This is an archive of past discussions about Battle of France. Do not edit the contents of this page. If you wish to start a new discussion or revive an old one, please do so on the current talk page.
84.27.81.59, if you are consulting any references as you write it'd improve the article if those were listed. Wikipedia is trying to encourage that all-around with Wikipedia:Cite sources. By the way, you may want to create a username so you get a talk page and so on. 119 10:24, 21 Feb 2005 (UTC)
The lack of information in this article seems to be a big hole in the series of articles on world War II Mintguy(T) 10:08, 20 Feb 2004 (UTC)
Yes, and some Information is quite doubtful. For instance that Keitel had a Panzergroup and actually was a frontline commander. Thats highly doubtful. I never heard or read that and i am quite familiar with WW2 history.
--Holger1076 00:14, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)
Keitel was serving in OKW at the time. Perhaps von Kleist was meant. 119 00:24, 20 Feb 2005 (UTC)
Very big. I just copied over some stuff from Fall of France (which is now a redirect). Some of what it says is a bit simplistic, but writing and account of this is a serious undertaking. DJ Clayworth20:28, 4 May 2004 (UTC)
Is "Case Yellow" really the same thing as the Battle of France? Case Yellow was the German plan for the invasion of France. And, as I recall, it was actually an early version of the German plan that wasn't actually used. We shouldn't be calling Case Yellow an equivalent name for the Battle of France. johnk 05:20, 24 Sep 2004 (UTC)
"Case Yellow" (Fall Geib) was the name of the operation, just as Fall Weiß was the conquest of Poland and Fall Blau was the 1942 Eastern offensive. I've seen "Fall" in this context translated as "operation." It's as correct to call the "Battle of France" "Case Yellow" as it is to call the "Battle of Normandy" "Operation Overlord." There were different plans for Fall Geib, but the name of the operation remained the same. I think "Battle of France" is the most neutral way to describe what happened. --ArminTamzarian 09:02, 30 Nov 2004 (UTC)
I'm getting rid of the bit about Hitler dancing the jig, as it has been definitively shown to be a hoax. 10 seconds of Googling can confirm. - Matt
Possible bias
I noted that listed as possible causes for the German victory was French "defeatism". I was wondering if there is any basis in this aside from anti-french sentiment so common in the US today. Harley peters
Well, the phenomenon is quite old and has been a part of most Polish history books since WWII. It is definitely not a recent idea. [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 04:37, Dec 18, 2004 (UTC)
I think that if it were covered more in-depth, it would be more palatable. I agree that throwing the phrase "French defeatism" out there by itself stinks of anti-French bias, but from my understanding of the politics of the time, there is some ground to stand on that may be worth pointing out in this article provided that it is done in the context of facts and realities of French wartime politics. Adam Faanes 08:17, 10 Feb 2005 (UTC)
Yes, I also agree that this interpretation "stinks with bias". It is much more important to understand that 1) the allies were not prepared to fight a war in 1940 that had recently incorporated new technologies and ideas. The Germans had perfected their communication problems as well as the mobility problems which plagued the Schlieffen Plan in 1914. Additionally, Britain only half-heartedly came to the aid of France, and when it appeared that the outlook was not favorable, the British withdrew their air support in preparation for fighting another day - They had this advantage that the French did not.
In conclusion, defeatism is a ridiculous interpretation of these events. Britain had the advantage of distance, and the Channel (as well as its navy) provided a boundary that was sufficient enough to avoid being overrun as the French had, and the mistakes they made early on did not jeopardize their existance as it had for the French. The Allies expected to fight the war exactly as they had in World War I - not just the French - just as the Germans had expected 1914 to go the same way as it did in 1870. France's proximity did not allow for a second chance after this mistake had been realized. Defeatism is garbage, and no American knows what life is like when a war is being fought literally in their backyard, let alone the same continent. Please remove and preserve this article's integrity. --Hohenstauf
22:42, 10 July 2005 (UTC)
The first remarks were made when the article was very different from what it is now. Defeatism is now only mentioned as one of the more common explanations that have been given — and the article should of course reflect this historical fact, that it has indeed been used as an explanation, most often in France itself. But you show a little bias yourself by suggesting that the armies of the Entente (yes, it was still called this way then :o) were somehow less modernised than the German forces. This is in fact an extreme simplification of a very complex technological and tactical situation.
Yes, I agree. Their strengths were relatively the same and so on. I would consider improved communication a distinct edge for the Germans, however - even if earlier conclusions about Allied equipment have changed over the years. --Hohenstauf11:10, 20 July 2005 (UTC)
On the strategic level, command & control on the French side were poor; but this was in part intentional, to give commanders more freedom. Ironically the, most certainly not intended, failure on the German side to exert strategic control allowed Guderian and Rommel to implement true Blitzkrieg tactics during a few crucial days.
On the tactical level it's true all German tanks were equipped with radio sets (though most had listening sets only), while French light tanks, with the exception of a single unit, had none.--MWAK05:44, 21 July 2005 (UTC)
Stub?
