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Legacy

Napoleon III did not live in Chiselburst in the 1840s; he lived in the west end of London and was pretty much solely based there during his earlier exiles, except for a period when he rented a proerty in Leamington Spa, and also a visit to the Duke of Somerset. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.125.101.201 (talk) 14:12, 22 October 2011 (UTC)[reply]

comment

Could something be mentioned here about his early life in the Carbonari, and how this hurt French interests by giving an unhealthy anti-Austrian bias to his foreign policy?

"He also directed the building of the French railway network. The design was very inefficient, however, as all routes lead to Paris. There were lines between Paris and Lyon, Caen, and Marseilles, but no lines connecting the latter cities to each other. Thus to travel from Marseilles to Bordeaux one needed to go via Paris, a great inefficiency. This was economically inefficient"

This does not sound much NPOV to me. David.Monniaux 14:41, 28 Jul 2004 (UTC)

True, but it doesn't sound very efficient to me! Admittedly, the writing might need some work... David Corbett 03:43, 24 February 2006 (UTC)[reply]

For those interested in the like, a contemporary American account of Napoleon III's death may be found at [1]. -- Itai 23:02, 28 Dec 2004 (UTC)

Why isn't the Paris Commune mentioned? --Tothebarricades.tk 03:58, 3 Feb 2005 (UTC)

Well, you can add something, of course. The Paris Commune was not particularly relevant to Napoleon III, though - it started after the armistice with Prussia/Germany, which itself was many months after Napoleon's capture at Sedan and the end of the Empire. john k 05:37, 3 Feb 2005 (UTC)


Generally speaking, this biography is largely biaised against Louis-Napoleon Bonaparte (LNB). Specifically, the part "President of the French Republic" is unacurrate and inconsistent with the next parts.

  • Describing LNB as a dictator and comparing his methods with Hitler's is an historical non sense :

- LNB re-established general elections for the house members
- He eventually accepted the parliamentary system (government shall have the confidence of the house, not just be chosen by the sovereign). It is mentionned later in the text.
- LNB legalized trade unions, it does not sound very hitlerian or dictatorial to me...

  • The Coup d'etat was obviously illegal, but just as illegal as the revolution that established the republic 4 years before.
  • The text suggests that his only asset and skill was his uncle name but then how could he gain and keep power during 22 years just thanks to his name ? That's historically ridiculous.
  • One should stress that LNB gave definitively in 1851 the right to vote to poor or uneducated men.
  • One cannot say that the 1849 "National Assembly was dominated by the Monarchists" since 446 members against 278 voted to allow his re-election (short of the 3/4 required majority)
  • I never heard of him "having a german accent"

--Geo115fr 02:50, 9 November 2006 (UTC)[reply]

Monarchists might vote for his re-election, surely? Certainly one might expect legitimists to do so (the Orleanists probably would have wanted Joinville or Aumale as the next president). The two monarchists groupings could not agree as to who the candidate for the throne would be, therefore not necessarily any harm in keeping LNB around. I agree that he should not be compared with Hitler, but at the same time, his rule is widely considered to be one of the bases for modern dictatorship. And "eventually" is the key word in his acceptance of parliamentary rule - it didn't happen until 1870. There was not even any nominal opposition until 1860 or so. Obviously, a 19th century ruler didn't have the tools of oppression available that a 20th century one would have. Equally obviously, Napoleon III considered himself a reformer, and sympathetic to the working man, and that influenced his policies re: labor unions, universal suffrags, etc. I fully agree that we should not say that his only asset was his uncle's name. He was clearly intelligent and had an ability to use his uncle's name to good purpose. He definitely had his flaws (many of them), but he wasn't a total incompetent. And he had smart people working for him, particularly Persigny. john k 12:42, 9 November 2006 (UTC)[reply]

The comparison with Adolf Hitler have been erased. However, it is still suitable to call him a dictator, at least for the early part of his imperial regime. I want to know more about his upbringing. Where did he live during which years? I have to know that in order to value the claim that he spoke French with a German accent. Did he have any military education? If not he would not have had the typical “soldier” posture shown on the uppermost portrait. The artist might just have painted him so in order to make his appearance more similar to his supposed uncle. It is generally assumed that his father was Louis Bonaparte. Charles Louis Napoléon might not have looked much like him. But the Mendelian laws of heredity allows for children not looking much like any of their parents.

2006-12-03 Lena Synnerholm, Märsta, Sweden.

Napoleon III had some sketchy military education (he had recieved some one-on-one instruction from fellow-exiles who had been colonels in Napoleon I's army during his youth in Switzerland), but had no actual military experience before he became Emperor, and had no talent for generalship. However, as his rule was in large part based on the reflected glow of his uncle's military glory, he had to portray himself as a military man in his uncle's image. Thus he was personally present as Commander-in-Chief at many of the battles fought during his reign, most notably Solferino and Sedan, and his publicity said he was the one making the tactical decisions, although in actual fact he left the decisions up to the professional generals. It was because he was personally present as (nominal) Commander at the Battle of Sedan that the Prussians were able to capture him in person.

The claim that he spoke French with a German accent is found in the 1911 Encyclopaedia Britannica, presumably based on primary sources of Napoleon III's own time: "It was at this time he acquired the German accent which he never lost." (http://www.1911encyclopedia.org/Napoleon_III) Louis-Napoleon spent his formative childhood and adolescent years, after his family's exile from France in 1815 when he was seven, in German-speaking countries. He first wandered around different places for two years with his mother, including both French-speaking Geneva and German-speaking Carlsruhe and Augsburg. They then found a permanent home in exile in Arenenburg, where they lived from 1817, when Louis-Napoleon was nine, in the German-speaking canton of Thurgau in Switzerland. As an adolescent he studied at the gymnasium school at Augsburg, in Bavaria, where he recieved his education. He visited Italy with his mother in 1823, but only moved there permanently after his education had been completed, in early adulthood. Thus the critical years of his childhood and adolescence, certainly from the age of nine onwards, were all spent in a German-speaking environment in Switzerland and Bavaria (although obviously he would have spent much of his time speaking French with his family and with his French tutors). See the 1911 Encyclopedia Britannica article.

Causabon, 5th November 2007.

That means he lived in French-spoken areas until he was nine. In general, people don’t have any accent if they begin to learn a language at the age of eight or earlier. So it is quite unlikely that he would had begun to speak his mother tongue with German accent. It is much more likely that he would had learned to speak German with FRENCH accent. There is exceptions to the rule, of cause. Encyclopaedia Britannica is said to be written by experts in the field. But his full name is written incorrectly in the article: I see no reason why he would be named “De Bourbon”. In fact, “Bourbon” is the name of a branch of the dynasty of de Capet which previously ruled France. (“de Capet”, or simply “Capet”, is one of the worlds oldest surnames.) I found a photo of Napoléon III on Wikimedia Commons, where he looked like he was in his late middle age (equivalent of a present-day 60-year-old). It does not show the typical “soldier” posture I thought about, so he did not had that.

2007-01-12 Lena Synnerholm, Märsta, Sweden.

Assassination attempt

The Times, Friday, Jan 13, 1854; pg. 5; Issue 21637; col F, gives the trial for those attempting to kill the Emperor as the day before; this is the Paris Hippodrome attempt. Is there an error with the cited date in April 1855? It would appear to be too late unless this ais the second attempt. Th eParis Hippodrome plot deserves a mention, anyway.-MrCandy

The Cotton Crisis, the Silver Drain, and the French Intervention in Mexico

This article does not adequately discuss the logic behind Napoleon's intervention in Mexico. Modern historians point to numerous factors for the intervention, ranging from his support of monarchies to France's protest to recent US expansion (Texas annexation and Gadsden Purchase). However, the two main factors for Napoleon's invasion of Mexico was the continuous and alarming loss of silver for specie and drastic decrease in cotton imports.

The 'silver drain' began in the early 1850s as vast amounts of gold from California, Siberia, and Australia poured into Europe. At first, France continued to import more silver than it exported (to other countries using silver as specie like Belgium and Switzerland), but as gold continued to flood European markets, silver became more scarce as speculators hoarded, melted down, and exported it. To specify this point, during 1850s the ratio of gold specie and silver specie inverted, changing from 3/4 silver and 1/4 gold to 1/4 silver and 3/4 gold. This meant that silver exports eventually exceeded silver imports, and France had to choose between three options: 1) maintain the law of 1803 which dictated that silver was the monetary unit (but would also accept gold because France's monetary system was actually bimetallic), 2) demonetize silver (which would totally change France's monetary structure), or 3) demonetize gold. The French opted for the first option because previous influxes of gold (like from Brazil in the 1820s) would breifly upset the monetary standard, and then stabilize. However, gold continued to pour in, silver became increasingly rare as speculators hoarded, melted down, and exported it to silver-consuming countries (most notably Switzerland and Belgium), who face similar crises. In other words, there was no precedent for the gold boom, and Napoleon sought silver supplies from Sonora which allegedly contained the world's largest silver deposits. This would help even out the gold-silver ratio and stabilize the crisis.

The 'cotton crisis' occurred when the United States broke out into Civil War. The Northern blockade prevented the South from exporting cotton. As a result, European consumers found themselves unable to obtain cotton, a very important industry in France. Although French entrepreneurs had investments in Algeria, Egypt, West Africa and Turkey, they did not make up for the drastic loss of cotton. The only other available market was India, which had a very different (and arguably worse) type of cotton and demanded payment in silver, which the French desperately sought to hold onto. The Indian cotton forced textile industries to change their machinery, which put many smaller mills under. Also, the decrease in cotton forced the cotton industry to produce less cotton, which consequentially raised cotton prices. The result was growing unemployment rates(which threatened to erupt into revolt) and a decrease in the export of luxury goods. Napoleon, with the urging of several surveys, sought to grow cotton in Mexico to remedy the problem.

