Jump to content

User:Cdjp1/sandbox/apartheid southern africa

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corps_des_chasseurs_forestiers

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chasseur#Chasseurs_Forestiers

http://forum.uniforminsignia.org/download/file.php?id=2225&mode=view

TO CREATE/expand

[edit]

https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/P%C3%B4le_judiciaire_de_la_Gendarmerie_nationale https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direction_g%C3%A9n%C3%A9rale_de_la_Gendarmerie_nationale https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inspection_g%C3%A9n%C3%A9rale_de_la_Gendarmerie_nationale https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gendarmerie_d%C3%A9partementale https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centre_de_planification_et_de_gestion_de_crise https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gendarmerie_de_l%27Armement https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gendarmerie_de_la_s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9_des_armements_nucl%C3%A9aires https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gendarmerie_des_transports_a%C3%A9riens https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peloton_sp%C3%A9cialis%C3%A9_de_protection_de_la_Gendarmerie https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Escadron_d%C3%A9partemental_de_s%C3%A9curit%C3%A9_routi%C3%A8re https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Officier_de_police_judiciaire https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Section_de_recherches_(Gendarmerie_nationale) https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_de_recherches https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brigade_d%C3%A9partementale_de_renseignements_et_d%27investigations_judiciaires https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peloton_de_surveillance_et_d%27intervention_de_la_Gendarmerie https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gendarmerie_pr%C3%A9v%C3%B4tale https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commandement_de_la_gendarmerie_outre-mer https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Commandement_des_%C3%A9coles_de_la_Gendarmerie_nationale https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gendarme_adjoint_volontaire https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forces_a%C3%A9riennes_de_la_Gendarmerie_nationale

sources

[edit]

Intro

[edit]

Bourgeois revolution is a term used in Marxist theory to refer to a social revolution that aims to destroy a feudal system or its vestiges, establish the rule of the bourgeoisie, and create a bourgeois (capitalist) state.[1][2] In colonised or subjugated countries, bourgeois revolutions often take the form of a war of national independence. The Dutch, English, American, and French revolutions are considered the archetypal bourgeois revolutions,[3][4] in that they attempted to clear away the remnants of the medieval feudal system, so as to pave the way for the rise of capitalism.[1] The term is usually used in contrast to "proletarian revolution", and is also sometimes called a "bourgeois-democratic revolution".[5][6]

Theories of bourgeois revolution

[edit]
Starting in the late 18th century, the Bildungsbürger ("educated bourgeoise") class defined itself more on the basis of education than material possessions and thus great emphasis was laid upon the education of children.

According to one version of the two-stage theory, bourgeois revolution was asserted to be a necessary step in the move toward socialism, as codified by Georgi Plekhanov.[7][8] In this view, countries that had preserved their feudal structure, like Russia, would have to establish capitalism via a bourgeois revolution before being able to wage a proletarian revolution.[9][10] At the time of the Russian Revolution, the Mensheviks asserted this theory, arguing that a revolution led by bourgeoisie was necessary to modernise society, establish basic freedoms, and overcome feudalism, which would establish the conditions necessary for socialism.[9] This view is prominent in Marxist-Leninist analysis.[11][12]

Political sociologist Barrington Moore Jr. identified bourgeois revolution as one of three routes from pre-industrial society to the modern world, in which a capitalist mode of production is combined with liberal democracy. Moore identified the English, French, and American revolutions as examples of this route.[13]

Neil Davidson believes that neither the establishment of democracy or the end of feudal relations are defining characteristics of bourgeois revolutions, but instead supports Alex Callinicos' definition of bourgeois revolution as being those that establish "an independent center of capital accumulation".[6][14][15] Charles Post labels this analysis as consequentialism, where there is no requirement of the prior development of capitalism or bourgeois class agency for bourgeois revolutions, and that they are only defined by the effects of the revolutions to promote the development of capital accumulation.[16]

Other theories describe the evolution of the bourgeoisie as not needing a revolution.[17] The German bourgeoisie during the 1848 revolution did not strive to take command of the political effort and instead sided with the crown.[18][19] Davidson attributes their behaviour to the late development of capitalist relations and uses this as the model for the evolution of the bourgeoisie.[20]

Left communists often view the revolutions leading to communist states in the twentieth century as "bourgeois revolutions".[21][22]

The goals of the bourgeois revolution

[edit]

According to the Marxist view, the tasks of the bourgeois revolution include:

Bourgeois revolutions in history

[edit]

Bourgeois revolutions in the middle ages

[edit]

Although with much less diffusion, some social movements of the European Late Middle Ages have also received the name of bourgeois revolution, in which the bourgeoisie begins to define itself in the nascent cities as a social class. Examples include the Ciompi Revolt in the Republic of Florence, Jacquerie revolts during the Hundred Years' War in France,[33] and Bourgeois revolts of Sahagún [es] in Spain.[34][35]

Bourgeois revolutions in the early modern period

[edit]

The first wave of bourgeois revolutions are those that occurred within the early modern period and were typically marked by being driven from below by the petty bourgeoisie against absolutist governments.[6]

In the foreground, five leering men of the Sons of Liberty are holding down a Loyalist Commissioner of Customs agent, one holding a club. The agent is tarred and feathered, and they are pouring scalding hot tea down his throat. In the middle ground is the Boston Liberty Tree with a noose hanging from it. In the background, is a merchant ship with protestors throwing tea overboard into the harbor.
A Loyalist customs official tarred and feathered by the Sons of Liberty, during the American Revolutionary War.

Bourgeois revolutions in the late modern period

[edit]
1911 battle at Ta-ping gate, Nanking, during the Chinese revolution of 1911. Painting by T. Miyano.

The second wave of bourgeois revolutions are those that occurred within the late modern period and were typically marked by being led from above by the haute bourgeoisie.[6]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b "Bourgeois Revolution". TheFreeDictionary.com. Archived from the original on 21 September 2022. Retrieved 6 November 2018.
  2. ^ Johnson, Walker & Gray (2014), p. 118; Calvert (1990), pp. 9–10; Hobsbawm (1989), pp. 11–12 harvp error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFHobsbawm1989 (help)
  3. ^ a b c d e Eisenstein (2010), p. 64 harvp error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFEisenstein2010 (help), quoted in Davidson, Neil (2012). "From Society to Politics; From Event to Process". How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions?. Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books. pp. 381–382. ISBN 978-1-60846-067-0.
  4. ^ a b Callinicos 1989, pp. 113–171. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFCallinicos1989 (help)
  5. ^ Wilczynski, Jozef, ed. (1981). "Bourgeois Revolution". An Encyclopedic Dictionary of Marxism, Socialism and Communism. London: Macmillan Press. p. 48. doi:10.1007/978-1-349-05806-8. ISBN 978-1-349-05806-8.
  6. ^ a b c d e f g h Davidson, Neil (May 2012). "Bourgeois Revolution and the US Civil War". International Socialist Review. No. 83. Center For Economic Research and Social Change. Archived from the original on 27 December 2021.
  7. ^ Post 2019, pp. 157–158.
  8. ^ Plekhanov, Georgi (1949) [1895]. The Bourgeois Revolution: The Political Birth of Capitalism. Archived from the original on 1 September 2018 – via Marxists Internet Archive.
  9. ^ a b "Stagism". Encyclopedia of Marxism. Archived from the original on 1 December 2017. Retrieved 6 November 2018 – via Marxists Internet Archive.
  10. ^ Lane, David (22 April 2020). "Revisiting Lenin's theory of socialist revolution on the 150th anniversary of his birth". European Politics and Policy. London School of Economics. Archived from the original on 3 May 2020.
  11. ^ Caputo, Renato. "Grandezza e limiti della rivoluzione borghese in Marx" [Magnitude and limits of the bourgeois revolution in Marx]. La Città Futura (in Italian). Archived from the original on 6 March 2023. Retrieved 6 March 2023.
  12. ^ Cervelli, Innocenzo (1976). "Sul concetto di rivoluzione borghese" [On the concept of bourgeois revolution]. Studi Storici (in Italian). 17 (1): 147–155. JSTOR 20564411. Retrieved 6 March 2023.
  13. ^ Calvert 1990, pp. 53–55.
  14. ^ Gluckstein, Donny (7 October 2013). "Comment on bourgeois revolutions". International Socialism (140). Archived from the original on 18 May 2017.
  15. ^ Post 2019, pp. 160–161, 166–167.
  16. ^ Post 2019, pp. 160–161.
  17. ^ Blackbourn, David. Economy and Society: A Silent Bourgeois Revolution. pp. 176–205. Archived from the original on 21 February 2023. in Blackbourn & Eley (1984)
  18. ^ Hallas (1988), pp. 17–20; Klíma (1986), pp. 93–94; Calvert (1990), pp. 53–55
  19. ^ Blackbourn, David. Economy and Society: The shadow side. pp. 206–237. Archived from the original on 21 February 2023. in Blackbourn & Eley (1984)
  20. ^ Davidson, Neil (2012). "Marx and Engels (2) 1847–52". How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions?. Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books. p. 144. ISBN 978-1-60846-067-0. In a world where most states have not yet experienced bourgeois revolutions, where most are even more economically underdeveloped than Germany, they too will give rise to "belated" bourgeoisies, the implication being that it is Germany rather than France that represents the likely pattern of bourgeois development.
  21. ^ a b "China: The bourgeois Revolution has been accomplished, the proletarian Revolution remains to be made". Communist Program (3). May 1977. Archived from the original on 10 October 2023 – via International Library of the Communist Left.
  22. ^ Post 2019, pp. 164–165.
  23. ^ Marx & Engels 1956, 8, p. 197.
  24. ^ Marx & Engels 1956, 16, p. 157.
  25. ^ Marx & Engels 1956, 37, p. 463.
  26. ^ Marx & Engels 1956, 8, p. 196.
  27. ^ Marx & Engels 1956, 22, pp. 235–236.
  28. ^ Elsenhans, Hartmut (2012). "Democratic revolution, bourgeois revolution, Arab revolution: The political economy of a possible success". NAQD. 29 (1): 51–60. doi:10.3917/naqd.029.0051. Archived from the original on 13 April 2023.
  29. ^ Marx & Engels 1956, 17, p. 337.
  30. ^ a b Marx & Engels 1956, 17, p. 592.
  31. ^ Heller 2006, Introduction pp. 2–4.
  32. ^ Marx & Engels 1956, 23, pp. 741–761.
  33. ^ Mollat, Michel [in French]; Wolff, Philippe [in French] (1970). Ongles bleus, jacques et ciompi - les révolutions populaires en Europe aux XIVe et XVe siècles [Ongles bleus, Jacquerie and Ciompi - popular revolutions in Europe in the 14th and 15th centuries] (in French). Calmann-Lévy.
  34. ^ Pastor de Togneri, Reyna [in Spanish] (1973). Conflictos sociales y estancamiento económico en la España medieval [Social conflicts and economic stagnation in medieval Spain] (in Spanish). Editorial Ariel.
  35. ^ Martín, José Luis. Historia de España [History of Spain (A society at war)]. Historia 16 (in Spanish). Vol. 4 - Una sociedad en guerra.
  36. ^ Bak, Janos (2022) [1976]. "'The Peasant War in Germany' by Friedrich Engels – 125 years later". In Bak, Janos (ed.). The German Peasant War of 1525. Routledge. pp. 93–99. doi:10.4324/9781003190950. ISBN 978-1-00-319095-0. S2CID 241881702.
  37. ^ Hallas 1988, pp. 17–20.
  38. ^ Heller (2006), Preface p. ix; Callinicos (1989), pp. 113–171 harvp error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFCallinicos1989 (help); Sewell (1994), Introduction pp. 22–23
  39. ^ Faulkner, Neil (24 October 2011). "A Marxist History of the World part 49: The French Revolution – Themidor, Directory and Napoleon". Counterfire. Archived from the original on 21 December 2023.
  40. ^ Lutsky, Vladimir (1969). "VII The Conquest of the East Sudan by Mohammed Ali. The Expedition to Morea". Modern History of the Arab Countries – via Marxists Internet Archive.
  41. ^ Modern World History Writing Group 1973a, p. 172.
  42. ^ Modern World History Writing Group 1973a, p. 233.
  43. ^ a b Klíma 1986, pp. 74–75.
  44. ^ Modern World History Writing Group (1973a), p. 255; Callinicos (1989), pp. 113–171 harvp error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFCallinicos1989 (help); Hallas (1988), pp. 17–20; Klíma (1986), pp. 74–75
  45. ^ a b Modern World History Writing Group 1973a.
  46. ^ Klíma 1986, p. 77.
  47. ^ a b c Post 2019, pp. 165–166.
  48. ^ Faulkner, Neil (8 January 2012). "A Marxist History of the World part 57: The American Civil War". Counterfire. Archived from the original on 21 December 2023.
  49. ^ Faulkner, Neil (18 January 2012). "A Marxist History of the World part 58: The Meiji Restoration". Counterfire. Archived from the original on 21 December 2023.
  50. ^ Modern World History Writing Group 1973b, p. 150.
  51. ^ Modern World History Writing Group 1973b, p. 130.
  52. ^ Modern World History Writing Group 1973b, p. 152.
  53. ^ Modern World History Writing Group 1973b, p. 160.
  54. ^ Zhang, Yuchun; Ma, Zhenwen (1976). 简明中国近代史 [A Concise Modern History of China] (in Chinese). Liaoning People's Publishing House. p. 301.
  55. ^ Modern World History Writing Group 1973b, p. 224.
  56. ^ Commission of the Central Committee of the CPSU (b), ed. (1938). "Istoriya Vsesoyuznoy kommunisticheskoy partii (bol'shevikov). Kratkiy kurs" История Всесоюзной коммунистической партии (большевиков). Краткий курс [History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Short course] (in Russian). Archived from the original on 12 April 2023.
  57. ^ Genkina, Esfir Borisovna [in Russian] (1927). Pokrovsky, Mikhail Nikolaevich [in Russian] (ed.). Fevral'skiy perevorot // Ocherki po istorii Oktyabr'skoy revolyutsii Февральский переворот // Очерки по истории Октябрьской революции [The February coup // Essays on the history of the October Revolution] (in Russian). Vol. 2.
  58. ^ Post 2019, pp. 160–163.
  59. ^ Hoxha, Enver (1984). Reflections on the Middle East (PDF). pp. 254, 265–266 – via Marxists Internet Archive. (254) From information we receive and the reports of news agencies which I read regularly, it is clear that regardless of the Islamic slogans which are used to show that the religious spirit is allegedly predominant in it, the Iranian revolution is an anti-feudal and anti-imperialist popular revolution. […] (265–266) The control of the situation has not slipped out of Khomeini's hands, but with the overthrow of the monarchy of the Pahlavis, with the liquidation of this mediaeval monarchy, the evolution in Iran has brought to the fore elements more organized, more radical, more progressive than Khomeini, elements who are operating for a democratic, bourgeois Iran with considerable rights. But we shall see to what extent they will achieve this aim.

Bibliography

[edit]

A proletarian revolution or proletariat revolution is a social revolution in which the working class attempts to overthrow the bourgeoisie and change the previous political system.[1][2] Proletarian revolutions are generally advocated by socialists, communists and anarchists.

