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* [[Ayuda:Caracteres especiales]]

==Deuda autonómica==

Con datos del IV trimestre de 2023, la deuda acumulada por las Comunidades autónomas españolas es la que sigue, clasificadas por la deuda en relación a su PIB:<ref>[https://datosmacro.expansion.com/deuda/espana-comunidades-autonomas?dr=2023-12 Deuda de las Comunidades Autónomas], en la web https://datosmacro.expansion.com, consultada el 8 de septiembre de 2024.</ref>

{| cellpadding="1" style="float: left; border: 1px solid #88a; background: #f7f8ff; padding: 1px; font-size: 101%; margin: 0; width: 29%"
|-
|colspan=4|<center><big>'''[[Comunidad autónoma|Comunidades autónomas]]'''</big><br />'''<big>Deuda'''</big></center>
|- bgcolor=silver
! # !! <small>CCAA</small> !! <small>Deuda<br /><small>(IV trimestre 2023)</small></small> !! <small>Deuda <small>(% {{versalita|pib}})</small></small>
|-
| 1 || {{ESP|VC}} || align="right" | 57&nbsp;993 || align="right" | 42&nbsp;20% 
|-
| 2 || {{ESP|CM}} || align="right" | 16&nbsp;156 || align="right" | 31&nbsp;90% 
|-
| 3 || {{ESP|MC}} || align="right" | 12&nbsp;139  || align="right" | 31&nbsp;20% 
|-
| 4 || {{ESP|CT}} || align="right" | 85&nbsp;986 || align="right" | 31&nbsp;00%
|-
| 5 || {{ESP|IB}} || align="right" | 8&nbsp;579 || align="right" | 22&nbsp;30%
|-
| 6 || {{ESP|EX}} || align="right" | 5&nbsp;322 || align="right" | 21&nbsp;80%
|-
| 7 || {{ESP|AR}} || align="right" | 9&nbsp;186 || align="right" | 20&nbsp;30%
|-
| 8 || {{ESP|CL}} || align="right" | 13&nbsp;865 || align="right" | 19&nbsp;90%
|-
| 9 || {{ESP|CB}} || align="right" | 3&nbsp;316 || align="right" | 19&nbsp;90%
|-
| 10 || {{ESP|AN}} || align="right" | 36&nbsp;649 || align="right" | 19&nbsp;80%
|-
| 11 || {{ESP|GA}} || align="right" | 12&nbsp;170 || align="right" | 16&nbsp;10%
|-
| 12 || {{ESP|RI}} || align="right" | 1&nbsp;625 || align="right" | 15&nbsp;70%
|-
| 13 || {{ESP|AS|Principado de Asturias}} || align="right" | 4&nbsp;243 || align="right" | 15&nbsp;10%
|-
| 14 || {{ESP|MD}} || align="right" | 35&nbsp;875 || align="right" | 12&nbsp;60%
|-
| 15 || {{ESP|PV}} || align="right" | 10&nbsp;661  || align="right" | 12&nbsp;40%
|-
| 16 || {{ESP|CN}} || align="right" | 6&nbsp;518 || align="right" | 12&nbsp;20%
|-
| 17 || {{ESP|NC}} || align="right" | 2&nbsp;951 || align="right" | 12&nbsp;00%
|-
|colspan=4|<small>* '''{{Versalita|fuente}}''': Datosmacro, 2024. En millones de euros.</small><ref>[https://datosmacro.expansion.com/deuda/espana-comunidades-autonomas?dr=2023-12 Deuda de las CCAA de España], en la web de Datosmacro, diario Expansión, consultada el 8 de septiembre de 2024.</ref>
|}

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==Primera instalación==

La Constitución de 1812, en su artículo 325, Título VI, Capítulo II, trata sobre el gobierno político-económico de la provincia, para lo que diseña la Diputación provincial. Previamente, en el discurso preliminar se define a esta nueva institución en cuatro ocasiones como "cuerpo" y jamás con la función "asesora", sino deliberativa -palabra que no cita- dentro de una ''naturaleza corporativa''. Si el artículo 324, que abre el capítulo II del Título VI, se dedica al jefe superior, « El gobierno político de las provincias residirá en el jefe superior, nombrado por el rey en cada uno de ellas », el artículo siguiente nombra por vez primera a las Diputaciones.

Una vez aprobada la Constitución, el gobierno incipiente español a la caída del imperio francés retomó el que había sido fruto de muchos debates y tanteamientos constitucionales, las diputaciones provinciales. Por medio de la ''Instrucción para el Gobierno económico-político de las provincias'' se ponen en marcha en las 18 provincias españolas y en 13 zonas marítimas una nueva institución para el gobierno interior: las Diputaciones provinciales.<ref>[https://dialnet.unirioja.es/servlet/articulo?codigo=134713 Instrucción de 23 de junio de 1813, para el Gobiemo económico-político de las provincias], por José Sarrión Gualda, ''Anuario de historia del derecho español'', ISSN 0304-4319, Nº 67, 1997, págs. 1195-1216.</ref>

En Córdoba la primera instalación se realizó el 18 de agosto de 1813, cuando se iniciaron las sesiones de la nueva corporación, tal y como se recoge en la primera acta. En efecto, la Orden de 18 de diciembre de 1812 disponía el funcionamiento de las nuevas diputaciones, que se compondrían de un presidente, el llamado Gefe político de la provincia, el Intendente, cargo del Antiguo Régimen, más cinco o siete individuos en representación de los partidos de la provincia, que elegirían un Secretario de la institución para la jefatura del personal y un Depositario para la administración de los arbitrios y nuevos impuestos.

En el acta del 18 de agosto de 1813 se explicita el nombre de los miembros de la Diputación cordobesa:
* Presidente: Barón de Casa Davalillo, Jefe superior político.
* Diputados: José Garrido y Portilla, prebendado de la Catedral; Juan María del Valle Calvo, maestrante de Ronda; Juan Antonio de Fuente Centella, abogado y regidor de Castro del Río; Joaquín Pérez Gómez, vecino de Pozoblanco; Pedro Coronado, notario mayor y gobernador del Juzgado eclesiástico de Córdoba; Juan Díaz García, vecino de Lucena; y Antonio Luis Salcedo y Utrilla, labrador de Almodóvar del Río.
* Intendente: Joaquín de Peralta.

Se crea la institución ''ex novo'', sin sede y sin personal, sin presupuesto y sin recursos propios, y lo que es más importante, sin medios coercitivos para el cumplimiento de sus funciones ante los ayuntamientos y autoridades de otras administraciones, primeras afectadas por la irrupción de la nueva institución provincial.

; Las actas
Las actas de la DPC durante los ocho primeros meses de su existencia delatan los múltiples problemas que la aquejan: los ayuntamientos de los municipios no está preparados ni prevenidos de las nuevas normas, ni cuentan con el personal ni la preparación necesarias. La nueva recaudación provincial chocará con los muros de los ayuntamientos que no sabían o no querían entender las nuevas directrices. Las inversiones serán escasas, las cuentas poco claras.

Uno de los nuevos problemas será el reclutamiento y la llamada a filas de los soldados. La institución provincial tendrá un papel de mediador entre los ayuntamientos de su término y el Ejército, necesitado de hombres para la lucha contra el invasor.

Las nuevas elecciones ocuparán parte de las sesiones, así como los nombramientos de los Ayuntamientos. Los términos municipales y los repartos de propios y baldíos aparecerán frecuentemente en las páginas escritas de las actas. 

Por último, la administración de Justicia incide también en el papel de la provincia, con casos de bandolerismo importantes y su incidencia en la seguridad ciudadana, asuntos que también tendrán cabida en la política de la institución.

; Permanencia

Durante los ocho meses de existencia, la DPC mantiene cargos y presidencia. Si la Instrucción hablaba de la creación de una Junta de Sanidad en cada Ayuntamiento, compuesta por el alcalde primero, el cura párroco, el facultativo, más un regidor y un vecino del municipio, pudiendo los ayuntamientos renovarla o mantenerla cada año o ampliarla y nombrar nuevos miembros.

El regreso de Fernando VII y el fin del régimen constitucional se reflejó en Córdoba con la última acta de este periodo, fechada el 7 de mayo de 1814.

==Segunda instalación==

La Instrucción de 3 de febrero de 1823, para el Gobierno político-económico de las provincias vino a perfilar y cerrar debates sobre el significado de la primera Instrucción de 1813. La corta duración de su aplicación efectiva no será óbice para restar importancia a la misma.

En efecto, la Diputación de Córdoba dejó de funcionar con fecha 8 de junio de 1823.

== VLADIMIR PUTIN ==

El presidente ruso [[Vladimir Putin]] fue nombrado presidente de Rusia de manera interina el 31 de diciembre de 1999, tras la salida de [[Boris Yeltsin]]. Desde 2000 fue presidente electo durante dos períodos (2000–2004 y 2004–2008). Tras ejercer de primer ministro en el período 2012–2018 bajo la presidencia de [[Dmitri Medvédev|Medvédev]], pasó nuevamente a la presidencia de la Federación Rusa en los períodos 2018–2024 y 2024 hasta el presente. <ref>{{cite news|last1=McKew|first1=Molly K.|title=Putin's Real Long Game|url=http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/01/putins-real-long-game-214589|access-date=2017-01-30|work=Politico Magazine|date=2017-01-01}}</ref> Durante su presidencia ha pertenecido a los partidos ''Unidad'' y ''Rusia Unida'', así como a la coalición ''Frente Popular'', un grupo de partidarios que Putin organizó en 2011 para ayudar a mejorar la percepción pública de ''Rusia Unida''. <ref>{{cite news|last=Korsunskaya|first=Darya|title=Putin promotes Russian People's Front as new power base|url=https://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-putin-idUSBRE92S08520130329|access-date=2017-01-30|work=Reuters|date=2017-03-29}}</ref> A su doctrina política se le ha llamado [[Putinismo]].

Putin ha disfrutado de altos índices de aprobación interna durante la mayor parte de su presidencia, con la excepción de 2011-2013, que probablemente se debe a las protestas rusas de 2011-2013. <ref>{{Cite web |title=Putin approval rating Russia 2021 |url=https://www.statista.com/statistics/896181/putin-approval-rating-russia/ |access-date=2022-03-08|website=Statista |language=en}}</ref><ref>{{Cite web |title=Poll: Putin's Approval Rating Is at All-Time High in Russia |url=https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/ukraine-plane-crash/poll-putins-approval-rating-all-time-high-russia-n161161 |access-date=2022-03-08 |website=NBC News |date=2014-07-21 |language=en}}</ref> En 2007, fue la Persona del Año de la revista Time. <ref>{{cite magazine|title=Person of the Year 2007: Choosing Order Before Freedom|url=http://content.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1690753_1690757,00.html|magazine=Time|first=Richard|last=Stengel|date=2007-12-19|access-date=2009-07-08}}</ref> En 2015, fue designado número uno en Time 100, la lista de la revista Time de las 100 personas más influyentes del mundo. <ref>{{Cite web|date=2015-04-14|title=Three guesses who has been voted the most influential person in the world...|url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/vladimir-putin-named-most-influential-figure-world-2015-time-100-readers-poll-a100441.html|access-date=2021-04-27|website=The Independent|language=en}}</ref> De 2013 a 2016, fue designado número uno en la lista Forbes de las personas más poderosas del mundo. La economía y el nivel de vida rusos crecieron rápidamente durante el primer período del régimen de Putin, impulsados en gran medida por un auge en la industria petrolera. Sin embargo, los precios más bajos del petróleo y las sanciones por la anexión de Crimea por parte de Rusia provocaron una recesión y un estancamiento en 2015 que ha persistido hasta el día de hoy. <ref>{{cite news|title=The World's Most Powerful People 2015|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidewalt/2015/11/04/the-worlds-most-powerful-people-2015/|newspaper=Forbes|date=Noviembre de 2015|first=David M.|last=Ewalt|access-date=2015-11-04}}</ref> Las libertades políticas se han visto drásticamente restringidas, en especial desde la [[Anexión de Crimea]] de 2015, lo que ha provocado una condena generalizada por parte de las organizaciones de derechos humanos -muchas de ellasprohibidas en el país; además desde 2022 y el inicio de la guerra Rusia-Ucrania, Putin ha sido descrito como un dictador. <ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.brookings.edu/articles/perspectives-on-the-potential-of-russian-oil/|title=Perspectives on the Potential of Russian Oil|website=Brookings.edu|last=Gaddy|first=Clifford G.|date=2004-07-01}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/28/business/worldbusiness/28iht-renrus.1.17283331.html|title=Russia's oil boom: Miracle or mirage?|newspaper=The New York Times|last=Kramer|first=Andrew E.|date=2008-10-28}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43210257|title=Life in Vladimir Putin's Russia explained in 10 charts|work=BBC News|date=2018-03-12}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://money.cnn.com/2018/01/22/news/economy/russia-putin-economy-election-oil/index.html|title=Russia faces 6 more years of stagnation under Putin|website=CNN|last=Petroff|first=Alanna|date=2018-01-22}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|title=Russia–Freedom in the World 2018|website=[[Freedom House]]|access-date=2018-08-27|archive-date=2018-04-01|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180401212949/https://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2018/russia}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://freedomhouse.org/blog/why-putin-not-okay|title=Why Putin Is Not Okay|website=Freedom House|last1=Galeano|first1=Sergio|last2=Roylance|first2=Tyler|date=2018-07-11}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.ecfr.eu/scorecard/2016/russia/25|title=Political freedom in Russia – ECFR's European Foreign Policy Scorecard 2016|website=European Council on Foreign Relations}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://memohrc.org/ru/bulletins/spisok-lic-priznannyh-politicheskimi-zaklyuchyonnymi-pravozashchitnym-centrom-memorial-za|title=Список лиц, признанных политическими заключёнными Правозащитным центром "Мемориал" (за исключением преследуемых в связи с реализацией права на свободу вероисповедания) по состоянию на 14 июня 2018 года|website=Memorial (society)|language=ru|trans-title=List of persons recognized as political prisoners by the Memorial Human Rights Center (with the exception of those prosecuted in connection with the exercise of the right to freedom of religion) as of 14 June 2018|date=2018-06-18}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://cpj.org/data/killed/?status=Killed&motiveConfirmed%5B%5D=Confirmed&type%5B%5D=Journalist&cc_fips%5B%5D=RS&start_year=2000&end_year=2018&group_by=year|title=Explore CPJ's database of attacks on the press|website=Committee to Protect Journalists}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/04/rights-groups-criticise-shameful-russian-crackdown-web-vpns|title=Rights groups condemn 'shameful' Russian crackdown on web VPNs|newspaper=The Guardian|last=Walker|first=Shaun|location=Moscow|date=2017-08-04}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/11/russia-four-years-of-putins-foreign-agents-law-to-shackle-and-silence-ngos/|title=Russia: Four years of Putin's 'Foreign Agents' law to shackle and silence NGOs|website=Amnesty International|date=2016-11-18}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |website=Atlantic Council |title=The Putin puzzle: Why is the Russian dictator so obsessed with Ukraine? |url=https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/the-putin-puzzle-why-is-the-russian-dictator-so-obsessed-with-ukraine/ |date=2022-05-24|access-date=2022-06-14|last=Vitvitsky |first=Bohdan}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.cnbc.com/2022/04/12/biden-suggests-putin-is-a-dictator-who-has-committed-genocide-half-a-world-away.html |title=Biden suggests Putin is a 'dictator' who has committed 'genocide half a world away' |website=CNBC |date=2022-04-12 |access-date=2022-06-14 |last=Pettypiece |first=Shannon}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |url=https://www.ft.com/content/e58832c5-a35a-4bf4-8be7-359b4563c1c9 |title=Putin's dictatorship is now based on fear rather than spin |newspaper=Financial Times |date=2022-04-17 |access-date=2022-06-14 |last=Guriev |first=Sergei}}</ref>

=== Generalidades ===

Se ha descrito el sistema político ruso bajo la presidencia de Putin como un sistema de liberalismo económico. La realidad es que el gobierno de la Federación rusa, lejos del liberalismo, ha practicado el proteccionismo y el paternalismo soviético, con una falta de transparencia en la gobernanza extrema, un creciente amiguismo y nepotismo en la gestión pública, dentro de un ambiente en el que la corrupción es algo generalizado. <ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.nemtsov.ru/docs/putin-itogi.pdf|script-title=ru:Независимый экспертеый доклад «Путин. Итоги»|trans-title=Experts' report|first1=Boris|last1=Nemtsov|first2=Vladimir|last2=Milov|date=Febrero de 2008|language=ru}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|script-title=ru:За четыре года мздоимство в России выросло почти в десять раз|trans-title=Bribe-taking in Russia has increased by nearly ten times|work=Финансовые известия|date=2005-07-21|language=ru|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090123083315/http://www.finiz.ru/cfin/tmpl-art/id_art-937000|archive-date=2009-01-23}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Energy: Revenues and Corruption Increase in Russia|work=Voice of America|date=2006-07-13|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081220114542/http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2006-07/2006-07-13-voa25.cfm|archive-date=2008-12-20}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=Чума-2005: коррупция|work={{transliteration|ru|Argumenty i Fakty}} [Arguments and Facts]|issue=29|page=1290|date=July 2005|language=ru|access-date=2008-12-23|archive-date=2014-12-05|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20141205055817/http://gazeta.aif.ru/online/aif/1290/04_01}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2005/07/C6FC8C8F-C942-4D9F-897B-564EE730990E.html|title=Russia: Bribery Thriving Under Putin, According To New Report|publisher=Radio Liberty|date=2005-07-22}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/dec/21/russia.topstories3|first=Luke|last=Harding|title=Putin, the Kremlin power struggle and the $40bn fortune|newspaper=The Guardian|date=2007-12-21}}</ref>

Entre 1999 y 2008, la economía rusa creció a un ritmo constante, <ref name="worldbankreports">{{cite news|title=Russian Economic Reports |publisher=World Bank|date=June 2007|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070813073808/http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/ECAEXT/RUSSIANFEDERATIONEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20888536~menuPK:2445695~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:305600,00.html|archive-date=2007-08-13|access-date=2014-03-24}}</ref> lo que algunos expertos atribuyen a la fuerte devaluación del rublo de 1998, las reformas estructurales de la era de [[Boris Yeltsin]], el aumento de los precios del petróleo y el crédito barato de los bancos occidentales. <ref>{{cite news|last=Polukin|first=Alexey|script-title=ru:К нефти легко примазаться|work=Novaya Gazeta|date=2008-01-10|access-date=2008-12-29|language=ru|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090102003527/http://www.novayagazeta.ru/data/2008/01/10.html|archive-date=2009-01-02}}</ref><ref name="Troublepipe">{{cite news|title=Trouble in the pipeline|newspaper=The Economist|date=8 May 2008|url=http://www.economist.com/business/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_id=11332313|access-date=2008-11-26}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|title=The flight from the rouble|newspaper=The Economist|date=2008-11-20|url=http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12641926|access-date=2008-11-26}}</ref> En opinión del ex embajador Michael McFaul (junio de 2004), el "impresionante" crecimiento económico a corto plazo de Rusia "vino simultáneamente con la destrucción de los medios de comunicación libres, amenazas a la sociedad civil y una corrupción absoluta de la justicia". <ref name=McFaul>{{cite news|url=http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/2004/06/b99061.html|title=The Putin Paradox|first=Michael|last=McFaul|date=2004-06-24|access-date=2017-01-29}}</ref>

Durante los dos primeros mandatos de Putin como presidente, promulgó una serie de reformas económicas liberales, como el impuesto fijo sobre la renta del 13 por ciento, impuestos reducidos sobre las ganancias y nuevos códigos territoriales y civiles. Durante este período, la pobreza en Rusia se redujo a más de la mitad <ref name=kommersantstats>{{cite news|title=Putin's Eight Years|work=Kommersant|date=4 May 2008|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160304073031/http://www.kommersant.com/page.asp?id=804651|archive-date=2016-03-04}}</ref> y el PIB real creció rápidamente. <ref name="news.xinhuanet.com">{{cite news|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080212192804/http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2008-02/09/content_7582876.htm|archive-date=2008-02-12|title=Putin visions new development plans for Russia|work=China Economic Information Service|access-date=2008-05-08}}</ref> Sin embargo, el ex embajador Michael McFaul declaró en junio de 2004 que el "impresionante" crecimiento económico de Rusia "se produjo simultáneamente con la destrucción de los medios de comunicación libres, las amenazas a la sociedad civil y una corrupción absoluta de la justicia". <ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.ej.ru/?a=note&id=5920|language=ru|script-title=ru:Путинизм как лошадь Мюнхгаузена|work=ej.ru|first=Dmitry|last=Oreshkin|date=2007-01-24}}</ref><ref name="Teflon">{{cite news|work=The Moscow Times|date=2008-12-23|access-date=2008-12-23|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081225082855/http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/600/42/373358.htm|archive-date=2008-12-25}}</ref> 

En asuntos exteriores, el gobierno de Putin ha buscado emular la grandeza, la beligerancia y el expansionismo de la ex Unión Soviética. pueden estar creando ahora un mercado internacional para el putinismo" ya que "la mayoría de las veces, las elites nacionales instintivamente antidemocráticas, oligárquicas y corruptas encuentran que una apariencia de democracia, con adornos parlamentarios y una pretensión de pluralismo, es mucho más atractiva y manejable que la cosa real". <ref name="Tisd">{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2007/nov/21/tisdallbriefing.simontisdall|title=Putinism could be the next Russian export|work=The Guardian|date=2008-11-21|access-date=2009-02-11|location=London|first=Simon|last=Tisdall}}</ref>

En un artículo publicado el 20 de septiembre de 2007 en The Washington Times, el economista estadounidense Richard W. Rahn calificó el putinismo como "una forma de gobierno nacionalista autoritaria rusa que pretende ser una democracia de libre mercado" y que "debe más de su linaje al fascismo que al comunismo". ", señalando que "el putinismo dependía de que la economía rusa creciera lo suficientemente rápido como para que la mayoría de la gente tuviera un nivel de vida cada vez mayor y, a cambio, estuviera dispuesta a soportar la suave represión existente". La suerte cambió, era probable que el putinismo se volviera más represivo". <ref name="RRahn"/> He predicted that "as Russia's economic fortunes changed, Putinism was likely to become more repressive".<ref name="RRahn">{{cite news|first=Richard W.|last=Rahn|url=http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/sep/20/putinism/|title=Putinism|work=The Washington Times|date=2008-09-20|access-date=2009-02-11}}</ref> Tras los comentarios de Rahn, Putin aceleró sus medidas autoritarias, promoviendo creencias y valores conservadores y silenciando sistemáticamente a los sectores de la oposición política dentro y fuera de la administración. <ref name=":0">{{cite book|title=The World Transformed 1945 to the Present|last=Hunt|first=Michael|publisher=Oxford University Press|year=2014|isbn=9780199371020|location=New York|pages=524–525}}</ref>

El historiador ruso Andranik Migranyan consideró que el régimen de Putin estaba restaurando lo que él consideraba las funciones naturales de un gobierno después del período de la década de 1990, cuando supuestamente gobernaban Rusia oligopolios que expresaban sólo sus propios intereses estrechos. Migranyan dijo: "Si la democracia es el gobierno de una mayoría y la protección de los derechos y oportunidades de una minoría, el régimen político actual puede describirse como democrático, al menos formalmente. En Rusia existe un sistema político multipartidista, mientras que varios partidos, la mayoría de ellos, que representan a la oposición, tienen escaños en la Duma del Estado". <ref name=Andranik/>

=== Putinismo ===
{{artículo principal|Putinismo}}

En un artículo publicado el 11 de enero de 2000 en ''[[Sovetskaya Rossiya]]'', el analista político ruso Andrey Piontkovsky caracterizó el putinismo como la etapa más alta y final del capitalismo de bandidos en Rusia, la etapa en la que, como dijo Lenin, la burguesía tira por la borda la bandera de las libertades democráticas y los derechos humanos; y también como una guerra, la «consolidación» de la nación sobre la base del odio contra algún grupo étnico, el ataque a la libertad de expresión, el lavado de cerebro informativo, el aislamiento del mundo exterior y una mayor degradación económica. <ref>{{cite magazine|last=Piontkovsky|first=Andrey|author-link=Andrey Piontkovsky|date=2000-01-11|title=Путинизм как высшая и заключительная стадия бандитского капитализма в России|trans-title=Putinism as highest and final stage of bandit capitalism in Russia|language=ru|magazine=Советская Россия|trans-magazine=Sovetskaya Rossiya|location=Moscow|issue=3}}</ref> Fue el primer uso registrado del término «putinismo». <ref>{{cite book|last1=Fedorov|first1=Valeriy|last2=Baskakova|first2=Yuliya|last3=Byzov|first3=Leontiy|last4=Chernozub|first4=Oleg|last5=Mamonov|first5=Mikhail|last6=Gavrilov|first6=Igor|last7=Vyadro|first7=Mikhail|date=2018|title=Выборы на фоне Крыма: электоральный цикл 2016–2018 гг. и перспективы политического транзита|trans-title=Elections against the backdrop of Crimea: election cycle 2016–2018 and perspectives of political transit|chapter="Путинизм" как социальный феномен и его ракурсы|trans-chapter="Putinism" as a social phenomenon and its aspects|editor-last=Fedorov|editor-first=Valeriy|language=ru|location=Moscow|publisher=Russian Public Opinion Research Center (ВЦИОМ)]|pages=587–602|isbn=9785041523244}}</ref>

Los términos «putinismo» y «putinista» suelen tener connotaciones negativas cuando se utilizan en los medios de comunicación occidentales 
<ref>{{cite news|author=Safire, William|url=https://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9403EFDD163FF932A05752C0A9669C8B63|title=Putinism Looms|work=The New York Times|date=2000-12-31|access-date=2008-12-26}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=Beichman, Arnold|title=The Perils of Putinism|work=The Washington Times|date=2007-02-11|access-date=2008-12-26|archive-date=2008-07-04|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080704205851/http://www.hoover.org/publications/digest/7468137.html}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=Will, George F.|title=Putinism On the March|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A20887-2004Nov29.html|newspaper=The Washington Post|date=2004-11-30|access-date=2008-12-26}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=Heffer, Simon|url=https://archive.today/20120914114626/http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/columnists/simonheffer/3561411/The-West-must-start-to-hit-Russia-where-it-hurts---in-the-roubles.html|archive-date=2012-09-14|title=The West must start to hit Russia where it hurts – in the roubles|work=The Daily Telegraph|date=2008-08-13|access-date=2008-12-26}}.</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=https://archive.today/20120731141755/http://www.eurotopics.net/es/presseschau/medienindex/media_articles/archiv_article/ARTICLE25007-Europe-is-sceptical-facing-the-Russian-presidentials|archive-date=2012-07-31|title=Europe is skeptical facing the Russian presidentials|date=2009-01-18|access-date=2009-01-20}}</ref><ref name="JShelton">{{cite news|title=The Market Will Punish Putinism|work=The Wall Street Journal|date=2008-09-03|access-date=10 February 2009|url-status=dead|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090108214546/http://online.wsj.com/public/article_print/SB122039907604792875.html|archive-date=2009-01-08}}</ref> para referirse al gobierno ruso de Putin, en el que los llamados "siloviki", el estamento militar y de seguridad, supuestamente controlan gran parte del poder político y financiero. Muchos {{lang|ru-Latn|siloviki}}<ref name=Krysha/><ref>{{cite news|author=Whitmore, Brian|url=http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2007/08/a728d464-224e-4ba1-8560-ad580c9c1d71.html|title=Russia: Putin May Go, But Can 'Putinism' Survive?|publisher=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty|date=2007-08-29|access-date=2018-06-02}}</ref> son amigos personales de Putin o trabajaron anteriormente con él en agencias de seguridad e inteligencia del Estado, como el FSB, el Ministerio del Interior y el ejército. <ref>{{cite news|author1=Belton, Catherine|author2=Buckley, Neil|url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/ffb58e54-2216-11dd-a50a-000077b07658.html|title=Friends in high places?|work=Financial Times|date=2008-05-15|access-date=2018-06-02}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=Kramer, Andrew|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/18/business/worldbusiness/18kgb.html?_r=1&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss&oref=slogin|title=Former Russian Spies Are Now Prominent in Business|work=The New York Times|date=18 December 2007|access-date=2 June 2018}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=Aslund, Anders|title=Russia's New Oligarchy: For Putin and Friends, a Gusher of Questionable Deals|publisher=iie.com|date=2007-12-12|access-date=2018-06-02|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20160324083752/http://iie.com/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=857|archive-date=2016-03-24}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://newsru.com/finance/01nov2007/gunvor.html|script-title=ru:Миллиардер Тимченко, "друг Путина", стал одним из крупнейших в мире продавцов нефти|publisher=NEWSru.com|date=2007-11-01|access-date=2018-06-02|language=ru}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://newsru.com/russia/17dec2007/putin40.html#2|script-title=ru:Путин остается премьером, чтобы сохранить контроль над бизнес-империей|publisher=NEWSru.com|date=2007-12-17|access-date=2018-06-02|language=ru}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|script-title=ru:За время президентства Путин "заработал" 40 миллиардов долларов?|access-date=29 January 2011|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081206131344/http://allcred.ru/2007/12/16/mn222.html|archive-date=2008-12-06|language=ru}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|url=http://newsru.com/russia/13may2008/megaputin.html|script-title=ru:Путин под занавес президентства заключил мегасделки по раздаче госактивов "близким людям"|publisher=NEWSru.com|date=2008-05-13|access-date=2018-06-02|language=ru}}</ref> Cassiday y Johnson afirman que, desde su llegada al poder en 1999, «Putin ha inspirado expresiones de adulación como Rusia no había visto desde los tiempos de José Stalin. Los homenajes a sus logros y atributos personales han inundado todos los medios de comunicación posibles" Ross afirma que el culto surgió rápidamente en 2002 y hace hincapié en la “voluntad de hierro, salud, juventud y decisión” de Putin. <ref>{{cite journal|author1=Cassiday, Julie A.|author2=Johnson, Emily D.|jstor=41061898|title=Putin, Putiniana and the Question of a Post-Soviet Cult of Personality|journal=Slavonic and East European Review|volume=88|issue=4|year=2010|pages=681–707|doi=10.1353/see.2010.0059 |s2cid=152158553 }}</ref><ref>{{cite book|first=Cameron|last=Ross|title=Russian Politics Under Putin|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=M26DMaA5-YkC&pg=PA26|year=2004|publisher=Manchester UP|page=26|isbn=9780719068010}}</ref>

=== Presidencia interina (1999–2000) ===
VER: Putin's rise to power

El 31 de diciembre de 1999, sorpresivamente el presidente [[Boris Yeltsin]] dimitió. En virtud de la Constitución de Rusia, el primer ministro se convirtió en Presidente en funciones. <ref>{{cite news|url=http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/585368.stm|title=Putin takes control in Russia|publisher=BBC News|date=1999-12-31}}</ref> No por casualidad, un día antes apareció en la página web del gobierno ruso un artículo firmado por [[Vladimir Putin]] titulado «Rusia en el cambio de milenio». El primer ministro daba su opinión sobre el pasado y planteaba los principales problemas del país. En opinión de Putin, la primera tarea era la consolidación de la sociedad rusa: «El trabajo fructífero y creativo, que tanto necesita nuestro país, es imposible en una sociedad dividida y atomizada internamente". <ref name=put1>[http://www.ng.ru/politics/1999-12-30/4_millenium.html Russia between the Millennia], Vladimir Putin (en ruso en el original).</ref> Sin embargo, subrayó: «En una Rusia democrática no debe haber acuerdos civiles forzados. El acuerdo social sólo puede ser voluntario". <ref name=put1 /> La clave no era otra que reforzar el Estado: «La clave para la recuperación y el crecimiento de Rusia reside hoy en la esfera político-estatal. Rusia necesita un poder estatal fuerte y debe tenerlo». Y añadió: «Un poder estatal fuerte en Rusia es un Estado federal democrático, basado en la ley y viable". <ref name=put1 /> Además, Putin señaló la necesidad de mejorar significativamente la eficiencia económica, la necesidad de llevar a cabo una política social coherente basada en hechos y resultados y destinada a luchar contra la pobreza, y la necesidad de proporcionar un crecimiento estable para el bienestar de la población. <ref name=put1 />