Napoleon felt confident that the intervention would work for several important reasons. First, the United States could not enforce the Monroe Doctrine in the middle of its Civil War. Second, France knew that other European countries would not oppose the intervention and wooed them by agreeing to repay 2/3 of Mexico's debt to European investors. Third, Mexican Conservatives appealed to Europe for a monarch, and during times of political unrest, even Mexican Liberals sought a monarch who would at least provide stability. Fourth, neither the Europeans nor the Mexicans wanted the US to expand any further south (into Mexico). Fifth, France's previous military victories in the Crimea and in Austria displayed the power of the French army, although the Prussians would later defeat the French in a war that shifted the balance of power on the European continent. In fact, it would not be until the US ended its war and began supplying Juarez's forces that the rebels would oust the French.

The French intervention in Mexico may have been a blunder on Napoleon's part because of the inherent chaotic and splintered atmosphere of Mexico (Apaches, Pimas, Liberals, Conservatives, etc.), especially in the Northern regions where most of the silver was supposedly, but also because Napoleon III miscalculated the outcome of the Civil War. However, his intent was justifiable, given France's situation: Mexico appeared to be the perfect country to solve the cotton crisis and the silver drain simultaneously. —Preceding unsigned comment added by Jhype86 (talk • contribs) 08:10, 7 April 2008 (UTC)[reply]

"However, it is still suitable to call him a dictator, at least for the early part of his imperial regime." I would say that he stayed a dictator until the Prussians kicked him out in the 1870s. He never called an election to legitimize his power, did he? Also, the article said that he was Napoleon's heir. Is this true, or did he just lie about it? 73.137.170.88 (talk) 01:59, 24 September 2015 (UTC)[reply]
I don't think he was any more of a dictator than other European monarchs of the time, with the exception of the UK. He was elected President by a huge majority, and after he seized power he regularly held referendums asking for public support, which he always received. By all indications he was quite popular in the country, except in Paris. Napoleon recognized him as his nephew, and he was recognized by Napoleon's family as heir. As some historians have noted, if he had left office after ten years instead of staying too long, he would be probably be considered one of the great French monarchs. SiefkinDR (talk) 08:37, 24 September 2015 (UTC)[reply]

In fiction

This information was placed there as a complement to the "In movies" section, but was quickly taken down and referred to as an "advertisement". This is not an advertisement, as there is no way I or anyone else can profit from someone following the link. It is a free site with creative product from unpaid web authors. The story in question is one of the very few treatments of Louis Napoleon in fiction anywhere, and since movies are being cited, and in other articles books are cited (i.e. "Tecumseh in Fiction").

The section on "advertisements" says this: Articles considered advertisements include those that are solicitations for a business, product or service, or are public relations pieces designed to promote a company or individual.

This entry is not a solicitation for a business, product or service (unless you consider writing a service, in which case Wikipedia can't realistically cite any books). The site in question is a commercial site, but this is not a commercial section of the site -- it's a creative section. Further, it is not a public relations entry, but a sincere effort to highlight one of the few mentions of Louis Napoleon in popular literature.

Requested move (2007)

The following discussion is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section.

This page recently was moved to a new title without discussion. The naming conventions require that the title be changed back to Napoleon III of France. However, this cannot be done without an admin's assistance, and so I have posted the move here for discussion. --Russ (talk) 13:47, 28 April 2007 (UTC)[reply]

The discussion above is closed. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made on the appropriate discussion page. No further edits should be made to this discussion.

Credit Mobilier

I de-linked the reference to the Credit Mobilier since it led to an article on the historic US company with that name. Perhaps someone should create another article for the Credit Mobilier mentioned in this article. Tmangray (talk) 00:42, 23 December 2007 (UTC)[reply]

Fatherhood

There is a possible sollution to the problem of who Charles Louis Napoléon's father was. After a great deal searching, I have managed to find a photo of him without a beard. It turned out that he had a cleft in his chin. This trait is due to a dominant gene, which means it is always expressed regaldless if you have it in one of two copies. Louis Napoléon Bonaparte also had a cleft in his chin. If no other possible father had Charles Louis Napoléon was really the son of his mother's husband.

2008-12-25 Lena Synnerholm, Märsta, Sweden.

At least one biography states that his illegitimacy was common knowledge, and that his mother used to joke about it - to the effect "Oh, Silly me. I got the dates wrong!" 86.154.93.83 (talk) 14:21, 11 May 2009 (UTC)[reply]

If his mother had more than one partner at the approximate time of conception his contemporaries could not have known if he was illegitimate or not. If Hortense did not have any opportunity to have sex with Louis at the time in question Louis Charles Napoléon was definitely illegitimate. On the other hand, if she had or could have sex with both her husband and a lover the son's cleft in the chin could be used to tell who the father was. I don't think he inherited this trait from his mother since I have seen several portraits of her and no-one of them shows her with a cleft in her chin.

2009-05-23 Lena Synnerholm, Märsta, Sweden.

Hortense could conceivably have given birth to Louis-Napoleon prematurely. He was born around three weeks early, and any child born between 180 to 300 days after conception could be recognized as a legitimate heir. Hortense and Louis were only reunited in August after she had been on a trip to Cauterets and the south, and so the child was expected for May 12 1808. There are a number of biographies that dispute that Louis-Napoleon was illegitimate, and Hortense denied it, privately, during the Restoration period. I'm not sure if paintings of Count Charles Bylandt-Palstercamps or a man named Ver Huell, near her at the time exist, but they do for the Marquis de Castellane[2], Carel Hendrik Ver Huell, and Élie, duc Decazes. The latter, often seen as the 'strongest candidate' does not have a cleft lip; Castellane might but it is difficult to say - he was a 48-year-old prefect, and Hortense had been avoiding the two prefects she was meant to see on her trip. (Is it possible that 'imperfections', such as cleft lip, might not be included in paintings?). It should be looked in the article, either way. Louis Bonaparte certainly believed it to be true. Yohan euan o4 (talk) 14:01, 21 June 2009 (UTC)[reply]

Charles Louis Napoléon may have thought that his mother avoided these two men because he wanted to believe that his mother's husband was his father. You repeatedly write about a “cleft lip” wile I pointed out that Charles Louis Napoléon had a cleft chin just like Louis Napoléon. This trait may be considered an “imperfection” from a biological point of view but not necessary from an aesthetic one. I have seen many portraits of Napoléon I Bonaparte. Some of them includes the cleft in his chin wile others does not. Joseph Léornard Castellane may have had a cleft chin but the portrait of him is rather fuzzy. Do you know if Hortense had any opportunity to be alone with him during the time she could have fallen pregnant?

2009-06-27 Lena Synnerholm, Märsta, Sweden.

Ha, yes, I meant "cleft chin". She was travelling to Garvanie between 19-25 July, with Adele de Broc and Pierre Thiénon, an artist, whom the writer of my biography does not consider. She wanted to avoid the "idle chatter" of the prefects and so took a different route to them, arriving a day early. She went ahead of the prefects (they didn't meet in Garvanie) and other authorities again to Saint-Sauveur, where she had a banquet with them before leaving for a final time, in the early hours of the morning after the banquet, with Mme de Boc. She later said that she regretted avoiding the group. There is a potential problem with the chin still - if Napoleon I has it in some but not others, then some artists presumably considered it insignificant, and we're working with a limited number of portraits, probably no more than one with some of these. Yohan euan o4 (talk) 19:00, 28 June 2009 (UTC)[reply]

It seems like Hortense herself said that she was not alone with any of those two men. That leaves Joseph Léornard de Castellane as a possible father of her son Louis Charles Napoléon. Did she have any opportunity to be alone with Joseph at the time she could have fallen pregnant? If so he could theoretically have been the father of her son. Then the question follows: did Joseph have any cleft in his chin? This can probably be answered by someone who has seen several portraits of him. Please note that they have to be enough similar to each other for you to tell that they depict the same person. If no-one of these portraits shows him with a cleft in his chin then Louis Charles Napoléon was most likely the son of his mother's husband.

2009-07-29 Lena Synnerholm, Märsta, Sweden.

A photo of Charles Louis Napoléon with his chin shaved can now be found here. Usually, he had a small beard as shown on this photo. Now the question is: did his mother Hortense have the chance to be alone with Joseph Léornard de Castellane during the time she could have fallen pregnant? If so the question which follows is if Joseph had any cleft in his chin. If the answer of any of these questions is “no” Charles Louis Napoléon was in all likehod the son of his mother's husband.

2010-12-29 Lena Synnerholm, Märsta, Sweden.

The issue of Napoleon III's legitimacy and paternity was widely debated within his life. It was obviously an open question, and many did think him a bastard, but there's no conclusive evidence. The most common rumor was that he was fathered by a Dutch sailor. Madame Cornu, a childhood family friend of Louis Napoleon, later estranged, argued pretty strongly for Louis' paternity when her interlocuter, the English economist Nassau Senior, spoke of him casually as having "Dutch blood":

He has not a drop of Dutch blood. He is the son of Louis. In the beginning of July, 1807, Napoleon effected a reconciliation between Hortense and Louis. They met at Montpelier, and spent three or four days, as was usually the case, quarrelling. She went off in a pet to Bordeaux, where the Emperor was, on his way to begin the seizure of Spain. She passed a few days with him, and then returned, at the end of July, to her husband at Montpelier. He has many little bodily tricks resembling those of Louis. Louis never looked you in the face; when he bowed it was not like anybody else – it was an inclination of the body on one side. He kept his hands close to his sides; Louis Napoleon has all these peculiarities. In the April of the following year Hortense was frightened and taken ill suddenly, and Louis Napoleon was born on the 20th of April, 12 days before he was expected. On this pretext Louis, in 1815, tried to get a divorce, but of course failed. He was always jealous of Hortense, bribed all her servants to watch her, and often said of Louis Napoleon, ‘ce n’est past mon enfant.’ But he was half-mad, and, I believe, said so only to teaze his wife. At one time he took possession of Louis Napoleon, and became exceedingly fond of him, which would scarcely have been the case if he had really doubted his legitimacy.