Isn't this article a slightly longer stub? It gives no detailed info on the campaign. No battles, no plans, nothing but the simple statement that there was some fighting... Could anyone with some knowledge on the topic expand the article? [[User:Halibutt|Halibutt]] 04:39, Dec 18, 2004 (UTC)
I think for a start we should break the article up into different sections for the campaign. My recommendation would be
Heh - I should have read this first. I gave the article a shot, but you're quite right that this needs greater depth. I think that the article is now past being a stub, but certainly it lacks the depth that, for instance, Battle of the Bulge has. Your outline could certainly work to fill that - if you would like help on this, I'd certainly be interested.Adam Faanes 08:17, 10 Feb 2005 (UTC)
Wow, very nice job in rebuilding the article. I'll help where I can, but I'm already kind of stretched (still working on the Lorraine Campaign in between studies). Oberiko 13:24, 10 Feb 2005 (UTC)
I too like the new article, but there are a few major problems:
It doesn't make very clear that operationally the German offensive had the nature of a counter-attack. The allied commanders didn't act hesitantly but very forcefully. They advanced as swiftly as the Germans in a modern motorized operation - but into friendly territory, wasting their fuel and readiness on gaining a position that proved to be inferior.
It will suggest to some that Gamelin also tactically expected some kind of WWI attack. In fact he was fully aware the Germans would try to attempt a mechanized breakthrough - he just thought they would do so at Gembloux on a very narrow frontage following their own doctrine of Schwerpunkt. So he concentrated half of his armoured reserves at that sector. The possibility of an attack through the Ardennes was considered but rejected as it wouldn't fit a breakthrough by tanks.
It doesn't mention the one decisive event of the whole campaign: the carpet bombing at Sedan, punching a hole in the French lines (and no, this was not done by Stuka's and tanks as all diagrams show...). So the decisive strategic surpise was that the Germans did not use tanks for the breakthrough itself - just for the strategic exploiting (the classic cavalry role!). And so Gamelin had been fatally right.
It confuses the (attempted) attacks by 1, 2 and 3 DC with the later attack of 4 DC under de Gaulle on the 17th.
It doesn't mention the fundamental difference of opinion between Guderian and Rommel on the one and the High Command on the other hand. The latter saw tanks simply as a means to conquer and protect enough room for the main body of infantry divisions to position itself favourably. The opinion of the two generals they didn't really understand themselves: at the time there was no clear concept of "Blitzkrieg" yet, neither at the High Command nor in the minds of Rommel and Guderian (read Achtung: Panzer! - or read it again). After the fact they would formalize it into a doctrine.
It doesn't mention the counter-attacks at Amiens and Abbéville not making clear how crippling the materiel losses were that threw away the last chance for effective defense.
It doesn't clearly differentiate between the two main phases of Fall Rot.
It doesn't make clear how utterly surprising the German victory was: the defeat of an enemy that was numerically superior in men, artillery, tanks and motorised units - and that this could only have been accomplished because that enemy gave up its main strength: the advantage of the defender - by being too offensive! (which brings us back at point one :o)
Of course there are also some minor factual inexactitudes: e.g. the Allies were already cut off at the 20th.
Naturally no one's saying this article is of featured calibre, but it's a much higher leap then it was before. You seem to be quite aware of the events during the Battle of France, considered helping out on it? Oberiko 00:39, 14 Feb 2005 (UTC)
It's certainly a much better article now - and very well written! The problem with my helping out is that I'm too aware of the events: I've been pushing a revisionist (or, as I like to call it, professional ;o) interpretation of this battle for over twenty years now, so I'm in serious danger of making it (my) POV - although over the years consensus has slowly shifted to my side. But I'll try to mention some indisputed facts - without patterning them too much...
Also, no information is given at all on the war as it unfolded in the Netherlands and Belgium.
Especially the Dutch defense was in many places relatively effective at stopping or seriously delaying the Germans (despite lack of equipment and training).
The Grebbe for example held out to the end as did fortress Kornwerderzand (with the assistance of elements of the Dutch navy). These forces surrendered only after German threats that the massacre of Rotterdam would be repeated against other major cities (especially Amsterdam and Utrecht were mentioned).
In the Netherlands it is generally believed that the German bombing of Rotterdam despite the city surrendering was NOT a failure or an error on the parts of the Germans but a deliberate show of force to get the Dutch forces they couldn't otherwise defeat without serious loss of life and time on their own side into submission.
Yes, we need separate articles for both the attack on The Netherlands (German invasion of The Netherlands) and the attack on Belgium (German invasion of Belgium in 1940). But some information is already given. :o) To describe these complicated and very interesting subcampaigns in the level of detail they deserve would, I feel, put too great an emphasis on events that in the end hardly influenced the general outcome.
To address some of your factual points: the Dutch Field Army had already been withdrawn to the New Waterline on the 14th, abandoning the Grebbeline. Still, it's true four of the nine Dutch divisions had seen no fighting at all. To call the Kornwederzand position a "fortress" perhaps stretches the meaning of the word too much, but that clever array of pillboxes blocking the Enclosure Dam was probably impregnable to the German 1st Cavalry Division attacking it. I'm personally convinced the bombardment of Rotterdam, whatever its tactical desirability, also had the nature of a planned terror attack. Also it's indisputable the Germans demanded the surrender of Utrecht, threatening to bomb the city itself even though the New Waterline ran east of it. Nevertheless the former has never been proven and in the latter case we shall never know what they would have bombed exactly. Though I fear the worst...
I would like to revise the numbers that we currently have. The ~400K is the number given as total French persons killed during both the combat AND the following occupation. For the battle itself; 100K dead, and 200K wounded are the figures that I've found. Oberiko 12:55, 18 Feb 2005 (UTC)
You are correct. I will give some more exact numbers, though it should be stressed that they won't reflect the latest research - and thus roughly will suffer from the same systematic errors ;o).
Sorry: only now I understand that you were referring to the first list. I think the creator of that one has simply made an error in his calculations: it should be 301,000 for all allies, in stead of 401,000. :o)
And again I've made a mistake: not the first list was wrong, but the second, giving only 100,000 French wounded. So the total is about 401,000 for all allies, which then just happens to coincide with the total number of French casualties in the war.