Interpretations

[edit]

The concept of a revolutionary proletariat was first put forward by the French revolutionary socialist and radical Auguste Blanqui.[3] The Paris Commune, contemporary to Blanqui and Marx, being viewed by some as the first attempt at a proletarian revolution.[4]

Marxists believe proletarian revolutions can and will likely happen in all capitalist countries,[5][6] related to the concept of world revolution. The objective of a proletarian revolution, according to Marxists, is to transform the bourgeois state into a workers' state.[7] The traditional Marxist belief was that a proletarian revolution could only occur in a country where capitalism had developed.[8][9]

The Leninist branch of Marxism argues that a proletarian revolution must be led by a vanguard of "professional revolutionaries", men and women who are fully dedicated to the communist cause and who form the nucleus of the communist revolutionary movement. This vanguard is meant to provide leadership and organization to the working class before and during the revolution, which aims to prevent the government from successfully ending it.[10] Vladimir Lenin believed that it was imperative to arm the working class to secure their leverage over the bourgeoisie. Lenin's words were printed in an article in German on the nature of pacifism and said "In every class society, whether based on slavery, serfdom, or, as at present, on wage-labour, the oppressor class is always armed."[11] It was under such conditions that the first successful proletarian revolution, the Russian revolution, occurred.[12][11][13]

Other Marxists, such as Luxemburgists, disagree with the Leninist idea of a vanguard and insist that the entire working class—or at least a large part of it—must be deeply involved and equally committed to the socialist or communist cause for a proletarian revolution to be successful.[14] To this end, they seek to build mass working class movements with a very large membership.[citation needed]

Finally, there are socialist anarchists and libertarian socialists. Their view is that the revolution must be a bottom-up social revolution which seeks to transform all aspects of society and the individuals which make up the society (see Asturian Revolution and Revolutionary Catalonia). Alexander Berkman said "there are revolutions and revolutions. Some revolutions change only the governmental form by putting a new set of rulers in place of the old. These are political revolutions, and as such they often meet with little resistance. But a revolution that aims to abolish the entire system of wage slavery must also do away with the power of one class to oppress another. That is, it is not any more a mere change of rulers, of government, not a political revolution, but one that seeks to alter the whole character of society. That would be a social revolution."[15]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ Liulevicius, Vejas (13 July 2020). "Russia: The Unlikely Place for a Proletarian Revolution". The Great Courses Daily. Archived from the original on 19 January 2022. Retrieved 19 January 2022.
  2. ^ Lenin, Vladimir (1918). "Chapter I: Class Society and the State". The State and Revolution – via Marxists Internet Archive.
  3. ^ Blake, William James (1939). An American Looks at Karl Marx. Cordon Company. p. 622 – via Google Books.
  4. ^ Spector, Maurice (15 March 1934). "The Paris Commune and the Proletarian Revolution". The Militant. Vol. III, no. 11. p. 3 – via Marxists Internet Archive.
  5. ^ Blackburn, Robin (May–June 1976). "Marxism: Theory of Proletarian Revolution". New Left Review. I (97).
  6. ^ Engels, Friedrich (October–November 1847). The Principles of Communism – via Marxists Internet Archive. Further, it has co-ordinated the social development of the civilized countries to such an extent that, in all of them, bourgeoisie and proletariat have become the decisive classes, and the struggle between them the great struggle of the day. It follows that the communist revolution will not merely be a national phenomenon but must take place simultaneously in all civilized countries – that is to say, at least in England, America, France, and Germany.
  7. ^ Goichbarg, Alexander [in German]. Revolução Proletária e Direito Civil [Proletarian Revolution and Civil Law] (in Portuguese).
  8. ^ Lane, David (22 April 2020). "Revisiting Lenin's theory of socialist revolution on the 150th anniversary of his birth". European Politics and Policy. London School of Economics.
  9. ^ Filho, Almir Cezar. "Moreno e os 80 anos do debate sobre a Revolução Permanente" [Moreno and the 80 years of the debate on the Permanent Revolution] (in Portuguese). Archived from the original on 16 December 2007. Retrieved 20 January 2011.
  10. ^ Lenin, Vladimir (1918). The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky.
  11. ^ a b Dunayevskaya, Raya (5 June 2017). "Lenin on Self-determination of Nations and on Organization After His Philosophic Notebooks". In Gogol, Eugene; Dmitryev, Franklin (eds.). Russia: From Proletarian Revolution to State-Capitalist Counter-Revolution. Brill. pp. 125–141. doi:10.1163/9789004347618_005. ISBN 978-90-04-34761-8. Retrieved 21 April 2022.
  12. ^ Deutscher, Isaac (May–June 1967). "The Unfinished Revolution: 1917–67" (PDF). New Left Review. I (43).
  13. ^ Chácon, Justin Akers (2018). "Introduction". Radicals in the Barrio: Magonistas, Socialists, Wobblies, and Communists in the Mexican American Working Class. Chicago, IL.: Haymarket Books. p. 38. ISBN 978-1-60846-776-1.
  14. ^ Várnagy, Tomás (19 April 2021). "A Central European Revolutionary: Rosa Luxemburg's remarkable, revolutionary life for democracy and socialism". Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung.
  15. ^ Berkman, Alexander (1929). "25". Now and After: The ABC of Communist Anarchism .
William III by Jan Wyck, commemorating the landing at Brixham, Torbay, 5 November 1688

The English Revolution is a term that describes two separate events in English history. Prior to the 20th century, it was generally applied to the 1688 Glorious Revolution, when James II was deposed and a constitutional monarchy established under William III and Mary II.[1][2]

However, Marxist historians began using it for the period covering the 1639-1651 Wars of the Three Kingdoms and the Interregnum that followed the Execution of Charles I in 1649, before the 1660 Stuart Restoration had returned Charles II to the throne.[3] Writing in 1892, Friedrich Engels described this period as "the Great Rebellion" and the Glorious Revolution of 1688 as "comparatively puny", although he claimed that both were part of the same revolutionary movement.[4] Later historians have also used this definition of the English Revolution in their work.[5]

Although Charles II was retroactively declared to have been the legal and rightful monarch since the death of his father in 1649,[6][7] which resulted in a return to the status quo in many areas, a number of gains made under the Commonwealth remained in law.[8][9]

Whig theory

[edit]

Tensions regarding the English monarchy began well before the Glorious Revolution. When Charles I was executed in 1649 by the English Parliament, England entered into a republic, or Commonwealth, that lasted until Charles II was reestablished as king of England in 1660. The intermittent civil wars that lasted between 1649 and 1688 were a "constitutional struggle originating from the unresolved contradictions fostered by the Reformation."[10][11] Debates amongst the England’s post-Reformation state and the constitutional basis for civil involvement in ecclesiastical and governmental issues continually converged together.[10] During the Glorious Revolution of 1688, King James II was replaced by the monarchs William III and Mary II, and a constitutional monarchy was established that was described by Whig historians as the "English Revolution".[1][12][11] That interpretation suggests that the "English Revolution" was the final act in the long process of reform and consolidation by Parliament to achieve a balanced constitutional monarchy in Britain, with laws made that pointed towards freedom.[13][11]

Marxist theory

[edit]

The Marxist view of the English Revolution, suggests that the events of 1640 to 1660 in Britain were a bourgeois revolution[14] in which the final section of English feudalism (the state) was destroyed by a bourgeois class (and its supporters) and replaced with a state (and society), which reflected the wider establishment of agrarian (and later industrial) capitalism. Such an analysis sees the English Revolution as pivotal in the transition from feudalism to capitalism and from a feudal state to a capitalist state in Britain.[15][16]

The phrase "English Revolution" was first used by Marx in the short text "England's 17th Century Revolution", a response to a pamphlet on the Glorious Revolution of 1688 by François Guizot.[17] Oliver Cromwell and the English Civil War are also referred to multiple times in the work The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte, but the event is not directly referred to by the name.[18] By 1892, Engels was using the term "The Great Rebellion" for the conflict, and, while still recognising it as part of the same revolutionary event, dismissed the Glorious Revolution of 1688 as "comparatively puny".[4]

According to the Marxist historian Christopher Hill:

The Civil War was a class war, in which the despotism of Charles I was defended by the reactionary forces of the established Church and conservative landlords, and on the other side stood the trading and industrial classes in town and countryside ... the yeomen and progressive gentry, and ... wider masses of the population whenever they were able by free discussion to understand what the struggle was really about.[19]

Later developments of the Marxist view moved on from the theory of bourgeois revolution to suggest that the English Revolution anticipated the French Revolution and later revolutions in the field of popular administrative and economic gains.[citation needed] Along with the expansion of parliamentary power, the English Revolution broke down many of the old power relations in both rural and urban English society.[19][20] The guild democracy movement of the period won its greatest successes among London's transport workers, most notably the Thames Watermen, who democratized their company in 1641–43.[21] With the outbreak of civil war in 1642, rural communities began to seize timber and other resources on the estates of royalists, Catholics, the royal family and the church hierarchy. Some communities improved their conditions of tenure on such estates.[citation needed]

The old status quo began a retrenchment after the end of the main civil war in 1646, and more especially after the restoration of the monarchy in 1660, but some gains endured in the long term. The democratic element introduced in the watermen's company in 1642, for example, survived, with vicissitudes, until 1827.[8][9]

Illustration from the 1649 title page of The Declaration and Standard of the Levellers of England by William Everard.

The Marxist view also developed a concept of a “Revolution within the Revolution” (pursued by Hill, Brian Manning and others), which placed a greater deal of emphasis on the radical movements of the period (such as the agitator Levellers, mutineers in the New Model Army and the Diggers), who attempted to go further than Parliament in the aftermath of the Civil War.

There were, we may oversimplify, two revolutions in mid-seventeenth-century England. The one which succeeded established the sacred rights of property (abolition of feudal tenures, no arbitrary taxation), gave political power to the propertied (sovereignty of Parliament and common law, abolition of prerogative courts), and removed all impediments to the triumph of the ideology of the men of property – the protestant ethic. There was, however, another revolution that never happened, though from time to time it threatened. This might have established communal property, a far wider democracy in political and legal institutions, might have disestablished the state church, and rejected the Protestant ethic.[22]

Brian Manning claimed:

The old ruling class came back with new ideas and new outlooks which were attuned to economic growth and expansion and facilitated, in the long run, the development of a fully capitalist economy. It would all have been very different if Charles I had not been obliged to summon that Parliament to meet at Westminster on November 3rd, 1640.[23]

Criticism

[edit]

The idea, while popular among Marxist historians, has been criticised by many historians of more liberal schools,[24] and of revisionist schools.[25]

The notion that the events of 1640 to 1660 constitute an English Revolution has been criticized by historians such as Austin Woolrych, who pointed out that

painstaking research in the county after county, in local record offices, and family archives, has revealed that the changes in the ownership of the real estate, and hence in the composition of the governing class, were nothing like as great as used to be thought.[26]

Woolrych argues that the notion that the period constitutes an "English Revolution" not only ignores the lack of significant social change contained within the period but also ignores the long-term trends of the early modern period which extend beyond this narrow time frame.

Neither Karl Marx nor Friedrich Engels ever ignored the further development of the bourgeois state beyond that point, however, as is clear from their writings on the Industrial Revolution.[27]

Other uses

[edit]

The term "English Revolution" is also used by non-Marxists in the Victorian period to refer to 1642 such as the critic and writer Matthew Arnold in The Function of Criticism at the Present Time: "This is what distinguishes it [the French Revolution] from the English Revolution of Charles the First's time".[28]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b Trevelyan 1938, p. ?.
  2. ^ Hobsbawm, E. J. (Spring 1989). "The Making of a "Bourgeois Revolution"". Social Research. 56 (1). The New School: 5–31. JSTOR 40970532.
  3. ^ Trotsky, Leon (1920). "4: Terrorism". Terrorism and Communism – via Marxists Internet Archive. In the seventeenth century England carried out two revolutions. The first, which brought forth great social upheavals and wars, brought amongst other things the execution of King Charles I, while the second ended happily with the accession of a new dynasty. [...] The reason for this difference in estimates was explained by the French historian, Augustin Thierry. In the first English revolution, in the "Great Rebellion," the active force was the people; while in the second it was almost "silent." [...] But the great event in modern "bourgeois" history is, nonetheless, not the "Glorious Revolution," but the "Great Rebellion."
  4. ^ a b Engels, Friedrich (1892). "1892 English Edition Introduction". Socialism: Utopian and Scientific – via Marxists Internet Archive.
  5. ^ Bulman, William J. (13 December 2021). "The English Revolution and the History of Majority Rule". Centre for Intellectual History, University of Oxford. Archived from the original on 30 January 2023.
  6. ^ House of Commons 1802a.
  7. ^ Harris, Tim (2005). Restoration: Charles II and His Kingdoms, 1660–1685. London: Allen Lane. p. 47. ISBN 0-7139-9191-7.
  8. ^ a b O'Riordan, Christopher (1992). "Self-determination and the London Transport Workers in the Century of Revolution". Archived from the original on 26 October 2009.
  9. ^ a b O'Riordan, Christopher (1993). "Popular Exploitation of Enemy Estates in the English Revolution". History. 78 (253): 184–200. doi:10.1111/j.1468-229X.1993.tb01577.x. Archived from the original on 26 October 2009.
  10. ^ a b Neufeld, Matthew (2015). "From Peacemaking to Peacebuilding: The Multiple Endings of England's Long Civil Wars". The American Historical Review. 120 (5): 1709–1723. doi:10.1093/ahr/120.5.1709. JSTOR 43697072 – via JSTOR.
  11. ^ a b c "Great rebellion, English Revolution or War of Religion?". Parliament of the United Kingdom. Archived from the original on 17 February 2023.
  12. ^ Yerby, George (2020). "Introduction: Recovering the Economic Context of History". The Economic Causes of the English Civil War: Freedom of Trade and the English Revolution. Routledge. pp. 2–3. ISBN 978-0-429-32555-7.
  13. ^ Richardson, R. C. (1988) [1977]. "3. The Eighteenth Century: The Political Uses of History". The Debate on the English Revolution. Issues in Historiography (2nd ed.). Routledge. pp. 36–55. ISBN 0-415-01167-1.
  14. ^ Eisenstein (2010), p. 64 harvp error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFEisenstein2010 (help), quoted in Davidson, Neil (2012). "From Society to Politics; From Event to Process". How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions?. Chicago, Illinois: Haymarket Books. pp. 381–382. ISBN 978-1-60846-067-0.
  15. ^ Callinicos, Alex (Summer 1989). "Bourgeois Revolutions and Historical Materialism". International Socialism. 2 (43): 113–171 – via Marxists Internet Archive.
  16. ^ Davidson, Neil (May 2012). "Bourgeois Revolution and the US Civil War". International Socialist Review. No. 83. Center For Economic Research and Social Change.
  17. ^ Marx, Karl; Engels, Friedrich (1850). "England's 17th Century Revolution: A Review of Francois Guizot's 1850 pamphlet Pourquoi la revolution d'Angleterre a-t-elle reussi?". Neue Rheinische Zeitung Politisch-ökonomische Revue – via Marxists Internet Archive.
  18. ^ Marx, Karl. "Index". The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte – via Marxists Internet Archive.
  19. ^ a b Hill, Christopher (2002) [1940]. The English Revolution 1640 – via Marxists Internet Archive.
  20. ^ "Causes of the English Civil War: What caused the civil war? What part did Cromwell play in causing the war?". The Cromwell Association. Archived from the original on 25 May 2022.
  21. ^ "Today in London Radical History, 1768: 2000 Thames Watermen Picket Royal Exchange & Mansion House, 1768, Over a Decline in Trade". Pasttense: London Radical Histories. 9 May 2018. Archived from the original on 19 June 2023.
  22. ^ Hill, Christopher (1991). The World Turned Upside Down: Radical Ideas in the English Revolution (New ed.). Penguin.
  23. ^ Manning, Brian (3 March 1984). "What Was the English Revolution". History Today. 34 (3). Archived from the original on 31 August 2020.
  24. ^ "Great rebellion, English Revolution or War of Religion?". UK Parliament. Archived from the original on 13 June 2021.
  25. ^ Stone, Lawrence (2017) [1972]. "Foreword (by Clare Jackson)". The Causes of the English Revolution 1529–1642 (Routledge Classics ed.). Routledge. pp. xiv–xv. ISBN 978-1-315-18492-0.
  26. ^ Woolrych, Austin (2002). Britain in Revolution, 1625–1660. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 794.
  27. ^ Marx, Karl; Engels, Friedrich. "Marx and Engels: On the Industrial Revolution: Primitive Accumulation and The Condition of the Working Class". Marxists Internet Archive.
  28. ^ Arnold, Matthew. The Function of Criticism at the Present Time (PDF). Blackmask.

Sources

[edit]

sv:Ekofascism

it:Ecofascismo

Death toll: 170 Injury toll: 398

Citations 2, 4, and 9 need to also be referenced in main body.

