国科学院高温气体动力学重点实验室 |date=17 March 2005 |access-date=16 April 2008 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304002515/http://lhd.imech.cas.cn/kyzb/201307/t20130723_116736.html |archive-date=4 March 2016 |url-status=live }}</ref><ref name="strategycenter.net">{{cite web |last=Fisher, Jr. |first=Richard |date=29 June 2011 |title=PLA and U.S. Arms Racing in the Western Pacific |url=http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.247/pub_detail.asp |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20140131161229/http://www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.247/pub_detail.asp |archive-date=31 January 2014 |access-date=20 June 2012 |website=[[International Assessment and Strategy Center]] |publisher= |quote=It is also possible that during this decade the PLA Navy could deploy initial railgun and laser weapons. It is known that the PLA has invested heavily in both technologies. |df=dmy-all}}</ref>

== Budget ==
{{Main|Military budget of China}}
{| class="wikitable floatright"
|+ Official budget
! Publication<br/>date
! Value<br/>(billions of {{USD}})
|-
| March 2000 || 14.6{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2001 || 17.0{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2002 || 20.0{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2003 || 22.0{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2004 || 24.6{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2005 || 29.9{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2006 || 35.0{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2007 || 44.9{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2008 || 58.8<ref>{{Cite news|url = https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/asia/04iht-military.2.10691808.html|title = China increases military spending|newspaper = The New York Times|date = 4 March 2008|last1 = Lague|first1 = David|access-date = 10 February 2020|archive-date = 26 November 2020|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20201126013813/https://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/04/world/asia/04iht-military.2.10691808.html|url-status = live}}</ref>
|-
| March 2009 || 70.0{{citation needed|date=December 2022}}
|-
| March 2010 || 76.5<ref name="military-spending">{{cite web|url = https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/|title = What does China really spend on its military?|date = 28 December 2015|access-date = 15 August 2018|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180816061738/https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/|archive-date = 16 August 2018|url-status = live}}</ref>
|-
| March 2011 || 90.2<ref name="military-spending"/>
|-
| March 2012 || 103.1<ref name="military-spending"/>
|-
| March 2013 || 116.2<ref name="military-spending"/>
|-
| March 2014 || 131.2<ref name="military-spending"/>
|-
| March 2015 || 142.4<ref name="military-spending"/>
|-
| March 2016 || 143.7<ref name="military-spending"/>
|-
| March 2017 || 151.4<ref name="military-spending"/>
|-
| March 2018 || 165.5<ref>{{cite web | url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/china-defence-spending-increase-190304053554047.html | title=China says defence spending increase to be 'appropriate' &#124; News &#124; al Jazeera | access-date=13 May 2019 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20190513053946/https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/03/china-defence-spending-increase-190304053554047.html | archive-date=13 May 2019 | url-status=live }}</ref>
|-
| March 2019 || 177.6<ref>{{cite news | url=https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/china-sets-date-for-two-sessions-in-latest-move-toward-post-covid-normal/ | title=China Sets Date for 'Two Sessions' in Latest Move Toward Post-COVID Normal | agency=Associated Press | access-date=6 May 2020 | archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20200505200816/https://thediplomat.com/2020/04/china-sets-date-for-two-sessions-in-latest-move-toward-post-covid-normal/ | archive-date=5 May 2020 | url-status=live }}</ref>
|-
| May 2020 || 183.5<ref>{{cite web|url = https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/#:~:text=In%20May%202020%2C%20China%20announced,1.189%20trillion%20(%24172.1%20billion).&text=This%20follows%20a%20recent%20trend,spending%20fall%20to%20single%20digits.|title = What Does China Really Spend on its Military?|date = 28 December 2015|access-date = 15 August 2018|archive-date = 16 August 2018|archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20180816061738/https://chinapower.csis.org/military-spending/#:~:text=In%20May%202020%2C%20China%20announced,1.189%20trillion%20(%24172.1%20billion).&text=This%20follows%20a%20recent%20trend,spending%20fall%20to%20single%20digits.|url-status = live}}</ref>
|-
| March 2021 || 209.4<ref name="janes_budget_2021">{{cite web |last1=Grevatt |first1=Jon |last2=Andrew |first2=MacDonald |title=China announces 6.8% increase in 2021 defence budget |url=https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/china-announces-68-increase-in-2021-defence-budget-0503 |website=Janes |date=5 March 2021 |access-date=28 April 2021 |archive-date=28 April 2021 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210428181241/https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/china-announces-68-increase-in-2021-defence-budget-0503 |url-status=live }}</ref>
|-
| March 2022 || 229.4<ref name="budget_2022">{{cite web |author=Yew Lun Tian |title=China plans 7.1% defence spending rise this year, outpacing GDP target |url=https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/china-defence-spending-rise-outpace-gdp-target-this-year-2022-03-05/ |website=Reuters |date=5 March 2022 |access-date=5 March 2022 |archive-date=5 March 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220305040743/https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/china-defence-spending-rise-outpace-gdp-target-this-year-2022-03-05/ |url-status=live }}</ref>
|-
| March 2023 || 235.8{{citation needed|date=April 2024}}
|}
China's official military budget for 2024 was at 1.67 trillion yuan (US$231 billion), which is an increase of 7.2% over the last year.<ref name=":12">{{cite web |date=5 March 2024 |title=China boosts military spending by 7.2%, vows to 'resolutely' deter Taiwan 'separatist activities' |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/05/china-defense-budget-2024.html |website=[[CNBC]] |access-date=22 December 2024 |archive-date=18 April 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240418185558/https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/05/china-defense-budget-2024.html |url-status=live }}</ref> The [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] (SIPRI) estimated that China's military expenditure was US$296&nbsp;billion in 2023, the second-largest in the world after the United States and accounting for [[List of countries by military expenditures|12 percent of the world's defence expenditures]].'''''<ref>{{Cite web |date=April 2024 |title=Trends in Military Expenditure 2023 |url=https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2404_fs_milex_2023.pdf#page=2 |access-date=22 April 2024 |publisher=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]] |archive-date=15 May 2024 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240515230851/https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2024-04/2404_fs_milex_2023.pdf#page=2 |url-status=live }}</ref>'''''[[File:Military Expenditures by Country 2019.svg|500px|thumb|center|A pie chart showing global [[List of countries by military expenditures|military expenditures]] by country for 2019, in US$ billions, according to SIPRI]]
{{clear}}