El artículo concluía con la afirmación alarmista de que Rusia se encontraba en medio de uno de los periodos más difíciles de su historia: «Por primera vez en los últimos 200-300 años, se enfrenta a la amenaza real de descender al segundo, y posiblemente incluso al tercer, rango de los estados del mundo". <ref name=put1 /> Para evitarlo, argumentaba que era necesario un tremendo esfuerzo por parte de todas las fuerzas intelectuales, físicas y morales de la nación porque “todo depende de nosotros, y sólo de nosotros, de nuestra capacidad para reconocer la magnitud de la amenaza, para unirnos y aplicarnos a un trabajo largo y duro”. <ref name=put1 />

Como se afirma en el curso de historia de los doctores rusos en Historia Barsenkov y Vdovin, las ideas básicas del artículo estaban representadas en el programa electoral de Vladímir Putin y contaban con el apoyo de la mayoría de los ciudadanos del país, lo que condujo a la victoria de Vladímir Putin en la primera vuelta de las elecciones de 2000, con el 52% de los votos emitidos. <ref name=bars>[http://www.alleng.ru/d/hist/hist035.htm ''History of Russia, 1917–2004''] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20180209184539/http://www.alleng.ru/d/hist/hist035.htm |date=2018-02-09}}, A.S. Barsenkov ([[:ru:Барсенков, Александр Сергеевич|RuWiki]]) and A.I. Vdovin, pag. 765. (en ruso)</ref>

=== Primer mandato presidencial (2000–2004) ===
VER Mikhail Kasyanov's Cabinet
[[File:Vladimir Putin 18 January 2001-3.jpg|thumb|Putin con el líder checheno [[Akhmad Kadyrov]] en 2001.]]
Las líneas maestras de la política exterior rusa fueron presentadas por Vladimir Putin en su discurso ante la Asamblea Federal de Rusia en abril de 2002: «Estamos construyendo relaciones constructivas y normales con todas las naciones del mundo, quiero subrayar, con todas las naciones del mundo. Sin embargo, quiero señalar algo más: la norma en la comunidad internacional, en el mundo de hoy, es también la dura competencia: por los mercados, por las inversiones, por la influencia política y económica. Y en esta lucha, Rusia tiene que ser fuerte y competitiva». «Quiero subrayar que la política exterior rusa se organizará en el futuro de forma estrictamente pragmática, basándose en nuestras capacidades e intereses nacionales: militares y estratégicos, económicos y políticos. Y también teniendo en cuenta los intereses de nuestros socios, sobre todo en la [[Comunidad de Estados Independientes|CEI]]».<ref>[http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2002/04/18/0000_type70029type82912_70662.shtml Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090226024418/http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2002/04/18/0000_type70029type82912_70662.shtml |date=2009-02-26}}. Vladimir Putin. 2002.</ref>

En su libro de 2008, el comentarista político ruso, [[teniente general]] retirado del KGB [Nikolai Leonov]], señaló que el artículo sobre el programa de Putin apenas se tuvo en cuenta entonces y nunca se volvió a tratar después, un hecho que Leonov lamentó, porque «su contenido es muy importante para contrastarlo con sus acciones posteriores [de Putin]» y así averiguar el patrón de Putin, según el cual «las palabras, la mayoría de las veces, no coinciden con sus acciones». <ref>[[Nikolai Leonov]]. ''Россия 2000–2008. Закат или рассвет?'' (''Russia 2000–2008. Sunset, or Dawn?''), Moscú, 2008, pag. 10.</ref>

==== Restauración del poder gubernamental ====

El concepto de «putinismo» fue descrito en sentido positivo por el politólogo ruso Andranik Migranyan. <ref name=Andranik>[http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/7/521.html What is ‘Putinism’?] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090205173344/http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/numbers/7/521.html |date=2009-02-05}}, por Andranik Migranyan. ''Russia in Global affairs''. 13 de abril de 2004.</ref> Según Migranyan, Putin llegó al cargo cuando peor estaba el régimen: la economía estaba «totalmente descentralizada» y «el Estado había perdido la autoridad central mientras los oligarcas robaban el país y controlaban sus instituciones de poder». En dos años, Putin restauró la jerarquía del poder, acabando con la omnipotencia de las élites regionales y destruyendo la influencia política de «oligarcas y oligopolios en el centro federal». El centro de poder no institucional de la era de Boris Yeltsin, comúnmente llamado «La Familia», quedó arruinado, lo que según Migranyan socavó a su vez las posiciones de actores como Boris Berezovsky y Vladimir Gusinsky, que habían intentado privatizar el Estado ruso «con todos sus recursos e instituciones». <ref name=Andranik /> 

Migranyan afirmó que Putin empezó a establecer reglas de juego comunes para todos los actores, empezando por un intento de restaurar el papel del gobierno como institución que expresa los intereses conjuntos de los ciudadanos y «capaz de controlar los recursos financieros, administrativos y mediáticos del Estado». Según Migranyan: «Naturalmente, de acuerdo con las tradiciones rusas, cualquier intento de aumentar el papel del Estado provoca una intensa repulsa por parte de los intelectuales liberales, por no mencionar a un segmento de la comunidad empresarial que no está interesado en el fortalecimiento del poder estatal hasta que no se haya apoderado de toda la propiedad estatal más atractiva». Migranyan afirmó que la opinión de los oligopolios sobre la democracia se basaba en la premisa de si estaban cerca del centro del poder, y no en «características y estimaciones objetivas de la situación del país». Migranyan afirmó que los medios de comunicación «libres», propiedad de, por ejemplo, Berezovsky y Gusinsky, no se parecían en nada a los medios libres tal y como los entiende Occidente, sino que servían a sus propios intereses económicos y políticos, mientras que «al resto de políticos y analistas se les negaba el derecho a salir en antena». <ref name=Andranik /> Migranyan considera que el refuerzo del papel de las fuerzas del orden es una prueba para poner barreras a los delincuentes, «sobre todo a los de las grandes empresas». <ref name=Andranik /> Migranyan ve en 2004 la fructificación de la revolución social iniciada por [[Mijail Gorbachov]], cuyos objetivos eran reconstruir el sistema social, afirmando que «el dominio absoluto de la propiedad privada en Rusia, reconocido hoy por todas las fuerzas políticas, ha sido el mayor logro y resultado de esta revolución social». <ref name=Andranik /> Según Migranyan, el principal problema de la democracia rusa es la incapacidad de su sociedad civil para gobernar el Estado y el subdesarrollo de los intereses públicos. En su opinión, esto es consecuencia de la incapacidad del Estado familiar de la era Yeltsin de crear «un entorno favorable para las medianas y pequeñas empresas». Migranyan considera que la Rusia moderna es una democracia, al menos formalmente, mientras que «el Estado, una vez restaurada su eficacia y el control sobre sus propios recursos, se ha convertido en la mayor corporación responsable de establecer las reglas del juego». Migranyan se pregunta hasta dónde puede llegar esta influencia en el futuro. En 2004, veía dos posibilidades para el régimen de Putin: o la transformación en una democracia consolidada, o el autoritarismo burocrático. Sin embargo, «si Rusia va por detrás de las naciones capitalistas desarrolladas en lo que respecta a la consolidación de la democracia, no es por la calidad de la democracia, sino por su cantidad y por el equilibrio entre la sociedad civil y el Estado». <ref name=Andranik />

===Segundo mandato presidencial (2004–2008)===
[[File:Vladimir Putin official portrait.jpg|thumb|left|160px|Retrato oficial de Vladimir Putin]]
[[File:2005 Victory Day Parade (4).jpg|thumb|Putin y el presidente estadounidense [[George W. Bush]] en 2005.]]

El informe de Andrew C. Kuchins de noviembre de 2007 afirmaba que «Rusia es hoy un [[régimen híbrido]] que podría calificarse mejor de “internacionalismo antiliberal”, aunque ninguna de las dos palabras es del todo exacta y requiere considerables matizaciones. De ser una protodemocracia débilmente institucionalizada, frágil y distorsionada en muchos aspectos en la década de 1990, Rusia bajo Vladimir Putin ha retrocedido en la dirección de un autoritarismo altamente centralizado, que ha caracterizado al Estado durante la mayor parte de sus 1.000 años de historia. Pero se trata de un Estado autoritario en el que el [[consentimiento de los gobernados]] es esencial. Dada la experiencia de la década de 1990 y la propaganda del Kremlin que enfatiza este período como uno de caos, colapso económico y humillación internacional, el pueblo ruso no tiene un gran entusiasmo por la democracia y sigue siendo políticamente apático a la luz de la extraordinaria recuperación económica y la mejora en el estilo de vida de tantas personas en los últimos ocho años. El gobierno emergente, altamente centralizado, combinado con una sociedad débil y sumisa, es el sello distintivo del paternalismo tradicional ruso». <ref>[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071214-russia_2017-web.pdf "Alternative Futures for Russia to 2017"]. In ''Russia and Eurasia Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies''. Noviembre de 2007, pág. 4.</ref>

En una entrevista concedida en 2007 a ''[[Der Spiegel]]'', [[Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn]] comentó sobre el régimen de Putin: «Putin ha heredado un país saqueado y oprimido, con una mayoría de su población desmoralizada y pobre. Comprendió y gestionó lo que era posible: una recuperación gradual y lenta. Estos esfuerzos no se notaron ni se apreciaron inmediatamente. En cualquier caso, es difícil encontrar ejemplos en la historia en los que las medidas de un país para recuperar la fuerza de su propio gobierno sean acogidas favorablemente por otros gobiernos». <ref name=Solj>Interview of ''[[Der Spiegel]]'' with [[Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn]] (23 de julio de 2007): [http://www.izvestia.ru/person/article3106464/ Russian translation] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071111082823/http://www.izvestia.ru/person/article3106464/ |date=2007-11-11}}, [http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/literatur/0,1518,496046,00.html partial German version], [http://service.spiegel.de/digas/find?DID=52345037 full German version (paid)].</ref>

Según un artículo de 2007 de [[Dimitri Simes]], aparecido en la revista ''[[Foreign Affairs]]'': «Con altos precios de la energía, políticas fiscales sólidas y oligarcas domesticados, el régimen de Putin ya no necesita préstamos internacionales ni ayuda económica y no tiene problemas para atraer importantes inversiones extranjeras a pesar de la creciente tensión con los gobiernos occidentales. Dentro de Rusia, la relativa estabilidad, la prosperidad y un nuevo sentido de la dignidad han atemperado la desilusión popular ante el creciente control estatal y la manipulación de mano dura del proceso político». <ref>[http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/10/losing_russia.html Losing Russia], in ''Foreign Affairs'', por Dimitri Simes. Noviembre/Diciembre de 2007.</ref>

[[File:Vladimir Putin in Tuva 2007-54.jpg|thumb|Putin saluda a ciudadanos de la república siberiana de [[Tuvá]] en 2007.]]
La corresponsal diplomática de la [[BBC]] [[Bridget Kendall]] describía en su artículo de 2007 la «década marcada» de los noventa en Rusia, con una «[[hiperinflación]] galopante», duras políticas de Yeltsin, un descenso de la población a un ritmo similar al de una nación en guerra, y el país pasando «de [[superpotencia]] a mendigo», para preguntarse a continuación: «Así pues, ¿quién puede culpar a los rusos por acoger con satisfacción la relativa estabilidad que Putin ha presidido durante los últimos siete años, aunque otros aspectos de su gobierno hayan proyectado una sombra autoritaria? En el mundo de la política rusa, lo que muchos temen no es que haya poca democracia, sino que haya demasiada. Por eso, según descubrí, algunos piden que Putin siga un tercer mandato. No porque le admiren -en privado, muchos dicen que él y sus compinches son tan corruptos y desprecian a los demás como sus predecesores comunistas-, sino porque desconfían de la idea de democracia, están resentidos con Occidente por impulsarla y temen lo que pueda ocurrir como resultado de las elecciones del próximo año. La experiencia reciente les ha enseñado que el cambio suele ser para peor y que es mejor evitarlo». <ref>[http://www.newstatesman.com/200706110024 Russia: The beggar becomes the belligerent], por [[Bridget Kendall]]. ''[[New Statesman]]''. 7 de junio de 2007 {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080723231031/http://www.newstatesman.com/200706110024|date=2008-07-23}}</ref>

==== Sociología política ====

Según Mark Smith (marzo de 2003), entre los principales caracteres del régimen de Putin hasta ese momento el más importante fue el desarrollo de un sistema corporativo mediante la búsqueda de estrechos vínculos con las organizaciones empresariales, la estabilidad social y la cooptación de los partidos de la oposición. <ref name="marksmith" /> Determinó tres agrupaciones principales en el liderazgo inicial de Putin: 1) los siloviki, 2) los liberales económicos y 3) los partidarios de «la Familia», es decir, los cercanos a Yeltsin. <ref name="marksmith" />

[[Olga Kryshtanovskaya]], que realizó un estudio sociológico en 2004, cifró en un 25% el número relativo de ''siloviki'' en la élite política rusa. <ref name=Krysha>[http://2004.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2004/63n/n63n-s43.shtml Mission "intrusion" is complete!] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20060723095634/http://2004.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2004/63n/n63n-s43.shtml |date=2006-07-23}} por Olga Kryshtanovskaya, 2004, ''[[Novaya Gazeta]]'' (en ruso)</ref> En el «círculo íntimo» de Putin, formado por unas 20 personas, el porcentaje de siloviki aumenta hasta el 58% y se reduce al 18-20% en el Parlamento y al 34% en el conjunto del Gobierno. <ref name=Krysha /> Según Kryshtanovskaya, no hubo una toma del poder como la burocracia del Kremlin ha llamado a los siloviki para «restablecer el orden». El proceso de llegada al poder de los ''siloviki'' comenzó supuestamente en 1996, durante el segundo mandato de Borís Yeltsin. «No personalmente Yeltsin, sino toda la élite deseaba detener el proceso revolucionario y consolidar el poder». Cuando Putin fue nombrado Primer Ministro en 1999, el proceso se vio impulsado. Según Olga: «Sí, Putin ha traído consigo a los silovikis. Pero eso no basta para entender la situación. También hay un aspecto objetivo: toda la clase política deseaba que vinieran. Fueron llamados al servicio... Se necesitaba un brazo fuerte, capaz desde el punto de vista de la élite de establecer el orden en el país». <ref name=Krysha />

Kryshtanovskaya señaló que también había personas que habían trabajado en estructuras que se creía que estaban afiliadas al [[KGB]]/[[FSB]], como el Ministerio de Asuntos Exteriores de la Unión Soviética, la Comisión Gubernamental de Comunicaciones, el Ministerio de Comercio Exterior, la agencia de prensa ''News'' y otras. El trabajo per se en tales agencias no implicaría necesariamente contactos con los servicios de seguridad, pero sí los haría probables. <ref name=Krysha2>{{in lang|ru}} [http://www.cprf.info/projects/vlast/22071.shtml Fradkov: jacket over straps], by Olga Kryshtanovskaya. ([[Moscow News]]. 3 de mayo de 2004. № 8.)</ref> Sumando las cifras de los «siloviki» oficiales y afiliados, llegó a una estimación del 77% de los mismos en el poder. <ref name=Krysha />

Según una investigación de la Fundación Rusa de Opinión Pública de 2005, el 34% de los encuestados piensa que «hay falta de democracia en Rusia porque no se respetan los derechos y libertades democráticos», y también señalaron la falta de ley y orden. Al mismo tiempo, el 21% de los encuestados dijo que había demasiada democracia en Rusia, y muchos de ellos señalaron los mismos inconvenientes que el grupo anterior: «[L]a falta de ley y orden, la irresponsabilidad y la no rendición de cuentas de los políticos». Según la Fundación: «Como vemos, las opiniones negativas de los rusos sobre la democracia se basan en su insatisfacción con las condiciones contemporáneas, mientras que algunos encuestados piensan que el modelo democrático no es adecuado en principio». Considerando el régimen moderno: «Es interesante que la mayoría de los encuestados piense que el gobierno de Putin marca la época más democrática de la historia rusa (29%), mientras que el segundo lugar lo ocupa la época de Brézhnev (14%). Algunos mencionan a Gorbachov y Yeltsin en este contexto (11% y 9%, respectivamente)». <ref>''Democracy in Russia (population poll)'', por The Public Opinion Foundation, marzo de 2005. (in [http://www.fom.ru/topics/775.html the original version of the report] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071102135047/http://www.fom.ru/topics/775.html |date=2007-11-02 }} en ruso)</ref> A finales de 2008, [[Lev Gudkov]], basándose en los datos de las encuestas del [[Levada Center]], señaló la casi desaparición de la [[opinión pública]] como institución sociopolítica en la Rusia de Putin y su sustitución por la todavía eficaz propaganda estatal. <ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2008/12/30/176062 |script-title=ru:Новогодний баланс: После стабильности |newspaper=Vedomosti|date=2008-12-30|access-date=2008-12-31|language=ru}}</ref>

=== Primer ministro (2008–2012) ===

La operación de cambio de poder entre Putin y Medvédev en 2008 se consideró en general una acción ''pro forma'' después de que la Constitución no permitiera a Putin ser reelegido para un tercer mandato en las elecciones presidenciales de 2008.

=== Tercer mandato presidencial (2012–2018) ===
[[File:Vladimir Putin - 2012.jpg|thumb|Vladimir Putin (retrato oficial 2012)]]
Según un estudio de Olesya Zakharova, investigadora del [[Higher School of Economics]] y del Centro de Investigación de Estudios de Europa Oriental de la [[Universidad de Bremen]], tras las protestas de 2011-2013 en la plaza Bolotnaya, que fueron descritas en el discurso oficial ruso como un abuso de las libertades democráticas y graves amenazas para la seguridad de los ciudadanos, Putin presentó un nuevo concepto de «democracia rusa», que interpretó exclusivamente como «cumplimiento y respeto de las leyes, normas y reglamentos», y que las libertades individuales y los derechos humanos ya no se consideraban requisitos previos para una sociedad democrática. <ref>{{cite web|last=Zakharova|first=Olesya|date=2021-04-07|title=Putin on Democracy|language=en|website=RIDL.io|access-date=2021-06-09|archive-date=2021-06-09|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210609125224/https://www.ridl.io/en/putin-on-democracy/}}</ref>

Las leyes rusas se modificaron de acuerdo con este nuevo concepto de «democracia». Según un estudio realizado por la Federación Internacional de Derechos Humanos ({{Lang-en|International Federation for Human Rights}}), en el periodo 2012-2018 se aprobaron en Rusia unas 50 leyes antidemocráticas. <ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.fidh.org/IMG/pdf/tableau_russie_web_paysage_v2-2.pdf|title=Table illustrating legislative crackdown on rights and freedoms of the civil society in Russia since 2012|publisher= FIDH.org }}</ref> Las nuevas leyes y normativas van desde mayores poderes de vigilancia y censura, pasando por leyes que prohíben «cuestionar la integridad de la nación rusa» -prohibiendo de hecho criticar la presencia de Rusia en el este de Ucrania y Crimea-, amplias leyes sobre «extremismo» que otorgan a las autoridades poderes para reprimir la libertad política y religiosa, hasta imponer determinadas visiones sobre la historia rusa prohibiendo a la gente pensar de forma diferente. A lo largo de estos últimos años también se ha elaborado un conjunto específico y complejo de leyes para dificultar a las ONG y a las organizaciones de derechos humanos el funcionamiento y la comunicación de sus actividades, el acceso a la información y la recepción de financiación internacional, obstaculizando así gravemente su capacidad para operar de forma independiente y, en el caso de las más pequeñas, para sobrevivir. <ref>{{cite web|date=2018-03-11|title=Russia 2012 – 2018: 50 anti-democracy laws entered into force within last presidential mandate|language=en|website=FIDH.org|url=https://www.fidh.org/en/region/europe-central-asia/russia/russia-2012-2018-50-anti-democracy-laws-entered-into-force-within}}</ref>

==== Nueva política social y lucha contra los derechos humanos ====

On 21 November 2012, the Federal Law of 20 July 2012 No.121-FZ [[Russian foreign agent law|"On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Regulation of the Activities of Non-profit Organisations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent"]],<ref>{{Cita web|type=Federal Law|index=121-FZ|date=20 July 2012|legislature=[[State Duma]]|title=О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации в части регулирования деятельности некоммерческих организаций, выполняющих функции иностранного агента|language=ru|trans-title=On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Regulation of the Activities of Non-profit Organisations Performing the Functions of a Foreign Agent|url=http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000505&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=20.07.2012&a8=121-%D4%C7&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=51&y=13}}</ref> which is the amendments to the Federal Law of 19 May 1995 No.82-FZ "On public associations", the Federal Law of 12 January 1996 No.7-FZ "On Non-profit Organizations", the Federal Law of 7 August 2001 No.115-FZ "On countering the legalization (laundering) of the proceeds of crime and the financing of terrorism", the [[Criminal Code of Russia]] and the Criminal Procedure Code of Russia, entered into force.<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=21 November 2012|title=Российские НКО не хотят быть "иностранными агентами"|language=ru|work=[[BBC]]|url=https://www.bbc.com/russian/russia/2012/11/121121_russia_ngo_agents_debate}}</ref> In accordance to this law, Russian non-profit organization, except for state and municipal companies, can be declared foreign agent if it participates in political activity in Russia and receives funding from foreign sources. Political activity is defined as any influence to public opinion and public policy including a sending a requests and petitions. The foreign agent label increases registration barriers for a non-profit organization in Russia. Once registered, non-profit organizations are subject to additional audits and are obliged to mark all their official statements with a disclosure that it is being given by a "foreign agent". This includes restrictions on foreigners and stateless peoples from establishing or even participating in the organization. Supervisory powers are allowed to intervene and interrupt the internal affairs of the NGO with suspensions for up to six months.

On 1 January 2013, the Federal Law of 28 December 2012 No.272-FZ [[Dima Yakovlev Law|"On Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens of the Russian Federation"]]<ref>{{Cita web|type=Federal Law|index=272-FZ|date=28 December 2012|legislature=[[State Duma]]|title=О мерах воздействия на лиц, причастных к нарушениям основополагающих прав и свобод человека, прав и свобод граждан Российской Федерации|language=ru|trans-title=On Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens of the Russian Federation|url=http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000505&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=28.12.2012&a8=272-%D4%C7&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=50&y=16}}</ref> (also known as [[Dima Yakovlev Law]] or Law of Scoundrels) entered into force.<ref>{{cite news|last=Kosyakov|first=Sergey|date=1 January 2013|title=Российский закон в ответ на "акт Магнитского" вступил в силу|language=ru|work=[[Deutsche Welle]]|url=https://www.dw.com/ru/%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B9%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%B8%D0%B9-%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%BD-%D0%B2-%D0%BE%D1%82%D0%B2%D0%B5%D1%82-%D0%BD%D0%B0-%D0%B0%D0%BA%D1%82-%D0%BC%D0%B0%D0%B3%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%82%D1%81%D0%BA%D0%BE%D0%B3%D0%BE-%D0%B2%D1%81%D1%82%D1%83%D0%BF%D0%B8%D0%BB-%D0%B2-%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%BB%D1%83/a-16490152}}</ref> It creates a list of citizens who are banned from entering Russia, and also allows the government to freeze their assets and investments. The law suspends the activity of politically active non-profit organizations which receive money from American citizens or organizations. It also bans citizens of the United States from adopting children from Russia. This law was adopted as the answer to American [[Magnitsky Act]].

On 3 June 2015, the amendments to the Federal Law of 28 December 2012 No.272-FZ [[Dima Yakovlev Law|"On Sanctions for Individuals Violating Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms of the Citizens of the Russian Federation"]], contained in the Federal Law of 23 May 2015, No.129-FZ [[Russian undesirable organizations law|"On amendments of some legislative acts of the Russian Federation"]],<ref>{{Cita web|type=Federal Law|index=129-FZ|date=23 May 2015|legislature=[[State Duma]]|title=О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации|language=ru|trans-title=On amendments of some legislative acts of the Russian Federation|url=http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000505&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=23.05.2015&a8=129-%D4%C7&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=63&y=16}}</ref> entered into force.<ref>{{cite web|date=3 June 2015|title=Вступил в силу закон о нежелательной на территории России деятельности иностранных и международных неправительственных организаций|website=Garant.ru|url=https://www.garant.ru/news/628915/}}</ref> These amendments give [[Prosecutor-General of Russia]] the power to extrajudicially declare foreign and international organizations "undesirable" in Russia and shut them down. There is no procedure for appeals. Organizations that do not disband when given notice to do so, as well as Russians who maintain ties to them, are subject to high fines and significant jail time. The law provides only one ground for recognizing organization as "undesirable" – "a threat to the fundamental principles of the constitutional order of the Russian Federation, defence capability of country or state security".

On 13 June 2016, the opinion of the [[Venice Commission]] on Russian undesirable organizations law<ref>{{Cite web |date=13 June 2016 |title=CDL-AD(2016)020 |url=https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)020-e |url-status=live |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230826153723/https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2016)020-e |archive-date=Aug 26, 2023 |website=Venice Commission}}</ref> was published. According to the [[Venice Commission]] conclusion, Russian undesirable organizations law consists the vague definition of certain fundamental concepts, such as "non-governmental organisations", grounds on the basis of which the activities of a foreign or international NGO may be declared undesirable, "directing of" and "participating in" the activities of a listed NGO, coupled with the wide discretion granted to the Office of the Public Prosecutor and the lack of specific judicial guarantees in the Federal Law, contradicts the principle of legality. The automatic legal consequences (blanket prohibitions) imposed upon NGOs whose activities are declared undesirable (prohibition to organise and conduct mass actions and public events or to distribute information materials) may only be acceptable in extreme cases of NGOs constituting serious threat to the security of the state or to fundamental democratic principles. In other instances, the blanket application of these sanctions might contradict the requirement under the [[European Convention on Human Rights]] that the interference with the freedom of association and assembly has to respond to a pressing social need and has to be proportional to the legitimate aim pursued. Furthermore, the inclusion of an NGO in the List should be made on the basis of clear and detailed criteria following a judicial decision or at least, the decision should be subject to an appropriate judicial appeal.

On 25 November 2017, the amendments, contained in the Federal Law of 25 November 2017 No.327-FZ "On Amendments to the articles 10.4 and 15.3 of the Federal Law "On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection" and to the article 6 of the Russian Federation Law "On the media"",<ref>{{Cita web|type=Federal Law|index=327-FZ|date=25 November 2017|legislature=[[State Duma]]|title=О внесении изменений в статьи 10.4 и 15.3 Федерального закона "Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации" и статью 6 Закона Российской Федерации "О средствах массовой информации"|language=ru|trans-title=On Amendments to the articles 10.4 and 15.3 of the Federal Law "On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection" and to the article 6 of the Russian Federation Law "On the media"|url=http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000505&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=25.11.2017&a8=327-%D4%C7&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=70&y=20}}</ref> entered into force.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Proskurnina|first1=Olga|last2=Teslova|first2=Elena|date=27 November 2017|title="Иностранный агент – теперь как знак качества"|language=ru|work=[[The New Times (magazine)|The New Times]]|url=https://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/130583}}</ref> In accordance to these amendments, any foreign juridical person distributing printed, audio or audio-visual materials can be declared a foreign media performing the functions of a "foreign agent" even if such juridical person does not have branches or representative offices in Russia. Foreign juridical persons declared a foreign media performing the functions of a "foreign agent" are obliged the [[Russian foreign agent law]].

===Cuarto mandato presidencial (2018–2024)===
[[File:Vladimir Putin in Kommunarka hospital1.jpg|thumb|Putin (dressed in the yellow hazmat suit) visits [[COVID-19 pandemic in Russia|coronavirus]] patients at the [[City Clinical Hospital No. 40 (Moscow)|City Clinical Hospital No. 40]] in [[Moscow]], 24 March 2020.]]