Ecofascism (sometimes spelled eco-fascism[1]) is a term used to describe individuals and groups which combine environmentalism with fascism.[2]

Philosopher André Gorz characterized eco-fascism as hypothetical forms of totalitarianism based on an ecological orientation of politics.[3] Similar definitions have been used by others in older academic literature in accusations of ecofascism of "environmental fascism".[4] However, since the 2010s, a number of individuals and groups have emerged that either self-identify as "ecofascist" or have been labelled as "ecofascist" by academic or journalistic sources.[5] These individuals and groups synthesise radical far-right politics with environmentalism,[6][7] and will typically argue that overpopulation is the primary threat to the environment and that the only solution is a complete halt to immigration or, at their most extreme, genocide against non-White groups and ethnicities.[8] Many far-right political parties have added green politics to their platforms.[9][1][10] Through the 2010s ecofascism has seen increasing support.[11]

Definition

[edit]

‘’Need Bookchin’s definition’’

In 2005, environmental historian Michael E. Zimmerman defined "ecofascism" as "a totalitarian government that requires individuals to sacrifice their interests to the well-being of the 'land', understood as the splendid web of life, or the organic whole of nature, including peoples and their states".[2] This was supported by philosopher Patrick Hassan’s work analysing historical accusations of ecofascism in academic literature.[12] Zimmerman argued that while no ecofascist government has existed so far, "important aspects of it can be found in German National Socialism, one of whose central slogans was "Blood and Soil".[2][13] Other political agendas, instead of environmental protection and prevention of climate change, are nationalist approaches to climate such as national economic environmentalism, securitization of climate change, and ecobordering.[14]

Ecofascists often believe there is a symbiotic relationship between a nation-group and its homeland.[15] They often blame the global south for ecological problems,[16][17] with their proposed solutions often entailing extreme population control measures based on racial categorisations,[18] and advocating for the accelerated collapse of current society to be replaced by fascist societies.[19] This latter belief is often accompanied with vocal support for terrorist actions.[20][21][22]

Vice has defined ecofascism as an ideology "which blames the demise of the environment on overpopulation, immigration, and over-industrialization, problems that followers think could be partly remedied through the mass murder of refugees in Western countries."[9] Environmentalist author Naomi Klein has suggested that ecofascists' primary objectives are to close borders to immigrants and, on the more extreme end, to embrace the idea of climate change as a divinely-ordained signal to begin a mass purge of sections of the human race. Ecofascism is "environmentalism through genocide", opined Klein.[1] Political researcher Alex Amend defined ecofascist belief as "The devaluing of human life—particularly of populations seen as inferior—in order to protect the environment viewed as essential to White identity."[23]

Terrorism researcher Kristy Campion defined ecofascism as "a reactionary and revolutionary ideology that champions the regeneration of an imagined community through a return to a romanticised, ethnopluralist vision of the natural order."[24]

The European Commission describes ecofascism as the "weaponization of climate change by far right populist political parties and white supremacist groups".[25] Tactics of this weaponization include the use of language and equating actors in population and migration discourses to components of the climate crisis. As said in a policy brief for The International Center for Counter-Terrorism, this "linguistic violence"[25] entails that "the invasion of non-native species that threaten the environment becomes synonymous with the invasion of immigrants, the protection of the environment with the protection of borders, trash with people, and environmental cleansing with ethnic cleaning."[25]

Helen Cawood and Xany Jansen Van Vuuren have criticised previous attempts to define ecofascism as focusing too heavily on environmental and ecological conservationism in historical fascist movements, and the subsequent definitions being too broad and encompassing many ontologically different ideologies.[26] In their criticism they summarise the current definition of ecofascism as used in the academic literature as "a movement that uses environmental and ecological conservationist talking points to push an ideology of ethnic or racial separatism".[27] This is supported by Blair Taylor statement that ecofascism refers to "groups and ideologies that offer authoritarian, hierarchical, and racist analyses and solutions to environmental problems".[28] Similarly, extremism researchers Brian Hughes, Dave Jones, and Amarnath Amarasingam argue that ecofascism is less a coherent ideology and more a cultural expression of mystical, anti-humanist romanticism.[29] This is further supported by Maria Darwish in her research into the Nordic Resistance Movement where while there is concern for environmental issues they are "a concern for Neo-Nazis only in so far as it supports and popularizes the backstage mission of the NRM", that is the implementation of a fascist regime,[30] and Jacob Blumenfeld stating "ecofascism names a specific far-right ideology that rationalizes white supremacist violence by invoking imminent ecological collapse and scarce natural resources".[31]

Borrowing from the "watermelon" analogy of eco-socialism, Berggruen Institute scholar Nils Gilman has coined the term "avocado politics" for eco-fascism, being "green on the outside but brown(shirt) at the core".[32][33][34]

In his book "Ecofascismo", the political scientist Carlos Taibo characterises the phenomenon as a response to crises brought about by climate change. The ecofascist solution is to "[P]reserve increasingly scarce resources for a select minority. And to marginalize – in the mildest version – and exterminate – in the harshest – what are seen as surplus populations, on a planet that has visibly exceeded its limits."[35][page needed] Crucially, Taibo argues that far from being circumscribed to the margins of right-wing extremism, which traditionally has mostly been associated with Climate change denial, ecofascist notions are likely to be pursued by "political forces we usually label as liberal and social-democratic", emerging within major centers of power in the west and among elites in the developing world.[35][page needed] From this perspective, the antecedents of ecofascism, extending beyond ecological currents in fascist movements of the past, would be ideologies typical of Western colonialism, returning in modernised forms.[35][page needed]


Ideological origins

[edit]

Madison Grant

[edit]

Sometimes dubbed the "founding father" of ecofascism,[36][37] Madison Grant was a pioneer of conservationism in America in the late 19th and early 20th century. Grant is credited as a founder of modern wildlife management. Grant built the Bronx River Parkway, was a co-founder of the American Bison Society, and helped create Glacier National Park, Olympic National Park, Everglades National Park and Denali National Park. As president of the New York Zoological Society, he founded the Bronx Zoo in 1899.[38]

In addition to his conservationist work, Grant was a trenchant racist.[39][40] In 1906, Grant supported the placement of Ota Benga, a member of the Mbuti people who was kidnapped, removed from his home in the Congo, and put on display in the Bronx Zoo as an exhibit in the Monkey House.[36][37] In 1916, Grant wrote The Passing of the Great Race, a work of pseudoscientific literature which claimed to give an account of the anthropological history of Europe.[41] The book divides Europeans into three races; Alpines, Mediterraneans and Nordics, and it also claims that the first two races are inferior to the superior Nordic race, which is the only race which is fit to rule the earth. Adolf Hitler would later describe Grant's book as "his bible" and Grant's "Nordic theory" became the bedrock of Nazi racial theories.[42] Additionally, Grant was a eugenicist: He cofounded and was the director of the American Eugenics Society and he also advocated the culling of the unfit from the human population.[43][44][45] Grant concocted a 100-year plan to perfect the human race, a plan in which one ethnic group after another would be killed off until racial purity would be obtained.[36] Grant campaigned for the passage of the Emergency Quota Act of 1921 and he also campaigned for the passage of the Immigration Act of 1924, which drastically reduced the number of immigrants from eastern Europe and Asia who were allowed to enter the United States.[46][44]

In the modern era, Grant's ideas have been cited by advocates of far-right politics such as Richard Spencer[38] and Anders Breivik.[37][47][48]

Nazism

[edit]

The authors Janet Biehl and Peter Staudenmaier suggest that the synthesis of fascism and environmentalism began with Nazism, stating that 19th and 20th century Germany was an early center of ecofascist thought, finding its antecedents in many prominent natural scientists and environmentalists, including Ernst Moritz Arndt, Wilhelm Heinrich Riehl, and Ernst Haeckel.[49] With the works and ideas of such individuals being later established as policies in the Nazi regime.[50] This is supported by other researchers who identify the Völkisch movement as an ideological originator of later ecofascism.[51][52] In Biehl and Staudenmaier's book Ecofascism: Lessons from the German Experience, they note the Nazi Party's interest in ecology, and suggest their interest was "linked with traditional agrarian romanticism and hostility to urban civilization".[53][54][55] With Zimmerman pointing to the works of conservationist and Nazi Walther Schoenichen as having pertinence to later ecofascism and similarities to developments in deep ecological understanding.[56] During the Nazi rise to power, there was strong support for the Nazis among German environmentalists and conservationists.[57] Richard Walther Darré, a leading Nazi ideologist and Reich Minister of Food and Agriculture who invented the term "Blood and Soil", developed a concept of the nation having a mystic connection with their homeland, and as such, the nation was dutybound to take care of the land.[58] This was supported by other Nazi theorists such as Alfred Rosenberg who wrote of how society's move from agricultural systems to industrialised systems broke their connection to nature and contributed to the death of the Volk.[53] Similar sentiments are found in speeches from Fascist Italy’s Minister of Agriculture Giuseppe Tassinari.[59] Because of this, modern ecofascists cite the Nazi Party as an origin point of ecofascism.[60][61][62] Beyond Darré, Rudolf Hess and Fritz Todt are viewed as representatives of environmentalism within the Nazi party.[63][64] Roger Griffin has also pointed to the glorification of wildlife in Nazi art and ruralism in the novels of the fascist sympathizers Knut Hamsun and Henry Williamson as examples.[65]

After the outlawing of the neo-nazi Socialist Reich Party, one of its members August Haußleiter moved towards organising within the environmental and anti-nuclear movements, going on to become a founding member of the German Green Party. When green activists later uncovered his past activities in the neo-nazi movement, Haußleiter was forced to step down as the party's chairman, although he continued to hold a central role in the party newspaper.[66] As efforts to expel nationalist elements within the party continued, a conservative faction split off and founded the Ecological Democratic Party, which became noted for persistent holocaust denial, rejection of social justice and opposition to immigration.[67]

Savitri Devi

[edit]
Savitri Devi's avowed Nazism, combined with her advocacy of animal rights and vegetarianism, has made her a figure of interest to ecofascists.[68]

The French-born Greek fascist Savitri Devi (born Maximiani Julia Portas) was a prominent proponent of Esoteric Nazism and deep ecology.[69] A fanatical supporter of Hitler and the Nazi Party from the 1930s onwards, she also supported animal rights activism and was a vegetarian from a young age. In her works, she espoused ecologist views, such as the Impeachment of Man (1959), in which she espoused her views on animal rights and nature.[70][71] In accordance with her ecologist views, human beings do not stand above the animals; instead, humans are a part of the ecosystem and as a result, they should respect all forms of life, including animals and the whole of nature. Because of her dual devotion to Nazism and deep ecology, she is considered an influential figure in ecofascist circles.[72][73]

Malthusianism

[edit]

Malthusian ideas of overpopulation have been adopted by ecofascists,[74] using Malthusian rationale in anti-immigration arguments[75] and seeking to resolve the perceived global issue by enforcing population control measures on the global south and racial minorities in white majority countries.[76] Such Malthusian ideas are often paired with Social Darwinist and eugenicist views.[77][45][78]

Ted Kaczynski, the Unabomber

[edit]
Ted Kaczynski AKA "The Unabomber" in a mug shot taken shortly after his arrest in April 1996.

Ted Kaczynski, better known as "The Unabomber", is cited as a figure who was highly influential in the development of ecofascist thought, and features prominently in contemporary ecofascist propaganda.[79] Between 1978 and 1995 Kaczynski instigated a terrorist bombing campaign aimed at inciting a revolution against modern industrial society,[80] in the name of returning humanity to a primitive state he suggested offered humanity more freedom while protecting the environment. In 1995 Kaczynski offered to end his bombing campaign if The Washington Post or The New York Times would publish his 35,000-word Unabomber manifesto. Both newspapers agreed to those terms. The manifesto railed not only against modern industrial society but also against "modern leftists", whom Kaczynski defined as "mainly socialists, collectivists, 'politically correct' types, feminists, gay and disability activists, animal rights activists and the like".[81][82]

Because of Kaczynski's intelligence and because of his ability to write in a high-level academic tone, his manifesto was given serious consideration upon its release and it became highly influential, even amongst those who severely disagreed with his use of violence. Kaczynski's staunchly radical pro-green, anti-left work was quickly absorbed into ecofascist thought.[83][84]

Kaczynski also criticized right-wing activists who complained about the erosion of traditional social mores because they supported technological and economic progress, a view which he opposed. He stated that technology erodes traditional social mores that conservatives and right wingers want to protect, and he referred to conservatives as fools.[85]

Although Kaczynski and his manifesto have been embraced by ecofascists,[83] he rejected "fascism",[86] including specifically "the 'ecofascists'", describing 'ecofascism' itself as 'an aberrant branch of leftism':[87][88]

The true anti-tech movement rejects every form of racism or ethnocentrism. This has nothing to do with "tolerance," "diversity," "pluralism," "multiculturalism," "equality," or "social justice." The rejection of racism and ethnocentrism is - purely and simply - a cardinal point of strategy.[87]

In his manifesto, Kaczynski wrote that he considered fascism a "kook ideology" and he also wrote that he considered Nazism "evil".[86] Kaczynski never tried to align himself with the far-right at any point before or after his arrest.[86]

In 2017, Netflix released a dramatisation of Kaczynski's life, titled Manhunt: Unabomber. Once again, the popularity of the show thrust Kaczynski and his manifesto into the public's mind and it also raised the profile of ecofascism.[89][61][86]

Garrett Hardin, Pentti Linkola, and "Lifeboat Ethics"

[edit]
Pentti Linkola's advocacy of "Lifeboat Ethics" is cited by commentators as an example of ecofascism.

Two figures influential in ecofascism are Garrett Hardin[90] and Pentti Linkola,[91][92] both of whom were proponents of what they refer to as "Lifeboat Ethics".[93] Hardin was a professor of Human Ecology at the University of California often described as a white nationalist.[94][95][96] His work was focused on the ethics of overpopulation and population control and suggested different methods like "birth control, abortion, and sterilization". Not only did he have medical suggestions but also stood against immigration and the end of foreign aid.[97]

Linkola was a Finnish ecologist and radical Malthusian[98] accused of being an active ecofascist[99] who actively advocated ending democracy and replacing it with dictatorships that would use totalitarian and even genocidal tactics[100] to end climate change.[47][101][102] Both men used versions of the following analogy to illustrate their viewpoint:


Renaud Camus

[edit]

Renaud Camus' conspiracy theory, the Great Replacement, has been influential on ecofascism, being referenced explicitly in multiple manifestos and had its ideas relayed in others.[103] In the conspiracy theory, the "native" white populations of western countries are being replaced by non-white populations as a directed political effort.[104][105]

Association with violence

[edit]

Ecofascist violence has occurred since the 21st century,[106][107] with academics and researchers warning that as ecological crises worsen and remain unaddressed, support for ecofascism and violence in the name of ecofascism will increase.[108]

Tree of Life Synagogue shooter https://earthworks.org/blog/eco-fascism-a-tangible-present-danger/


In December 2020, the Swedish Defence Research Agency released a report on ecofascism. The paper argued that ecofascism is intimately tied to the ideology of accelerationism, and ecofascists nearly exclusively choose terror tactics over the political approach.[106] Further, the SDRA argues not all ecofascist mass shooters have been recognized as such: Pekka-Eric Auvinen who shot eight people in Finland in 2007 before killing himself adhered to the ideology according to his manifesto titled "The Natural Selector's Manifesto".[109][110] He advocated "total war against humanity" due to the threat humanity posed to other species. He wrote that death and killing is not a tragedy, as it constantly happens in nature between all species. Auvinen also wrote that the modern society hinders "natural justice" and that all inferior "subhumans" should be killed and only the elite of humanity be spared. In one of his YouTube videos Auvinen paid tribute to the prominent deep ecologist Pentti Linkola.[106]

2010s

[edit]

James Jay Lee, the eco-terrorist who took several hostages at the Discovery Communications headquarters on 1 September 2010, was described as an ecofascist by Mark Potok of the Southern Poverty Law Center.[111]

Anders Breivik committed the 2011 Norway attacks on 22 July 2011, in which he killed eight people by detonating a van bomb at Regjeringskvartalet in Oslo, and then killed 69 participants of a Workers' Youth League (AUF) summer camp, in a mass shooting on the island of Utøya.[112][113][114] While dismissive of climate change, Breivik’s manifesto was concerned with the carrying capacity of the planet,[115] taking inspiration from Kaczynski[116] and Grant’s The Passing of the Great Race.[48] Breivik’s solution to this perceived problem was to cap the global population at 2.5 billion people, with the reduction in the global population being forced upon the global south.[115] Through his actions he sought to inspire other terrorist attacks,[117] and was an inspiration for later ecofascist terrorists.[118]

William H. Stoetzer, a member of the Atomwaffen Division, an organisation responsible for at least eight murders, was active in the Earth Liberation Front as late as 2008 and joined Atomwaffen in 2016.[119]

Brenton Tarrant, the Australian-born perpetrator of the Christchurch mosque shootings in New Zealand described himself as an ecofascist,[120] ethno-nationalist, and racist[121][122] in his manifesto The Great Replacement, named after a far-right conspiracy theory[123] originating in France. In the manifesto Tarrant specifically mentions Breivik as an ideological and operational influence.[124] Researchers point to Tarrant's terrorist attack as the moment when discussion of ecofascism moved from academic and specialist circles into the mainstream.[125][126] Jordan Weissmann, writing for Slate, describes the perpetrator's version of ecofascism as "an established, if somewhat obscure, brand of neo-Nazi"[127] and quotes Sarah Manavis of New Statesman as saying, "[Eco-fascists] believe that living in the original regions a race is meant to have originated in and shunning multiculturalism is the only way to save the planet they prioritise above all else".[127][128] Similarly, Luke Darby clarifies it as: "eco-fascism is not the fringe hippie movement usually associated with ecoterrorism. It's a belief that the only way to deal with climate change is through eugenics and the brutal suppression of migrants."[37]

Patrick Crusius, the perpetrator of the 2019 El Paso shooting wrote a similar manifesto, professing support for Tarrant.[129] Posted to the online message board 8chan,[130] it blames immigration to the United States for environmental destruction,[131][28] saying that American lifestyles were "destroying the environment",[132] invoking an ecological burden to be borne by future generations,[133][37] and concluding that the solution was to "decrease the number of people in America using resources".[132] Crusius outlined how he took inspiration from Tarrant and Breivik in his manifesto.[134][135][136] Crusius and Tarrant also inspired Philip Manshaus who attacked a mosque in Norway in 2019.[137][138] The El Paso terrorist attack catapulted into public awareness the "greening of hate" that has long haunted the American environmental movement. https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/4-november-december/feature/eco-fascism-uncovered-el-paso-texas

Eco-fascists have been noted as using the Algiz rune and pine tree emojis to identity each other online on social media platforms[139][140]

2020s

[edit]

The Swedish self-identified ecofascist Green Brigade is an eco-terrorist group linked to The Base that is responsible for multiple mass murder plots.[141][142][126] The Green Brigade has been responsible for arson attacks against targets deemed to be enemies of nature,[9][143] like an attack on a mink farm that caused multi-million-dollar damages.[142][144] Two members were arrested by Swedish police, allegedly planning assassinating judges and bombings.[145][146]