== Symbols ==

=== Anthem ===
{{Main|Military Anthem of the People's Liberation Army}}
[[File:Оркестр Народно-освободительной армии Китая.jpg|thumb|The [[Central Military Band of the People's Liberation Army of China]] at the [[Great Hall of the People]]. The band is a common performer of the military anthem of the PLA at ceremonial protocol events.]]
The March of the Chinese People's Liberation Army was adopted as the military anthem by the Central Military Commission  on 25 July 1988.<ref>{{Cite web |date=25 July 2021 |title=1988年7月25日，中央軍事委員會決定將《中國人民解放軍進行曲》，定為中國人民解放軍的軍歌。 |trans-title=July 25, 1988: March of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is designate as the military song of the People's Liberation Army |url=https://www.ourchinastory.com/zh/2070/%E3%80%8A%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%BB%8D%E9%80%B2%E8%A1%8C%E6%9B%B2%E3%80%8B%E5%AE%9A%E7%82%BA%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%BB%8D%E8%BB%8D%E6%AD%8C |website=Our China Story |language=zh |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200842/https://www.ourchinastory.com/zh/2070/%E3%80%8A%E4%B8%AD%E5%9C%8B%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%BB%8D%E9%80%B2%E8%A1%8C%E6%9B%B2%E3%80%8B%E5%AE%9A%E7%82%BA%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%BB%8D%E8%BB%8D%E6%AD%8C |url-status=live }}</ref> The lyrics of the anthem were written by composer [[Gong Mu]] (real name: Zhang Yongnian; [[Chinese language|Chinese]]: 张永年) and the music was composed by Korea-born Chinese composer [[Zheng Lücheng]].<ref>{{Cite news |date=16 July 2010 |title=军歌歌词是怎样变迁的？那些"飘扬的旗帜" |language=zh |trans-title=How did the lyrics of military songs change? Those "Flags Waving" |work=[[China News Service]] |url=https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cul/2010/07-16/2406888.shtml |access-date=10 December 2022 |archive-date=10 December 2022 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221210200841/https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cul/2010/07-16/2406888.shtml |url-status=live }}</ref><ref>{{Cite book |last1=Lee |first1=Lily Xiao Hong |url=https://archive.org/details/isbn_0765600439 |title=Biographical Dictionary of Chinese Women, Volume II |last2=Wiles |first2=Sue |date=2015-01-28 |publisher=[[Routledge]] |isbn=978-1-317-51562-3 |edition=0 |pages=145 |language=en |doi=10.4324/9781315719313 |quote="... situation of their conflicting nationalities by returning to China, where Zheng Lücheng took out Chinese citizenship. ... PRC, Zheng Lücheng was active in his work as a composer; he wrote the music for the Western-style opera Cloud Gazing."}}</ref>

