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安提坦战役
夏普斯堡战役
南北战争的一部分

“安提坦战役”，库兹和艾莉森（英语：Kurz & Allison）1878年绘制，描述了伯恩赛德桥（英语：Burnside's Bridge）军事行动的场景
日期1862年9月17日，​162年前​（1862-09-17）
地点
华盛顿县夏普斯堡附近
39°28′24″N 77°44′41″W / 39.47333°N 77.74472°W / 39.47333; -77.74472
结果
参战方
 美国（联邦（英语：Union (American Civil War)））  美利坚联盟国（邦联）
指挥官与领导者
乔治·B·麦克莱伦 罗伯特·李
参战单位
波多马克军团[2] 北维吉尼亚军团[3]
德克萨斯旅（英语：Texas Brigade）
兵力
87,164人[4][5] 38,000人“参战”[5]
伤亡与损失
12,410人
2,108人战死
9,549人负伤
753人被俘/失踪[6][7]		 10,316人
1,567人战死
7,752人负伤
1,018人被俘/失踪[6][7]

Template:Campaignbox 马里兰战役

安提坦战役（英语：Battle of Antietam，/ænˈtiːtəm/），也称夏普斯堡战役（英语：Battle of Sharpsburg），是南北战争中于美国南方的一场战役，发生于1862年9月17日的夏普斯堡及安提坦溪（英语：Antietam Creek）附近，交战双方分别是罗伯特·李将军率领的邦联北维吉尼亚军团，以及乔治·B·麦克莱伦将军指挥的联邦（英语：Union (American Civil War)）波多马克军团。这场战役是马里兰会战的一部分，也是南北战争东线战场（英语：Eastern Theater of the American Civil War）中第一场两集团军级别的交战。安提坦战役是美国军事史上最血腥的一天，当天共有22,717人死亡、受伤或失踪[8]。

乔治·B·麦克莱伦少将（英语：Major general (United States)）率领的联邦军在追击罗伯特·李的邦联军进入马里兰州后，便向后者在安提坦溪后方的防御阵地进攻。9月17日拂晓，约瑟夫·胡克少将麾下的兵团对邦联军左翼发起猛烈进攻。袭击和反击席卷了米勒的麦田（英语：Miller's Cornfield），并在邓克教堂（英语：Schwarzenau Brethren）周围混战。联邦军对桑肯路的袭击最终攻破了邦联军的中路，但联邦军的优势并未扩大。下午时分，安布罗斯·伯恩赛德（英语：Ambrose Burnside）少将率领的联邦兵团参战，占领了安提坦溪上的一座石桥，并向邦联右翼推进。在这个关键时刻，A·P·希尔少将麾下的邦联师从哈波斯渡口赶来并发动突袭反击，随后击退了伯恩赛德并结束了战斗。虽然邦联在人数上屈于一比二的劣势，但李将军投入了所有的部队，而麦克莱伦只派出不到四分之三的军队参战，这让邦联军得以与联邦军在战场上一较高下。当日夜里，双方都加固了各自的防线。尽管伤亡惨重，李将军仍于9月18日派出部队与麦克莱伦进行小规模作战，并将他残存的部队撤往波多马克河南侧[9]。

尽管联邦军在人数上占有优势，但麦克莱伦的进攻还是无法达成部队集结（英语：force concentration）的目的，这让李将军能通过转移部队并沿著内线（英语：interior lines）行军来应对联邦军的挑战。这就是为何麦克莱伦即便拥有足够的预备队（这些预备队本可用来部署以扩大局部胜利的经验），却仍无法摧毁李将军的邦联军。麦克莱伦坚持自己错误的认知，认定他在数量上寡不敌众，这导致他在整场战役中都过度谨慎。

麦克莱伦挡住了李将军入侵马里兰的势头，但后者仍能不受过分谨慎的前者阻挠地将邦联军撤回维吉尼亚州。麦克莱伦拒绝追击李将军，从而导致他在11月被亚伯拉罕·林肯总统解职。虽然安提坦战役最终在战术上（英语：Tactical victory）非决定性，但邦联军首先从战场撤回并放弃入侵马里兰州，从而让联邦取得了战略性胜利（英语：Strategic victory）。这场足够重大的胜利，让林肯有信心发表解放奴隶宣言，该宣言透过解放邦联各州共计超过350万的奴隶，开始解放所有在法律上被视为美国奴隶的人。由于英法两国在南北战争前就已事实上废除奴隶制且时任政府强烈反对奴隶制，因此这个宣言阻碍了他们任何尝试承认邦联的潜在计画。

背景：马里兰会战

主条目：马里兰会战
更多信息：半岛会战、七日战役、北维吉尼亚会战、第二次马纳沙斯之役、南北战争东线战场（英语：Eastern Theater of the American Civil War）和南北战争
马里兰会战，1862年9月3日至15日间的部队行动
  邦联
  联邦

1862年8月30日，罗伯特·李在第二次马纳沙斯之役取胜，随后其麾下的北维吉尼亚军团约55,000人[10][11][12]于9月3日进入马里兰州。在成功的鼓舞下，邦联高层打算将战争带入敌方领土。李将军对马里兰的入侵，是为了与同时入侵肯塔基州的布拉克斯顿·布拉格（英语：Braxton Bragg）及埃德蒙·柯比·史密斯（英语：Edmund Kirby Smith）军团相互呼应。后勤方面的原因也很重要，因为北维吉尼亚地区的农场已经缺乏食物了。基于1861年春天发生的巴尔的摩暴动，以及林肯总统在前往就职典礼的路上必须变相穿过巴尔的摩的事实，邦联高层认为马里兰州会热情地欢迎他们的到来。邦联军行军时还唱著“马里兰，我的马里兰（英语：Maryland, My Maryland）！”，但到了1862年秋天，马里兰州亲联邦的情绪压倒了另一方的声音，尤其该州西部更是如此。当李将军的部队经过州民的家门时，他们不是躲在房子里，就是在一旁冷眼瞧著，与此相反，波多马克军团则是受到州民们得鼓舞与激励。包括总统杰佛逊·戴维斯在内的部分邦联政治人物都相信，如果他们能在联邦领土上打一场胜仗，将会增加被外国承认的机会。这样的胜利可能会得到英法两国的认可及财政支持，虽然没有证据显示李将军认为邦联应该基于这种可能性制定相关的军事计划[13][14]。

当麦克莱伦麾下87,000人[4]的波多马克军团前去截击李将军时，两位联邦士兵[a]发现了三支雪茄，里面裹著的正是李将军遗失命令的副本（英语：Special Order 191），上面记载著邦联详细的战斗计画。这个命令显示出李将军将分兵进击哈波斯渡口及黑格斯敦，并在地理上分成了数个区块，因此如果麦克莱伦进军迅速，可将邦联军孤立的各部分别击破。麦克莱伦等了大约18个小时后才决定利用这一情报并重新部署部队，从而浪费了一次决定性地击败李将军的机会[17]。

安提坦战役前，双方在马里兰会战中进行了两场重要的军事行动：一是石墙杰克森少将攻占哈波斯渡口（英语：Battle of Harpers Ferry），导致李将军麾下大部因为参与联邦军的投降仪式，而缺席安提坦战役初期阶段；另一场则是麦克莱伦在南山之役中突袭穿越蓝岭山脉，但邦联军在两隘道的坚守推迟了麦克莱伦的推进，从而使李将军有足够时间在夏普斯堡集结其馀部队[18]。

交战部队

更多信息：安提坦战役联邦军战斗序列（英语：Antietam Union order of battle）
参战双方总指挥官

联邦军

联邦各军团指挥官
战斗结束后，林肯总统与麦克莱伦将军和部属在格罗夫农场合影，著名人物包括：（左起）1.德洛士·萨克特（英语：Delos Bennett Sackett）上校；4.乔治·W·莫雷尔（英语：George W. Morell）将军；5.亚历山大·S·韦博（英语：Alexander S. Webb），第五军团参谋长；6.麦克莱伦将军；8.乔纳森·莱特曼（英语：Jonathan Letterman）医生；10. 林肯总统；11.亨利·J·洪特（英语：Henry J. Hunt）；12.菲兹·约翰·波特（英语：Fitz John Porter）；15.安德鲁·A·亨弗瑞斯（英语：Andrew A. Humphreys）；16.乔治·阿姆斯壮·卡斯特团长

乔治·B·麦克莱伦少将麾下的波多马克军团，在吸收约翰·波普（英语：John Pope (military officer)）的维吉尼亚军团后，增强到了六个步兵兵团[19][20]。