In June 2021, the Telegram-based Terrorgram collective published an online guide with incitements for attacks on infrastructure and violence against minorities, police, public figures, journalists, and other perceived enemies. In December 2021, they published a second document containing ideological sections on accelerationism, white supremacy, and ecofascism.[147][148][149]

During 2021, several neo-Nazi groups and individuals who espoused ecofascist rhetoric were arrested and charged by French authorities for planning terrorist attacks.[21] These include the group Recolonisons la France, and two "accelerationists" in Occitania.[21][150]

In an interview with a blog Maldición Eco-Extremista a leader of the eco-extremist group Individualists Tending to the Wild (ITS) claimed to have taken some organisational influence from the fascist accelerationist terrorist group Order of Nine Angles, while disavowing the group's fascism. However, Foundation for Defense of Democracies characterized ITS's literature as ecofascist.[151][152]

Payton S. Gendron, the instigator of the 2022 Buffalo shooting, also wrote a manifesto self-describing as "an ethno-nationalist eco-fascist national socialist" within it and also professing support for far-right shooters from Tarrant[153] and Dylann Roof to Breivik and Robert Bowers.[154][155] Later in 2022, the Terrorgram collective released another publication, with analysts believing it would likely inspire further "Buffalo shootings".[156]

In Finland on 15 March 2024, the anniversary of Christchurch mosque shooting, a Finnish army Non-commissioned officer was arrested for allegedly planning a mass shooting in a university in Vaasa that day. As her motivation she said the world needed "a mass culling" to put an end to "selfish individualism", "human degeneration", global warming and conspicuous consumption.[157][158] The Finnish police described her as ecofascist and that she had read books by Nietzsche, Linkola and Kaczynski. Additionally she had praised Pekka-Eric Auvinen in internet conversations and had visited Jokela school where he perpetrated the mass shooting.[159]

On 12 August 2024 at least five people were wounded in a mass stabbing attack in Eskisehir, Turkey. The perpetrator had called for "Total Human Death" and voiced support for Ted Kaczynski and Accelerationism on the Internet.[160]

Criticism

[edit]

The deep ecologic activist and "left biocentrism" advocate David Orton stated in 2000 that the term is pejorative in nature and it has "social ecology roots, against the deep ecology movement and its supporters plus, more generally, the environmental movement. Thus, 'ecofascist' and 'ecofascism', are used not to enlighten but to smear." Orton argued that "it is a strange term/concept to really have any conceptual validity" as there has not "yet been a country that has had an "eco-fascist" government or, to my knowledge, a political organization which has declared itself publicly as organized on an ecofascist basis."[161][a]

Accusations of ecofascism have often been made but are usually strenuously denied.[161][164] Left wing critiques view ecofascism as an assault on human rights, as in social ecologist Murray Bookchin's use of the term.[165]

Deep ecology

[edit]

Deep ecology is an environmental philosophy that promotes the inherent worth of all living beings regardless of their instrumental utility to human needs. It has long been linked to fascist ideologies, both by critics and fascist proponents.[56][166] In certain texts, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss, a leading voice of the "deep ecology" movement, opposes environmentalism and humanism, even proclaiming, in imitation of a famous phrase of the Marquis de Sade, "Écologistes, encore un effort pour devenir anti-humanistes" ("Ecologists, another effort to become anti-humanists!").[167] Luc Ferry, in his anti-environmentalist book Le Nouvel Ordre écologique [fr] published in 1992, particularly incriminated deep ecology as being an anti-humanist ideology bordering on Nazism.[168][169] Modern ecofascism has been described as a deep ecological philosophy combined with antihumanism and an accelerationist stance.[170]

Bookchin's critique of deep ecology

[edit]

Murray Bookchin criticizes the political position of deep ecologists[171] such as David Foreman:

There are barely disguised racists, survivalists, macho Daniel Boones, and outright social reactionaries who use the word ecology to express their views, just as there are deeply concerned naturalists, communitarians, social radicals, and feminists who use the word ecology to express theirs... It was out of this former kind of crude eco-brutalism that Hitler, in the name of "population control," with a racial orientation, fashioned theories of blood and soil...

The same eco-brutalism now reappears a half-century later among self-professed deep ecologists who believe that Third World peoples should be permitted to starve to death and that desperate Indian immigrants from Latin America should be excluded by the border cops from the United States lest they burden "our" ecological resources.[165]

Sakai on "natural purity"

[edit]

Such observations among the left are not exclusive to Bookchin. In his review of Anna Bramwell's biography of Richard Walther Darré, political writer J. Sakai and author of Settlers: The Mythology of the White Proletariat, observes the fascist ideological undertones of natural purity.[172] Prior to the Russian Revolution, the tsarist intelligentsia was divided on the one hand between liberal "utilitarian naturalists", who were "taken with the idea of creating a paradise on earth through scientific mastery of nature" and influenced by nihilism as well as Russian zoologists such as Anatoli Petrovich Bogdanov; and, on the other, "cultural-aesthetic" conservationists such as Ivan Parfenevich Borodin, who were influenced in turn by German Romantic and idealist concepts such as Landschaftspflege and Naturdenkmal.[173]

Narrowness of the label

[edit]

Political scientist Balša Lubarda has criticised the use of the term "ecofascism" as not sufficiently covering and describing the wider network of ideologies and systems that feed into ecofascist action, suggesting the term "far-right ecologism" (FRE) instead.[174][175][176] Lubarda is supported by researcher Bernhard Forchtner who emphasises ecofascism's existence as a fringe ideology that has had little impact on the wider far-right's interaction with environmentalism.[177][178]

Disavowment

[edit]

As ecofascism has become more prevalent various environmental groups and organisations have publicly disavowed the ideology and those who subscribe to it.[179]

Far-right green movements

[edit]

In recent years there has been a greater proliferation in ecofascist groups globally in line with the proliferation of ecofascist rhetoric.[180][181]

Australia

[edit]

Australia has seen an increasing prominence of ecofascism among its far-right groups in recent years.[182][183]

Cite error: The opening <ref> tag is malformed or has a bad name (see the help page).


Austria

[edit]

The Greens of Austria [de] (DGÖ) had been founded in 1982 by the former NDP official Alfred Bayer to use the popularity of the green movement at the time for the purposes of the NDP. The party managed to win a number of municipal seats in the mid-1980s but in 1988 the Constitutional Court banned the party on grounds of Neo-Nazism alongside a parallel ban on the NDP.[184]

Finland

[edit]

The neo-fascist Blue-and-Black Movement includes ecofascist policy goals, stating that they aim to protect the nature and biodiversity of Finland, and to live in harmony with nature, ending ritual slaughter, fur-farming and animal testing.[185]

France

[edit]

Nouvelle Droite movement

[edit]

The European Nouvelle Droite movement, developed by Alain de Benoist and other individuals involved with the GRECE think tank, have also combined various left-wing ideas, including green politics, with right-wing ideas such as European ethnonationalism.[65][21][186] Various other far-right figures have taken the lead from de Benoist, providing an appeal to nature in their politics, including: Guillaume Faye, Renaud Camus, and Hervé Juvin.[21] From the nineteenth century to Zemmour, ecofascism contaminates the political debate (reporterre.net)

Génération identitaire

[edit]

In 2020, following articles from self-described ecofascist Piero San Giorgio [fr], a spokesperson for Génération identitaire, Clément Martin, advocated for zones identitaires à défendre, ethnically homogenous zones to be violently defended in order to protect the environment.[21]

National Rally

[edit]

Marine Le Pen, president of the far-right National Rally (Rassemblement National, or RN) in the French National Assembly, has shown an ecofascist approach towards climate change issue and has incorporated environmental issues into her platform, although her policies regarding the climate often reflect a nationalist and protectionist stance to address it.[187][188] Le Pen has stated that concern for the climate is inherently nationalist, and that immigrants "do not care about the environment".[189][188] Jordan Bardella, president of National Rally, embraces similar beliefs and has stated "Borders are the environment’s greatest ally; it is through them we will save the planet."[188]

Solutions for climate change proposed for Le Pen also align with right-wing conservative economics. She has disregarded liberal free trade economics, under her belief that it "kills the planet" and creates "suffering for animals". Rather than supporting mass production of international commerce, she designed a localist project for "economic patriotism" to boost French products.[190]

Climate change was not in the RN's party platform until around 2019, when the issue began to be capitalized electorally by both leftist and center parties alike. In response to this rising awareness regarding environmental issues, Le Pen designed an energy plan focused on fossil fuels, opposing wind and solar energy,[191] and emphasizing expanding nuclear power wherein she delineated a party policy where 70% of France's electricity was to come from nuclear energy by 2050. Additionally, Le Pen supports maintaining oil heating systems and reducing taxes on fossil fuels, which contradicts climate experts' recommendations, and could increase France's dependence on fossil fuels.[192]

Germany

[edit]

Staudenmaier points to how from the post-war period in Germany an ecofascist section has always been present in the German far-right, though as a minor peripheral section,[193][194] with others pointing out a long history of right-wing individuals and groups being present in the environmental and green movement in Germany.[195]

Die Heimat

[edit]
Frank Franz, the current leader of the NPD, in 2017.

Die Heimat (The Homeland), previously known as the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), a German Nationalist far-right party, has long sought to utilise the green movement.[196] This is one of many strategies the party has used to try to gain supporters.[197]

The German far-right has published the magazine Umwelt & Aktiv [de], that masquerades as a garden and nature publication but intertwines garden tips with extremist political ideology.[198][199][200] This is known as a "camouflage publication" in which the NPD has spread its mission and ideologies through a discrete source and made its way into homes they otherwise wouldn’t.[197] Right-wing environmentalists are settling in the northern regions of rural Germany and are forming nationalistic and authoritarian communities which produce honey, fresh produce, baked goods, and other such farm goods for profit. Their ideology is centered around "blood and soil" ruralism in which they humanely raise produce and animals for profit and sustenance. Through their support of this operation, and the backing of many others, it's reported that the NPD is trying to wrestle the green movement, which has been dominated by the left since the 1980s, back from the left through these avenues.[201]

It's difficult to know if when one is buying local produce or farm fresh eggs from a farmer at their stand, they're supporting a right-wing agenda. Various efforts are being made to halt or slow the infiltration of right-wing ecologists into the community of organic farmers such as brochures about their communities and common practices. However, as the organic cultivation organisation, Biopark, demonstrates with their vetting process, it's difficult to keep people out of communities because of their ideologies. Biopark specifies that they vet based on cultivation habits, not opinions or doctrines, especially when they're not explicitly stated.[197]

AfD

[edit]

Prominent Alternative für Deutschland (Alternative for Germany) politician, Björn Höcke, has stated his desire to "reclaim" natural conservation from the left.[202] Höcke believes that nature conservation is not correctly executed under climate justice politics, and is quoted stating that the AfD has "to take the issue of nature conservation back from the Greens"[203] However, Höcke recognizes that a socially conservative position that strongly values environmental protection is not the majority position of the AfD. Regardless, Höcke sees the work of far-right ecological magazine, Die Kehre, as laying a theoretical standpoint for the AfD to later draw from.[203]

Collegium Humanum

[edit]

The Collegium Humanum was an ecofascist organisation in Germany from 1963 to 2008. It was established in 1963[204] as a club, was first active in the German environmental movement, then from the early 1980s became a far-right political organisation and was banned in 2008 by the Federal Minister of the Interior Wolfgang Schäuble due to "continued denial of the Holocaust".[205]

Other groups

[edit]

The term is also used to a limited extent within the Neue Rechte.[206] The neo-Artamans have been identified as ecofascists in their attempts to revive the agrarian and völkisch traditions of the Artaman League in communes that they have built up since the 1990s.[207][197]

Hungary

[edit]
László Toroczkai, leader of the Our Homeland Movement party, speaking at Corvin köz [hu].

Following the fall of Communism in Hungary at the end of the 1980s, one of the new political parties that emerged in the country was the Green Party of Hungary. Initially having a moderate centre-right green outlook, after 1993 the party adopted a radical anti-liberal, anti-communist, anti-Semitic and pro-fascist stance, paired with the creation of a paramilitary wing.[208] This ideological swing resulted in many members breaking off from the party to form new green parties, first with Green Alternative in 1993 and secondly with Hungarian Social Green Party in 1995. Each green party remained on the political fringe of Hungarian politics and petered out over time.[209] It was not until the formation of LMP – Hungary's Green Party in the 2010s that green politics in Hungary consolidated around a single green party.

The far-right Hungarian political party Our Homeland Movement has adopted some elements of environmentalism, and commonly refers to itself as the only true green party;[210] for example, the party has called on Hungarians to show patriotism by supporting the removal of pollution from the Tisza River while simultaneously placing the blame on the pollution on Romania and Ukraine.[211][212] Similarly, elements of the far-right Sixty-Four Counties Youth Movement proscribe themselves to the "Eco-Nationalist" label, with one member stating "no real nationalist is a climate denialist".[213]

India

[edit]
Narendra Modi addressing at the inauguration of the India Pavilion, at COP21

Narendra Modi's leadership of India with the Bharatiya Janata Party seeks to install a complete system of Hindutva,[214] with repression of racial and religious minorities and caste discrimination.[215] Since 2018 Modi has been increasingly viewed as an environmental champion and used rhetoric about protecting the environment to greenwash his image and the image of his party.[216][217][218]

International

[edit]

Greenline Front is an international network of ecofascists which originated in Eastern Europe, with chapters in a variety of countries such as Argentina, Belarus, Chile, Germany, Italy, Poland, Russia, Serbia, Spain and Switzerland.[219]

Serbia

[edit]

Leviathan Movement promotes ecology and protects animals from cruelty by, among other things, saving them from abusers. Leviathan has been reported as an ideologically neo-fascist[220] and neo-nazi group.[221] They used to share an office with the Serbian Right, a far-right political party, and Leviathan ’s leader, Pavle Bihali, is seen in pictures on his social media accounts posing with neo-Nazis.[222]

Sweden

[edit]

The Nordic Resistance Movement, a pan-Nordic[223][224] neo-Nazi[225] movement in the Nordic countries and a political party in Sweden has been continually described as ecofascist,[226][227] and have declared themselves as the "new green party" of the Nordics.[228] In their English-language literature they continually link immigration to environmental degradation

Switzerland

[edit]

In Switzerland, the initiators of the Ecopop initiative were accused of eco-fascism by FDFA State Secretary Yves Rossier [de] at a Christian Democratic People's Party of Switzerland event on 11 January 2013.[229] However, after threatening to sue, Rossier apologized for the allegation.[230]

United Kingdom

[edit]
Protestors against Nick Griffin's appearance on Question Time, 2009

There is also a historic tradition between the far-right and environmentalism in the UK.[231][232] Throughout its history, the far-right British National Party has flirted on and off with environmentalism. During the 1970s the party's first leader John Bean expressed support for the emerging environmentalist movement in the pages of the party's newspaper and suggested the primary cause of pollution as overpopulation, and therefore immigration into Britain must be halted.[233][48] During the 2000s the BNP sought to position itself as the "only 'true' green party in the United Kingdom, dedicating a significant portion of their manifestos to green issues. During an appearance on BBC One's Question Time in October 2009, then-leader Nick Griffin proclaimed:

Unlike the fake "Greens" who are merely a front for the far left of the Labour regime, the BNP is the only party to recognise that overpopulation – whose primary driver is immigration, as revealed by the government's own figures – is the cause of the destruction of our environment. Furthermore, the BNP's manifesto states that a BNP government will make it a priority to stop building on green land. New housing should wherever possible be built on derelict "brown land".[234]

The Guardian criticised Griffin's claims that himself and the BNP were truly environmentalists at heart, suggesting it was merely a smokescreen for anti-immigrant rhetoric and pointed to previous statements by Griffin in which he suggested that climate change was a hoax.[234] These suspicions seemed to be proven correct when in December 2009 the BNP released a 40-page document denying that global warming is a "man-made" phenomenon.[235] The party reiterated this stance in 2011, as well as making claims that wind farms were causing the deaths of "thousands of Scottish pensioners from hypothermia".[236] John Bean a far-right activist and politician, the first leader of the BNP and latterly a leader within the National Front, wrote regularly in the National Front’s magazine about the problems of pollution and environmental degradation tying them to ideas of overpopulation and immigration.[233]

In 2024 it was reported by Searchlight that the fascist groups Patriotic Alternative and Homeland party has also started to make claims that the countryside was being destroyed by immigration.[237]

In Scotland, former UKIP candidate and activist Alistair McConnachie, who has questioned the Holocaust, founded the Independent Green Voice in 2003,[238] and multiple ex-BNP members and activists have stood as candidates for the party.[239]

United States

[edit]

During the 1990s a highly militant environmentalist subculture called Hardline emerged from the straight edge hardcore punk music scene and established itself in a number of cities across the US. Adherents to the Hardline lifestyle combined the straight edge belief in no alcohol, no drugs, no tobacco with militant veganism and advocacy for animal rights. Hardline touted a biocentric worldview that claimed to value all life, and therefore opposed abortion, contraceptives, and sex for any purpose other than procreation. On this same line, Hardline opposed homosexuality as "unnatural" and "deviant”.[240] Hardline groups were highly militant; In 1999 Salt Lake City grouped Hardliners as a criminal gang and suggested they were behind dozens of assaults in the metro area.[241] That same year CBS News reported that Hardliners were behind the firebombing of fast food outlets and clothing stores selling leather items, and attributed 30 attacks to Hardliners.[242] The Hardline subculture dissolved after the 1990s.

