A

# **VINDICATION**

OF

### **CERTAIN PASSAGES**

IN

### THE COMMON ENGLISH VERSION

OF THE

NEW TESTAMENT.

ADDRESSED TO

GRANVILLE SHARP, ESQ.

**AUTHOR OF THE** 

"Remarks on the uses of the Definite Article in the Greek Text of the New Testament."

BY THE REV. CALVIN WINSTANLEY, A.M.

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#### ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following tract being out of print in England, it was thought of sufficient value to be republished in this country. It is an able examination of an intricate subject, the discussion of which has excited considerable interest, and which is in it-self of sufficient importance to require the attention of the theological student.

The remarks of Granville Sharp Esq. upon the Uses of the Definitive Article in the Greek Text of the New Testament first appeared in the Museum Oxoniense. Two editions of them were afterwards edited by Dr. Burgess, Bishop of St. David's, and they were regarded by some critics as affording to the Trinitarian an unanswerable argument in support of his creed. The following are the alterations which Mr. Sharp would introduce into the Received Version on the authority of the rules he advanced.

Acts xx, 28. (Adopting the reading του Κυριου και Θεου) he would translate "The church of him who is Lord and God."

Ephes. v, 5. "In the kingdom of Christ our God."

2 Thess. i, 12. "According to the grace of Jesus Christ our God and Lord."

1 Tim. v, 21. }

2 Tim. iv, 1. } "Before Jesus Christ, our God and Lord."

Titus ii, 13. "The glorious appearing of Jesus Christ, our great God and Saviour."

2 Peter i, 1. "Of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ,."

Jude 4. "Our only master Jesus Christ, both God and Lord."

No alteration has been made from the English edition of Mr. Winstanley's Vindication of the common version of these texts, except the correction of numerous typographical errors. An appendix has been added by a friend of the editor, containing some remarks upon Middleton's Treatise on the Greek Article, and such extracts from the notice of that work which appeared in the Monthly Review for May and June 1810, as were thought applicable to the subject.

### VINDICATION, &c.

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SIR.

WHEN, I first perused your Remarks on the uses of the definitive article in the Greek text of the New Testament, I confess, I did not see them in that imposing light in which they have since been recommended to public attention. The tract appeared to my judgment to be defective in several particulars; but my opinion of it was, for a time, considerably affected by reading afterwards the strong and unqualified language of your learned editor, the present Bishop of St. David's. I determined, therefore, to bestow upon it as minute and careful an examination as I was capable of, that I might not be led into error, either by a veneration for great names, or by, what is not less common or less natural, a secret spirit of opposition to magisterial decisions on subjects incapable of demonstration.

The following observations have lain by me for a considerable time, owing to causes which it is not necessary to state; I only mention this circumstance as affording some presumption that they have not been hastily prepared for the press, as I have had time enough to revolve and review them; and that I may, without arrogance, propose them to your candid reflection, as sufficient to convince you, notwithstanding the acknowledged authority of your learned editor, that you have not "decidedly applied a rule of construction to the correction of the common English version of the New Testament;" that there exists no necessity for correcting that version according to your rule; and that it does not "conceal from the English reader any thing discoverable in the original."

In saying this, I incur the danger, it seems of being thought *a partial reader*, *unacquainted* with the Greek language, or even blinded by unhappy prejudices, if I do not expose myself to the imputation of Socinianism. But if you will peruse my remarks with patience to the end, though you may not acquit me of the involuntary imperfections of error and ignorance, you will, I am persuaded, not seriously charge me with wilful perversion of the sacred writings: οὐ γαρ σπευδω νικησαι κακως, ἀλλα ζητησαι ἀληθως.

Be this as it may, the question between us is simply concerning the accuracy and fidelity of the common English version in those particular passages, which, you insist, ought to be corrected; and which, I think, need no such correction. To defend them as they now stand, all doctrinal inferences for the present being kept apart, should not be regarded as a useless labour, when it is considered, that your censures tend to bring that version into disrepute, after it has been read so long by authority in our churches, and been used with confidence and veneration by a numerous body of unlettered Christians. Some inconvenience, not to say some danger, might be apprehended from admitting alterations into it, or even from publicly proposing them as necessary; and, therefore, they ought to be rejected, until their necessity be proved by incontestible evidence. Whether you have yet done this will appear in the sequel.

But before your rules are examined, it will not be improper to takes some notice of a principle of interpretation advanced by your learned editor, namely, that in all remote and written testimony the weight of evidence must ultimately depend upon the grammatical analogy of the language in which it is recorded. Admitting this to be true, for it is indisputable, yet if applied, as it seems intended to be, to the examination of separate passages, uncompared with, and uncontrolled by, other passages of similar import in the same author, it will sometimes disappoint the student. Such passages, if the grammatical construction alone be considered, may be ambiguous, and, by themselves, afford no satisfactory evidence. They want illustration and solution; and the cardinal question is, Whence is this solution to be sought? Not ultimately from critics and commentators, not from versions, nor yet from Greek and Latin fathers. The learned Beza may be confronted with the no less learned Erasmus, the former versions with the present, and to the opinion of the fathers may be opposed direct exceptions to your principal rule: so that we are driven at last to that source of illustration, which ought never to be rejected, except in cases of extreme necessity. If the sacred writers have expressed themselves ambiguously in some instances, and on the same subject clearly in others, and still more in a great plurality of others, we are bound, in exclusion of every extraneous authority, to consult them as their own best interpreters; δει γαρ ύπερ των άφανων τοις φανεροις μαρτυριοις χρησθαι.

Should this appear to be the real state of all the passages adduced for a corrected version, our common version may be satisfactorily defended. This is all I undertake to do; and for this purpose we may now proceed to the discussion of your rules. They are here transcribed for the sake of more convenient reference.

- RULE I. When two personal nouns of the same case are connected by the copulative  $\kappa\alpha$ , if the former has the definitive article, and the latter has not, they both relate to the same person.
  - RULE II. If both nouns have the article, but not the copulative, they relate to the same person.
- RULE III. If the first has the article and the second has not, and there is no copulative, they also relate to the same person.
  - RULE IV. If the nouns are not personal, they relate to different things or qualities.
- RULE V. If personal nouns of the same case are connected by the copulative, and the first has not the article, they relate to different persons.
- RULE VI. If they are connected by the copulative, and both have the article, they relate also to different persons.

In this discussion I shall observe the following method:

First, I shall point out some sources of error common to all your rules.

*Secondly*, I shall consider a class of exceptions which are not repugnant to the conclusion you would establish.

Thirdly, I shall produce such exceptions as are inconsistent with that conclusion.

Fourthly, I shall offer some remarks on the Syntax of the definitive article, and the copulative.

Lastly, I shall examine the passages of Scripture, which are the objects of this investigation.

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These rules are all founded on the presence or the absence of the copulative or the article; and nothing can be more imperfect than such rules. Both the copulative and the article are frequently suppressed by authors, and must be supplied by the reader's understanding. As this can only be done by attending to the context, and sometimes to the signification of the words employed, so far as the construction (the presence or absence of the copulative, for instance,) from being always the sole guide to sense, that an apprehension of the sense must frequently precede our knowledge of the construction; as when we have to determine, whether two personal nouns of the same case, gender, &c.. in immediate connexion,

are in concord or apposition, and, therefore, relating to the same person, or not. Thus, according to your second and third rules taken together, and compared with your examples, personal nouns connected without the copulative denote the same person. If you mean nouns in concord or apposition, you beg the question, and nobody will oppose you; but if you mean simply nouns so arranged in the same sentence, your rules are false: and that such is your meaning is evident from your excepting nouns impersonal only, or genitives depending on each other in succession. I will transcribe two of your examples, followed by two more of a different kind, but constructed in the same manner.

και ήγαλλιασε το πνευμα μου έπι τῷ θεῷ τῷ σωτηρι μου.

This example is intended to confirm your second rule. The next is to serve the same purpose under your third; but they prove nothing but that nouns in apposition denote the same person or thing.

Παυλος, δουλος θεου, ἀποςολος δε Ίησου.

But now let us compare these that follow.

τις ή των τοσουτων ένωσις, και διαιρεσις ένουμενων, του πνευματος, του παιδος, του πατρος. – Athen. Leg. 49.

έαν μη άναγεννηθητε ύδατι ζωντι, είς όνομα πατρος, υίου, άγιου πνευματος, ού μη είσελθητε είς την βασιλειαν των οὐρανων. – Clementina, 698

Here are nouns person, constructed according to your rules and genitive cases too, not depending on each other, yet plain exceptions. They are instances of the copulative suppressed, according the figure *asyndeton*, and very common with Greek writers, when several similar words are used in succession. You must have read of such a figure, though you must as certainly have forgotten it; for some of your examples adduced in confirmation of your rules are only instances of it; and your fourth rule is nothing else. *If nouns* (connected without the copulative) are not personal, they relate to different things or qualities. This is your fourth rule, and here is your example:

χαρις, έλεος, είρηνη άπο θεου πατρος ήμων.

The copulative is here suppressed, and might as well have been so with nouns personal; or it might have been used in either case, without any difference in signification. So little is to be inferred from the omission of the copulative, without attention to the known sense of the words employed.

Nothing, again, can be more fallacious than the manner in which you have arrived at the formation of your rules; which is evidently by inferring a general rule of interpretation from a prevailing mode of construction. Thus, having never found, that, when the same person is meant by nouns joined by the copulative, the article is repeated before the second noun; you infer that whenever the article is not so repeated, the same

person is meant. Let us then compare two examples from Aristotle's Ethics:

ό δε χαριεις και έλευθερος ούτως έξει.

This example agrees with your first rule, and would be considered by you as some confirmation of it; but take the other:

περι άς (ἀπολαυσεις) λεγομεν τον σωφρονα και ἀκολαςον.

This is a plain exception to your rule; and is known to be so, not from the context, nor the construction, but from the signification of the nouns themselves, which cannot be understood of the same person; so that we must have recourse to a principle of interpretation distinct from any mentioned by you, namely, a regard to the sense of the nouns employed. Simple, and almost trifling, as all this may appear, yet it deserves to be repeated; for if you were to add this principle as a limitation of your grand rule, by saying, the nouns relate to the same person, except where their signification forbids it, all your criticisms would avail little, and you would be obliged to examine the New Testament upon more enlarged and liberal grounds than you have taken.

To any rules founded on the use of the copulative, or article, or both, and directing us to understand two persons to be intended, there is a whole class of exceptions, which, as they do not affect your final conclusion one way or other, should be brought together, and set aside to prevent embarrassment; I allude to nouns used as predicates of a proposition.

The predicate of a proposition is thus constructed in Greek. Of an incontrovertible proposition the predicate never takes the article; as,

ό μεν γαρ μεγαλοπρεπης έλευθεριος· ό δε έλευθεριος ούθεν μαλλον μεγαλοπρεπης. – Arist.

And, therefore, (excepting proper names, or pronouns having the force of proper names) when two nouns are joined by a verb, one having the article, and the other not, that which has the article is the subject, the other the predicate, as,

θεος ήν ὁ λογος

Though too much stress may have been laid on the omission of the article before  $\theta\epsilon\omega\zeta$ ; yet that omission is by no means insignificant. It serves, according to the Greek idiom, to exhibit the noun  $\theta\epsilon\omega\zeta$  as an attribute of the Logos; not as an equivalent appellation that might be substituted for it. In this sense the Greek fathers understood it, as is evident from their using the noun  $\theta\epsilon\omega\zeta$  as an adjective in allusion to this passage; the expression  $\dot{o}$   $\theta\epsilon\omega\zeta$   $\lambda\omega\gamma\omega\zeta$  being familiar to

them. The common version is inferior in precision to the original, nor could it be otherwise; the English noun *God* not admitting the distinction preserved in the Greek. But if the word *Deity* were substituted, the translation would approach as near to the precision of the original, as the language would admit, as thus:

In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with the Deity, and the word was Deity.

Of a similar kind is the much contested text of St. Peter, βεδαιοτερον ἐχομεν τον προφητικον λογον, which Sherlock has rendered differently, as he confesses, from all the Greek expositors, and inconsistently with the construction. Βεδαιοτερον must be the predicate, and the whole passage does not necessarily signify more than this, *We have the prophetic word more sure*, or, *it is more sure to us*: whether in its own nature, or in consequence of the transfiguration and its attendant circumstances, this is not the place to enquire. The above use of the verb ἐχω, as well as of its corresponding verb *habeo*, to connect a predicate to its subject is not uncommon, as in Origen's comment on this passage from the  $54^{th}$  Psalm.

Ίδου γαρ ὁ θεος βοηθει μοι, και ὁ κυριος ἀντιληπτωρ της ψυχης μου.

The comment is this:

Βοηθον δε έχειν όμολογει τον πατερα, και κυριον αντιλαμβανομενον της ψυχης αὐτου, ίνα είπη τον υίον.

He confesses that he has the father his helper – that the father is his helper, &c. where it is remarkable that Origen does not repeat the article before κυριον, though it is repeated in the text.

Of a convertible proposition (that is when the predicate is equally comprehensible with the subject) both the subject and the predicate have the article, or are both without it, as

ώςε δηλον, ότι και ό δικαιος έςται ό τε νομιμος και ό ίσος. – Arist.