. Cornu had no obvious reason to lie - she was completely estranged from the emperor by 1859, when she was saying this. This is from Nassau Senior's Conversations with M. Thiers, M. Guizot, and Other Distinguished Persons, during the Second Empire, Vol. II (London, 1878), p. 334. john k (talk) 16:45, 29 December 2010 (UTC)[reply]

I want to point out that the personality is only 40-50% hereditary. If Charles Louis Napoléon was the son of his mother's husband they would have shared 20-25% of their personalities. Furthermore, the heritability of personality traits is so complicated that you simply can't predict the behaviour of a person from the behaviour of his or her biological parents. In general, heritability is much more complicated than these people's contemporaries imagined. In order to retroactively tell who was the biological father of a certain person we have to use present knowledge of heritability. Today it is known that a cleft in the chin has to exist in at least one of the parents in order for a child to have it. Charles Louis Napoléon had a cleft in his chin as shown in the photo I previously linked to. His mother Hortense most likely did not have this trait so he must have inherited it from his father. Hortense's husband Louis Napoléon most likely did have a cleft chin. If no other possible father had this trait Charles Louis Napoléon was really the son of his mother's husband.

2011-01-03 Lena Synnerholm, Märsta, Sweden.

Charles Louis Napoléon’s fatherhood is not impossible forensically test. If there is a hair sample from him or from his son Napoléon Eugène it could be used for testing. (I see no reason to doubt that guy’s fatherhood.) If so, the Y chromosome could be compared to that of Jean-Christophe Bonaparte, his father Charles Napoléon, or his uncle Jérôme Xavier. I can’t help wondering if the later is named for his great-great-grandfather who Charles Louis Napoléon might have called “Uncle Jérôme”. Anyway, a genetic comparison would tell if such a nickname would have been factually correct or not.

2012-08-01 Lena Synnerholm, Märsta, Sweden.

Recent DNA reports suggest that he was not the son of his mother's husband, as his DNA does not match Napoleon & Jerome Bonaparte's reported haplotypes. See [3]. - Nunh-huh 13:53, 12 December 2013 (UTC)[reply]

See also [4] and the Haplogroup of NIII. is I(M170). The same Haplogroup is published by another descendant [5]. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 178.2.104.47 (talk) 10:30, 21 December 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Thank you so much! Now it has been shown that Charles Louis Napoléon Bonaparte was illegitimate in exactly the same way as I suggested. However, someone may well have come up with the idea independently of me.

2013-12-31 Lena Synnerholm, Märsta, Sweden.

Title : Napoleon of France ?

This article should be renamed as the official title of Napoleon III was "Napoleon III, Emperor of the French". He never was "Emperor of France". That's important because it symbolically meant that he came from the "nation" and was not a king by divine right like the monarchs of the Ancien Régime. I propose to rename this article "Napoleon III" as there never was an other monarch called "Napoleon III". DITWIN GRIM (talk) 15:15, 18 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Support move as disambiguation in this case is unnecessary. DrKay (talk) 09:43, 26 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Support move for reasons given above, consistent with argument RE Napoleon I. --Frania W. (talk) 13:29, 26 February 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Support move as per Frania W. AJRG (talk) 17:20, 31 March 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Requested move

The following discussion is an archived discussion of the proposal. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on the talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

Page moved. Vegaswikian (talk) 05:46, 8 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Napoleon III of France → Napoleon III — "Napoleon I of France" has been moved to Napoleon I, we ought to be consistent. PatGallacher (talk) 15:33, 31 March 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Support both moves as disambiguation is unnecessary. DrKay (talk) 15:54, 31 March 2010 (UTC)[reply]

If none with that name followed him, it would be perfect; however, since there were two after him, that made him n° 1, and we have to drop the "Bonaparte" surname (my way of thinking). --Frania W. (talk) 12:22, 2 April 2010 (UTC)[reply]
The above discussion is preserved as an archive of the proposal. Please do not modify it. Subsequent comments should be made in a new section on this talk page. No further edits should be made to this section.

Location of death

Chislehurst was not in Greater London at the time on Napoleon's death, it was in Kent. Mjroots (talk) 21:32, 6 October 2010 (UTC)[reply]

Confusing or erroneous sentence?

Under "President of the French Republic", I see this: 

 The coup of 1851 alienated the reactionary and careerist elements in the Assembly. Victor Hugo, who had 
 hitherto shown support for Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte, decided to go into exile after the coup, and became 
 one of the harshest critics of Napoleon III, despite the amnesty of political opponents in 1992.

That last clause, "despite the amnesty of political opponents in 1992", seems completely unrelated to Hugo becoming a critic of Napoleon III. I'm no English major but I have been speaking it for 30 or so years, and I was pretty confused. Can someone who knows what it's supposed to mean clarify? RobI (talk) 19:13, 28 March 2011 (UTC)[reply]

It's been fixed, but 1992 should have been 1859. -Ashley Pomeroy (talk) 18:09, 24 February 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Siamese Embassy Painting

I couldn't help but notice that the picture of the Siamese Embassy being received by Napoleon III's court is reversed. Napoleon is actually supposed to be seated on the left of the picture not the right. Is there any reason for this, such as copyright reasons, because I'm pretty sure it's in the public domain now? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 142.104.106.80 (talk) 02:33, 27 February 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Judging from the orientation of the sashes over the dignitaries' shoulders, it looks to be in the correct orientation to me. DrKay (talk) 08:00, 27 February 2012 (UTC)[reply]

I see your point. I mentioned this because I was reading "Napoleon III: A Life", (New York: Carrol & Graf Publishers, 1999) by Fenton Bresler and I came across this picture, recognizing it from this page, but it was reversed as I mentioned. Just judging by how the internet can be and comparing that to a scholarly book, I figured the book was probably right. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 50.92.211.156 (talk) 10:24, 1 March 2012 (UTC)[reply]

If you look very closely at the bottom-right of the painting, his signature - J L Gerome - is written into a stone block, so the picture is supposed to have Napoleon to the right. It seems that the vast majority of scans of the painting crop this bit out, but Wikipedia's version goes to the edges. -Ashley Pomeroy (talk) 18:33, 24 February 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Recently uploaded portrait by Adolphe Yvon

Napoleon III (Adolphe Yvon)

The recently added Walters Art Museum collection includes this portrait from 1868. Not sure whether (and where) to include it in the article. Seems to be a good closeup of his face, though. Warrickball (talk) 14:19, 8 May 2012 (UTC)[reply]

Does this refer to Napoleon III's parents?

I find "Louis married Hortense when he was thirty and she nineteen.".

But I am finding Louis Napoleon born 1778 and Hortense de Beauharnais born 1783, so they'd only be about 5 (not 11) years apart in age. Please clarify. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 128.63.16.20 (talk) 19:42, 2 December 2013 (UTC)[reply]

Eugénie or Eugenie

Is there a preferred style? It seems to alternate at random; she is introduced as Eugénie, becomes Empress Eugénie, but from then on there's no consistent style. -Ashley Pomeroy (talk) 18:09, 24 February 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Crapulinsky

The lemma Crapulinsky redirects here, presumably as a nickname of Napoleon III, but there is no explanation or even mentioning of that name in the article. I remember having seen it in an essay by Karl Marx but there coud be earlier references.--158.169.150.5 (talk) 14:39, 10 March 2014 (UTC)[reply]

"Very long"?

Is the article size the main important issue? If so, what are the reasons? As I see, the lede should be no more than four paragraphs. Any other problems that make size the issue? --George Ho (talk) 05:25, 24 August 2014 (UTC)[reply]

All the above. The subject isn't important enough to make me put a great effort to bring it into WP:SIZE but I'll dabble at it. Jim.henderson (talk) 00:40, 17 September 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Division is virtually required

I was just passing by and was taken aback by the length of the article. I did some reading on WP:SIZE and we really ought to consider applying WP:SPINOUT at this point, the recommended starting point for considering dividing the article is 50KB, and an article "almost certainly should be divided" at 100KB; this article is 178KB. If I had to suggest divisions I'd imagine something like the following:

  • Early life of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte
  • Political career of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte (1836-48)
  • Presidency of Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte
  • Transition to the Second Empire
  • Reign of Napoleon III
  • Defeat and downfall of Napoleon III:Franco-Prussian War
    • Exile and death of Napoleon III
  • Personal life of Napoleon III
  • Legacy/Public image and perception of Napoleon III
    • Bonapartism
    • Cultural depictions of Napoleon III
  • Titles and honours of Napoleon III
  • Arms and flags of Napoleon III

or:

etc.