第一兵团（英语：I Corps (Union Army)），由约瑟夫·胡克少将指挥，下辖数个师：

第二兵团（英语：II Corps (Union Army)），由爱德温·V·萨姆纳（英语：Edwin V. Sumner）少将指挥，下辖数个师：

第五兵团（英语：V Corps (Union Army)），由菲兹·约翰·波特（英语：Fitz John Porter）少将指挥，下辖数个师：

第六兵团（英语：VI Corps (Union Army)），由威廉·B·富兰克林（英语：William B. Franklin）少将指挥，下辖数个师：

第九兵团（英语：IX Corps (Union Army)），由安布罗斯·伯恩赛德（英语：Ambrose E. Burnside）少将（战役期间由雅各布·道尔森·考克斯（英语：Jacob Dolson Cox）准将下达行动命令）指挥，下辖数个师：

第十二兵团（英语：XII Corps (Union Army)），由约瑟·K·曼斯菲尔德（英语：Joseph K. Mansfield）少将指挥，下辖数个师：

骑兵师，由阿尔弗雷德·普莱森顿（英语：Alfred Pleasonton）准将指挥，下辖数个旅：

邦联军

邦联各军团指挥官
更多信息：安提坦战役邦联军战斗序列（英语：Antietam Confederate order of battle）

李将军将麾下的北维吉尼亚军团组成两大步兵兵团[11][21]。

第一兵团，由詹姆斯·隆史崔特少将指挥，下辖各师：

第二兵团，由石墙杰克森少将指挥，下辖各师：

其馀部队还包括詹姆斯·尤尔·布朗·史都华少将率领的骑兵团（英语：Cavalry Corps, Army of Northern Virginia），以及威廉·N·彭德尔顿（英语：William N. Pendleton）指挥的预备炮兵部队。第二兵团的炮兵被配属到各师当中，与第一兵团将炮兵留在兵团层级的配置不同。

战役前奏

军队部署

1862年9月15日至16日安提坦战场的情况
安提坦战役概览

9月15日，李将军开始将他可用的兵力沿著低脊（low ridge）部署于安提坦溪后方（夏普斯堡附近）。这虽然是有效的防御阵地，但并非坚不可摧。当地地形为步兵提供了很好的掩护，上面有铁栅栏和石围墙、石灰岩露出部、小凹陷及低洼地（英语：Swale (landform)）。他们前面的小河只是一个小障碍，宽度从60英尺（18米）到100英尺（30米）不等，在某些地方是可横渡的，并有三座两两相距1英里（1.6千米）的石桥横越。但这对邦联军来说也是个危险的据点，因为他们的后方被波多马克河所阻挡，如有需要时附近也仅有谢泼兹敦（英语：Shepherdstown, West Virginia）的波特勒浅滩（Boteler's Ford）可供撤离[b]。9月15日，李将军可直接指挥的部队不超过一万八千人，这样的兵力仅仅是联邦军的三分之一[22]。

9月15日下午，联邦军先头两个师抵达战场，其馀大部则于当天傍晚到达。虽然联邦军如于9月16日早上立即攻击将在数量上具有压倒性的优势，但麦克莱伦那谨慎的个性，以及相信李将军在夏普斯堡的部队高达十万人，让他将攻势拖延至隔天[23]。这让邦联军有更多时间能准备防御阵地，并使隆史崔特的兵团及石墙杰克森的兵团[c]能分别从黑格斯敦及哈波斯渡口赶抵战场。石墙杰克森依托波多马克河驻防左翼（战场北方），隆史崔特则依托安提坦溪驻防右翼（战场南方），整条防线约4英里（6千米）长[d][24]。

9月16日傍晚，麦克莱伦下令胡克的第一兵团横渡安提坦溪，并探查敌军位置。米德部小心翼翼地袭击了东树林（East Woods）附近的胡德部。夜幕降临后炮火依然持续，而麦克莱伦将他的部队进行布署以待隔日的战斗，他的计画是压倒敌军左翼，而这个决定是根据安提坦溪上的桥梁配置所安排：下游的桥[e]由虚张声势的邦联军所控制，中游的桥[f]则处于夏普斯堡附近的火炮范围下，而上游的桥距离最近的邦联炮兵阵地约莫2英里（3.2千米），因此可从该处安全渡河。麦克莱伦计画投入麾下一半以上的部队，先以两个兵团发起进攻，再由第三个兵团后续支援，如有必要甚至会投入第四个兵团。他打算以第五个兵团像邦联右翼同时发起佯攻牵制，并于任何一边的攻势取得进展时，亲率预备队进攻中路[25]。双方在东树林的前哨战让李将军得知了麦克莱伦的意图，并依此对其防线做了相应的准备。李将军将他的部队转移到左翼，并向还未抵达战场的两支部队（）发出紧急讯息He shifted men to his left flank and sent urgent messages to his two commanders who had not yet arrived on the battlefield: Lafayette McLaws with two divisions and A.P. Hill with one division.[26][23]

地形及其后果

McClellan's plans were ill-coordinated and were executed poorly. He issued to each of his subordinate commanders only the orders for his own corps, not general orders describing the entire battle plan. The terrain of the battlefield made it difficult for those commanders to monitor events outside of their sectors. Moreover, McClellan's headquarters were more than a mile in the rear (at the Philip Pry house, east of the creek). This made it difficult for him to control the separate corps. This is why the battle progressed the next day as essentially three separate, mostly uncoordinated battles: morning in the northern end of the battlefield, midday in the center, and afternoon in the south. This lack of coordination and concentration of McClellan's forces almost completely nullified the two-to-one advantage the Union enjoyed. It also allowed Lee to shift his defensive forces to meet each offensive.[23]

战役过程

早上阶段

地点：战场北端

Assaults by the I Corps, 5:30 to 7:30 a.m.

麦田

The battle opened at dawn (about 5:30 a.m.) on September 17 with an attack down the Hagerstown Turnpike by the Union I Corps under Joseph Hooker. Hooker's objective was the plateau on which sat the Dunker Church, a modest whitewashed building belonging to a local sect of German Baptists. Hooker had approximately 8,600 men, little more than the 7,700 defenders under Stonewall Jackson, and this slight disparity was more than offset by the Confederates' strong defensive positions.[27] Abner Doubleday's division moved on Hooker's right, James Ricketts's moved on the left into the East Woods, and George Meade's Pennsylvania Reserves division deployed in the center and slightly to the rear. Jackson's defense consisted of the divisions under Alexander Lawton and John R. Jones in line from the West Woods, across the Turnpike, and along the southern end of Miller's Cornfield. Four brigades were held in reserve inside the West Woods.[28]

As the first Union men emerged from the North Woods and into the Cornfield, an artillery duel erupted. Confederate fire was from the horse artillery batteries under Jeb Stuart to the west and four batteries under Col. Stephen D. Lee on the high ground across the pike from the Dunker Church to the south. Union return fire was from nine batteries on the ridge behind the North Woods and twenty 20-pounder Parrott rifles, 2 miles (3 km) east of Antietam Creek. The conflagration caused heavy casualties on both sides and was described by Col. Lee as "artillery Hell."[29]

Seeing the glint of Confederate bayonets concealed in the Cornfield, Hooker halted his infantry and brought up four batteries of artillery, which fired shell and canister over the heads of the Federal infantry into the field. A savage battle began, with considerable melee action with rifle butts and bayonets due to short visibility in the corn. Officers rode about cursing and yelling orders no one could hear in the noise. Rifles became hot and fouled from too much firing; the air was filled with a hail of bullets and shells.[30]

Dead Confederate soldiers from Starke's Louisiana Brigade, on the Hagerstown Turnpike, north of the Dunker Church. Photograph by Alexander Gardner.