Polish losses: 1140 KIA, 4850 WIA: but on other pages i saw that one division alone had 5200 losses, so it would mean that 2nd (only two IIRC actually saw the battle) had not large losses. around 10.000 soldiers interned in Switzerland. 19-25.000 (saw different estimates) evacuated to UK. Basically, Polish army in the west had to be rebuilt almost from scratch for the second time after defeat in France 1940.. Szopen 10:31, 18 Mar 2005 (UTC)
No worries, you've done a great job with this article thus far to say the least. Oberiko 14:58, 18 Feb 2005 (UTC)
British casualties ?
Hello, the given number remains very mysterious as long as no explanation is given (68.000 dead ? -
not possible, I think - 68.000 captured ? ... without wounded ? - without evacuated wounded ? - how much dead ?)
Thanks, WernerE (german wiki) 24.2.2006
Very true, but without exact references it is all we can do...Obviously most of the German "missing" had been killed; but it is best to simply give the data and let people draw their own conclusions. Also you have forgotten that some German POW's did remain as 1,200 paratroopers were shipped from The Netherlands to England. --MWAK10:37, 24 February 2006 (UTC)
Map
This article definitely needs a map. Even a contemporary map without campaign details would go a long way.
A Map of the battle would do wonders.
I think this article needs a map asap.--Idleguy 08:08, July 15, 2005 (UTC)
I added a number of maps. For those who are into military history, the maps at the US military academy are excellent, and are public domain[1]. --Goodoldpolonius216:58, 31 July 2005 (UTC)
The map at the very top right is wrong though. Army Group C did NOT commence the fatal attack, or any but diversionary attacks during the Battle ofFfrance. It was Army Group A (in the middle) that cut through the Ardennes.
I read in a book a few years ago (the book was a biography on Hitler written at the latest in the 80s but maybe as early as the early-mid 70s, I don't have it on hand currently) that the Allies had very specific intelligence on the planned German invasion, but did not take advantage of it because a) they had recieved the information many times before and the German attack didn't come, even though it was supposed to occur, but the weather prevented the Luftwaffe from doing its part so the invasion was delayed, reslting in a similarity to "The Boy Who Cried Wolf". and/or b) the Allies just did not use the information properly. I am not sure if this is true and if it is it should surely be included. If anyone ehas comments on this please give them.say1988 17:41, August 2, 2005 (UTC)
Dutch diplomats had contacts with dissident German officers who gave them the exact time of the start of the German offensive — each time that is, for the offensive was many times postponed. The Dutch then, despite their neutrality, informed the Entente. All this mattered very little. The offensive was hardly a surprise attack. Even if Gamelin had received the full German operational plan, it's doubtful whether he would have changed his dispositions much. What makes the campaign so special for us: its Blitzkrieg aspect, was not part of that plan! On the other hand even slight changes might have led to German failure because, if you model the campaign, such failure is the typical outcome anyway. The Germans were very lucky on many occasions: e.g. Guderian considered postponing the breakthrough attempt to 14 May because he feared not having enough infantry. If so, the counterattack would have been carried out by 3 DCR instead of 7 BCL and might well have reduced the bridgehead, leaving Heinz without sufficient means for a second try :o).
That explains everything I want to know, but some of that information should probably be included in the article, at least the delays in the origional plan, and maybe I just missed it when I read the article but I did not see any of that information.say1988 15:14, August 3, 2005 (UTC)
Order of Battle
Can anyone get a list of units that participated (at least from non-French armies because as far as I know pretty much the entire French army may have participated and if it did it is probably pointless listing all the units in teh French army). Also at least according to my history text a Canadian unit took part, the Hastings and Prince Edward regiment often referred to as the Hasty Ps. I dont know the size of the unit either, but as soon as it made contact with the Germans a General retreat was called in the area it was in and it left France (before Dunkirk) a day or two after it arrived. If any other information is available there. please post it. Thanks to all who will help.say1988 17:41, August 2, 2005 (UTC)
I'd like to see some Order of Battle pages for the start of this battle. At this level it would probably make sense to show mostly division level and above, yes? How about a page for the Allies and another for the Axis? (C.f.List of orders of battle.) — RJH22:22, 16 September 2005 (UTC)
Should this article have a final concluding section explaining the consequences of the fall of France? This was a major turning point in the War and had major implications for all pre-war strategies. I'll draft something, but would welcome any thoughts... Wiki-Ed13:17, 11 August 2005 (UTC)
Mmm, well Hitler was concerned about a two-front war and the conquest of Franch freed up most of his army for Barbarossa. It also provided coastal bases for U-boat operations, and provided a potential launching point for a potential invasion of England. The French colonies became a concern for England, and it took the French fleet out of action in the Mediterranean. Oh yes, it also cost England much of her army equipment, which was abandoned at Dunkirk and wouldn't be available for a devense against Seelowe. — RJH22:16, 16 September 2005 (UTC)
And not to forget France and the Low Countries were an important asset in themselves with their modern industry, mines, strategic food, raw materials and oil stocks and labour force. Perhaps the most important consequence was that it gave Hitler the illusion Blitzkrieg made him invincible, tempting him to attack the Soviet-Union with a poorly equipped army, while the output of German war industry was too low to sustain a protracted war.--MWAK06:49, 17 September 2005 (UTC)
Suicide Bombers?