White supremacist John Tanton and the network of organisations he created, dubbed the Tanton network, have been described as ecofascist.[243][244] Tanton and his organisations spent decades linking immigration to environmental concerns.[245][246][247] https://www.sierraclub.org/washington/blog/2020/01/overpopulation-myth-and-its-dangerous-connotations Tigue 2022: "Once relegated to the fringes of society, ecofascism has found its way into mainstream discourse in recent years. Its origins, in many ways, trace back to the Tanton network, a collection of more than a dozen anti-immigration groups founded or funded by John Tanton" https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/4-november-december/feature/eco-fascism-uncovered-el-paso-texas

Political researchers Blair Taylor and Eszter Szenes have identified multiple threads in alt-right discourse and ideology that align with far-right ecologism and ecofascism.[248][249]

The Green Party of the United States has also long been the target of various far-right figures, such as anti-Semitic conspiracy theorists, who have tried to shift the party drastically to the far-right.[5]

In 1994, so-called "Takings" bills were introduced by the U.S. Congress to financially compensate wetlands owners who were unable to develop their land for profit due to environmental protection policies. These bills were met with resistance by "anthropocentric market liberals", who oppose any sort of market regulation or intervention of the state into private ownership. Hence, these "takings" bills were deemed ecofascist and proponents of the bills were "disparaged" and viewed as "'nature-loving' romantics for having reactionary tendencies that may be consistent with fascism". The Journal for Social Theory and Practice uses this instance to exemplify how growing public frustration with complex federal environmental regulations leads to rapidly polarizing opinions on environmental regulations in the United States: one is either a citizen who supports people, private property, and the U.S. Constitution, or a radical environmentalist who supports nature, communal ownership, and ecofascism.[250]

Mark Brnovich[251][252] https://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/4-november-december/feature/eco-fascism-uncovered-el-paso-texas

Internet

[edit]

Ecofascists coalescing online, prominent use of memes in closed groups and public facing accounts, memes used and referenced in terrorist manifestos. [253]

"In the darker rooms of the internet, chat sites abound where members embrace precisely eco-fascist ideas, characterized by a combination of the climate crisis, ecological collapse, immigration, racial mixing and nature conservation."[254]

"A reoccurring theme in online communities and of perpetrators of extremist violence have made explicit reference to narratives of ecofascism."[255] "Despite their predilections for a romantic return to natural order, ecofascist groups and individuals have created a notable digital footprint within Australian and international communities to recruit and communicate these ideals."[256]

Manavis 2018

"Eco-fascism is a modern-day ideology, fuelled by the internet, but its roots are deep – and often forgotten."[232]

Richards, Jones & Brinn 2022 harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRichardsJonesBrinn2022 (help)

Walsh 2022

Various eco-accelerationist channels on Telegram glorify Kaczynski’s terrorism whilst proclaiming him a "martyr." One popular meme consists of a photograph of Kaczynski together with the "Ted Talks" logo and its slogan, "ideas worth spreading." "Uncle Ted Did Nothing Wrong," declares another. His violence is also linked to contemporary calls for the "Boogaloo"—shorthand for the impending race war in extreme right circles. “Ted boogied for 17 years,” declared one Telegram channel. "Ted used his mega brain. Be like Ted." Kaczynski’s aforementioned hostility to Nazism is also rationalised in terms of common struggle. "Certain elements will caw that Uncle Ted dissed national socialists and modern adherents," another channel stated. "I encourage you to trust me because this is 100 percent our fight and a huge reason he is facing backlash is because our collective spheres spread his ideas harder than almost anyone." Others involved in this milieu have corresponded with Kaczynski directly. One user posted a photograph of the letter he had received from the Unabomber, advising its sender to "undertake the systematic cultivation of self-discipline" in response to a question about the qualities young people should aspire to. "Ted wants us to do better, and frankly we should listen to him," responded another user.[257]

"Even on the "full-fat" far-right fringes, the great replacement theory accommodates a variety of conflicting ideas. The accused shooter in Buffalo claims to have been "radicalised" by online message boards such as Reddit, 4chan and 8chan, which he began browsing during the pandemic. These boards have become a gateway for white-nationalist extremism, through the sharing of racist memes, conspiracy theories and extremist literature and manifestos. His manifesto borrows heavily from that of the Christchurch shooter, who killed 51 people in New Zealand in 2019. That manifesto was titled "The Great Replacement". It was full of racist, white nationalist and anti-immigrant sentiments, railing against declining white birthrates, "white genocide" and immigration policies supposedly injurious to people of European descent. "[258] Molloy 2022 Telegram Kaati et al. 2020

Pejorative

[edit]

Detractors on the political right tend to use the term "ecofascism" as a hyperbolic general pejorative against all environmental activists,[259][260] including more mainstream groups such as Greenpeace, prominent activists such as Greta Thunberg, and government agencies tasked with protecting environmental resources.[164][261] Such detractors include Rush Limbaugh and other conservative and wise use movement commentators.[262][263] The term as a pejorative has been used in multiple countries.[264]

See also

[edit]

Notes

[edit]
  1. ^ Since 2000, multiple individuals and groups have self described as ecofascists, including:

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b c Corcione 2020.
  2. ^ a b c Zimmerman 2008, p. 531.
  3. ^ Gorz, André (1977). Ökologie und Politik [Ecology and Politics] (in German). Rowohlt: Reinbek. p. 75.
  4. ^ Hassan 2021, pp. 51–53.
  5. ^ a b Phelan 2018.
  6. ^ Jahn, Thomas; Wehling, Peter (1991). Ökologie von rechts. Nationalismus und Umweltschutz bei der Neuen Rechten und den Republikanern [Ecology from the right. Nationalism and environmentalism among the New Right and Republicans] (in German). Campus, Frankfurt/Main, New York.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  7. ^ Ditfurth 1992, pp. 278, 324.
  8. ^ Kamel, Lamoureux & Makuch 2020; Corcione 2020; Oksa 2005; Taylor 2020, pp. 277–278; Harris 2022, pp. 458–459; Staudenmaier 2004, p. 520
  9. ^ a b c d Kamel, Lamoureux & Makuch 2020.
  10. ^ Ross & Bevensee 2020, pp. 4–9.
  11. ^ Protopapadakis 2014, p. 587; Dyett & Thomas 2019, p. 220; Kaati et al. 2020; Harris 2022, p. 452; Tynan 2023, pp. 90–91; Chalecki 2023, p. 1
  12. ^ Hassan 2021, p. 53.
  13. ^ Macklin 2022, p. 982: "Instead, this article highlights an emerging strain of "eco-fascism" within sections of the contemporary extreme right that takes "Blood and Soil" as its ideological baseline and fuses it with a particularly virulent form of misanthropic ecological nihilism that views violence and terrorism against the current social, political, and economic order, as the only means of restoring man to a state of pristine pastoral purity."
  14. ^ Huq & Mochida 2018, p. 4; Yakushko & De Francisco 2022, pp. 471–472; Lynch 2022, pp. 17–18: "Similar to other critical perspectives of the greening of hate, the authors critique what they call 'ecobordering,' which represents 'the consolidation and sanitization of a constellation of 19th and 20th century Malthusian, conservative, and ecofascist ideas, as well as Romantic-era notions of nature and belonging.'"; Saltmarsh 2022: "Moore and Roberts describe the contemporary far-right's approach to climate change, despite historical nods at 'nature protection', as a combination of denialism and securitisation, with the first undermining mitigation and promoting continued extraction, and the second redirecting security complexes toward expanding and protecting sites of extraction from resistance."
  15. ^ Forchtner & Lubarda 2023; Yakushko & De Francisco 2022, p. 472; Farrell-Molloy & Macklin 2022; Hancock 2022; Chalecki 2023, p. 6: "Ecofascists believe that race and nationality are literally tied to the natural environment of the country and that "blood and soil" determines who belongs in a country and who doesn't."; Armiero & von Hardenberg 2013, p. 291: "Nevertheless, in Fascist discourses and politics, reclamation was not only about land and water; it also included humans, who needed to be redeemed as well. The blend of soil and people in a racist and nationalistic fusion gave the Fascist environmental narrative its distinctive character."
  16. ^ Kitch, Sally L. (2023). "Reproductive Rights and Ecofeminism". Humanities. 12 (2): 34. doi:10.3390/h12020034.
  17. ^ Lynch 2022, pp. 6–8.
  18. ^ Thomas & Gosink 2021, pp. 40–43; Lynch 2022, pp. 17–18; Walsh 2022: "They are often radicalized online, as the latest alleged shooter claims to have been, and many believe that white people, along with the environment, are threatened by non-white overpopulation. They often call for a halt to immigration, or the eradication of non-white populations."}}; Tilley & Ajl 2022, p. 13; Anantharaman 2022
  19. ^ Richards, Jones & Brinn 2022, p. 1: "Expressions of eco-fascism often entail extreme population control measures advocated by right-wing activists and ethnonationalist governments, and accelerationist propaganda hastening the collapse of societies worldwide." harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRichardsJonesBrinn2022 (help); Manavis 2018; Yakushko & De Francisco 2022, pp. 457–458, 472; Farrell-Molloy & Macklin 2022: "The co-opting of Kaczynski provides eco-fascists with a 'green accelerationist' pathway as the use of violent tactics to increase tensions can easily be applied to his ideas, elevating him as 'an obvious sage of violence.'"; Kaati et al. 2020, p. 3: "Ett drag som ekofascimen delar med många av de nyare radikalnationalistiska rörelserna, som exempelvis the Base eller Atomwaffen Division, är accelerationism. Accelerationismen hos dessa grupper går ut på att försöka påskynda det moderna samhällets undergång genom upprepade aktioner som skapar kaos och splittring. Strategierna innefattar bland annat sabotage, mord och masskjutningar." ["A trait that eco-fascism shares with many of the newer radical nationalist movements, such as the Base or Atomwaffen Division, is accelerationism. The accelerationism of these groups consists of trying to hasten the demise of modern society through repeated actions that create chaos and division. The strategies include sabotage, murder and mass shootings."]; Molloy 2022: "The fusion between militant accelerationism and eco-fascism produced a distinctly high level of content promoting sabotage and infrastructural attack"
  20. ^ Dannemann 2023, p. 5.
  21. ^ a b c d e f d'Allens 2022a.
  22. ^ Macklin 2022, p. 982.
  23. ^ Amend, Alex (9 July 2020). "Blood and Vanishing Topsoil: American Ecofascism Past, Present, and in the Coming Climate Crisis". Political Research Associates. Archived from the original on 3 October 2020. Retrieved 27 February 2023.
  24. ^ Campion 2021, pp. 933–934.
  25. ^ a b c "Investigating the role of disinformation in the rise of eco-fascism". CORDIS. European Commission. Archived from the original on 6 July 2024. Retrieved 6 July 2024.
  26. ^ Cawood & Vuuren 2022, pp. 90–92.
  27. ^ Cawood & Vuuren 2022, pp. 89–91.
  28. ^ a b Arvin 2021.
  29. ^ Hughes, Jones & Amarasingam 2022, p. 998.
  30. ^ Darwish 2018, p. 90.
  31. ^ Blumenfeld 2022, p. 173.
  32. ^ Gilman, Nils (7 February 2020). "The Coming Avocado Politics: What Happens When the Ethno-Nationalist Right Gets Serious about the Climate Emergency". Breakthrough Institute. Archived from the original on 3 September 2023.
  33. ^ Sargent, Greg (26 August 2021). "Opinion: The dark future of far-right Trumpist politics is coming into view". Washington Post. Archived from the original on 3 December 2022.
  34. ^ Chalecki 2023, p. 6.
  35. ^ a b c Taibo, Carlos (2022). Ecofascismo: una introducción [Ecofascism: an introduction] (in Spanish). Madrid: Catarata. ISBN 978-84-1352-531-0. OCLC 1352408231.
  36. ^ a b c Tucker 2019.
  37. ^ a b c d e Darby 2019a.
  38. ^ a b Patin 2021.
  39. ^ "Madison Grant (U.S. National Park Service)". U.S. National Park Service. Archived from the original on 7 June 2022. Retrieved 15 August 2022.
  40. ^ Purdy 2015; Frazier 2019; Alexander 1962
  41. ^ Spiro, Jonathan Peter (2009). "Creating the Refuge". Defending the Master Race: Conservation, Eugenics, and the Legacy of Madison Grant. University of Vermont Press, University Press of New England. pp. 225–226. doi:10.2307/j.ctv1xx9bzb.13. ISBN 978-1-58465-715-6. JSTOR j.ctv1xx9bzb.13. S2CID 239426317.
  42. ^ Patin 2021; Weymouth 2021; Sparrow 2019; Hoff 2021
  43. ^ Yakushko & De Francisco 2022, pp. 467–469.
  44. ^ a b Hoff 2021.
  45. ^ a b Hussein 2022.
  46. ^ Sparrow 2019.
  47. ^ a b Adler-Bell, Sam (24 September 2019). "Why White Supremacists Are Hooked on Green Living". The New Republic. Archived from the original on 14 November 2019. Retrieved 21 December 2021.
  48. ^ a b c Knights 2020.
  49. ^ Biehl & Staudenmaier 1996, pp. 6–7; Macklin 2022, p. 979: "Indeed, it was the German nationalist, zoologist, and naturalist, Ernest Haeckel, who coined the term ökologie in 1866."; Naustdalslid 2023, pp. 49–52; Tynan 2023, p. 101; Szenes 2023, p. 3: "German zoologist and eugenicist Ernst Haeckel, who, by stressing the connection between the purity of nature and the purity of race, paved the way for German National Socialism."
  50. ^ Dyett & Thomas 2019, pp. 217–219.
  51. ^ Ross & Bevensee 2020, pp. 9–10.
  52. ^ Szenes 2023, p. 3: "White supremacist environmentalism is not a new phenomenon but one with a long and troubled history, whose roots can be traced back to the 19th century German Völkisch movement, German Romanticism, and anti-Enlightenment nationalism."
  53. ^ a b Biehl & Staudenmaier 1996, p. 12.
  54. ^ Smith, Kev. "Ecofascism: Deep Ecology and Right-Wing Co-optation". Environment and Ecology. Archived from the original on 13 February 2023. Retrieved 14 February 2023.
  55. ^ Olsen, Jonathan (1999). Nature and Nationalism: Right-Wing Ecology and the Politics of Identity. New York: St. Martin's Press.
  56. ^ a b Zimmerman 2004.
  57. ^ Brüggemeier, Franz-Josef; Cioc, Mark; Zeller, Thomas (2005). How Green Were the Nazis?: Nature, Environment, and Nation in the Third Reich. Ohio University Press.
  58. ^ Hughes, Jones & Amarasingam 2022, p. 999; Macklin 2022, p. 982; Molloy 2022: "Neo-völkisch-’ism’, the revival of paganism and folklore traditions, aimed to denote a mystical connection between land and race, reinforcing the 'naturalness' of the in-group to the ecosystem"; Dannemann 2023, p. 6; Szenes 2023, p. 3: "The notorious Nazi slogan 'Blood and Soil', a symbol for the mystical-spiritual connection between race and nature, was coined by Walter Darré, the NSDAP's Minister for Food and Agriculture."; Staudenmaier 2004, p. 519
  59. ^ Armiero & von Hardenberg 2013, p. 292: "land and race are indissolubly bound; it is through the land that we make the history of our race; the race rules, develops, and fecundates the land"
  60. ^ Wilson 2019: "Nazism and a twisted version of ecological thinking are joined in the minds of a share of rightwing extremists."
  61. ^ a b c Bennett 2019.
  62. ^ Toulouse, Teresa A.; Zimmerman, Michael E. (2016). "Ecofascism". In Adamson, Joni; Gleason, William A.; Pellow, David N. (eds.). Keywords for Environmental Studies. New York University Press. p. 64. ISBN 978-0-8147-6083-3.
  63. ^ Dahl, Göran (2006). Radikalare än Hitler?: de esoteriska och grona nazisterna, Inspirationskallor, Pionjarer, Forvaltare, Attlingarby [More radical than Hitler?: The esoteric and verdant Nazis, Pioneers, Trustees, Attlingarby] (in Swedish). Atlantis. pp. 136–145. ISBN 91-7353-122-7. OCLC 225237172.
  64. ^ Biehl & Staudenmaier 1996, pp. 13–14.
  65. ^ a b Griffin 2008.
  66. ^ "June 21–22: West German Greens Decide to Contest First Federal Elections". Global Green Party History Chronology – 1980. Global Greens, Brussels. Archived from the original on 4 February 2016. Retrieved 28 January 2016.
  67. ^ Lee, Martin A. (2000). The Beast Reawakens: Fascism's Resurgence from Hitler's Spymasters to Today's Neo-Nazi Groups and Right-Wing Extremists. New York City: Routledge. pp. 217–218. ISBN 0415925460. OCLC 1106702367.
  68. ^ Macklin 2022, p. 983: "Savitri Devi’s blend of Aryan supremacism, vitriolic anti-Semitism, Hinduism, animal rights and ecology, have served as the basis for a post-war redefinition of Nazism as a “religion of nature” in the more cultic corners of the extreme right."
  69. ^ Goodrick-Clarke, Nicholas (2003). Black Sun: Aryan Cults, Esoteric Nazism, and the Politics of Identity. New York University Press. pp. 57, 88. ISBN 0-8147-3155-4. OCLC 47665567. Archived from the original on 8 May 2016 – via Google Books.
  70. ^ Greer, John Michael (2003). The new encyclopedia of the occult. Llewellyn Worldwide. pp. 130–131. ISBN 978-1-56718-336-8. Archived from the original on 15 February 2016 – via Google Books.
  71. ^ Macklin 2022, pp. 982–984.
  72. ^ "Savitri Devi: The mystical fascist being resurrected by the alt-right". BBC. 29 October 2017. Archived from the original on 22 November 2017. Retrieved 19 January 2020.
  73. ^ Manavis 2018: "The links between Devi’s views and eco-fascism are supported by the fact she’s enjoyed something of a renaissance amongst members of the alt-right in the last several years."
  74. ^ Farrell-Molloy & Macklin 2022: "While most of what has been discussed about eco-fascism is centred on anti-immigration "green" nationalism or far-right neo-Malthusian arguments about overpopulation"; Guenther 2023, p. 16; Earthworks 2022b: "These include the racist Malthusian idea that the human population will reach a carrying capacity that the earth can't sustain, which has been repeatedly debunked, […] we must be cognizant that the origin of national parks and protected areas lies in explicitly eugenicist and white supremacist ideology that violently displaced Indigenous peoples from the lands they stewarded since time immemorial."; Tynan 2023, pp. 101–102; Kamel, Lamoureux & Makuch 2020; Saltmarsh 2022: "his manifesto tied climate change to usual far-right thought, a Malthusian ecological politics intersecting with ideas around racial replacement that culminated in the use of deadly violence against the Muslim 'other'."; Forchtner & Lubarda 2020: "Eco-fascism, mostly associated with the 'green wing' in historical National Socialism and neo-Malthusian authoritarians of the 1960s/70s, is an iridescent concept that signifies the preoccupation of extreme-right actors with environmentalist concerns."; d'Allens 2022b
  75. ^ Lynch 2022, p. 11.
  76. ^ Dyett & Thomas 2019, pp. 210–216; Wilkinson 2020; Hughes, Jones & Amarasingam 2022, p. 999; Thomas & Gosink 2021, pp. 40–43; Fernández & Hart 2023, pp. 5–6; Walsh 2022: "They are often radicalized online, as the latest alleged shooter claims to have been, and many believe that white people, along with the environment, are threatened by non-white overpopulation. They often call for a halt to immigration, or the eradication of non-white populations."}}; Macklin 2022, pp. 986–987
  77. ^ Kaati et al. 2020, pp. 4–6.
  78. ^ Earthworks 2022b: "These include the racist Malthusian idea that the human population will reach a carrying capacity that the earth can't sustain, which has been repeatedly debunked, […] we must be cognizant that the origin of national parks and protected areas lies in explicitly eugenicist and white supremacist ideology that violently displaced Indigenous peoples from the lands they stewarded since time immemorial."
  79. ^ Molloy 2022: "Kaczynskian anti-technology radicalism represented an adoption and co-option of Unabomber Ted Kaczynski’s ideology and embodied the strongest point of cohesion across the subculture."
  80. ^ Macklin 2022, p. 984.
  81. ^ Didion, Joan (23 April 1998). "Varieties of Madness". The New York Review of Books. Archived from the original on 13 August 2017.
  82. ^ Macklin 2022, pp. 984–985.
  83. ^ a b Wilson 2019: "Contemporary eco-fascists are inspired by a number of key figures. One is "Unabomber" Ted Kaczynski, whose terrorist campaign against what he called "industrial society" combined violence, misanthropy and a self-dramatising manifesto."
  84. ^ Farrell-Molloy & Macklin 2022: "This view of leftism as inconsistent with wild nature is mirrored by the eco-fascists belief they must seize stewardship of the environment from the left"
  85. ^ "The Unabomber Trial: The Manifesto". The Washington Post. 1997. Archived from the original on 22 February 2021.
  86. ^ a b c d Hanrahan 2018.
  87. ^ a b Kaczynski, Ted. "Ecofascism: An Aberrant Branch of Leftism". The Anarchist Library. Archived from the original on 21 February 2022. Retrieved 21 February 2022.
  88. ^ Skauge-Monsen, Vilde (1 June 2022). "Save the bees, not refugees": Far-right environmentalism meets the Internet (A comparative content analysis of Nazi Germany's environmentalism and four self-proclaimed ecofascist channels on Telegram) (PDF) (Master's). University of Oslo, Department of media and communication. Archived from the original (PDF) on 11 December 2022.
  89. ^ a b Wilson 2019.
  90. ^ Guenther 2023, p. 16.
  91. ^ Oksa 2005, p. 75.
  92. ^ Macklin 2022, p. 986.
  93. ^ Knights 2020; Tilley & Ajl 2022, p. 3: "Lifeboat Ethics advocates for the abandonment of the populous poor to save the rich few in a limited planetary 'lifeboat'."; Allison 2020, p. 3; Protopapadakis 2016, pp. 227–228
  94. ^ "Garrett Hardin". Southern Poverty Law Center. Archived from the original on 15 November 2021. Retrieved 20 July 2018.
  95. ^ Tilley & Ajl 2022, p. 2.
  96. ^ Biss, Eula (8 June 2022). "The Theft of the Commons". The New Yorker. Archived from the original on 11 August 2022. Retrieved 13 June 2022.
  97. ^ "Guide to the Garrett Hardin Papers". Online Archive of California. Archived from the original on 7 July 2022. Retrieved 22 June 2024.
  98. ^ Hughes, Jones & Amarasingam 2022, p. 1005.
  99. ^ Protopapadakis 2014, p. 590.
  100. ^ Macklin 2022, pp. 986–987.
  101. ^ Anwar, André (13 November 2007). "Pentti Linkola: "Es hilft nicht, Kameraden zu erschießen"" [Pentti Linkola: "It doesn't help to shoot comrades"]. Der Tagesspiegel (in German). Archived from the original on 20 January 2015.
  102. ^ Linkola, Pentti (2011). Can life prevail?: a revolutionary approach to the environmental crisis (2nd English ed.). Arktos. ISBN 978-1-907166-63-1. OCLC 780962580.
  103. ^ Forchtner 2019: "The murder of 51 people in Christchurch, New Zealand, in March 2019 has led to, for example, a gun reform bill in New Zealand and renewed interest in the notion of 'the great replacement'. […] However, the idea of 'the great replacement' did play a role in this second shooting too which undoubtedly invites further scrutiny."; O'Neill 2022, pp. 39–40; Achenbach 2019; Rueda 2020; Tilley & Ajl 2022, pp. 202–203: "The manifesto's ideology is often traced back to a 2011 work of Renaud Camus, titled Le Grand Remplacement, and understood as a sibling of US white genocide conspiracies."; Anantharaman 2022: "For instance, the Buffalo shooting suspect calls himself an eco-fascist acting against overpopulating "invaders" to save the environment. Similar discourses were invoked in the Christchurch mass shooting in New Zealand. In these circles, population is not at the margins but at the very center of (racial) anxieties. Nightly sermons about "the great replacement theory" are case in point."; Rose 2022: "Replacement themes were also invoked by mass shooters in Utøya, Norway, in 2011, at the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, in 2018 and in El Paso, Texas, in 2019. Yet each of these shooters – all white men – targeted a different group of people. The Buffalo shooter killed only Black Americans. The Christchurch shooter terrorised Muslims leaving Friday prayers. "
  104. ^ "Le "Grand Remplacement", cauchemar de l'extrême droite" [The "Great Replacement", a nightmare of the far right]. Le Temps (in French). 9 July 2020. ISSN 1423-3967. Archived from the original on 21 September 2023. L'écrivain distingue alors les remplacés (la civilisation européenne et sa culture), les remplaçants (les immigrés venus majoritairement d'Afrique du Nord et d'Afrique subsaharienne) et les remplacistes (le pouvoir qui ne cherche pas à inverser les flux migratoires afin de servir des intérêts politiques, de gauche notamment). [The writer then distinguishes between the replaced (European civilization and its culture), the replacements (the immigrants coming mainly from North Africa and sub-Saharan Africa) and the replacers (the power which does not seek to reverse migratory flows in order to erve political interests, particularly left-wing ones).]
  105. ^ Guidi 2022.
  106. ^ a b c d Kaati et al. 2020.
  107. ^ Tynan 2023, pp. 101.
  108. ^ Dyett & Thomas 2019, p. 220; Kaati et al. 2020; Hassan 2021, p. 52; Harris 2022, p. 452
  109. ^ Svahn, Clas (10 November 2007). "Bland Auvinens vänner var det extrema normalt" [Among Auvinen's friends, the extreme was normal]. Dagens Nyheter (in Swedish). Archived from the original on 10 March 2016.
  110. ^ Macklin 2022, p. 987.
  111. ^ Potok, Mark (1 September 2010). "Apparent Eco-Terrorist Holding Hostages at TV Building". Southern Poverty Law Center. Archived from the original on 10 April 2016. Retrieved 20 February 2023.
  112. ^ Lewis, Mark; Cowell, Alan (24 August 2012). "Norway Killer Is Ruled Sane and Given 21 Years in Prison". The New York Times. Retrieved 24 August 2012.
  113. ^ Pracon, Adrian (1 June 2012). "Utøya, a survivor's story: 'No!' I yelled. 'Don't shoot!'". The Guardian. London. Retrieved 24 August 2012.
  114. ^ Dearden, Lizzie (20 April 2016). "Anders Breivik: Right-wing extremist who killed 77 people in Norway massacre wins part of human rights case". The Independent. London, England. Archived from the original on 20 April 2016. Retrieved 18 September 2021.
  115. ^ a b Macklin 2022, p. 981.
  116. ^ Shifflett 2021, pp. 75–76; van Gerven Oei 2012, pp. 88–94; Macklin 2022, pp. 984–985; Pearse 2015, pp. 460–462
  117. ^ Shifflett 2021, pp. 76–79.
  118. ^ Hafez 2019; Macklin & Bjørgo 2021, pp. 16–20; Macklin 2022, p. 981; Shifflett 2021, p. 90
  119. ^ Thayer, Nate (6 December 2019). "Secret Identities of U.S. Nazi Terror Group Revealed". Archived from the original on 7 December 2019. Retrieved 25 February 2021.
  120. ^ Koziol 2019; Achenbach 2019; d'Allens 2022a: "Quelques minutes auparavant, il diffusait un manifeste de soixante-quatorze pages dans lequel il détaillait son parcours idéologique et se revendiquait ouvertement « écofasciste »." ["A few minutes earlier, he had published a seventy-four-page manifesto in which he detailed his ideological background and openly claimed to be an "eco-fascist"."]}}; Richards, Jones & Brinn 2022 harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRichardsJonesBrinn2022 (help)
  121. ^ Fisher, Marc; Achenbach, Joel (15 March 2019). "Boundless racism, zero remorse: A manifesto of hate and 49 dead in New Zealand". The Washington Post. Archived from the original on 11 December 2020. Retrieved 16 September 2019.
  122. ^ Ross & Bevensee 2020, p. 1.
  123. ^ Darby, Luke (5 August 2019b). "How the 'Great Replacement' conspiracy theory has inspired white supremacist killers". The Daily Telegraph. London – via ProQuest.
  124. ^ Macklin & Bjørgo 2021, pp. 16–20.
  125. ^ Campion 2021, pp. 926–927.
  126. ^ a b Macklin 2022, p. 990.
  127. ^ a b Weissmann 2019.
  128. ^ Manavis 2018.
  129. ^ Noack 2019: "The author was the latest in a succession of extremists to refer to Christchurch as a touchstone event for more hate."; d'Allens 2022a; Forchtner & Lubarda 2020; Richards, Jones & Brinn 2022 harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRichardsJonesBrinn2022 (help)
  130. ^ Arango, Tim; Bogel-Burroughs, Nicholas; Benner, Katie (3 August 2019). "Minutes Before El Paso Killing, Hate-Filled Manifesto Appears Online". The New York Times. Archived from the original on 30 September 2019.
  131. ^ Owen, Tess (6 August 2019). "Eco-Fascism: the Racist Theory That Inspired the El Paso and Christchurch Shooters". Vice News. Archived from the original on 20 January 2021.
  132. ^ a b c Lennard 2019.
  133. ^ Achenbach 2019.
  134. ^ Hafez 2019.
  135. ^ Üzeltüzenci, Pinar (29 April 2020). "Humans are not the Virus: Why Ecofascism is Bad for You". Mangal Media. Archived from the original on 26 February 2023. Retrieved 30 September 2023.
  136. ^ Darian-Smith 2022, pp. 91–92.
  137. ^ Ross & Bevensee 2020, p. 3.
  138. ^ Burke, Jason (11 August 2019). "Norway mosque attack suspect 'inspired by Christchurch and El Paso shootings'". The Guardian. ISSN 0261-3077. Archived from the original on 17 December 2019. Retrieved 11 August 2019.
  139. ^ Shajkovci, Ardian (27 September 2020). "Eco-Fascist 'Pine Tree Party' Growing as a Violent Extremism Threat". Homeland Security Today.us. Archived from the original on 1 November 2020. Retrieved 22 December 2021.