The words ὁ δικαιος, ὁ νομιμος, ὁ ἰσος, are all convertible terms in the philosophy of Aristotle, and may be substituted for one another.

ό ζων άρτος ό ύπο του πατρος δοθεις ό υίος έςιν. – Origen.

και ή άμαρτια έζιν ή παρανομια.

On this passage, Pearson has somewhere remarked, that the two nouns are constructed as perfectly convertible, as if there could be no sin, where there was no transgression of law.

ή τροφη των φοδουμενων τον κυριον ή σοφια έςιν του θεου.

άρχη γαρ σοφιας φοδος κυριου. - Origen.

Now two or more nouns may be connected as predicates of the same subject, and, therefore, as relating to the same person in every form of construction, with or without, either copulatives, or articles

παντα γαρ ὁ θεος ἐζιν αὐτος αὑτῳ, φως ἀπροσιτον, κοσμος τελειος, πνευμα, δυναμις, λογος. – Athenag. Leg. 61.

You would regard this example as a confirmation of one of your rules, though it is nothing to the purpose. There is no copulative; but there might have been four, as in the next;

οὐκ ἐζιν μου ἀξιος, λεγει του εἰναι υἱος θεου, και μαθητης θεου, ὁμου και φιλος και συγγενης. –  $Clem.\ Alex.$ 

άρχιερευς γαρ των προσφορων ήμων, και προς τον πατερα παρακλητος έςιν ὁ υίος του θεου. – Origen.

οὐ δαιμων ὁ τους τοιουσδε ἐπιτρεψας προς τον θεον, ἀλλα θεος λογος, και θεου παις. – Origen

βοηθος μου και άντιληπτωρ μου εί συ. – Psalm.

ίσχυς μου και άντιληπτωρ μου ὁ κυριος. – Psalm.

συ εί αὐτος ὁ βασιλευς μου, και ὁ θεος μου. – Psalm.

You have adduced some passages of the same kind, as exceptions to your fifth, and sixth rules, as,

έγω είμι το Ά και το Ώ, άρχη και τελος.

τον όφιν τον άρχαιον, ός έςι διαδολος και σατανας.

These (latter) you say, are two different names or appellatives, attributed (by the explanatory words  $\delta\varsigma$   $\dot{\epsilon}\varsigma\iota$ ) to the same old serpent. That is, they are predicates of the same proposition. So far your distinction is sufficiently correct: but you have not always been equally circumspect; for under your third rule, according to which, *The omission of the copulative between two or more nouns (of the same case) even without the article before the second noun, will denote the same person*, you give this example,

πεποιθας τε σεαυτον όδηγον είναι τυφλων, φως των έν σκοτει, παιδευτην άφρονων, διδασκαλον νηπιων, κ. τ. λ.

The nouns,  $\delta\delta\eta\gamma\sigma\nu$ ,  $\phi\omega\zeta$ , &c. are certainly descriptive of the same person; not, as you think, because the copulative is omitted; but because they are predicates of the same indirect proposition; and would have equally described the same person, had the copulative been used, as it might have been, as before;

οὐκ ἐζιν μου ἀξιος, του είναι υίος θεου, και μαθητης θεου.

ότι ψευζης έςι και ό πατηρ αὐτου.

ήξει θεου υίος, των όσιων κριτης, και των άδικων κολαςης. – Origen.

I have added this last example, for the sake of observing, that the verb substantive is implied, and must be understood: *The son of God will come* (to be) *the judge of the holy*, &c. The same remark is applicable to these examples that follow, and many more:

είς ὁ ἐτεθην κηρυξ και ἀποςολος και διδασκαλος ἐθνων.

ότι και κυριον και χριζον αύτον ὁ θεος ἐποιησεν.

τουτον ὁ ἀρχηγον και σωτηρα ύψωσε τη δεξια αύτου.

It is upon this occasion, that you bring in your Fourth Rule, namely, It is upon this occasion, that you bring in your Fourth Rule, namely, Yet it is otherwise, when the nouns are not of personal description or application; for then they denote distinct things or qualities, as,

χαρις, έλεος, είρηνη άπο θεου πατρος ήμων.

But these nouns are so many subjects of a sentence, divisible into as many sentences, the copulative being suppressed; had they been predicates, they might have described the same person, or thing, as,

παντα γαρ ὁ θεος ἐςιν αὐτος αὑτῳ, φως ἀπροσιτον, κοσμος τελειος, πνευμα, δυναμις, λογος. – Athenag. Leg.

Or with the copulative,

ίσχυς μου και ύμνησις μου ὁ κυριος.

The noun  $i\sigma\chi\nu\zeta$  and  $\dot{\nu}\mu\nu\eta\sigma\iota\zeta$ , separated from the context, are certainly names of different things; but here they are descriptive of one person  $\dot{o}$  κυριος, as much as nouns personal would be; as for instance,  $\beta o \eta\theta o \zeta$  και  $\dot{\alpha}\nu\tau\iota\lambda\eta\pi\tau\omega\rho$  in a former example.

παρεδωκεν έαυτον ύπερ ήμων προσφοραν και θυσιαν τω θεω.

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And now, SIR, having collected, in order to set aside, that class of exceptions, which would otherwise only perplex and embarrass our enquiry, I shall proceed to examine your several Rules in their order, and prove them to be some defective, some fallacious, and others absolutely false.

RULE I. When two personal nouns of the same case are connected by the copulative  $\kappa\alpha$ , if the former has the definitive article, and the latter has not, they both relate to the same person, as,  $\dot{\delta}$  θεος  $\kappa\alpha$  πατηρ---- $\dot{\delta}$  κυριος  $\kappa\alpha$  σωτηρ.

This rule is generally true; but it is defective, inasmuch as it is liable to exceptions, which, if taken together, and fairly considered, must be fatal to the inference you would deduce from it. Nouns not personal are excluded by the terms of the rule: and your acknowledged exceptions are of plurals, and proper names. I add, 1<sup>st</sup>, That national appellations must be excepted, as,

ό Μωαδιτης και Άμμανιτης. - Origen de Orat. 229.

2<sup>d</sup>, If one of the nouns be a plural.

περι του Ίησου και χριζιανων. – Origen.

είς τας Άθηνας έξεπεμψε συν τη μητρι και δουλοις. Clementina, 718.

3<sup>d</sup>, If one of the nouns be impersonal.

μετα του άξιοπρεπες ατου έπισκοπου ύμων, και άξιοπλοκου πνευματικου ζεφανου του πρεσθυτεριου ύμων. – Ignat. epist. 21.

Ασπαζομαι τον άξιοθεατον έπισκοπον, και θεοπρεπεςατον πρεσδυτεριον.

4<sup>th</sup>, If one of them be a proper name.

οί πιζοι εἰκονα ἐχουσι του ἀρχοντος θεου πατρος, και Ἰησου Χριζου. – Ignat. ad Magn.

έν θεληματι του πατρος, και Ίησου Χριστου του θεου ήμων. – Ignat. ad Ephes.

5<sup>th</sup>, When the signification of the nouns renders any farther mark of personal distinction unnecessary.

περι άς (ἀπολαυσεις) λεγομεν τον σωφρονα και ἀκολαζον. – Arist. Ethic.

του γαρ έγκρατους και άκρατους τον λογον έπαινουμεν. – *Id*.

ποτερον ὁ ἐγκρατης και ἀκρατης εἰσι τω περι ά, ή τω πως, ἐχοντες την διαφοραν. – Id.

 $\dot{\delta}$  δ' άγαθος και κακος ήκιςα διαδηλοι καθ'  $\dot{\delta}$ πνον. – Id.

ή του έλευθερου παιδια διαφερει της του άνδραποδωδους, και αὐ του πεπαιδευμενου και άπαιδευτου. – Id.

έν τω γαρ έχειν μεν, μη χρησθαι δε, διαφερουσαν όρωμεν την έξιν· ώς τε και έχειν πως και μη έχειν· οίον τον καθευδοντα, και μαινομενον, και οίνωμενον. -Id.

και δια τουτ' είς ταυτο τον άκρατη και άκολαστον τιθεμεν, και έγκρατη και σωφρονα. – Id.

In all the above-cited passages from Aristotle, the nouns, though personal, are used in a general or universal sense. In this respect, it must be confessed, they differ materially from those of which you would correct the common version; and so far may be thought inapplicable to our present purpose. But they are not totally inapplicable; as they prove, that when the signification of the nouns renders any farther precaution unnecessary, the second article may be omitted, without confounding the distinction of persons. They prove also that the article may be understood after the copulative; for the same author as frequently repeats it with similar nouns, as.

είτα περι ποια τον άκρατη και τον έγκρατη θετεον.

And sometimes he omits it altogether, and also in the same sense, as,

ό αὐτος λογος και περι οἰνωμενου και καθευδοντος.

ό μεν οὐν Περσων ή Ῥωμαιων βασιλεως σατραπης και ύπεροχος, ή ςρατηγος. κ. τ. λ. – Cels. apud Orig.

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I shall now subjoin several quotations, which come within all the limitations of your first rule, and are direct exceptions to it.

Clemens Alexandrinus has this quotation from Plato:

τον παντων θεον αίτιον και τ8 ήγεμονος και αίτι8 πατερα κυριον έπομνυντας.

Here του ήγεμονος και αίτιου is an agreement with your rule, but

τον παντων θεον----και πατερα κυριον is in direct opposition to it. Origen has the same quotation with some difference, but still without the repetition of the article before πατερα, thus,

και τον των παντων θεον, ήγεμονα των τε όντων και των μελλοντων, του τε ήγεμονος και αίτιου πατερα και κυριον ἐπομνυντας.

Clemens observes, that Plato appears to be describing the Father and the Son; φαινεται πατερα και υίον ἐμφαινων; and Origen makes a similar observation: so that neither of these Greek fathers thought the repetition of the article so necessary to distinguish two persons. It may be remarked also, by the way, that where Clemens writes πατερα κυριον, Origen writes πατερα και κυριον, for one person; which is an exception to your fifth rule.

τω θεω των όλων προσεχετε και διδασκαλώ των περι αὐτου μαθηματων τω Ίησου. – Orig. contra Cels. 497.

This is surely a pertinent example. The attribute  $\delta\iota\delta\alpha\sigma\kappa\alpha\lambda\circ\varsigma$  without the article repeated, must be referred not to the preceding  $\dot{o}$  θεος, but to the following  $\dot{o}$  Ἰησους as a distinct subject; and in the same manner may five of your examples be understood. If you should object, that the article, though not prefixed to  $\delta\iota\delta\alpha\sigma\kappa\alpha\lambda\circ\varsigma$  is to Ἰησους, it may be replied, that it is not there a mark of difference, but of identity with  $\delta\iota\delta\alpha\sigma\kappa\alpha\lambda\circ\varsigma$ , and being prefixed to a proper name might as well have been omitted. That it is not, in such a situation, a mark of personal distinction, might be shown in many instances, such as these,

λεγει δε ὁ κυριος ήμων και σωτηρ Ἰησους ὁ Χριζος ἐν εὐαγγελιοις. – Const. Apost. 258. τον κοινον ήμων θεον και κυριον τον χριζον. – See Sharp, 110.

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τφ δε θεφ πατρι, και υίφ τφ κυριφ ήμων Ἰησου Χριζφ συν τφ άγιφ πνευματι δοξα. – See note in Burgh's Enquiry, 359.

In this example, as well as in the last one cited from Origen, the article is not repeated immediately after the copulative, and is so far an exception to your rule. If it be objected, that it is afterwards repeated, I reply, as before, that in such a situation it is a mark of identity with the noun immediately preceding. Besides, if you should think it any thing more, you must give up one of your own examples, namely,

Διαμαρτυρομαι οὐν ἐγω ἐνωπιον του θεου και κυριου Ἰησου Χριστου ΤΟΥ μελλοντος κρινειν ζωντας και νεκρους.

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γινεται δη ούν τα παντα του ἀνθρωπου, ότι τα παντα του θεου· και κοινα ἀμφοιν τοιν φιλοιν τα παντα, του θεου και ἀνθρωπου. – Clem. Alexand. 76.

If any objection should be made to this example, it must be, that the last noun,  $\dot{\alpha}v\theta\rho\omega\pi\sigma\varsigma$ , (by which the author means a pious Christian) is used in a general sense. It is, however, a farther proof that the repetition of the article is not so necessary, as you have supposed. The reason why it is omitted in this particular instance, I shall consider hereafter; for the present I shall produce some examples, to which no objection can be imagined.

μεθ' ού δοξα τω θεω και πατρι και άγιω πνευματι. *Epist. Eccles. Smyrn. de Martyr. Polycarp* φοβου τον θεον, υίε, και βασιλεα, και μηθ' έτερω αὐτων ἀπειθησης. – *Paræm. cap.* 24, v. 21

This passage from the Septuagint, which I am surprised you should have overlooked, is thus quoted in the interpolated epistle of Ignatius to the Smyrneans:

τιμα, φησιν, υίε, τον θεον και βασιλεα.

It would be unnecessary to examine the rest of your rules, if you had not proposed them as confirmations of the first: but this being the case, some notice must be taken of them; and it shall be as short as I can make it.

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Your second rule is, that when both the nouns have the article but not the copulative, they relate to the same person.