The next morning, on the 14th, two French tank battalions tried to counter-attack but were repulsed by suicidal attacks with satchel charges by fanatical German combat engineers
Were these actually engineers who used risky (suicidal) tactics to destroy french tanks by planting charges on them (like the greasy socket charges in saving private ryan) or did they actually blow themselves up like suicide bombers? I would find the latter hard to believe, such things were generally not done by european soldiers. Of course there are examples of a few soldiers who were willing to sacrifice themselves for their comrades or the fatherland (a single prussian engineer blew himself up to create a breach in a danish fortification in the war of 1864), but the text implies large numbers of soldiers doing it. A clarification and source would be nice.
Admiral Darlan's promise to prevent the French fleet at Toulon from falling into German hands was not entirely upheld
What exactly does this referr to? The capture of french vessels at Toulon in 1942 would be out of place here, as the location of this sentence the text makes it sound as if french ships were handed to the Germans before British actions at Mers-el-Kebir. AFAIK this did not happen.
They were indeed suicidal attacks, not suicide attacks :o). However the entire passage has to be rewritten anyway: while writing it I was fooled by German propaganda. On 14 May at noon Stuka's bombed Chémery, though it was already taken. They killed several German officers among whom the commander of Pionierbataillon 43. To cover up the mistake they invented a Heldentod for him. I will detail and correct the account of the events of 14 May, as I have been much too imprecise.
Darlan gave Churchill his word that he would ensure the French fleet at Toulon was scuttled, should the Germans attempt to gain control over it. However article 8 of the armistice stipulated the Germans would control the fleet there. Of course in the latter case "control" meant "check whether it adhered to the armistice conditions", but the British saw the ambiguity as a serious danger, best remedied by sinking most of the French fleet.
Hi,
The title for this article is incorrect as the content covers both the Battle of France and the Battle of the Low Countries. The battle of the Low Countries (Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland) is planned by the German military operation Case Yellow (Fall Gelb) while the battle of France, a successive offensive to Case Yellow, is planned by the German military operation Case red (Fall Red).
Next, the current title gives the impression that independant countries Belgium, Luxembourg and Holland are part of France, which is not. A possible solution would be to change the title into The Battle of the Low countries and France or even better to split it into 2 articles; Operation Yellow (Battle of the Low Countries) and Operation Red (Battle of France). WO218:45, 4 January 2006 (UTC)File:Palm.jpeg
Well, it's an existing convention to name the entire conflict (Fall Gelb and Fall Rot together) "The Battle of France". The title of this article simply reflects that normal usage; it's not an endorsement of it. An encyclopedia is not an authority; it's simply a mirror. However it would certainly be desirable to have a separate Fall Rot article, detailing the events in June :o)--MWAK08:40, 5 January 2006 (UTC)
Ok, it is a piety that the historians forgot to provide reasonable details about the Low Countries in this offensive. Let's work to have a separate Fall Rot and Fall Gelb article to emphasize the military planning behind the main offensive to Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg and France. Today Fall Gelb is rerouted to Battle of France. I propose to write an article on Fall Gelb and Fall Rot with an italic highlight in the beginning to the main article Battle of France. WO219:10, 5 January 2006 (UTC)File:Palm.jpeg
This is English Wikipedia. Articles should use common English names. We have articles at Operation Barbarossa for Unternehmen Barbarossa and Operation Sealion for Unternehmen Seelöwe as these particular undertakings are known in English. But Case Yellow and Case Red (Fall Gelb and Fall Rot) are simply not in common usage in English. Commonly the two are known as the Battle of France. Blame Churchill if you like.
Unattributed and controversial viewpoints
Hi MWAK, this is JQ. I see that you reverted some of my changes and no big deal. I do believe the staffing vs. training issue regarding the "B" divisions is not accurately portrayed in this article, but it really is a small issue in the big scheme. However, lets look at one in particular passage:
Line 158 reads now:
Equipment imbalances. Contrary to popular opinion, often assuming that the Germans had a completely mechanized army, while the French only had WWI equipment, there was no general disparity of armament levels. It is generally acknowledged that in a pure battle of attrition, the Germans could not have won.
"Contrary to popular opinion"??? Who holds this opinion?
"It is generally acknowledged that in a pure battle of attrition, the Germans could not have won." Who acknowledges this?
Statements like this, maybe they are right, maybe not, but in all cases they need to be qualified with a reference or an explanation. How can we fix this passage so it is either referenced or qualified? - JQ17:39, 29 January 2006 (UTC)
Sorry for answering so late: I was pondering on what response would be best; your edit has now forced me to make up my mind :o).
When referring to a "popular opinion", I was perhaps too ambiguous: what I meant was a "popular belief" among the greater part of the semi-informed public (the majority of humanity of course living happily along without being bothered by these issues). So I couldn't give a direct reference quote to that. We might of course, on a higher level, refer either to popular books perpetuating the myth in question or, on a higher level again, to serious publications lamenting it (both of which are quite numerous), but that would be beside the point. When stating "Contrary to popular belief, Caesar never said veni, vidi, vici" are we then supposed to proof that there is such a belief to begin with? Or could we simply work from a shared background knowledge — while tacitly suggesting to the reader who didn't share it, that he is invited to?
A similar ambiguity laid in my use of "generally" — but now I didn't refer to the semi-informed, but to the informed only. Then the question "Who acknowledges this?" becomes easy to answer. There is a true consensus among experts that in an ideal battle of attrition those qualitative advantages the Germans might have had, were in any case not enough to compensenate for the lack of numerical superiority needed to overcome the tactical advantage of the defender. I know of no writer holding the opposite point of view. In this case it might of course be functional to give a quote; and yet it would again be a bit beside the point.