--Varavour (talk) 07:12, 22 November 2014 (UTC)[reply]

No: Bad idea. the article is about one person's life --he ruled a major country for many years and was very active. Breaking up a biography has never been done in Wikipedia history articles to my knowledge. There is no ironclad rule--and whoever wrote suggestions about length had failed to consider biographies. , so that opinion is not much help. (It was written a decade ago in the days of dial-up modems when download time was an issue.) However I did move 27,000 bytes out on the overseas empire that had little to do with Napoleon. Rjensen (talk) 07:37, 22 November 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Well, it's a suggestion I'm making based off of observations of other biographical articles. For example, Vladimir Putin has articles for Political career of Vladimir Putin, Public image of Vladimir Putin, Domestic policies of Vladimir Putin, Foreign policy of Vladimir Putin, and a few others. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk has an article for his personal life, his reforms, his military career, and his death and state funeral. These are just a few. Note I am not advocating literally dividing the article into bits but rather making full articles for subtopics while the main article would be abridged. This is actually quite common, so I'm surprised you've never heard of it, actually... --Varavour (talk) 01:29, 23 November 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Putin and Ataturk spinoffs did NOT save any space (they are both longer than this article) The WP advice on Spinoff is very old fashioned -- it was explicitly designed for users with dial-up telephone modems! It shows little understanding of why people use encyclopedias. In any case Napoleon III is not designed for beginners. It's an advanced, sophisticated topic written at the level of university students studying European history. That calls for keeping the main threads all together. Rjensen (talk) 03:19, 23 November 2014 (UTC)[reply]
For more readers than ever, WP:TOOBIG is a barrier
I quite agree that the article is too long. Many, including biographies, are. On my own slow tablet it is difficult to read, whether by mobile view or desktop view. On my smartphone, pretty near impossible, whether by mobile app or mobile view, and just plain impossible to edit. More millions every day around the world are coming to depend on similar hardware and slower connections. Some little bits of the article have been trimmed off lately (I'm a trimmer) so existing detail articles can take part of the load. Some existing detail articles are not used in this way yet, and obviously this method is a slow road to the goal. Perhaps, yes, a few new articles ought also be made for this purpose. Someone who wants to go a little faster can start by naming the first to be made. After checking for existing articles that can already serve, make the new one. This too will not be a rapid process, but for a not terribly important personage the urgency is not great. — Preceding unsigned comment added by Jim.henderson (talk • contribs)
We have had zero complaints from users about length. The time it takes to read an article is not a function of your screen size, it's how well you read moderately advanced English prose full of references to many people and places and events. The smartphone readers have an advantage--they can much more easily skip to read the sections of interest and ignore the rest, and they can read it in many more times & places. Rjensen (talk) 06:42, 25 November 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Let the article alone, please. It works quite well at its job. It has 110,354 characters (18,185 words) which is not so terribly difficult to read. The full article with its markup and images is not a problem for modern internet speeds. Binksternet (talk) 07:43, 25 November 2014 (UTC)[reply]
Taking a larger view, this article looks pretty good compared to a number of others. If people are expressing the drive to split this article I would suggest directing that energy elsewhere. For instance, the Philippe Pétain bio needs copyediting and more references. The Albert François Lebrun bio needs expansion. The Charles de Gaulle bio needs some fact tags addressed. The bio of Napoleon II needs a firm hand at clarification and referencing. The Émile Ollivier bio could easily be expanded. That's just a tiny sample. Binksternet (talk) 20:57, 25 November 2014 (UTC)[reply]

Citations to Milza (dated 2009)

I note most citations to Milza are dated 2006, equating to his book on Napoleon III. However I also notice a few dated 2009, but with no correspondingly dated book given under title in the references or reading list. Is this a mistake for 2006, or is it a different book, or is it an enhanced edition of the 2006 book?Cloptonson (talk) 20:26, 31 March 2015 (UTC)[reply]

re: "elected by a direct popular vote"

The French article states clearly that this was a males-only (men-only) vote. Why do we not state that this was so?

99.251.239.140 (talk) 23:38, 25 December 2015 (UTC)[reply]

woman suffrage was not on the table--and mentioning women could not vote suggests it was an issue. Rjensen (talk) 01:37, 26 December 2015 (UTC)[reply]

Quotation regarding relationships with women

In the personal section, this is quoted, with regard to his affairs with women: "It is usually the man who attacks. As for me, I defend myself, and I often capitulate."

This quotation should be given a date. Was this spoken during the height of his power, or after the defeat at Sedan? The quality of the humor differs significantly, depending on when it was said.

Paternity

Shouldn't the article reflect that recent DNA testing shows that he was likely not Louis Napoleon's son? Emperor001 (talk) 11:50, 19 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Someone tried to add something about that recently, but the souring provided did not support the claim. Flyte35 (talk) 14:35, 19 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]
The article for House of Bonaparte has the reference. Is that source good? Emperor001 (talk) 16:40, 21 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]
If you mean the papers by Lucotte and colleagues, I am unable to find any mention of Napoleon III in them. DrKay (talk) 17:06, 21 April 2017 (UTC)[reply]

Quick Question

Hi so a random question here, but, the article states: "[...] the first elected by a direct popular vote, and the youngest until the election of Emmanuel Macron in 2017." So Macron was elected really recently, and I'm just wondering, how does that fact get to an article like this so quickly? Like, how does that happen. Does someone read on the news that Macron got elected and think, "Oh, better go update my article on Napoleon the Third!" Like, I don't understand how such a recent event, with all the facts about the world it changes, even start to bring about corrections. 96.21.68.3 (talk) 05:01, 11 May 2017 (UTC)[reply]

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"best known today for his grand reconstruction of Paris"?

By whom? Presumably this is not true among Mexicans who have never been to Paris. Is it supported by the cited source? Hijiri 88 (聖やや) 11:52, 7 March 2018 (UTC)[reply]

William Kirkpatrick of Closeburn

"William Kirkpatrick of Closeburn, was a Scottish wine merchant"

It's a side point to this article, perhaps better addressed in the 'Eugenia de Montijo' article ( where I have also raised the point) but it is my understanding that William Kirkpatrick was descended from the Kirkpatricks of Conheath who had diverged from the Closeburn branch back in the mid-C14th.

Lead sentence

Many extracts, summaries and indexes of Wikipedia use the lead sentence of the article. It is therefore important that the lead sentence states what makes the person notable. Even if it is repeated in the info box. --Escape Orbit (Talk) 18:24, 20 December 2018 (UTC)[reply]

Yes, I agree with this. Not all articles have infoboxes (been a bit of a counter-trend to not have an infobox), and sometimes it's collapsed by default on mobile, so the prose remains important. hbdragon88 (talk) 04:35, 21 December 2018 (UTC)[reply]
I've made some modifications to the first paragraph, keeping in mind the above comments about how the first paragraph often is borrowed as a summary in Google and other sites, and should be able to stand by itself. With this in mind I put the Presidency first and then the Empire in the first sentence. I also made some other modifications so there wasn't too much repetition in the lead, but that it included the major events.

Recent edit's by an IP

I'm attempting to understand what 2.92.126.42 (talk · contribs · deleted contribs · logs · filter log · block user · block log) wants to say. I've invited him to discuss on this talk page, but so far he has refused. So I decided to create a new section. From what I gather, the main points he wants to convey are:

  1. Bonaparte refused to set aside the restrictions of the Treaty of Paris on Russian control of the black sea, hindering his ability to create an alliance with Russia
  2. Bismark's promise to help set aside these restrictions played a crucial role in keeping Russia out of an alliance with France.

He quotes a Russian source to support the first point, and makes the the second point twice with two different sources (one of which is a memoir). Is this a reasonable summary? Putting aside the somewhat awkward grammar and questionable sources, would anyone know if there are there good sources backing up these points and if so should we include these points in the article?

Personally, I see some merit of including a mention on the second point (if it is true and can be adequately sourced). I'm somewhat confused on the first point. Unless there is some evidence that Bonaparte considered this action, I don't see how it is relevant. What a Russian thinks Bonaparte should have done seems tangential to an article about Bonaparte if it was never discussed by or with Bonaparte. ---- Work permit (talk) 15:53, 3 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]

It can be added, if the edit isn't too essay-like. Nigos (t@lk • Contribs) 00:19, 4 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks. Do I understand the two points correctly? If you do, and they are valid, I could try my hand at finding additional sources and adding them ---- Work permit (talk) 00:34, 4 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]
The question of life France was unable to gain any allies against Germany is an important one & all historians writing in French or English have covered it in detail. The issues of the Crimean war treaty were not especially relevant-- France and Russia became friends by 1860. As far as Russia concerned by far the main stumbling point was the status of Poland. Jelavich in the standard history of Russian foreign policy says in the late 1860s "the renewal of ties with St. Petersburg foundered as usual on the rocks of the Polish problem and the [Polish] revolution. In 1867 the Czar visited the Paris exhibition... Not only was he coolly received by the French crowds, but he was also shot at twice by a Pole." [Barbara Jelavich, St. Petersburg and Moscow: Tsarist and Soviet foreign policy 1814–1974 pp 154-55.] Walter Moss says that in 1863 During the revolt in Poland, "Napoleon III had made requests and demands in behalf of the Polish rebels. He joined with Great Britain and Austria to put pressure on Russia, and it proved fruitless. It'd only angered Russia and cooled the more cordial relationship that had been developing between Russia and France." Walter G. Moss (2002). Russia in the Age of Alexander II, Tolstoy and Dostoevsky. pp. 30–31. Bismarck supported Russia on the Polish question. For more details see A. I. U. Polunov; Thomas C. Owen; L. G Zakharova (2015). Russia in the Nineteenth Century: Autocracy, Reform, and Social Change, 1814-1914: Autocracy, Reform, and Social Change, 1814-1914. Routledge. p. 160. Rjensen (talk) 02:07, 4 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]
I doubt the Russians would have expected to have the Black Sea Clauses lifted in the early 1860s - it was very soon after the war, and it would have been like Streseman trying to get the Treaty of Versailles lifted in 1924. Clearly there was a lot of friction between France and Russia over Poland, but these things aren't always barriers to alliances being formed when deeper issues of realpolitik are at stake - compare the Franco-Russian Entente, between ideological polar opposites, of 1893, and the British ententes with France (1904) and Russia (1907), with both of whom Britain had areas of friction. Specifically, it's by no means impossible that there might have been exploratory Franco-Russian feelers in the late 1860s, especially after the Prussian victory in 1866, and that for the sake of argument they stumbled on Napoleon III's refusal to give up any of what he saw as his gains at the Treaty of Paris in 1856. We'd need a source though. Bismarck had of course been keeping the Russians sweet over Poland since the Alvensleben Agreement of 1863.Paulturtle (talk) 01:21, 8 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]

I welcome everyone and I will speak in more detail if this topic is of interest.

Of course, Napoleon III sought to emulate the foreign policy of his great relative. For example, an attempt to conquer Mexico directly resembles the expedition of Napoleon I to Egypt. And the support of Poland directly aimed to recreate the Duchy of Warsaw of 1807. But we must remember that the military clash between France and Prussia was directly on the agenda after 1866 and everyone in Europe was waiting for it. Therefore, after 1866, France concentrated all its forces for the future war with Prussia and all the adventures of Napoleon III stopped. Every division he needed was at the front, not in Mexico or against Russia for freedom of Poland.