Meade's 1st Brigade of Pennsylvanians, under Brig. Gen. Truman Seymour, began advancing through the East Woods and exchanged fire with Colonel James Walker's brigade of Alabama, Georgia, and North Carolina troops. As Walker's men forced Seymour's back, aided by Lee's artillery fire, Ricketts's division entered the Cornfield, also to be torn up by artillery. Brig. Gen. Abram Duryée's brigade marched directly into volleys from Colonel Marcellus Douglass's Georgia brigade. Enduring heavy fire from a range of 250码（230米） and gaining no advantage because of a lack of reinforcements, Duryée ordered a withdrawal.[28]

The reinforcements that Duryée had expected—brigades under Brig. Gen. George L. Hartsuff and Col. William A. Christian—had difficulties reaching the scene. Hartsuff was wounded by a shell, and Christian dismounted and fled to the rear in terror. When the men were rallied and advanced into the Cornfield, they met the same artillery and infantry fire as their predecessors. As the superior Union numbers began to tell, the Louisiana "Tiger" Brigade under Harry Hays entered the fray and forced the Union men back to the East Woods. The casualties received by the 12th Massachusetts Infantry, 67%, were the highest of any unit that day.[31] The Tigers were beaten back eventually when the Federals brought up a battery of 3-inch ordnance rifles and rolled them directly into the Cornfield, point-blank fire that slaughtered the Tigers, who lost 323 of their 500 men.[32]

...the most deadly fire of the war. Rifles are shot to pieces in the hands of the soldiers, canteens and haversacks are riddled with bullets, the dead and wounded go down in scores.
Captain Benjamin F. Cook of the 12th Massachusetts Infantry, on the attack by the Louisiana Tigers at the Cornfield[33]

While the Cornfield remained a bloody stalemate, Federal advances a few hundred yards to the west were more successful. Brig. Gen. John Gibbon's 4th Brigade of Doubleday's division (recently named the Iron Brigade) began advancing down and astride the turnpike, into the cornfield, and in the West Woods, pushing aside Jackson's men.[34] They were halted by a charge of 1,150 men from Starke's brigade, leveling heavy fire from 30码（30米） away. The Confederate brigade withdrew after being exposed to fierce return fire from the Iron Brigade, and Starke was mortally wounded.[35] The Union advance on the Dunker Church resumed and cut a large gap in Jackson's defensive line, which teetered near collapse. Although the cost was steep, Hooker's corps was making steady progress.

Confederate reinforcements arrived just after 7 a.m. The divisions under McLaws and Richard H. Anderson arrived following a night march from Harpers Ferry. Around 7:15, General Lee moved George T. Anderson's Georgia brigade from the right flank of the army to aid Jackson. At 7 a.m., Hood's division of 2,300 men advanced through the West Woods and pushed the Union troops back through the Cornfield again. The Texans attacked with particular ferocity because as they were called from their reserve position they were forced to interrupt the first hot breakfast they had had in days. They were aided by three brigades of D.H. Hill's division arriving from the Mumma Farm, southeast of the Cornfield, and by Jubal Early's brigade, pushing through the West Woods from the Nicodemus Farm, where they had been supporting Jeb Stuart's horse artillery. Some officers of the Iron Brigade rallied men around the artillery pieces of Battery B, 4th U.S. Artillery, and Gibbon himself saw to it that his previous unit did not lose a single caisson.[36] Hood's men bore the brunt of the fighting, however, and paid a heavy price—60% casualties—but they were able to prevent the defensive line from crumbling and held off the I Corps. When asked by a fellow officer where his division was, Hood replied, "Dead on the field."[37]

Hooker's men had also paid heavily but without achieving their objectives. After two hours and 2,500 casualties, they were back where they started. The Cornfield, an area about 250码（230米） deep and 400码（400米） wide, was a scene of indescribable destruction. It was estimated that the Cornfield changed hands no fewer than 15 times in the course of the morning.[38] Major Rufus R. Dawes, who assumed command of Iron Brigade's 6th Wisconsin Regiment during the battle, later compared the fighting around the Hagerstown Turnpike with the stone wall at Fredericksburg, Spotsylvania's "Bloody Angle", and the slaughter pen of Cold Harbor, insisting that "the Antietam Turnpike surpassed them all in manifest evidence of slaughter."[39] Hooker called for support from the 7,200 men of Mansfield's XII Corps.

... every stalk of corn in the northern and greater part of the field was cut as closely as could have been done with a knife, and the [Confederates] slain lay in rows precisely as they had stood in their ranks a few moments before.
Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker[30]
Assaults by the XII Corps, 7:30 to 9:00 a.m.

Half of Mansfield's men were raw recruits, and Mansfield was also inexperienced, having taken command only two days before. Although he was a veteran of 40 years' service, he had never led large numbers of soldiers in combat. Concerned that his men would bolt under fire, he marched them in a formation that was known as "column of companies, closed in mass," a bunched-up formation in which a regiment was arrayed ten ranks deep instead of the normal two. As his men entered the East Woods, they presented an excellent artillery target, "almost as good a target as a barn." Mansfield himself was shot in the chest and died the next day. Alpheus Williams assumed temporary command of the XII Corps.[40][41]

The new recruits of Mansfield's 1st Division made no progress against Hood's line, which was reinforced by brigades of D.H. Hill's division under Colquitt and McRae. The 2nd Division of the XII Corps, under George Sears Greene, however, broke through McRae's men, who fled under the mistaken belief that they were about to be trapped by a flanking attack. This breach of the line forced Hood and his men, outnumbered, to regroup in the West Woods, where they had started the day.[31] Greene was able to reach the Dunker Church, Hooker's original objective, and drove off Stephen Lee's batteries. Federal forces held most of the ground to the east of the turnpike.

Hooker attempted to gather the scattered remnants of his I Corps to continue the assault, but a Confederate sharpshooter spotted the general's conspicuous white horse and shot Hooker through the foot. Command of his I Corps fell to General Meade, since Hooker's senior subordinate, James B. Ricketts, had also been wounded. But with Hooker removed from the field, there was no general left with the authority to rally the men of the I and XII Corps. Greene's men came under heavy fire from the West Woods and withdrew from the Dunker Church.

The Dunker Church after September 17, 1862. Here, both Union and Confederate dead lie together on the field.

In an effort to turn the Confederate left flank and relieve the pressure on Mansfield's men, Sumner's II Corps was ordered at 7:20 a.m. to send two divisions into battle. Sedgwick's division of 5,400 men was the first to ford the Antietam, and they entered the East Woods with the intention of turning left and forcing the Confederates south into the assault of Ambrose Burnside's IX Corps. But the plan went awry. They became separated from William H. French's division, and at 9 a.m. Sumner, who was accompanying the division, launched the attack with an unusual battle formation—the three brigades in three long lines, men side-by-side, with only 50 to 70码（60米） separating the lines. They were assaulted first by Confederate artillery and then from three sides by the divisions of Early, Walker, and McLaws, and in less than half an hour Sedgwick's men were forced to retreat in great disorder to their starting point with over 2,200 casualties, including Sedgwick himself, who was taken out of action for several months by a wound.[42][43][44][45] Sumner has been condemned by most historians for his "reckless" attack, his lack of coordination with the I and XII Corps headquarters, losing control of French's division when he accompanied Sedgwick's, failing to perform adequate reconnaissance prior to launching his attack, and selecting the unusual battle formation that was so effectively flanked by the Confederate counterattack. Historian M. V. Armstrong's recent scholarship, however, has determined that Sumner did perform appropriate reconnaissance and his decision to attack where he did was justified by the information available to him.[46]

The final actions in the morning phase of the battle were around 10 a.m., when two regiments of the XII Corps advanced, only to be confronted by the division of John G. Walker, newly arrived from the Confederate right. They fought in the area between the Cornfield in the West Woods, but soon Walker's men were forced back by two brigades of Greene's division, and the Federal troops seized some ground in the West Woods.

The morning phase ended with casualties on both sides of almost 13,000, including two Union corps commanders.[47]

正午阶段

地点：邦联中路战线

桑肯路：“血腥之道”（Sunken Road: "Bloody Lane"）

Assaults by the XII and II Corps, 9 a.m. to 1 p.m.

By midday, the action had shifted to the center of the Confederate line. Sumner had accompanied the morning attack of Sedgwick's division, but another of his divisions, under French, lost contact with Sumner and Sedgwick and inexplicably headed south. Eager for an opportunity to see combat, French found skirmishers in his path and ordered his men forward. By this time, Sumner's aide (and son) located French, described the terrible fighting in the West Woods and relayed an order for him to divert Confederate attention by attacking their center.[48]

French confronted D.H. Hill's division. Hill commanded about 2,500 men, less than half the number under French, and three of his five brigades had been torn up during the morning combat. This sector of Longstreet's line was theoretically the weakest. But Hill's men were in a strong defensive position, atop a gradual ridge, in a sunken road worn down by years of wagon traffic, which formed a natural trench.[49]

French launched a series of brigade-sized assaults against Hill's improvised breastworks at around 9:30 a.m.. The first brigade to attack, mostly inexperienced troops commanded by Brig. Gen. Max Weber, was quickly cut down by heavy rifle fire; neither side deployed artillery at this point. The second attack, more raw recruits under Col. Dwight Morris, was also subjected to heavy fire but managed to beat back a counterattack by the Alabama Brigade of Robert Rodes. The third, under Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball, included three veteran regiments, but they also fell to fire from the sunken road. French's division suffered 1,750 casualties (of his 5,700 men) in under an hour.[50]

Reinforcements were arriving on both sides, and by 10:30 a.m. Robert E. Lee sent his final reserve division—some 3,400 men under Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson—to bolster Hill's line and extend it to the right, preparing an attack that would envelop French's left flank. But at the same time, the 4,000 men of Maj. Gen. Israel B. Richardson's division arrived on French's left. This was the last of Sumner's three divisions, which had been held up in the rear by McClellan as he organized his reserve forces.[51] Richardson's fresh troops struck the first blow.