I call this a fallacious rule, because, if by the copulative *omitted*, you mean *neither expressed nor understood*, the rule is indeed true; but then it is no more than a common rule of concord, and of much less importance, than you intended it should appear. It is founded on the manner in which an attribute is connected in Greek to its subject; which is, by prefixing the article to the attribute, wherever the latter is placed. One of your examples, and they are all alike, is, τον ποιμενα τον μεγαν, the great shepherd, which may be thus expressed, ὁ μεγας ποιμην----ποιμην ὁ μεγας----*or* ὁ ποιμην ὁ μεγας. This last form of construction is the foundation of your rule. But if from hence you would infer that the mere omission of the copulative between such nouns shows them to relate to the same person, your rule is false; as for instance,

των Σιδυλλων το πληθος, ή Σαμια, ή Κολοφωνια, ή Κυμαια, ή κ. τ. λ. – Clem. Alexand.

τις ή των τοσουτων ένωσις, και διαιρεσις ένουμενων, του πνευματος, του παιδος, του πατρος. – Athenag. Leg. 49.

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Your third rule is, that the omission of the copulative between two or more nouns (of the same case) of personal description, even without the ar-

ticle before the second noun, will have the same effect; namely, will denote the same person.

This rule is no more than an extension of the former, and equally fallacious, and for the same reason. If you mean, when the *copulative is neither expressed nor understood*, you have only given a common rule of concord, or apposition: if you mean any thing more, your rule is false. Your first example is nothing to the purpose, the several nouns being predicates of a proposition; and for that reason only are descriptive of the same person; not, as you suppose, because the copulative is omitted, for it might as well have been inserted,  $\pi \epsilon \pi o i \theta \alpha \zeta$  τε σεαυτον όδηγον είναι τυφλων, φως των ἐν σκοτει,  $\pi \alpha i \delta \epsilon \nu \tau \eta v$  ἀφρονων,  $\delta i \delta \alpha \sigma \kappa \alpha \lambda o v$  νηπιων. κ. τ. λ. St. Paul might have written, και φως, και  $\pi \alpha i \delta \nu \tau \eta v$ , και  $\delta i \delta \alpha \sigma \kappa \alpha \lambda o v$ , without any difference of signification.

Your following rules are instances of concord or apposition, and are known to be so, not from the omission of the copulative, but from that, and the signification of the nouns, taken together; as will appear from the subjoined examples, which are direct exceptions to your rule:

Διακονος ἀφοριζει ὑποδιακονον, ἀγνωςην, ψαλτην, διακονισσαν, κ. τ. λ. – Constit. Apost. 1.8.

έαν μη άναγεννηθητε ύδατι ζωντι, είς όνομα πατρος, υίου, άγιου πνευματος, ού μη είσελθητε είς την βασιλειαν των οὐρανων. – Clementina, 698.

όπου οὐκ ἐνι Ἑλλην και Ἰουδαιος, περιτομη και ἀκροδυςια, βαρδαρος, Σκυθης, δουλος, ἐλευθερος. – St. Paul

έν ταυταις κατεκειτο πληθος πολυ των ἀσθενουντων, τυφλων, χολων, ξηρων, ἐκδεχομενων την του ὑδατος κινησιν. –  $St.\ John$ 

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Your fourth rule, relating to nouns not personal, may be passed over. It is sufficient to repeat, that it is founded on the construction called *asyndeton*. Let us proceed to the fifth; viz. When there is no article before the first noun, the insertion of the copulative before the next noun, or name, of the same case, denotes a different person or thing from the first.

This rule, as it relates to things expressed by more than two nouns, is only the fourth rule with the ellipsis of the copulative supplied. In your first example, all the copulatives might have been omitted. I ought to have observed before, that the *asyndeton* never takes place, unless there be more than two nouns; thus we have  $\chi \alpha \rho \iota \zeta$  ύμιν και εἰρηνη ἀπο θεου πατρος, where the copulative could not be omitted;  $\chi \alpha \rho \iota \zeta$ , εἰρηνη ἀπο θεου πατρος, with the copulative understood. If, therefore, you had restricted your second and third

rules, to two nouns only, they would have been true; that is, they would have been rules of concord; but that was evidently short of your intention: besides the concord may be carried through several nouns.

But this fifth rule, as it relates to persons, is utterly false; nouns constructed according to it, may relate to the same, or to different persons. Of different persons you have given examples; my business is to adduce some, where the same person is described.

οὐ γαρ ἐζιν - ἀδικουντα, και ἐπιορκουντα, και ψευδομενον, δυναμιν βεβαιαν κτησασθαι. – Demost.

εὐχαριζωμεν δε ώς θεφ και πατρι και κυριφ. – Origen.

εὐχεσθαι ήμας οὐ δει, ἀλλα δι' ἀρχιερεως και παρακλητου δυναμενου συμπαθειν ταις ἀσθενειαις ήμων. – Origen.

πιζευσον ἀνθρωπε ἀνθρωπφ και θεφ· πιζευσον ἀνθρωπε τῷ παθοντι και προσκυνουμενφ θεφ ζωντι. – Clem. Alex. 578.

παραδολην κυριου τις νοησει, εί μη σοφος και έπιςημων, και άγαπων τον κυριον αύτου. – Clem. Alex. 578.

Your exception is, "when the numerical adjective  $\varepsilon i \zeta$  precedes the first noun; in which case the copulative  $\kappa \alpha i$  will have the same effect that it has between two nouns where only the first is preceded by the article, agreeably to the first rule;" as,  $Ei \zeta \theta \varepsilon o \zeta \kappa \alpha i \pi \alpha \tau \eta \rho$ .

It is true that it will have the same effect; that is, it will generally denote the same person, but not always; as,

ύμεις οὐν, ὡ ἐπισκοποι, εἰς ἑνα πατερα, και υἱον, και ἁγιον πνευμα, τριτον βαπτισατε. – Constit. Apost.

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Your sixth rule is, If both the nouns, connected by the copulative, have the article, they relate to different person.

There is no more truth in this rule than in the preceding one. You should have said, the nouns are distinct appellations, or attributes, generally of different persons, but sometimes of the same person. You have, in part, acknowledged this, by saying, "except distinct and different actions are intended to be attributed to one and the same person, that is, as far as may be discovered by the context." But there frequently occur passages, in which neither the context, nor the grammatical construction, nor any thing present, without a previous acquaintance with the usual application of the terms, can enable us to determine whether one person, or two, be intended; as,

ό δε όμολογουμενος ύπο του πασης κτισεως προτοτοκου, και του υίου του άνθρωπου, συνισταται δια της του υίου του θεου, και του υίου του άνθρωπου όμολογιας τῷ ἐν οὐρανοις πατρι. – Origen.

No reader unacquainted with the language of the Greek Testament, or of ecclesiastical writers, could possibly discover whether the above genitives were appellations of one person, or of two. It would be difficult to show, why the like previous knowledge must be abandoned during our attempts to interpret passages constructed according to your first rule; in order to determine whether they must, or must not be considered as exceptions to it. I add several more exceptions to the last, or sixth rules.

που οὐν ἐζιν ὁ ἐν τοις προφητοις λεγων, και ὁ τεραζια πεποιηκως. – Origen. ὁπερ ἠν ὁ μονογενης του θεου, και ὁ πρωτοτοκος πασης κτισεως. – Origen.

ίνα - ὁ θεος δοξαζηται, και ὁ μονος ἀγαθος και ὁ μονος σωτηρ δι' υίου ἐξ αἰωνος εἰς αἰωνα ἐπιγινωσκηται. – Clem. Alex. 723.

εί οὐν ὁ κυριος ἡμων, και ὁ διδασκαλος, ούτως ἐταπεινωσεν ἑαυτον. – Const. Apost. 290. και ἐξορκιζω σε κυριον τον θεον του οὐρανου, και τον θεον της γης. – Gen. ὁ θεος Ἀδρααμ και ὁ θεος Ναχωρ κρινει ἀνα μεσον ἡμων. – Gen.

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I should now proceed to the immediate consideration of the several passages of Scripture in question, if I had not thought that the following observations on the use of the prepositive article, and the copulative, might contribute to the elucidation of the subject. Some of them will contain nothing but what must be familiar to most readers of Greek; but others I have reason to regard in a different light, having never met with them in any grammatical treatise; and all of them may convey information to those who have not paid particular attention to this portion of Greek syntax. As I wish to make myself clearly understood, I must be speak your candour in favour of any little prolixity that may appear in them.

The definitive article denotes that appellation, whether single or complex, to which it is prefixed, is peculiar to the thing signified, or not common to it with any other thing. Of course it is used in the whole extent of its signification, including all and every thing, to which the single or complex term can be applied. The article might, therefore, be defined to be, the symbol of universality or totality. Accordingly, when it is prefixed to an appellative noun, without any adjunct of limitation expressed or understood, it includes the whole genus, as,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\sigma\varsigma$ , man; in which case the article is frequently omitted, as,

πολιτικον γαρ ὁ ἀνθρωπος και συζῆν πεφυκος. – Arist. φυσει πολιτικον ἀνθρωπος – Arist.

If the article with any term of distinction or limitation, is placed either before or after a noun appellative, the words include as much of the genus, as they can be applied to, as,  $\dot{o}$  ἀγαθος ἀνθρωπος, the good man, i.e. every good man.

And if the appellation, whether single or complex, be peculiar to some individual, it will, of course signify that individual only, as,  $\Delta \eta \mu \sigma \theta \epsilon v \eta \zeta$  ὁ ἡητωρ. Πλατων ὁ φιλοσοφος. In this case, however, the adjunct of distinction is frequently understood, as ὁ κηρυξ, the *messenger*, meaning ὁ κηρυξ ὁ προλεγομένος. – *Thucyd*.

As to the copulative  $\kappa\alpha\iota$ , in its proper sense of a copulative, it always implies plurality; and is used to connect words of the same class, if not in grammatical, at least in logical consideration; as, several subjects, several attributes, several predicates or affirmations, or words used as subjects, attributes or predicates: nor does it ever connect dissimilar words, as an attribute to its subject; whether these consist of an adjective and substantive, or of two substantives; as,  $\dot{\delta}$   $\dot{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\circ\dot{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\omega\pi\circ\dot{\alpha}$ ,  $\dot{\delta}$   $\theta$   $\dot{\epsilon}$   $\dot{\epsilon}$ 

In like manner a proper name and appellative connected as subject and attribute, do not admit the copulative between them, as Πλατων  $\dot{o}$  φιλοσοφος.

There are, however, two seeming exceptions to this rule regarding the copulative. The first arises from the frequent practice in Greek of prefixing the copulative to all the words connected by it, not excepting the first: and therefore, when an adjective agrees with two following substantives, the copulative may be inserted between the adjective and the first substantive, in the sense rendered by the particle *both*, as,

λεγομεν – του βελτιονος ἀει και μοριου και ἀνθρωπου σπουδαιοτεραν την ἐνεργειαν. – Arist. And when a substantive is followed by two adjectives agreeing with it, the copulative may be inserted between the substantive and the first adjective, as,

έν τοις συναλλαγμασι και τοις έκουσιοις και τοις άκουσιους. – Id.

The other seeming exception, according to which the copulative may be inserted between an adjective and substantive, is, when it is used as an amplification, expressed by *vel*, in Latin; or in English by *though*, or by *even* placed after both the nouns, as,

 $\dot{\alpha}$  οὐδε θεμις τω σωφρονι και ἀνθρωπω βλεπειν. – Origen. Quæ vel verecundo homni adspicere nefas. Which things to behold would be abominable for a modest man even; or for a modest person, though a man.

Except in the two cases above-mentioned, the attribute is placed, without the copulative, in immediate connexion with its subject; the

article, if it be used at all, being always prefixed to the attribute. When the attribute is the former of the two nouns, there is only one article, as,  $\dot{o}$  ἀγαθος ἀνθρωπος. When the attribute is in the latter place, there may be one or two articles, as, ἀνθρωπος  $\dot{o}$  ἀγαθος, or,  $\dot{o}$  ἀνθρωπος  $\dot{o}$  ἀγαθος. When the attribute is placed before the article and the subject, the words constitute a whole proposition, as, ἀγαθος  $\dot{o}$  ἀνθρωπος, the man is good. The same may be said, when the attribute without an article follows the article and the subject, as  $\dot{o}$  ἀνθρωπος ἀγαθος, the man is good: nor is it agreeable to the general idiom of the Greek language to use this last arrangement to signify the good man, unless there be another attribute or term of distinction inserted between the article and subject, and something farther be expressly affirmed of the whole, as,

ό σοφιζικός λογός ψευδομένος, άπορια. – Arist.

ή μετα λογου έξις πρακτικη, έτερον έςι της μετα λογου ποιητικης έξεως. – Ιd.

ή δε καλουμενη γνωμη - ή του έπιεικους έςι κρισις όρθη. – Id.

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When several attributes are connected by the copulative, the Greek writers seem to have been directed to the use of the article solely by a regard to perspicuity; according to which, the general rule is, to repeat the article when different things, and especially when different persons are intended; and to avoid the repetition, when the same thing, and especially when the same person is described: but to this rule there are frequent exceptions, depending often on the mere arrangement of words. Thus, when two adjectives precede the substantive, though relating to different things expressed by that substantive, the article is not always repeated, as,

ού γαρ πανταχου ίσα τα οίνηρα και σιτηρα μετρα. – Arist.