Now as to explanation, you are absolutely right. The article really needs an analysis of the military potential of both sides. But this is a contentious issue; treating it in the level of detail that is needed to prevent it from misleading the reader would make it far too long for a short section in Historiography. And this is the reason I presented it as a simple contrast between the myth that only the Germans were modernly equipped and the (by experts) uncontested truth that there was a general parity in equipment levels. That there are many pitfalls is shown by your own edit: you state that both sides were numerically roughly equal in armour. That is fully in line with all scientific literature. But more recent works for and by armour enthusiasts clearly show that the number of tanks and self-propelled guns actually committed to battle by the Allies was about 50% larger. The French materiel reserves had not properly been taken into account; also not a single "scientific" publication gives the correct production numbers. The situation with the respective airforces is even more complex. So I basically shrank away from any detail. :o)--MWAK14:45, 1 February 2006 (UTC)
Although I think the most recent edit is excellent and improves the article, I have to question the use of the term "main battle tank". I am not sure the concept existed at the time; if it did, none of the tanks then in use were so designated. Also, the majority of the tanks used by both sides were light tanks, not even mediums. I understand the general point being made, I just think we could make it a bit more accurately with slightly modified language. Sorry if I am nitpicking. DMorpheus19:11, 1 February 2006 (UTC)
Dear MWAK and DMorpheus, thank you for the notes. MWAK, I'll have to get back to your note later this week as I'm snowed under until at least Friday afternoon and you make many points I should think on for a bit. DMorpheus, you are probably making a good and valid point. The specific tanks I was thinking of when I wrote of the MBT's were French: B-1bis and Souma's; British Matalida's; and German Pzkw-III, Pzkw-IV and Pskw-38t's. But I think your point is correct and if you feel a revision is in order just go to it and set the passage right. JQ05:09, 2 February 2006 (UTC)
It's a tough call, frankly. I don't think it is necessary to the article to get into this issue at all; it is a narrow technical issue that had no major influence on the campaign. So one option is to simply remove any reference to tank quality. On the other hand, many popular histories make the claim that the German tanks were somehow better or more numerous. I believe this may be what MWAK was getting at. Even if that broad statement were true (and it isn't really) it doesn't automatically follow that it had any real importance in the campaign. But in the immediate post-campaign period, it was used by Allied sources such as Churchill to explain away the shocking collapse of the French Army. It's always useful to dispel a myth.
Maybe the issue should be set in that context. Both the "Fifth Column" and German tank superiority were myths created to explain the duller truth - that the German Army out-thought and out-maneuvered the French, without any "magic bullets". DMorpheus15:17, 2 February 2006 (UTC)
Italian Participation
Italian troop numbers are given as 700,000 here; the CommandoSupremo site says 300,000. I will try to find a reliable figure. The 32-Division count appears correct, but there is no direct way to work out the troop numbers from that. They fought only for the last 11 days of the campaign, on a minor front, and accomplished virtually nothing, so I am not sure this should really be labeled an "Axis victory". It is literally correct but gives a false impression nonetheless. DMorpheus21:00, 27 February 2006 (UTC)
I tend to agree. As I already pointed out to Kurt, the real number of divisions partcipating is about sixteen (non-reserve divisions of 1st and 4th Army). What really happened was that the Italian troops approached the French main positions, overran some outposts and halted their advance when taking losses. The number of troops in western North Italy was higher than one would expect though, as there were many smaller units, see http://www.comandosupremo.com/France.htmland ; the units of 6th Army not allocated to the front armies were also in theatre and there was of course an extensive supply and training system. 300,000 is a good estimate for the front line units, 700,000 for the total of all soldiers present in theatre. --MWAK08:16, 28 February 2006 (UTC)
THE ITALIAN FORCES (BATTLE OF THE ALPS):
4th Army (General Guzzoni) (Northern sector), with target Moutiers: 9 divisions and 3 alpine groups; 1st Army (General Pintor)(Southern sector), with target Nice: 13 divisions. Tot.: 315,000 Italians against 185,000 French (General Olry) who were behind a strong defensive line. Sources: Eddy Bauer, "Storia Illustrata".
Italians
The fact that Italians achieved little during the campaing does not change the facts. Italy was Germany's ally, one of the Axis, and France, Italy's enemy was defeated decisively, even if Italians achieved little during the campaing.
"halted their advance when taking losses" I disagree. Italians advance was hindered by weather conditions and the terrain.
I think the images of German troops marching through the Arch de Triumph and Hitler in front of the Eiffel Tower should be included in this article.Both images are very powerful in there meaning and are (I think) NPOV. One could see them as testments to German power or of the horror of the Nazi conquest. I found a great image of the German troops marching [here[2]] and I think they are in the public domain. This image would look great on the title page, I would put it up myself but I'm not sure how to do it. 1600 EST 25 April 2006 LCpl
You have to be near certain they are in the public domain; thinking it is not enough ;o).--MWAK08:03, 26 April 2006 (UTC)
Ok here is one of Hitler in Paris from the National Archives and I an certain it is Public Domain [[3]] ) 1507 EST, 26 April 2006 LCpl
Here is a picture of Adolf Hitler in Paris that is already uploaded. I think it would look great as the main picture. If someone who knows how to put it in the article please free to do so.