The support of Poland by the great powers in 1860s was very conditional. Yes, they filed protests, but there was no joint performance. Each power served its own. And besides, it is on the verge of a joke, when France together with Austria protested for the freedom of Poland. When Austria itself had its slice of Poland. Obviously, Austria was very angry with Russia and therefore the temptation to say nasty things against Russia overpowered everything.

A brief summary of the following - France after 1866 have been concentrating their forces for a future war with Prussia and did not want to start a new adventures. Especially after the complete failure of the past in Mexico. France needed every division against the Prussians. The question of an Alliance with Russia is therefore on the agenda. But as I said - France and Napoleon III did not want to meet Russia and cancel the restrictive clauses of the Paris Treaty of 1856. Simply because France's foreign policy in 1860s COMPLETELY failed. Therefore, for reasons of prestige, they (Napoleon III and his command) did not want to cancel the Paris Treaty of 1856, even to the detriment of today's interests. That is, they were going to new defeats and disaster in 1870 at the Sedan.


Of course, Russia wanted to abolish the restrictive clauses of the Paris Treaty of 1856. As Bismarck said (and he had the experience of communicating with Russia) - "Russia knows how to wait, to wait persistently, stubbornly. Do not rely on paper contracts torn by force from her. It was a waste of paper". Russia considered the terms of the Treaty of 1856 unfair and it was only a matter of time for Russia, Russia only waiting for the right time to oppose it. And this moment came in 1870, when after the surrender of the French army, surrounded in Metz, France finally lost hope to change the course of the war in their favor and everyone understood it. That's when Russia announced refusal to comply with the restrictions according to Treaty of 1856.


— Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 07:23, 9 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]


That’s a bit of a crystal ball argument. Yes, France’s diplomacy was faulty at times, but during the 1860s they still were one of the (if not the) acknowledged dominant military powers on the European continent, and they had good reasons to think they were ready for a war against Prussia. It’s only after the Austrians’ defeat in 1866 at Konniggratz that they started to see Prussia as a real threat to French interests. Which gave France little time for them to acquire new allies against Prussia until war suddenly broke out during the summer of 1870 after they were goaded into it by Bismarck. Remember that for all European countries in 1870 the War came as a surprise. Most countries were because of its sudden start to not ready to intervene on one side of the other.
Plus they had to make some choices as to who might be their allies: who was more likely to aid them? Russia who they had fought only 15 years ago, whose monarch had close familial ties to the Hohenzollerns and who already heavily politically sympathized with Prussia because they had supported him during the Crimea War and even military aided him during the Polish Rising of 1863 (because they had to safeguard their own interests in the Prussian part of Poland)? Not likely at all. So why give up some terms you recently fought for and get nothing in return for it? Or might Austria, even then still a first class power, and which had only just lost the war for German dominance from Prussia in 1866, be a more likely prospect. France thought it more likely that the Austrians would join their cause, especially given the fact that count Beust was giving them signals that they would do so if French arms were successful during the early stages of the war. Which everybody expected. And thus French diplomatic efforts concentrated on Austria.
Plus France erroneously thought that states like Bavaria, Saxony and Wurttemberg (who in 1866 had fought on the Austrian side and were as a consequence of that dfeat forced under Prussia's dominance) would use the opportunity of a Franco-Prussian war to get more independent from Prussia. And had French arms be successful, that scenario might very well have unfolded.
What French diplomacy could not foresee was 1. the extraordinary lightning speed of German mobilization, which was unheard off for the day and was mainly aided by the newly constructed advanced railroad network. 2. that the new Prussian military system of using all reserve troops (even second and third line) in the front line (which went against all military practice of the day) would be so effective and give them numerical superiority on the battlefield. That was a military gamechanger. 3. the effectiveness of the newly acquired and reformed Prussian rifled artillery guns on the battlefield (only four years earlier the Austrian artillery outclassed the outdated Prussian field guns, which were often still smoothbore) 4. the rise of German nationalism in the southern German states which coupled with the early military success prevented the sovereigns of Saxony, Wurttemberg and Bavaria of trying to shake of the Prussian “yoke”. France had counted on them to “rebel” but given the military situation that did not and could not come to pass.
And of course the military blunders the French hoisted on themselves mainly through incompetent leadership.
More likely the early French defeats at Spicheren, Wörth, and Sedan were to explain French diplomatic isolation as the lightning start of the military campaign and it’s disastrous results for France prevented other countries to step in on the French side. That’s what really poisoned the well against France, not its diplomatic inadequacy. It also clearly dampened Austrian enthusiasm for a new war against Prussia… after all why align one selves with a side that was clearly losing. –- fdewaele, 9 July 2019, 12:35 CET.


Answer: — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 11:32, 9 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]


You repeat the French arguments of the pre-Sedan era. These arguments, of course, have their own logic and, to some extent, credibility. But the reality is they are completely broke at Sedan in 1870. You should not try to revive the dead, especially after 150 years in the grave.

France did not want to meet Russia halfway and cancel the Paris agreement of 1856. This is a historical fact. Why did France insist on preserving a Treaty that was not necessary? This is also a historical issue. My opinion - I repeat - is simply because France's foreign policy in 1860 COMPLETELY failed. Well, if she had at least a minimal success and at least somewhere - undoubtedly, Napoleon III would have gone to meet Russia for an ally against Prussia.

Well, at least in Mexico, well, at least with Poland, well, at least the smallest piece of land on the Rhine or at least in Luxembourg - this would allow for the world and France to imagine that everything is going well. But in fact - on the contrary, everywhere a complete failure and deception. The whole world sees that Napoleon III is a complete loser. Therefore, even to a minimum extent to abandon the past achievements of Napoleon III did not want to somehow maintain its prestige. That is, the road to disaster in 1870. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 11:30, 9 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Once again you are employing faulty crystal ball logic and your own personal opinion. It is easy to state today what they should have or should not have done in the past but alas for Napoleon III neither he nor his advisors were equipped with a crystal ball. He had to go on the assessment by his advisors of the political and military state of Europe and he could not foresee/predict how events would unfold on the battlefield or what secret schemes other countries were involved in. And up to 1866 everything inside the European continent was seemingly going his way (Crimea, Italy in 1859). Mexico was merely a long distance sideshow which didn’t really affect European continental politics. It’s the sudden and complete Prussian victory over Austria in 1866 and its consequences which changed the political landscape of Europe overnight (and this to the detriment of France) and which amounted to a real political card shuffle. That’s what necessitated a French political and military realignment. Unfortunately for him (read for instance Michael Howard's book with regards to those reforms) he let himself by the arch-schemer Bismarck be prematurely goaded into a war before all the reforms (which were due to internal political opposition not fully implemented but were downsized from its original plan) that were being implemented could take root. Besides what would have cancelling the Paris treaty have brought the French? Politically speaking? At that time nothing... as the Russia of the day was definitely not going to intervene on the French side against Prussia. It would take a catastrophic German diplomatic blunder under Wilhelm II and the growing of a unified Germany as a threat to Russia some 25 years later to have the Russians change alliances. But in 1860-1870 that was certainly not in the cards. His only possible allies were Austria – which was itself rather suspicious of Russian intentions in the Balkan – and Italy. Given those facts and the fact that Britain was not ready to dump the treaty at that time either, abrogating the treaty would have gained France nothing but would have made alliances with for instance Austria more difficult. –- fdewaele, 9 July 2019, 14:10 CET.


Answer:

Well, we always act on the basis of the information that is available now, not later. So here Napoleon III is not alone in this circumstance. And Bismarck acted as he could not know what will turn his trickery of Napoleon III. Who knows? Maybe in 1870 it will come back times Jena und Auerstedt?

Imagine that in the 1860s in the foreign policy of France everything went well - you can today in 2019. I will repeat - at least the minimum success and though somewhere would allow Napoleon III to represent it then to the French. But even the minimum success was not. The complete failure of French foreign policy in the 1860s is a historical fact.

And you're wrong when you write " But in 1860-1870 that was certainly not in the cards.". Judging by this, you can not imagine the situation in 1870s. When Prusso-Germany decided to completely destroy France and prevent its revival as an enemy. In this case we are talking about "he War-Scare Of 1875".

Very soon Russia was for France the only world power that could help her against the attack of Prusso-Germany. In 1875 Prusso-Germany compeled the signature of a treaty ceding Belfort to Germany, imposing limitations on the French military establishment, and providing for an indemnity of 10 milliards to be paid in installments covering a period of not less than 20 years". "The military party in Germany, still dissatisfied with the treaty of Frankfort, has decided that the time has come to remedy its defects and to put an end forever to the possibility of a recovery on the part of France. Only Russia stands in a position to veto their schemes...". [1] — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 12:35, 9 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]

What Napoleon should have done is an interesting question for scholarly articles and history forums. What he actually did is what belongs in this article. Do you have any evidence he seriously considered approaching Russia?---- Work permit (talk) 12:55, 9 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]
The Franco-Russian temporary rapprochement in the mid-1870s was a direct consequence of the Treaty of Frankfurt and the establishment of the German empire and its annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. On the one hand a weakened France was desperately seeking new allies. On the other hand those same events worried many European countries, including Russia, to some extent. As a consequence of its victory over Austria and France the German empire had become a unified state but also due to its size became a potential military threat to all neighboring countries. Those annexations and unifications had seen, what in effect was the Prussian military, double in numbers. The annexations first of former Austrian allies (Hannover, Nassau, Holstein,…) and later on the unification with independent southern German states as Bavaria, Saxony, Wurttemberg, Baden, Hessen,… had in itself added some 16 infantry divisions and two cavalry divisions to the German (read: Prussian) army’s roster, which was due to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine augmented even more with an extra two infantry divisions and extra territory. And in the intervening years that army had grown further with the creation of new army corps. But that were a sequence of events that nobody – especially not France - had foreseen in the 1860s. The stance of Russia and France towards each other in the mid-1870s thus does not say anything about how those countries looked at each other before the dramatic events of 1870. It’s cause and effect. You can’t transpose events from a decade later to an earlier political equilibrium. Also, at that time it certainly was not to the benefit of neither Austria, Russia or the UK to see the new German empire start another war in western Europe against France which could only lead to more territorial loss for France and an even stronger position for Germany, or could lead to a general conflict. So they poured cold water on those German intentions in 1875. It’s a rare case of Bismarck overplaying his hand but the League of the Three Emperors which was formed in 1873 remained for some years in effect. -- fdewaele, 9 July 2019, 15:42 CET.