If the adjectives follow the substantives, though they relate to the same person or thing, the article may be repeated or not, as,

θεος ὁ μεγας και ἰσχυρος. – Jerem.

θεος ὁ μεγας και ὁ ἰσχυρος. – Genes.

έν τη ήμερα ἐκεινη ἐπαξει ὁ θεος την μαχαιραν την άγιαν, και την μεγαλην, και την ἰσχυραν ἐπι τον δρακοντα. – Isaiah.

But if one, or all the attributes follow their subject, and relate to different things expressed by the same noun, the article is invariable repeated; as,

το δε δεσποτικον δικαιον και το πατρικον, οὐ ταὐτο τουτοις, ἀλλ' ὁμοιον. – Arist.

τα τε γαρ ύπερδαλλοντα γυμνασια, και τα έλλειποντα φθειρει την ίσχυν. – Ιd.

και γαρ των πρωτων όρων και των έσχατων, νους έςι και οὐ λογος. – Id.

The same rule is observed when any restrictive words are used as attributes, and in the same order, as,

τα αὐτοις ἀγαθα, και τα ἀνθρωποις δυνανται θεωρειν. – *Id*.

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Τυχικος ὁ ἀγαπητος ἀδελφος, και πιζος διακονος, και συνδουλος ἐν κυριῳ. – Coll. iv. 7. παρα του κυριου και θεου και σωτηρος ἡμων Ἰησου Χριζου – μαθειν ἐχεις. – Clement. Epit. ὁ πολυιζωρ και πολυμαθης και Ἰουδαιοις και Χριζιανοις ἀμαθιαν ἐγκαλων και ἀπαιδευσιαν Κελσος. – Origen, 529.

μονον γαρ τον σοφον οἱ φιλοσοφοι βασιλεα, νομοθετην, ζρατηγον, δικαιον, όσιον, θεοφιλη, κηρυττουσι. – *Clem. Alex.* 351.

As several examples of the copulative omitted have been already adduced under my occasional remarks on the *asyndeton*, it is unnecessary to multiply them here: I shall only add, that the several particulars are sometimes collected into pairs, the copulative being inserted between each pair, as in a former example from St. Paul.

όπου οὐκ ἐνι Ἑλλην και Ἰουδαιος, περιτομη και ἀκροδυςια, βαρδαρος, Σκυθης, δουλος, ἐλευθερος.

In the above remarks on the syntax of the article and the copulative, I do not pretend to have produced anything more than must be familiar, and obvious, to every attentive reader of the Greek language: but the following are such as I have reason to consider in a different light. They are recommended to your particular attention, as they will afford additional evidence, that in the use of the article and the copulative, the Greek writers were governed not so much by any arbitrary rules, as by a regard to perspicuity and distinctness; and that, accordingly, there are some cases, in which the article can not be repeated after the copulative, whether the nouns relate to the same thing or person, or to different things or persons; there are others, in which it must be repeated; and there are others

again, in which the repetition depends on the pleasure of the writer, or perhaps, on prevailing habit; but in all, the fundamental principle seems to have been a regard to perspicuity: where this was sufficiently secured, either by the terms or the context, there was evidently a proportional latitude allowed in the construction.

There are at least three cases, in which the article cannot be repeated after the copulative, whether the nouns express identity or diversity of persons or things. That which shall be first mentioned, is, when the nouns must be taken conjunctively; that is, when what is affirmed of them, must be understood as affirmed of them all in conjunction, and cannot be applied to each of them separately, or, when the nouns are not parts of so many distinct sentences, but of one indivisible sentence, as,

ό τε γαρ παντα φευγων και φοβουμενος και μηδεν ύπομενων, δειλος γινεται. – Arist.

Here, indeed, the same person is intended; but it is not for that reason that the article is not repeated; but because the several nouns connected by the copulative must be taken together to make up the subject of the words  $\delta \epsilon i \lambda o \zeta \gamma i \nu \epsilon \tau \alpha i$ , which could not be affirmed of each of the preceding distinctly: so again,

τιθεασι γαρ φιλον, τον βουλομενον και πραττοντα τάγαθα, ή φαινομενα, έκεινου ένεκα. – Id.

The words τον βουλομενον και πραττοντα τάγαθα, must be taken together, to complete the definition of  $\dot{o}$  φιλος. Had either of the terms been a sufficient description of a friend, the article would have been repeated, to express, not different persons, but distinct and complete appellations of the same person, as,

φανερον δ' ἐκ τουτου και ὁ ἐπιεικης τις ἐςιν. ὁ γαρ των τοιουτων προαιρετικος και πρακτικος, και ὁ μη ἀκριδοδικαιος ἐπι το χειρον, ἀλλ' ἐλαττωτικος, και ἐχων τον νομον βοηθον, ἐπιεικης ἐςι. – Id.

This example contains to descriptions of ὁ ἐπιεικης.

έν οίς γαρ μηδεν κοινον έςι τω άρχοντι και άρχομενω, οὐδε φιλια. – Id.

Though different persons are here signified, yet the article is omitted before the second, because the word  $\kappa \omega \omega \zeta$ , cannot be applied to each of them separately taken, but to them both in conjunction; for whatever is common, must be so to two persons, or things, at least. Yet I would not venture to affirm, that this is always the construction of the noun  $\kappa \omega \omega \zeta$ , as the repetition of the article could occasion no obscurity. The propriety of it, however, is evident; and receives some confirmation from a passage already adduced from *Clemens Alex*.

γινεται δη οὐν τα παντα του ἀνθρωπου, ότι τα παντα του θεου· και κοινα ἀμφοιν τοιν φιλοιν τα παντα, του θεου και ἀνθρωπου.

In these instances, the copulative without the article following, has the same sense as the conjunctive preposition  $\sigma\nu\nu$ , or the Latin *cum*, *commune est mihi tecum*. From this application of the copulative, the construction of some of the texts, of which you would correct the version might be accounted for without going farther. Thus the words  $\dot{\eta}$   $\beta\alpha\sigma\lambda\epsilon\iota\alpha$   $\tau\nu\nu$   $\tau\nu$   $\tau\nu$   $\tau\nu$   $\tau\nu$   $\tau\nu$  may be so constructed to express more emphatically the community of that kingdom – *the common kingdom of Christ and God*. Had the adjective  $\tau\nu$  been inserted in its proper place, the construction would have been perfectly regular. If, however, you should consider this remark as a refinement, you are at liberty to reject it; for I shall make no farther use of it; and we will proceed with our examples.

Two infinitives are often comprehended under one common article, and for the same reason as the nouns above, as,

γιγνεται (ἰσχυς) γαρ έκ του πολλην τροφην λαμδανειν και πολλους πονους ὑπομενειν. – Arist.

The author evidently means that strength is generated, not from each of the two actions distinctly, but from them both in conjunction. The infinitives denote distinct actions, but the words γιγνεται ἰσχυς ἐκ του cannot be affirmed of each of them: so again,

ή μεν ἀσωτια, τω μεν διδοναι και μη λαμβανειν ὑπερβαλλει, τω δε λαμβανειν ἐλλειπει – Id. το εὐδαιμονειν ἐζιν ἐν τω ζῆν, και ἐνεργειν. – Id.

άγαθον το μη εύξασθαι, ή το εύξασθαι και μη άποδουναι – Ecclesiast.

When the infinitives are affirmed of distributively, the article is repeated, as,

χαλεπον δε γινεται και το συγχαιρειν, και το συναλγειν οίκειως πολλοις. – Arist.

The author is plainly speaking of two distinct difficulties; so that the words χαλεπον δε γινεται must be understood as separately affirmed of each of the infinitives.

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A second case, in which the article cannot be repeated, arises out of the construction of oppositions. A noun set in opposition to a preceding one has the article repeated, as,

οὐδε ὁμοιον έζιν έπι τε των τεχνων, και των άρετων. -Id.

But when two or more nouns are collected together on the side of such opposition, the article is not repeated on the same side, as,

ούδε γαρ τον αύτον έχει τροπον έπι τε των έπιζημων και δυναμεων, και έπι των έξεων. – Id.

The reason of this construction seems obvious enough. The nouns  $\dot{\epsilon}\pi\iota\zeta\eta\mu\omega\nu$  and  $\delta\upsilon\nu\alpha\mu\epsilon\omega\nu$  are not opposed to each other, but both

of them to  $\tau\omega\nu$  έξεων; a distinction that would entirely vanish, if they were all constructed in the same manner: for then the three nouns would stand in equal opposition to each other. The rule is so general, that it is to be observed in the following example from the fifth book of Thucydides, apparently without the same necessity.

ή πολις ή μεταπεμψαμενη διδοτω τω μεν όπλιτη και ψιλω και τοξοτη τρεις όβολους, τω δε ίππει, κ. τ. λ.

Though the several nouns are used in a general sense, the construction is not reconcilable to your rule, and so far furnishes another striking exception to it.

In such instances as this last, in which the whole context, especially with the particles  $\mu\epsilon\nu$  and  $\delta\epsilon$ , renders an adherence to the above rule respecting oppositions less necessary, one might naturally expect to meet with occasional exceptions to it; and therefore, though I have not met with any, I have only called the rule general. But when there is nothing but the article to mark the points of opposition, I have no doubt that the rule holds invariably.

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A third case, and the last that I can discover, in which the article cannot be repeated after the copulative, is, when between the article and the first noun there is an attribute, or any term of limitation, common to all the following nouns, as,

ή δοξα δ' αὐτη δοκει γεγενησθαι έκ των περι την τροφην λυπων και ήδονων. – Arist.

It is evident, that had the article been prefixed to the latter noun  $\dot{\eta}\delta ov\omega v$ , the words would have signified pleasures generally, or universally, instead of pleasures  $\pi\epsilon\rho\iota$   $\tau\eta\nu$   $\tau\rhoo\phi\eta\nu$ . It is omitted, therefore, to preserve the reference to the foregoing, and common restriction. As this rule is founded on a cogent reason, I have no hesitation in pronouncing it invariable. Examples are of frequent occurrence; such as these,

συμβαινει δη περι τας ένεργειας τουναντιον άπο των οἰκειων ήδονων τε και λυπων. – Id. περι τα αὐτω ἀγαθα και συμφεροντα. – Id.

τοις σφετεροις τεκνοις και φιλοις. -Id.

λεγομεν – του βελτιονος ἀει και μοριου και ἀνθρωπου σπουδαιοτεραν την ἐνεργειαν. – Id. οίον τα περι τους θεους ἀναθηματα και κατασκευαι και θυσιαι. – Id.

It may be remarked from the last two examples, that the rule still obtains, though the nouns be of different genders.

ή κατα χριζον ἀγαπητικη ήμων διδασκαλια τε και πολιτεια. – Clem. Alex.

τεκμηριον έσεσθαι της τουτου θρασυτητος και τολμης. – Lysias

δειγματα της έκεινου γνωμης και κακοδαιμονιας. – Demosth.

ή Μακεδονικη άρχη και δυναμις. – *Id*.

It is very rare to meet with nouns personal of the singular number, thus constructed; the following, however, is one:

ό μεν οὐν Περσων ή Ῥωμαιων βασιλεως σατραπης και ὑπεροχος ή ςρατηγος. – Cels. ap. Orig.

The following contains only one personal noun:

δια τουτο έγω τω άγιω Ἰουδαιων θεω και νομω προσεφυγον. – Clementina, 655.

The next (to which a particular reference will be made hereafter) contains personal nouns only, and completely overthrows the universality of your rule:

αἰνουντας εὐχαριζειν, τῷ μονῷ πατρι και υίῷ, υίῷ και πατρι, παιδαγωγῷ και διδασκαλῷ υίῷ, συν και τῷ ἀγιῷ πνευματι. – Clem. Alexand. 266.

It follows, that when the noun subjoined to the copulative is not subject to the preceding attribute or restriction understood, the article must be repeated, as,

ώσπερ γαρ έν ταις πολεσιν ένισχυει τα νομιμα και τα ήθη, ούτω και έν οἰκειαις οἱ πατρικοι λογοι και τα ήθη. – Arist.

Had the adjective  $\pi\alpha\tau\rho$ iko $\varsigma$  been understood with the second substantive, the article must have been omitted before it, according to the former examples.

In all the above examples the application of the rule has been considered with relation to different things or persons: when the same thing or person is meant, the rule is still the same, provided the preceding attribute or restriction be common to all the nouns following; when it is not common, and the same person meant, the connexion is made by the article without the copulative; in which case the same person will be described by a second and distinct appellation, of which the former makes no part, as,

ό μακαριος και μονος δυναζης, ό βασιλευς των βασιλευοντων και κυριος των κυριευοντων.

The same construction is often used without the same necessity, as,

άσεδουσιν είς – τον άγιον δημιουργον τον παντοκρατορα μονον θεον. – Clem. Alex. 441.

άπιζειν ἐπιχειρουντας ἀξιωπιζω διδασκαλω τω μονω σωτηρι θεω. – Id.