On 2 December 2019, the amendments, contained in the Federal Law of 2 December 2019 No.426-FZ "On Amendments to the Russian Federation Law "On the media" and the Federal Law "On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection"",<ref>{{Cita web|type=Federal Law|index=426-FZ|date=2 December 2019|legislature=[[State Duma]]|title=О внесении изменений в Закон Российской Федерации "О средствах массовой информации" и Федеральный закон "Об информации, информационных технологиях и о защите информации"|language=ru|trans-title=On Amendments to the Russian Federation Law "On the media" and the Federal Law "On Information, Information Technologies and Information Protection"|url=http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000505&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=02.12.2019&a8=426-%D4%C7&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=51&y=12}}</ref> entered into force.<ref>{{cite news|last=Tadtaev|first=Georgiy|date=2 December 2019|title=Путин подписал закон о СМИ — иноагентах|language=ru|work=[[RBK Group|RBK]]|url=https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5de54c659a7947261920173a}}</ref> In accordance to these amendments, foreign juridical persons declared a foreign media performing the functions of a "foreign agent" must form a Russian juridical person and inform Russian authorities about this. Also these amendments provided the possibility to designate natural person as "foreign agent" – this requires that natural person distributes a materials of a foreign media performing functions of a "foreign agent" (for example, in social media) and receive funding from foreign sources (for example, salary from international company).<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=2 December 2019|title=Путин разрешил признавать граждан "иностранными агентами"|language=ru|work=[[MediaZona]]|url=https://zona.media/news/2019/12/02/inoagenty}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Prokshin|first=Nikita|date=31 December 2019|title=Привет, иностранный агент|language=ru|work=[[Kommersant]]|url=https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4213361}}</ref>

On 30 December 2020, the amendments, contained in the Federal Law of 30 December 2020 No.481-FZ "On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Establishment Additional Measures to Counter the Threats to National Security",<ref>{{Cita web|type=Federal Law|index=481-FZ|date=30 December 2020|legislature=[[State Duma]]|title=О внесении изменений в отдельные законодательные акты Российской Федерации в части установления дополнительных мер противодействия угрозам национальной безопасности|language=ru|trans-title=On Amendments to Legislative Acts of the Russian Federation regarding the Establishment Additional Measures to Counter the Threats to National Security|url=http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000505&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=30.12.2020&a8=481-%D4%C7&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=59&y=14}}</ref> entered into force.<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=30 December 2020|title=Путин подписал закон о физических лицах — "иностранных агентах"|language=ru|work=[[MediaZona]]|url=https://zona.media/news/2020/12/30/agent}}</ref> In accordance to these amendments, special marking are envisaged not only for a publications of non-profit organizations declared a "foreign agent" but also for a publications of its founders, heads, members, employees. Individuals (Russian citizens, foreign citizens and stateless persons) also can be declared "foreign agent" for their political activity. Political activity is defined as any influence to public opinion including publications in social media and public policy including a sending a requests and petitions. The publications of individuals declared "foreign agent" also must be marked. Individuals declared "foreign agent" are obliged to make special reporting and are deprived of the right to hold public office.
[[File:Putin and Macron meeting with a large table.jpg|thumb|right|Putin meeting with French President [[Emmanuel Macron]] in the Kremlin on 7 February 2022]]
The articles 13.15, 19.7.5-2, 19.7.5-3, 19.7.5-4, 19.34, 19.34.1, 20.28 of the [[Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses]] establish liability providing for substantial fines for violating [[Russian foreign agent law]]. The article 330.1 of the Criminal Code of Russia establish criminal liability providing for imprisonment for up to 5 years and compulsory labour for violating [[Russian foreign agent law]].<ref>{{cite news|last=Romashenko|first=Sergey|date=1 March 2021|title=В России ужесточено законодательство об "иноагентах"|language=ru|work=[[Deutsche Welle]]|url=https://www.dw.com/ru/%D0%B2-%D1%80%D0%BE%D1%81%D1%81%D0%B8%D0%B8-%D1%83%D0%B6%D0%B5%D1%81%D1%82%D0%BE%D1%87%D0%B0%D1%8E%D1%82-%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BA%D0%B0%D0%B7%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%B8%D1%8F-%D0%B4%D0%BB%D1%8F-%D0%BF%D1%80%D0%B8%D0%B7%D0%BD%D0%B0%D0%BD%D0%BD%D1%8B%D1%85-%D0%B8%D0%BD%D0%BE%D0%B0%D0%B3%D0%B5%D0%BD%D1%82%D0%B0%D0%BC%D0%B8/a-56733298}}</ref> The article 20.33 of the Code of the Russian Federation on Administrative Offenses establish liability providing for substantial fines for violating [[Russian undesirable organizations law]]. The article 284.1 of the Criminal Code of Russia establish criminal liability providing for imprisonment for up to 6 years and compulsory labour for violating [[Russian undesirable organizations law]].<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=16 June 2021|title=Дума ввела уголовное наказание за работу в нежелательной организации|language=ru|work=[[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty|Radio Liberty]]|url=https://www.svoboda.org/a/duma-vvela-ugolovnoe-nakazanie-za-rabotu-v-nezhelateljnoy-organizatsii/31310650.html}}</ref>

=== 2020 constitutional amendments ===
{{Main|2020 amendments to the Constitution of Russia}}
In January 2020, Putin proposed a number of [[2020 amendments to the Constitution of Russia|substantial amendments]] to the Constitution of Russia. To introduce these amendments, he held a [[2020 Russian constitutional referendum|referendum]]. They were approved on 1 July 2020 by a contested popular vote. The amendments had wide reaching impacts, including extending Presidential term limits, allowing the President to fire federal judges, and constitutionally banning same-sex marriage.<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=16 March 2020|title=Russia's Top Court Approves Putin Reform Plan to Stay President Until 2036|language=en|work=[[The Moscow Times]]|url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/03/16/russias-top-court-approves-putin-reform-plan-to-stay-president-until-2036-a69643|access-date=17 March 2020}}</ref>

With Putin's signing a decree on 3 July 2020 to officially insert the amendments into the Russian Constitution, they took effect on 4 July 2020.<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=3 July 2020|title=Putin orders constitution changes allowing him to rule until 2036|language=en|work=[[Al Jazeera English|Al Jazeera]]|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/amp/news/2020/07/putin-orders-constitution-allowing-rule-2036-200703142851167.html|access-date=12 July 2020}}</ref>

The [[Venice Commission]] concluded that the amendments have disproportionately strengthened the position of the [[President of Russia|President of the Russian Federation]] and have done away with some of the checks and balances originally foreseen in the [[Constitution of Russia|Constitution]], taken together, these changes go far beyond what is appropriate under the principle of [[separation of powers]], even in [[Presidential system|presidential regimes]], and the speed of the preparation of such wide-ranging amendments was clearly inappropriate for the depth of the amendments considering their societal impact.<ref>{{cite web|date=23 March 2021|title=Venice Commission adopts new opinion on 2020 constitutional amendments and the procedure for their adoption in the Russian Federation|language=en|publisher=[[Council of Europe]]|url=https://www.coe.int/en/web/moscow/-/venice-commission-adopts-new-opinion-on-2020-constitutional-amendments-and-the-procedure-for-their-adoption-in-the-russian-federation}}</ref>

=== Persecution of Navalny and mass protests ===
{{Main|2021 Russian protests}}
Protests in Russia began on 23 January 2021 in support of opposition leader [[Alexei Navalny]] who was detained upon his arrival at [[Sheremetyevo International Airport|Sheremetyevo Airport]] after treatment and rehabilitation in Germany. On the first day, protests were held in 198 towns and cities across Russia. On 31 January, more than 4000 protesters were detained which is the record number in Russia's post-Soviet history.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Venkina|first1=Yekaterina|last2=Barysheva|first2=Yelena|last3=Satanovskiy|first3=Sergey|last4=Dik|first4=Sergey|date=31 January 2021|title=Акции в поддержку Навального: рекордное число задержанных по всей России|language=ru|work=[[Deutsche Welle]]|url=https://www.dw.com/ru/akcii-v-podderzhku-navalnogo-rekordnoe-chislo-zaderzhannyh-po-vsej-rossii/a-56396061}}</ref>

On 2 February, [[Alexei Navalny|Navalny]]'s suspended sentence of three and a half years was replaced with a prison sentence. In March, his team launched a campaign demanding for his freedom, with protests planned after 500,000 people pledge to participate. On 21 April 2021, there was another mass protest. Subsequently, Russian authorities identified participants of the protest using public [[Closed-circuit television|video surveillance]] and [[facial recognition system]] and initiated proceedings against them; many protesters were dismissed from their jobs and were expelled from universities.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Smolentseva|first1=Natalya|last2=Prokopenko|first2=Alexander|date=29 April 2021|title=Увольнения и аресты: как преследуют участников митингов за Навального|language=ru|work=[[Deutsche Welle]]|url=https://www.dw.com/ru/uvolnenija-i-aresty-kak-presledujut-uchastnikov-mitingov-za-navalnogo/a-57365266}}</ref>

On 9 June 2021, Vyacheslav Polyga, [[judge]] of [[Moscow City Court]], upheld the administrative claim of the [[prosecutor]] of [[Moscow|Moscow city]] Denis Popov and decided<ref>{{cite web|url=https://team29.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Reshenie_FBK.pdf|title=Решение Московского городского суда от 09.06.2021 года по делу No.3а-1573/2021|publisher=Team29.org|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210629180921/https://team29.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/Reshenie_FBK.pdf|archive-date=29 June 2021}}</ref> to recognize [[Anti-Corruption Foundation]], Citizens' Rights Protection Foundation and [[Political campaign staff|Alexei Navalny staff]] as extremist organizations, to liquidate [[Anti-Corruption Foundation]], Citizens' Rights Protection Foundation and confiscate their assets, to prohibit the activity of [[Political campaign staff|Alexei Navalny staff]] (case No.3а-1573/2021).<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=9 June 2021|title=Мосгорсуд признал ФБК и штабы Навального экстремистскими организациями|language=ru|work=[[MediaZona]]|url=https://zona.media/news/2021/06/09/fbk}}</ref> Case hearing was held [[in camera]] because, as indicated by [[advocate]] [[Ilia Novikov]], the case file including the text of the administrative claim was [[Classified information|classified]] as [[Classified information#Secret|state secret]].<ref>{{cite news|last=Safonova|first=Kristina|date=11 June 2021|title="ФБК — это самая важная организация в России. Прокуроры нас убеждали в том же самом" Интервью адвоката Ильи Новикова — об итогах суда над структурами Навального|language=ru|work=[[Meduza]]|url=https://meduza.io/feature/2021/06/10/fbk-eto-samaya-vazhnaya-organizatsiya-v-rossii-prokurory-nas-ubezhdali-v-tom-zhe-samom}}</ref> According to [[advocate]] [[Ivan Pavlov (lawyer)|Ivan Pavlov]], [[Alexei Navalny]] was not the party to the [[Trial|proceedings]] and the [[judge]] refused to give him such status; at the hearing, the [[prosecutor]] stated that defendants are extremist organizations because they want the change of power in Russia and they promised to help participants of the protest with payment of administrative and criminal fines and with making a complaints to the [[European Court of Human Rights]].<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=9 June 2021|title=Суд признал ФБК и Штабы Навального экстремистскими и запретил их|language=ru|work=[[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty|Radio Liberty]]|url=https://www.svoboda.org/a/mosgorsud-priznal-fbk-i-shtaby-navaljnogo-ekstremistskimi-i-zapretil/31299399.html}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=9 June 2021|title=Russia Blacklists Navalny's Political and Activist Movements as 'Extremist'|language=en|work=[[The Moscow Times]]|url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/06/09/russia-blacklists-navalnys-political-and-activist-movements-as-extremist-a74159}}</ref> On 4 August 2021, [[First Appellate Ordinary Court (Russia)|First Appellate Ordinary Court]] located in [[Moscow]] upheld the decision of the court of first instance (case No.66а-3553/2021) and this decision entered into force that day.<ref>{{cite news|last=Dyuryagina|first=Kira|date=4 August 2021|title=ФБК не прошёл апелляцию|language=ru|work=[[Kommersant]]|url=https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/4928980#id2092924}}</ref> On 28 December 2021, it was reported that [[Anti-Corruption Foundation]], Citizens' Rights Protection Foundation and 18 natural persons including Alexei Navalny filed a cassation appeals to the Second Cassation Ordinary Court.<ref>{{cite news|last=Kropman|first=Vitaliy|title=Признание ФБК "экстремистской организацией" обжаловано в суде|language=ru|date=28 December 2021|magazine=[[Deutsche Welle]]|url=https://www.dw.com/ru/priznanie-fbk-jekstremistskoj-organizaciej-obzhalovali-v-sude/a-60277415}}</ref> On 25 March 2022, the [[Second Cassation Ordinary Court (Russia)|Second Cassation Ordinary Court]] rejected all cassation appeals and upheld the judgements of lower courts (case No.8а-5101/2022).<ref>{{cite web|title=Кассационный суд отклонил жалобы на признание ФБК экстремистской организацией|language=ru|date=25 March 2022|publisher=Russian Agency of Legal and Judicial Information|url=http://rapsinews.ru/judicial_news/20220325/307827684.html}}</ref>

=== Changes in the political and law enforcement practice ===
[[File:Last Address Sign - Moscow, Kostyansky Lane, 4 (2021-02-14) 01.jpg|thumb|Russian opposition politician [[Ilya Yashin]] was sentenced to eight-and-a-half years in prison under Russia's [[Russian 2022 war censorship laws|war censorship laws]] for his [[Protests against the Russian invasion of Ukraine|anti-war]] statements in 2022.]]
In the opinion of [[Vladimir Pastukhov]], [[Political science|political scientist]], Russian [[advocate]] and [[Honorary title (academic)|honorary]] senior [[research associate]] of [[University College London]] School of Slavonic and East European Studies, after [[2020 amendments to the Constitution of Russia|amendments to the Constitution of Russia]], the phase transition had happened – Russia had transformed from [[Authoritarianism|authoritarian]] [[dictatorship]] into [[Totalitarianism|totalitarian]] [[Tyrant|tyranny]]. This transition is due to the convergence of two factors: the completion of establishment of the [[Political repression|repressive]] infrastructure and the creation of ersatz [[ideology]] which is the eclectic set composed of such elements as [[Tsarist autocracy|paternalistic autocracy (tsarism)]], [[communism]], [[Pan-Slavism]], [[Eastern Orthodox Church|Eastern Orthodoxy]], [[Eurasianism]], [[right-wing populism]], [[left-wing populism]], cult of victory in [[Great Patriotic War (term)|Great Patriotic War]], [[anti-Americanism]], [[imperialism]], [[xenophobia]], Russian [[messianism]], versailles syndrome and [[revanchism]]. The transformation into totalitarian state is reflected in the transition from selective repressions against [[Opposition (politics)|opposition politicians]] and political [[Activism|activists]] who struggle for power to mass repressions against [[dissident]]s and potentially disloyal citizens who just do not want to support Putin's regime.<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Pastukhov|first=Vladimir|date=9 June 2021|title=Deep Mind State. Борьба с инакомыслием как увертюра к массовому террору|language=ru|magazine=MBK-news|url=https://mbk-news.appspot.com/sences/deep-mind-state-borba/}}</ref>

The poisoning of [[Dmitry Bykov]], writer, [[poet]] and [[Literary criticism|literary critic]] who criticized Putin's regime,<ref>{{cite magazine|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=9 June 2021|title=Отравить пересмешника. Как ФСБ пыталась убить Дмитрия Быкова|language=ru|magazine=[[The Insider (website)|The Insider]]|url=https://theins.ru/politika/242567}}</ref> the criminal proceedings against [[Ivan Pavlov (lawyer)|Ivan Pavlov]], [[advocate]] who defended persons accused of [[treason]] and [[extremism]],<ref>{{cite news|last1=Goryashko|first1=Sergey|last2=Pushkarskaya|first2=Anna|last3=Chizh|first3=Oksana|date=30 April 2021|title="Это месть ФСБ". Что известно о деле адвоката Ивана Павлова|language=ru|work=[[BBC]]|url=https://www.bbc.com/russian/news-56939927}}</ref> and Denis Karagodin, [[philosopher]] who has been digging into archives to find out the truth about his great-grandfather murder during Stalin's [[Great Purge]],<ref>{{Cite news|last=Dixon|first=Robyn|author-link=Robyn Dixon (journalist)|date=9 May 2021|title=He spent years uncovering the Stalin-era execution of his great-grandfather. Lawsuits seek to bury the evidence.|language=en|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|location=Tomsk|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russia-stalin-history-family-execution/2021/05/07/0c296b28-8c0e-11eb-a33e-da28941cb9ac_story.html|url-access=limited|access-date=10 February 2022|issn=0190-8286}}</ref> and the pressure against numerous independent [[journalist]]s became the signs of new times.

On 4 June 2021, the amendments, contained in Federal Law of 4 June 2021, No.157-FZ, entered into force. According to these amendments, any person who was a founder, a head, a member, an employee of the organization recognized as extremist or terrorist or just who donated this organization or expressed support for this organization (in writing or orally) is deprived of [[Nomination rules|the right to stand for election]]. This legal provision has retroactive effect because it includes the case where a person carried out relevant activity before the organization was recognized as extremist or terrorist, nevertheless, such person is deprived of [[Nomination rules|passive suffrage]].<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=4 June 2021|title=Путин подписал закон о запрете избираться причастным к экстремизму|language=ru|work=[[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty|Radio Liberty]]|url=https://www.svoboda.org/a/putin-podpisal-zakon-o-zaprete-izbiratjsya-prichastnym-k-ekstremizmu/31290268.html}}</ref> Furthermore, under Article 282.2 of the Criminal Code of Russia the participation in the activity of extremist organization carries a sentence of between 2 and 6 years' imprisonment for ordinary participants and between 6 and 10 years' imprisonment for founders and heads of such organization. And reigning approach in Russian law enforcement practice is that the former participant of the organization, recognized as extremist and liquidated by [[Judgment (law)|court decision]], is considered as a person who continues the activity of such organization in the event he is the participant new organization even if these organizations have different statutes and objectives (many activists were convicted in Putin's Russia precisely in accordance with this approach, for example, the members of group supporting the referendum "For responsible authority!"<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Kurilova|first=Anastasiya|date=11 August 2017|title=Борцы за референдум сели экстремистами. Осуждены организаторы всенародного голосования "За ответственную власть"|language=ru|magazine=[[Kommersant]]|issue=146|page=4|url=https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3380189}}</ref> and the members of organization "People's Militia of Russia"<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=11 June 2021|title=Соратников Квачкова приговорили к 10 и 15 годам колонии|language=ru|work=[[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty|Radio Liberty]]|url=https://www.svoboda.org/a/soratnikov-kvachkova-prigovorili-k-10-i-15-godam-kolonii/31302629.html}}</ref>). So, the convergence of aforementioned approach in law enforcement practice and new law establishes the legal framework for subsequent political repressions of people who participated or supported the organizations recognized as extremist and liquidated by [[Judgment (law)|court decision]] even if such people's actions occurred prior to the date of [[Judgment (law)|court decision]].

[[File:Vladimir Putin's 2023 Address to the Federal Assembly (1).jpg|thumb|[[Mikhail Mishustin|Mishustin]], [[Vyacheslav Volodin|Volodin]], [[Dmitry Medvedev|Medvedev]], [[Patriarch Kirill of Moscow|Patriarch Kirill]] and other prominent figures of the Putin regime during Putin's [[2023 Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly|Presidential Address to the Federal Assembly]] on 21 February 2023. Medvedev called for the use of death squads against politically active [[Russian emigration following the Russian invasion of Ukraine|Russian exiles]].<ref>{{cite news |last1=Soldatov |first1=Andrei |title=How the Kremlin Is Taking Aim at its Russian Critics in Exile |url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2023/01/16/how-the-kremlin-is-taking-aim-at-its-russian-critics-in-exile-a79958 |work=The Moscow Times |date=16 January 2023}}</ref>]]
In [[Golos (election monitor)|Golos]] assessment, at least 9 million people have been deprived of the [[Nomination rules|right to stand for election]] in Russia.<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=22 June 2021|title=Голос: не менее 9 млн человек лишены права быть избранным на предстоящих выборах в России|language=ru|work=[[Novaya Gazeta]]|url=https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/06/22/golos-ne-menee-9-mln-chelovek-lisheny-prava-byt-izbrannym-na-predstoiashchikh-vyborakh-v-rossii}}</ref>

On 6 July 2021, the opinion of the [[Venice Commission]] on [[Russian foreign agent law]] [https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/default.aspx?pdffile=CDL-AD(2021)027-e] was published.<ref>{{cite web|date=6 July 2021|title=Venice Commission calls on Russian authorities to thoroughly revise the entire body of "foreign agent" legislation, including the most recent amendments|language=en|publisher=[[Council of Europe]]|url=https://www.coe.int/en/web/moscow/-/venice-commission-calls-on-russian-authorities-to-thoroughly-revise-the-entire-body-of-foreign-agent-legislation-including-the-most-recent-amendments |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20221018135820/https://www.coe.int/en/web/moscow/-/venice-commission-calls-on-russian-authorities-to-thoroughly-revise-the-entire-body-of-foreign-agent-legislation-including-the-most-recent-amendments |archive-date= Oct 18, 2022 }}</ref> According to the [[Venice Commission]] conclusion, [[Russian foreign agent law]] constitutes serious violations of basic human rights, including the freedoms of association and expression, the right to privacy, the right to participate in public affairs, as well as the prohibition of discrimination. The [[Venice Commission]] is particularly concerned by the combined effect of the most recent amendments on entities, individuals, the media and civil society more broadly. The combined effect of the recent reforms enables authorities to exercise significant control over the activities and existence of associations as well as over the participation of individuals in civic life.

===Education reforms===
On 1 June 2021, the Federal Law of 5 April 2021 No.85-FZ "On Amendments to the Federal Law "About education in Russian Federation""<ref>{{Cita web|type=Federal Law|index=85-FZ|date=5 April 2021|legislature=[[State Duma]]|title=О внесении изменений в Федеральный закон "Об образовании в Российской Федерации"|language=ru|trans-title=On Amendments to the Federal Law "About education in Russian Federation"|url=http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000505&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=05.04.2021&a8=85-%D4%C7&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=67&y=13}}</ref> entered into force.<ref>{{cite news|last=Gordeev|first=Vladislav|date=1 June 2021|title=Закон о просветительской деятельности вступил в силу|language=ru|work=[[RBK Group|RBK]]|url=https://www.rbc.ru/politics/01/06/2021/60b4fc319a79475548f4f7af}}</ref> This law establishes the concept of the [[Science outreach|outreach activity]]: it is the activity, carrying out outside educational programs, which aims to dissemination of a knowledge and an experience, to formation of a skills, a values, and a competence, in order to intellectual, spiritual and moral, creative, physical, and (or) professional development of individual, and to meet educational needs of individual. The manner, conditions and implementation modalities of outreach activity and also the procedure for the control of such activity are regulated by the [[Government of Russia]]. Outreach activity can be carried out by public and local authorities and natural and juridical persons concluded a contracts with educational institutions in the order determined by the Government of Russia. Although the [[Russian Academy of Sciences]] and numerous cultural and educational societies opposed the bill,<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=13 January 2021|title=В РАН призвали отозвать законопроект о контроле властей за просветительской деятельностью|language=ru|work=[[Vedomosti]]|url=https://www.vedomosti.ru/society/news/2021/01/13/853910-v-ran-prizvali-otozvat-zakonoproekt-o-kontrole-za-prosvetitelskoi-deyatelnostyu-razzhiganii-rozni}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=19 January 2021|title=Российские просветители выступили против закона о просветительской деятельности|language=ru|work=[[Colta.ru]]|url=https://www.colta.ru/news/26406-rossiyskie-prosvetiteli-vystupili-protiv-zakona-o-prosvetitelskoy-deyatelnosti}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last=Schiermeier|first=Quirin|date=12 February 2021|title=Russian academics decry law change that threatens scientific outreach|language=en|journal=[[Nature (journal)|Nature]]|url=https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-021-00385-5|doi=10.1038/d41586-021-00385-5|pmid=33580221|s2cid=231909475}}</ref> it was adopted by the [[State Duma]], approved by the [[Federation Council (Russia)|Federation Council]] and signed by President Putin.<ref>{{cite news|last=Bondarenko|first=Maria|date=5 April 2021|title=Путин подписал закон о просветительской деятельности|language=ru|work=[[RBK Group|RBK]]|url=https://www.rbc.ru/politics/05/04/2021/606b16f69a79476ab9a9c863}}</ref> According to scientists, science popularizers, educationalists, lawyers, this law, in fact, establishes the prior censorship of virtually every ways to share knowledge and conviction, contrary to the articles 19 and 29 of the [[Constitution of Russia]].<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Borisova|first=Alexandra|date=28 January 2021|title="Это форма предварительной цензуры": как поправки о просветительской деятельности отразятся на науке, бизнесе и обществе|language=ru|magazine=[[Forbes]]|url=https://www.forbes.ru/forbeslife/419721-eto-forma-predvaritelnoy-cenzury-kak-popravki-o-prosvetitelskoy-deyatelnosti}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Bobenko|first1=Mayya|last2=Anisimova|first2=Natalia|last3=Poryvaeva|first3=Lyubov|date=16 March 2021|title=Какие претензии у ученых к новому закону о просветительской деятельности|language=ru|work=[[RBK Group|RBK]]|url=https://www.rbc.ru/society/16/03/2021/6050f2f19a79472d1a022044}}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine|last=Pikhovkin|first=Alexander|date=27 April 2021|title=Запретительный порядок: как правительство собирается исполнять закон о просветительской деятельности|language=ru|magazine=[[Forbes]]|url=https://www.forbes.ru/obshchestvo/427933-zapretitelnyy-poryadok-kak-pravitelstvo-sobiraetsya-ispolnyat-zakon-o}}</ref> According to the authors, the law aims to shield Russian citizens against anti-Russian propaganda.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://duma.gov.ru/news/50970/|date=16 March 2021|title=Каким будет новый закон о просветительской деятельности?|language=ru|publisher=[[State Duma]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=1 June 2021|title=Russia Bans Unauthorized 'Foreign Influence' Educational Activities|language=en|work=[[The Moscow Times]]|url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2021/06/01/russia-bans-unauthorized-foreign-influence-educational-activities-a74065}}</ref>

==Fifth presidential term (2024–present)==
{{see also|Mikhail Mishustin's Second Cabinet}}

== Domestic policy ==
{{Main|Domestic policy of Vladimir Putin}}
On 9 May 2000, the newspaper [[Kommersant]] had published the document called «[[Revision number Six]]», which was the reform project of Presidential Administration. Before the text of the document, [[editor-in-chief]] wrote: «the fact that such program is being developing is very important it is in itself ... if this will be a reality, almost of the entire population of Russia – from politicians and governors to ordinary voters – will be under surveillance by secret services».<ref>{{cite magazine|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=9 May 2000|title=Редакция N 6|language=ru|magazine=[[Kommersant|Коммерсантъ-Власть]]|issue=18|page=18|url=https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/16875}}</ref> This document was published again in 2010.<ref>{{cite magazine|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=14 June 2010|title=Редакция N 6. Избранное|language=ru|magazine=[[Kommersant|Коммерсантъ-Власть]]|issue=23|page=16|url=https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1385567}}</ref>

Furthemore, on 9 May 2000, the newspaper [[Kommersant]] had published an article by deputy editor-in-chief Veronika Kutsyllo, according to which the text of «Revision number Six» had been provided to journalists by anonymous employee of the Presidential Administration; Putin was mentioned in the text of this document as acting president and the attached charts, totalling more than 100 pages, were drawn up before [[1999 Russian legislative election]], and these facts created the reason to believe that the work on this document started long before [[2000 Russian presidential election]].<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Kutsyllo|first=Veronika|date=9 May 2000|title=Пока не страшно, но уже противно|language=ru|magazine=[[Kommersant|Коммерсантъ-Власть]]|issue=18|page=25|url=https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/16876}}</ref>
[[File:Dmitry Medvedev in Sakha, November 2011-11.jpeg|thumb|President [[Dmitry Medvedev]] with local people in the [[Sakha Republic]] in Siberia in 2011]]
The authors of "Revision number Six" stated that Russian social and political system at the time was self-regulatory that was totally unacceptable to Putin who wished that all social and political processes in Russia were completely managed by one single body. The Presidential Administration and, more specifically, its Domestic Policy Directorate was to be such body.

The authors of «Revision number Six» rejected the possibility of direct prohibition on opposition activities and independent mass media activities considering that Russian society was not ready for that, and it was the reason, they proposed that Domestic Policy Directorate of the Presidential Administration uses the combination of public and secret activities. Secret activities were to be carried out with the direct use of [[Secret service|special services]], in particular, [[Federal Security Service]].<ref>{{cite news|last=Wines|first=Michael|date=5 May 2000|title=Newspaper Reports Kremlin Push for Stronger Central Control|work=[[The New York Times]]|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2000/05/05/world/newspaper-reports-kremlin-push-for-stronger-central-control.html}}</ref> The main objective of such secret activity was to take control over activity of [[Political party|political parties]], community and political leaders, [[governor]]s, [[legislature]]s, [[candidate]]s for elective positions, [[election commission]]s and [[election official]]s, [[mass media]] and [[journalist]]s. To achieve this objective, the following tasks were set: 1) the collection information (including dirt) about individuals and organizations of interests and the pressure on them; 2) the creation of conditions under which independent mass media cannot operate; 3) taking control over elections to ensure the victories of pro-Kremlin candidates; 4) the establishment of [[civil society organization]]s which are ostensibly independent but actually are under the full control of the Kremlin; 5) the discredit the opposition and the creation of the informational and political barrier around Putin (good things happen thanks to Putin personally but bad officials are responsible for bad things and not Putin; Putin does not respond to opposition's charge and does not participate in debates – others do that for him).

According to Vasily Gatov, the analyst of [[Annenberg School for Communication and Journalism]] at the [[University of Southern California]], the realizations of the provisions of «Revision number Six» means building the state where [[Democracy|democratic]] [[institution]]s exist nominally but in reality these [[institution]]s are fully controlled by Presidential Administration and [[secret police]].<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Shimov|first=Yaroslav|date=17 May 2016|title=Путин пошёл дальше Андропова|language=ru|magazine=[[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty|Radio Liberty]]|url=https://www.svoboda.org/a/27741064.html}}</ref> He characterized such [[regime]] as «[[counterintelligence]] [[State (polity)|state]]» (one of the kinds of [[guided democracy]]).<ref>{{cite web|last=Gatov|first=Vasily|date=14 May 2016|title=Канарейка в шахте. РБК и общественный интерес в "государстве контрразведки"|publisher=[[Carnegie Moscow Center]]|url=https://carnegie.ru/commentary/63588}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last=Gatov|first=Vasily|date=15 May 2016|title=No Canaries in the Coal Mine: The Demise of RBC|publisher=TheRussianReader.com|url=https://therussianreader.com/2016/05/15/rbc-russian-free-press-demise/}}</ref>

On 7 May 2016, the newspaper [[Kommersant]] had published an article by Ilya Barabanov and Gleb Cherkasov containing an analysis of the implementation of provisions of «Revision number Six». They concluded that, although the authors of «Revision number Six» had not taken into account some things (for example, authors of the aforementioned document denied the need for creation of pro-Kremlin political party, [[United Russia|which actually was established subsequently]]), by and large, the provisions of «[[Revision number Six]]» were conducted.<ref>{{cite magazine|last1=Barabanov|first1=Ilya|last2=Cherkasov|first2=Gleb|date=7 May 2016|title=16 лет Редакции №6|language=ru|magazine=[[Kommersant|Коммерсантъ]]|url=https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2980456}}</ref>

=== Authoritarian bureaucratic state ===
[[File:Protester arrested by the police Mosgorsud 02-02-2021.jpg|thumb|Protester arrested by the police in February 2021]]
Russian politician [[Boris Nemtsov]] and commentator [[Vladimir Kara-Murza]] define Putinism in Russia as "a [[One-party state|one party system]], [[censorship]], a [[State Duma|puppet parliament]], ending of an independent judiciary, firm centralization of power and finances, and hypertrophied role of [[FSB (Russia)|special services]] and [[vertical of power|bureaucracy]], in particular in relation to business".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrc/document-listings/russian/04(01)-MAS.pdf|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070926231555/http://www.defac.ac.uk/colleges/csrc/document-listings/russian/04(01)-MAS.pdf|url-status=dead|archive-date=26 September 2007|title=Russia After The Presidential Election|access-date=6 March 2015|date=April 2004|last=Smith|first=Mark A.}}</ref>

Russia's nascent [[middle class]] showed few signs of political activism under the regime as [[Masha Lipman]] reported: "As with the majority overall, those in the middle-income group have accepted the paternalism of Vladimir Putin's government and remained apolitical and apathetic".<ref>[https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/06/03/AR2007060300950_pf.html "Russia's Apolitical Middle"], by Masha Lipman. ''[[Washington Post]]''. 4 June 2007.</ref>

In December 2007, the Russian sociologist Igor Eidman ([[VCIOM]]) categorized the Putin regime as "the power of bureaucratic [[oligarchy]]" which had "the traits of extreme right-wing dictatorship — the dominance of [[State monopoly capitalism|state-monopoly]] capital in the economy, ''silovoki'' structures in governance, [[clericalism]] and [[statism]] in ideology".<ref>{{in lang|ru}} [http://vremya.ru/2007/230/4/194002.html Популяры вместо оптиматов. Оппозиция в России может быть только новой и левой.] [[Vremya Novostei]] № 230 14 December 2007.</ref>

In August 2008, ''The Economist'' wrote about the virtual demise of both Russian and Soviet [[intelligentsia]] in post-Soviet Russia and noted: "Putinism was made strong by the absence of resistance from the part of society that was meant to provide intellectual opposition".<ref name="IntellEc">{{cite news|url=http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11880594|title=Russian intellectuals. The hand that feeds them |newspaper=The Economist|date=7 February 2008|access-date=5 February 2009}}</ref>
In early February 2009, [[Aleksander Auzan]], an economist and board member at a research institute set up by [[Dmitry Medvedev]], said that in the Putin system "there is not a relationship between the authorities and the people through Parliament or through nonprofit organizations or other structures. The relationship to the people is basically through [[Television in Russia|television]]. And under the conditions of the crisis, that can no longer work".<ref name="Hardtimes">{{cite web|url=http://www.iht.com/articles/2009/02/01/europe/putin.4-420610.php |title=Hard times in Russia spell trouble for Putin |work=The International Herald Tribune |date=1 February 2009 |access-date=3 February 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090203234102/http://iht.com/articles/2009/02/01/europe/putin.4-420610.php |archive-date=3 February 2009 }}</ref>
About the same time, [[Vladimir Ryzhkov]] pointed out that a bill Medvedev had sent to the [[State Duma]] in late January 2009, when signed into law, will allow Kremlin-friendly regional legislatures to remove opposition mayors who were elected by popular vote: "It is no coincidence that Medvedev has taken aim at the country's mayors. Mayoral elections were the last bastion of direct elections after the Duma cancelled the popular vote for governors in 2005. Independent mayors were the only source of political competition against governors who were loyal to the Kremlin and United Russia. Now one of the few remaining checks and balances against the monopoly on executive power in the regions will be removed. After the law is signed by Medvedev, the power vertical will be extended one step further to reach every mayor in the country".<ref name="RyzhMT">{{cite web|url=http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1016/42/374171.htm |title=Medvedev the Sham Liberal |work=[[The Moscow Times]] |date=3 February 2009 |access-date=5 February 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090208021809/http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1016/42/374171.htm |archive-date=8 February 2009 }}</ref>