This is a tremendous article. If people can pile up some more footnotes and tweak a few other things, I see no reason this shouldn't be featured.UberCryxic20:35, 3 June 2006 (UTC)
I would advise strongly against it. The article is really rather poor and incoherent and is in dire need of a complete makeover. Also for some strange reason articles tend to decline in quality when going through a FA-process :o).--MWAK07:18, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
MWAK, I strongly disagree. This is a terrific article, very coherent, and certainly very detailed and comprehensive. All it really needs are footnotes.UberCryxic19:10, 4 June 2006 (UTC)
No, it needs to be completely rewritten. I should know: I wrote most of it in the first place :o). Especially the section about the German planning distorts the facts very severely. In February 2005 I left most of it untouched, hesitating to open that particular can of worms. Also we should notice that the "Historiography" gives all kinds of data that should really be treated in separate sections about French and German equipment and tactical doctrine. But that is an even bigger can of worms. The problem is that recent research has falsified many popular notions about the battle and that present research is debunking even more. We are in the middle of a paradigm shift in our thinking about what happened in the beginning of WWII. As could be expected, it was the German side that got the most attention. That put me in a difficult position while expanding the article: if I treated the subject in a correct encyclopedic way, by giving in detail the different views about it, the German side of things would get a more modern, or "revisionist" account, while the French side would still be rather outdated because profound research there is just beginning to get published. This would create a totally unbalanced representation of events. So I went for a more superficial consensus view, leaving much vague with a lot of hidden "sap verb" and glossing over most areas of contention. I'm glad it made for a good narrative but it is more illusion than substance...--MWAK07:02, 5 June 2006 (UTC)
Discrepancy regarding date of surrender of France in June 1940
The Historiography section makes several controversial, rather revisionist statements that opposes or contradicts facts that have been put forth by mainstream historians for decades. Such statements I believe should be cited, and the people who are making these statements should also be mentioned. Its not so much the lack of neutrality (though the section does sympathize greatly with the French) as opposed to the lack of resources. Chubdub10:23, 8 August 2006 (UTC)
Yes, it's quite possible you're right. But to avoid an (equally possible) misunderstanding, could you indicate which (kind of) statements exactly you consider to be revisionist? It could be that the "facts" you refer to aren't hypotheses made by reputable historians but those to be found in popular literature, which happens to be of an extremely poor quality on this subject. So statements like "There was no general equipment imbalance between Germany and France" or "There was no serious fifth column activity" might seem "revisionist" to someone who has only read popular historical works, but have really always been mainstream. --MWAK06:54, 9 August 2006 (UTC)
Historiography, French AT guns
There is no mention in the Historiography section of the lack of adequate anti-tank weapons amoung the French infantry. They were equiped primarily with 25mm AT guns, which were useless against German tanks. Consequently the French infantry tended to melt away when attacked by Panzers. The French were well aware of this short coming before the war, and it was a major reason why over half of the French tanks were spread out all along the front, to provide support to the infantry. This resulted in the French tanks usually being outnumbered by the more concentrated German tanks. While the significance of this can be debated, I do not understand why it is not being mentioned at all. Madmax 8 August 2006
Maybe it's not mentioned because it may not be accurate. Let's look at the data.
Gun performance
25mm AT gun against armor sloped at 30 degrees from vertical: 35mm at 100 meters; 29mm at 500 meters.
47mm AT gun agaionst armor sloped at 30 degrees: 39mm at 100 meters, 33mm at 500 meters.
Armor protection
Pzkw-II ausf C (the most common German tank in May 1940): 16mm turret front, 14mm sides, near vertical.
Pzkw-III ausf E (best German tank in May 1940): 30mm turret front, sides, hull front and sides, near vertical.
Pzkw-IV ausf D (best-protected German tank in May 1940, at least from the front): 35mm turret front, 30mm hull front, 20mm hull sides, near vertical.
We can ignore the thinly-armored but common Pzkw-I; IIRC protection on the numerous 35(t)s and 38(t)s was similar to the Pzkw-III.
Draw your own conclusions, but I would say if the French Infantry "melted away" it wasn't because their AT weapons wouldn't do the job. "Tank panic" was common in many Armies in the blitzkreig era.
French tank deployment has been discussed at length, but consider that the vast majority of French tanks (all except the B-1bis and S35) had guns *worse* than the towed weapons cited above. So why would they be deployed to defend against German tanks?
Finally, I would also add that most of the combatants of WW2 devoted a high percentage of their tanks to Infantry support; the Germans were the sole major exception to this.
I generally agree with DMorpheus's points — and like to make a few comments of my own:
The French 25 mm anti-tank gun was indeed adequate to destroy all German tanks frontally, as it showed by doing so on several instances. The German penetration data mentioned are even somewhat pessimistic as they were based on thick test plates (and those of the very powerful 47 mm probably simply wrong, see: http://forum.axishistory.com/viewtopic.php?t=79218&highlight=char :o). The problem was that there were sometimes too few available. It's true the 25 mm was easily deflected by sloped armour; but then the German tanks used a lot of vertical plates.
The fact that most French tanks were part of the Infantry, the Weapon, has deceived many into concluding that they therefore were mainly used for infantry support. This description of their function is however very ambiguous. Certainly the tanks weren't "divided among the infantry" as an organic part of infantry units, such as a division or even an army corps. They were specialised offensive breakthrough vehicles that were concentrated into independent armoured units acting as a reserve; some, as the Armoured Divisions, on the highest operational level; others as Groupements of brigade strength on army level. When effecting the breakthrough they obviously had to cooperate with infantry and artillery. The problem for the French in this was not so much that the ties between armour and infantry were too close, but to the contrary that they were too weak as the armoured units had little or no organic infantry and artillery component and higher level training with infantry units had been rare, so that in the war coordination proved to be too slow. Never was a decision made on the strategic level to divide tanks to protect infantry against German tanks. On several occasions some commanders would split armoured units to bolster the front line. They were probably right in assuming it was better to prevent an enemy breakthrough than to try counterattacking with the Infantry armoured units that were ill-equipped for the encounter fight.