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As to the cases in which the repetition of the article after the copulative is especially necessary, they all arise out of a regard to

perspicuity, distinctness, emphasis, or the like; as may appear from a few examples.

δοκει τε και άλαζων είναι ὁ θρασυς και προσποιητικός της άνδρειας – Arist.

In this passage the words ἀλαζων and προσποιητικος are two predicates. Had the latter been a second subject, the article must have been repeated. Accordingly, it will be found a very general rule, that when a second subject follows the predicate, the article must be repeated after the copulative, to distinguish it from a second predicate, with which it might otherwise be confounded; or even to prevent its appearing to be constructed as one, as,

δοκει δε ὁ τε παρανομος ἀδικος εἰναι και ὁ πλεονεκτης, και ὁ ἀνισος. – Id. περι ταυτα μεν οὐν εἰσιν ὁ τε δειλος, και ὁ θρασυς, και ὁ ἀνδρειος. – Id.

περι τας τοιαυτας δη ήδονας ή σωφροσυνη και ή ἀκολασια έςιν. – Id.

τοιουτον δε μαλιςα ή ἐπιθυμια και ὁ παις. – Id.

παντες άγαπωσι μαλλον τα αύτων έργα, ώσπερ οί γονεις και οί ποιητοι. – Id.

And yet with the same arrangement there are some, though very few, instances of the article not repeated, where the omission can lead to no mistake, as,

είναι δε τοιουτους ήγουμεθα τους οίκονομικους και πολιτικους. – Id.

περι ήδονας και λυπας είσιν οί τ' έγκρατεις και καρτερικοι, και άκρατεις και μαλακοι. – *Id*.

In comparisons, distinctions, distributions, the article is especially repeated, as,

τι δε διαφερει ή άρετη και ή δικαιοσυνη, δηλον. – Id.

διηρηται το παθος, και ή πραξις είς άνισα. – Ιd.

το έκουσιον και το άκουσιον διαφερει πολυ. – Id.

ό μεντοι κυδευτης και ό λωποδυτης και ό ληζης των άνελευθερων είσιν. – Ιd.

And when each of the nouns has the copulative with a particular emphasis, as,

έκ γαρ του κιθαριζειν και οἱ ἀγαθοι και οἱ κακοι γιγνονται κιθαριζαι. – Ιd.

περι ήδονας και λυπας πασα ή πραγματεια, και τη άρετη και τη πολιτικη. – Id.

και τφ άδικφ και τφ άκολαςφ έξην τοιουτοις μη γενεσθαι. – Ιd.

εὐϊατος τε γαρ και ὑπο της ἡλικιας, και ὑπο της ἀποριας. – Ιd.

But where no obscurity could follow from a different construction, a greater liberty was allowed; as you have seen in the several exceptions to your first rule: two examples shall be transcribed, that you may compare them without farther trouble:

εἰτα περι ποια τον ἀκρατη, και τον ἐγκρατη θετεον. – Id.

του γαρ έγκρατους και άκρατους τον λογον έπαινομεν. – Id.

And now, SIR, if you have impartially considered the above remarks, and recollect the several exceptions produced to your first rule, you may probably suspect, that the texts of scripture which are the immediate objects of this inquiry, may be farther exceptions to the same rule of interpretation: and if you will permit the sacred writers to be explained by themselves, in preference to Chrysostom or Theophylact, that suspicion will approach very near to conviction.

Upon the supposition that your rule may be acknowledged not to hold universally, and that the authority of a few of the Greek fathers is not finally decisive, I take it for granted, that any of the ordinary sources of illustration may be applied to, in the prosecution of this inquiry: such as comparing the author with himself, with the prevailing modes of construction, in the New Testament, the Septuagint, the earliest Fathers, &c. and I shall have recourse to them accordingly.

As the order in which the passages of scripture in question are examined, is of no importance in itself, I shall follow that which seems most suitable to the purpose of illustration; and therefore, begin with Ephes. v. 5.

οὐκ έχει κληρονομιαν έν τη βασιλεια τοῦ χριζου και θεου.

You insist that one person only can be intended here, because the article is not repeated after the copulative. On the contrary, the insertion of the copulative is, I should think, a clear proof, that two persons are meant, and for these reasons:

- 1. The noun χριζος, though an adjective according to etymology, yet in use and application assumes the nature of a proper name. In this respect it does not essentially differ from such proper names as Justus, Clemens, Secundus, Tertius. It is used as a proper name in a multitude of passages; such, for instance, as χριζος ἀπεθανεν ὑπερ των ἁμαρτιων ἡμων. ---- Ωσπερ γαρ ἐν τῷ Ἀδαμ παντες ἀποθνησκουσιν, οὑτω και ἐν τῷ χριστῷ παντες ζωοποιηθησονται. ----Μωσης μεν πιζος ἐν ὁλῷ τῷ οἰκῷ αὐτου, ὡς θεραπων, χριζος δε, ὡς υἰος ἐπι τον οἰκον αὐτου. In these two passages the word χριζος performs the office of a proper name as completely as the words Adam and Moses.
- 2. Accordingly the noun χριζος, whatever you please to call it, is constructed as a proper name in every passage of the New Testament, with which the one before us can be compared: so that wherever an attribute is joined to it, the connexion is made without the copulative. As Herod the king, is Hρωδης ὁ βασιλευς; so Christ the king of Israel,

ό χριζος ό βασιλευς του Ίσραηλ, καταδατω νυν άπο του ζαυρου. – Mark.

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The construction is the same with the attributes, Lord and Saviour, and with others, as, τω γαρ κυριώ χριζω δουλευετε. – Coll. 3. δια Ίησου Χριζου του σωτηρος ήμων. – Tit. iii. 6. είς και μεσιτης θεου και ἀνθρωπων, ἀνθρωπος Χριζος Ἰησους. – I Tim. ii. 5. εἰ οὐτος ἐστιν ὁ Χριζος ὁ ἐκλεκτος του θεου. – Luke xxiii. 35. παρακλητον ἐγομεν προς τον πατερα, Ἰησουν γριζον δικαιον. – I John ii.1.
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Many similar passages might be referred to, if it were not superfluous. Had there been in the New Testament on such expression as ὁ χριζος και κυριος, for *Christ the Lord*, or as Ἰησους ὁ χριζος και κυριος, *Jesus the Christ and Lord*, it would have been parallel to that under examination, in the sense you ascribe to it. But as the case actually stands, the passage we are considering must either be an exception to your rule, or a deviation from the constant form of construction in every similar instance. The former supposition contains no improbability, as the noun χριζος is a proper name, or *cognomen*; and we have seen that one proper name is sufficient to except the passage in which it occurs from the operation of your rule: the latter is in the highest degree improbable. It may be affirmed with confidence, that had one person been intended, the usual construction would have been observed, and the author would have written χριζου θεου, or του θεου χριζου, or the like. Similar examples occur frequently in the earliest writers, as παντα ὑπεταξεν Χριζω τω βασιλει ἡμων. ---- ὁ κυριος ἡμων Χριστος . . . . . ἐχρισθη. – *Clem. Alex*.

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έτοιμους γινεσθαι είς θεου του χριςου παρουσιαν. – Id. κατα δυναμιν χριςου του θεου. – Ignat. ad Trall. καλως έποιησατε ύποδεξαμενοι ώς διακονους χριςου θεου. – Ad. Smyrn. ό γαρ θεος ήμων Ίησους ό Χριςος. – Ignat. ad Mag. εύρομεν το σωτηριον ήμων Ἰησουν Χριςον, τον άρχιερεα των προσφορων ήμων. – Clem.
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το αίμα αύτου έδωκεν ύπερ ήμων ὁ Χριζος ὁ κυριος ήμων. – *Id.* γινεσθε ἀρεζοι ἐν πασι χριζω τω θεφ ήμων –

Rom. Epist. 1.

But here I find from your third edition, which contains all that I know of the laborious work of your diligent correspondent,\* that I encounter the imposing and formidable authority of some of the Greek fathers; who must certainly have understood the idiom of their own language. They might have erred by not adverting to the idiom of the Greek Testament. The whole

[\* The Rev. C. Wordsworth, who wrote *Six Letters addressed to Granville Sharp*, *Esq.* in which he endeavoured to prove, that the early Greek fathers understood the controverted texts in the sense which Mr. Sharp affixed to them.]

weight of their authority may be removed without any mighty effort, either of intellect or of criticism. They evidently understood the two nouns as attributes of a similar class, and therefore, not less properly connected by the copulative to express one person in any situation, than the nouns Lord and Saviour, or the like; but the sacred writers evidently regarded the noun *Christ* in a different light, as appears by their constantly joining an attribute to it (when they join one at all) in the same manner as an adjective to its substantive; not as a co-ordinate epithet. There is, indeed, an instance of the words Lord and Christ, connected by the copulative, where they are distinct predicates of a proposition and resolvable into two: but that instance is foreign to the present argument.

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1 Tim. v.21. – Διαμαρτυρομαι ένωπιον του θεου και κυριου Ίησου Χριζου και των έκλεκτων άγγελων. κ. τ. λ.

It is very doubtful whether the noun κυριος be part of the true reading or not; but upon either supposition, your proposed version is exposed to insuperable objections. If the word in question be omitted, the rest remaining in the same order as above, the passage is unaffected by your rule, the proper name being immediately subjoined to the copulative. If you adopt the order of the Alexandrian manuscript, and place the noun Χριζος next after the copulative, the same objections occur as to the former example. In no similar instance, of unequivocal signification, do the sacred writers insert the copulative between an attribute and a name of Jesus, whether that name be *Christ*, or *Jesus*, or *Christ Jesus*, or *Jesus Christ*; ὁ θεος και Χριστος Ἰησους for one person, is as little congruous to the style of the New Testament, as would be, ὁ κυριος και Χριστος, or Ἰησους ὁ κυριος και Χριστος: and to suppose that St. Paul would deviate from the usual construction, where an adherence to it would have prevented all ambiguity, is repugnant to any principles of rational criticism. How easy, and how natural, would it have been for him to write ἐνωπιον του θεου ἡμων Ἰησου Χριστου. Τησου Χριστου του κυριου ὑμων, and the like?

As to the order of the words, it is evident that by inverting the two nouns, all ambiguity would be removed, as  $\dot{\epsilon}\nu\omega\pi$ 100 kur100 ku1

θεου Ἰησου Χριστου; and it is highly probable, independently of the advantage attainable by it of greater perspicuity, that such an arrangement would have been observed, had the author intended to describe no more than one person; because such arrangement would have been consonant to that which constantly prevails throughout the New Testament in every parallel instance. Thus when the two attributes Lord and Saviour, are together ascribed to Christ, the noun κυριος is never so placed as to be connected with the other following the copulative, as εἰς την αἰωνιον βασιλειαν του κυριου ἡμων και σωτηρος Ἰησου Χριστου. – 2 Pet. i. II.

In the same epistle there are similar examples; but it is useless to transcribe them, as the arrangement, I am speaking of, is so familiar to every ear, that the contrary one would hardly be tolerated even in English – our Saviour and Lord Jesus Christ. But as St. Peter is no rule for St. Paul, I add one from the latter writer, which may afford some presumption for at least what sort of arrangement would have suggested itself to him, had he been describing the same person in the passage under examination: εἰρηνη ἀπο θεου πατρος, και κυριου Ἰησου Χριστου του σωτηρος ἡμων. This arrangement would have removed all ambiguity; ἐνωπιον κυριου Ἰησου Χριστου του θεου, as ὁ κυριος ἡμων και θεος Ἰησους Χριστος ὁ υίος του θεου του ζωντος πρωτον ἐποιησε. – Ignat. ad. Ephes. interpol.

If, however, you should regard these remarks on the order of words as of little consequence, you must be differently affected by comparing the two next examples.

2 Tim. iv. 1. Διαμαρτυρομαι οὐν ἐγω ἐνωπιον του θεου και Ἰησου Χριστου του μελλοντος κρινειν ζωντας και νεκρους, κ. τ. λ.

This is the reading of Griebach's Testament; the common reading has του κυριου, after the copulative; you prefer κυριου, omitting the article, but without sufficient authority; the best reading according the authority of the most ancient and valuable MSS. is Χριστου Ἰησου, not Ἰησου Χριστου, the noun κυριος being omitted. With this reading we must understand two persons to be intended for the reason already assigned, namely, that it is contrary to the invariable construction of the New Testament to insert the copulative between the nouns, Ἰησους οτ Χριστος, or Ἰησους Χριστος, and any of the indisputable attributes of Christ. But the next parallel passage will decide the question, if any remain.

1 Tim. vi. 13. Παραγγελλω σοι ένωπιον του θεου του ζωοποιουντος τα παντα, και Χριστου Ίησου του μαρτυρησαντος έπι Ποντιου Πιλατου την καλην όμολογιαν.