  140. ^ Manavis 2018: "Tree, earth, or mountain emojis are parked next to almost every eco-fascist’s Twitter name, often accompanied by a Norse/Proto-Germanic rune – most commonly Algiz, "ᛉ" or "ᛦ", known as the "life" rune."; Kaati et al. 2020, pp. 12–13; Molloy 2022: "Far-right co-opted symbols, like the algiz rune or sonnenrad, accompanied depictions of nature, establishing a distinct eco-fascist brand which travelled easily across far-right networks."
  141. ^ a b Smith 2021, pp. 100–102.
  142. ^ a b Farrell-Molloy & Macklin 2022: "One group to have emerged from this milieu is the short-lived 'Green Brigade' describing themselves as "accelerationist eco-extremists," the group acted as the eco-fascist wing for the neo-Nazi 'The Base,' and were responsible for an arson attack against a Swedish mink farm in 2020."
  143. ^ Fine & Love-Nichols 2021, p. 308.
  144. ^ Macklin 2022, p. 991.
  145. ^ Lamoureux, Mack (25 December 2020). "Neo-Nazis Are Using Eco-Fascism to Recruit Young People". Vice News. Archived from the original on 1 November 2020.
  146. ^ Lamoureux, Mack (25 December 2020). "Alleged Eco-Terrorists Discussed Abortion Clinic Bombing, Assassinating Judge: Court Documents". Vice News. Archived from the original on 8 January 2021.
  147. ^ "EU Terrorism Situation and Trend Report 2022" (PDF). Europol. 23 November 2022. Archived from the original (PDF) on 13 July 2022.
  148. ^ Carless, Will (5 July 2022). "The extremist watchers: How a network of researchers is searching for the next hate-fueled attack". Phys.org. Archived from the original on 23 November 2022. Retrieved 23 November 2022.
  149. ^ Farrell-Molloy & Macklin 2022: "Across the "Terrorgram" community on Telegram, which provided a digital home to Siege-culture following the removal of neo-Nazi forums Iron March and Fascist Forge, Kaczynski's writings are frequently referenced and he is venerated as one of their 'holy trinity' alongside Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh and Norway far-right terrorist Anders Breivik."
  150. ^ "Deux militants d'ultradroite appelant à des «actions violentes» arrêtés en possession d'armes" [Two far-right activists calling for "violent action" arrested in possession of weapons]. Libération (in French). Agence France-Presse. 17 November 2021. Archived from the original on 31 March 2024.
  151. ^ "9 ITS Interview". 12 March 2021. Archived from the original on 2 November 2021. ITS never recognized that, although it is true we have taken some organizational experiences of these groups without caring much about their political orientation, not because we write or quote the TOB we are right-wing Satanists, at some point we have also taken experiences from the Paraguayan People's Army, or from the Mapuche, and that does not mean that we are leftist or indigenists, the same thing happens when we quote the First Capital Command of Brazil, or the Magliana Band of Italy, not because we mention them we are part of those mafias, NO. ITS takes the best of each criminal group and puts it into practice, we also see their mistakes so that we do not commit them, this is how ITS is nurtured and takes experience from that inherited empirical knowledge.
  152. ^ Gartenstein-Ross, Daveed; Chace-Donahu, Emelie; Plant, Thomas (23 July 2023). "The Order of Nine Angles: Its Worldview and Connection to Violent Extremism". Foundation for Defense of Democracies. Archived from the original on 26 July 2023. A purported leader of the transnational militant group Individuals Tending Toward the Wild (ITS) — a group whose literature features anarchist and eco-fascist themes — claimed in an interview posted on the anarchist website Maldición Eco-Extremista that the group has "taken some organizational experiences" from O9A and Tempel ov Blood.
  153. ^ Richards, Jones & Brinn 2022. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRichardsJonesBrinn2022 (help)
  154. ^ a b Starr 2022.
  155. ^ Thompson, Carolyn; Collins, Dave (15 May 2022). "Racially motivated shooter pointed to Christchurch attacks in 'manifesto'". The Sydney Morning Herald. Archived from the original on 1 June 2022.
  156. ^ "Flash Alert: High Risk of Violence With the Publication of "The Hard Reset: A Terrorgram Publication"". The Counterterrorism Group, Inc. 7 July 2022. Archived from the original on 11 August 2022. Retrieved 23 November 2022.
  157. ^ Karvinen, Eevi (18 March 2024). "23-vuotias nainen julkaisi hälyttävää materiaalia verkossa – Puolustus: "Ei aikomusta vahingoittaa"" [23-year-old woman published alarming material online - Defense: "No intent to harm"]. Iltalehti (in Finnish). Archived from the original on 18 March 2024.
  158. ^ Harju, Jukka (7 July 2024). "Koulu iskun valmistelusta syytetty nainen saapui oikeuteen kasvojaan peittelematta - Syyte: Valmisteli tekoa vuosia" [The woman accused of preparing the school attack appeared in court without covering her face - Accusation: She prepared the act for years]. Helsingin Sanomat (in Finnish). Archived from the original on 7 July 2024.
  159. ^ Hämäläinen, Veli-Pekka (28 May 2024). "KRP: Näin koulusurma-aikeista syytetyn nuoren naisen kotoa löytyneet tekstit avaavat hänen ajatteluaan" [KRP: This is how the texts found in the home of a young woman accused of planning to kill a school open up her thinking]. Yleisradio (in Finnish). Archived from the original on 1 June 2024.
  160. ^ ""Dead society": Tracing the Online Dimension of a Militant Accelerationist-Inspired Attack in Turkey". Global network on extremism and technology. 16 August 2024.
  161. ^ a b Orton 2000. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFOrton2000 (help)
  162. ^ Koziol 2019.
  163. ^ a b Smith 2021, pp. 29–30.
  164. ^ a b Staudenmaier 2003.
  165. ^ a b Bookchin 1987. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFBookchin1987 (help)
  166. ^ Huq & Mochida 2018, p. 5.
  167. ^ Næss, Arne (1989). Ecology, Community and Lifestyle. Translated by Rothenberg, David. Cambridge University Press. doi:10.1017/CBO9780511525599. ISBN 9780511525599.
  168. ^ Flipo, Fabrice (2014). Nature et politique. Contribution à une anthropologie de la modernité et de la globalisation [Nature and politics. Contribution to an anthropology of modernity and globalization] (in French). Amsterdam. ISBN 978-2354801342.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  169. ^ Taylor & Zimmerman 2008, p. 458.
  170. ^ "Ekofascism med rötter i djupekologin" [Ecofascism with roots in deep ecology]. Landets Fria (in Swedish). 9 March 2021. Archived from the original on 11 March 2021. Retrieved 28 March 2021.
  171. ^ Oksa 2005, p. 85.
  172. ^ Sakai, J. (2003). The Green Nazi - an investigation into fascist ecology. Kerspledebeb. ISBN 978-0-9689503-9-5.
  173. ^ Weiner, Douglas R. (2000). Models Of Nature: Ecology, Conservation, and Cultural Revolution in Soviet Russia. University of Pittsburgh Press. ISBN 978-0-8229-5733-1.
  174. ^ Lubarda, Balša (December 2020). "Beyond Ecofascism? Far-Right Ecologism (FRE) as a Framework for Future Inquiries". Environmental Values. 29 (6). White Horse Press [de]: 713–732. doi:10.3197/096327120X15752810323922. S2CID 214075497.
  175. ^ Farrell-Molloy & Macklin 2022: "It should be stated that eco-fascism itself is a fringe phenomenon and has not significantly impacted mainstream or radical right politics. This is why the term far-right ecologism has been proposed as an alternative label, to prevent ‘eco-fascism,’ with its more narrow definition outlined above, from dominating our understanding of the broader radical right’s nature politics."
  176. ^ Forchtner & Lubarda 2023.
  177. ^ Forchtner & Lubarda 2020: "Given this, it seems that eco-fascism should not dominate our understanding of the wider radical right’s relationship with nature. Indeed, this relationship is multifaceted due to the array of radical-right actors who engage in it, from anti-liberal actors to outright anti-democratic ones."
  178. ^ Moore & Roberts 2022a, pp. 8–9, 12–13.
  179. ^ Achenbach 2019; Earthworks 2022a; Guidi 2022; Walsh 2022: "The mainstream environmentalist movement, which has largely embraced social justice, has repeatedly rejected eco-fascists, saying the ideology greenwashes hate and is more focused on white supremacy than environmental protection."}}; Shapiro, Ozug & Morell 2022; Earthworks 2022b: "Eco-fascism presents a tangible, present danger to almost every person on Earth, especially the communities most impacted by the climate crisis. Organizations active in the environmental and climate justice movements, like Earthworks, must do our part in acknowledging and raising awareness of these issues, rooting out eco-fascists among our circles and preventing any more from joining, and working in solidarity with those who strongly oppose ecofascism."
  180. ^ Yakushko & De Francisco 2022, pp. 471–472.
  181. ^ Fernández & Hart 2023.
  182. ^ O'Neill 2022.
  183. ^ Campion & Phillips 2023.
  184. ^ Kriebernegg, David (2014). Braune Flecken der Grünen Bewegung: Eine Untersuchung zu den völkisch-antimodernistischen Traditionslinien der Ökologiebewegung und zum Einfluss der extremen Rechten auf die Herausbildung grüner Parteien in Österreich und in der BRD [Brown spots of the Green Movement: An investigation into the völkisch-antimodernist traditions of the ecology movement and the influence of the extreme right on the development of green parties in Austria and the Federal Republic of Germany] (Master's) (in German). University of Graz. Archived from the original on 2 August 2021.
  185. ^ "Ohjelma" [Program]. Blue-and-Black Movement (in Finnish). Archived from the original on 20 February 2023. Retrieved 29 March 2023.
  186. ^ Griffin, Roger (2000). "Between Metapolitics and Apoliteia: the Nouvelle Droite's Strategy for Conserving the Fascist Vision in the 'Interregnum'". Modern & Contemporary France. 8 (1): 35–53. doi:10.1080/096394800113349. S2CID 143890750.
  187. ^ ; ;
  188. ^ a b c Aronoff, Kate (15 April 2022). "Marine Le Pen's Climate Policy Has a Whiff of Ecofascism". The New Republic. Archived from the original on 24 June 2024. Retrieved 29 Jun 2024.
  189. ^ Szenes 2023, p. 2.
  190. ^ Garric, Audrey (21 April 2022). "Macron and Le Pen layout starkly different visions on climate change". Le Monde. Archived from the original on 24 June 2024.
  191. ^ Saltmarsh 2022.
  192. ^ Goldberg, Nicolas (11 April 2022). "Le program énergétique de Marine Le Pen: tout pour les énergies fossiles, rien pour le climat" [Marine Le Pen's energy program: everything for fossil fuels, nothing for the climate]. La Grande Conversation (in French). Archived from the original on 24 June 2024.
  193. ^ Staudenmaier, Peter (2020). "Fascist Ecology: The 'Green Wing' of the Nazi Party and its Historical Antecedents". Pomegranate: The International Journal of Pagan Studies. 13 (10): 4–21. doi:10.1558/pome.v13.i10.14577. S2CID 53602598. Archived from the original on 11 June 2018.
  194. ^ Walsh 2022: "Elements of the far-right scene in Germany and across Europe still champion environmental causes, and things like organic farming. In Germany, environmental groups risk being infiltrated by far-right extremists."
  195. ^ Ditfurth 1992, pp. 278–287.
  196. ^ Staudenmaier 2004, pp. 519–520.
  197. ^ a b c d Connolly 2012.
  198. ^ Naujoks, Claudia (29 August 2008). "Grün oder braun? Zum nationalistischen Ökomagazin "Umwelt und Aktiv"" [Green or brown? To the nationalist eco-magazine "Umwelt und Aktiv"]. Störungsmelder [de] (in German). Archived from the original on 28 September 2022. Retrieved 3 November 2012.
  199. ^ Staud, Toralf [in German]; Heise, Katrin (11 January 2012). "Naturschutz in Braun. Wie Rechtsextreme in der Ökoszene mitmischen" [Nature conservation in brown. How right-wing extremists get involved in the eco-scene]. Deutschlandradio Kultur (in German). Archived from the original on 13 December 2017. Retrieved 21 January 2013.
  200. ^ Fuchs, Dana (26 July 2010). "Die grünen Braunen – Rechtsextremismus im Umweltschutz" [The green browns - right-wing extremism in environmental protection]. Belltower.News (in German). Archived from the original on 1 October 2020. Retrieved 3 November 2012.
  201. ^ Oltermann, Philip (28 June 2020). "German far right infiltrates green groups with call to protect the land". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 8 March 2023. Retrieved 15 June 2023.
  202. ^ Oltermann, Philip (28 June 2020). "German far right infiltrates green groups with call to protect the land". The Observer. ISSN 0029-7712. Archived from the original on 1 June 2024. Retrieved 9 July 2024.
  203. ^ a b Holly, Leon (19 April 2024). "Make Ökos rechts again?" [Make "Eco" Right Again?]. Die Tageszeitung (in German). Archived from the original on 20 July 2024.
  204. ^ Collegium Humanum: Von der NS-Reichsleitung zum Zentrum der Holocaustleugner [Collegium Humanum: From the Nazi Reichsleitung to the center of the Holocaust deniers] (in German). 2006. p. 9.
  205. ^ "Schäuble verbietet rechtsextreme Organisationen" [Schäuble bans right-wing extremist organizations]. Die Welt Online (in German). 7 May 2008. Retrieved 17 October 2017.
  206. ^ Benninger, Martin (1996). "Ökofaschismus: Bedrohung oder Schimäre? Über ein neues Schlagwort" [Eco-Fascism: Threat or Chimera? About a new catchphrase]. Criticón (in German). 26: 191–195.
  207. ^ Dannemann 2023, p. 6.
  208. ^ Vida, István (2011). "Magyarországi Zöld Párt (MZP)". Magyarországi politikai pártok lexikona (1846–2010) [Encyclopedia of the Political Parties in Hungary (1846–2010)] (in Hungarian). Gondolat Kiadó. pp. 430–432. ISBN 978-963-693-276-3.
  209. ^ Nohlen, D.; Stöver, P. (2010). Elections in Europe: A data handbook. Nomos. p. 899. ISBN 978-3-8329-5609-7.
  210. ^ Szenes 2023, p. 2: "The Hungarian Our Homeland Movement, a far right opposition party, refers to itself as the only 'green party' in the country that truly cares about protecting the environment."
  211. ^ Margulies, Morgan (2021). "Eco-Nationalism: A Historical Evaluation of Nationalist Praxes in Environmentalist and Ecologist Movements". Consilience: The Journal of Sustainable Development (23): 22–29. doi:10.7916/consilience.vi23.6226. Archived from the original on 6 February 2021. Retrieved 21 December 2021.
  212. ^ Szenes 2021, pp. 179–180.
  213. ^ Lubarda, Balša (9 February 2021). "When Ecologism Turns (Far) Right: the Hungarian Laboratory". Archived from the original on 11 May 2021. Retrieved 21 December 2021.
  214. ^ Bhatty, Kiran; Sundar, Nandini (17 September 2020). "Sliding from majoritarianism toward fascism: Educating India under the Modi regime". International Sociology. 35 (6). SAGE Publications: 632–650. doi:10.1177/0268580920937226. ISSN 0268-5809. S2CID 224896271.
  215. ^ Krishna & Noorani 2003, p. 4: "the archival evidence presented by Marzia Casolari conclusively shows how much the proponents of Hindutva admired European fascism; liberally borrowed from it and this influence continues even today"; Leidig 2020, pp. 215–237; Brown, McLean & McMillan 2018, p. 381; Jaffrelot 1999, pp. 25–30; Drèze 2020, pp. 229–236; Malik & Singh 1992, pp. 318–336; Seshia 1998, pp. 1036–1050; Gillan 2002, pp. 73–95; Moore & Roberts 2022a, pp. 61–64
  216. ^ Kanji, Azeezah (2 June 2023). "Ecofascism Is a Rising Threat. We Should Take Modi's Ascendance as a Warning". truthout. Archived from the original on 2 June 2023. Retrieved 11 October 2023.
  217. ^ Moore, Sam; Roberts, Alex (7 February 2022b). "Ecofascism and Indian nationalism". The Ecologist. Archived from the original on 21 March 2023. Retrieved 11 October 2023.
  218. ^ Moore & Roberts 2022a, pp. 61–64.
  219. ^ Forchtner & Lubarda 2020.
  220. ^ Eror, Aleks (11 February 2022). "Toksična mešavina nacionalizma i prava životinja u Srbiji" [A toxic mixture of nationalism and animal rights in Serbia]. Radio Slobodna Evropa (in Serbo-Croatian). Archived from the original on 4 April 2022. Retrieved 13 March 2022.
  221. ^ Mulhall, Joe; Khan-Ruf, Safya; Bego, Fabio (2021). "Spotlight on the Western Balkans: Far-right trends in the region". State of Hate: Far-Right Extremism in Europe. London: Hope Not Hate; Amadeu Antonio Foundation; EXPO Foundation. p. 108.
  222. ^ Djukanovic, Vladan; Djureinovic, Jelena; Momcilovic, Predrag (23 October 2020). "In 'Far-Right Ecologism', European Extremists Pursue Broader Appeal". Balkan Insight. Archived from the original on 5 November 2020. Retrieved 2 February 2022.
  223. ^ Askanius, Tina (29 April 2021b). "Women in the Nordic Resistance Movement and their online media practices: between internalised misogyny and "embedded feminism"". Feminist Media Studies. 22 (7): 1763–1780. doi:10.1080/14680777.2021.1916772. ISSN 1468-0777. ...the Nordic Resistance Movement—a pan-Nordic organisation with chapters in Finland, Denmark, Norway and Iceland.
  224. ^ Fontaine, Andie Sophia (4 August 2016). "Swedish Neo-Nazis Come To Iceland, Seeking Recruits". The Reykjavík Grapevine. Archived from the original on 6 August 2016. Retrieved 15 May 2021. ...the NRM, which seeks to form a pan-Nordic state...
  225. ^ Darwish 2018, pp. 27–30; Askanius 2021a, pp. 147–165: "...the neo-Nazi organization the Nordic Resistance Movement in Sweden..."; Reuters Staff 2017: "A Finnish court banned neo-Nazi group the Nordic Resistance Movement (PVL) on Thursday..."; Harkov & Joffre 2020: "The Nordic Resistance Movement, a neo-Nazi group, targeted Jews in Sweden, Denmark, Norway and Iceland with antisemitic harassment during the week before Yom Kippur."; Szenes 2023, p. 6: "the NRM, the largest, most active, and most violent militant neo-Nazi group that operates across the Nordic countries"
  226. ^ Dalsbro, Anders (25 November 2020). "Ekofascism - Blod, jord och maskulinitet" [Ecofascism - Blood, soil and masculinity]. Expo.se (in Swedish). Archived from the original on 7 February 2021. Retrieved 3 February 2021.
  227. ^ Szenes 2021, p. 148.
  228. ^ Darwish, Maria (21 January 2019). "Når grønt blir brunt" [When green turns brown]. Morgenbladet (in Norwegian). Archived from the original on 2 September 2019.
  229. ^ "Chefdiplomat bezeichnet Ecopop-Initianten als "Ökofaschisten"" [Chief diplomat describes Ecopop initiators as "eco-fascists"]. Tages-Anzeiger (in German). 19 January 2013. Archived from the original on 20 February 2023. Retrieved 20 February 2023.
  230. ^ Häfliger, Markus (22 January 2013). "Staatssekretär entschuldigt sich für Faschismus-Vergleich" [Secretary of State apologizes for fascism comparison]. Neue Zürcher Zeitung (in German). Archived from the original on 20 February 2023. Retrieved 20 February 2023.
  231. ^ Pepper, David (1996). Modern Environmentalism: An Introduction. Routledge. pp. 226–230.
  232. ^ a b Smyth 2019.
  233. ^ a b Jones 2020.
  234. ^ a b Hickman 2009a.
  235. ^ Hickman, Leo (16 December 2009b). "BNP document proves the far right is at home with climate change denial". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 13 November 2021. Retrieved 21 December 2021.
  236. ^ Ward, Bob (11 May 2011). "British election results show climate change denial is not a vote winner". London School of Economics. Archived from the original on 14 February 2023. Retrieved 21 December 2021. The BNP Scottish manifesto uses the tactic of linking opposition to wind farms with climate change denial, alleging in its section on 'Global Warming' that "huge expenditures on inefficient wind farms, to the detriment of essential winter services, have cost lives on Scottish roads, and caused the death of thousands of Scottish pensioners from hypothermia".
  237. ^ Searchlight Team (24 February 2024). "Eco-fascism A new found 'concern' for the climate emergency – writes Luke Michael". Searchlight. Archived from the original on 26 July 2024. Retrieved 24 July 2024.
  238. ^ Duffy, Judith (23 May 2021). "The Independent Green Voice founder who was barred from UKIP". The National. Archived from the original on 26 August 2021. Retrieved 26 August 2021.
  239. ^ Briggs, Billy (5 May 2021). "Alleged Holocaust denier and ex-BNP activists standing for independent 'Green' party". The Ferret. Archived from the original on 26 August 2021. Retrieved 26 August 2021.
  240. ^ Staudenmaier, Peter (January 2005). "Ambiguities of Animal Rights". social-ecology.org. Institute for Social Ecology. Archived from the original on 31 July 2018. Retrieved 26 April 2022. The "Hardline faction grew out of the Straight Edge movement in punk culture, and combines uncompromising veganism with purportedly "pro-life" politics. Hardliners believe in self-purification from various forms of 'pollution': animal products, tobacco, alcohol, drugs, and "deviant" sexual behavior, including abortion, homosexuality, and indeed any sex for pleasure rather than procreation. Their version of animal liberation professes absolute authority based on the "laws of nature".
  241. ^ Smith, Gabriel (2011). "White Mutants of Straight Edge: The Avant-Garde of Abstinence". The Journal of Popular Culture. 44 (3): 633–646. doi:10.1111/j.1540-5931.2011.00852.x.
  242. ^ "CBS Tonight News Segment on Hardline Straight Edge in Salt Lake City UT". CBS News. Press Record. 13 December 2015. Retrieved 26 April 2022 – via YouTube.
  243. ^ Cox, Stan (26 April 2023). "Not a Green Bone in Their White Bodies". Resilience. Archived from the original on 1 June 2023. Retrieved 12 October 2023.
  244. ^ Beirich, Heidi; Potok, Mark (1 July 2010). Greenwash: Nativists, Environmentalism and the Hypocrisy of Hate (Report). Southern Poverty Law Center. Archived from the original on 3 June 2023. Retrieved 1 October 2023.
  245. ^ Beirich, Heidi (26 February 2009). "SPLC: The Nativist Lobby: Three Faces of Intolerance" (PDF). Intelligence Report. Southern Poverty Law Center. Archived from the original (PDF) on 14 October 2014. Retrieved 29 April 2017.
  246. ^ "John Tanton's files". Bentley Historical Library, University of Michigan. Archived from the original on 25 December 2022.
  247. ^ "The Network". Hate in the News. Tolerance.org. 18 June 2002. Archived from the original on 26 December 2002.
  248. ^ Taylor 2020, pp. 278–280.
  249. ^ Szenes 2023, pp. 3–4: "The conflation of nature, 'the land of opportunity' for the white race and white supremacy; the myth of 'the frontier' and settler colonialist fascination with an empty 'wilderness' (as if Indigenous peoples had never existed); and a (neo)Malthusian 'fixation' with overpopulation in the developing world15 have all been identified as precursors to the 'modern' ecofascist ideas of the American alt-right."
  250. ^ Zimmerman, Michael E. (Summer 1995). "The Threat of Ecofascism". Social Theory and Practice. 21 (2): 207–238. doi:10.5840/soctheorpract199521210. JSTOR 23557116. Retrieved 6 July 2024.
  251. ^ Shapiro, Ozug & Morell 2022.
  252. ^ Tigue 2022.
  253. ^ Macklin 2022, pp. 988–990.
  254. ^ Naustdalslid 2023, pp. 58–59.
  255. ^ O'neill 2022, p. 37.
  256. ^ O'neill 2022, p. 38.
  257. ^ Macklin 2022, p. 985.
  258. ^ Rose 2022.
  259. ^ Forchtner & Lubarda 2020: "As such, it is also a highly loaded term, used both academically and as a slur."
  260. ^ d'Allens 2020.
  261. ^ Huq & Mochida 2018, p. 9; Richards, Jones & Brinn 2022 harvnb error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFRichardsJonesBrinn2022 (help); Fine & Love-Nichols 2021, p. 308; Knights 2020
  262. ^ Quiroga, Paloma (10 May 2021). "Ecofascism: What It Is and What It Isn't". Environmental Synthesis and Communication. Wellesley College. Archived from the original on 15 May 2021.
  263. ^ Huq & Mochida 2018, pp. 7–9.
  264. ^ Madelin, Pierre (26 June 2020). "La tentation écofasciste : migrations et écologie" [The ecofascist temptation: migrations and ecology]. terrestrials.org (in French). Archived from the original on 1 June 2024.