Sunken Road

Leading off the fourth attack of the day against the sunken road was the Irish Brigade of Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Meagher. As they advanced with emerald green flags snapping in the breeze, a regimental chaplain, Father William Corby, rode back and forth across the front of the formation shouting words of conditional absolution prescribed by the Roman Catholic Church for those who were about to die. (Corby would later perform a similar service at Gettysburg in 1863.) The mostly Irish immigrants lost 540 men to heavy volleys before they were ordered to withdraw.[52]

Gen. Richardson personally dispatched the brigade of Brig. Gen. John C. Caldwell into battle around noon (after being told that Caldwell was in the rear, behind a haystack), and finally the tide turned. Anderson's Confederate division had been little help to the defenders after Gen. Anderson was wounded early in the fighting. Other key leaders were lost as well, including George B. Anderson (no relation; Anderson's successor, Col. Charles C. Tew of the 2nd North Carolina, was killed minutes after assuming command)[53] and Col. John B. Gordon of the 6th Alabama. (Gordon received 5 serious wounds in the fight, twice in his right leg, twice in the left arm, and once in the face. He lay unconscious, face down in his cap, and later told colleagues that he should have smothered in his own blood, except for the act of an unidentified Yankee, who had earlier shot a hole in his cap, which allowed the blood to drain.)[54] Rodes was wounded in the thigh but was still on the field. These losses contributed directly to the confusion of the following events.

We were shooting them like sheep in a pen. If a bullet missed the mark at first it was liable to strike the further bank, angle back, and take them secondarily.
Sergeant of the 61st New York[55]

As Caldwell's brigade advanced around the right flank of the Confederates, Col. Francis C. Barlow and 350 men of the 61st and 64th New York saw a weak point in the line and seized a knoll commanding the sunken road. This allowed them to get enfilade fire into the Confederate line, turning it into a deadly trap. In attempting to wheel around to meet this threat, a command from Rodes was misunderstood by Lt. Col. James N. Lightfoot, who had succeeded the unconscious John Gordon. Lightfoot ordered his men to about-face and march away, an order that all five regiments of the brigade thought applied to them as well. Confederate troops streamed toward Sharpsburg, their line lost.

The Bloody Lane in 2005

Richardson's men were in hot pursuit when massed artillery hastily assembled by Gen. Longstreet drove them back. A counterattack with 200 men led by D.H. Hill got around the Federal left flank near the sunken road, and although they were driven back by a fierce charge of the 5th New Hampshire, this stemmed the collapse of the center. Reluctantly, Richardson ordered his division to fall back to north of the ridge facing the sunken road. His division lost about 1,000 men. Col. Barlow was severely wounded, and Richardson mortally wounded.[56] Winfield S. Hancock assumed division command. Although Hancock would have an excellent future reputation as an aggressive division and corps commander, the unexpected change of command sapped the momentum of the Federal advance.[57]

Confederate dead lie in the "Bloody Lane" after the Battle of Antietam, 1862.

The carnage from 9:30 a.m. to 1:00 p.m. on the sunken road gave it the name Bloody Lane, leaving about 5,600 casualties (Union 3,000, Confederate 2,600) along the 800-码（700-米） road. And yet a great opportunity presented itself. If this broken sector of the Confederate line were exploited, Lee's army would have been divided in half and possibly defeated. There were ample forces available to do so. There was a reserve of 3,500 cavalry and the 10,300 infantrymen of Gen. Porter's V Corps, waiting near the middle bridge, a mile away. The VI Corps, under Maj. Gen. William B. Franklin, had just arrived with 12,000 men. Franklin was ready to exploit this breakthrough, but Sumner, the senior corps commander, ordered him not to advance. Franklin appealed to McClellan, who left his headquarters in the rear to hear both arguments but backed Sumner's decision, ordering Franklin and Hancock to hold their positions.[58]

Later in the day, the commander of the other reserve unit near the center, the V Corps, Maj. Gen. Fitz John Porter, heard recommendations from Maj. Gen. George Sykes, commanding his 2nd Division, that another attack be made in the center, an idea that intrigued McClellan. However, Porter is said to have told McClellan, "Remember, General, I command the last reserve of the last Army of the Republic." McClellan demurred and another opportunity was lost.[59]

下午阶段

地点：战场南端

“伯恩赛德桥”

Assaults by the IX Corps, 10 a.m. to 4:30 p.m.

The action moved to the southern end of the battlefield. McClellan's plan called for Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside and the IX Corps to conduct a diversionary attack in support of Hooker's I Corps, hoping to draw Confederate attention away from the intended main attack in the north. However, Burnside was instructed to wait for explicit orders before launching his attack, and those orders did not reach him until 10 a.m.[60] Burnside was strangely passive during preparations for the battle. He was disgruntled that McClellan had abandoned the previous arrangement of "wing" commanders reporting to him. Previously, Burnside had commanded a wing that included both the I and IX Corps and now he was responsible only for the IX Corps. Implicitly refusing to give up his higher authority, Burnside treated first Maj. Gen. Jesse L. Reno (killed at South Mountain) and then Brig. Gen. Jacob D. Cox of the Kanawha Division as the corps commander, funneling orders to the corps through him.

Burnside had four divisions (12,500 troops) and 50 guns east of Antietam Creek. Facing him was a force that had been greatly depleted by Lee's movement of units to bolster the Confederate left flank. At dawn, the divisions of Brig. Gens. David R. Jones and John G. Walker stood in defense, but by 10 a.m. all of Walker's men and Col. George T. Anderson's Georgia brigade had been removed. Jones had only about 3,000 men and 12 guns available to meet Burnside. Four thin brigades guarded the ridges near Sharpsburg, primarily a low plateau known as Cemetery Hill. The remaining 400 men—the 2nd and 20th Georgia regiments, under the command of Brig. Gen. Robert Toombs, with two artillery batteries—defended Rohrbach's Bridge, a three-span, 125-foot (38 m) stone structure that was the southernmost crossing of the Antietam.[61] It would become known to history as Burnside's Bridge because of the notoriety of the coming battle. The bridge was a difficult objective. The road leading to it ran parallel to the creek and was exposed to enemy fire. The bridge was dominated by a 100-foot (30 m) high wooded bluff on the west bank, strewn with boulders from an old quarry, making infantry and sharpshooter fire from good covered positions a dangerous impediment to crossing.

Go and look at [Burnside's Bridge], and tell me if you don't think Burnside and his corps might have executed a hop, skip, and jump and landed on the other side. One thing is certain, they might have waded it that day without getting their waist belts wet in any place.
Confederate staff officer Henry Kyd Douglas[62]

Antietam Creek in this sector was seldom more than 50 feet (15 m) wide, and several stretches were only waist deep and out of Confederate range. Burnside has been widely criticized for ignoring this fact.[62] However, the commanding terrain across the sometimes shallow creek made crossing the water a comparatively easy part of a difficult problem. Burnside concentrated his plan instead on storming the bridge while simultaneously crossing a ford McClellan's engineers had identified a half mile (1 km) downstream, but when Burnside's men reached it, they found the banks too high to negotiate. While Col. George Crook's Ohio brigade prepared to attack the bridge with the support of Brig. Gen. Samuel Sturgis's division, the rest of the Kanawha Division and Brig. Gen. Isaac Rodman's division struggled through thick brush trying to locate Snavely's Ford, 2 miles (3 km) downstream, intending to flank the Confederates.[63][61][64]

Crook's assault on the bridge was led by skirmishers from the 11th Connecticut, who were ordered to clear the bridge for the Ohioans to cross and assault the bluff. After receiving punishing fire for 15 minutes, the Connecticut men withdrew with 139 casualties, one-third of their strength, including their commander, Col. Henry W. Kingsbury, who was fatally wounded.[65] Crook's main assault went awry when his unfamiliarity with the terrain caused his men to reach the creek a quarter mile (400 m) upstream from the bridge, where they exchanged volleys with Confederate skirmishers for the next few hours.[66]