You acknowledge, as you necessarily must, that in this last passage, the names of distinct persons are connected by the copulative; and of course in the former one. For what is the difference between them? In both, according to the most authoritative reading of the former, the name Χριστος Ἰησους is immediately subjoined to the copulative; and in both, that name is immediately followed by the article and a participle; του μελλοντος----του μαρτυρησαντος. If it be admitted that the noun κυριος should be rejected from the first of the three passages, (and so it is cited by Clem. Alex. Strom. lib. 1.) then they are all equally descriptive of distinct persons by construction, independently of the light reflected upon the two former from the last: but if you will have the noun κυριος to make part of the original context, (except in the last passage) you are, I am persuaded, contending for two direct exceptions to your rule, provided St. Paul be allowed to interpret himself. For what have we before us in the three passages? They are neither more nor less than so many similar obtestations, from the same author, addressed to the same person, comprising terms of the same import; - before God and Christ Jesus. I should think it utterly repugnant to any rational principle of criticism to imagine any such difference of signification in them, as you would ascribe to them; and upon no better evidence, than that of a doubtful reading, interpreted by a rule that is liable to many exceptions, and not even applicable to any of the passages hitherto examined, but upon the improbable supposition that they are deviations from the form of construction observed in all similar instances: though that form has the advantage of being in no respect ambiguous.

It may be added here, that St. Paul uses this expression, ένωπιον του θεου, where God the father can only be meant, as  $\dot{\alpha}$  δε γραφω ύμιν, ίδου ένωπιον του θεου, ότι οὐ ψευδομαι. *Gal.* i.20.----ἐνωπιον του σωτηρος ἡμων θεου. – 1 *Tim.* ii. 3.

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2 Thess. i. 12. Κατα την χαριν του θεου ήμων και κυριου Ίησου Χριστου.

I cannot think that St. Paul intended to denominate one person only in this passage, because *first*, in the Septuagint, when these words κυριος and θεος are ascribed to one person, the connexion is made without the copulative; κυριος ὁ θεος, ὁ κυριος ὁ θεος, *the Lord God*----κυριος ὁ θεος ἡμων, the Lord our God. St. Paul had only to adopt this arrangement, with which he must have been sufficiently acquainted, and the whole would have been incapable of any other sense than that which you attribute to it: as κατα την χαριν κυριου

του θεου ἡμων Ἰησου Χριστου, and, therefore, I apprehend that the insertion of the copulative between the two nouns affords a strong presumption that he meant to separate the latter, κυριος, from the preceding  $\dot{o}$  θεος, and assign it to the proper name, as a distinct subject.

But, *secondly*, had he preferred to insertion of the copulative to designate the same person, it is highly probable that he would have chosen a different arrangement, so as to preserve the noun kuriog in its usual construction, του κυριου και θεου Ίησου Χριστου, which would also have determined, beyond dispute, the application of θεου.

On a former occasion, I forbore to urge, as far as I might have done, this argument founded on the arrangement of the words, because it was there less necessary: but on this, where it appears to me nearly decisive of the author's meaning, if not entirely so, I think it expedient to be more particular; and, therefore, I observe, that the noun κυριος being in an eminent degree the discriminating and leading title of Christ, it always takes, in the New Testament, where there is no room for doubt, an emphatical and prominent position; not the subordinate one, to which you would reduce it. In the only passage that unequivocally applies the two nouns *Lord* and *God*, to Christ, namely, the address of St. Thomas, the former preserves its proper position, though the two are expressed distinctly, not conjunctively, *my Lord, and my God*.

Had all or any of the passages, we are considering, been understood from the first, in the sense you impute to them, they must have found their way, as forms, I mean, or models of construction, into the earliest writings of the Christian Church; because they would have been the only models to be adopted. But in the earliest writings, whether genuine or spurious, those in particular collected by *Cotelerius*, under the common title of *Patrici Apostolici*, though containing several conjunctive applications of the titles *Lord* and *God* to Christ, the collocation is never what it most probably would have been, had the authors understood St. Paul as you do; take these examples:

ό έμος κυριος και θεος Ίησους Χριζος. – Mart. – Ignat. 163.

ό κυριος ήμων και θεος Ἰησους Χριζος ό υίος του θεου του ζωντος. – *Ignat. ad. Ephes.* interpol.

παρα του κυριου και θεου και σωτηρος ήμων Ίησου Χριζου – μαθειν έχεις. - *Clement. Epitome*.

έχομεν ἰατρον και τον κυριον ἡμων θεον Ἰησουν τον Χριζον. – *Ignat. ad. Ephes. interpol.* ἀπεναντι γαρ των του κυριου και θεου ἐσμεν ὀφθαλμων. – *Polycarpi Epist.* 186.

In this last example the words are not apparently applied to Christ; but they serve to show the order that would be observed in applying them to any one person.

Lastly, If to these arguments be added the consideration that St. Paul frequently employs the noun  $\theta \epsilon o \varsigma$  absolutely in direct contradistinction to our Lord Jesus Christ, as in the benediction, The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, and the love of God, &c. that he tells us, we have one God, the Father; and one Lord, Jesus Christ; and that your rule is liable to various and indisputable exceptions, you may perhaps think that an impartial reader may have sufficient reason to add the passage at the head of this discussion to those exceptions. In this light I shall continue to regard it, until I meet with more convincing arguments to alter my opinion, than any you have been able to advance; and in the same light I consider the following, without apprehension of error.

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Jude 4. και τον μονον δεσποτην θεον, και κυριον ήμων Ίησουν Χριζον άρνουμενοι.

In every point of view in which I can contemplate this passage, there occur to me insuperable objections to your translation of it; whether I reflect upon the construction, or upon the sense of the words employed. With respect to the former, you understand the three nouns  $\delta\epsilon\sigma\pi\sigma\tau\eta\nu$ ,  $\theta\epsilon\sigma\nu$ ,  $\kappa\nu\rho\nu$ , as so many attributes of Jesus Christ. Had this been the intention of the writer, it is exceedingly probable, because much more agreeable to the idiom of the language, that he would have inserted the copulative between each of them as in these instances:

άναγκαιον δε ήγησαμην Έπαφροδιτον τον άδελφον και συνεργον και συςρατιωτην μου, ύμων δε άποςολον, και λειτουργον της χρειας μου, πεμψαι προς ύμας. *Phil.* ii. 25.

Τυχικος ὁ ἀγαπητος ἀδελφος, και πιζος διακονος, και συνδουλος ἐν κυριφ. – Coll. iv. 7.

και ἐπεμψαμεν Τιμοθεον, τον ἀδελφον ήμων, και διακονον του Θεου, και συνεργον ήμων. – 1 Thess. iii. 2.

On the other hand, if you should change your ground a little, and understand the noun  $\delta \epsilon \sigma \pi \sigma \tau \eta \nu$  as the attribute of Θεον, and, therefore, as performing the office of an adjective to it, in the sense of the *only supreme God*; then it would have accorded better with Greek syntax, to have made the connexion with the following κυριον by the article without the copulative, τον μονον  $\delta \epsilon \sigma \pi \sigma \tau \eta \nu$ , τον κυριον  $\dot{\eta} \mu \omega \nu$ ; which was also very obvious and easy expedient to exclude

all ambiguity from the passage. I believe you will find it to be a general, if not invariable, rule; when the article, attribute, and substantive, are followed by another substantive, a farther appellation of the same person or thing, the attribute not being intended as common to the two, that the connexion is made by the article alone; of this construction I have already given some examples, with reason of it, as,

ό μακαριος και μονος δυναζης, ό βασιλευς των βασιλευοντων και κυριος των κυριευοντων. – 1 *Tim.* vi. 15.

έξαπεςειλε τον μονογενη αύτου υίον τον κυριον ήμων Ίησουν Χριζον. - Clementin. 762.

In the former of these examples I suppose St. Paul did not intend the adjectives  $\mu\alpha\kappa\alpha\rho\iota\circ\varsigma$  and  $\mu\circ\iota\circ\varsigma$  to be understood with  $\beta\alpha\sigma\iota\lambda\epsilon\iota\circ\varsigma$ ; yet as there was no incongruity in the application, he might have substituted the copulative for the article; but in the latter, the connexion could not be made otherwise than it is, because the adjective  $\mu\circ\iota\circ\varsigma$  could not be applied to  $\kappa\iota\circ\rho\iota\circ\iota$ .

The uncommonness of the construction in the passage from St. Jude, supposing only one person to be meant, seems to have induced the Complutensian editors to put a correcting hand to it. *contra codices* (see Griesbach's Test.) thus, τον μονον δεσποτην και Θεον τον κυριον ήμων Ἰησουν Χριζον, which indeed would render the whole clear and plain; and shews at the same time that, understanding the passage as you do, they were dissatisfied with the construction.

However, taking the passage as it is given in our common editions, the former portion of it is in construction exactly parallel with  $\delta$   $\sigma\omega\tau\eta\rho$   $\eta\mu\omega\nu$   $\Theta\epsilon\sigma\varsigma$ ; which occurs several times in the writings of St. Paul. Now  $\delta$   $\sigma\omega\tau\eta\rho$ , in this form of expression is not a discriminating attribute, as if there was a Saviour God, besides other Gods not Saviours; but the noun  $\Theta\epsilon\sigma\varsigma$  is the particularizing name; and performs the same office that a proper name would in the same place; and the words may be rendered precisely, *our Saviour, namely God:* or, as they are rendered in the common version, *God our Saviour.* In the same manner may the whole passage of Jude be rendered:

Denying God the supreme governor, and our Lord Jesus Christ.\*

And that such is the true rendering, as to the sense, whether  $\Theta \epsilon o \zeta$  be part of the original or not, may be placed beyond all reasonable doubt, if we farther consider the signification of the noun  $\delta \epsilon \sigma \pi o \tau \eta \zeta$ , as well as its actual application in the New Testament, and in the

<sup>\*</sup> Since these remarks were written, I have, by accident seen an English version of the date of 1585, in which the passage of St. Jude is thus rendered, *Denying God the only Lord, and the Lord Jesus Christ*.

most ancient writings of the Christian Church. The noun δεσποτης is *Herus*, and is used by St. Paul as equivalent to οἰκοδεσποτης, *pater familias*.

έν μεγαλη δε οἰκια οὐκ ἐςι μονον σκευη χρυσᾶ και ἀργυρᾶ . . . . εἰ οὐν τις ἐκκαθαρη ἑαυτον ἀπο τουτων, ἐςαι σκευος εἰς τιμην, ἡγιασμενον και εὐχρηςον τω δεσποτη. – 2 *Tim.* ii. 20.

Now our Lord is not  $\delta$  δεσποτης, pater familias; still less is he  $\delta$  μονος δεσποτης, in his father's house, but the son and heir of all things: accordingly there is not a passage in the New Testament that unequivocally ascribes this title to Christ; but several that do to God the Father, as above, and,

νυν ἀπολυεις τον δουλον σου, δεσποτα, κατα το ἡημα σου. – Luke ii. 29.

όμοθυμαδον ήραν φωνην προς τον Θεον, και είπον· δεσποτα, συ ὁ Θεος, ὁ ποιησας. κ. τ.  $\lambda$ . – Acts iv. 24.

Clemens Romanus, whose first epistle approaches the nearest of all the ancient writings in style, and therefore, in point of authority, to the canonical scriptures, uses the same noun as equivalent to  $\dot{o}$   $\Theta \epsilon o \varsigma$ , and in contradistinction to our Lord Jesus Christ, as,

διεσωσε δι' αύτου (Νωε) ὁ δεσποτης τα εἰσελθοντα ἐν ὁμονοια ζωα εἰς την κιβωτον. – 151.

ταυτα παντα ὁ μεγας δημιουργος και δεσποτης των ἀπαντων ἐν εἰρηνη και ὁμονοια προσεταξεν εἰναι, ἐνεργετων τα παντα, ὑπερεκπερισσως δε ἡμας τους προσπεφευγοτας τοις οἰκτιρμοις αὐτου, δια του κυριου ἡμων Ἰησου Χριςου. – 159.

κατανοησωμεν, άγαπητοι, πως ὁ δεσποτης ἐπιδεικνυται διηνεκως ήμιν την μελλουσαν ἀναςασιν ἐσεσθαι, ής την ἀπαρχην ἐποιησατο τον κυριον Ἰησουν Χριζον. – 160.

δια τουτου (χριζου) ήθελησεν ό δεσποτης της άθανατου γνωσεως ήμας γευσασθαι. – 167.

In the same epistle there are more passages of the same kind, one of which I will select, as it is completely parallel with the former part of St. Jude's.

ήξιωσεν (Έσθηρ) τον παντοποιητην δεσποτην Θεον των αίωνων. – 178.

Justin Martyr uses the same word as distinct from vioç.

ή πρωτη δυναμις, μετα τον πατερα παντων και δεσποτην Θεον, και υίος, ὁ λογος ἐστιν. – See Clarke on the Trin. 119.

έν ὀνοματι του πατρος των όλων και δεσποτου Θεου, και του σωτηρος ήμων Χριστου Ἰησου, και πνευματος άγιου. – See *Bingham's Antiq.* vol. iv. 191.

Not having the works of Justin Martyr, I am obliged to refer to Clarke and Bingham.