Answer:

Look, if you don't even do anything, you do something. In this case, you do nothing. What I want to say can be formulated as follows:

1.Napoleon III did not make any serious attempts to negotiate with Russia. Although Russian-French negotiations were a fact (there was a visit of the Russian Emperor to Paris in 1868.

2. Obviously, Napoleon III sought only to put pressure on Bismarck, scare him with an Alliance with Russia, to force him to make concessions to the territory. But Napoleon III himself did not want to make concessions to Russia, because he understood that in return Russia would demand the abolition of the restrictive clauses of the Paris Treaty of 1856.

3.The foreign policy of France in the 1860s was completely unsuccessful and therefore Napoleon III did not want to give up past achievements in the name of prestige.

4.The Franco-Russian Union took place only after the abolition of the restrictions of the Paris Treaty of 1856 and immediately proved its usefulness. When Russia did not allow the second defeat of France in 1875 and the transformation of France into a German vassal like Austria. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 13:10, 9 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Answer:

You wrote: "But that were a sequence of events that nobody – especially not France - had foreseen in the 1860s". I agree only with the indication "not France".

"Napoleon III's clique soared in the clouds of Sevastopol glory, not sinking in thoughts to the sinful earth, and was not capable of analysis from the standpoint of geopolitical realism, neglected cooperation with Russia, unleashed a war with Prussia. The thirst for territorial gains did not leave her until the end, and she did not keep her thoughts about the need to break foreign policy priorities and turn to the needs of a partner".

You see, it was a clash with reality in 1870 for France. After that, France began to look at the world more adequately. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 14:22, 9 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]

What you are proposing is adding your own crystal ball interpretation to the article as to what Napoleon III should have done. As said by another editor: that has no place in a biographic Wikipedia article. And I agree with that stance because much of that is based on hindsight. Nor do you provide concrete evidence of concrete French political/diplomatic negotiations with Russia in the late 1860s. As at that time Prussia and Russia were supporters of each other, that would have been most unlikely. Secondly: it's not because France ultimately chose an Austrian policy over a Russian rapprochement (because at that time both were exclusionary), that at that time diplomatically and military speaking they made the wrong choice. Given Austria’s defeat in 1866 they were a if not the logical potential (military) partner vis-a-vis an inimical Prussia whereas Russia was not. It was the rapidity of the military events of the summer of 1870 and the collapse of its armies which lead to the downfall of the 2nd Empire and that made all French diplomatic steps towards Austria suddenly moot (plus Russia which had since the Crimean war – and what they saw as Austria’s “betrayal” - a more or less antagonistic view of Austria began threatening to intervene on the Prussian side if Austria would intervene on the French side).
With regards to point 4: whatever the Third Republic years later did has no bearing to what Napoleon III and his regime should have done in the 1860s. In effect it's a cause and effect situation because the republic's actions could only come as a reaction to the unexpected French defeat. It also took place in an entirely different geopolitical situation. Had Napoleon III known what was waiting for him he undoubtably with the benefit of hindsight would have steered another course that summer. But he didn’t. -- fdewaele, 9 July 2019, 16:24 CET.


Answer:

You surprise, when you write: Nor do you provide concrete evidence of concrete French political/diplomatic negotiations with Russia in the late 1860s.

First, the talks were held during the visit of the Russian Emperor to Paris in 1867. And secondly, in life it is considered not only what is done, but also what is not done. Napoleon III did not want to bind himself with specific promises, and sought only to scare Bismarck that he still gave at least something of the land that promised Napoleon III before 1866.

And what could be done in 1875 could be done in 1868 or 1869. Isn't it? Here simply over you and all other dominates historical knowledge. We all know that the next time the old opponents met in 1914, we think it could not have been otherwise. And could be and immediately in 1875. When Russia though with the Tsar who liked Prussia, but Russia warned Germany that doesn't trust Germany and won't allow new defeat of France. And the Germans retreated. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 14:41, 9 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Again, history is about what happened, not about what could have been. In international politics the old adagium of Palmerston and De Gaulle rules supreme: "No nation has friends only interests." And those interests can - sometimes rapidly - change with the years and the circumstances. The geopolitical world of 1914 was not that of pre-1870, 1870 or 1875 or 1878. And France's and Russia's position, interests and needs pre-1870 were different from those in 1875, 1878 or 1914.-- fdewaele, 9 July 2019, 18:21 CET

Answer:

"You can't enter the same river twice." Is that what you're saying? That's a long time ago. It is also said that "history is the teacher of life." Therefore, it is possible and necessary to compare historical situations and make conclusions. Even after 150 years. My opinion is that you still do not quite want to admit that France in 1860s had a complete failure in foreign policy. And this failed policy is a historical fact. Well, who is responsible for this situation? It is also obvious - Napoleon III himself. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 18:40, 9 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]

And my opinion is that you seem to be pushing a personal point of view with regards to Russia, and keep engaging in crystal ball comparisons. Comparisons to what happened in 1875 and so on are not relevant to a biography of Napoleon III (and especially not as to what happened in the run-up to the War of 1870), who by then was not only out of power but was also very much dead. Writing whole paragraphs with regards to what he should have done with regards to Russia is not only undue weight, as compared to the dipolamtic engagements with the other great powers mentionened in the article, but the way it is written also reeks as original research, which is also not allowed on wikipedia.
Besides I never said that French diplomacy was successfull, it at times clearly was faulty as I explicitly stated... but they did have to make certain calls as to which nation to court and which not. They didn't have the luxury we have today because historians nowadays have access to all sorts of archives in all those countries involved, have thus a 360° view and have the benefit of hindsight. And sometimes the situation on the ground evolves in a way that diplomats did not anticipate. Nobody in Europe expected the Germans to so decisively defeat the French imperial army in so short a time. Between the start of the war and Sedan were only about 5 weeks. And the suddeness of the onset of the war and the rapidity of the German military campaign made many an embryonic political and diplomatic maneuvre by the French moot. Nobody joins a loser.
Russia was also not the only power in Europe and pusuing an alliance with a certain country meant that an alliance with other countries was not compatible. For instance Austria and Russia had been at political loggerheads with each other since the Crimean War and never fully trusted each other (not even when later on allied through the "Dreikaiserbund"). Deciding that Russia was a lost cause anyway and not really worth courting, whereas Austria might have given more hope (especially due to Beust's shenanigans) may very well have been a sensible point of view at the time. French diplomacy thus worked - somewhat naively - towards that goal: Austria. Unsourced questioning as to what Napoleon and his diplomats should have done, based on what happened years later when the geopolitical situation was different, is thus not helpfull. Besides if we engage in whatifsms: what if he had pursued Russia to the detriment of a possible Austrian alliance and they ultimately gave him the cold shoulder... then you now might very well be writing that he should have engaged in diplomatic maneuvers to get the Austrians on his side. "What ifs" might make good literature, but they are bad history. -- fdewaele, 9 July 2019, 23:10 CET

Answer:

Still, it turns out I'm right. You don't want to admit the obvious, total failure of French foreign policy in the 1860s. Like, "Yes, something was wrong but generally speaking - it was not so bad". Yes? Because Napoleon III sought at least the smallest piece of territory well, at least where, even on the Rhine, even in Belgium, even in Luxembourg. Even such a small success in obtaining territory would allow him to imagine for his French and for the world that everything is going well. But even the smallest success did not happen. Napoleon III himself and France were completely deceived by Bismarck and received NOTHING. Complete failure. Even the smallest success even in Mexico, even with Poland would allow to speak - "Everything is not so bad as it seems". But the small success was not. "There are no more mistakes that you could make, because all possible mistakes have already been made by you" - these words Thiers addressed to the Emperor of the French in 1867 is wrong? Do not try to deny the obvious, especially after 150 years.

I'm not only bringing my personal point of view here. This view is generally accepted in Russia. In a rebuke to France from Russia constantly is the fact that Napoleon III did not seek allience with Russia, and only allowed the fog and trying to scare the Bismarck that Bismarck still gave any of the territories that he promised to Napoleon III, to 1866.