While Rodman's division was out of touch, slogging toward Snavely's Ford, Burnside and Cox directed a second assault at the bridge by one of Sturgis's brigades, led by the 2nd Maryland and 6th New Hampshire. They also fell prey to the Confederate sharpshooters and artillery, and their attack fell apart.[67] By this time it was noon, and McClellan was losing patience. He sent a succession of couriers to motivate Burnside to move forward. He ordered one aide, "Tell him if it costs 10,000 men he must go now." He increased the pressure by sending his inspector general, Col. Delos B. Sackett, to confront Burnside, who reacted indignantly: "McClellan appears to think I am not trying my best to carry this bridge; you are the third or fourth one who has been to me this morning with similar orders."[68]

The third attempt to take the bridge was at 12:30 p.m. by Sturgis's other brigade, commanded by Brig. Gen. Edward Ferrero. It was led by the 51st New York and the 51st Pennsylvania, who, with adequate artillery support and a promise that a recently canceled whiskey ration would be restored if they were successful, charged downhill and took up positions on the east bank. Maneuvering a captured light howitzer into position, they fired double canister down the bridge and got within 25码（23米） of the enemy. By 1 p.m., Confederate ammunition was running low, and word reached Toombs that Rodman's men were crossing Snavely's Ford on their flank. He ordered a withdrawal. His Georgians had cost the Federals more than 500 casualties, giving up fewer than 160 themselves. And they had stalled Burnside's assault on the southern flank for more than three hours.[69][70]

  • Charge of the 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania across Burnside's Bridge, by Edwin Forbes
    Charge of the 51st New York and 51st Pennsylvania across Burnside's Bridge, by Edwin Forbes
  • Battle of Antietam by Kurz and Allison
    Battle of Antietam by Kurz and Allison
  • Confederate guns on the hill above poured fire into the Union ranks at Burnside's bridge. Photo taken just after the Battle of Antietam, 1862.
    Confederate guns on the hill above poured fire into the Union ranks at Burnside's bridge. Photo taken just after the Battle of Antietam, 1862.
  • Union positions below the Confederates at Burnside Bridge
    Union positions below the Confederates at Burnside Bridge
  • Burnside Bridge in 2012
    Burnside Bridge in 2012

Burnside's assault stalled again on its own. His officers had neglected to transport ammunition across the bridge, which was itself becoming a bottleneck for soldiers, artillery, and wagons. This represented another two-hour delay. Gen. Lee used this time to bolster his right flank. He ordered up every available artillery unit, although he made no attempt to strengthen D.R. Jones's badly outnumbered force with infantry units from the left. Instead, he counted on the arrival of A.P. Hill's Light Division, currently embarked on an exhausting 17 mile (27 km) march from Harpers Ferry. By 2 p.m., Hill's men had reached Boteler's Ford, and Hill was able to confer with the relieved Lee at 2:30, who ordered him to bring up his men to the right of Jones.[71]

The Federals were completely unaware that 3,000 new men would be facing them. Burnside's plan was to move around the weakened Confederate right flank, converge on Sharpsburg, and cut Lee's army off from Boteler's Ford, their only escape route across the Potomac. At 3 p.m., Burnside left Sturgis's division in reserve on the west bank and moved west with over 8,000 troops (most of them fresh) and 22 guns for close support.[72]

An initial assault led by the 79th New York "Cameron Highlanders" succeeded against Jones's outnumbered division, which was pushed back past Cemetery Hill and to within 200码（200米） of Sharpsburg. Farther to the left, Rodman's division advanced toward Harpers Ferry Road. Its lead brigade, under Col. Harrison Fairchild, containing several colorful Zouaves of the 9th New York, commanded by Col. Rush Hawkins, came under heavy shellfire from a dozen enemy guns mounted on a ridge to their front, but they kept pushing forward. There was panic in the streets of Sharpsburg, clogged with retreating Confederates. Of the five brigades in Jones's division, only Toombs's brigade was still intact, but he had only 700 men.[73]

A. P. Hill's division arrived at 3:30 p.m. Hill divided his column, with two brigades moving southeast to guard his flank and the other three, about 2,000 men, moving to the right of Toombs's brigade and preparing for a counterattack. At 3:40 p.m., Brig. Gen. Maxcy Gregg's brigade of South Carolinians attacked the 16th Connecticut on Rodman's left flank in the cornfield of farmer John Otto. The Connecticut men had been in service for only three weeks, and their line disintegrated with 185 casualties. The 4th Rhode Island came up on the right, but they had poor visibility amid the high stalks of corn, and they were disoriented because many of the Confederates were wearing Union uniforms captured at Harpers Ferry. They also broke and ran, leaving the 8th Connecticut far out in advance and isolated. They were enveloped and driven down the hills toward Antietam Creek. A counterattack by regiments from the Kanawha Division fell short.[74]

The IX Corps had suffered casualties of about 20% but still possessed twice the number of Confederates confronting them. Unnerved by the collapse of his flank, Burnside ordered his men all the way back to the west bank of the Antietam, where he urgently requested more men and guns. McClellan was able to provide just one battery. He said, "I can do nothing more. I have no infantry." In fact, however, McClellan had two fresh corps in reserve, Porter's V and Franklin's VI, but he was too cautious, concerned he was greatly outnumbered and that a massive counterstrike by Lee was imminent. Burnside's men spent the rest of the day guarding the bridge they had suffered so much to capture.[75]

后续发展

Confederate dead gathered for burial after the battle.[76] Photograph by Alexander Gardner.
Photograph by Alexander Gardner of Lincoln and McClellan near the Antietam battlefield, October 3, 1862

The battle was over by 5:30 p.m. On the morning of September 18, Lee's army prepared to defend against a Federal assault that never came. After an improvised truce for both sides to recover and exchange their wounded, Lee's forces began withdrawing across the Potomac that evening to return to Virginia.[77] Losses from the battle were heavy on both sides. The Union had 12,410 casualties with 2,108 dead.[6] Confederate casualties were 10,316 with 1,546 dead.[7][78] This represented 25% of the Federal force and 31% of the Confederates. Overall, both sides lost a combined total of 22,720 casualties in a single day, almost the same amount as the number of losses that had shocked the nation at the 2-day Battle of Shiloh five months earlier.[79] Of the other casualties, 1,910 Union and 1,550 Confederate troops died of their wounds soon after the battle, while 225 Union and 306 Confederate troops listed as missing were later confirmed as dead. Several generals died as a result of the battle, including Maj. Gens. Joseph K. Mansfield and Israel B. Richardson and Brig. Gen. Isaac P. Rodman on the Union side, and Brig. Gens. Lawrence O. Branch and William E. Starke on the Confederate side.[80] Confederate Brig. Gen. George B. Anderson was shot in the ankle during the defense of the Bloody Lane. He survived the battle but died later in October after an amputation.[54] The fighting on September 17, 1862, killed 7,650 American soldiers.[81] More Americans died in battle on September 17, 1862, than on any other day in the nation's history. Antietam is sometimes cited as the bloodiest day in all of American history, but the deaths from the Galveston Hurricane of 1900 are significantly higher.[来源请求] The bloodiest battle in American history was Gettysburg, but its more than 46,000 casualties occurred over three days. Antietam ranks fifth in terms of total casualties in Civil War battles, falling behind Gettysburg, Chickamauga, Chancellorsville, and Spotsylvania Court House.

President Lincoln was disappointed in McClellan's performance. He believed that McClellan's overly cautious and poorly coordinated actions in the field had forced the battle to a draw rather than a crippling Confederate defeat.[82] The president was even more astonished that from September 17 to October 26, despite repeated entreaties from the War Department and the president himself, McClellan declined to pursue Lee across the Potomac, citing shortages of equipment and the fear of overextending his forces. General-in-Chief Henry W. Halleck wrote in his official report, "The long inactivity of so large an army in the face of a defeated foe, and during the most favorable season for rapid movements and a vigorous campaign, was a matter of great disappointment and regret."[83] Lincoln relieved McClellan of his command of the Army of the Potomac on November 5, effectively ending the general's military career. He was replaced on November 9 by General Burnside.[84]

外部视频链接
video icon Presentation by James McPherson on Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, September 11, 2008, C-SPAN

Some students of history question the designation of "strategic victory" for the Union. After all, it can be argued that McClellan performed poorly in the campaign and the battle itself, and Lee displayed great generalship in holding his own in battle against an army that greatly outnumbered his. Casualties were comparable on both sides, although Lee lost a higher percentage of his army. Lee withdrew from the battlefield first, the technical definition of the tactical loser in a Civil War battle. However, in a strategic sense, despite being a tactical draw, Antietam is considered a turning point of the war and a victory for the Union because it ended Lee's strategic campaign (his first invasion of Union territory). American historian James M. McPherson summed up the importance of the Battle of Antietam in his book, Crossroads of Freedom:

No other campaign and battle in the war had such momentous, multiple consequences as Antietam. In July 1863 the dual Union triumphs at Gettysburg and Vicksburg struck another blow that blunted a renewed Confederate offensive in the East and cut off the western third of the Confederacy from the rest. In September 1864 Sherman's capture of Atlanta electrified the North and set the stage for the final drive to Union victory. These also were pivotal moments. But they would never have happened if the triple Confederate offensives in Mississippi, Kentucky, and most of all Maryland had not been defeated in the fall of 1862.[85]

The results of Antietam also allowed President Lincoln to issue the preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, which gave Confederate states until January 1, 1863, to return or else lose their slaves. Although Lincoln had intended to do so earlier, he was advised by his Cabinet to make this announcement after a Union victory to avoid the perception that it was issued out of desperation.