Two or three of the above cited passages from *Clem. Rom.* are also quoted by *Clem. Alex. Strom. lib.* 4. whose authority may there-

fore be added to that of his predecessors; and indeed the consentient language of antiquity, which has appropriated the titles of supremacy, as  $\dot{o}$   $\mu o v o c \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \pi a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}\pi \iota \tau a v \tau \omega v \Theta c c$ ,  $\dot{o}$   $\dot{e}$   $\dot$ 

You are aware, as unavoidably you must be, that your interpretation of St. Jude, as well as of St. Paul in another text, may prove rather too much for the credit of your rule, as it applies to our Lord the titles of the only potentate God, and the great God; which are evidently titles of supremacy, equivalent to ὁ μακαριος και μονος δυναςης, and therefore incommunicable; for a communicable supremacy, in the proper sense of the words, is a contradiction in terms. You meet the objection by saying, "that the true Unitarian Christian, being convinced that the supreme attributes of the divine nature are applied to each of the three divine persons in both the Testaments, will, of course, be aware also that each of these divine persons must necessarily be the great God, and the only potentate, as there is but one God, one only supreme power or Godhead."

This, Sir, is not the language of venerable antiquity, which has uniformly preserved the distinction between ὁ ἐπι παντων Θεος, and ὁ μονογενης Θεος; without fearing the imputation of maintaining the existence of a superior and inferior God. The unity of the godhead,  $\theta \epsilon o \tau \eta \varsigma$ , was secured by asserting one only fountain and root of Deity. Such words are figurative indeed, but they are intelligible. From the supreme attributes, of which you speak, you must except, I should suppose, that of underived self-existence, which is the basis of essential supremacy, and which gives and appropriates the same quality of essential supremacy to all the attributes of the Father, without derogating the divinity of the Son. The former, even in the Nicene Creed, is distinguished by the title of  $\Theta \cos \delta$   $\pi \alpha \nu \tau \circ \kappa \rho \alpha \tau \omega \rho$ ; the latter is there denominated, not  $\delta$   $\theta \cos \zeta$ , but θεος ἐκ θεου, in language as orthodox, guarded, and circumspect, as could possibly be put together. You must acknowledge that the Father is the God of our Lord Jesus Christ, and that our Lord is not the God of his father; that is, you must acknowledge a supremacy not communicable, and which is the foundation of all those high titles of preeminence that are appropriated to the Father: so that your observations do not remove the objection you have stated. It exists in all its force, and, added to the arguments that have been brought forward, proves, at least to my present conviction, that St. Jude speaks of two distinct persons, and furnishes a direct, and fatal exception to your rule. If any thing farther were wanting to show the fallacy of

that rule, as an universal one, the following passage from *Clem. Alex.* will be abundantly sufficient; which I have reserved to this place, for particular consideration, on account of its near resemblance to that under examination:

αἰνουντας εὐχαριζειν, τῷ μονῷ πατρι και υίῷ, υίῷ και πατρι, παιδαγωγῷ και διδασκαλῷ υίῷ, συν και τῷ άγιῷ πνευματι.

This passage concerns an address of praise to the Trinity, at the end of his *Pedagogue*, in which he represents the Trinity as being all one,  $\dot{\epsilon}v$ , one thing or being, not one person. That the article was not omitted after the copulative to express that unity, is plain from his speaking of the Holy Spirit, in as strong a form of distinction as the language would admit: but the article was omitted, as I understand him, for the same reason as in some former instances; because the adjective  $\mu ov \phi$  is common to the two following nouns, *Praising the only father, and* (only) *Son*, &c. but for whatever purpose the article was not repeated, the passage is another direct exception to your rule: and this being admitted, the remaining texts will not give us much trouble.

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# 2 Pet. i. I. έν δικαιοσυνη του Θεου ήμων και σωτηρος Ίησου Χριζου.

The arrangement of the words suggests no objection to your rendering of them; on the contrary they correspond exactly with what follows very soon after in the same chapter, verse 11. είς την αίωνιον βασιλειαν του κυριου ήμων και σωτηρος Ἰησου Χριζου: and this parallelism would undoubtedly support you as a mere grammarian, or philologist. But on the broad principles of general criticism, there arise very strong objections to your interpretation. The attributes *Lord* and *Saviour*, applied to the same person are usually connected by the copulative; but the nouns σωτηρ and θεος are as regularly connected without it, as κατ ἐπιταγην του σωτηρος ἡμων Θεου. *Tit.* i. 4. ---- ἱνα την διδασκαλιαν του σωτηρος ἡμων Θεου. ii. 10. ---- ἡ φιλανθρωπια ἐπεφανη του σωτηρος ἡμων Θεου. iii. 4. and therefore the interposition of the copulative must appear to render St. Peter somewhat ambiguous. It will be said, why then do you not understand him according to the prevailing idiom of the language? I answer, because he appears to me to have explained himself in the very next verse, ἐν ἐπιγνωσει του Θεου, και Ἰησου του κυριου ἡμων. It is not very probable that he would thus in immediate consecution, use the words God and the Saviour Jesus Christ, and God and our Lord Jesus Christ, first to signify one person, and then two; without any assignable reason for so remarkable a difference.

Moreover, the righteousness of God, occurs so frequently in the writings of St. Paul, who is quoted in this epistle of St. Peter, that we may be well justified in paraphrasing the passage, so as to signify that justification which we receive from God through the mediator.

The reading is somewhat doubtful; some copies have the pronoun  $\dot{\eta}\mu\omega\nu$  repeated, with other varieties; but I pass over this circumstance, as of no great moment; though as far as it goes, it is unfavourable to your interpretation. What I would farther observe is, that when you undertake to inform the English reader of the true meaning of the words in a proper English idiom, by placing the proper name first, you seem to forget, that such an arrangement is no more an English, than it is a Greek idiom. It would be equally proper and equally unequivocal in the latter, as in the former language. Had St. Peter only thought of doing for himself in Greek, what you have done for him in English; not the least, even grammatical, ambiguity would have adhered to his words. He might surely have written,  $\chi\rho\iota\zeta$ 00 του Θεου και σωτηρος  $\dot{\eta}\mu\omega\nu$ , and I fear you will find it difficult to assign any reason for his not so doing, that shall be so respectful towards him, as acknowledging that he meant to denominate two persons. But of this more hereafter.

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Tit. ii. 13. – προσδεχομενοι την μακαριαν έλπιδα και έπιφανειαν της δοξης του μεγαλου Θεου, και σωτηρος ήμων Ίησου Χριζου.

In this passage the adjective μακαριαν being common to the two following nouns, the article is not repeated before the second, έπιφανειαν – the blessed hope and (blessed) appearance. Of this invariable rule of construction, we have had already many examples. I will add two or three more from the New Testament, to save your time: - ή τε ἀϊδιος αὐτου δυναμις και θειστης----του Θεου του καλουντος ὑμας εἰς την ἑαυτου βασιλειαν και δοξαν----εἰπε δε ὁ Ἰησους προς τους παραγενομενους ἐπ' αὐτον ἀρχιερεις και ςρατηγους του ἱερου και πρεσδυτερους. Of the same kind you will find several more.

Now, Sir, if you understand the adjective  $\mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\lambda\omega\nu$  as common to the two following nouns, as you must upon your won hypothesis, we have then a sufficient reason to assign for the omission of the article before the second, whether one, or two persons be intended. The sense of the whole might then be, *looking for the blessed hope and* (blessed) appearance of the glory of the great God, and our (great) Saviour Jesus Christ. If it be said that our Lord is no where else called the great Saviour; neither is he called  $\dot{\phi}$   $\mu\epsilon\gamma\alpha\zeta$   $\Theta\epsilon\sigma\zeta$ , nor any thing like it.

However it must be acknowledged, (for nothing, carrying the least appearance of subterfuge, can be tolerated on such an occasion) that it is very rare to meet with nouns personal in the singular number, constructed as above; I mean with an article and adjective common to two following nouns, relating to different persons. But as instances of nouns not personal so constructed are very frequent; as we have had one, in which the former is a personal noun,  $\tau \omega$  αγιω Ἰουδαιων Θεω και νομω, another just now from St. Luke, in which both nouns are personal nouns, plural, τους παραγενομενους ἐπ' αὐτον ἀρχιερεις και ςρατηγους. and a still more remarkable one from *Clem. Alex.* in which both the personal nouns are singular, τω μονω πατρι και νίω - with such instances before us, the application of the rule to the text under consideration, will not be thought forced, in a grammatical point of view. But in the present case, though it might suggest a plausible reason for the omission of a second article, there is no necessity for laying any stress upon it: the words του μεγαλου Θεου have in themselves a just claim to be considered as one of the preeminent and incommunicable titles of God the Father. It is more agreeable to the general tenor and language of scripture so to regard them.

ό γαρ κυριος ό Θεος ήμων, ούτος Θεος των θεων, και κυριος των κυριων, ό Θεος ό μεγας και ίσχυρος και φοδερος. – Deuter. x. 17.

There are many passages similar to this; which also accords with Paul's *King of kings, and Lord of lords*, necessarily understood of God the Father.

The observation that God is never said to appear, and that the word ἐπιφανεια is of no consequence. St. Paul, is not speaking, of the appearance of God, but of the glory of God; and our Lord has told us, that he will come in the glory of his father . The common version, which renders της δοξης as equivalent to an adjective , the glorious appearance, is less suitable to the context, as the noun ἐπιφανεια, is already furnished with its proper adjective μακαρια: besides, St. Paul says, that through Christ we rejoice in the hope of the glory of God, καυχωμεθα ἐπ ἐλπιδα της δοξης του Θεου: a coincidence of expression, not a little illustrative of a passage from the same pen.

The observation of *Whitby* that *Clem. Alex.* quotes this text of St. Paul, when he is asserting the divinity of Christ, if it mean that he quotes it as an argument, or proof, is a mistake. *Clemens* is all along speaking of a past appearance only, and therefore he begins his quotation with a former verse.  $\dot{\eta}$  χαρις του Θεου  $\dot{\eta}$  σωτηριος πασιν

ἀνθρωποις ἐπεφανη, &c. and then proceeds, τουτο ἐστι το ἀσμα το καινον, ἡ ἐπιφανεια, ἡ νυν ἐκλαμψασα ἐν ἡμιν του ἐν ἀρχη ὀντος και προοντος λογου. ἐπεφανη δε ἐναγχος ὁ προων Σωτηρ, &c. so that his authority inclines the other way round: for he has not appealed to this text, though he had it before him, when he was expressly asserting the divinity of Christ, as Θεος, and ὁ Θεος λογος, but not as ὁ μεγας Θεος. It may be added here, that as the gracious appearance of Christ upon earth, is represented by St. Paul as the appearing of the grace of God; so his glorious appearance hereafter, may well be described as the appearance of the glory of God.

The authority of some of the Greek fathers, appealed to in your support, adds nothing to the solidity of your inferences; it only serves to prove, what will not be contested, that your first rule has a real foundation in the idiom of the language; but has no tendency to prove that this or that particular text, cannot be an exception to your rule, or if you please a violation of that idiom. The possibility of this seems never to have occurred to them, as a question to be examined on the broad basis of general criticism. They read and understood the New Testament as any man naturally reads and understands his native language; and for this reason especially, might unwarily fall into mistakes in their expositions. What is called the natural and obvious sense of an author, is not always his true sense; particularly when that author writes in a foreign language, and clothes his own idioms in it. That such is the character of the Greek text of the New Testament is maintained by the acutest critics of modern times; though some of them may perhaps have been too fond of finding out Hebraisms, Syriasms, &c. Be this as it may, it is because the Greek fathers, those of whom we are now speaking acquiesced without farther inquiry in what appeared to them the natural sense, that they failed to ask themselves, why, for instance, a copulative should be inserted between ὁ Χριζος and Θεος, by St. Paul, who never inserts one between Χριζος and κυριος, though the construction ought evidently to have been the same in both cases, had the same person been intended in both; and is found in fact to be the same in the earliest writings of the Greek churches; Χριζος ὁ Θεος, and the like, occurring in them as familiarly, though not so frequently, as Χριζος ὁ κυριος, &c. Even Theodoret, it seems, has once *inadvertently* written Θεου του Χριζου, so that according to him the copulative is a redundancy, to say the least of it.

I regret that my little library will not enable me to trace the time when the form  $\delta$  Xrisos kai  $\Theta$ eos, as well as those of the other

texts under discussion, began first to be used as indisputably descriptive of one person. Certainly not in the Apostolic age, nor for a considerable time after. The discovery would throw some light upon the history of sacred criticism, and some upon the present subject. As long as those forms were not in use, they were either not understood in the sense you ascribe to them, or were not thought sufficiently explicit and unequivocal.

What has been observed concerning those Greek fathers, whose authority is cited in support of your opinion; that it does not appear to have ever occurred to them as an object of critical investigation, whether the several texts, we have been examining, were particular deviations from the prevailing idiom, is equally applicable to yourself. After having established, by a fair induction of particulars, a general rule of interpretation, with the exception of plurals and proper names only, you ought, I apprehend, to have inquired whether that rule was liable, or not, to farther exceptions, and of what nature; so as to reduce them, if possible, to some common character; and then to have stated, and fairly examined, the question, whether those passages, to the interpretation of which you would apply your rule, belonged to the class of exceptions, or if not, whether they might not be particular and anomalous exceptions. The neglect of this, I regard, as a radical defect that pervades and vitiates your whole tract: a defect, which I have endeavoured to the best of my abilities to supply. How far I have succeeded must remain with others to determine.