On 9 July 2020, the popular governor of the [[Khabarovsk Krai]], [[Sergei Furgal]], who defeated the candidate of Putin's United Russia party in elections two years ago, was detained and flown to Moscow. Furgal was arrested 15 years after the alleged crimes he is accused of. Every day since June 11, mass protests have been held in the Khabarovsk Krai in support of Furgal.<ref>{{cite news |title=Anti-Putin Protests in Russia's Far East Gather Steam |url=https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/anti-putin-protests-russias-far-east-gather-steam |work=VOA News |date=25 July 2020}}</ref> The protests included anti-Kremlin slogans like "Putin resign", "Twenty years, no trust", or "Away with Putin!".<ref>{{cite news |title=Anger at Kremlin Grows in Latest Massive Russian Far East Protest |url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/07/25/mass-anti-kremlin-rallies-grip-russias-far-east-a70977 |work=The Moscow Times |date=25 July 2020}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=Anti-Kremlin protests in Khabarovsk: 'We hate Moscow!' |url=https://www.dw.com/en/anti-kremlin-protests-in-khabarovsk-we-hate-moscow/a-54323185 |work=Deutsche Welle |date=26 July 2020}}</ref>

=== Human rights and repression ===
{{Main|Human rights in Russia}}
[[File:Protests on Tverskaya Street.jpg|thumb|[[2021 Russian protests]] in support of the opposition leader [[Alexei Navalny]]]]
{{See also|Opposition to Vladimir Putin in Russia|Assassination of Anna Politkovskaya|Poisoning of Alexander Litvinenko|Assassination of Boris Nemtsov|Poisoning of Alexei Navalny}}

On 7 April 2022, Russia was suspended from the [[United Nations Human Rights Council]] over reports of "gross and systematic violations and abuses of human rights" after 93 members voted in favor.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.reuters.com/world/un-vote-suspending-russia-human-rights-council-over-ukraine-2022-04-07/|title=U.N. suspends Russia from human rights body, Moscow then quits|website=Reuters|date=7 April 2022}}</ref>

=== Pro-government propaganda and pressure on independent media ===
[[File:Vladimir Rudol'fovich Solovyov and Vladimir Putin.jpeg|thumb|Putin's propagandist [[Vladimir Solovyov (journalist)|Vladimir Solovyov]]]]
{{Main|Propaganda in the Russian Federation|Media freedom in Russia}}
On 1 March 2022, Russian authorities blocked access to [[Echo of Moscow]] and [[TV Rain]],<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/03/01/russia-blocks-2-independent-media-sites-over-war-coverage-a76693| url-status=live | archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220301/https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/03/01/russia-blocks-2-independent-media-sites-over-war-coverage-a76693| archive-date=1 March 2022 |title=Russia Blocks 2 Independent Media Sites Over War Coverage |website=[[The Moscow Times]] |date=1 March 2022}}{{cbignore}}</ref> Russia's last [[Television in Russia|independent TV station]].<ref>{{cite news |title=Russia's Only Independent TV Station Won't Censor the Ukraine War |url=https://www.vice.com/en/article/jgmakx/russia-ukraine-invasion-dozhd-tv| url-status=live | archive-url=https://ghostarchive.org/archive/20220301/https://www.vice.com/en/article/jgmakx/russia-ukraine-invasion-dozhd-tv| archive-date=1 March 2022 |work=Vice |date=28 February 2022}}{{cbignore}}</ref>

On 4 March 2022, Putin signed into law a bill introducing [[Russian fake news laws|prison sentences of up to 15 years]] for those who publish "knowingly false information" about the Russian military and its operations, leading to some media outlets in Russia to stop reporting on Ukraine.<ref>{{cite web |url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/03/04/putin-signs-law-introducing-jail-terms-for-fake-news-on-army-a76768 |title=Putin Signs Law Introducing Jail Terms for 'Fake News' on Army |website=Moscow Times |date=4 March 2022}}</ref>

== Economic policies ==
On 9 July 2000, while speaking to the Russian Parliament, Putin advocated an economy policy<ref>[http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1P2-536806.html Putin Advocates Strong Russia, Liberal Economy; President Surprisingly Candid In First State of Nation Address]{{dead link|date=March 2014}}</ref> which would have introduced a [[flat tax]] rate of 13%<ref name="heritage">[http://www.heritage.org/press/commentary/ed032403.cfm Russia's Flat-Tax Miracle] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090206124146/http://www.heritage.org/Press/Commentary/ed032403.cfm |date=6 February 2009 }} 24 March 2003.</ref> and a reduction in the corporate tax rate from 35 percent to 24 percent.<ref name="heritage" /> Putin also intended for small businesses to get better treatment under this economic reform package. Under Putin, the old system which included high tax rates has been replaced with a new system where companies can choose either a 6 percent tax on gross revenue or a 15 percent tax on profits.<ref name="heritage" />

In February 2009, Putin called for a single [[VAT]] rate to be "as low as possible" (at the time it stood at an average rate of 18 percent), which could be reduced to between 12 percent and 13 percent.<ref name="iht_lowertaxes">[http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/08/business/rustax.php Putin calls for lower taxes to spur business growth]. [[International Herald Tribune]]. 8 February 2008. {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080211041604/http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/02/08/business/rustax.php |date=11 February 2008 }}</ref> The overall tax burden was lower in Russia under Putin than in most European countries.<ref name="taxcompare">{{cite book|ssrn=526745 |title=A Comparative Study of Taxation in Russia and Other CIS, East European and OECD Countries |date=9 April 2004 |last1=Preobragenskaya |first1=Galina G. |last2=McGee |first2=Robert W. |s2cid=152657776}}</ref>

=== Corporatism and state intervention in economy ===
According to Dr [[Mark Smith (analyst of Russian politics)|Mark Smith]] (March 2003), Putin had developed a "[[corporatism|corporatist system]]" in the sense that under him the Kremlin was interested in close ties with business organizations such as the [[Russian Union of Industrialists and Entrepreneurs]], [[Delovaya Rossiya]] and the trade union federation (FNPR).<ref name="marksmith">[http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/russian/E111 The Putinite System] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090418125150/http://www.da.mod.uk/colleges/arag/document-listings/russian/E111 |date=18 April 2009 }} Dr. Mark A. Smith</ref> This was a part of Putins attempts to involve broad sectors of society in the making and implementation of policy.<ref name="marksmith" />
[[File:RF NG pipestoEU.gif|thumb|Under Putin, Russia is a major exporter of [[Petroleum|oil]] and [[Natural gas|gas]] to much of Europe.]]
"There is a school of thought which says that a number of Putin's steps in the economy (notably the fate of [[Yukos]]) were signs of a shift toward a system normally described as [[state capitalism]],<ref>[http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/gvosdev200311050739.asp ''Putin's Gamble. Where Russia is headed''.] by [[Nikolas Gvosdev]]. www.nationalreview.com. 5 November 2003. {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081228011223/http://www.nationalreview.com/comment/gvosdev200311050739.asp |date=28 December 2008 }}</ref><ref>[https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A37580-2004Jul8.html ''Putin's Kremlin Asserting More Control of Economy. Yukos Case Reflects Shift on Owning Assets, Notably in Energy.''] by [[Peter Baker (author)|Peter Baker]].
[[Washington Post]]. 9 July 2004.</ref><ref name="FT">[http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d776a916-ff2f-11da-84f3-0000779e2340.html "Back in business – how Putin's allies are turning Russia into a corporate state"] by Neil Buckley and [[Arkady Ostrovsky]]. ''[[Financial Times]]''. 19 June 2006.</ref> where "the entirety of state-owned and controlled enterprises are run by and for the benefit of the cabal around Putin—a collection of former KGB colleagues, Saint Petersburg lawyers, and other political cronies", he said in his words.<ref>[http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/013/522fputt.asp "What Putin Stands For. Planes, uranium, tanks, infrastructure, and nuclear power for sale"] by Reuben F. Johnson. ''[[Weekly Standard]]''. 23 April 2007. Volume 012. Issue 30.</ref>

According to [[Andrey Illarionov]], advisor of Putin until 2005, Putin policies were a new socio-political order "distinct from any seen in our country before" as members of the Corporation of Intelligence Service Collaborators had taken over the entire body of state power, followed an ''[[omertà]]''-like behavior code and were "given instruments conferring power upon others—membership "perks", such as the right to carry and use weapons". According to Illarionov, this "Corporation has seized key government agencies—the Tax Service, [[Ministry of Defence (Russia)|Ministry of Defense]], [[Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Russia)|Ministry of Foreign Affairs]], [[Duma|Parliament]], and the [[Media freedom in Russia|government-controlled mass media]]—which are now used to advance the interests of [Corporation] members. Through those agencies, every significant resource in the country—security/intelligence, political, economic, informational and financial—is being monopolized in the hands of Corporation members".<ref name="Illarionov">{{cite web|first=James|last=Kimer|title=Andrei Illarionov: Approaching Zimbabwe|publisher=[[Robert Amsterdam]]|url=http://robertamsterdam.com/andrei_illarionov_approaching_zimbabwe/|date=25 April 2007|access-date=6 March 2015}}</ref> Members of the Corporation formed an isolated [[caste]] and according to an anonymous former KGB general cited by ''[[The Economist]]'', "[a] Chekist is a breed ... A good KGB heritage—a father or grandfather, say, who worked for the service—is highly valued by today's [[silovik]]i. Marriages between siloviki clans are also encouraged.<ref name="Neo-KGB">[http://www.economist.com/world/displaystory.cfm?story_id=9682621 "Russia under Putin. The making of a neo-KGB state"]. ''The Economist''. 23 August 2007.</ref>

Jason Bush, chief of the Moscow bureau of the magazine ''Business Week'' has commented in December 2006 on troubling growth of government's role: "The Kremlin has taken control of some two dozen Russian companies since 2004 making them [[public property]], including oil assets from [[Sibneft]] and Yukos, as well as banks, newspapers, and more. Despite his sporadic support for pro-market reforms, Putin has backed national champions such as energy concerns [[Gazprom]] and [[Rosneft]]. The private sector's share of output fell from 70% to 65% last year, while public owned companies now represent 38% of stock market capitalization, up from 22% a year ago".<ref name="Bush">[https://web.archive.org/web/20061213231041/http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/dec2006/gb20061207_520461.htm "Russia: How Long Can The Fun Last?"] by [[Jason Bush]]. ''[[Business Week]]''. 7 December 2006.</ref>

On 20 September 2008 and when the [[Great Recession|late 2000s recession]] had started to hit the well-being of Russia's top tycoons, the ''[[Financial Times]]'' said that "Putinism was built on the understanding that if tycoons played by Kremlin rules they would prosper".<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/9d1cffd0-8624-11dd-959e-0000779fd18c.html|title=Russian lessons|work=[[Financial Times]]|date=20 September 2008|access-date=22 September 2008}}</ref>

Although Russia's state intervention in the economy had been usually criticized in the West, a study by Bank of Finland's Institute for Economies in Transition (BOFIT) in 2008 showed that state intervention had had a positive impact on the [[corporate governance]] of many companies in Russia as the formal indications of the quality of corporate governance in Russia were higher in companies with state control or with a stake held by the government.<ref name="yakovlev">[http://www.bof.fi/NR/rdonlyres/3B399E29-C7A5-41A6-B22F-07C9C3E61E72/0/dp2608.pdf Andrei Yakovlev, State-business relations and improvement of corporate governance in Russia] Bank of Finland Institute for Economies in Transition, 2008 {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090205110744/http://www.bof.fi/NR/rdonlyres/3B399E29-C7A5-41A6-B22F-07C9C3E61E72/0/dp2608.pdf |date=5 February 2009 }}</ref>
{{See also|Gazprom|Rosneft}}

=== Rising living standards ===
[[File:Severnaya Dolina 11 2010.jpg|thumb|300px|"Northern Valley" housing estate under construction in [[Saint Petersburg]], 2010]]
In 2005, Putin launched [[National Priority Projects]] in the fields of [[Health care in Russia|health care]], [[Education in Russia|education]], housing and [[Agriculture in Russia|agriculture]]. In his May 2006 annual speech, Putin proposed increasing maternity benefits and [[prenatal care]] for women. Putin was strident about the need to reform the judiciary considering the present federal judiciary "Sovietesque", wherein many of the judges hand down the same verdicts as they would under the old Soviet judiciary structure and preferring instead a judiciary that interpreted and implemented the code to the current situation. In 2005, responsibility for federal prisons was transferred from the [[Ministry of Internal Affairs (Russia)|Ministry of Internal Affairs]] to the [[Ministry of Justice (Russia)|Ministry of Justice]].

The most high-profile change within the national priority project frameworks was probably the 2006 across-the-board increase in wages in healthcare and education as well as the decision to modernise equipment in both sectors in 2006 and 2007.<ref name="bofit">[http://www.bof.fi/NR/rdonlyres/C02B01A1-7210-472C-87C7-ABAF303168F7/0/bon0608.pdf The challenges of the Medvedev era, 2008] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081113153601/http://www.bof.fi/NR/rdonlyres/C02B01A1-7210-472C-87C7-ABAF303168F7/0/bon0608.pdf |date=13 November 2008 }}</ref>
 	
[[File:Зрители лектория Cosmos на Geek Picnic 2018 SPb.jpg|thumb|Russians at a 2018 event]]
During Putin's government, poverty was cut more than half.<ref name="kommersantstats" />

In 2006, chief of ''[[Business Week]]''{{'}}s Moscow bureau [[Jason Bush]] commented on the condition of Russian middle class: "This group has grown from just 8 million in 2000 to 55 million today and now accounts for some 37% of the population, estimates Expert, a market research firm in Moscow. That's giving a lift to the mood in the country. The share of Russians who think life is 'not bad' has risen to 23% from just 7% in 1999, while those who find living conditions 'unacceptable' has dropped to 29% from 53%, according to a recent poll". However, "[n]ot everyone has shared in the prosperity. Far from it. The average Russian earns $330 a month, just 10% of the U.S. average. Only a third of households own a car, and many—particularly the elderly—have been left behind".<ref name="Bush" />

At the end of Putin's second term, [[Jonathan Steele (journalist)|Jonathan Steele]] has commented on Putin's legacy: "What, then, is Putin's legacy? Stability and growth, for starters. After the chaos of the 90s, highlighted by Yeltsin's attack on the Russian parliament with tanks in 1993 and the collapse of almost every bank in 1998, Putin has delivered political calm and a 7% annual rate of growth. Inequalities have increased and many of the new rich are grotesquely crass and cruel, but not all the Kremlin's vast revenues from oil and gas have gone into private pockets or are being hoarded in the government's "stabilisation fund". Enough has gone into modernising schools and hospitals so that people notice a difference. Overall living standards are up. The second Chechen war, the major blight on Putin's record, is almost over".<ref>[https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/story/0,,2171416,00.html Putin's legacy is a Russia that doesn't have to curry favour with the west] by [[Jonathan Steele (journalist)|Jonathan Steele]]. ''The Guardian''. 18 September 2007.</ref>

=== Other economic developments and assessments ===
In June 2008, a group of [[Finland|Finnish]] economists wrote that the 2000s had so far been an economic boon for Russia, with GDP rising about 7% a year and by the beginning of 2008 Russia had become one of the ten largest economies in the world.<ref name="challenges_of_medv_era" />

[[File:GDP of Russia since 1989.svg|thumb|Russian GDP since the end of the [[Soviet Union]] (from 2014 are forecasts)]]
In Putin's first term, many new economic reforms were implemented along the lines of the "Gref program". The multitude of reforms ranged from a flat income tax to bank reform, from land ownership to improvements in conditions for small businesses.<ref name="challenges_of_medv_era" />

In 1998, over 60% of industrial turnover in Russia was based on barter and various monetary surrogates. The use of such alternatives to money now today fallen out of favour, which has boosted economic productivity significantly. Besides raising wages and consumption, Putin's government has received broad praise also for eliminating this problem.<ref name="challenges_of_medv_era">[http://www.bof.fi/NR/rdonlyres/C02B01A1-7210-472C-87C7-ABAF303168F7/0/bon0608.pdf Korhonen et at, The challenges of the Medvedev era] Bank of Finland's Institute for Economies in Transition, 2008 {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081113153601/http://www.bof.fi/NR/rdonlyres/C02B01A1-7210-472C-87C7-ABAF303168F7/0/bon0608.pdf |date=13 November 2008 }}</ref>

In the opinion of the Finnish researchers, the most high-profile change within the national priority project frameworks was probably the 2006 across-the-board increase in wages in healthcare and education as well as the decision to modernise equipment in both sectors in 2006 and 2007.<ref name="challenges_of_medv_era" />

The rise in the overall living standards further deepened Russia's social and geographical discrepancies. In July 2008, [[Edward Lucas (journalist)|Edward Lucas]] of ''The Economist'' wrote: "The colossal bribe-collecting opportunities created by Putinism have heightened the divide between big cities (particularly Moscow) and the rest of the country".<ref>{{cite news|first=Edward|last=Lucas|url=http://www.economist.com/world/europe/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11784695|title=For your freedom and ours
|newspaper=The Economist |date=24 July 2008 |access-date=25 February 2009|author-link=Edward Lucas (journalist)}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|first=Edward|last=Lucas |url=http://edwardlucas.blogspot.com/2008/07/europe-view-no-91.html |title=Europe View no 91 |publisher=Edwardlucas.blogspot.com |date=25 July 2008 |access-date=24 March 2014}}</ref>

In November 2008, the retired KGB [[lieutenant-general]] [[Nikolai Leonov]], in assessing the overall results of Putin's economic policies for the period of 8 years, said that [w]ithin this period, there has only been one positive thing, if you leave aside the trivia. And that thing is the price of oil and natural gas".<ref>[http://www.russdom.ru/node/49 Генерал КГБ Н.С.Леонов: "В нашей стране умеют только пилить бабки"]. KGB [[lieutenant-general]] [[Nikolai Leonov]]'s interview. 1 November 2008.</ref> In the closing paragraphs of his 2008 book, the retired general said: "Behind the gilded facade of Moscow and [[Saint Petersburg]], there lies a demolished country that, under the current characteristics of those in power, has no chance to restore itself as one of the developed states of the world".<ref>[[Nikolai Leonov|Н.С. Леонов]]. ''Россия 2000–2008. Закат или рассвет?'' М. 2008, page 538.</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.russdom.ru/node/80 |title=АНОНС: Вышла новая книга Н.С.Леонова "Закат или рассвет? Россия: 2000–2008" |publisher=Russdom.ru |access-date=24 March 2014}}</ref>
[[File:Countries by Natural Gas Proven Reserves (2014).svg|thumb|250px|Countries by [[List of countries by natural gas proven reserves|natural gas proven reserves]] (2014), based on data from The World Factbook. Russia has the world's largest reserves.]]

On 29 November 2008, [[Gennady Zyuganov]], leader of the [[Communist Party of Russian Federation]] (the largest opposition group within Russia with its 13% of seats in the [[Duma|national Parliament]]), in his speech before the 13th Party Congress lamented that due to "heroic efforts" of the "Yeltsinites" the country has lost 5 out of the 22 million square kilometers of its "historical territory" and that Russia faces de-industrialization, de-population and mental debilitation. The ruling group has in his opinion no notable successes to boast of, no clear plan of action and is only focussed on staying in power at all costs.<ref>[http://kprf.ru/party_live/61739.html Political Report of the CPRF Central Committee to the 13th Party Congress], by G.Zyuganov. 29 November 2008.</ref>

To characterize the kind of state Putin had built in socio-economic terms, in early 2008 professor [[Marshall Goldman|Marshall I. Goldman]] coined the term "[[petrostate]]" in ''Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia'',<ref>[[Marshall Goldman|Marshall I. Goldman]]. ''Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia'', Oxford University Press, May 2008.</ref> where he ''inter alia'' argued that while Putin had followed the advice of economic advisers in implementing reforms such as a 13 percent flat tax and creating a stabilization fund to lessen inflationary pressure, his main personal contribution was the idea of creating "national champions" and the renationalization of major energy assets. In his June 2008 interview, Marshall Goldman said that in his opinion Putin had created a new class of oligarchs, whom some called "silogarchs", Russia having come in second in the [[Forbes|''Forbes'' magazine]] list of the world's billionaires after only the United States.<ref>[http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/0047.html Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia]. [[Carnegie Council]], Marshall I. Goldman and Joanne J. Myers. 4 June 2008. {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081010150646/http://www.cceia.org/resources/transcripts/0047.html |date=10 October 2008 }}</ref>

In December 2008, [[Anders Åslund]] pointed out that Putin's chief project had been "to develop huge, unmanageable state-owned mastodons, considered "national champions"", which had "stalemated large parts of the economy through their inertia and corruption while impeding diversification".<ref name="AAsl">{{cite news|author=Anders Åslund|url=http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=27959|title=Crisis Puts Putinomics to the Test|work=[[The St. Petersburg Times (Russia)|The St. Petersburg Times]]|date=29 December 2008|access-date=11 February 2009|author-link=Anders Åslund|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090101210601/http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=27959|archive-date=1 January 2009|url-status=dead}}</ref>

=== People are new oil ===
On 14 November 2016, [[Elvira Nabiullina]], the head of [[Central Bank of Russia]], stated that "the previous model which based upon exporting raw materials and stimulating consumption, including through consumer lending, has been exhausted; this was manifested in «the fading of the rates of economic growth before the crisis and the drop in oil prices".<ref>{{cite news|last=Kalyukov|first=Yevgeniy|date=14 November 2016|title=Набиуллина рассказала о смене модели развития экономики России|language=ru|work=[[RBK Group|RBK]]|url=https://www.rbc.ru/economics/14/11/2016/5829b9229a7947388373a8f3}}</ref>

Russian economist Dmitriy Prokofiev believes that the new economic model of Putin's Russia is based on the same principles that were used during the [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin's]] [[Five-year plans of the Soviet Union|five-year plans]]. The essence of this system is to provide investment in large projects under the patronage of the government and guarantee the income of the political and economic elite by direct and indirect uptake of money from the population. As a result of cheap labour and expensive capital policy, economic entities use labour-based and not capital-intensive technologies. At the same time, the impoverishment of the population and the decrease of the domestic consumer demand forces economic entities to seek objects for investment outside Russia. That is why the profits of large companies and their owners do not affect the income of individuals.<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Prokofiev|first=Dmitriy|date=18 December 2019|title=В 2020-х Россия рискует повторить коллективизацию: вместо нефти прибыль будут извлекать из людей|language=ru|magazine=[[Novaya Gazeta]]|issue=142|url=https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2019/12/16/83185-vozvraschenie-stalinskoy-ekonomiki}}</ref>

New economic model was named «People are new oil». This phrase entered the lexicon of Russian bureaucrats believing that citizens are the source of income and benefits, but not an object of concern and care.<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Aptekar|first=Pavel|date=20 November 2018|title=Что не так в разговорах о людях как о "второй нефти"|language=ru|magazine=[[Vedomosti]]|url=https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2018/11/20/787000-chto-ne-tak}}</ref>

The particular manifestations of the new economic model are the following: freezing of the funded part of the pension from 2014 until at least the end of 2023,<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=8 December 2020|title=Путин подписал закон о заморозке накопительной пенсии до конца 2023 года|language=ru|work=[[RBK Group|RBK]]|url=https://www.rbc.ru/rbcfreenews/5fcf64209a794761108a9a35}}</ref> raising the retirement age,<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=1 January 2019|title=В России вступил в силу закон о повышении пенсионного возраста|language=ru|work=[[RTVI]]|url=https://rtvi.com/news/vstupil-zakon-o-povyshenii-pensionnogo-vozrasta/}}</ref> value added tax rate hike,<ref>{{cite news|last=Tadtaev|first=Georgiy|date=3 August 2018|title=Путин утвердил повышение НДС до 20%|language=ru|work=[[RBK Group|RBK]]|url=https://www.rbc.ru/economics/03/08/2018/5b64b8fc9a7947bb671ac4d4}}</ref> income tax on natural persons rate hike,<ref>{{cite news|last=Polyakova|first=Viktoriya|date=23 November 2020|title=Путин подписал закон о повышении налога с высоких зарплат|language=ru|work=[[RBK Group|RBK]]|url=https://www.rbc.ru/economics/23/11/2020/5fbb8a219a794776ba09d3b2}}</ref> reviving the [[Joseph Stalin|Stalin's]] [[Gulag|practice of using the prisoner's labour]].<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Tarasov|first=Alexey|date=29 April 2021|title=Отправят ли Навального строить БАМ? Правительство возвращает экономическую практику времен ГУЛАГа: зеков хотят послать на сибирские мегастройки. А ФСИН и так зарабатывает миллиарды на обесцененном труде|language=ru|magazine=[[Novaya Gazeta]]|url=https://novayagazeta.ru/articles/2021/04/29/otpraviat-li-navalnogo-stroit-bam}}</ref>

Since 2013, the incomes of Russian residents are declining for eight years in a row.<ref>{{cite news|last=Solovyeva|first=Olga|date=4 February 2021|title=Уровень жизни россиян вернулся к показателям 2010 года|language=ru|work=[[Nezavisimaya Gazeta]]|url=https://www.ng.ru/economics/2021-02-04/4_8075_economics1.html}}</ref>

== Foreign policy ==
{{Main|Foreign policy of Vladimir Putin}}
[[File:Vladimir Putin at the Millennium Summit 6-8 September 2000-7.jpg|thumb|right|With [[Bill Clinton]] in September 2000]]
[[File:Vladimir Putin 22 July 2001-3.jpg|thumb|right|With [[George W. Bush]] in July 2001]]
[[File:Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama (2015-09-29) 01.jpg|thumb|right|With [[Barack Obama]] in September 2015]]
[[File:President Trump at the G20 (48144047611).jpg|thumb|right|With [[Donald Trump]] in June 2019]]
[[File:Putin in Switzerland 2021 10.jpg|thumb|right|With [[Joe Biden]] in June 2021]]

In June 2000, Putin's decree was approved by the "Concept of the Russian Federation's foreign policy". According to this document, the main objectives of foreign policy are the following:
*Ensuring reliable security of the country.
*The impact of global processes in order to create a stable, just and democratic world order.
*The creation of favorable external conditions for the onward development of Russian.
*Formation of the Neighbourhood zone around the perimeter of the Russian borders.
*Search agreement and coinciding interests with foreign countries and international associations in the process of solving problems, Russia's national priorities.
*Protecting the rights and interests of Russian citizens and compatriots abroad.
*Promote a positive perception of the Russian Federation in the world.