The Union victory and Lincoln's proclamation played a considerable role in dissuading the governments of France and Britain from recognizing the Confederacy; some suspected they were planning to do so in the aftermath of another Union defeat. When the issue of emancipation was linked to the progress of the war, neither government had the political will to oppose the United States, since it linked support of the Confederacy to support for slavery. Both countries had already abolished slavery, and the public would not have tolerated the government militarily supporting a sovereignty upholding the ideals of slavery.[86]

战场保存

The battle is commemorated at Antietam National Battlefield. Conservation work undertaken by Antietam National Battlefield and private groups, has earned Antietam a reputation as one of the nation's best preserved Civil War battlefields. Few visual intrusions mar the landscape, letting visitors experience the site nearly as it was in 1862.[87]

Antietam was one of the first five Civil War battlefields preserved federally, receiving that distinction on August 30, 1890. The U.S. War Department also placed over 300 tablets at that time to mark the spots of individual regiments and of significant phases in the battle. The battlefield was transferred to the Department of the Interior in 1933. The Antietam National Battlefield now consists of 2,743 acres.

The Civil War Trust (a division of the American Battlefield Trust) and its partners have acquired and preserved 316 acres of the Antietam Battlefield.[88] In 2015, the Trust saved 44.4 acres in the heart of the battlefield, between the Cornfield and the Dunker Church, when it purchased the Wilson farm for about $1 million.[89] The preservation organization has since removed the postwar house and barn that stood on the property along Hagerstown Pike and returned the land to its wartime appearance.[90]

历史照片和绘画

Mathew Brady's gallery, "The Dead of Antietam" (1862)

On September 19, 1862, two days after the Battle of Antietam, Mathew Brady sent photographer Alexander Gardner and his assistant James Gibson[91] to photograph the carnage. In October 1862 Brady displayed the photos by Gardner in an exhibition entitled "The Dead of Antietam" at Brady's New York gallery. Many images in this presentation were graphic photographs of corpses, a presentation new to America. This was the first time that many Americans saw the realities of war in photographs as distinct from previous "artists' impressions".[92] The New York Times published a review on October 20, 1862, describing how, "Of all objects of horror one would think the battle-field should stand preeminent, that it should bear away the palm of repulsiveness." But crowds came to the gallery drawn by a "terrible fascination" to the images of mangled corpses which brought the reality of remote battle fields to New Yorkers. Viewers examined details using a magnifying glass. "We would scarce choose to be in the gallery, when one of the women bending over them should recognize a husband, a son, or a brother in the still, lifeless lines of bodies, that lie ready for the gaping trenches."[93]

Captain James Hope murals

Captain James Hope of the 2nd Vermont Infantry, a professional artist, painted five large murals based on battlefield scenes he had sketched during the Battle of Antietam. He had been assigned to sideline duties as a scout and mapmaker due to his injuries. The canvasses were exhibited in his gallery in Watkins Glen, New York, until his death in 1892. He had prints made of these larger paintings and sold the reproductions. In the 1930s his work was damaged in a flood. The original murals were shown in a church for many years. In 1979, the National Park Service purchased and restored them.[94][95] They were featured in a 1984 Time-Life book entitled The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam.[96]

图集

The images below include photographs by Alexander Gardner, who was employed by Mathew Brady and whose photographs were exhibited in Brady's New York gallery in October 1862, and the murals by Captain James Hope restored by the National Park Service.

  • Confederate soldiers on the Antietam battlefield as they fell inside the fence on the Hagerstown road, September 1862 by Alexander Gardner
    Confederate soldiers on the Antietam battlefield as they fell inside the fence on the Hagerstown road, September 1862 by Alexander Gardner
  • Harper's Weekly drawing of dead soldiers on Antietam battlefield, based on Gardner photograph
    Harper's Weekly drawing of dead soldiers on Antietam battlefield, based on Gardner photograph
  • Confederate horses lay dead and artillery caissons destroyed on Antietam battlefield[97]
    Confederate horses lay dead and artillery caissons destroyed on Antietam battlefield[97]
  • Dead on Antietam battlefield[98]
    Dead on Antietam battlefield[98]
  • Confederate dead at Bloody Lane, looking east from the north bank. Alexander Gardner photograph.
    Confederate dead at Bloody Lane, looking east from the north bank. Alexander Gardner photograph.
  • Confederate dead at Bloody Lane, looking northeast from the south bank. Alexander Gardner photograph.[99]
    Confederate dead at Bloody Lane, looking northeast from the south bank. Alexander Gardner photograph.[99]
  • "Confederate soldier who after being wounded had evidently dragged himself to a little ravine on the hillside where he died".[76] Photograph by Alexander Gardner.
    "Confederate soldier who after being wounded had evidently dragged himself to a little ravine on the hillside where he died".[76] Photograph by Alexander Gardner.
  • Federal burial party by Alexander Gardner[100]
    Federal burial party by Alexander Gardner[100]
  • Burying Union dead on the Antietam battlefield
    Burying Union dead on the Antietam battlefield
  • "A Lonely Grave" — Federal grave at Antietam by Alexander Gardner[101]
    "A Lonely Grave" — Federal grave at Antietam by Alexander Gardner[101]
  • Antietam Battlefield photograph by Alexander Gardner[102]
    Antietam Battlefield photograph by Alexander Gardner[102]
  • Artillery hell by Captain James Hope (Dunker Church at the far left)
    Artillery hell by Captain James Hope (Dunker Church at the far left)
  • "A Fateful Turn" — Late morning looking east toward the Roulette Farm by Captain James Hope
    "A Fateful Turn" — Late morning looking east toward the Roulette Farm by Captain James Hope
  • "The Aftermath at Bloody Lane" by Captain James Hope
    "The Aftermath at Bloody Lane" by Captain James Hope
  • "Wasted Gallantry" by Captain James Hope
    "Wasted Gallantry" by Captain James Hope
  • Burnside Bridge by Captain James Hope
    Burnside Bridge by Captain James Hope
  • The Lutheran Church just east of Sharpsburg marks the extent of the Union offensive during the Battle of Antietam, 1862.
    The Lutheran Church just east of Sharpsburg marks the extent of the Union offensive during the Battle of Antietam, 1862.

公众文化

The Battle of Antietam was featured at the beginning of the film Glory (1989), directed by Edward Zwick and starring Matthew Broderick, Denzel Washington, Cary Elwes, and Morgan Freeman. The scene depicts the wounding of Captain Robert Gould Shaw of Massachusetts.[103][104]

The Massachusetts-based ink manufacturer Noodler's[105] carries an ink called Antietam. The colour is a reddish brown.

