Mancomunidad de Polonia-Lituania-Moscovia

La Mancomunidad Polaco-Lituana-Moscovita fue un estado propuesto qe se hubiera basado en la unión personal de la Mancomunidad de Polonia-Lituania y el Zarato Ruso. Hubo varios intentos, por diferentes medios, de lograrla, entre 1574 y 1658, e incluso en las postrimerías del siglo XVIII, pero nunca se llevó a término debido a la incompatibilidad de las demandas de ambas partes.

LA unión propuesta es conocida en la historiografía polaca como la Triple Unión (unia troista) y también ha sido llamada la Unión polaco-rusa (unia polsko-rosyjska) o Unión polaco-moscovita (unia polsko moskiewska).

Razones

Los impulsores de esta unión entre la nobleza de Polonia, incluyendo a influentes pensadores seculares como Jan Zamoyski y Lew Sapieha, daban diferentes argumentos para defenderala: la paz en la turbulenta frontera oriental, un poderoso aliado militar y territorios relativamente poco poblados (en comparación con la Corona polaca) para colonizar y reducir a servidumbre. La idea también estaba respaldada por los jesuitas y otros emisarios papales que nunca abandonaron la idea de convertir la ortodoxa Rusia al catolicismo. Algunos boyardos rusos encontraron atractiva la propuesta (como Borís Godunov, que apoyaba la candidatura de Teodoro I en 1587) debido a varias razones, entre ellas el hecho de que la Libertad Dorada, si se aplicaba en Rusia, debilitaría el poder del zar y así se le concedería a la nobleza un estatus mayor del que nunca había disfrutado anteriormente.

Las propuestas de ese momento se argumentaban alrederdor de una unión personal entre la Mancomunidad y Rusia, y varios acuerdos económicos y políticos (eliminación de barreras comerciales, libre movimiento de gente, etc.), hasta la creación de un sólo país, usando el entramado legal que había conducido a la creación de la Mancomunidad de Polonia-Lituania tras la Unión de Lublin de 1569. De todos modos todas las propuestas presentadas por el lado polaco fueron rechazadas por el zar. Las negociaciones más prometedoras tuvieron lugar en 1600, cuando una misión diplomática polaca encabezada por Lew Sapieha llegó a Moscú. Sapieha le presentó a Borís Godunov un plan elaborado de unión entre Polonia-Lituania y Rusia. Los súbditos de ambos gobernantes serían libres de servir al otro gobernante, viajar, contratar matrimonios, poseer tierra o ir a estudiar al otro país.​

Aunque el lado moscovita estaba de acuerdo en algunas de las partes de los tratados propuestos (como la extradición de criminales sospechosos), se oponía estrictamente a los asuntos relativos a la tolerancia religiosa (religiones no ortodoxas, especialmente el catolicismo, eran perseguidas en Rusia, al contrario que en Polonia, donde había libertad de fe) y el libre movimiento de los súbditos (según algunos estudiosos polacos).​ Transformar el zarato ruso en una república modelada acorde a la Mancomunidad de Polonia-Lituania resultó ser un proyecto demasiado ambicioso. Muchos rusos temían la polonización, que ya estaba ocurriendo entre la nobleza lituana y rutena, y se convertía en un peligro mayor al tener en cuenta la cantidad de nobles y campesinos que escapaban de Rusia,​​ a lo que el zar Iván había respondido con una política de violentas represiones, la así llamada opríchnina. La Unión de Brest de 1596 fue un argumento mayor para los opositores ortodoxos a a la unión, que argumentaban que ésta sería un preludio de la catolicización de Rusia.

History

Polish Succession

The idea was first broached in the 16th century after the death of the last Polish king of the Jagiellon dynasty, Sigismund II Augustus. Tsar Ivan IV of Russia ("the Terrible") became a popular candidate among the Polish nobility. He had substantial support in Poland, especially among the lesser and middle nobility, who saw in him an opportunity to limit the growing power of the magnates. During the interregnum, two diplomatic missions (led by Michał Harraburda, pisarz litewski, and Jędrzej Taranowski) were sent from Poland to Moscow to hold discussions. The negotiations failed, due to hostilities resulting from the Livonian War, territorial demands by Ivan (who wanted former territories of Kievan Rus', then under control of Lithuania), and decision by Ivan that Russian side will not 'lower itself to the level of other European monarchies and send a diplomatic mission to Poland begging for him to become a king'. During the second interregnum, in 1574, candidature of Ivan IV was even highly regarded in Poland, however the Moscow diplomatic mission that arrived in Poland had no orders nor prerogatives to negotiate this matter. Eventually the disappointed pro-Ivan faction, represented by Jan Sierakowski, issued a statement in Sejm: ...Great Prince of Muscovy would be the best choice for king, but due to his silence we are forced to forget him and should not mention him again.​