Official German doctrine prescribed that the armoured divisions be used for the exploitation phase — not the breakthrough, that had to be executed by the Infantry. Although after 1936 many Infantry Independent Armoured Brigades had been raised for infantry support, the last of these had been disbanded after the Polish campaign, not inspired by some doctrinal insight that tanks should be concentrated into Panzerdivisionen but because the Infantry, then the dominant Weapon, hadn't much faith in tanks anyway. They, correctly, assumed that superior training would enable German infantry to break the enemy lines without armour support. Besides, the PzKpfw Is that had been made available were of little value. They waited for enough Sturmgeschütze to be build to give some really effective support. This also means that, contrary to popular accounts, the French doctrine had a larger emphasis on mechanisation than the German: both used armour for exploitation, but only the French for the breakthrough phase. And this again explains why German tank production lagged behind the French.
As a result in May 1940 German armour made relatively little contact with French infantry, considering the scale of the campaign. The fortified lines at Sedan and Monthermé were not broken by tanks but by infantry (in the first case crucially supported by carpet bombing). At Dinant there simply was no fortified line. In The Netherlands 9PD made almost no contact with Dutch troops. German armour avoided heavily defended zones if possible, so the quality of French anti-tank guns was basically irrelevant. If all French divisions would have been equipped with 72 90mm direct fire guns, the outcome would probably have been the same. On the one occasion in May where a fortified line was attacked however (against higher orders), it ended in failure: on 15 May 4PD was repulsed by the 47 mm guns of the 1st Moroccan Infantry Division, losing some 120 vehicles.
These are valid points, I don't agree with all of them, but they are interesting. However my point is not whether or not the AT guns really affected the campaign, but rather that many historians have CLAIMED they were a major cause of the French defeat, and thus they should be included in the Historiography section, perhaps along with a refutation. This has been done with many other claimed causes of the defeat. Madmax 9 August 2006
That is very different from your original comment, but no matter. If you have sources on this by all means include them, along with the facts above showing that poor-quality AT guns could not have been a contributing factor in the French defeat. DMorpheus17:21, 9 August 2006 (UTC)
Sources will be easy to find :o). But this is just one of several typical mistakes made. The supposedly absent French anti-tank mines come to mind...--MWAK17:55, 9 August 2006 (UTC)
I´d like to point out fe few things that should be changed.
Equipment imbalances:
It says “In armor protection and penetrating power of main armament many of the French and British tanks were actually superior to their German counterparts.”
That´s not correct. The part about the armor protection is right, but not the one about the armament. French AFV were armed with four different guns:
1.The 25mm gun: Does not sound like much, but it could kill any german tank at distances up to 700 meters.
2.The 47mm gun: One of the most powerful Tank/AT-guns at that time. Killed german tanks at up to 1500 meters.
3.The 37mm gun SA-38: The typical 37mm gun, not as powerful as the 47mm, but unlike the 25mm it could fire HE shells.
4.The 37mm gun SA-18: Obsolete gun from WW1. It was ok for firing HE, but with a muzzle velocity of just 388 m/s it was totally useless against tanks.
And one most important factors is not mentioned at all. The German tanks had three men turrets, while almost all of the French ones had one man turrets. As a result the commander/gunner/loader was totally overworked and could do neither of his jobs properly.
Poor strategy:
The forces General Gamelin sent noth to defend the Netherlands were his only reserves. As a result the French had to defend a frontage of several hundred kilometres without any mobile reserves. This was a flagrant violation of the french doctrine, but in spite of criticism form other high ranking Generals nothing was done to correct this mistake. Markus Becker 16:43, 13 August 2006 (CET) By the way, how do I add my name , date and time of the posting automatically?
To add your name automatically just type four tildes (four of these ~) at the end of your post. It makes for much better communication.
Now as to your points, I am sorry, the original language is not incorrect. Both the original sentence and your post make generalizations, while we should perhaps be more specific. It is certainly true that "many" British and French tanks had better firepower than many of their German counterparts. The French S35 and B-1 tanks, and any of the British cruisers, had guns that could penetrate any of the German tanks at long range (by 1940 standards). You are correct that the *most common* tank gun on the French side was the SA18 37mm, but that does not contradict the original sentence at all. You might want to add, as an aside, that some of the French light recon tanks such as the AMR series were armed only with rifle-caliber MGs. So your list of French tank guns is not complete.
What was the most common German tank gun? Was it not the 20mm on the Panzer II ?
As to the German tanks: Many had three-man turrets, but the majority did not. The most common German tanks in 1940 were the Panzer II, Panzer I, and the ex-Czech 35(t) and 38(t). The excellent Panzer III with its three-man turret was a distinct minority of tank types, with a few hundred available. Although it was probably the best tank on either side, it is no more accurate to generalize from the Panzer III to all German tanks than it would be to generalize from the B-1 to all French tanks. Even in June 1941 less than half the German tanks were Panzer IIIs. Likewise with the Panzer IV, only a few hundred were present.
To take the most common French tank gun, the SA18, and compare it to the most common German tank, the Panzer II, we see that, far from being useless, the SA18 firing APC can penetrate the frontal 16mm armor of the Panzer II at ranges beyond 500 yards, and can get a side penetration against the 14mm armor at 1000 yards. Compared to the most common tanks being fielded in 1941 or 1942, yes, the SA18 is pretty useless, but in 1940 it was not scrap metal.
As to the British tanks, the 2-pounder had better performance that the German or Czech 37mm, good enough to penetrate any of the German tanks at long range.
As for armor protection, again we are all generalizing. The tiny number of British Infantry tanks and the French cavalry S35 and battle tank B-1 were much better protected than any of the German vehicles of any weight.