参见

注解

  1. ^ 第27印第安那志愿步兵团的巴顿·米切尔（英语：Barton W. Mitchell）下士及约翰·M·布洛斯（英语：John M. Bloss）一级中士（英语：First Sergeant）[15][16]
  2. ^ 位于夏普斯堡西北方10英里（16千米）的威廉斯波特 (马里兰州)浅滩，已被石墙杰克森用于进军哈波斯渡口。联邦军在战役的部属使得邦联军从该方向撤退变得不切实际。
  3. ^ 不含A·P·希尔的师
  4. ^ 随著战役的进行及李将军的调度，这些兵团的边界有时会互相重叠。
  5. ^ 随后将被命名为伯恩赛德桥
  6. ^ 位于自邦斯伯勒（英语：Boonsboro, Maryland）来的路上

参考

  1. ^ NPS; see the discussion of "strategic victory" in the Aftermath section.
  2. ^ 更多资讯： Official Records, Series I, Volume XIX, Part 1, pp. 169–80.
  3. ^ 更多资讯： Official Records, Series I, Volume XIX, Part 1, pp. 803–10.
  4. ^ 4.0 4.1 更多资讯： Reports of Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan, U. S. Army, commanding the Army of the Potomac, of operations August 14 – November 9 (Official Records, Series I, Volume XIX, Part 1, p. 67).
  5. ^ 5.0 5.1 Eicher, p. 363，指出联邦部队有75,500人。
    Sears, p. 173，则指出联邦部队有75,000人，其中有效战力为71,500人及300门火炮；p. 296，他指出联邦伤亡12,401人占了所有参战部队的四分之一，且麦克莱伦承认真正参战的部队“仅有50,000名步兵及炮兵”；p. 389，他指出邦联有效战力“仅仅稍微超过38,000人”，这当中包含下午才抵达战场的A·P·希尔师。
    Priest, p. 343，则写出波多马克军团共有87,164人，其中有53,632人参战，而北维吉尼亚军团则有30,646人参战。
    Luvaas and Nelson, p. 302，指出联邦有87,100人参战，而邦联则有51,800人参战。
    Harsh, Sounding the Shallows, pp. 201–02，分析了人物的史学，并显示Ezra A. Carman（一位影响其他部分来源的战场历史学家）使用了“参战”人物；共有38,000名士兵，但不包括潘德（Pender）旅和菲尔德（Field）旅（这些部队约半数是炮兵），以及用于确保战线后方目标的部队。
  6. ^ 6.0 6.1 6.2 更多资讯： Official Records, Series I, Volume XIX, Part 1, pp. 189–204.
  7. ^ 7.0 7.1 7.2 根据Sears, pp. 294–96显示，双方的伤亡人数分别为：
    联邦：共12,410人（2,108人战死、9,549人负伤、753人被俘/失踪）；
    邦联：共10,316人（1,546人战死、7,752人负伤、1,018人被俘/失踪）
    Sears指出：“毫无疑问，被列入失踪名单的1,771人中有许多人实际上已经战死，被埋葬在下落不明的坟墓中。(there is no doubt that a good many of the 1,771 men listed as missing were in fact dead, buried uncounted in unmarked graves where they fell.)”
    Cannan, p. 201.指出邦联的伤亡人数是估计值，因为回报的人数有包含南山之役及谢泼兹敦战役（英语：Battle of Shepherdstown）的伤亡人数而未做区分;
    McPherson, p. 129，给出邦联损失人数的范围: 1,546–2,700人战死、7,752–9,024人负伤。他也指出双方伤兵中，共计有超过2,000人最后因伤重而死。
    Priest, p. 343，回报联邦伤亡人数为12,882人（2,157人战死、9,716人负伤、1,009人失踪或被俘），而邦联伤亡人数则是11,530人（1,754人战死、8,649人负伤、1,127人失踪或被俘）
    Luvaas and Nelson, p. 302，引述联邦伤亡人数为12,469人（2,010人战死、9,416人负伤、1,043人失踪或被俘），而邦联伤亡人数则是10,292人（9月14日–20日间，1,567人战死、8,725人负伤、加上约2,000人失踪或被俘）
  8. ^ McPherson 2002，第3页.
  9. ^ NPS.
  10. ^ McPherson 2002，第100页.
  11. ^ 11.0 11.1 Eicher 2001，第337页.
  12. ^ Sears, p. 69 "perhaps 50,000".
  13. ^ Sears 1983，第65–66页.
  14. ^ McPherson 2002，第88–89页.
  15. ^ Sears 1983，第112页.
  16. ^ McPherson 2002，第108页.
  17. ^ McPherson 2002，第109页.
  18. ^ McPherson 2002，第110–12页.
  19. ^ Sears 1983，第359–66页.
  20. ^ Welcher, pp. 786–88; Eicher, p. 338.
  21. ^ O.R. Series 1, Vol. XIX part 2 (S# 28), p. 621; Luvaas and Nelson, pp. 294–300; Esposito, map 67; Sears, pp. 366–72. 尽管包括官方记录（英语：Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies）在内的大多数历史文件都将这些组织称为“军团（Corps）”，但实际上一直到马里兰战役之后的1862年11月6日，这些组织才被正式指定。1862年的大部分时间里，隆史崔特的部队被称为右翼，而石墙杰克森的部队则被称为左翼。(Gen. Lee referred in official correspondence to these as "commands". See, for instance, Luvaas and Nelson, p. 4. Lee used this term because a Confederate law forbade the creation of army corps. It had been intended as a states' rights measure to ensure that governors would retain some control over the troops from their state, and Lee lobbied strongly for repeal of this law.) Harsh, Sounding the Shallows, pp. 32–90, states that D.H. Hill was temporarily in command of a "Center Wing" with his own division commanded initially by Brig. Gen. Roswell S. Ripley, and the divisions of Maj. Gen. Lafayette McLaws and Brig. Gen. John G. Walker. The other references list him strictly as a division commander.
  22. ^ Bailey 1984，第60页.
  23. ^ 23.0 23.1 23.2 Sears 1983，第174页.
  24. ^ Sears 1983，第164, 175–76页.
  25. ^ Bailey 1984，第63页.
  26. ^ Harsh, Taken at the Flood, pp. 366–67
  27. ^ Sears 1983，第181页.
  28. ^ 28.0 28.1 Wolff 2000，第60页.
  29. ^ Sears 1983，第190–91页.
  30. ^ 30.0 30.1 Bailey 1984，第70页.
  31. ^ 31.0 31.1 Wolff 2000，第61页.
  32. ^ Bailey 1984，第71–73页.
  33. ^ Bailey 1984，第71页.
  34. ^ Dawes 1999，第88–91页.
  35. ^ Bailey 1984，第75页.
  36. ^ Dawes 1999，第91–93页.
  37. ^ Bailey 1984，第79页.
  38. ^ Bailey 1984，第91页.
  39. ^ Dawes 1999，第95页.
  40. ^ Bailey 1984，第79–80页.
  41. ^ Sears 1983，第206页.
  42. ^ Armstrong 2002，第3–27页.
  43. ^ Eicher 2001，第353–55页.
  44. ^ Wolff 2000，第61–62页.
  45. ^ Sears 1983，第221–30页.
  46. ^ Armstrong 2002，第39–55页.
  47. ^ Kennedy, p. 120.
  48. ^ Bailey 1984，第93页.
  49. ^ Bailey 1984，第94页.
  50. ^ Wolff 2000，第63页.
  51. ^ Bailey 1984，第99页.
  52. ^ Bailey 1984，第100页.
  53. ^ Bailey 1984，第101–03页.
  54. ^ 54.0 54.1 Sears 1983，第242页.
  55. ^ Bailey 1984，第102页.
  56. ^ Sears 1983，第254页.
  57. ^ Bailey 1984，第108页.
  58. ^ Bailey 1984，第108–09页.
  59. ^ Bailey 1984，第141页.
  60. ^ Jamieson, p. 94. McClellan issued the order at 9:10, after the repulse of Hooker's and Mansfield's assaults, having waited for the VI Corps to reach the battlefield and take up a reserve position.
  61. ^ 61.0 61.1 Wolff 2000，第64页.
  62. ^ 62.0 62.1 Douglas 1940，第172页.
  63. ^ Eicher 2001，第359–60页.
  64. ^ Sears 1983，第260页.
  65. ^ Tucker, p. 87.
  66. ^ Sears 1983，第263页.
  67. ^ Bailey 1984，第120页.
  68. ^ Sears 1983，第264–65页.
  69. ^ Sears 1983，第266–67页.
  70. ^ Bailey 1984，第125–26页.
  71. ^ Sears 1983，第276页.
  72. ^ Bailey 1984，第131页.
  73. ^ Bailey 1984，第132–36页.
  74. ^ Bailey 1984，第136–37页.
  75. ^ Sears 1983，第291–92页.
  76. ^ 76.0 76.1 Site identified by Frassanito, pp. 105–108.
  77. ^ Sears 1983，第297, 306–07页.
  78. ^ 10,291 Confederate casualties: 1,567 killed and 8,724 wounded for the entire Maryland Campaign. See: Official Records, Series I, Volume XIX, Part 1, pp. 810–13.
  79. ^ https://www.nps.gov/anti/learn/historyculture/casualties.htm
  80. ^ Sears 1983，第194, 206, 254, 287, 290页.
  81. ^ "Death Tolls for Battles of the 16th, 17th, 18th & 19th Centuries (1500–1900)", citing the National Park Service.
  82. ^ Sears 1983，第296页.
  83. ^ Bailey 1984，第67页.
  84. ^ Sears 1983，第338-339页.
  85. ^ McPherson 2002，第155页.
  86. ^ Sears 1983，第318页.
  87. ^ Preservationists see victory at Antietam 150 years later. latimes. [August 10, 2015]. 
  88. ^ [1] American Battlefield Trust "Saved Land" webpage. Accessed May 22, 2018.
  89. ^ "Critical Piece of Antietam Battlefield Preserved," Hagerstown (Md.) Herald Mail, Sept. 30, 2015. Accessed Jan. 3, 2018.
  90. ^ Antietam Rebirth Accessed Jan. 3, 2018.
  91. ^ Brady employed almost two dozen men, each of whom was given a traveling darkroom, to photograph scenes from the battle. There are hundreds of photos in the National Archives taken by Brady and his associates from numerous Civil War sites.
  92. ^ Matthew [sic] Brady Antietam Photography Exhibit From 1862 Recreated At National Museum of Civil War Medicine. Huffington Post. October 5, 2012 [June 1, 2013]. （原始内容存档于October 21, 2012）.  已忽略未知参数|df= (帮助)
  93. ^ Brady's Photographs: Pictures of the Dead at Antietam. The New York Times. October 20, 1862. 
  94. ^ Hope paintings, Hope restored. National Park Service. 
  95. ^ James Hope (1818/19–1892) Papers, 1854–1983 (bulk: 1856–1872) MSA 529 & Size D (PDF). Vermont Historical Society. 
  96. ^ Bailey 1984，第110页.
  97. ^ Site identified by Frassanito, pp. 168–70.
  98. ^ Site identified by Robert Kalasky, "Military Images" Volume XX, Number 6 May–June 1999, pp. 24–29.
  99. ^ The Union soldiers looking on were likely members of the 130th Pennsylvania, who were assigned burial detail
  100. ^ Site identified by Frassanito, pp. 144–47.
  101. ^ Site identified by Frassanito, pp. 171–74.
  102. ^ Original description claimed "Battlefield of Antietam on the Day of the Battle" September 17, 1862; however, see Frassanito, pp. 70–73.
  103. ^ America’s Civil War: 54th Massachusetts Regiment. Historynet.com. June 12, 2006 [March 11, 2017]. 
  104. ^ Klein, Christopher. "Glory" Regiment Attacks Fort Wagner, 150 Years Ago. The History Channel. July 18, 2013 [March 11, 2017]. 
  105. ^ http://noodlersink.com/noodlers-ink-color/ink-colors-and-their-properties/