On 10 February 2007, Putin delivered a [[Munich speech of Vladimir Putin|confrontational speech in Munich]] where, inter alia, he accused the [[Western culture|West]] of breaking the promise not to [[Enlargement of NATO|expand NATO]] into new countries in [[Eastern Europe]] believing that is a threat to Russia's national security. According to John Lough, associate fellow of the [[Chatham House]], Putin's statement was based on the myth that the [[Western culture|West]] deceived Russia by reneging on its promises at the end of the [[Cold War]] not to enlarge [[NATO]] and chose to pass up the opportunity to integrate Russia into a new European security framework and instead encouraged Moscow back on to a path of confrontation with the United States and its allies. In fact, the Soviet Union neither asked for nor was given any formal guarantees that there would be no further expansion of [[NATO]] beyond the territory of a [[German reunification|united Germany]] and, in addition, the Soviet Union signed the Charter of Paris in November 1990 with the commitment to 'fully recognize the freedom of States to choose their own security arrangements'.<ref>{{cite book|last1=Allan|first1=Duncan|last2=Bohr|first2=Annette|last3=Boulegue|first3=Mathieu|last4=Giles|first4=Keir|last5=Gould-Davies|first5=Nigel|last6=Hanson|first6=Philip|last7=Lough|first7=John|last8=Lutsevych|first8=Orysia|last9=Mallinson|first9=Kate|last10=Marin|first10=Anais|last11=Nixey|first11=James|last12=Noble|first12=Ben|last13=Petrov|first13=Nikolai|last14=Schulmann|first14=Ekaterina|last15=Sherr|first15=James|last16=Wolczuk|first16=Kataryna|last17=Wood|first17=Andrew|date=13 May 2021|title=Myths and misconceptions in the debate on Russia|chapter=Myth 03: 'Russia was promised that NATO would not enlarge'|language=en|location=London|publisher=[[Chatham House]]|pages=29–31|isbn=978-1-78413-461-7|url=https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/05/myths-and-misconceptions-debate-russia}}</ref> In opinion of [[Andrey Vladimirovich Kolesnikov|Andrey Kolesnikov]], senior fellow of the [[Carnegie Moscow Center]], this speech was the "foul of the last hope": Russian president wanted to scare the West with his frankness believing that, perhaps, "western partners" would take into account his concerns and make several steps forward to meet him. It had a reverse effect but this scenario was also calculated: either you will or you will not, Russia will be transforming from the fragment of the [[Western culture|West]] into the super-sovereign island. Seeing as what happened thereafter, he decided for himself that he is free in his actions: because he had not succeeded in becoming a world leader by western rules, he would become a world leader by his own rules.<ref>{{cite web|last=Kolesnikov|first=Andrey|date=10 February 2017|title=Его Фултон: к десятилетию Мюнхенской речи Владимира Путина|language=ru|publisher=[[Carnegie Moscow Center]]|url=https://carnegie.ru/2017/02/10/ru-pub-67973}}</ref>

In a 2010 article in the German newspaper ''[[Süddeutsche Zeitung]]'' dedicated to the participation in the annual economic forum, it was proposed to create a European economic alliance stretching from [[Vladivostok]] to [[Lisbon]]. As steps towards the creation of the alliance indicates a possible unification of customs tariffs and technical regulations, the abolition of the visa regime with the [[European Union]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://lenta.ru/news/2010/11/25/wirtschaft/|title=Putin proposed European economic alliance from Vladivostok to Lisbon|access-date=27 March 2016}}</ref>

In August 2013, according to experts the Russian-American relations have reached their lowest point since the end of the [[Cold War]] era. The September President [[Barack Obama]]'s visit to [[Moscow]] and his talks with Putin were canceled due to temporary asylum in Russia, a former employee of the [[CIA]] [[Edward Snowden]], disagreements on the [[Syrian Civil War|situation in Syria]] and the problems with human rights in Russia.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/08/10_a_5548849.shtml|title=Obama explained why refused to meet with Putin|date=10 August 2013 |access-date=27 March 2016}}</ref> Russia has a long history of [[Anti-Americanism]], dating back to the early days of the [[Cold War]]. In some of the latest Russian population polls, the United States and its allies consistently top the list of greatest enemies.<ref>[http://www.levada.ru/18-06-2013/levada-tsentr-glavnym-vragom-rossiyane-schitayut-ssha «Левада-Центр»: главным врагом россияне считают США], Levada-center: Russians consider U.S. as a main enemy.</ref><ref>"[https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2018/02/07/more-russians-are-sure-of-the-u-s-meddling-in-their-politics-than-the-other-way-around-poll-finds/ More Russians are sure of the U.S. meddling in their politics than the other way around, poll finds]". ''The Washington Post''. 7 February 2018.</ref> Survey results published by the [[Levada-Center]] indicate that, as of August 2018, Russians increasingly viewed the United States positively following the [[2018 Russia–United States summit|Russia–U.S. summit in Helsinki]] in July 2018.<ref>{{cite news |title=Anti-Americanism Wanes in Russia After Putin-Trump Summit, Survey Says |url=https://themoscowtimes.com/news/anti-americanism-wanes-russia-after-putin-trump-summit-survey-says-62425 |work=[[The Moscow Times]] |date=2 August 2018}}</ref> But only 14% of Russians expressed net approval of [[Political positions of Donald Trump|Donald Trump's policies]] in 2019.<ref>{{cite news |title=Few in other countries approve of Trump's major foreign policies, but Israelis are an exception |url=https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/02/03/few-in-other-countries-approve-of-trumps-major-foreign-policies-but-israelis-are-an-exception/ |work=Pew Research Center |date=3 February 2020}}</ref> According to the Pew Research Center, "57% of Russians ages 18 to 29 see the U.S. favorably, compared with only 15% of Russians ages 50 and older."<ref>{{cite news |title=How people around the world see the U.S. and Donald Trump in 10 charts |url=https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/01/08/how-people-around-the-world-see-the-u-s-and-donald-trump-in-10-charts/ |work=[[Pew Research Center]] |date=8 January 2020}}</ref>

On 11 September 2013, ''[[The New York Times]]'' published an article by Putin, "Russia calls for caution". It is written in the form of an open letter to the American people, containing an explanation of the Russian political line against the Syrian conflict. It is also the Russian president warns against President Obama's thesis "About the exclusivity of the American nation". The article caused a mixed reaction of the world community.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.interfax.ru/world/328890|title=McCain wants to respond to Putin|access-date=27 March 2016}}</ref>

In 2013, Putin won the first place in the annual ranking of most influential people in the world by ''[[Forbes]]''.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/carolinehoward/2013/10/30/the-worlds-most-powerful-people-2013/#78a23bad5ed1|title=The World's Most Powerful People 2013|website=[[Forbes]] |access-date=27 March 2016}}</ref> In 2014, the result was the same.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.forbes.com/sites/carolinehoward/2014/11/05/ranking-the-worlds-most-powerful-people-2014/#6df3f26c5e87|title=The World's Most Powerful People 2014|website=[[Forbes]] |access-date=27 March 2016}}</ref>

On 18 March 2014, Vladimir Putin gave the [[Crimean speech of Vladimir Putin|Crimean speech]]. Many Russian and foreign public figures compared this speech to [[Adolf Hitler|Hitler's]] speech on Sudetenland from 1939 as using "the same arguments and vision of history".<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=20 March 2014|title=Putin's words over Crimea 'terribly reminiscent of Hitler'|language=en|work=[[Euronews]]|url=https://www.euronews.com/2014/03/20/putin-s-words-over-crimea-terribly-reminiscent-of-hitler}}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine|last=Piontkovsky|first=Andrey|author-link=Andrey Piontkovsky|date=31 March 2014|title=Немец в Кремле|language=ru|magazine=[[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty|Radio Liberty]]|url=https://www.svoboda.org/a/25314776.html}}</ref> Pro-Kremlin [[Political science|politologist]] [[Andranik Migranyan]] opposed to the position of the [[historian]] [[Andrey Zubov]]<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Zubov|first=Andrey|author-link=Andrey Zubov|date=1 March 2014|title=Это уже было|language=ru|magazine=[[Vedomosti]]|url=https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2014/03/01/andrej-zubov-eto-uzhe-bylo}}</ref> and stated that there was a difference between [[Adolf Hitler]] before 1939 and Hitler after 1939, and after the [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|annexation of Crimea]] Putin should be compared with "good Hitler".<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Migranyan|first=Andranik|author-link=Andranik Migranyan|date=3 April 2014|title=Наши Передоновы|language=ru|magazine=[[Izvestia]]|url=https://iz.ru/news/568603}}</ref>

[[File:Shanghai Cooperation Organization member states Summit gets underway in Samarkand 02.jpg|thumb|250px|Putin, [[Alexander Lukashenko|Lukashenko]], [[Recep Tayyip Erdoğan|Erdoğan]], [[Narendra Modi|Modi]], Xi Jinping and other leaders at the [[Shanghai Cooperation Organisation]] summit on 16 September 2022]]
On 24 October 2014, Vladimir Putin made the [[Valdai speech of Vladimir Putin|Valdai speech]] in which he accused the [[United States]] of undermining the world order<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Buckley|first=Neil|date=24 October 2014|title=Putin unleashes fury at US 'follies'|language=en|magazine=[[Financial Times]]|url=https://www.ft.com/content/fa42acf8-5b9f-11e4-81ac-00144feab7de}}</ref> and predicted that the clash would not be the last to pit Russia and the United States against each other.<ref>{{cite magazine|last1=Demirjian|first1=Karoun|last2=Birnbaum|first2=Michael|date=24 October 2014|title=Russia's Putin blames U.S. for destabilizing world order|language=en|magazine=[[The Washington Post]]|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/russias-putin-blames-us-for-destabilizing-world-order/2014/10/24/1c2e684f-6c00-41a0-8458-03533d644657_story.html}}</ref> Putin threatened "sharp increase in the likelihood of a whole set of violent conflicts with either direct or indirect participation by the world's major powers" including those arising from "internal instability in certain countries" "located at the intersections of major states’ geopolitical interests, or on the border of cultural, historical, and economic civilizational continents", citing the example of [[Ukraine]]<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Buckley|first=Neil|date=27 October 2014|title=Putin makes west an offer wrapped up in a warning|language=en|magazine=[[Financial Times]]|url=https://www.ft.com/content/8adeb6d0-5d0d-11e4-9753-00144feabdc0}}</ref> and warning that this example "will certainly not be the last".<ref>{{cite magazine|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=27 October 2014|title=Vladimir Putin lays out a menacing choice for the West|language=en|magazine=[[The Washington Post]]|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/vladimir-putin-lays-out-a-menacing-choice-for-the-west/2014/10/27/ca7fc194-5dfd-11e4-8b9e-2ccdac31a031_story.html}}</ref>

In September 2015, Putin spoke at the [[United Nations General Assembly]] session in [[New York City]] for the first time in 10 years. In his speech, he urged the formation of a broad anti-terrorist coalition to combat [[ISIS]] and blamed the [[War in Donbas (2014–2022)|events in Ukraine]] on "external forces", warned the West against unilateral sanctions, attempts to push Russia from the world market and export of [[color revolutions]]. For the first time, he also held a meeting with President Obama to discuss the situation in [[Syria]] and [[Ukraine]], but in the outcome of the negotiations and despite the persistence of deep contradictions the experts saw a faint hope for a compromise and the warming of relations between the two countries.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.rbc.ru/politics/29/09/2015/560a97849a7947d6af019635|title=Syrian Party: Putin's initiative as the West reacted to the UN|date=29 September 2015 |access-date=27 March 2016}}</ref>

In September 2015, Vladimir Putin sent [[Russian military intervention in the Syrian civil war|Russian troops in Syria]] supporting [[Bashar al-Assad]] in his war against [[Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant]], [[Al-Nusra Front]] and also [[Syrian opposition]] militant groups opposed to the Syrian government.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Bocharova|first1=Svetlana|last2=Rubin|first2=Mikhail|last3=Makutina|first3=Maria|last4=Glinkin|first4=Maksim|date=30 September 2015|title=За Сирию, за Асада: когда и зачем Москва решила воевать|language=ru|work=[[RBK Group|RBK]]|url=https://www.rbc.ru/politics/30/09/2015/560bffdd9a794744eb92da3b}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=30 September 2015|title=Russia carries out first air strikes in Syria|language=en|work=[[Al Jazeera English|Al Jazeera]]|url=https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/9/30/russia-carries-out-first-air-strikes-in-syria}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=30 September 2015|title=Syria crisis: Russian air strikes against Assad enemies|language=en|work=[[BBC]]|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-34399164}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Roth|first1=Andrew|last2=Murphy|first2=Brian|last3=Ryan|first3=Missy|date=30 September 2015|title=Russia begins airstrikes in Syria; U.S. warns of new concerns in conflict|language=en|newspaper=[[The Washington Post]]|url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/russias-legislature-authorizes-putin-to-use-military-force-in-syria/2015/09/30/f069f752-6749-11e5-9ef3-fde182507eac_story.html}}</ref><ref>{{cite news|last1=Payne|first1=Ed|last2=Starr|first2=Barbara|last3=Cullinane|first3=Susannah|date=1 October 2015|title=Russia launches first airstrikes in Syria|language=en|work=[[CNN]]|url=https://edition.cnn.com/2015/09/30/politics/russia-syria-airstrikes-isis/index.html}}</ref> [[Wagner Group]], affiliated to Putin's close circle and tacitly coordinated by [[GRU (Russian Federation)|GRU]], was also used in the war against [[Bashar al-Assad|Assad]]'s opponents.<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Korotkov|first=Denis|date=16 October 2015|title="Славянский корпус" возвращается в Сирию|language=ru|magazine=Fontanka.ru|url=https://www.fontanka.ru/2015/10/16/118/}}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine|last1=Rozhdestvenskiy|first1=Ilya|last2=Baev|first2=Anton|last3=Rusyaeva|first3=Polina|date=25 August 2016|title=Призраки войны: как в Сирии появилась российская частная армия|language=ru|magazine=[[RBK Group|RBK]]|url=https://www.rbc.ru/magazine/2016/09/57bac4309a79476d978e850d}}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine|last1=Yakoreva|first1=Anastasia|last2=Reyter|first2=Svetlana|date=14 February 2018|title=Неопознанная армия. Что такое ЧВК Вагнера|language=ru|magazine=TheBell.io|url=https://thebell.io/neopoznannaya-armiya-chto-takoe-chvk-vagnera}}</ref>

[[File:Putin-Xi press conference (2023).jpg|thumb|Putin welcomes Chinese President [[Xi Jinping]] in Moscow during Xi's [[2023 visit by Xi Jinping to Russia|visit to Russia in March 2023]].]]
Putin supported [[Nicolás Maduro]] in [[Venezuelan presidential crisis]]<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=25 September 2019|title=Russia's Putin hosts Venezuelan leader Maduro for talks|language=en|work=[[Associated Press]]|url=https://apnews.com/article/402a390d48d84ba8b83e294f797959e8}}</ref> and sent Russian troops led by the chief of Staff of the [[Russian Ground Forces]] [[Colonel General]] {{ill|Vasily Petrovich Tonkoshkurov|lt=Vasily Tonkoshkurov|ru|Тонкошкуров, Василий Петрович}} to [[Caracas]].<ref>{{cite news|last=Roth|first=Andrew|date=28 March 2019|title=Russia acknowledges presence of troops in Venezuela|language=en|work=[[The Guardian]]|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2019/mar/28/russian-troops-landed-caracas-talks-venezuela-envoy-military}}</ref>

On 29 August 2020, Vladimir Putin stated that Russia accepts the election result of [[2020 Belarusian presidential election|Belarusian presidential election]] and recognizes [[Alexander Lukashenko]] as legitimate [[President of Belarus]].<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=29 August 2020|title=Путин заявил, что Россия признает легитимность президентских выборов в Белоруссии|language=ru|work=[[TASS]]|url=https://tass.ru/politika/9320613}}</ref> Earlier, in mid-August 2020, there were reports that several dozen [[Military vehicle|trucks]], identical to the ones used by the [[National Guard of Russia]], without registration plates and any marks, were sighted in [[Smolensk Oblast]] and [[Pskov Oblast]] heading toward [[Belarus]]ian border. In Conflict Intelligence Team assessment, these trucks could carry no less than 600 soldiers.<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=17 August 2020|title=CIT: на пути к Беларуси заметили десятки грузовиков Росгвардии|language=ru|work=[[Meduza]]|url=https://meduza.io/news/2020/08/17/cit-na-puti-k-belarusi-zametili-desyatki-gruzovikov-rosgvardii}}</ref> Kremlin did not confirm the sending Russian troops to Belarus, said that events in Belarus did not yet warrant Russia's military involvement and condemned alleged foreign interference in Belarus's affairs by [[Western culture|Western countries]] against the backdrop of [[2020–2021 Belarusian protests|mass protests in Belarus]].<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=19 August 2020|title=Russia Slams 'Foreign Meddling' in Belarus, Rules Out Immediate Military Aid|language=en|work=[[The Moscow Times]]|url=https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2020/08/19/russia-slams-foreign-meddling-in-belarus-rules-out-immediate-military-aid-a71199}}</ref> [[Hans van Baalen]] considered that Russian [[Intervention (international law)|intervention]] in Belarus is already a fact.<ref>{{cite magazine|last=van Baalen|first=Hans|author-link=Hans van Baalen|date=9 September 2020|title=Russian intervention in Belarus is already a fact|language=en|magazine=[[Euractiv]]|url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/europe-s-east/opinion/russian-intervention-in-belarus-is-already-a-fact/}}</ref>

=== State-sponsored global public relations effort ===
[[File:Vice President Pence Delivers Remarks at the Fifth World Holocaust Forum (49456793356).jpg|thumb|Putin with Israeli Prime Minister [[Benjamin Netanyahu]] during the [[World Holocaust Forum]] at the [[Yad Vashem]] in Jerusalem, January 2020]]
Shortly after the [[Beslan school hostage crisis|Beslan terror act]] in September 2004, Putin enhanced a Kremlin-sponsored program aimed at "improving Russia's image" abroad.<ref name="washpost">{{cite news |url=https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/05/AR2008030503539_pf.html |title=Russia Pumps Tens of Millions Into Burnishing Image Abroad |date=6 March 2008 |newspaper=Washington Post |access-date=4 January 2009 |first=Peter |last=Finn}}</ref> According to an unnamed former Duma deputy, there existed a classified article in the RF federal budget that provided for financing measures to this purpose.<ref>[http://www.newsru.com/russia/13sep2004/conference.html Кремль пытается скупать западных журналистов, которые улучшат его имидж]. [[NEWSru]]. 13 September 2004.</ref>

One of the major projects of the program was the creation in 2005 of ''[[Russia Today]]''—a rolling [[English language|English-language]] TV news channel providing 24-hour news coverage, modeled on [[CNN]]. Towards its start-up budget, $30 million of public funds were allocated.<ref>[http://2005.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2005/52n/n52n-s00.shtml «Честь России стоит дорого». Мы выяснили, сколько конкретно] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070428091159/http://2005.novayagazeta.ru/nomer/2005/52n/n52n-s00.shtml |date=28 April 2007 }}. ''[[Novaya gazeta]]''. 21 July 2005.</ref><ref>[http://www.vedomosti.ru/newspaper/article.shtml?2005/06/06/92991 Имидж за $30 млн]. [[Vedomosti]]. 6 June 2005.</ref> A [[CBS News]] story on the launch of Russia Today quoted [[Boris Kagarlitsky]] as saying it was "very much a continuation of the old [[Propaganda in the Soviet Union|Soviet propaganda]] services".<ref>{{cite news|url=http://www.cbc.ca/arts/story/2006/03/10/russia-today-critics.html |title=Journalism mixes with spin on Russia Today: critics |publisher=[[CBC News]] |date=10 March 2006 |access-date=4 January 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070611184421/http://www.cbc.ca/arts/story/2006/03/10/russia-today-critics.html |archive-date=11 June 2007 }}</ref> In 2007, ''Russia Today'' employed nearly 100 English-speaking special correspondents worldwide.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.broadbandtvnews.com/archive_cen/160905.html |title=Russia Today tomorrow |date=15 September 2005 |publisher=Broadband TV News |access-date=26 July 2007 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20061113191955/http://www.broadbandtvnews.com/archive_cen/160905.html |archive-date=13 November 2006 }}</ref>

Russia's deputy foreign minister [[Grigory Karasin]] said in August 2008 in the context of the [[2008 South Ossetia war|Russia-Georgia conflict]]: "Western media is a well-organized machine, which is showing only those pictures that fit in well with their thoughts. We find it very difficult to squeeze our opinion into the pages of their newspapers".<ref name=variety>[https://www.variety.com/article/VR1117990468.html?categoryid=14&cs=1 Russia claims media bias], by Nick Holdsworth. ''Variety''. August 2008.</ref> Similar views were expressed by some Western commentators.<ref name="sobell_western">[http://theivanovosti.typepad.com/the_ivanov_report/files/download_the_article.pdf Western treatment of Russia signifies erosion of reason]. Dr. Vlad Sobell. 2007.</ref><ref name="Interview with David Johnson">[http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-93-1.cfm Interview with David Johnson] by the [[Moscow News]]. April 2007. {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090211191502/http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2007-93-1.cfm |date=11 February 2009 }}</ref>

William Dunbar, who was reporting then for ''Russia Today'' from [[Georgia (country)|Georgia]], said he had not been on air since he mentioned Russian bombing of targets inside Georgia on 9 August 2008 and had to resign over what he claimed was biased coverage by the outlet.<ref name=variety /><ref>[http://www.sptimes.ru/index.php?action_id=2&story_id=26810 "Conflict Opens Up Front In Mass Media Coverage"]. ''[[The St. Petersburg Times (Russia)|The St. Petersburg Times]]''. 12 August 2008.</ref>
[[File:Hamilton and Putin.jpg|thumb|right|Putin congratulates [[Lewis Hamilton]], the winner of [[2014 Russian Grand Prix]].]]
The public relations efforts notwithstanding, according to an opinion poll released in February 2009 by the BBC World Service, Russia's image around the world had taken a dramatic dive in 2008: forty-two percent of respondents said they had a "mainly negative" view of Russia, according to the poll, which surveyed more than 13,000 people in 21 countries in December and January.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1010/42/374363.htm |title=Russia's Image Takes Major Hit, Poll Finds |date=9 February 2009 |work=[[The Moscow Times]] |access-date=11 February 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090217144035/http://www.moscowtimes.ru/article/1010/42/374363.htm |archive-date=17 February 2009 }}</ref>

In June 2007, ''[[Vedomosti]]'' reported that the Kremlin had been intensifying its official [[lobbying]] activities in the United States since 2003, among other things hiring such companies as Hannaford Enterprises and [[Ketchum Inc.|Ketchum]].<ref>[http://newsru.com/russia/05jun2007/lobby.html Россия наращивает официальную лоббистскую деятельность в США]. [[NEWSru]]. 5 June 2007.</ref>

In the 2012 ''[[Moskovskiye Novosti]]'' magazine article "Russia and changing world",<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Putin|first=Vladimir|author-link=Vladimir Putin|date=27 February 2012|editor-last=Gurevich|editor-first=Vladimir|title=Россия и меняющийся мир|language=ru|trans-title=Russia and changing world|magazine=Московские новости|trans-magazine=Moskovskiye Novosti|location=Москва|issn=0443-1243|url=https://www.mn.ru/politics/78738}}</ref> Putin directly stated that [[Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation]] and [[Russkiy Mir Foundation]] are Russia's international lobbying tools.

In accordance with 26 Article of Federal Law of 24 May 1999, No.99-FZ, Worldwide Congress of Compatriots is the highest body that ensures interaction between [[Russians|Russian]] compatriots and Russia's authorities; in the inter-Congress period, the executive functions in the sphere of interaction between Russian compatriots and Russia's authorities are carried out by {{ill|Worldwide Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots|ru|Всемирный координационный совет российских соотечественников}}.<ref>{{Cita web|type=Federal Law|index=99-FZ|date=24 May 1999|legislature=[[State Duma]]|title=О государственной политике Российской Федерации в отношении соотечественников за рубежом|language=ru|trans-title=About public policy on compatriots abroads|url=http://pravo.gov.ru/proxy/ips/?searchres=&bpas=cd00000&a3=102000505&a3type=1&a3value=&a6=&a6type=1&a6value=&a15=&a15type=1&a15value=&a7type=1&a7from=&a7to=&a7date=24.05.1999&a8=99-%D4%C7&a8type=1&a1=&a0=&a16=&a16type=1&a16value=&a17=&a17type=1&a17value=&a4=&a4type=1&a4value=&a23=&a23type=1&a23value=&textpres=&sort=7&x=70&y=18}}</ref>
[[File:Kylian Mbappé receives the best young player award at the 2018 Football World Cup Russia.jpg|thumb|right|Putin at the [[2018 FIFA World Cup Final]] in Russia]]
{{ill|International Council of Russian Compatriots|ru|Международный совет российских соотечественников}} is another organization that unify different movements of [[Russians|Russian]] émigrés. International Council of Russian Compatriots was founded after the congress with the participation of Vladimir Putin, which was held in 2001.

In opinion of Dmitry Khmelnitsky, Soviet and German [[architect]] and [[historian]], the Russian network of agents of influence abroad is extraordinarily broad and differentiated. It consists of a multitude of organizations created and financed by Moscow and under social groups and simulating social, cultural and scholarly activity. Some of these organizations are directed at the local communities, others at émigrés from the Soviet Union and Russia, although sometimes both these tasks are addressed by one and the same organizations. Their classification by itself is worthy of attention because under this format, the Russian special services work in all the countries of the world. Since Vladimir Putin came to power, Moscow has created several major and many minor organizations to work with [[Russians|Russian]] and [[Soviet people|Soviet]] emigres. Among the most important are the International Council of Russian Compatriots, the Worldwide Coordinating Council of Russian Compatriots Living Abroad, the Worldwide Congress of Russian-Speaking Jewry and the [[Russkiy Mir Foundation]], a pass-through funding group which now operates more than 200 Russian centers around the world. But it is only the tip of the iceberg.<ref>{{cite web|last=Khmelnitsky|first=Dmitry|date=28 August 2018|title=Moscow has Complex System to Run Agents of Influence Abroad|language=en|website=Russialist.org|url=https://russialist.org/moscow-has-complex-system-to-run-agents-of-influence-abroad-khmelnitsky-says/}}</ref>

The Russian network of agents of influence in [[Western culture|Western countries]] included even military-patriotic camps where Russian-speaking youth received military training.<ref>{{cite web|last=Gurzhiy|first=Ruslan|date=1 September 2017|title=Why does Kremlin need militarized troops in the U.S.?|language=en|website=SlavicSac.com|url=https://www.slavicsac.com/2017/09/01/kremlin-need-militarized-troops-u-s/}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|last=Gurzhiy|first=Ruslan|date=21 May 2018|title=Who is Funding Pro-Putin Paramilitary Formations in America?|language=en|website=SlavicSac.com|url=https://www.slavicsac.com/2018/05/21/russian-cossacks-national-union/}}</ref> The activity of the one of such camps caused a scandal in [[Serbia]]n society.<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=28 August 2018|title=Vučić: Kamp na Zlatiboru bio paravojni|language=sr|work=[[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty|Radio Liberty]]|url=https://www.slobodnaevropa.org/a/29445598.html}}</ref> Some pro-Kremlin [[Russians|Russian]] diaspora organizations are under the investigation by the [[Federal Bureau of Investigation]].<ref>{{cite news|last=Reid Ross|first=Alexander|date=7 June 2021|title=FBI Investigating Russian Diaspora Group|language=en|work=[[The Daily Beast]]|url=https://www.thedailybeast.com/fbi-investigating-russian-diaspora-group}}</ref>

=== Militarism and wars outside Russian territory ===
{{See also|Second Chechen War|Russo-Georgian War|Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|Russo-Ukrainian War|Russian invasion of Ukraine (2022–present)}}
[[File:Military exercises Center-2019-06.jpg|thumb|Putin, [[Sergei Shoigu]] and [[Valery Gerasimov]] at the Center-2019 military exercise]]
[[Russian Armed Forces]] underwent various reforms during Putin's rule. The first reform was announced by minister of defence [[Sergei Ivanov]] in 2001 and was completed in 2004. As a result of the reform, constant combat readiness [[Military organization#Commands, formations, and units|military units]], staffed with [[Volunteer military|volunteers]] only, appeared in Russia but [[Conscription|draft system]] had been retained.<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=9 February 2009|title=Военные реформы. 1992–2009|language=ru|work=[[Vzglyad (newspaper)|Vzglyad]]|url=https://vz.ru/information/2009/2/9/254417.html}}</ref> As of 2008, there were 20% constant combat readiness [[Military organization#Commands, formations, and units|military units]], manned to wartime standards, and 80% [[Cadre (military)|cadre]] [[Military organization#Commands, formations, and units|military units]], manned to peacetime standards, in [[Russian Armed Forces]].<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=30 December 2008|title=Военные новости-2008: горячий август, реформа армии и дальние походы|language=ru|work=[[Interfax]]|url=https://www.interfax.ru/russia/54787}}</ref>

After the [[Russo-Georgian War]], it became clear that Russian military organization needed further reform; as [[Vladimir Shamanov]] said, [[Cadre (military)|cadre]] regiments and divisions, intended for receiving mobilization resources and deployment in the period immediately preceding the outbreak of war, have become a costly relic.<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Shamanov|first=Vladimir|author-link=Vladimir Shamanov|date=11 February 2009|title=Необходимость реформ подтвердила война|language=ru|magazine=[[Krasnaya Zvezda]]|url=http://old.redstar.ru/2009/02/11_02/2_04.html}}</ref> On 14 October 2008, minister of defence [[Anatoly Serdyukov]] announced the beginning of new reform.<ref>{{cite news|last=Pitalev|first=Ilya|date=18 December 2008|title=Суть военных реформ в России – план Сердюкова|language=ru|work=[[RIA Novosti]]|url=https://ria.ru/20081218/157554452.html}}</ref> The main organizational change was the transition from a 4-level operational chain of command (Military District – Army – Division – Regiment) to a 3-level one (Military District – Operational Command (Army) – Brigade).<ref>{{cite news|last=Nikolskiy|first=Alexey|date=15 July 2010|title=Российская армия делится на четыре части|language=ru|work=[[Vedomosti]]|url=https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/articles/2010/07/15/rossijskaya-armiya-delitsya-na-chetyre-chasti}}</ref> Also Russia fully refused [[Cadre (military)|cadre]] [[Military organization#Commands, formations, and units|military units]], manned to peacetime standards (so-called "paper divisions"), and since that times only constant combat readiness [[Military organization#Commands, formations, and units|military units]], 100% manned up to wartime standards, were part of [[Russian Armed Forces]].<ref>{{cite news|last=Barabanov|first=Mikhail|date=20 October 2008|title=Реформа боевого духа|language=ru|work=[[Kommersant]]|url=https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1041918}}</ref> On 31 October 2010, [[Anatoly Serdyukov]] stated that changes in organizational-regular structure was completed.<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=31 October 2010|title=Сердюков: реформа армии завершится к 2020 году|language=ru|work=[[Kommersant]]|url=https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/1532331}}</ref>

[[File:№ 3009 А.И. Старчков.jpg|thumb|Russian postage stamp honoring a soldier killed in the [[Russo-Ukrainian War]]. As of February 2023, the number of Russian soldiers [[Casualties of the Russo-Ukrainian War|killed and wounded in Ukraine]] was estimated at nearly 200,000.<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.nytimes.com/2023/02/02/us/politics/ukraine-russia-casualties.html|journal=[[The New York Times]]|date=February 2, 2023|title=Soaring Death Toll Gives Grim Insight Into Russian Tactics}}</ref>]]
According to Alexander Golts, journalist and military columnist, as a result of aforementioned reforms, Russia gained absolute military dominance in the post-Soviet area and [[Russian Armed Forces]] gained the ability that it had never had: ability to quick deployment, which was clearly demonstrated on 26 February 2014.<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Golts|first=Alexander|date=12 March 2018|title=Россия милитаристская|language=ru|magazine=[[The New Times (magazine)|The New Times]]|url=https://newtimes.ru/articles/detail/151996}}</ref>

Some military experts{{which|date=June 2023}} mentioned that since the [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|Annexation of Crimea]] and the beginning of the [[Russo-Ukrainian War]], Russia organized many new military units and formations without a significant increase in the number of [[Volunteer military|volunteers]] and [[Conscription|conscripts]], prompting them to consider these units "paper divisions".<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=20 December 2018|title=Почему в армию возвращаются "бумажные дивизии"|language=ru|work=Openmedia.io|url=https://openmedia.io/news/pochemu-v-armiyu-vozvrashhayutsya-bumazhnye-divizii/}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=24 December 2018|title=Russia's "Paper Divisions"|language=en|publisher=[[Warsaw Institute]]|url=https://warsawinstitute.org/russias-paper-divisions/}}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine|last=Ishchenko|first=Sergey|date=14 June 2021|title=Пока громить НАТО мы готовимся "бумажными" дивизиями|language=ru|magazine=Svpressa.ru|url=https://svpressa.ru/war21/article/301181/}}</ref> However, in 2018, Russia began to form a [[military reserve force]] staffed by volunteers selected from among retired active duty soldiers.<ref>{{cite news|last1=Stepovoy|first1=Bogdan|last2=Ramm|first2=Alexey|last3=Andreev|first3=Yevgeniy|date=13 February 2018|title=В резерв по контракту|language=ru|work=[[Izvestia]]|url=https://iz.ru/706732/bogdan-stepovoi-aleksei-ramm-evgenii-andreev/v-rezerv-po-kontraktu}}</ref> Reservists serve in conventional military units; thus, reserve units are staffed to wartime standards and are therefore indistinguishable from regular units. The number of reservists is not made available to the public in open sources or from the [[Ministry of Defence (Russia)|Ministry of Defence]]. This makes it difficult for establish real troop strength of new Russian military formations.{{Citation needed|date=June 2023}}

According to [[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]], Russia had been in the top 5 military spenders since 2006, except 2018, and Russia's military expenditure reached $61.7 billion in 2020.<ref>{{cite web|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=26 April 2021|title=World military spending rises to almost $2 trillion in 2020|language=en|publisher=[[Stockholm International Peace Research Institute]]|url=https://www.sipri.org/media/press-release/2021/world-military-spending-rises-almost-2-trillion-2020}}</ref> In [[RBK Group|RBK]] assessment, based on 2017 [[Federal State Statistics Service (Russia)|Federal State Statistics Service]] data, budget expenditures, [[Classified information|classified]] as [[Classified information#Secret|state secret]], reached 5,3% of [[gross domestic product]].<ref>{{cite magazine|last1=Ageeva|first1=Olga|last2=Tkachev|first2=Ivan|last3=Starostina|first3=Yulia|date=28 August 2019|title=Секретная часть ВВП достигла 4,9 трлн руб. Как в национальных счетах России оказались сокрыты вооружения и разработки|language=ru|magazine=[[RBK Group|RBK]]|url=https://www.rbc.ru/economics/28/08/2019/5d5ff9129a79472cffd85d1a}}</ref> In 2021, the 15% of budget expenditures are [[Classified information|classified]] as [[Classified information#Secret|state secret]].<ref>{{cite web|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=30 September 2020|title=Правительство засекретило 15% бюджета|language=ru|publisher=Finanz.ru|url=https://www.finanz.ru/novosti/aktsii/pravitelstvo-zasekretilo-15percent-byudzheta-1029635981|access-date=25 June 2021|archive-date=31 May 2021|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20210531060204/https://www.finanz.ru/novosti/aktsii/pravitelstvo-zasekretilo-15percent-byudzheta-1029635981|url-status=dead}}</ref>
[[File:Z_symbol_on_a_billboard.jpg|thumb|[[Z (military symbol)|Z symbol]] on a billboard reads {{Lang-ru|За Путина|lit=For Putin}}]]
In [[Andrey Piontkovsky|Andrey Piontkovsky's]] opinion, Putin feels frustration towards the Soviet Union's defeat in the [[Cold War]] — which Piontkovsky calls a [[World War III|"Third World War"]] — and seeks to defeat the [[Western culture|West]] in a "Fourth World War." In fact, Putin has started this war in 2014 with [[Annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation|annexation of Crimea]], more specifically since 20 February 2014 – this date is specified in the [[Medal "For the Return of Crimea"]].<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Piontkovsky|first=Andrey|author-link=Andrey Piontkovsky|date=1 January 2019|title=Туман войны. Андрей Пионтковский – о времени выбора|language=ru|magazine=[[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty|Radio Liberty]]|url=https://www.svoboda.org/a/29673800.html}}</ref> Piontkovsky believes that geopolitical thinking of Putin and his close circle was reflected in the 2018 "Zavtra" magazine article by Alexander Khaldey:<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Piontkovsky|first=Andrey|author-link=Andrey Piontkovsky|date=14 December 2018|title=Ярче тысячи солнц. Андрей Пионтковский – о разрушении до основания|language=ru|magazine=[[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty|Radio Liberty]]|url=https://www.svoboda.org/a/29652467.html}}</ref>

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{{Cquote|Some American real colonel said that Russia believes in vain that it will serve the purposes of de-escalation of tension if Russia will use nuclear weapon. Russia is wrong. Nuclear weapon usage will not serve the purposes of de-escalation, Moscow will not achieve its goals like that.