"But Napoleon III, not understanding all the dimensions of the danger that grew up at the Eastern border of France, did nothing to make at least an attempt to get closer to St. Petersburg. When in the autumn of 1870 Thierre rushed to St. Petersburg to ask for Allience and help, it was too late. After the Sedan, neither Alexander II nor Gorchakov wanted to hear about it". [2]

IP just stated he fact that Napoleon III did not seek allience with Russia that is false even though it is cited to a 1959 Soviet history book. The problem with Soviet historiography from 1959, is that very few Soviet scholars were allowed to Do research outside the USSR. Furthermore the Soviet historians were all required to follow the same party line on every major issue, and indeed every minor issue. That was all still true when I was a visiting history professor at Moscow State University in 1986. Scholars who did have access to the archives come up with a different interpretation: After the Crimean war ended, Napoleon III tried hard to reach a friendly entente with Russia, and succeeded in so doing in 1858. However, when revolt in Poland broke out in 1863, France sent a series of notes to Russia demanding reforms and broke the entente. In Prussia, Bismarck took a friendly position toward Russia on Poland and other issues, and made sure that when war broke out between France and the German states in 1870, Russia was neutral. see A.J.P. Taylor,The struggle for mastery in Europe, 1848-1918 (1954), pp 97, 105, 138, 206-7. Rjensen (talk) 07:17, 10 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]
Indeed, after all Napoleon III had to content with internal French politics as well: he always had to navigate between the demands of hardcore ultramontanist Catholics and royalists on the one side, and the intellectual heirs of the old Republic on the other side. And France from the days of Louis XV on always had a sympathetic view with regards to Poland, which was enhanced by the fact that France being a mainly Catholic nation they saw their fellow Catholics being oppressed by the Orthodox Russians. Given the strength of both the court of public opinion and the internal opposition in France he simply couldn’t afford to offend the Catholics too much. And those internal matters off course directly influenced his foreign policy, especially during the 1860s with regards to the Roman question in Italy and France’s attitude towards Poland/Russia. As they say: all politics is local. Often even international politics.
The biggest political blunder of Napoleon in fact was not his diplomatic endeavors post-1866 but was clearly underestimating Bismarck’s machinations, Gallic overconfidence and letting himself be goaded into a sudden war against Prussia before the (much scaled down because Napoleon “lost” the same internal political battle with regards to army reforms which years earlier Bismarck and Wilhelm I had “won” in Prussia) reforms of the late Marshal Niel were fully implemented and could fully take effect. And that was Bismarck’s main goal: go to war against France at the time and conditions of HIS choosing instead of a later time when France would have become stronger and might have found allies against him. The entire Bismarckian policy from 1866 on had been to diplomatically try to isolate France and at the same time goad the French into a war where France seemed the aggressor so the other German states - who only grudgingly accepted the new Prussian dominance - would unite against the French aggression. In that he clearly succeeded.
In fact it is the underlying same argument that a generation later drove Imperial Germany towards the path of war: because their estimations of the ongoing Russian reforms stated that the Russian army and economy would get much stronger from 1916 on, so the timing of 1914 seemed “opportune” to the German military to force a war before their opponents grew much stronger.
Also, once more his comparisons to what happened after Sedan are not useful with regards to the situation before the War. After all the situation had changed dramatically pretty much overnight. As stated repeatedly: nobody had expected the quickness, fullness and magnitude of the French imperial defeat during those first 5 weeks of war. That was the true international gamechanger. So of course the new French regime of Gambetta, Thiers & company were desperately seeking new allies wherever they could find them. And of course neither Russia, Austria or any other country would tie themselves to a losing cause at that time. But the fact that later on France of the Third Republic was emasculated by the Treaty of Frankfurt and a new powerful player – the Second reich – had arrived on the international stage upset the balance of European power and created certain “opportunities” later on, which weren’t there before. --- fdewaele, 10 July 2019, 10:31 CET.

Answer:

I can only encourage you and everyone to discuss the topic, not to express opinions about the historians referred to. We all have personal opinions who are considered authoritative historians, and who can not be considered so. I have it different than you. I can also express my opinion about the historians you refer to (if you ask), it will be different and you will not like it, as I think. Therefore, I urge to discuss the stated topic and come to some consensus. If we only express our opinions, there will be no consensus.

The point of view that I present and argue is not only my own. And I cited a reference to the authoritative work of 1959 as proof of that. This opinion has existed in Russia for a long time. And today the situation is the same. I can give you modern sources that say the same thing.

No Alliance between France and Russia was concluded in 1860.

"Gorchakov reported to the Emperor: "Nor the services we have to him (Napoleon III) provided, neither friendly representations, nor visit of Your Majesty to Paris weren't able to establish between us and France that serious Union which would promote preservation of balance and the peace in Europe" [3]

The question of Poland, of course, complicated relations between France and Russia. French society sympathized with the independence of Poland, and Napoleon III himself undoubtedly meant the restoration in some new form of the Duchy of Warsaw in 1807. But in general, the Polish question did not play a major role. Later in 1870s there was a rapid rapprochement between France and Russia with the formation of a military Alliance in the end. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 07:55, 10 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]


Answer to fdewaele:

I can only say that for a bunch of particulars can not miss the main thing. But the main thing was - inadequate perception of themselves and the world. In the summer of 1870 for France there was a tough clash with reality. And to this France was not six months or a year. And all 1860s from one failure to another France was on road to a disaster. Do not pretend that "there were some mistakes, but in general - it was not so bad as it seems". — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 08:59, 10 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]

I never said that France diplomacy in the 1860s was stellar. I’ve already umpteenth times said it was clearly faulty and even ruinous. But this discussion started about your “what ifs” with regards to Franco-Russian relations. You make it seem as if that would have solved Napoleon’s political and diplomatic conundrums but that’s pure conjecture as both countries at the time had reasons for the political and diplomatic course they each chose to follow on the European theatre. Which does not mean those courses in the short and long term were ultimately successful. Sometimes your own (in)actions create the monster that later on bites your own hand (for instance Russia-German Empire).
Besides had Franco-Russian relations improved, as you conjecture, then that would have had automatic consequences with regards to its relations with other countries like Austria and the UK, and might have created other diplomatic conundrums. But that scenario did not unfold and is merely alternative history. And that is the main problem with regards to your position: with regards to those points it’s conjecture and not facts.
For what it was worth France post-1866 got “played” and isolated by Bismarck, while simultaneously France tried (ultimately unsuccessfully) to get Austria on her side with regards to a Franco-Prussian conflict. But it’s an indisputable fact that the French sudden military collapse was an international game changer which was diplomatically speaking a reset button. Nobody joins a loser, whereas often countries join a winner of even interfere in a stalemate out of opportunistic reasons. And that’s what French diplomacy - enticed by count Beust’s winks and nods - thought Austria would have done (just as they did with regards to Russia during the Crimean War) in 1870. And what France also had planned to do in 1866 with regards to the Austro-Prussian War. But in both 1866 and 1870 the rapidness of the military situation on the ground prevented those scenario’s to unfold. – fdewaele, 10 July 2019, 11:49 CET.
IP states there was no French Russian treaty signed in 1860. Mistaken--It was signed in 1859 and was in operation in 1859-63 when France ended it. Here are two detailed articles.1) "ON 3 March 1859 was signed in Paris a secret Franco-Russian treaty which represented the result of Napoleon III's efforts to secure for himself such Russian aid as was possible in the forthcoming war with Austria" see B. H. Sumner "The Secret Franco-Russian Treaty of 3 March 1859" The English Historical Review Vol. 48, No. 189 (Jan., 1933), pp. 65-83 online; and 2) John Knox Stevens, "The Franco-Russian Treaty of 1859: New Light and New Thoughts." The Historian 28.2 (1966): 203-223. online AJP Taylor p 106 says the 1859 treaty "Was a triumph for Napoleon; and indeed it alone made possible the liberation of Italy". The treaty stated in article 1: "in case of war of Piedmont and France against Austria, the Emperor Alexander will, from the moment of the declaration of war, adopt a political and military position most clearly demonstrating his benevolent neutrality towards France." [Stevens 1966 page 221 has the full text]. The secret treaty was published in 1938 for the first time --Krasnyi Askhiv 88 (1938) p 199. Rjensen (talk) 10:49, 10 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]
As I said before circumstances often dictate diplomatic evolutions. And that can make positions change on a short notice. A fact that was very obvious during the middle part of the 19th century. After the Russian defeat during the Crimean War relations between Austria and Russia remained very strained, so a denouement between France and Russia to the detriment of Austria would not have come as a surprise. In fact Russian public opinion during the late 1850s was more anti-Austrian, than anti-British or anti-French. After all Russia at that time was feeling very betrayed over what they saw on the one hand as Austrian ingratitude (after saving them from revolution and Hungarian insurrection in 1848) and on the other hand as Austrian perfidy over Austria’s actions during the Crimean War (the Austrians first had staged an armed neutrality, then forced the Russians out of Wallachia and occupied those Danube regions themselves, and they had ultimately even threatened to join the Allies which forced the Russians to accept the Treaty of Paris). So that was a breeding ground for a temporal French-Russian denouement: France sought an ally against Austria with regards to Napoleon's Italian policy, and Russia saw an opportunity to try to get out of some of the restrictive clauses of the Treaty of Paris, while at the same time getting “revenge” for Austria’s earlier behaviour. But by 1863 the political situation in Europe (both external as internal) had changed again (amongst which the Polish situation), which saw both countries go in different directions again. –- fdewaele, 10 July 2019, 13:35 CET.

Answer to Rjensen:

You yourself write that the agreement recorded from Russia "benevolent neutrality towards France". No more than. Russia was not going to agree with the leadership of Napoleon III and embark on his adventures. In Russia immediately understood the whole foreign policy adventurism of Napoleon III and didn't want to be with him somewhere in Mexico. Russia's position was very, very cautious.

If we believe you, it turns out that it was Napoleon III who refused to honor Russia with his favors in 1863. Not at all. "And what, talked Gorchakov, instead of destruction of the European balance? To Russia was proposed "Galicia, but the price for it - the war with an unknown outcome; as for painful conditions for us, 1856, we were promised at the conclusion of the peace - eventual support, due to circumstances utterly beyond rational accounting".[4]

That is, Russia from the very beginning put a condition for the Franco-Russian Union to abolish the restrictions of the Paris Treaty of 1856. But Napoleon III did not promise anything concrete, only vague phrases. Therefore, the Franco-Russian Union died before even being born. The question of Poland here is not the main one, although he, of course, also played against it.


— Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 17:38, 10 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]

Answer to Fdewaele:

Historia magistra vitae est.History is the teacher of life. Let us proceed from this. We study history for the purpose not to repeat past mistakes. I understand that you just do not want to talk a lot about the mistakes of Napoleon III and France (of course). That's why you seek to reduce his mistakes somehow. Like, Yes, he could not know how it would end. Anyway, it wasn't that simple. And Bismarck tricked him, and Prussians too quickly done in summer 1870. And all you have to what? To repeat old arguments pre-Sedan era. Again, these arguments have own logic and to some extent convincing. But! They ran out of 1 September 1870 at Sedan. This is reality. You should not try to revive the dead, especially if the dead man spent 150 years in the grave. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 19:24, 10 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]


In addition on the subject of the Franco-Russian Alliance, 1859:

Russia agreed a treaty with France on 3 March 1859, but promised no more than `benevolent neutrality` in the event of Franco-Piedmontese attack on Austria. The treaty also stated that if war broke out in north Italy other countries were to be informed that this struggle cannot endanger the interests of great mutual powers, whose balance of power will not be affected. Having signed the treaty, Russia went on trying to solve the Italian problem through diplomatic channels. (...) the cardinal problem, from the point of view of Russian diplomacy, was no longer the intensification but the localization of the Italian crisis. [5]

That is, Russia's cooperation with France was very limited. Russia very careful looking at Napoleon III, didn't want to become a junior partner of his and participate in his adventures. For fear of being somewhere in Mexico. Russia did not assume any direct obligations to participate in the war or even in military demonstrations against Austria. Even against Austria, which in Russia then directly hated and relations with which were spoiled finally. Until the end of both empires in 1910s, Russian-Austrian relations were bad. But even against Austria, Russia was not going to participate in the war. All the promises of Napoleon III to give a piece of Austria to Russia (Galicia) - Russia rejected and put a condition of the Franco-Russian Union, the abolition of restrictions of the Treaty of Paris of 1856. But here Napoleon III only says vague phrases and Russia refused a serious Franco-Russian Union — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 07:37, 12 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]

More information on the topic:

The Russians immediately set about establishing good relations with Sardinia and France, a radical break from previous Russian foreign policy. The Russian ambassador told the Sardinian prime minister, Count Camillo di Cavour, “Our two countries must be good friends because they don’t have interests that divide them, and they have common grudges that bring them together.”94 Then, in 1858, Russia entered negotiations with France to cooperate in the impending war between Sardinia and Austria that France planned to join. Russia was willing to concentrate sufficient forces on the Austrian border to occupy 150,000 Austrian troops and press other powers to remain neutral, and it would have been willing to do more in return for French support in repealing the Bessarabian cession or the Black Sea clauses of the Treaty of Paris. In the course of negotiations, Tsar Alexander II told the French he would not intervene militarily but would rather employ “the tactic followed by Austria during the Crimean war.”[95] France and Russia were never able to come to agreement on the points that would have led to the most intimate relations, but a vague secret agreement was signed on 3 March 1859 in which Russia agreed to benevolent neutrality toward France and to exert pressure on neutral states on France’s behalf in the event of a Franco-Austrian war. Russia also led France to expect a troop demonstration that would tie down Austrian troops in Galicia. With these assurances, France and Sardinia fought the Italian War in which Austria lost the northern Italian province of Lombardy. [6]

That is, Russia acted very, very cautiously. For the Alliance with France was immediately put forward the condition of the revision of the Treaty of Paris in 1856, and when France did not go for it, the cooperation with France was severely limited. Russia did not take any direct obligations even in terms of military demonstrations, There were only some oral agreements between the Russian Tsar and Napoleon III, but in any case Russia did not want to bind itself with any clear obligations until France, in turn, also did not express clearly its position on the abolition of the restrictions of the Paris Treaty of 1856. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 10:35, 12 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]


More information on this topic.

Since Crimean war events had shown that despite its apparent logic, there were great obstacles in the path of a Franco-Russian alliance. To be sure, neither of the powers could succeed in the mayor objectives without support from the other: France in the revision of the settlement of 1815 and Russia in the revision of that of 1856. Without Russia`s benevolent neutrality Napoleon would have hesitated to move against Austria in 1859 and without French assistance Russia had little chance of liquidating the restrictions placed on her sovereignty in the Black Sea. Yet Napoleon was reluctant to part company with London; he feared British sea power for which Russia could supply no substitute. Furthermore Czar Alexander was much to conservative to relish entering into a genuinely revolutionary compact with Napoleon. After the annexation of Nice and Savoy he became increasingly cool to the idea. But Gorchakov was incorrigible. Even in the midst of the conservative rapprochement of 1860 he continued to hold out an arm to Paris eager for the most feeble handshake. [7]

That is, Russia from the very beginning put a condition for the Union with France - revision of the Paris Treaty in 1856. But Napoleon III refused. It is clear why - the Treaty of 1856 was beneficial for England. France did not need the sovereign rights of Russia on the Black sea. But it was necessary to favor England. Because his overseas adventures might have taken place at all if England had approved them, even reluctantly and tacitly. But Napoleon III wanted it overseas adventures - in Mexico, Vietnam, Syria and so on. That's why he let the fog in conversations with Russia and delayed time. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 14:12, 12 July 2019 (UTC)[reply] 


Dear interlocutors, maybe a fragment of the text should be as follows:

French policy at that time can be described in the following words: "He (the Minister of foreign Affairs of France in 1870 Gramont) merely presumed that the Austrians and Danes would spontaneously join a Franco-Prussian war, that Italy would come along sooner or later, and that Russia would not budge". [8] It can be concluded that the Alliance with Russia was not planned at all. This seems rather strange if you know what role the Alliance of France with Russia played in the future, eventually formalized into a military Alliance, since 1907. The alliance with Russia was possible only after the abolition of the restrictions of the Paris Treaty of 1856. But France under the leadership of Napoleon III did not want to do this. “Since Crimean war events had shown that despite its apparent logic, there were great obstacles in the path of a Franco-Russian alliance. To be sure, neither of the powers could succeed in the major objectives without support from the other: France in the revision of the settlement of 1815 and Russia in the revision of that of 1856. Without Russia`s benevolent neutrality Napoleon would have hesitated to move against Austria in 1859 and without French assistance Russia had little chance of liquidating the restrictions placed on her sovereignty in the Black Sea. Yet Napoleon was reluctant to part company with London; he feared British sea power for which Russia could supply no substitute. [9] “Odious for the Russian side, his clauses remained an insurmountable obstacle to the agreement of the two countries". [10] "Nobody expected the Black Sea clauses restricting Russian power to last very long after the Treaty of Paris of 1856. In every European diplomatic crisis for the next 14 years every state (except Britain) offered support for ending the restriction in return for a quid pro quo that was important to them at the time. Napoleon III was the first to do so during the talks about a Franco-Russian alliance in 1858-1859. He had no real interest in supporting the clauses which always meant much more to the British than to French. Neutralization of the Black Sea survived until the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71". [11]

Initially, Napoleon III refused to revise the Treaty of Paris in 1856, because he feared to cause dissatisfaction with Britain and it could interfere with his plans for colonial conquests (In 1860-1867 years were military expeditions to China, Indochina, Mexico, Syria, etc.). Then the situation changed, in 1860s France faced a number of diplomatic defeats in Europe from Prussia. Actually the crisis around Spain in 1870 also had no serious significance for the military security of France, because Spain was not a serious enemy, and Prussia had a small military fleet compared to the French. This shows how France's foreign policy was devoid of manoeuvre, since any new failure, even the smallest one, or what can be thought of as a failure, was perceived painfully by public opinion in France. France's foreign policy was so unfortunate that it was forced, for reasons of prestige, to hold on to past achievements to the detriment of today's interests. Thus, the Alliance with Russia by France was excluded. In contrast, Prussia was ready for rapprochement with Russia. Prussia was the only world power that supported Russia in the demands of the revision of the Treaty of Paris of 1856. Prussia promised Russia support in canceling the terms of the Paris Treaty of 1856. Bismarck, having declared it impossible to keep 100 million Russians in a humiliated position without sovereign rights to their Black Sea coastline, [12] supported Russia in the abolition of the Treaty of Paris, and in return achieved freedom of action against France in 1870-71.

"Bismarck had bought Tsar Alexander II’s complicity by promising to help restore his naval access to the Black Sea and Mediterranean (cut off by the treaties ending the Crimean War), other powers were less biddable". [13]

Thus Prussia got rid of the "nightmare of the war on two fronts" (which Prussia was able to do in 1866 against Austria by Italy), secured freedom of action against France in 1870. — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2.92.126.42 (talk) 06:49, 17 July 2019 (UTC)[reply]

  1. ^ J.V. Fuller The War-Scare Of I875. The American Historical Review, Vol. 24, No. 2 (Jan., 1919), pp. 196-226. Oxford University Press. p.212
  2. ^ History of diplomacy. In 5 volumes. M. 1959. Vol.1 p.735
  3. ^ Vinogradov V. N. Was there a connection between the triumph of France in the Crimean war and its defeat at the Sedan? New and recent history. 2005. No. 5
  4. ^ Vinogradov V. N. Was there a connection between the triumph of France in the Crimean war and its defeat at the Sedan? New and recent history. 2005. No. 5
  5. ^ David Saunders. Russia in the age of Reaction and reforms 1801-1881. Taylors&Francis. 2014. p.282
  6. ^ Ronert F. Trager. Long-Term Consequences of Aggressive Diplomacy: European Relations after Austrian Crimean War Threats. Security Studies, 2012. p.255
  7. ^ Otto Pflanze. Bismarck and the development of Germany. Princeton University Press. 1968. p.137
  8. ^ The Franco-Prussian war. The German Conquest of France In 1870-1871. Geoffrey Wawro.2003. Cambridge University Press. p.36
  9. ^ Otto Pflanze. Bismarck and the development of Germany. Princeton University Press. 1968. p.137
  10. ^ Виноградов В.Н. Была ли связь между и торжеством Франции в Крымской войне и ее разгромом под Седаном? Новая и новейшая история. 2005. №5. Vinogradov V. N. Was there a connection between the triumph of France in the Crimean war and its defeat at the Sedan? New and recent history. 2005. No. 5.
  11. ^ Clive Ponting. The Crimean War. The truth behind the myth. 2005. p.339
  12. ^ Bismarck O. Thoughts and memories, vol.2. M., 1940, p. 97.
  13. ^ The Franco-Prussian war. The German Conquest of France In 1870-1871. Geoffrey Wawro.2003. Cambridge University Press. p.238
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