As to the objection which has been deduced from the consideration that a different construction would have been chosen to secure to the several texts the sense you ascribe to them; I consider it as completely decisive, where the noun  $X\rho\iota\zeta\sigma\zeta$  is placed either immediately before, or immediately after, the copulative: in the other passages, where the nouns  $\theta\epsilon\sigma\zeta$  and  $\kappa\iota\rho\iota\sigma\zeta$  or  $\sigma\omega\tau\eta\rho$  occur in direct consecution, that objection might claim but little respect, if applicable to any one instance exclusively; but as applicable to them all, it must appear to carry too much weight to be easily overruled. For why should the copulative be thrust between nouns, which in other instances are placed in immediate connexion to express one person? Or if the usual construction must, contrary to all probability, be abandoned without altering the sense, why should the important noun  $\theta\epsilon\sigma\zeta$  be always on the unfavourable side of the copulative, and never be joined immediately to the proper name, as it might have been in perfect conformity with the idiom of the language, and as it

was in the times immediately succeeding that of the Apostles? The construction to which I object in your sense of the passages, was an innovation of later days; but when introduced, I have already said, I possess not the means of determining with precision.

When to these reflections is added the sense of the words employed, together with the various exceptions to your rule, I think I stand upon solid ground, when I assert, that there exists no necessity for altering the common version in these particular passages; and that you have not decisively applied a rule of construction to the correction of that version.

To all this, you have two main objections to urge, which you consider as decisive on your part. The former is, that the several passages are in construction parallel with  $\dot{o}$  Θεος και πατηρ, and ought to be interpreted accordingly. Now, Sir, if your rule and principles of criticism must be permitted to close up every other source of illustration, there is an end of all farther enquiry; but if not, we may observe, that the same Almighty Being is called indifferently θεος, πατηρ, θεος πατηρ,  $\dot{o}$  θεος και πατηρ, and once  $\dot{o}$  θεος πατηρ, but where do we meet with  $\dot{o}$  θεος Χριζος? Not in the New Testament, though frequently enough in other writings. And here I cannot help remarking the strange, not to say, extravagant language of Beza on occasion of the text, του μεγαλου Θεου και σωτηρος ήμων Ἰησου Χριζου; on which he goes so far as to say, "dico non magis probabiliter ista posse ad duas distinctas personas referri, quam illam locutionem,  $\dot{o}$  Θεος και πατηρ Ἰησου Χριστου." The latter cannot possibly be understood of more than one person, independently of a grammatical rule; it is surely too much to say of the former.\*

Your second objection is, that if, in any of the texts that have been examined, distinct persons had been intended, the distinction would have been preserved by the repetition of the article. But it is not a little remarkable, that there is no instance in the New Testament, of such a distinction being so preserved, between the particular nouns in question; I mean when the nouns  $\theta \epsilon \omega \zeta$  and  $\kappa \omega \rho \omega \zeta$  or  $\omega \omega \tau \eta \rho$  are connect-

<sup>\*</sup> It is not undeserving of notice in this place, that there is no such expression in the New Testament, as  $\dot{o}$   $\pi\alpha\tau\eta\rho$   $\theta\epsilon\sigma\varsigma$  or  $\theta\epsilon\sigma\varsigma$   $\dot{o}$   $\pi\alpha\tau\eta\rho$ . Of these expressions, the latter especially would imply an acknowledgement of more Gods than one, contrary to the decisive tenor of the sacred volume; the addition of  $\dot{o}$   $\pi\alpha\tau\eta\rho$ , in such an arrangement, being, according to the idiom of the language, constructed as a discriminating attribute. The use of this expression  $\theta\epsilon\sigma\varsigma$   $\dot{o}$   $\pi\alpha\tau\eta\rho$ , was another innovation of later days.

ed by the copulative: the form of construction is then, θεος και κυριος, ὁ θεος και κυριος, but never ὁ θεος και ὁ κυριος. The most probable reason that I can imagine for this peculiarity is, that these particular nouns, when unequivocally descriptive of one person, being connected throughout the Septuagint, and the New Testament, without the copulative, as κυριος ὁ θεος in abundance of instances in the former - ὁ θεος ὁ σωτηρ in several - ἐπι κυριον τον θεον αὐτων, --- ἐπι τῷ θεῷ τῷ σωτηρι μου. St. Luke ---- του σωτηρος ἡμων θεου. St. Paul. – the reason, I say, may be, that the sacred writers naturally felt the interposition of the copulative, as a sufficient mark of personal diversity, without being aware of the necessity of farther mark of discrimination which you would require from them. There would be nothing improper , nothing ungrammatical, nor a particle of ambiguity, in writing κυριος ὁ Θεος Ἰησους Χριζος; and it is quite as probable that, with these particular nouns, they would have omitted the copulative to express one person, as that they would have repeated the article to express two. At all events, as you have founded an argument upon what would have been the construction, to accord with a presumed signification, you can have no just objection to the employment of the same kind of reasoning on the opposite side of the question.

What has been observed concerning the manner of connecting the noun Xριζος with its attribute, as well as the nouns κυριος and θεος or σωτηρ, to denote the same person, viz. that they are, throughout the Greek Bible, joined without the copulative, will furnish a satisfactory answer to a remark of yours, which constitutes a prominent feature in your argument. There are, you say, no exceptions, in the New Testament, to your rule; that is, I suppose unless these particular texts be such; which you think utterly improbable. You would argue, then, that if these texts were exceptions, there would be more. I do not perceive any great weight in this hypothetical reasoning. But, however plausible it may appear, the reply is at hand. There are no other words, between which the insertion of the copulative, would effect so remarkable a deviation from the established form of constructing them to express one person; and of course, would so pointedly suggest a difference of signification. Had the form ὁ θεος και κυριος ἡμων, as well as θεος ὁ κυριος ἡμων, and, in the same sense, been used in the Septuagint, or the New Testament, or ὁ Χριζος και κυριος in the latter, for one person, all this reasoning would have been spared; but as the contrary is the fact, it is nothing surprising to find all these particular texts in question appearing

as exceptions to your rule, and the sole exceptions; I mean in the New Testament for we have had an incontrovertible one from the Septuagint.

Throughout the whole of this discussion, I have purposely endeavoured, as far as your tract would permit me, to render the argument and the inference inaccessible to the mere English reader; because I consider him totally incompetent to estimate the force of the one, and of course the justness of the other: except indeed, what could not be avoided, that I have distinctly stated my present conviction, that the common version needs not those corrections you would bestow upon it. This intermediate inference is expressed without reserve; but how far it may be supposed to affect the evidence for a fundamental article of the catholic faith, he is not invited by me to consider. I would rather tell him, that he may rest satisfied with his Testament, and may consult it with his habitual veneration; that a better translation upon the whole, and better adapted to his purposes, will not easily be obtained. The learned will not acquiesce in the authority of any version, however excellent, but will have recourse to the original for information: so that I agree with you in deprecating all clamour, not Socinian only, about the necessity of a new translation; all calumnious charges of corruption; and all arrogant attempts at imaginary correction; and even all pretensions to a more close and literal rendering of the original text. To give to certain words a new arrangement, that would be equally positive and unequivocal in either language, and to call the process a necessary accommodation to the English idiom, is to delude the reader into a belief that your rendering is in no respect more than equivalent to the original. The authors of the common version seem to have been more scrupulous. They had before them the older versions, to which you appeal; and had probably better grounds for not adopting them, than ignorance or prejudice. They were men of learning and integrity; they might have been acquainted with all the limitations of your rule; and must evidently have thought, that the older versions had said more than they had a right to say. The very circumstance of their having such versions to guide them, is in favour of their authority, if an appeal must be made to versions at all; as it affords a fair presumption, that they had religiously considered the subject, before they ventured to give the public a different rendering.

I place the whole of this discussion principally upon the footing of a defence of the common version; and, I frankly acknowledge,

for the purpose of screening myself, if possible, from uncandid insinuations. To submit to any thing of the kind in silence might be injurious to my character; and to be put upon the defending of *myself* would be painful to my feelings. Whatever public notice may be taken of this work, I hope and trust, will be confined to the arguments, and the philological observations, and the author left out of the question. It ought not to be represented as an invidious employment for a clergyman of the Church of England, to vindicate an authorised version, which he is bound to use in the discharge of his office, to appeal to in his public instructions, and which it is generally thought unadvised in a preacher to censure and correct from the pulpit. Had I been prompted to this investigation by no other motive than a wish to satisfy my conscience, and acquit myself of blame, for having persisted, as an individual, in keeping your candle under the bushel, where it has glimmered for centuries, unobserved, except through the spectacles of a few poring critics, I should be perfectly justified; but I might, without affectation, ascribe this work to other motives, more impressive in themselves, and of more general interest.

Your interpretation exhibits the sacred penmen in unfavourable colours, irreconcilable with the uprightness and simplicity that characterize their writings. It represents them as varying from their constant practice, and rejecting a positive and unequivocal mode of expression, upon occasions, when such a mode must have forced itself upon their minds, from the inevitable effect of habit. You will grant, that in the first example, St. Paul would have accorded better with himself had he joined the attribute  $\Theta \epsilon \circ \zeta$  to  $X \rho \iota \zeta \circ \zeta$  in the same manner as he does those of  $\kappa \circ \rho \circ \zeta$ or σωτηρ, and that by so doing he would have been as explicit, and have left as little occasion for doubt, in the one case as in the other. For my own part, I do not perceive the least ambiguity in either case. But upon your hypothesis, he has varied from himself, and thereby has perplexed and obscured his meaning; and for what conceivable end? Was an explicit declaration one of those things that were lawful indeed, but not expedient? Was he afraid, by too bluntly disclosing a sublime and astonishing mystery, of offending the prejudices of the Jews, or alarming the wisdom of the Greeks? He was all things to all men, and fed his recent converts to Christianity with milk; but he would not descend to a disingenuous artifice, a kind of pious fraud, to promote the honour of his divine Master. But you will say, his words do clearly, and without any obscurity or ambiguity,

express the sense you ascribe to them. Let this be proved from principles of impartial and liberal criticism with respect to any of the texts, and every syllable of this censure shall be cheerfully retracted. I do not mean, that St. Paul, when teaching the divinity of our Lord was obliged by the law of probity, to assert the doctrine in every or any instance, in direct terms, rather than by necessary consequence; but I do say, that whenever he intended to assert it *totidem verbis*, he would not obscure his language by a redundancy, which he never admits in any parallel instance.

Upon a comprehensive view of the subject, the conduct of your whole tract seems exposed to the charge of indiscretion; and still more does the tone of exultation with which it has been received and applauded by your abettors. Your work has been held up in terms of defiance, as bringing to light the most decisive argument that ever was directed against the apostacy of Socinius; one which our adversaries can neither gainsay nor resist. Never, it is said, was his school attacked with so formidable a weapon. Thus, the old grounds, to which you must, at last, return, and where alone you can safely take your stand, are incautiously depreciated and degraded. Should your remarks prove at last to be fallacious, the termination of this temporary triumph may be eagerly received by the adversary as a final concession, and turned upon you, perhaps, in the true spirit of party zeal. You may have reason, therefore, to be satisfied that they are confuted, if they have been, by one who is no Socinian; and who thinks there are much more cogent arguments in reserve, when your rule of interpretation shall be abandoned. Had you succeeded in proving to a demonstration that the noun  $\Theta \epsilon \circ \varsigma$  was unequivocally applied to Christ, in a dozen places of scripture, the Socinian would retreat under cover of an inferior sense. It is well for our cause that we can pursue him with arguments, which, in a simple and honest mind, admit neither of strivings about words, nor dividing about a name. There is more real, because more practical consequence, in the plain and indisputable fact, that grace, mercy, and peace are invoked from the Lord Jesus Christ in conjunction with God the Father, than in a hundred grammatical or metaphysical subtleties.

There is as much zeal as circumspection in the laborious researches of your learned correspondent, when he endeavours to prove not by express testimony, but by analogy, that all the texts, which we have been discussing, were uniformly understood, as you understand them, from the times of the Apostles. I think it fortunate

that this can neither be demonstrated, nor even rendered probable. If it could, it might give occasion to the adversary to insinuate, that a misunderstanding of the scriptures, easily traced to its source in the prevailing idiom of the language, was coeval with the earliest direct and positive assertions of our Lord's divinity. It cannot therefore, be disagreeable to you, though it may be unnecessary, to be told that his doctrine was received, and directly asserted, in the Greek churches, long before these texts were called to its support, either directly, by way of appeal, (which indeed is not the practice of the earliest writers,) or indirectly, by way of allusion, adoption, or imitation. Hence it may be presumed that the doctrine then rested on other grounds.

I have nothing farther to add to these remarks than to recommend them to your serious consideration; and to request that nothing contained in them may be considered as wilfully disrespectful towards yourself, or the learned editor of your former editions. His character has long stood high for extensive erudition directed to the best of purposes; and I understand, that you are deservedly esteemed as a gentleman and a Christian. Of your talents and scholarship the evidence is before the public. But when an election is to be made between personal respect, or a deference to authority, and a veneration for truth, the preponderance of obligation is manifest, and the decision ought to be immediate.

Άμφοιν γαρ όντοιν φιλοιν όσιον προτιμάν την άληθειαν.

I am, Sir, with thanks for alluring me to an examination, which perhaps I should otherwise never have thought of,

Yours,

C. Winstanley.