I'm not diplomat and therefore I'll be blunt – we don't seek the de-escalation AFTER nuclear weapon usage, we seek the de-escalation BEFORE nuclear weapon usage. AFTER nuclear weapon usage, we'll just ruin you along with the rest of the world. Herein lies our goal of nuclear weapon usage. So say whatever you want but not even try.

I'm not diplomat and therefore I'll be blunt – Russia will not permit the existence of anti-Russian Ukraine and either will subdue it or will destroy it to the ground, however long it takes. Russia has enough means and capabilities for that. There will be no compromises on this point. Ukraine, that do what it wants like promiscuous woman, is misguided dream of Ukrainian politicians, erroneous and harmful to their health.

I'm not diplomat and therefore I'll be blunt – dear former republics of USSR, especially Georgia, Belarus and Kazakhstan! Russia endures your independence only temporarily and will surely bring you under control. It will never be that you will decide for yourself what alliance you join, what spokes you put in Russia's wheel, what terms you dictate to Russia, what things blackmail and scare Russia with. Don't let your imaginations carry you away, it won't be forever. We will bring you back and will put you in subordinate position. You know very well this yourself, you are just delaying the inevitable. Elites of all former Soviet republics will be replaced by obedient to Russia as soon as Russia increase its economic might. It will be done by force and bribing. Russia always used to do that and there's no reasons to think this time would be different.

Baltic States will also be brought under Russian control or will be strangled until full exhaustion. The reason is simple: Russia needs control of exit point from Baltic Sea to the Danish Straits and North Sea, and Russia will get it. Europe can't lock Russia in a bottleneck of the Baltic ports forever. If that requires the collapse of NATO, Russia intends to bring that and won't stop until it do that. Thankfully, NATO has many enemies in the world besides Russia, and we have someone to form alliance with.

I'm not diplomat and therefore I'll be blunt – Russia will make Europe be skewered on the gas needle, and thereby will have Europe by the throat, no matter how hard Europe tries to get out. After that, Russia will not care about European objections regarding Ukraine's fate and will do whatever it need to do, at the same time giving Europeans a chance to save their faces. Ukraine won't get any chances to save anything, this is its karma. Also Russia will kick United States out of Europe even if it takes 200 years and requires the alliance with China.

I'm not diplomat and therefore I'll be blunt – Russia will do everything to destroy USA, firstly in reputational aspect and then in economic and military aspects. Russia will not condone an existence of USA as USA will not condone an existence of Russia. All horrible things what Russia will be able to do to USA, Russia will surely do. Those things what Russia will not be able to do, Russia will do later but will do it certainly – no one should have any illusions.
|author=Alexander Khaldey
|source=in the 2018 "Zavtra" magazine article.<ref>{{cite magazine|date=5 March 2018|title=Александр Халдей. Я не дипломат и потому скажу прямо|language=ru|magazine=Zavtra.ru|url=https://zavtra.ru/blogs/ya_ne_diplomat_i_potomu_skazhu_pryamo_}}</ref>
}}
  </div>
</div>

Piontkovsky considers that Putin's strategical purposes are following: 1) the installation of Russian military and political control under post-Soviet area and, perhaps, [[Central Europe]]; 2) the discrediting of [[NATO]] as unable to protect its members; 3) the entrenching Russia's sphere of interest in [[Europe]] through new [[Yalta Conference|"Yalta Agreement"]] with humiliated [[United States|USA]]. These goals should be achieved through 3 elements:<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Piontkovsky|first=Andrey|author-link=Andrey Piontkovsky|date=17 February 2020|title=Без обнажения меча. Андрей Пионтковский – о "доктрине Помпео"|language=ru|magazine=[[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty|Radio Liberty]]|url=https://www.svoboda.org/a/30436948.html}}</ref>
* [[Valery Gerasimov|Gerasimov]] doctrine of hybrid war
* [[Nikolai Patrushev|Patrushev]] doctrine of nuclear blackmail
* Russian traditional despising an own citizens lives that provides an advantage over "hedonistic [[Western culture|West]]"
The Gerasimov doctrine<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Gerasimov|first=Valery|author-link=Valery Gerasimov|date=27 February 2013|editor-last=Khodarenok|editor-first=Mikhail|title=Ценность науки в предвидении|trans-title=Value of science lies in foresight|language=ru|magazine=Военно-промышленный курьер|volume=8|trans-magazine=Military-industrial courier|location=Moscow|issue=476|pages=1–3}}</ref> enunciates wide use of so-called non-linear warfare and reflexive control (propaganda, cyberattacks, diplomatic actions, economic instruments, bribing foreign public officials, etc.); specifically fighting are carried out by special forces and mercenaries under the guise of local partisans. This doctrine declares that non-military tactics are not auxiliary to the use of force but the preferred way to win; that they are, in fact, the actual war.<ref>{{cite magazine|last=McKew|first=Molly K|date=1 September 2017|editor-last=Heuser|editor-first=Stephen|title=The Gerasimov Doctrine|magazine=Politico Magazine|location=Arlington, Virginia|volume=4|issue=5|issn=2381-1595}}</ref> The difference between Gerasimov doctrine and Western views of hybrid conflict is that Russian doctrine combines both low-end, hidden state involvement with high-end, direct, even braggadocio superpower involvement.<ref>{{cite magazine|last1=Karber|first1=Phillip|last2=Thibeault|first2=Joshua|date=June 2016|editor-last=Maze|editor-first=Rick|title=Russia's new-generation warfare|magazine=ARMY Magazine|location=Arlington, Virginia|volume=66|issue=6|pages=60–64|issn=0004-2455}}</ref> Russian hybrid warfare conduct aims to create a "hallucinating fog of war" and consistent deception that aims not to paralyze the West's intelligence and anticipatory capabilities, but to alter Western analytical end-results and perceptions of Russia's strategic intentions.<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Kasapoglu|first=Can|date=November 2015|title=Russia's Renewed Military Thinking: Non-Linear Warfare and Reflexive Control|magazine=Research Paper|location=Roma|issue=121|issn=2076-0949}}</ref> The Gerasimov doctrine has been directly applied by Russia in the [[Russo-Ukrainian War]].<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Jones|first=Sam|date=29 August 2014|title=Ukraine: Russia's new art of war|language=en|magazine=[[Financial Times]]|url=https://www.ft.com/content/ea5e82fa-2e0c-11e4-b760-00144feabdc0}}</ref>
[[File:Military exercises Center-2019-07.jpg|thumb|Putin with members of the '[[Young Army Cadets National Movement|Yunarmiya]]' - or Young Army. The Young Army movement is the Kremlin's attempt to mobilize and provide basic military skills to [[Russian youth]].]]
The essence of the Patrushev doctrine boils down to "de-escalation through nuclear escalation". Russia would cause a direct military conflict against NATO in any region outside Russian territory, for example in the [[Baltic States]], avoiding the use of weapons of mass destruction. At first, Russia would succeed, using an element of surprise, but later a turning point in the war would be achieved to the benefit of NATO. At that time, Russia would threaten to use nuclear weapons, and if the threats do not succeed, Russia would launch a limited nuclear strike on targets in [[Europe]]. If the [[Western culture|West]] decide to make a limited nuclear retaliatory strike, then Russia would make a larger nuclear strike on targets in [[Europe]] and [[United States|USA]]. Kremlin strategists believe that the [[Western culture|West]] would flinch first, giving up to "strong-willed Russia", and would agree to end the war on Putin's terms.<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Piontkovsky|first=Andrey|author-link=Andrey Piontkovsky|date=15 April 2019|title=Второе пришествие. Андрей Пионтковский – с тревожными прогнозами|language=ru|magazine=[[Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty|Radio Liberty]]|url=https://www.svoboda.org/a/29879125.html}}</ref> American response to Russian Patrushev doctrine has been so-called [[Mike Pompeo|Pompeo]] doctrine,<ref>{{cite web|last=Jushkin|first=Vladimir|date=5 June 2020|title=Pompeo vs Patrushev. Vladimir Jushkin – about "Patrushev doctrine" and arms race|language=en|publisher=ICDS.ee|url=https://icds.ee/en/pompeo-vs-patrushev/}}</ref> the major standpoints of which were set out in the 2018 US National Defense Strategy, in which for the first time since the end of the Cold War Russia was designated as a global power and principal opponent of the [[United States|USA]]. The 2018 Nuclear Posture Review declared that the key objective of U.S. nuclear policy is to dissuade Russia from its mistaken impression that a first-use of nuclear weapons by Russia in a conflict would de-escalate the conflict with terms favorable to Russia.<ref>{{cite web|last=Ryan|first=Kevin|date=5 February 2018|title=Making Sense of the U.S. National Defense Strategy|language=en|publisher=[[Carnegie Moscow Center]]|url=https://carnegie.ru/commentary/75434}}</ref> As in the Cold War times, the [[Arctic]] can be the area of potential NATO-Russia conflict.<ref>{{cite magazine|last=Klare|first=Michael|date=11 February 2020|title=A World War Could Break Out in the Arctic|magazine=[[The Nation]]|url=https://www.thenation.com/article/world/nato-russia-norway/}}</ref>

On March 7, 2024, American President [[Joe Biden]] given the [[2024 State of the Union Address]] where he compared Russia under Vladimir Putin to [[Adolf Hitler]]'s [[German-occupied Europe|conquests of Europe]].<ref>{{cite web |title=Biden compares Putin to Hitler as he makes the case for continued aid to Ukraine in SOTU address |url=https://www.yahoo.com/news/biden-compares-putin-hitler-makes-100000473.html |website=[[Yahoo!]], The New Voice of Ukraine |date=8 March 2024}}</ref>

=== Special operations outside Russian territory ===
{{See also|2014 Vrbětice ammunition warehouses explosions|Russian interference in the 2016 United States elections|2016 Montenegrin coup allegations|Poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal}}

== Ideology ==
[[File:Vladimir Putin at the Tavrida National Youth Educational Forum (2017-08-20) 07.jpg|thumb|Putin's trip to annexed [[Crimea]] in August 2017]]{{see also|Anti-American sentiment in Russia|Eurasianism|Putinism}}Political scientist Irina Pavlova said that [[Chekism|chekists]] were not merely a corporation of people united to expropriate financial assets as they had long-standing political objectives of transforming [[Moscow]] to the [[Third Rome]] and an [[ideology]] of "containing" the United States.<ref name="Pavlova">[http://www.grani.ru/Politics/Russia/President/m.128359.html Badly informed optimists], by Irina Pavlova, grani.ru</ref> Columnist [[George Will]] emphasized in 2003 the [[nationalism|nationalistic nature]] of Putinism: "Putinism is becoming a toxic brew of nationalism directed against neighboring nations, and populist envy, backed by assaults of state power, directed against private wealth. Putinism is a form of [[national socialism]] without the demonic element of [[Adolf Hitler|its pioneer]]".<ref>[http://www.jewishworldreview.com/cols/will121503.asp Democracy under siege]. [[George Will]]. 15 December 2003.</ref> According to Illarionov, the [[ideology]] of chekists is [[nashism]] ("ours-ism"), the selective application of rights.<ref name="Illarionov" />

According to [[Dmitri Trenin]] (2004), Head of the [[Carnegie Moscow Center]], the then Russia was one of the least ideological countries around the world: "Ideas hardly matter, whereas interests reign supreme. It is not surprising then that the worldview of Russian elites is focused on financial interests. Their practical deeds in fact declare In capital we trust". Trenin described Russia's elite involved in the process of policy-making as people who largely owned the country. Most of them were not public politicians, but the majority were bureaucratic capitalists. According to Trenin, "having survived in a ruthless domestic business and political environment, Russian leaders are well adjusted to rough competition and will take that mindset to the world stage". However, Trenin called Russian-Western relations, from Moscow's perspective, "competitive, but not antagonistic". He said that "Russia does not crave world domination, and its leaders do not dream of restoring the Soviet Union. They plan to rebuild Russia as a great power with a global reach, organized as a supercorporation".<ref name="Trenin">[http://carnegieendowment.org/2007/03/01/russia-redefines-itself-and-its-relations-with-west/3lz "Russia Redefines Itself and Its Relations with the West"], by [[Dmitri Trenin]]. ''[[The Washington Quarterly]]''. Spring 2007.</ref>

According to [[Dmitri Trenin|Trenin]], Russians "no longer recognize U.S. or European moral authority". He said that "from the Russian perspective, there is no absolute freedom anywhere in the world, no perfect democracy, and no government that does not lie to its people. In essence, all are equal by virtue of sharing the same imperfections. Some are more powerful than others, however, and that is what really counts".<ref name="Trenin" />

In the opinion of Russian [[Political science|political scientist]] [[Ekaterina Schulmann]], Putin's Russia practices "reverse cargo cult". In the original [[cargo cult]], straw-manure airplanes were built in the vain hope that these would attract real airplanes made of aluminium delivering "cargo", i.e. foreign-made good the cultists desired and could not produce themselves. In a reverse cargo cult, believers deny there are any real, functioning airplanes made of aluminium anywhere -- ''all'' airplanes are made of straw and manure. The difference between more successful and less successful nations (reverse cargo cultists insist) lies in the possibility or impossibility to hide this fact. Embracing a political reverse cargo cult, the Russian political elite agrees Russia has the straw-and-manure equivalent of real democracy (there are no free and transparent elections, independent court, etc.), but the only true difference between its imitation institutions and those of [[Western culture|Western countries]] is that the west has succeeded in "promoting" its governing system, deceiving the credulous and naive into thinking its democracy is "aluminum" and can actually fly.  Russia's inability to "promote itself" (Putin's elite insists) not only has nothing to do with the quality of its governance, but is in fact proof of Russia's "spirituality, ethical purity and moral integrity", in contrast to a "cynical, corrupt and deceitful" [[Western culture|West]].<ref>{{cite web|last=Schulmann|first=Ekaterina|author-link=Ekaterina Schulmann|date=22 January 2010|title=Соломенный самолёт|language=ru|url=https://users.livejournal.com/-niece/126963.html}}</ref><ref>{{cite magazine|last=Schulmann|first=Ekaterina|author-link=Ekaterina Schulmann|date=24 December 2014|title=Практический Нострадамус, или 12 умственных привычек, которые мешают нам предвидеть будущее|language=ru|magazine=[[Vedomosti]]|url=https://www.vedomosti.ru/opinion/articles/2014/12/24/prakticheskij-nostradamus}}</ref>

=== Russian nationalism ===
[[File:Обращение Президента Российской Федерации 2022-02-24.webm|thumb|Putin's [[On conducting a special military operation|address to the nation]] (with English captions) on 24 February 2022<ref>{{cite news |title=Full text: Putin's declaration of war on Ukraine |url=https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/full-text-putin-s-declaration-of-war-on-ukraine |publisher=[[The Spectator]] |date=24 February 2022}}</ref>]]
Some authors, such as [[Michael Hirsh (journalist)|Michael Hirsh]], have described Putin as a "messianic" [[Russian nationalism|Russian nationalist]] and Eurasianist.<ref>{{cite news |title=Putin's Thousand-Year War |url=https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/12/putins-thousand-year-war/ |work=Foreign Policy |date=12 March 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=The cocktail of ideologies behind Vladimir Putin |url=https://www.dw.com/en/the-cocktail-of-ideologies-behind-vladimir-putin/a-61242466 |work=Deutsche Welle |date=24 March 2022}}</ref><ref>{{cite news |title=The Grand Theory Driving Putin to War |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/22/opinion/russia-ukraine-putin-eurasianism.html |work=The New York Times |date=22 March 2022}}</ref>

Putin's views evolved over time. In his speech on 18 June 2004 at the international conference ''"Eurasian Integration: Trends of Modern Development and Challenges of Globalization"'', Putin said about the problems hindering integration: "I would say that these problems can be formulated very simply. This is great-power chauvinism, this is nationalism, this is the personal ambitions of those on whom political decisions depend, and, finally, this is just stupidity, ordinary cavemen's stupidity".<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=46438 |title=Putin: Obstacles for integration are great-power chauvinism, personal ambitions of some politicians and just stupidity |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071214081635/http://www.gazeta.kz/art.asp?aid=46438 |archive-date=14 December 2007 |url-status=dead}}</ref>

From around 2014, the Putin regime embraced [[Great Russian chauvinism]] and began to actively promote it.<ref>{{cite news |last1=Simpson |first1=Jeffrey |title=The return of Great Russian chauvinism |url=https://www.theglobeandmail.com/opinion/the-return-of-great-russian-chauvinism/article17298477/ |work=The Globe and Mail |date=5 March 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |date=26 February 2022 |title=Putin's Anti-Bolshevik Fantasies Could Be His Downfall|url=https://www.jacobinmag.com/2022/02/putin-anti-bolshevik-tsarist-mythic-history-ukraine|author-last=Kessler|author-first=Mario|access-date=11 March 2022 |work=Jacobin}}</ref> In July 2021, Putin published an essay titled ''[[On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians]]'', in which he states that Belarusians, Ukrainians and Russians should be in one [[All-Russian nation]] as a part of the [[Russian world]] and are "one people" whom "forces that have always sought to undermine our unity" wanted to "divide and rule".<ref>{{cite web |last = Putin |first = Vladimir |author-link = Vladimir Putin |date = 12 July 2021 |title = Article by Vladimir Putin 'On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians' |url = http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181 |archive-url = https://web.archive.org/web/20220125053520/http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/66181 |archive-date = 25 January 2022 |website = The Kremlin |publisher = [[Government of Russia]]. }}</ref> 

In [[Address concerning the events in Ukraine|a speech on 21 February 2022]], following the escalation in the [[2021–2022 Russo-Ukrainian crisis]],<ref>{{cite web |date=2022-02-21 |title=Putin orders troops into eastern Ukraine on 'peacekeeping duties' |website=[[The Guardian]] |url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/21/ukraine-putin-decide-recognition-breakaway-states-today |archive-date=2022-02-23 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20220223175613/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/feb/21/ukraine-putin-decide-recognition-breakaway-states-today |url-status=live}}</ref> Putin made a number of claims about Ukrainian and Soviet history, including stating that modern Ukraine was created by the [[Bolsheviks]] in 1917 as part of a communist [[National delimitation in the Soviet Union|appeasement of nationalism]] of ethnic minorities in the former [[Russian Empire]], specifically blaming [[Vladimir Lenin]] for "detaching Ukraine from Russia".<ref>{{cite web|last=Gotev |first=Georgi |url=https://www.euractiv.com/section/global-europe/news/putins-world-selected-quotes-from-a-disturbing-speech/ |title=Putin's world: Selected quotes from a disturbing speech – |publisher=Euractiv.com |date= 22 February 2022}}</ref> Putin spoke of the "historic, strategic mistakes" that were made when in 1991 the USSR "granted sovereignty" to other [[Republics of the Soviet Union|Soviet republics]] on "historically Russian land" and called the entire episode "truly fatal".<ref>{{cite news |last1=JOFFRE |first1=TZVI |title=Russian parliament questions Lithuania's independence with new bill |url=https://www.jpost.com/international/article-709046 |date=9 June 2022}}</ref> He described Ukraine as being turned into the "anti-Russia" by the West.<ref>{{cite magazine |title=What the West Will Never Understand About Putin's Ukraine Obsession |url=https://time.com/6140996/putin-ukraine-threats/ |magazine=[[Time (magazine)|Time]] |date=22 January 2022}}</ref> 

On 24 February, Putin in a [[On conducting a special military operation|televised address]] announced a "special military operation" in Ukraine,<ref>{{cite news |title=Full text: Putin's declaration of war on Ukraine |url=https://www.spectator.co.uk/article/full-text-putin-s-declaration-of-war-on-ukraine |publisher=The Spectator (1828) Ltd |date=24 February 2022}}</ref> launching a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.<ref name=dwrus>{{cite news|publisher=Deutsche Welle|title=Russia launches massive invasion of Ukraine — live updates|date=24 February 2022|url=https://www.dw.com/en/russia-launches-massive-invasion-of-ukraine-live-updates/a-60893588}}</ref>

=== Rehabilitation of the Imperial Russia ===
It is claimed that Putin models himself on the [[Tsar]] [[Peter the Great]], whose reign is reminiscent of a Russian imperial greatness which the Kremlin is keen to promote. A presidential commission asked Putin in 2003 to grant the request of one of [[Nicholas II]]'s last surviving relatives to rehabilitate the [[House of Romanov]].<ref name="Romanov">{{cite web|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/dec/20/russia.nickpatonwalsh|title=Presidential commission says it has evidence which will absolve Nicholas II of crimes and rehabilitate the last tsarist family|work=[[The Guardian]]|date=20 December 2002|access-date=24 September 2015}}</ref> Willing to regain the imperial grandeur of Russia, Putin invited the Romanov imperial family to return to Russia in July 2015.<ref name="DN">{{cite news|url=https://www.dn.pt/inicio/pessoas/interior.aspx?content_id=4690935|title=Rússia quer trazer de novo os Romanov e voltar a ser o país dos czares (Russia wants to bring back the Romanovs and wants to become again the country of the Tsars.)|newspaper=[[Diário de Notícias]]|date=21 July 2015|access-date=24 September 2015|language=pt|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20150807143628/http://www.dn.pt/inicio/pessoas/interior.aspx?content_id=4690935|archive-date=7 August 2015|url-status=dead}}</ref> According to the presidential commission, this move would represent a significant final step in Russia's journey to embrace its [[Russian Empire|imperial]] history.<ref name="Romanov"/>

An alliance has been forged between the [[Russian Orthodox Church|Church]] and the Kremlin since Putin became President of the Russian Federation. An adherent of the [[Russian Orthodox Church]], Putin has allowed the regaining by the Orthodox Church of much of the importance that the Church had enjoyed in the Russian Empire and has won the enthusiastic support of its religious leaders.<ref name="Russian Orthodox Church">{{cite web|url=https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/1579638/Orthodox-Church-unholy-alliance-with-Putin.html|title=Orthodox Church unholy alliance with Putin|publisher=[[Telegraph Media Group|The Telegraph]]|date=23 February 2008|access-date=24 September 2015}}</ref>

American historian [[Stanley G. Payne]] argued that Putin's political system is "more a revival of the creed of Tsar [[Nicholas I of Russia|Nicholas I]] in the 19th century that emphasized 'Orthodoxy, autocracy, and nationality' than one resembling the revolutionary, modernizing regimes of Hitler and Mussolini."<ref>{{cite news |title=Nasty, Repressive, Aggressive -- Yes. But Is Russia Fascist? Experts Say 'No.' |url=https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-repressive-aggressive-not-fascist/31794918.html |work=Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty |date=9 April 2022}}</ref>

=== Rehabilitation of the Soviet Union ===
[[File:2018 Moscow Victory Day Parade 25.jpg|thumb|Putin at the [[2018 Moscow Victory Day Parade|Victory Day parade in Moscow]] on 9 May 2018 to commemorate the 73rd anniversary of the Soviet victory over [[Nazi Germany]] in the [[Great Patriotic War (term)|Great Patriotic War]]]]
[[File:Immortal Regiment in Moscow (2018-05-09) 11.jpg|thumb|Putin participating in the [[Immortal Regiment]], with participants holding the images of their relatives who fought in the War]]
Some commentators have said that current Putin holds many [[Neo-Sovietism|neo-Soviet]] views, especially concerning social policies, law and order and military strategic defense.<ref>Slade, G [http://www.sras.org/news2.phtml?m=633 Deconstructing the Millennium Manifesto: The Yeltsin-Putin Transition and the Rebirth of Ideology] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070926235109/http://www.sras.org/news2.phtml?m=633 |date=26 September 2007 }}. ''The School of Russian and Asian Studies''. 2005.</ref>

The first politically controversial step made by Putin, then the FSB Director, was restoring in June 1999 a memorial plaque to former Soviet leader and [[KGB]] director [[Yuri Andropov]] on the facade of the building, where the KGB had been headquartered.<ref>[http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/8260-14.cfm Andropov's Legacy in Putin's Foreign Policy]. [[The Jamestown Foundation]]. 18 June 2004. {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090212120251/http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/8260-14.cfm |date=12 February 2009 }}</ref>

In late 2000, Putin submitted a bill to the State Duma to use the [[National Anthem of the Soviet Union|Soviet national anthem]] as the new [[National anthem of Russia|Russian national anthem]]. The Duma voted in favor. The music remained identical, but new lyrics were written by the same author who wrote the Soviet lyrics.<ref>{{cite news |title=Russian Deputies Restore Soviet National Anthem (Published 2000) |work=The New York Times |date=9 December 2000 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20230327005404/https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/09/world/russian-deputies-restore-soviet-national-anthem.html |archive-date=2023-03-27 |url-status=live |url=https://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/09/world/russian-deputies-restore-soviet-national-anthem.html |last1=Tyler |first1=Patrick E. }}</ref>

In September 2003, Putin was quoted as saying: "The Soviet Union is a very complicated page in the history of our peoples. It was heroic and constructive, and it was also tragic. But it is a page that has been turned. It's over, the boat has sailed. Now we need to think about the present and the future of our peoples".<ref>[http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2003/09/19/1204_type82914type82915_52505.shtml Answers to Questions at a Press Conference following the CIS Summit] {{webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20120803052552/http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2003/09/19/1204_type82914type82915_52505.shtml |date=3 August 2012 }}. 19 September 2003.</ref>

In February 2004, Putin said: "It is my deep conviction that the dissolution of the Soviet Union was a national tragedy on a massive scale. I think the ordinary citizens of the former Soviet Union and the citizens in the [[Post-Soviet states|post-Soviet space]], the [[Commonwealth of Independent States|CIS countries]], have gained nothing from it. On the contrary, people have been faced with a host of problems." He went on to say, "Incidentally, at that period, too, opinions varied, including among the leaders of the Union republics. For example, [[Nursultan Nazarbayev]] was categorically opposed to the dissolution of the Soviet Union and he said so openly proposing various formulas for preserving the state within the common borders. But, I repeat, all that is in the past. Today we should look at the situation in which we live. One cannot keep looking back and fretting about it: we should look forward".<ref>[http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/02/12/0002_163321.shtml President Vladimir Putin's Answers to Questions During a Meeting with His Election Campaign Representatives] {{webarchive|url=https://archive.today/20120802234228/http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2004/02/12/0002_163321.shtml |date=2 August 2012 }}. 12 February 2004.</ref>

In April 2005, during his formal address to Russia's [[Federal Assembly (Russia)|Parliament]], President Putin said: "Above all, we should acknowledge that the collapse of the Soviet Union was a major geopolitical disaster of the century. As for the Russian nation, it became a genuine drama. Tens of millions of our co-citizens and compatriots found themselves outside Russian territory. Moreover, the epidemic of disintegration infected Russia itself".<ref>{{cite web |url=http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml |title=Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation |publisher=Kremlin.ru |access-date=24 March 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090524042631/http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2005/04/25/2031_type70029type82912_87086.shtml |archive-date=24 May 2009 }}</ref>

In December 2007, Putin said in the interview to the ''[[Time (magazine)|Time]]'' magazine: "Russia is an ancient country with historical, profound traditions and a very powerful moral foundation. And this foundation is a love for the Motherland and patriotism. Patriotism in the best sense of that word. Incidentally, I think that to a certain extent, to a significant extent, this is also attributable to the American people".<ref>[http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/12/19/1618_type82916_154779.shtml Interview with Time Magazine] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080306114451/http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2007/12/19/1618_type82916_154779.shtml |date=6 March 2008 }}. 19 December 2007.</ref>
[[File:Moscow rally 1 May 2012 19.JPG|thumb|[[Communist Party of the Russian Federation|Communist]] protesters with the sign: "The order of dismissal for Vladimir Putin for the betrayal of the strategic national interests", Moscow, 1 May 2012]]

In August 2008, ''The Economist'' claimed: "Russia today is ruled by the KGB elite, has a Soviet anthem, servile media, corrupt courts and a rubber-stamping parliament. A new history textbook proclaims that the Soviet Union, although not a democracy, was 'an example for millions of people around the world of the best and fairest society'".<ref name="IntellEc" />

In November 2008, ''[[International Herald Tribune]]'' stated:
<blockquote>The Kremlin in the Putin era has often sought to maintain as much sway over the portrayal of history as over the governance of the country. In seeking to restore Russia's standing, Putin and other officials have stoked a nationalism that glorifies Soviet triumphs while playing down or even whitewashing the system's horrors. As a result, throughout Russia, many archives detailing killings, persecution and other such acts committed by the Soviet authorities have become increasingly off-limits. The role of the security services seems especially delicate, perhaps because Putin is a former KGB agent who headed the agency's successor, the FSB, in the late 1990s.<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/11/26/europe/26archives.php |title=Purging history of Stalin's terror |work=International Herald Tribune |date=27 November 2008 |access-date=2 January 2009 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081203055420/http://www.iht.com/articles/2008/11/26/europe/26archives.php |archive-date=3 December 2008 }}</ref></blockquote>

Putin has an amicable relationship with [[Gennady Zyuganov]], the leader of [[Communist Party of the Russian Federation]] (KPRF).<ref>[http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/70505 Встреча с лидером КПРФ Геннадием Зюгановым (Meeting with the leader of KPRF Gennady Zyuganov]</ref><ref>{{cite news|last=Clover |first=Charles |url=http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/3c6abd0c-5309-11e1-8aa1-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2WMwq7eL5 |title=Kremlin has plan B for poll run-off |newspaper=Financial Times |publisher=Ft.com |date=9 February 2012 |access-date=24 March 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://kprf.ru/party_live/61739.html |title=Political Report of the CPRF Central Committee to the 13th Party Congress |publisher=Kprf.ru |date=5 December 2008 |access-date=24 March 2014}}</ref><ref>{{cite web |url=http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/rad-green/2001-November/001596.html |title=Russian Communist leader denounced Putin for US alliance |publisher=Lists.econ.utah.edu |date=9 November 2001 |access-date=24 March 2014 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20131021124152/http://lists.econ.utah.edu/pipermail/rad-green/2001-November/001596.html |archive-date=21 October 2013 }}</ref> Roger Boyes considers Putin more of a latter-day [[Leonid Brezhnev]] than a clone of Stalin.<ref>{{cite news|author=Last updated at 12:01AM, 6 December 2012 |url=http://www.thetimes.co.uk/tto/opinion/columnists/article3621837.ece |title=Roger Boyes considers Putin more of a latter-day Brezhnev than a clone of Stalin |work=The Times |date=6 December 2012 |access-date=24 March 2014}}</ref>