Nevertheless this sentence creates a wrong impression. Let´s concentrate on the modern tanks. As David pointed out the French had 2,300, the Germans had roughly 1,000. But while all of the modern german tanks had decent guns, almost 2/3 of the French did not. As far as the absolute numbers are concerned the French had even less decently armed Tanks than the Germans. So it should say “in penetrating power of main armament most of the French tanks were inferior to their german counterparts, except for obsolete tanks like Pz.I and II.” By the way, I don´t find this "~" on my keyboard. Markus Becker 80.143.102.24117:23, 13 August 2006 (UTC)
Again I agree with DMorpheus — and again I'd like to add a few things :o):
David Lehmann wrote this in early 2002. He today perhaps would put a lesser emphasis on the material factors. Certainly he made some mistakes, as including the German command tanks and excluding the AMR 33 and 35s from the tank numbers just because they were called automitrailleuse; also it should be mentioned that the French had far larger materiel reserves than the Germans. The French had about 3700 modern tanks in France. When the campaign ended the allied forces had committed about 2300 AFVs with a reasonable anti-tank capacity to battle, the Germans less than 1300. The 37 mm SA18 was in itself of course a very poor gun to fight other armour, especially since many PzKpfw IIs had been uparmoured to 30 mm; however this depended strongly on the type of ammunition used; many of the cavalry 37 mm SA18 guns were modified to fire a superior type.
The sentence as you give it would be equally deceptive. The situation was that the majority of both French and German tanks was obsolescent and underarmed. However those French tanks that weren't were superior in firepower to their German counterparts (being the PzKpfw 35(t), 38(t), III and IV). They were slightly less in number: about 1000 to 1100, including materiel reserves. And to the French tanks we should add about 500 British and Belgian AFVs with 40 or 47 mm guns.
What you wrote about the strategy was as such completely correct, but partly implied by the text as it stands and certainly largely made explicit in what was written before. To speak in defence of Gamelin it should be added that he had good reasons to try to maintain a connection with the Dutch: he knew that when the Nazi regime hadn't collapsed in 1941 he would have to take the offensive himself. The prospect of assaulting the Siegfried Line frontally didn't appeal to him at all, so like Montgomery four years later he intended to go around the Westwall on its northern flank. For this it would be extremely convenient to already have a toehold on the northern bank of the Rhine. It's true that the article is deficient in the treatment of both the German and the French development of strategy. As it happens I'm writing a Dutch version which discusses these subjects more adequately and I hope to improve this one when I'm finished.--MWAK18:10, 13 August 2006 (UTC)
Fall of Paris
This artical no longer mentiones the fall of Paris to the Wehrmacht on June 14th. I would also like to ask (again) for any PD pictures of German troops marching through the Arch de Triumph to be added to the artical for, "One could see them as testments to German power or of the horror of the Nazi conquest" LCpl00:10, 29 August 2006 (UTC)
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Italian Casualties
The Italian casualties in the battle of the Alps were 1,247 killed or missing and 2,631 wounded. Other 2,151 soldiers suffered freezing (source: Eddy Bauer, Storia controversa della seconda Guerra Mondiale - vol.2). The Italian soldiers took Lanslebourg and a part of Menton.
The Italian attack started on June 21 and ended 4 days later. The armistice between Italy and France was signed on June 24, 1940 in Rome (Villa Incisa).
FA
I know the subject has already been broached, and im not gonna nominate it, but I think this is a great article that just needs some work in specific areas (ie copyedit/unencyclopedic tones). Im gonna go ahead and do as much as I can (although I am no expert on the area), and lets just see where it leads us. I will do it all piece meal as opposed to a few massive edits, so feel free to revert and I am sorry if any of my edits are inconsistent with points you are trying to make. Collaberator/collabtators welcome. --Gregorof/(T)09:40, 4 November 2006 (UTC)
i saw this guy in a video Divide & Conquer released in 1943 and directed by Frank Capra using various source including captured material.
1:the author of the picture is unknown
2:the date june 1940 is an estimation given after, since the author is unknown.
3:there was no american to take photograph in france by 1940 as the US did not joined its allies despite Churchills several demands.
In "Divide and Conquer" the video shows this very same guy waving at the French navy leaving Toulon (south france) for the french colonies (where the free french force will be soon organized). he probably had relatives leaving, no one knows hence an interpretation of his emotion is pure propaganda.
4:the place isn't paris but toulon (according to this footage from Divide & Conquer 1943). actually it is not surprising since in november 2005 when the riots rose in France there was a practical joke in France's media and people about CNN's map of france with a dozen cities names in the map and not a single one was in the right place, it was like los angeles for new york, chicago for san francisco and dallas for miami! not a local channel, the mighty CNN..! (look by yourself
5:these people are not here to welcome the germans but to tell adieu to the french navy leaving france
6:there was no one waving at the germans nor welcoming them when the ennemy entered paris: see this footage again from D&C.
Obviously this picture is used as anti-french propaganda and its caption is lies. i suspect the person who put it there to be francophobe and to use it in the article as an evidence of the supposed cowardice part of the French military victories (practical joke) which is supported by many ignorant kids. in this case i suggest this link from the article. as a consequence i've removed this picture to rename its caption (image info needs to be corrected as well) or to use another picture with verified source since as you can see a same unsourced document can be used to illustrate two opposite views!
i've selected the following public domain picture from D&C that shows what really happened when the Nazi entered Paris in 1940 nazi parade in parisShame On You18:38, 21 November 2006 (UTC)
![[3]](https://www.archives.gov/research/ww2/photos/images/ww2-82.jpg){kind=link}