来源

第二手来源

  • Armstrong, Marion V. Disaster in the West Woods: General Edwin V. Sumner and the II Corps at Antietam. Sharpsburg, MD: Western Maryland Interpretive Association. 2002. 
  • Bailey, Ronald H. The Bloodiest Day: The Battle of Antietam. Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books. 1984. ISBN 0-8094-4740-1. 
  • Cannan, John. The Antietam Campaign: August–September 1862. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole, 1994. ISBN 0-938289-91-8.
  • Eicher, David J. The Longest Night: A Military History of the Civil War. New York: Simon & Schuster. 2001. ISBN 0-684-84944-5. 
  • Esposito, Vincent J. West Point Atlas of American Wars. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1959. OCLC 5890637. The collection of maps (without explanatory text) is available online at the West Point website.
  • Frassanito, William A. Antietam: The Photographic Legacy of America's Bloodiest Day. Gettysburg, PA: Thomas Publications, 1978. ISBN 1-57747-005-2.
  • Harsh, Joseph L. Sounding the Shallows: A Confederate Companion for the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2000. ISBN 0-87338-641-8.
  • Harsh, Joseph L. Taken at the Flood: Robert E. Lee and Confederate Strategy in the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1999. ISBN 0-87338-631-0.
  • Jamieson, Perry D. Death in September: The Antietam Campaign. Abilene, TX: McWhiney Foundation Press, 1999. ISBN 1-893114-07-4.
  • Kalasky, Robert. "Union dead...Confederate Dead'." Military Images Magazine. Volume XX, Number 6, May–June 1999.
  • Kennedy, Frances H., ed. The Civil War Battlefield Guide. 2nd ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1998. ISBN 0-395-74012-6.
  • Luvaas, Jay, and Harold W. Nelson, eds. Guide to the Battle of Antietam. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1987. ISBN 0-7006-0784-6.
  • McPherson, James M. Crossroads of Freedom: Antietam, The Battle That Changed the Course of the Civil War. New York: Oxford University Press. 2002. ISBN 0-19-513521-0. 
  • Priest, John Michael. Antietam: The Soldiers' Battle. New York: Oxford University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-19-508466-7.
  • Sears, Stephen W. Landscape Turned Red: The Battle of Antietam. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 1983. ISBN 0-89919-172-X. 
  • Tucker, Phillip Thomas. Burnside's Bridge: The Climactic Struggle of the 2nd and 20th Georgia at Antietam Creek. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000. ISBN 0-8117-0199-9.
  • Welcher, Frank J. The Union Army, 1861–1865 Organization and Operations. Vol. 1, The Eastern Theater. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-253-36453-1.
  • Wolff, Robert S. The Antietam Campaign. Heidler, David S.; Heidler, Jeanne T. (编). Encyclopedia of the American Civil War: A Political, Social, and Military History. New York: W. W. Norton & Company. 2000. ISBN 0-393-04758-X. 
  • National Park Service battle description

第一手来源

延伸阅读

  • Armstrong Marion V., Jr. Unfurl Those Colors! McClellan, Sumner, and the Second Army Corps in the Antietam Campaign. Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2008. ISBN 978-0-8173-1600-6.
  • Ballard, Ted. Battle of Antietam: Staff Ride Guide. Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2006. OCLC 68192262.
  • Breeden, James O. "Field Medicine at Antietam." Caduceus: A Humanities Journal for Medicine and the Health Sciences 10#1 (1994): 8–22.
  • Carman, Ezra Ayers. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862. Vol. 1, South Mountain. Edited by Thomas G. Clemens. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2010. ISBN 978-1-932714-81-4.
  • Carman, Ezra Ayers. The Maryland Campaign of September 1862: Ezra A. Carman's Definitive Account of the Union and Confederate Armies at Antietam. Edited by Joseph Pierro. New York: Routledge, 2008. ISBN 0-415-95628-5.
  • Catton, Bruce. "Crisis at the Antietam." American Heritage 9#5 (August 1958): 54–96.
  • Frassanito, William A. Antietam: The Photographic Legacy of America's Bloodiest Day. New York: Scribner, 1978. ISBN 978-0-684-15659-0.
  • Frye, Dennis E. Antietam Shadows: Mystery, Myth & Machination. Sharpsburg, MD: Antietam Rest Publishing, 2018. ISBN 978-0-9854119-2-3.
  • Gallagher, Gary W., ed. Antietam: Essays on the 1862 Maryland Campaign. Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1989. ISBN 0-87338-400-8.
  • Gottfried, Bradley M. The Maps of Antietam: An Atlas of the Antietam (Sharpsburg) Campaign, including the Battle of South Mountain, September 2–20, 1862. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2011. ISBN 978-1-61121-086-6.
  • Jermann, Donald R. Antietam: The Lost Order. Gretna, LA: Pelican Publishing Co., 2006. ISBN 1-58980-366-3.
  • Hartwig, D. Scott. To Antietam Creek: The Maryland Campaign of 1862. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. ISBN 978-1-4214-0631-2.
  • Murfin, James V. The Gleam of Bayonets: The Battle of Antietam and the Maryland Campaign of 1862. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1965. ISBN 0-8071-0990-8.
  • Perry D. Jamieson and Bradford A. Wineman, The Maryland and Fredericksburg Campaigns, 1862–1863. Washington, DC: United States Army Center of Military History, 2015. CMH Pub 75-6.
  • Rawley, James A. Turning Points of the Civil War. University of Nebraska Press. 1966. ISBN 0-8032-8935-9. OCLC 44957745. 
  • Reardon, Carol and Tom Vossler. A Field Guide to Antietam: Experiencing the Battlefield through Its History, Places, and People (U of North Carolina Press, 2016) 347 pp.
  • Slotkin, Richard. The Long Road to Antietam: How the Civil War Became a Revolution. New York: Liveright, 2012. ISBN 978-0-87140-411-4.
  • Vermilya, Daniel J. That Field of Blood: The Battle of Antietam, September 17, 1862. Emerging Civil War Series. El Dorado Hills, CA: Savas Beatie, 2018. ISBN 978-1-61121-375-1.

外部链接

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