In August 2014, he rejected [[Vladimir Zhirinovsky]]'s proposal to return the Imperial flag and [[God Save the Tsar!|anthem]].<ref>{{cite news|title=Rosja powinna być monarchią, a Putin imperatorem|url=http://www.wprost.pl/ar/464562/Rosja-powinna-byc-monarchia-a-Putin-imperatorem/|access-date=24 August 2014|agency=wprost}}</ref>

On 30 October 2017, Putin opened the [[Wall of Grief]], the first Russian memorial dedicated to the victims [[Political repression in the Soviet Union|Stalinist repressions]]. It was seen as a gesture towards the Russian [[intelligentsia]].<ref>{{cite news|title=Wall of Grief: Putin opens first Soviet victims memorial |publisher=[[BBC News]]|url=https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-41809659|date=30 October 2017}}</ref>

=== Neo-Stalinism ===
[[File:Moscow rally 24 December 2011, Sakharov Avenue -13.JPG|thumb|Moscow rally in Sakharov Avenue, the top text says "You are on the right way, comrades!"<ref>''Note'': The phrase "Верной дорогой дорогой идете, товарищи! " is the title of a propaganda slogan of Lenin showing "the right way", widespread in the Soviet Union. (''Большой словарь русских поговорок'' (''The Larger Dictionary of Russian Sayings''), eds. В. М. Мокиенко, Т. Г. Никитина. Moscow. Олма Медиа Групп. 2007.)</ref> while the bottom text marks "Colonel Putin and Colonel [[Muammar Gaddafi|Gaddafi]]", 24 December 2011]]
In May 2000, ''[[The Guardian]]'' wrote: "When a band of former [[Soviet dissident]]s declared in February that Putinism was nothing short of modernised [[Stalinism]], they were widely dismissed as hysterical prophets of doom. 'Authoritarianism is growing harsher, society is being militarised, the military budget is increasing,' they warned, before calling on the West to 're-examine its attitude towards the Kremlin leadership, to cease indulging it in its barbaric actions, its dismantlement of democracy and suppression of human rights.' In the light of Putin's actions during his first days in power, their warnings have gained an uneasy new resonance".<ref>{{cite news|url=https://www.theguardian.com/world/2000/may/29/russia.ameliagentleman|title=Back to the USSR|newspaper=The Guardian|date=29 May 2000|access-date=24 February 2009 |location=London |first=Amelia |last=Gentleman}}</ref>

In February 2007, [[Arnold Beichman]], a conservative research fellow at the [[Hoover Institution]], wrote in ''[[The Washington Times]]'' that "Putinism in the 21st century has become as significant a watchword as Stalinism was in the 20th".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2007/feb/10/20070210-101939-5365r/|title=Regression in Russia|work=[[Washington Times]]|date=10 February 2009|access-date=24 February 2009}}</ref>

Also in 2007, Lionel Beehner, formerly a senior writer for the [[Council on Foreign Relations]], maintained that on Putin's watch [[nostalgia]] for Stalin had grown even among young Russians and Russians' [[neo-Stalinism]] manifesting itself in several ways.<ref>[http://www.cfr.org/publication/13697/ Russia's Soviet Past Still Haunts Relations with West] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081202063214/http://www.cfr.org/publication/13697/ |date=2 December 2008 }} by Lionel Beehner. [[Council on Foreign Relations]]. 29 June 2007.</ref>

In February 2007, responding to a listener's assertion that "Putin had steered the country to Stalinism" and "all entrepreneurs" were being jailed in Russia, the [[Russian opposition]] radio host [[Yevgeniya Albats]] said: "Come on, this is not true; there is no Stalinism, no concentration camps—thankfully". She went on to say that if citizens of the country would not be critical of what was occurring around them, referring to the "orchestrated, or genuine" calls for the "[[tsar]] to stay on", that "could blaze the trail for very ugly things and a very tough regime in our country".<ref>[http://www.echo.msk.ru/programs/albac/55902/ "Full Albats"]. [[Ekho Moskvy]]. [[Yevgeniya Albats]]. 28 October 2007. (in Russian)</ref>

=== Ideology as "State First" ===
While some might argue that Putin's leadership does not reflect an ideology, Chris Miller has discerned three beliefs which are consistent with Putin's announcements and account for his actions. This three-part ideology must be understood in the context of the history of Russia and of Putin himself. When Putin began his political career, the Soviet Union was unable to effectively collect taxes or provide services in part due to inadequate governmental control of the empire. Putin believed that the government needed to first establish strong centralized control of the empire. To maintain that central control has always been his highest priority. Second, to keep the populace supportive of his government and thus to prevent revolt, Putin believes that the key is rising wages and pensions. In that way, he maintains enough of a popular base that the populace tends to tolerate other problems. Third, economic progress depends heavily on private enterprises but only so long as those enterprises do not interfere with either central government control or rising salaries and pensions. When a private enterprise threatens either belief one or two, then the government takes control of the enterprise so that the enterprise supports beliefs one and two. These three beliefs are not followed without some compromises, but Miller argues that these beliefs help explain the behavior of Putin.<ref name="Miller2018">{{Cite book |first=Chris |last=Miller |title= Putinomics: Power and Money in Resurgent Russia |year=2018 |publisher=University of North Carolina Press |isbn= 978-1469640662 |page=217}}</ref>

== Criticism ==

=== Personality cult ===
[[File:PresidentPutin.JPG|thumb|Satirical cartoon about Putin's influence on the media]]

In June 2001, the [[BBC]] noted that a year after Putin took office, the Russian media had been reflecting on what some saw as a growing [[personality cult]] around him: Russia's [[TV-6 (Russia)|TV-6]] television had shown a vast choice of portraits of Putin on sale at a shopping mall in an underground passage near Moscow's Park of Culture.<ref>[http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/not_in_website/syndication/monitoring/media_reports/1390283.stm Private enterprise meets personality cult.] [[BBC]]. 15 June 2001.</ref>

In October 2007, some scenes at the United Russia congress caused Belarus President [[Alexander Lukashenko]], who was allied to Russia within the "[[Union State]]", to recall the Soviet times, complete with the official adoration towards the Communist Party leader and talking to Russia's regional press representatives he said that in Russia {{ill|Putin's personality cult|ru|Культ личности Путина}} was being created.<ref>{{in lang|ru}} [http://www.lenta.ru/news/2007/10/12/luka/ Лукашенко обнаружил в России культ личности Путина]. ("Lukashenko has discovered Putin's personality cult in Russia"). 12 October 2007.</ref>

In 2008, the [[Paris]]-based [[Agence France-Presse|AFP]] reported that ahead of the December parliamentary and March presidential elections, in which despite being required by the constitution to leave office, Putin was widely expected to find some way to retain power as his personality cult was gathering pace.<ref>[http://www.haaba.com/news-story/putin-personality-cult-gathers-pace-ahead-election Putin personality cult gathers pace ahead of election.] [[Agence France-Presse|AFP]]. 15 October 2007. {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20080511183405/http://www.haaba.com/news-story/putin-personality-cult-gathers-pace-ahead-election |date=11 May 2008 }}</ref>

After Medvedev was elected president in March 2008, [[Federal government of the United States|United States government]]-funded [[Radio Liberty]] reported that during his eight-year presidency Putin had managed to build a personality cult around himself similar to those created by Soviet leaders. Although there had not been giant statues of Putin put up across the country (like those of Stalin before), he had the honor of being the only Russian leader to have had a pop song written about him: "[[Takogo kak Putin|A man like Putin]]", which hit the charts in 2002.<ref>[http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1079604.html Russia: Can Medvedev Create Putin-Style Personality Cult?]. [[Radio Liberty]]. 7 March 2008.</ref>

The formation and promotion of the Putin's personality cult have been provoking opposition political figures reactions, pointing out the negative changes in Putin's mentality. For example, in April 2014, in an interview with journalists [[Boris Nemtsov]] called Putin a mental patient. This statement was used as the basis for initiation of criminal proceeding against Nemtsov but, eventually, the case was requalified to administrative offence.<ref>{{cite news|last=Kichanova|first=Vera|date=6 October 2014|title=Немцов избежал уголовного преследования за мат в адрес Путина|language=ru|work=Republic.ru|url=https://republic.ru/posts/l/1167356}}</ref> In 2016, an application, requiring Putin's [[mental health]] check-ups and the termination his [[President of Russia|presidential authority]] on his [[Mental disorder|mental illness]] ground under the procedure provided for in the article 92 of the [[Constitution of Russia]], was lodged with [[Prime Minister of Russia]]. The negative response to this request was appealed to the court but the administrative claim was dismissed in 2017.<ref>{{cite news|author=<!--Staff writer(s)/no by-line.-->|date=17 July 2017|title=Новосибирец пытался добиться проверки психического здоровья Путина|language=ru|work=[[Kasparov.ru]]|url=https://www.kasparov.ru/material.php?id=596C8B9DD5714}}</ref>

In an interview with Spanish newspaper ''[[El País]]'', Russian opposition politician [[Alexei Navalny]] said that "It is difficult for me to understand exactly what is going on in [Putin's] mind. ... 20 years of power would spoil anyone and make them crazy. He thinks he can do whatever he wants."<ref>{{cite news |title=Alexey Navalny: 'I have no doubt that Putin gave the order to poison me' |url=https://english.elpais.com/international/2020-12-14/alexei-navalny-i-have-no-doubt-that-putin-gave-the-order-to-poison-me.html |work=El País |date=14 December 2020}}</ref>

=== FSB influence ===
[[File:Vladimir Putin 18 January 2002-2.jpg|thumb|right|Putin and [[Nikolai Patrushev]] at a meeting of the board of the Federal Security Service]]
According to some scholars,<ref name="Takeover">[https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600500483699 The Chekist Takeover of the Russian State], Julie Anderson, ''International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence'', Volume 19, Issue 2, May 2006, pages 237–288.</ref><ref name="Anderson">[https://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600601079958 The HUMINT Offensive from Putin's Chekist State] Julie Anderson, ''International Journal of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence'', Volume 20, Issue 2, June 2007, pages 258–316.</ref> Russia under Putin has been transformed into an "[[Federal Security Service (Russia)|FSB]] state".

Shortly after becoming Russian Prime Minister, Putin was reported to have joked to a group of his KGB associates: "A group of FSB colleagues dispatched to work undercover in the government has successfully completed its first mission".<ref name="Paddock">{{cite web|url=https://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/latimes/access/47922334.html?dids=47922334:47922334&FMT=ABS&FMTS=ABS:FT&type=current&date=Jan+12%2C+2000&author=RICHARD+C.+PADDOCK&pub=Los+Angeles+Times&edition=&startpage=1&desc=COLUMN+ONE |title=''The KGB Rises Again in Russia'' – by R.C. Paddock – ''Los Angeles Times''. 12 January 2000 |publisher=Pqasb.pqarchiver.com |date=12 January 2000 |access-date=24 March 2014}}</ref><ref>[http://www.thefreelibrary.com/Putin's+personality+cult:+The+real+Vladimir+Putin+--+career+KGB...-a084650472 Putin's personality cult: The real Vladimir Putin — career KGB officer and figurehead for a vast criminal collective — is disguised by the Kremlin myth of his popularity as a pro-Western national hero of Russia]. 8 April 2002.</ref>

The former [[Securitate]] [[Lieutenant General]] and [[defector]] [[Ion Mihai Pacepa]] wrote in [[National Review Online]] in 2006 that former KGB officers were running Russia and that FSB had the right to monitor the population electronically, control political process, search private property, cooperate with employees of the federal government, create [[Front organization|front enterprises]], investigate cases and run its own prisons.<ref name="Pacepa0">[http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MzY4NWU2ZjY3YWYxMDllNWQ5MjQ3ZGJmMzg3MmQyNjQ= The Kremlin's Killing Ways] – by Ion Mihai Pacepa, National Review Online. 28 November 2006 {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070808171854/http://article.nationalreview.com/?q=MzY4NWU2ZjY3YWYxMDllNWQ5MjQ3ZGJmMzg3MmQyNjQ= |date=8 August 2007 }}</ref>

Various 2006 estimates showed that Russia had above 200,000 members of the FSB, or one FSB employee for every 700 citizens of Russia (the exact number of the overall FSB staff is [[classified information|classified]]).<ref>[http://www.ng.ru/politics/2006-01-27/2_stolica.html FSB will get new members, the capital will get new land], by Igor Plugataryov and Viktor Myasnikov, [[Nezavisimaya Gazeta]], 2006, (in Russian)</ref> The [[Russian Armed Forces]] [[General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation|General Staff]] as well as its subordinate structures, such as the Russian [[Strategic Missile Troops]] headquarters, are not submitted to the Federal Security Service,<ref>[http://www.mil.ru/eng/ Russian Armed Forces], official site (in English) {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071014000345/http://www.mil.ru/eng/ |date=14 October 2007 }}</ref> but the FSB might be interested in monitoring such structures as they intrinsically involve state secrets and various degrees of admittance to them.<ref>{{in lang|ru}} [http://www.fsb.ru/under/secret.html Law on State Secrets], 1997 edition {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071024195605/http://www.fsb.ru/under/secret.html |date=24 October 2007 }}</ref> The Law on Federal Security Service<ref name="fsblaw">{{in lang|ru}} [http://www.fsb.ru/under/pologen.html Law about the Organs of the Federal Security Service] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070905010445/http://www.fsb.ru/under/pologen.html |date=5 September 2007 }}</ref> which defines its functions and establishes its structure does not involve such tasks as managing strategic branches of national industry, controlling political groups, or infiltrating the federal government.<ref name="fsblaw" />

In 2006, political scientist Julie Anderson wrote: "Under Russian Federation President and former career foreign intelligence officer Vladimir Putin, an 'FSB State' composed of [[Chekism|chekists]] has been established and is consolidating its hold on the country. Its closest partners are [[organized crime|organized criminals]]. In a world marked by a [[globalization|globalized economy]] and information infrastructure, and with [[List of designated terrorist organizations|transnational terrorism groups]] utilizing all available means to achieve their goals and further their interests, [[Foreign Intelligence Service (Russia)|Russian intelligence]] collaboration with these elements is potentially disastrous".<ref name="Takeover" />

[[File:Yulia Navalny, Alexey Navalny and Ilya Yashin at Moscow rally 2013-06-12.JPG|thumb|Russia's opposition politician [[Alexey Navalny]] accused the FSB of being behind his poisoning.]]
Russian historian [[Yuri Felshtinsky]] compared the takeover of the Russian state by the ''siloviki'' to an imaginary scenario of the [[Gestapo]] coming to power in [[Germany]] after [[World War II]]. He pointed out a fundamental difference between the [[secret police]] and ordinary [[political parties]], even [[totalitarianism|totalitarian]] ones, such as the [[Communist Party of the Soviet Union]], i.e. Russia's secret police organizations are wont to employ the so-called [[active measures]] and [[extrajudicial killing]]s, hence they killed [[Alexander Litvinenko]] and directed [[Russian apartment bombings]] and other terrorism acts in Russia to frighten the civilian population and achieve their political objectives, according to Felstinsky.<ref>[http://www.c-span.org/video/?200627-1/book-discussion-blowing-russia-secret-plot Blowing Up Russia: The Secret Plot to Bring Back KGB Terror]. Historian [[Yuri Felshtinsky]] explains his views on the nature of Putinism on [[C-SPAN]].</ref>

In April 2006, [[Reuel Marc Gerecht]], a former [[Middle East]] specialist at the [[Central Intelligence Agency]] (CIA), presented a list of those who had "mysteriously" died during Putin's presidency and wrote: "Vladimir Putin's Russia is a new phenomenon in Europe: a state defined and dominated by former and active-duty security and intelligence officers. Not even [[Fascism|fascist]] [[Italy]], [[Nazi Germany]], or the Soviet Union – all undoubtedly much worse creations than Russia – were as top-heavy with intelligence talent. [...] There is no historical precedent for a society so dominated by former and active-duty internal-security and intelligence officials – men who rose up in a professional culture in which murder could be an acceptable, even obligatory, business practice. [...] Those who operated within the Soviet sphere were the most malevolent in their practices. These men mentored and shaped Putin and his closest friends and allies. It is therefore unsurprising that Putin's Russia has become an [[assassination]]-happy state where detention, interrogation, and torture – all tried and true methods of the Soviet KGB – are used to silence the voices of untoward journalists and businessmen who annoy or threaten Putin's FSB state".<ref>[http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.25917/pub_detail.asp A Rogue Intelligence State? Why Europe and America Cannot Ignore Russia] by Reuel Marc Gerecht. 6 April 2007. {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070914154832/http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.25917/pub_detail.asp |date=14 September 2007 }}</ref>

One of the leading members of Putin's ruling elite, [[Nikolai Patrushev]], Director of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation (August 1999–May 2008) and subsequently Secretary of the [[Security Council of Russia]], was known for his propagation of the idea of "chekists" as "neo-aristocrats" ({{lang-ru|неодворяне}}).<ref>{{in lang|ru}} [http://kp.ru/daily/22458/7028/ Директор Федеральной службы безопасности России Николай Патрушев: Если мы «сломаемся» и уйдем с Кавказа – начнется развал страны]. Patrushev's interview to ''[[Komsomolskaya Pravda]]''. 20 December 2000.</ref><ref>{{in lang|ru}} [http://txt.newsru.com/russia/06nov2007/imperia.html В России уже почти 15 тысяч "новых дворян": Ксения Собчак, Алексий II, Николай Патрушев]. [[NEWSru]]. 6 November 2007.</ref><ref>{{in lang|ru}} [http://www.agentura.ru/forum/archive/2760.html «Неодворяне» перегрызлись] {{webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20120218134639/http://www.agentura.ru/forum/archive/2760.html |date=18 February 2012 }} by Alexander Golts 16 September 2006.</ref>

A report by [[Andrew Kuchins|Andrew C. Kuchins]] in November 2007 said: "The predominance of the intelligence services and mentality is a core feature of Putin's Russia that marks a major and critical discontinuity from not only the 1990s but all of Soviet and Russian history. During the Soviet period, the Communist Party provided the glue holding the system together. During the 1990s, there was no central organizing institution or ideology. Now, with Putin, it is "former" KGB professionals who dominate the Russian ruling elite. This is a special kind of brotherhood, a mafia-like culture in which only a few can be trusted. The working culture is secretive and nontransparent".<ref>[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/071214-russia_2017-web.pdf Alternative Futures for Russia to 2017]. A Report of the Russia and Eurasia Program, [[Center for Strategic and International Studies]]. November 2007. Page 5.</ref>

=== Cronyism and corruption ===
{{see also|Russian oligarch|Corruption in Russia}}
[[File:Nizhny Novgorod. Anti-Corruption Rally (26 March 2017).jpg|thumb|The [[Levada Center]] survey showed that 58% of surveyed Russians supported the [[2017–2018 Russian protests]] against high-level corruption.<ref>"[http://www.levada.ru/2017/06/13/aktsii-protesta-12-iyunya/ Акции протеста 12 июня]". [[Levada Centre]]. 13 June 2017.</ref>]]
Russia, under Putin's regime, has often been referred to as a [[kleptocracy]] and an [[oligarchy]].<ref>{{cite journal|last=Fish|first=M. Steven|title=What Has Russia Become?|jstor=26532689|journal=Comparative Politics|volume=50|number=3|date=April 2018|pages=327–346|publisher=[[City University of New York]]|location=New York City|doi=10.5129/001041518822704872}}</ref><ref>{{cite journal|last1=Guriev|first1=Sergei|last2=Rachinsky|first2=Andrei|title=The Role of Oligarchs in Russian Capitalism|year=2005|volume=19|number=1|journal=The Journal of Economic Perspectives|pages=131–150|publisher=[[American Economic Association]]|doi=10.1257/0895330053147994 |jstor=4134996|s2cid=17653502 |doi-access=free}}</ref> In 2000, Russia's [[political analyst]] [[Andrei Piontkovsky]] called Putinism "the highest and culminating stage of bandit capitalism in Russia".<ref>[http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/4094.html#1 Putinism: highest stage of robber capitalism], by [[Andrei Piontkovsky]]. ''The Russia Journal''. 7–13 February 2000. The title is an allusion to work "[[Imperialism]] as the last and culminating stage of capitalism" by [[Vladimir Lenin]] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070711235241/http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/4094.html#1 |date=11 July 2007 }}</ref> He said that "Russia is not corrupt. [[Political corruption|Corruption]] is what happens in all countries when businessmen offer officials large bribes for favors. Today's Russia is unique. The businessmen, the politicians, and the bureaucrats are the same people. They have [[Privatization in Russia|privatized]] the country's wealth and taken control of its financial flows".<ref>[http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=4852 Review of Andrei's Pionkovsky's ''Another Look Into Putin's Soul'' by the Honorable Rodric Braithwaite], [[Hoover Institute]] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20070927230557/http://www.hudson.org/index.cfm?fuseaction=publication_details&id=4852 |date=27 September 2007 }}</ref> According to scholar [[Karen Dawisha]], 110 of Putin's cronies control 35% of Russia's wealth.<ref>{{cite book|title=Putin's Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia?|url=https://books.google.com/books?id=TwWZBAAAQBAJ&q=%22democracy+for+decoration+rather+than+direction%22&pg=PA8|access-date=3 October 2015|date=30 September 2014|pages=8|last1=Dawisha|first1=Karen|isbn=978-1476795218|publisher=Simon and Schuster}}</ref>

In concluding her book ''A Russian Diary'' (2007), the Russian [[investigative journalist]] [[Anna Politkovskaya]] said: "Our state authorities today are only interested in making money. That is literally all they are interested in".<ref>[[Anna Politkovskaya]]. ''A Russian Diary'', Vintage Books, London, 2008, p. 300.</ref>

Such views were shared by politologist Julie Anderson who said the same person can be a Russian intelligence officer, an organized criminal and a businessman,<ref name="Takeover" /> who quoted the former CIA Director [[James Woolsey]] as saying: "I have been particularly concerned for some years, beginning during my tenure, with the interpenetration of Russian organized crime, Russian intelligence and [[Law enforcement in Russia|law enforcement]], and Russian business. I have often illustrated this point with the following hypothetical: If you should chance to strike up a conversation with an articulate, English-speaking Russian in, say, the restaurant of one of the luxury hotels along Lake Geneva, and he is wearing a $3,000 suit and a pair of Gucci loafers, and he tells you that he is an executive of a Russian trading company and wants to talk to you about a joint venture, then there are four possibilities. He may be what he says he is. He may be a Russian intelligence officer working under commercial cover. He may be part of a Russian organized crime group. But the really interesting possibility is that he may be all three and that none of those three institutions have any problem with the arrangement".<ref>(''Congressional Statement of R. James Woolsey, Former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, 21 September 1999, Hearing on the Bank of New York and Russian Money Laundering'')</ref>

[[File:Opening of the Crimean bridge (2018-05-15) 01.jpg|thumb|Putin's childhood friend [[Arkady Rotenberg]] is one of the richest people in Russia.<ref>{{cite news |title=Richest families in Russia as of July 15, 2020, based on assets |url=https://www.statista.com/statistics/1156415/richest-families-in-russia/ |work=Statista.com}}</ref>]]

In April 2006, Putin himself expressed extreme irritation about the ''de facto'' privatization of the customs sphere, where smart officials and entrepreneurs "merged in ecstasy".<ref>[http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2006-119-19.cfm Pavel K. Baev. Putin's fight against corruption resembles matryoshka doll] {{webarchive |url=https://web.archive.org/web/20071010044134/http://www.cdi.org/russia/johnson/2006-119-19.cfm |date=10 October 2007 }}</ref>

According to the estimates published in "Putin and Gazprom" by Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov, Putin and his friends pilfered assets of $80 billion from Gazprom during his second term as president.<ref>{{cite web|author=Anders Åslund |url=http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1016/42/373401.htm |title=Crisis Puts Putinomics to the Test |work=[[The Moscow Times]] |date=24 December 2008 |access-date=24 December 2008 |url-status=dead |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20081225193048/http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1016/42/373401.htm |archive-date=25 December 2008 |author-link=Anders Åslund }}</ref><ref>[http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=1086 Crisis Puts Putinomics to the Test] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090101071643/http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/opeds/oped.cfm?ResearchID=1086 |date=1 January 2009 }} Peterson Institute for International Economics</ref>

On 29 January 2009, Russian billionaire [[Alexander Lebedev]] claimed that Prime Minister Putin's strategy for economic recovery was based on cronyism and was fueling corruption and also said: "We have two Putins. There are lots of words, but the system doesn't work".<ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1009/42/374055.htm |archive-url=https://archive.today/20120918121928/http://www.themoscowtimes.com/article/1009/42/374055.htm |url-status=dead |archive-date=18 September 2012 |title=Lebedev Slams Putin's Anti-Crisis Strategy |work=[[The Moscow Times]] |date=30 January 2009 |access-date=3 February 2009 }}</ref>

In March 2017, [[Alexei Navalny]] and the [[Anti-Corruption Foundation]] published another in-depth investigation of properties and residences used by [[Dmitry Medvedev]] and his family. A report called ''[[He Is Not Dimon To You]]'' shows how Medvedev allegedly owns and controls large areas of land, villas, palaces, yachts, expensive apartments, wineries and estates through complicated ownership structures involving shell companies and foundations.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrwlk7_GF9g|script-title=ru:Он вам не Димон|publisher=[[Alexei Navalny]] on YouTube|access-date=5 April 2017|language=ru|archive-date=28 March 2017|archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170328021257/https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrwlk7_GF9g|url-status=live}}</ref> 

=== Nepotism ===
Russians critical of the [[2022 Russian mobilization]] have used social media and other electronic means (e.g. [[Twitter]]) to enquire en masse Russia's top officials and deputies, who supported [[Russo-Ukrainian War|war with Ukraine]] and mobilization, whether they themselves or their sons would go to the front. Most of them either refused to answer or gave excuses, such as Alexey Mishustin (premier [[Mikhail Mishustin]]'s son), ignored the citizens' questions (Moscow city council deputy Andrey Zyuganov, the grandson of [[Gennady Zyuganov]]) or blocked the person asking (e.g. [[Dmitry Rogozin]]'s reaction to the BBC question on Twitter, whether he has advised his son Alexey to volunteer)<ref>{{Cite web |date=22 September 2022 |title="У них есть более важные и срочные дела". Что отвечают чиновники и депутаты на предложение отправиться в военкомат |url=https://www.bbc.com/russian/features-62999426 |website=BBC News Russian |language=ru}}</ref> [[Nikolay Peskov]], the son of Putin's spokesman [[Dmitry Peskov]], told pranksters, who pretended to be recruitment officers, that he had no intention of going to war and would resolve the issue "on a different level."<ref>{{cite news |title=Pranksters called the son of one of Putin's closest allies and told him he is being enlisted in the army — but he refused |url=https://www.businessinsider.com/pranksters-tell-kremlin-officials-son-hes-being-enlisted-he-refused-2022-9 |work=Business Insider |date=22 September 2022}}</ref><ref name="draft-dodging"/> It was seen as an example of [[nepotism]] in Putin's Russia.<ref name="draft-dodging">{{cite news |title=Draft-dodging son of top Putin aide caught exempting himself from fighting in Ukraine war |url=https://fortune.com/2022/09/22/draft-dodging-son-top-putin-aide-dmitry-peskov-caught-exempting-himself-fighting-in-ukraine-war/ |work=Fortune |date=22 September 2022}}</ref>

=== Panama Papers ===
{{see also|Panama Papers}}
The [[Panama Papers]] revealed a network of secret offshore deals and vast loans worth $2bn (£1.4bn) that seem to lay a trail to Russia's President Vladimir Putin. The transactions include fake share deals; multimillion-dollar charges for vague "consultancy" services; and repeated payments of large sums in "compensation" for allegedly cancelled share deals and a $200m loan for $1. Though his name does not appear in any of the records, the data shows how deals that seemingly could not have been secured without his patronage made members of his close circle fabulously wealthy.<ref name="Guardian Putin">[https://www.theguardian.com/news/2016/apr/03/panama-papers-money-hidden-offshore Panama Papers: a special investigation: Revealed: the $2bn offshore trail that leads to Vladimir Putin]. ''The Guardian''. 3 April 2016.</ref> Putin's name does not appear in any of the records released to date, but those of his associates do. Construction billionaires [[Arkady Rotenberg|Arkady]] and [[Boris Romanovich Rotenberg|Boris Rotenberg]], musician [[Sergei Roldugin]], business magnate [[Alisher Usmanov]] and billionaire [[Gennady Timchenko]] are mentioned in the leaked documents.<ref name="Guardian Putin" />

=== Putin's Palace ===
{{Main|Putin's Palace}}
On 19 January 2021, the documentary film ''[[Putin's Palace (film)|Putin's Palace. History of World's Largest Bribe]]'' produced by the [[Anti-Corruption Foundation]] was released on [[YouTube]]. The film investigates the Residence at Cape Idokopas commonly known as [[Putin's Palace]] that it claims was constructed for President Vladimir Putin and details a corruption scheme allegedly headed by Putin involving the construction of the palace. The film estimates that the residence, located near the town of [[Gelendzhik]] in [[Krasnodar Krai]], cost over ₽100 billion (approximately $1.35 billion) with what it says was "the largest bribe in history".

The film ''[[Putin's Palace (film)|Putin's Palace. History of World's Largest Bribe]]'' is the best known but neither the first nor last investigation of the corruption scheme in the construction of the [[Putin's Palace|Residence at Cape Idokopas]].

=== Russian apartment bombings ===
{{Main|Russian apartment bombings}}
According to [[David Satter]], [[Yuri Felshtinsky]], [[Alexander Litvinenko]], [[Vladimir Pribylovsky]] and [[Boris Kagarlitsky]], the bombings were a successful [[false flag operation]] coordinated by the Russian state security services to win public support for a new full-scale war in Chechnya and to bring Putin to power.<ref name="Kagarlitsky">{{cite news |last1=Cockburn |first1=Patrick |title=Russia 'planned Chechen war before bombings' |url=https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-planned-chechen-war-before-bombings-727324.html |newspaper=Independent |access-date=14 September 2017 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20090827150331/http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/russia-planned-chechen-war-before-bombings-727324.html |archive-date=27 August 2009 |url-status=dead |date=29 January 2000}}</ref><ref name="DavidSatter">{{cite web |url=http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SatterHouseTestimony2007.pdf |title=David Satter&nbsp;– House committee on Foreign Affairs |access-date=29 January 2012 |url-status=dead |archive-url =https://web.archive.org/web/20110927065706/http://www.hudson.org/files/publications/SatterHouseTestimony2007.pdf |archive-date=27 September 2011}}</ref><ref name="Felshtinsky">{{Citation |last1=Felshtinsky |first1=Yuri |author-link1=Yuri Felshtinsky |last2=Pribylovsky |first2=Vladimir |author-link2=Vladimir Pribylovsky |title=The Age of Assassins. The Rise and Rise of Vladimir Putin |publisher=Gibson Square Books |place=London |isbn=978-1-906142-07-0 |url=https://www.theguardian.com/books/2008/apr/20/politics |date=20 April 2008 |access-date=23 May 2010 |pages=105–111}}</ref><ref name="Videoat">{{YouTube|PnkYo9TuBIQ}} ''In Memoriam Aleksander Litvinenko'', Jos de Putter, Tegenlicht documentary VPRO 2007, Moscow, 2004 Interview with [[Anna Politkovskaya]]</ref><ref name="Evangelista">{{Cite book |last=Evangelista |first=Matthew |title=Unarmed Forces: The Transnational Movement to End the Cold War |publisher=Cornell University Press |year=2002 |isbn=0-8014-8784-6 |page=81}}</ref><ref name="DidPutin">[https://web.archive.org/web/20080930094108/http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m1571/is_14_16/ai_61892243/print Did Putin's Agents Plant the Bombs?], Jamie Dettmer, [[Insight on the News]], 17 April 2000.</ref><ref name="Theconsolidation">’’The consolidation of Dictatorship in Russia’’ by [[Joel M. Ostrow]], [[Georgy Satarov|Georgiy Satarov]], [[Irina Khakamada]] p.96</ref><ref name="McCain">[https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=f4f5cf0c-9104-4b3f-8ebe-84f3dc24c51b McCain decries "new authoritarianism in Russia"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20170618030108/https://www.mccain.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/press-releases?ID=F4F5CF0C-9104-4B3F-8EBE-84F3DC24C51B |date=18 June 2017}}, [[John McCain]]'s press release, 4 November 2003</ref> <ref name=rew6>{{cite web |url=https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/electionbulletin1-00.doc |title=RUSSIAN ELECTION WATCH No. 6, January 2000 |author=<!--Not stated--> |date=January 2000 |website=[[Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs]] |publisher=Harvard University (John F. Kennedy School of Government) |access-date=29 October 2018 |archive-date=30 October 2018 |archive-url=https://web.archive.org/web/20181030014021/https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/electionbulletin1-00.doc |url-status=live}}</ref> Some of them described the bombings as typical "[[active measures]]" practised by the [[KGB]] in the past. The war in Chechnya boosted Prime Minister and former FSB Director Vladimir Putin's popularity, and brought the pro-war [[Unity (political party, Russia)|Unity Party]] to the [[State Duma]] and Putin to the presidency within a few months.