=== Flag and insignia ===
{{Main|Flag of the People's Liberation Army}}
The PLA's insignia consists of a roundel with a red star bearing the two [[Chinese character]]s "{{lang|zh|八一}}"(literally "eight-one"), referring to the [[Nanchang uprising]] which began on 1 August 1927 (first day of the eighth month) and symbolic as the CCP's founding of the PLA.<ref>{{cite news |last=Wu |first=Fei |date=2009-10-01 |title=Military Parade Marks Anniversary |publisher=China Daily |agency=Xinhua |url=http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/60th/2009-10/01/content_8759348.htm |accessdate=2009-11-04 |archive-date=9 October 2019 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20191009092009/http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/60th/2009-10/01/content_8759348.htm |url-status=live }}</ref> The inclusion of the two characters ("{{lang|zh|八一}}") is symbolic of the party's revolutionary history carrying strong emotional connotations of the political power which it shed blood to obtain. The flag of the Chinese People's Liberation Army is the war flag of the People's Liberation Army; the layout of the flag has a golden star at the top left corner and "{{lang|zh|八一}}" to the right of the star, placed on a red field. Each service branch also has its flags: The top {{frac|5|8}} of the flags is the same as the PLA flag; the bottom {{frac|3|8}} are occupied by the colors of the branches.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.diyifanwen.com/fanwen/bayijianjunjie/143152262.html|title=81 Flag and Other Signs|language=zh|access-date=2009-11-04|archive-date=1 December 2018|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181201134106/https://www.diyifanwen.com/fanwen/bayijianjunjie/143152262.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

The flag of the Ground Forces has a forest green bar at the bottom. The naval ensign has stripes of blue and white at the bottom. The Air Force uses a sky blue bar. The Rocket Force uses a yellow bar at the bottom. The forest green represents the earth, the blue and white stripes represent the seas, the sky blue represents the air and the yellow represents the flare of missile launching.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-06/23/content_1542456.htm|title=Flag, Emblem and Song of the People's Liberation Army|date=2004-06-23|work=Xinhua Net News|publisher=Xinhua|language=zh|access-date=2009-11-04|archive-date=11 July 2016|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160711142438/http://news.xinhuanet.com/ziliao/2004-06/23/content_1542456.htm|url-status=live}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0701/c1011-28516063.html|title=Uniform of Rocket Force|date=2016-07-01|work=People's Daily|language=zh|access-date=2016-07-06|archive-date=4 November 2020|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20201104131431/http://military.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0701/c1011-28516063.html|url-status=live}}</ref>

<gallery class="center" widths="120">
File:People's Liberation Army Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|alt=A golden star, along with three Chinese characters, placed on a red background.|PLA
File:Ground Force Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|alt=A golden star, along with three Chinese characters, placed on a red background. At the bottom of a flag is a green bar.|[[People's Liberation Army Ground Force|Ground Force]]
File:Naval Ensign of the People's Republic of China.svg|alt=A golden star, along with three Chinese characters, placed on a red background. At the bottom of a flag are stripes of blue, white, blue, white and blue.|[[People's Liberation Army Navy|Navy]]
File:Air Force Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|alt=A golden star, along with three Chinese characters, placed on a red background. At the bottom of a flag is a sky blue bar.|[[People's Liberation Army Air Force|Air Force]]
File:Rocket Force Flag of the People's Republic of China.svg|alt=A golden star, along with three Chinese characters, placed on a red background. At the bottom of a flag is a yellow bar.|[[People's Liberation Army Rocket Force|Rocket Force]]
</gallery>

== See also ==
{{Portal|China|Communism}}
* [[Outline of the Chinese Civil War]]
* [[Outline of the military history of the People's Republic of China]]
* [[Republic of China Armed Forces]]