Russian Succession

The mixed circle of the proponents of this idea saw an opportunity in Russia after Ivan the Terrible, the last Russian ruler of that time whose legitimacy was never questioned, died without issue. The proposal was revived soon after Ivan's death, through the reigns of Stefan Batory in Poland and Feodor I in Russia. After Batory's death in 1587, Feodor I became quite interested in acquiring the Polish throne, and sent a diplomatic mission to Poland. His support among the Lithuanians was high, but Poles issued several demands, among them requiring Fedors's conversion to Catholicism, an absolutely unthinkable event. Eventually Sigismund III Vasa was elected the king of Poland. Death of Feodor prompted Sigismund to propose his candidacy for the Moscow throne, however by the time Polish diplomatic mission arrived in Moscow, Boris Godunov was elected the new tsar.​

With the legitimacy issues clouding the entire period of the rule of Boris Godunov, Russia submerged into even greater chaos upon his death, the Russian Time of Troubles, which was accompanied by a decisive Polish armed intervention, or the Polish–Muscovite War (1605–1618), commonly referred to in Russia as the Polish intervention in the end-17th century.^{[cita requerida]} In the course of the Polish–Muscovite War, the Polish prince (later king) Władysław IV Vasa was briefly elected a Russian Tsar among other such strange developments like enthronement and short reign of False Dmitriy I, an impostor of tsar Ivan's son. However, Wladyslaw was never officially enthroned and his quick election remained in history as one of the fluke events of Russia's Time of Troubles.

The idea was again proposed in 1656–1658, when Moscow suggested that one of the points of negotiations would be the election of the Russian tsar for the Polish throne. This time it was the Polish side which presented demands (conversion to Catholicism, territorial changes) that eventually discouraged Russians from pursuing this project.

Proposal of the last Polish king

Finally, the idea returned in the 18th century, when the last Polish king Stanisław August Poniatowski attempted to save the Polish state by proposing a marriage between himself and Russian Empress, Catherine the Great.

The very possibility that such an idea could have been seriously considered by the Polish side early on was likely based on the spirit of the 1573 Warsaw Convention (Warsaw Compact), that guaranteed, at least formally, an equality for non-Catholic nobles in the Commonwealth. However, while the adopted convention was an unprecedentedly liberal act for its time, such full equality was never achieved in reality even within the Commonwealth itself. Taking into account that the most divisions of that time, if not dynastic, were the religious divisions and the relationship between the Catholic and the Eastern Orthodox branches of Christianities were strained at best, it remains surprising that such an idea was seriously considered at all. It remains equally unlikely, that such an idea could have been accepted by the Russian side because the view towards Catholicism in the Russian Empire was highly negative.

Thus, while the idea of a Polish–Lithuanian–Muscovite Commonwealth was supported early on by some progressive and secular Polish diplomats, in the end the efforts of the few could not overcome Russian opposition to Catholicism and the fear that such a union would spell Catholic domination over the Orthodox religion.

Legacy

In the 19th century the three nations did in fact come to share a common sovereign when, after the partitions of the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, Tsar Alexander I of Russia was crowned king of Poland. This version of an overarching union was, however, quite different from the original Polish idea of a federation similar to the Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Véase también

• Mancomunidad Polaco-Lituana-Rutena

Further reading

• K. Tyszkowski, Plany unii polsko-moskiewskiej na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku, "Przegląd Współczesny", t. XXIV, 1928, s.392-402
• K. Tyszkowski, Poselstwo Lwa Sapieha do Moskwy, Lwów, 1929
• S. Gruszewski, Idea unii polsko-rosyjskiej na przełomie XVI i XVII wieku, "Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce", t. XV, 1970, s.89-99
• Ł.A. Derbow, K woprosu o kandidatiure Iwana IV na polskij prestoł (1572-1576), "Uczonyje zapiski Saratowskowo uniwersiteta", t. XXXIX, Saratow, 1954
• B.Flora, Rosyjska kandydatura na tron polski u schyłku XVI wieku, "Odrodzenie i Reformacja w Polsce"', t. XVI, 1971, s.85-95
• Krzysztof Rak, Federalism or Force: A Sixteenth-Century Project for Eastern and Central Europe, Sarmatian Review, January 2006
• Zbigniew Wojcik, Russian Endeavors for the Polish Crown in the Seventeenth Century, Slavic Review, Vol. 41, No. 1 (Spring, 1982), pp. 59–72JSTOR