== See also ==
* [[Putinland]]
* [[Putinversteher]]
* [[Economy of Russia#Recovery and growth (1999–2008)|Recovery and growth of the Russian economy (1999–2008)]]
* [[Russian oligarch]]s
* [[Putinism]]
* [[History of the Russian Federation]]
* [[Political groups under Vladimir Putin's presidency]]
* [[Spain under Francisco Franco]]

== References ==
{{reflist|30em}}

==Further reading==
* Breslauer, George W. and Colton, Timothy J. 2017. ''[https://www.amacad.org/daedalus/russia-beyond-putin Russia Beyond Putin]''. [[Daedalus (journal)]].

==External links==
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wt_6mPxgUNI "Putinism: the ideology"] – 1:20 lecture by professor [[Anne Applebaum]] spoken in London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), recorded on Monday 28 January 2013.
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K9EVB5q0_SQ "Putinism and Russian Protest"] – 2:00 panel lecture/discussion in [[University of California Television]], published on 29 October 2012.
* [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ch7j8ldsiP8 "Can Putin Contain Post-Putinism?"] – 1:20 lecture at ICDS (International Centre for Defence Studies), published on 28 November 2012.
* Haroon, Agha Iqrar. [http://www.dispatchnewsdesk.com/the-putinist-approach-and-half-hearted-european-union-ukraine-is-a-story-of-a-beautiful-lady-being-loved-by-two-men/ "The "Putinist Approach" and "Half hearted" European Union—Ukraine is a story of a "Love Triangle" of a beautiful lady being loved by two men"] {{Webarchive|url=https://web.archive.org/web/20171230172553/https://www.dispatchnewsdesk.com/the-putinist-approach-and-half-hearted-european-union-ukraine-is-a-story-of-a-beautiful-lady-being-loved-by-two-men/ |date=30 December 2017 }} (4 December 2013).

Category:2000s in Russia
Category:2010s in Russia
Category:2020s in Russia
Category:Presidency of Russia
Category:History of Russia (1991–present)

==Sistema de Financiación Autonómica==

El '''Sistema de Financiación Autonómica''' (SFA) es el conjunto de normas que rigen la redistribución del presupuesto español entre las Comunidades de régimen foral, las Comunidades Autónomas de régimen común y las Ciudades autónomas. En total, redistribuye aproximadamente el 25 % del presupuesto español, mientras el gobierno central controla aproximadamente un 50 % del presupuesto y los ayuntamientos y las entidades locales otro 25 %. El actual modelo se aprobó en 2009 con arreglo a la ley 22/2009, de 18 de diciembre, por la que se regula el sistema de financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas de régimen común y Ciudades con Estatuto de Autonomía y se modifican determinadas normas tributarias. <ref>{{Cita web|url=https://www.boe.es/buscar/act.php?id=BOE-A-2009-20375|título=Ley 22/2009, de 18 de diciembre, por la que se regula el sistema de financiación de las Comunidades Autónomas de régimen común y Ciudades con Estatuto de Autonomía y se modifican determinadas normas tributarias|editorial=BOE|fecha=2009-12-19}}</ref> Desde 2023, el Ministerio de Hacienda cuenta con una propuesta de reforma surgida de la Comisión de Expertos del Comité Técnico Permanente de Evaluación (CTPE). <ref>{{Cita web|url=https://www.epe.es/es/activos/20211213/claves-sistema-financiacion-autonomica-12974831|título=El laberinto del reparto de los fondos para los servicios básicos|editorial=El Periódico de España|sitioweb=https://www.epe.es|fecha=2021-12-13}}</ref>

==References==
{{Reflist|2}}

== Distribución de la renta ==
{| cellpadding="1" style="float: right; border: 1px solid #88a; background: #f7f8ff; padding: 1px; font-size: 100%; margin: 0; width: 25%"
|-
|colspan=4|<center><big>Presupuestos de las '''[[Comunidad autónoma|Comunidades autónomas]]'''</big><br />'''Ingresos per cápita'''</center>
|- bgcolor=silver
! # !! <small>CCAA</small> !! Ingresos<br />([[2002]]) !! Ingr./pers.<br />([[2002]])
|-
| 1 || {{ESP|NC}} || align="right" | 4&nbsp;005&nbsp;305 || align="right" | 6&nbsp;255€
|-
| 2 || {{ESP|PV}} || align="right" | 10&nbsp;952&nbsp;490  || align="right" | 5&nbsp;054€
|-
| 3 || {{ESP|EX}} || align="right" | 4&nbsp;598&nbsp;370 || align="right" | 4&nbsp;268€
|-
| 4 || {{ESP|CB}} || align="right" | 2&nbsp;465&nbsp;473 || align="right" | 4&nbsp;240€
|-
| 5 || {{ESP|RI}} || align="right" | 1&nbsp;322&nbsp;628 || align="right" | 4&nbsp;231€
|-
| 6 || {{ESP|CT}} || align="right" | 29&nbsp;449&nbsp;783 || align="right" | 3&nbsp;958€
|-
| 7 || {{ESP|AS|Principado de Asturias}} || align="right" | 3&nbsp;921&nbsp;178 || align="right" | 3&nbsp;791€
|-
| 8 || {{ESP|GA}} || align="right" | 10&nbsp;257&nbsp;010 || align="right" | 3&nbsp;785€
|-
| 9 || {{ESP|CM}} || align="right" | 7&nbsp;564&nbsp;497 || align="right" | 3&nbsp;706€
|-
| 10 || {{ESP|IB}} || align="right" | 4&nbsp;240&nbsp;897 || align="right" | 3&nbsp;685€
|-
| 11 || {{ESP|CL}} || align="right" | 8.788.430 1&nbsp;107&nbsp;220 || align="right" | 3&nbsp;608€
|-
| 12 || {{ESP|AR}} || align="right" | 4.687.268 1&nbsp;308&nbsp;563 || align="right" | 3&nbsp;562€	
|-
| 13 || {{ESP|VC}} || align="right" | 17.354.885 1&nbsp;087&nbsp;778 || align="right" | 3&nbsp;517€
|-
| 14 || {{ESP|CN}} || align="right" | 7&nbsp;264&nbsp;829 || align="right" | 3&nbsp;371€
|-
| 15 || {{ESP|MC}} || align="right" | 4&nbsp;916&nbsp;213  || align="right" | 3&nbsp;338€
|-
| 16 || {{ESP|AN}} || align="right" | 18&nbsp;999&nbsp;333 || align="right" | 2&nbsp;536€ *
|-
| 17 || {{ESP|MD}} || align="right" | 7&nbsp;706&nbsp;192 || align="right" | 1&nbsp;367€ *
|-
|colspan=3|<center>'''[[Ciudad autónoma|Ciudades autónomas]]'''</center>
|-
| 18 || {{ESP|CE}} || align="right" | 266&nbsp;616 || align="right" | 3&nbsp;138€ 
|-
| 19 || {{ESP|ML}} || align="right" | 259&nbsp;582 || align="right" | 3&nbsp;014€
|-
|colspan=4|<small>* '''{{Versalita|fuente}}''': Datosmacro, 2018. En miles de euros.</small><ref>[https://datosmacro.expansion.com/estado/presupuestos/espana-comunidades-autonomas Tablas estadísticas de presupuestos de las CCAA de España]., en la web de Datosmacro, diario Expansión, consultada el 22 de agosto de 2018.</ref>
|}

{{otros usos}}
{{sucesión 
| título = [[Archivo:Escudo institucional de la Junta de Andalucía.svg|50px]]<br /> [[Premio Andalucía de la Crítica]] 
| predecesor =  [[Óscar Esquivias]]
| período = [[2007]]
| sucesor = [[Juan Manuel de Prada]]
}}

== Columnas ==

{{Columnas}}
* [[Ananá]]
* [[Fragaria|Frutilla]]
* [[Limón]]
{{Nueva columna}}
* [[Banana]]
* [[Manzana]]
* [[Melón]]
{{Nueva columna}}
* [[Naranja]]
* [[Pera]]
* [[Sandía]]
{{Final columnas}}

Columna al 50 %
{{Columnas|50%}}
* [[Ananá]]
* [[Fragaria|Frutilla]]
* [[Limón]]
{{Nueva columna}}
* [[Banana]]
* [[Manzana]]
* [[Melón]]
{{Nueva columna}}
* [[Naranja]]
* [[Pera]]
* [[Sandía]]
{{Final columnas}}

== Wikitabla ==
{| class="wikitable col1der col2cen col3izq col4der"
| Columna 1 a la derecha
| &nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;Columna&nbsp;2&nbsp;centrada&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp;&nbsp; <!-- los nbsp para que sea más ancha -->
| Columna 3 a la izquierda
| Columna 4 a la derecha 
|-
| abcde || abcde || abcde || abcde
|-
| fghij
| style="text-align:left" | alineación “sobreseída”
| fghij
| fghij
|}

{{Ficha de documento
|nombre_documento         = [[Edad de los Metales]]
|imagen                   = Copper tongue dagger (Bellbeaker).png
|ancho_imagen             = 60px
|leyenda_imagen           = <big>[[Edad del Cobre]]</big><br /><big>[[Edad del Bronce]]</big><br /><big>[[Edad del Hierro]]</big><br />
|función                  =
}}

{{Ficha de documento
|nombre_documento         = <small><small>Este artículo forma parte de la serie</small></small><br /><big>'''Historia de Brasil'''</big>
|imagen                   = Coat of arms of Brazil.svg
|ancho_imagen             = 90px
|leyenda_imagen           = <big>[[Constitución brasileña de 1824|Era pré-cabralina]]</big><br /><big>[[Colonización de Brasil|Período colonial (1530–1815)]]</big><br /><big>[[Reino Unido de Portugal, Brasil y Algarve|Reino Unido de Portugal, Brasil<br />y Algarve (1815–1822)]]</big><br /><big>[[Império do Brasil|Imperio del Brasil (1822–1889)]]</big><br /><big>[[República Velha|Primera República (1889–1930)]]</big><br /><big>[[Era Vargas|Era Vargas (1930–1945)]]</big><br /><big>[[Cuarta República brasileña|Cuarta República (1946–1964)]]</big><br /><big>[[Dictadura militar en Brasil|Dictadura militar (1964–1985)]]</big><br /><big>[[Sexta República brasileña|Sexta República (1985–actualidad)]]</big><br /><big>[[Constitución brasileña|Constitución]]</big><br />
|función                  =
}}

== La generación de la Democracia ==
Con el término '''generación de la Democracia''' se denomina a un conjunto de intelectuales y escritores españoles del siglo xx que se dio a conocer en el panorama cultural alrededor de 1975, coincidiendo con la irrupción de la joven democracia española. España, que acababa de salir de una [[Dictadura franquista|dictadura]] de 40 años que comenzó con una [[Guerra civil española|guerra fratricida]], atravesó una difícil [[Transición política]] tras la muerte de dictador [[Francisco Franco]]. En puridad, la naciente Democracia española surgió con la aprobación de la [[Constitución de 1978]]. Sin embargo, desde los primeros años de la década de 1970 se instala en el panorama intelectual y político un grupo de personas que van a protagonizar los cambios trascendentales del país, ejemplo de transición pacífica donde los haya. 

En general, se puede afirmar que la Democracia española hubo de superar innumerables obstáculos n un corto plazo de tiempo. En efecto, legalizados los partidos de la oposición al régimen franquista, fundamentalmente [[PSOE]] y [[Partido Comunista de España]], en la primavera de 1978, y convocadas las primeras elecciones democráticas en España desde 1936 para el día 15 de junio de 1977, los nuevos partidos políticos españoles se movilizaron en poco tiempo para cerrar las heridas de 40 años de dictadura. 

El nuevo Parlamento, tomó la decisión de elaborar una Constitución que uniera la joven democracia española con la Constitución de 1931. Esa Constitución fue aprobada [[Constitución de 1978]] en diciembre de 1978

La literatura ha de superar aún viejos resabios de la poesía ''novísima''. Entre 1980 y 2000 esta nueva generación novelística ha dado nombres como: [[Javier Marías]].<ref>{{Cita web|url=https://www.elmundo.es/cultura/2014/05/30/53875572e2704eb2648b4576.html|título=1989-2014: las 25 mejores novelas|editorial=El Mundo|fecha=30 de mayo de 2014}}</ref>

=== Pensamiento ===
Los elegidos, quizá en representación de una nómina que podría ser más amplia, son [[Rafael Argullol]], [[Adela Cortina]], [[Félix Duque]], [[Javier Echevarría]], [[Víctor Gómez Pin]], [[José Jiménez]], [[Miguel Morey]], [[Javier Sádaba]] y [[Eugenio Trías]].<ref>{{Cita web|url=https://www.elcultural.com/revista/letras/La-generacion-de-la-democracia/4833|título=La generación de la democracia|editorial=El Cultural. Diario El Mundo|fecha=22 de mayo de 2002}}</ref>

===Poesía===
La generación de los Novísimos, con [[Pere Gimferrer]] a la cabeza, se integra a la perfección en esa generación de la Democracia que aúna poesía, novela y arte. 

===Referencias===
{{Listaref}}

== Bibliografía ==
* [[Paul Preston]] : ''Franco: caudillo de España''. Barcelona : Círculo de Lectores, 1994. {{ISBN|84-226-5204-8}}.
* [[Paul Preston]] : ''Franco: a biography''. London : HarperCollins, 1993. {{ISBN|0-00-215863-9}}

== Organização ==
Do ponto de vista da sua competência organizativa interna, compete ao Tribunal Constitucional eleger o seu Presidente e Vice-Presidente, elaborar os regulamentos internos necessários ao seu bom funcionamento, aprovar a proposta de orçamento anual, fixar no início de cada ano o calendário das suas sessões ordinárias e exercer outras competências atribuídas por lei.

O Presidente e Vice-Presidente são eleitos pelos juízes do Tribunal Constitucional, por voto secreto, sem discussão ou debate prévios, em sessão presidida, na falta de um e outro, pelo juiz mais antigo e secretariada pelo mais novo. É eleito Presidente o juiz que obtiver o mínimo de nove votos e Vice-Presidente o que obtiver o mínimo de oito votos.

O Presidente tem as seguintes funções:
*Representa o Tribunal e assegura as suas relações com os demais órgãos e autoridades públicas;
*Recebe as candidaturas e as declarações de desistência dos candidatos a [[Presidente da República]] e preside à assembleia de apuramento geral da eleição presidencial e das eleições para o Parlamento Europeu;
*Preside às sessões plenárias do Tribunal;
*Preside à 1.ª e 2.ª Secções do Tribunal.

Compete ao Vice-Presidente:
*Presidir à 3.ª Secção do Tribunal.
*Substituir o Presidente nas suas faltas.

== Funcionamento ==
[[Archivo:Tribunal Constitucional 2019.png|miniatura|320px|Composição actual do Tribunal Constitucional (2019). Na primeira fila ao centro encontra-se o Presidente, Conselheiro Manuel da Costa Andrade, e à sua direita o Vice-Presidente, Conselheiro João Pedro Barrosa Caupers.]]
O Tribunal Constitucional funciona em sessões plenárias e por secções, consoante a natureza da matéria sobre a qual é chamado a pronunciar-se.

O Tribunal reúne ordinariamente, em regra todas as semanas, de acordo com a periodicidade definida no regimento interno e na calendarização fixada no início de cada ano judicial.

Cada juiz dispõe de um voto e o Presidente (ou o Vice-Presidente, quando o substitui) tem voto de qualidade; assim, em caso de empate na votação, considera-se vencedora a posição que tiver obtido o seu voto. Os juízes vencidos podem fazer declaração de voto.

O [[Ministério Público]] é representado no Tribunal Constitucional pelo [[Procurador-Geral da República]], que pode delegar o exercício das suas funções no Vice-Procurador-Geral ou em Procuradores-Gerais-Adjuntos.

O local de funcionamento do Tribunal Constitucional é o Palácio Ratton, na Rua de "O Século", 111, em [[Lisboa]].
[[Ficheiro:Palácio Ratton.png|miniatura|O Palácio Ratton, sede do [[Tribunal Constitucional (Portugal)|Tribunal Constitucional de Portugal]]]]

== Competências ==
Ao Tribunal Constitucional cabe-lhe apreciar a inconstitucionalidade de quaisquer normas.

Por outro lado, o Tribunal Constitucional dispõe de várias competências relativas ao Presidente da República. No exercício destas, cabe-lhe verificar a morte e declarar a impossibilidade física permanente do Presidente da República.

O Tribunal dispõe ainda de competência para julgar os [[recurso]]s relativos à perda do mandato de [[deputado]] à Assembleia da República ou às [[Assembleias Legislativas das regiões autónomas]].

Em matéria de contencioso eleitoral, por sua vez, o Tribunal Constitucional intervém no processo relativo à eleição do Presidente da República, recebendo e admitindo as candidaturas e decidindo os correspondentes recursos.

Quanto aos referendos nacionais, o Tribunal Constitucional intervém fiscalizando previamente a sua constitucionalidade e legalidade.

No que diz respeito aos [[referendo]]s regionais e locais, o Tribunal Constitucional intervém, igualmente, na fiscalização prévia da sua constitucionalidade.

Ao Tribunal Constitucional compete igualmente aceitar a inscrição de partidos políticos, coligações e frentes de partidos, apreciar a legalidade e singularidade das suas denominações, siglas e símbolos, e proceder às anotações a eles referentes que a lei imponha. Compete-lhe também julgar as ações de impugnação de eleições e de deliberações de órgãos de partidos políticos que, nos termos da lei, sejam recorríveis, apreciar a regularidade e a legalidade das contas dos partidos e aplicar as correspondentes sanções, ordenar a extinção de partidos e de coligações de partidos, bem como verificar regularmente o número de filiados.

Compete-lhe também, desde [[1 de janeiro]] de [[2005]], apreciar a regularidade e a legalidade das contas das [[campanha eleitoral|campanhas eleitorais]].

Ao Tribunal Constitucional cabe declarar que uma qualquer organização perfilha a [[ideologia]] [[fascismo|fascista]] e decretar a respetiva extinção.

O Tribunal Constitucional procede ainda ao registo e arquivamento das declarações de património e rendimentos e das declarações de incompatibilidades e impedimentos que são obrigados a apresentar os titulares de cargos políticos ou equiparados, e decide acerca do acesso aos respetivos dados.

==Secções==
Os Juízes estão distribuídos por 3 Secções, sendo a 1.ª e 2.ª Secções presididas pelo Presidente do Tribunal e a 3.ª Secção presidida pelo Vice-Presidente. O Vice-Presidente integra ainda a 1.ª Secção. Os demais Juízes integram apenas uma das Secções.<ref>{{citar web|URL=http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/juizes04.html|título=Secções|autor=Tribunal Constitucional|data=|publicado=|acessodata=}}</ref><ref>Artigo 41.º da Lei de Organização, Funcionamento e Processo do Tribunal Constitucional.</ref>
===1ª Secção===
*'''Presidente:''' Conselheiro Presidente [[Manuel da Costa Andrade]]
*Conselheiro Vice-Presidente [[João Pedro Barrosa Caupers]]
*Conselheira [[Maria de Fátima Mata-Mouros de Aragão Soares]]
*Conselheiro [[José António Pires Teles Pereira]]
*Conselheiro [[José João Gordo Nunes Abrantes]]

===2ª Secção===
*'''Presidente:''' Conselheiro Presidente [[Manuel da Costa Andrade]]
*Conselheiro [[Fernando Vaz Ventura]]
*Conselheiro [[Pedro Manuel Pena Chancerelle de Machete]]
*Conselheira [[Mariana Rodrigues Gomes Canotilho]]
*Conselheira [[Maria da Assunção Pinhal Raimundo]]

===3ª Secção===
*'''Presidente:''' Conselheiro Vice-Presidente [[João Pedro Barrosa Caupers]]
*Conselheira [[Maria José Reis Rangel de Mesquita]]
*Conselheiro [[Lino José Baptista Rodrigues Ribeiro]]
*Conselheiro [[Gonçalo Manoel de Vilhena de Almeida Ribeiro]]
*Conselheira [[Joana Maria Rebelo Fernandes Costa]]

== Cronologia dos Juízes-Conselheiros ==
Cor laranja - Presidente do Tribunal Constitucional<br>
Cor amarela - Vice-Presidente do Tribunal Constitucional<br>
Cor azul - Restantes juízes

<table border="1" cellpadding="1" cellspacing="0" style="font-size:80%;border-collapse:collapse;">

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<tr>
<th>Década
<th>Início do Mandato
<th colspan=13>Juízes-Conselheiros

<tr>
<td rowspan="7">1980s

<td >[[6 de agosto]]<br> [[1983]]

<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="orange">Armando Marques Guedes
<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="lightblue">José Manuel Cardoso da Costa
<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="lightblue">Luís Nunes de Almeida
<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="yellow">José Magalhães Godinho
<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="lightblue">Antero Monteiro Diniz
<td rowspan="1" bgcolor="lightblue">Joaquim Costa Aroso
<td rowspan="3" bgcolor="lightblue">[[Jorge Campinos]]
<td rowspan="6" bgcolor="lightblue">José Joaquim Martins da Fonseca
<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="lightblue">Mário Afonso
<td rowspan="6" bgcolor="lightblue">Mário de Brito
<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="lightblue">Messias Bento
<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="lightblue">Raul Domingos Mateus da Silva
<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="lightblue">[[Vital Moreira]]

<tr>
<td >[[24 de agosto]]<br> [[1984]]

<td >

<tr>
<td >[[15 de fevereiro]]<br> [[1985]]

<td rowspan="2" bgcolor="lightblue">António Costa Mesquita

<tr>
<td >[[12 de agosto]]<br> [[1985]]

<td rowspan="2">

<tr>
<td >[[26 de agosto]]<br> [[1986]]

<td rowspan="1">

<tr>
<td >[[2 de agosto]]<br> [[1989]]

<td rowspan="4" bgcolor="lightblue">[[António Vitorino]]
<td rowspan="7" bgcolor="orange">José Manuel Cardoso da Costa
<td rowspan="7" bgcolor="yellow">Luís Nunes de Almeida
<td rowspan="7" bgcolor="lightblue">Armindo Ribeiro Mendes
<td rowspan="7" bgcolor="lightblue">Antero Monteiro Diniz
<td rowspan="7" bgcolor="lightblue">José Manuel Bravo Serra
<td rowspan="7" bgcolor="lightblue">José de Sousa e Brito
<td >
<td rowspan="7" bgcolor="lightblue">Messias Bento
<td rowspan="7" bgcolor="lightblue">Maria da Assunção Esteves
<td rowspan="7" bgcolor="lightblue">Vítor Nunes de Almeida

<tr>
<td >[[30 de outubro]]<br> [[1989]]

<td rowspan="7" bgcolor="lightblue">Alberto Tavares da Costa
<td rowspan="7" bgcolor="lightblue">Fernando Alves Correia
<td rowspan="1" bgcolor="lightblue">Mário de Brito

<tr>
<td rowspan="8">1990s
<td >[[2 de junho]]<br> [[1993]]

<td >

<tr>
<td >[[4 de novembro]]<br> 1993

<td rowspan="3" bgcolor="lightblue">Guilherme da Fonseca

<tr>
<td >[[10 de março]]<br> [[1994]]

<td >

<tr>
<td >[[18 de maio]]<br> 1994

<td rowspan="1" bgcolor="lightblue">Maria Fernanda Palma Pereira

<tr>
<td >[[4 de março]]<br> [[1998]]

<td >
<td >

<tr>
<td >[[11 de março]]<br> 1998

<td rowspan="11" bgcolor="lightblue">Maria Fernanda Palma Pereira
<td rowspan="2">
<td rowspan="9" bgcolor="lightblue">Artur Maurício
<td rowspan="4" bgcolor="lightblue">Maria Helena de Brito
<td rowspan="11" bgcolor="lightblue">Maria dos Prazeres Beleza
<td rowspan="11" bgcolor="lightblue">José Manuel Bravo Serra
<td rowspan="4" bgcolor="lightblue">José de Sousa e Brito
<td rowspan="4" bgcolor="lightblue">Guilherme da Fonseca
<td rowspan="3" bgcolor="lightblue">Messias Bento
<td rowspan="11" bgcolor="lightblue">[[Paulo da Mota Pinto]]
<td rowspan="3" bgcolor="lightblue">Vítor Nunes de Almeida

<tr>
<td >[[13 de março]]<br> [[1998]]

<td rowspan="4">
<td >

<tr>
<td >[[16 de março]]<br> [[1998]]

<td rowspan="4" bgcolor="orange">José Manuel Cardoso da Costa
<td rowspan="4" bgcolor="yellow">Luís Nunes de Almeida
<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="lightblue">Alberto Tavares da Costa

<tr>
<td rowspan="12">2000s
<td >[[11 de setembro]]<br> [[2001]]

<td >
<td >

<tr>
<td >[[9 de dezembro]]<br> [[2002]]

<td rowspan="7" bgcolor="lightblue">Maria Helena de Brito
<td rowspan="11" bgcolor="lightblue">Benjamim Silva Rodrigues
<td rowspan="13" bgcolor="lightblue">Carlos José Belo Pamplona de Oliveira
<td rowspan="8" bgcolor="lightblue">Gil Manuel Gonçalves Gomes Galvão
<td rowspan="11" bgcolor="lightblue">Mário José de Araújo Torres

<tr>
<td >[[11 de abril]]<br> [[2003]]

<td bgcolor="lightblue"> [[Rui Manuel Gens de Moura Ramos]]

<tr>
<td >[[23 de abril]]<br> [[2003]]

<td rowspan="2">
<td rowspan="6" bgcolor="yellow"> [[Rui Manuel Gens de Moura Ramos]]
<td rowspan="3" bgcolor="orange">Luís Nunes de Almeida

<tr>
<td >[[26 de setembro]]<br> [[2003]]

<tr>
<td >[[5 de dezembro]]<br> 2003

<td rowspan="11" bgcolor="lightblue">Vítor Manuel Gonçalves Gomes

<tr>
<td >[[6 de setembro]]<br> [[2004]]

<td rowspan="2" bgcolor="orange">Artur Maurício
<td >

<tr>
<td >[[21 de outubro]]<br> [[2004]]

<td rowspan="10" bgcolor="lightblue">[[Maria João da Silva Baila Madeira Antunes]]

<tr>
<td >[[11 de março]]<br> [[2007]]

<td >
<td >
<td >
<td >
<td >
<td >

<tr>
<td >[[4 de abril]]<br> 2007

<td rowspan="11" bgcolor="lightblue">Ana Maria Guerra Martins
<td rowspan="11" bgcolor="lightblue">Carlos Alberto Fernandes Cadilha
<td rowspan="1" bgcolor="lightblue">[[Rui Pereira]]
<td rowspan="11" bgcolor="lightblue">João Eduardo Cura Mariano Esteves
<td rowspan="4" bgcolor="lightblue">José Manuel Cardoso Borges Soeiro
<td rowspan="6" bgcolor="orange"> [[Rui Manuel Gens de Moura Ramos]]
<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="yellow">Gil Manuel Gonçalves Gomes Galvão
<td rowspan="6" bgcolor="lightblue">Maria Lúcia Amaral

<tr>
<td >[[17 de maio]]<br> [[2007]]

<td >

<tr>
<td >[[13 de julho]]<br> 2007

<td rowspan="4" bgcolor="lightblue"> Joaquim José Coelho de Sousa Ribeiro

<tr>
<td rowspan="7">2010s
<td >[[4 de fevereiro]]<br> [[2010]]

<td rowspan="7" bgcolor="lightblue">Catarina Teresa Rola Sarmento e Castro

<tr>
<td >[[12 de abril]]<br> [[2011]]

<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="lightblue">José da Cunha Barbosa

<tr>
<td >[[12 de julho]]<br> [[2012]]

<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="lightblue">Fernando Vaz Ventura
<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="lightblue">Maria de Fátima Mata-Mouros de Aragão Soares Homem
<td rowspan="5" bgcolor="lightblue">Maria José Reis Rangel de Mesquita

<tr>
<td >[[1 de outubro]]<br> [[2012]]

<td rowspan="4" bgcolor="orange"> Joaquim José Coelho de Sousa Ribeiro
<td rowspan="4" bgcolor="lightblue">Pedro Manuel Pena Chancerelle de Machete
<td rowspan="4" bgcolor="yellow"> Maria Lúcia Amaral

<tr>
<td >[[20 de junho]]<br> [[2013]]

<td rowspan="3" bgcolor="lightblue"> Lino José Baptista Rodrigues Ribeiro

<tr>
<td >[[6 de março]]<br> [[2014]]

<td rowspan="2" bgcolor="lightblue"> João Pedro Barrosa Caupers

<tr>
<td >[[9 de julho]]<br> [[2015]]

<td rowspan="1" bgcolor="lightblue"> José António Pires Teles Pereira


</TABLE>

== Entidade das Contas e Financiamentos Políticos ==
A Entidade das Contas e Financiamentos Políticos é um órgão independente que funciona junto do Tribunal Constitucional e que tem como atribuição coadjuvá-lo tecnicamente na apreciação e fiscalização das contas anuais dos partidos políticos e das contas das campanhas eleitorais para todos os órgãos políticos electivos (nacionais, regionais e locais).<ref>{{citar web|URL=http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/tc/contas00.html|título=Entidade das Contas e Financiamentos Políticos|autor=Tribunal Constitucional|data=|publicado=|acessodata=}}</ref>

Fundada em 30 de Janeiro de 2005, a Entidade das Contas e Financiamentos Políticos é constituída por um Presidente e dois Vogais, sendo um destes revisor oficial de contas. São eleitos pelo Plenário do Tribunal Constitucional, sob proposta do Presidente deste Tribunal, para um mandato de 4 anos, renovável uma vez.

Desde 2017 é Presidente da Entidade das Contas e Financiamentos Políticos José Eduardo de Oliveira Figueiredo Dias.

== Ligações externas ==
* {{Oficial|http://www.tribunalconstitucional.pt/ |pt}}

Categoria:Tribunais de Portugal]]
Categoria:Tribunais constitucionais]]
Categoria:Fundações em Portugal em 1982]]

==Referencias==
{{Listaref}}

{{NF|1983||Cortes Romero, Manuel}}

Categoría:Políticos de Andalucía]]