== References ==
{{reflist}}

===Works cited===
* {{Cite book |url=https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/ARN33195-ATP_7-100.3-000-WEB-1.pdf |title=Army Techniques Publication 7-100.3: Chinese Tactics |publisher=Headquarters, United States Army |year=2021 |isbn=9798457607118 |location=Washington, D.C. |ref={{sfnref|ATP 7-100.3: Chinese Tactics|2021}}}}
* {{cite book |last1=Goldstein |first1=Melvyn C. |title=The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the Dalai Lama |date=1997 |publisher=University of California Press |isbn=978-0-520-21254-1 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=3gFKI09MWuUC |language=en}}
* {{cite book |author=The International Institute for Strategic Studies |title=The Military Balance 2022 |date=14 February 2022 |publisher=Routledge |isbn=978-1-000-62003-0 |url=https://books.google.com/books?id=vOFeEAAAQBAJ |language=en}}
* {{cite report |last1=Kaufman |first1=Alison A. |last2=Mackenzie |first2=Peter W. |date=2009 |title=The Culture of the Chinese People's Liberation Army |url=https://publicintelligence.net/mcia-pla-culture-study/ |publisher=Marine Corps Intelligence Activity |access-date=2024-06-23 |archive-date=2024-06-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20240623194841/https://publicintelligence.net/mcia-pla-culture-study/ |url-status=live }}
* {{cite report |editor1-last=Pollpeter |editor1-first=Kevin |editor2-last=Allen |editor2-first=Kenneth W. |date=14 June 2012 |title=The PLA as Organization v2.0 |url=https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/AD1082742 |publisher=China Aerospace Studies Institute }}
* {{cite book |editor1-last=Saunders |editor1-first=Phillip C. |editor2-last=Ding |editor2-first=Arthur S. |editor3-last=Scobell |editor3-first=Andrew |editor4-last=Yang |editor4-first=Andrew N.D. |editor5-last=Joel |editor5-first=Wuthnow |title=Chairman Xi Remakes the PLA: Assessing Chinese Military Reforms |url=https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Publications/Books/Chairman-Xi-Remakes-the-PLA/ |date=2019 |publisher=National Defense University Press |location=Washington, D.C. |isbn=978-1070233420 |ref={{harvid|Saunders et al.|2019}}}}

== Further reading ==
{{Commons}}
{{Library resources box}}

=== History ===

* {{Cite book |last=Dreyer |first=Edward L. |title=China at War: 1901–1949 |publisher=[[Pearson Longman]] |year=1995 |isbn=9780582051232 |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last=Fravel |first=M. Taylor |title=Active Defense: China's Military Strategy Since 1949 |publisher=[[Princeton University Press]] |year=2019 |isbn=9780691210339 |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last=Li |first=Xiaobing |title=A History of the Modern Chinese Army |publisher=[[University Press of Kentucky]] |year=2007 |isbn=9780813172248 |edition= |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Whitson |first1=William W. |title=The Chinese High Command: A History of Communist Military Politics, 1927–71 |last2=Huang |first2=Zhenxia |last3=Chên-hsia |first3=Huang |publisher=[[Greenwood Publishing Group|Praeger]] |year=1973 |isbn=978-0333150535 |language=en}}

=== Present-day ===

* {{Cite book |url=https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF |title=2022 Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China |publisher=[[United States Department of Defense]] |year=2022 |location=Arlington, Virginia |language=en}} (China Military Power Report, Annual Report to [[United States Congress|Congress]])
* {{Cite book |last1=Chase |first1=Michael S. |url=https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR893.html |title=China's Incomplete Military Transformation: Assessing the Weaknesses of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) |last2=Jeffery |first2=Engstrom |last3=Cheung |first3=Tai Ming |last4=Gunness |first4=Kristen A. |last5=Harold |first5=Scott |last6=Puska |first6=Susan |last7=Berkowitz |first7=Samuel K. |publisher=[[RAND Corporation]] |year=2015 |isbn=9780833088307 |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last=Fisher |first=Richard D. |url=https://archive.org/details/chinasmilitarymo0000fish |title=China's Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach |publisher=[[Greenwood Publishing Group|Praeger Security International]] |year=2008 |isbn=9780275994860 |language=en}}
* {{Cite book |last1=Kamphausen |first1=Roy |url=https://www.nbr.org/publication/beyond-the-strait-pla-missions-other-than-taiwan/ |title=Beyond the Strait: PLA Missions Other Than Taiwan |last2=Lai |first2=David |last3=Scobell |first3=Andrew |year=2009 |publisher=[[Strategic Studies Institute]] |isbn=9781304886385 |language=en}}

{{s-start}}
{{s-bef |before = [[Eighth Route Army]] and [[New Fourth Army]] }}
{{s-ttl |title = Armed wing of the [[Chinese Communist Party]]
|years = 1 November 1948 &ndash; ''present'' }}
{{s-inc}}
{{s-end}}
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