Cite error: A list-defined reference named "FOOTNOTESaltmarsh2022" is not used in the content (see the help page).
Cite error: A list-defined reference named "FOOTNOTEWalsh2022" is not used in the content (see the help page).

Cite error: A list-defined reference named "FOOTNOTESzenes2021179–180" is not used in the content (see the help page).

Bibliography

[edit]

Further reading

[edit]


newsources

[edit]

The Rise of the Far-Right: From Climate Denial to Eco-Fascism - YouTube

Violent Environments Series - Edge Effects

Deep ecology is an environmental philosophy that promotes the inherent worth of all living beings regardless of their instrumental utility to human needs, and the restructuring of modern human societies in accordance with such ideas.

Deep ecology argues that the natural world is a complex of relationships in which the existence of organisms is dependent on the existence of others within ecosystems. It argues that non-vital human interference with or destruction of the natural world poses a threat therefore not only to humans but to all organisms constituting the natural order.

Deep ecology's core principle is the belief that the living environment as a whole should be respected and regarded as having certain basic moral and legal rights to live and flourish, independent of its instrumental benefits for human use. Deep ecology is often framed in terms of the idea of a much broader sociality; it recognizes diverse communities of life on Earth that are composed not only through biotic factors but also, where applicable, through ethical relations, that is, the valuing of other beings as more than just resources. It is described as "deep" because it is regarded as looking more deeply into the reality of humanity's relationship with the natural world, arriving at philosophically more profound conclusions than those of mainstream environmentalism.[1] The movement does not subscribe to anthropocentric environmentalism (which is concerned with conservation of the environment only for exploitation by and for human purposes), since deep ecology is grounded in a different set of philosophical assumptions. Deep ecology takes a holistic view of the world humans live in and seeks to apply to life the understanding that the separate parts of the ecosystem (including humans) function as a whole. The philosophy addresses core principles of different environmental and green movements and advocates a system of environmental ethics advocating wilderness preservation, non-coercive policies encouraging human population decline, and simple living.[2]

Origins

[edit]

In his original 1973 deep ecology paper,[3] Arne Næss stated that he was inspired by ecologists who were studying the ecosystems throughout the world. Naess also made clear that he felt the real motivation to 'free nature' was spiritual and intuitive. 'Your motivation comes from your total view or your philosophical, religious opinions,' he said, 'so that you feel, when you are working in favour of free nature, you are working for something within your self, that ... demands changes. So you are motivated from what I call ‘deeper premises’.[4]

In a 2014 essay,[5] environmentalist George Sessions identified three people active in the 1960s whom he considered foundational to the movement: author and conservationist Rachel Carson, environmentalist David Brower, and biologist Paul R. Ehrlich. Sessions considers the publication of Carson's 1962 seminal book Silent Spring as the beginning of the contemporary deep ecology movement.[5] Næss also considered Carson the originator of the movement, stating "Eureka, I have found it" upon encountering her writings.[6]

Other events in the 1960s which have been proposed as foundational to the movement are the formation of Greenpeace, and the images of the Earth floating in space taken by the Apollo astronauts.[7]

Principles

[edit]

Deep ecology proposes an embracing of ecological ideas and environmental ethics (that is, proposals about how humans should relate to nature).[8] It is also a social movement based on a holistic vision of the world.[1] Deep ecologists hold that the survival of any part is dependent upon the well-being of the whole, and criticise the narrative of human supremacy, which they say has not been a feature of most cultures throughout human evolution.[7] Deep ecology presents an eco-centric (earth-centred) view, rather than the anthropocentric (human-centred) view, developed in its most recent form by philosophers of the Enlightenment, such as Newton, Bacon, and Descartes. Proponents of deep ecology oppose the narrative that man is separate from nature, is in charge of nature, or is the steward of nature,[9] or that nature exists as a resource to be freely exploited. They cite the fact that indigenous peoples under-exploited their environment and retained a sustainable society for thousands of years, as evidence that human societies are not necessarily destructive by nature. They believe that the current materialist paradigm must be replaced - as Naess pointed out, this involves more than merely getting rid of capitalism and the concept of economic growth, or 'progress', that is critically endangering the biosphere. 'We need changes in society such that reason and emotion support each other,' he said. '... not only a change in a technological and economic system, but a change that touches all the fundamental aspects of industrial societies. This is what I mean by a change of 'system'.[10] Deep ecologists believe that the damage to natural systems sustained since the industrial revolution now threatens social collapse and possible extinction of humans, and are striving to bring about the kind of ideological, economic and technological changes Naess mentioned. Deep ecology claims that ecosystems can absorb damage only within certain parameters, and contends that civilization endangers the biodiversity of the earth. Deep ecologists have suggested that the human population must be substantially reduced, but advocate a gradual decrease in population rather than any apocalyptic solution[11]: 88  In a 1982 interview, Arne Naess commented that a global population of 100 million (0.1 billion) would be desirable.[12] However, others have argued that a population of 1 - 2 billion would be compatible with the deep ecological worldview.[11] Deep ecology eschews traditional left wing-right wing politics, but is viewed as radical ('Deep Green') in its opposition to capitalism, and its advocacy of an ecological paradigm. Unlike conservation, deep ecology does not advocate the controlled preservation of the landbase, but rather 'non-interference' with natural diversity except for vital needs. In citing 'humans' as being responsible for excessive environmental destruction, deep ecologists actually refer to 'humans within civilization, especially industrial civilization', accepting the fact that the vast majority of humans who have ever lived did not live in environmentally destructive societies – the excessive damage to the biosphere has been sustained mostly over the past hundred years.

In 1985, Bill Devall and George Sessions summed up their understanding of the concept of deep ecology with the following eight points:[13]

  • The well-being of human and nonhuman life on earth is of intrinsic value irrespective of its value to humans.
  • The diversity of life-forms is part of this value.
  • Humans have no right to reduce this diversity except to satisfy vital human needs
  • The flourishing of human and nonhuman life is compatible with a substantial decrease in human population.
  • Humans have interfered with nature to a critical level already, and interference is worsening.
  • Policies must be changed, affecting current economic, technological and ideological structures.
  • This ideological change should focus on an appreciation of the quality of life rather than adhering to an increasingly high standard of living.
  • All those who agree with the above tenets have an obligation to implement them.

Development

[edit]
YPJ members in a greenhouse farm, for ecological cooperative farming in Rojava (AANES)

The phrase "Deep Ecology" first appeared in a 1973 article by the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss.[3] Næss referred to "biospherical egalitarianism-in principle", which he explained was "an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom. Its restriction to humans is … anthropocentrism with detrimental effects upon the life quality of humans themselves... The attempt to ignore our dependence and to establish a master-slave role has contributed to the alienation of man from himself."[3] Næss added that from a deep ecology point of view "the right of all forms [of life] to live is a universal right which cannot be quantified. No single species of living being has more of this particular right to live and unfold than any other species".[14] As Bron Taylor and Michael Zimmerman have recounted,

a key event in the development of deep ecology was the "Rights of Non-Human Nature" conference held at a college in Claremont, California in 1974 [which] drew many of those who would become the intellectual architects of deep ecology. These included George Sessions who, like Naess, drew on Spinoza's pantheism, later co-authoring Deep Ecology - [Living as if Nature Mattered] with Bill Devall; Gary Snyder, whose remarkable, Pulitzer prize-winning Turtle Island proclaimed the value of place-based spiritualities, indigenous cultures, and animistic perceptions, ideas that would become central within deep ecology subcultures; and Paul Shepard, who in The Tender Carnivore and the Sacred Game, and subsequent works such as Nature and Madness and Coming Home to the Pleistocene, argued that foraging societies were ecologically superior to and emotionally healthier than agricultur[al societies]. Shepard and Snyder especially provided a cosmogony that explained humanity's fall from a pristine, nature paradise. Also extremely influential was Edward Abbey's Desert Solitaire, which viewed the desert as a sacred place uniquely able to evoke in people a proper, non-anthropocentric understanding of the value of nature. By the early 1970s the above figures put in place the intellectual foundations of deep ecology.[15]

Sources

[edit]
Old-growth forest in Biogradska Gora National Park, Montenegro

Deep ecology is an eco-philosophy derived from intuitive ethical principles. It does not claim to be a science, although it is based generally on the new physics, which, in the early 20th century, undermined the reductionist approach and the notion of objectivity, demonstrating that humans are an integral part of nature; this is a common concept always held by primal peoples.[16][17] Devall and Sessions, however, note that the work of many ecologists has encouraged the adoption of an "ecological consciousness", quoting environmentalist Aldo Leopold's view that such a consciousness "changes the role of Homo sapiens from conqueror of the land community to plain member and citizen of it."[18] Though some detractors assert that deep ecology is based on the discredited idea of the "balance of nature", deep ecologists have made no such claim. They do not dispute the theory that human cultures can have a benevolent effect on the landbase, only the idea of the control of nature, or human supremacy, which is the central pillar of the industrial paradigm. The tenets of deep ecology state that humans have no right to interfere with natural diversity except for vital needs: the distinction between "vital" and "other needs" cannot be drawn precisely.[19] Deep ecologists reject any mechanical or computer model of nature, and see the earth as a living organism, which should be treated and understood accordingly.[20]

Arne Næss uses Baruch Spinoza as a source, particularly his notion that everything that exists is part of a single reality.[21] Others have copied Næss in this, including Eccy de Jonge[22] and Brenden MacDonald.[23]

Aspects

[edit]

Environmental education

[edit]

In 2010, Richard Kahn promoted the movement of ecopedagogy, proposing using radical environmental activism as an educational principle to teach students to support "earth democracy" which promotes the rights of animals, plants, fungi, algae and bacteria. The biologist Dr. Stephan Harding has developed the concept of "holistic science", based on principles of ecology and deep ecology. In contrast with materialist, reductionist science, holistic science studies natural systems as a living whole. He writes:

We encourage … students to use [their] sense of belonging to an intelligent universe (revealed by deep experience), for deeply questioning their fundamental beliefs, and for translating these beliefs into personal decisions, lifestyles and actions. The emphasis on action is important. This is what makes deep ecology a movement as much as a philosophy.[8]

Spirituality

[edit]

Deep ecologist and physicist Frijof Capra has said that '[Deep] ecology and spirituality are fundamentally connected because deep ecological awareness is, ultimately, spiritual awareness.'[24]

Arne Naess commented that he was inspired by the work of Spinoza and Gandhi, both of whom based their values on grounds of religious feeling and experience. Though he regarded deep ecology as a spiritual philosophy, he explained that he was not a 'believer' in the sense of following any particular articles of religious dogma. ' ... it is quite correct to say that I have sometimes been called religious or spiritual, 'he said, 'because I believe that living creatures have an intrinsic worth of their own, and also that there are fundamental intuitions about what is unjust.'.[25]

Næss criticised the Judeo-Christian tradition, stating the Bible's "arrogance of stewardship consists in the idea of superiority which underlies the thought that we exist to watch over nature like a highly respected middleman between the Creator and Creation".[14] Næss further criticizes the reformation's view of creation as property to be put into maximum productive use.

However, Naess added that while he felt the word 'God' was 'too loaded with preconceived ideas', he accepted Spinoza's idea of God as 'immanent' - 'a single creative force'... 'constantly creating the world by being the creative force in Nature'. He did not, he said, 'exclude the possibility that Christian theological principles are true in a certain sense ...'.[25]

Joanna Macy in "the Work that Reconnects" integrates Buddhist philosophy with a deep ecological viewpoint.

Criticisms

[edit]

In certain texts, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss, leader of the "Deep ecology" movement, opposes environmentalism and humanism, even proclaiming, in imitation of a famous formula of the Marquis de Sade, "Écologistes, encore un effort pour devenir anti-humanistes" ("Ecologists, another effort to become anti-humanists!").[26] The sentence is provocative and has been used a lot against Næss and his movement, however Næss is part here of a Heideggerian philosophical filiation which does not advocate any hatred of humans but rather a criticism of short-term anthropocentrism, calling to an enlargement of the moral community and not to the denigration of humans.[27] He defended himself against it in the same text and elsewhere, affirming that he was in opposition to any form of "unlimited cult of life" : "As ecosophists, we must avoid making people believe that we say "yes!" to everything that comes from nature”.[26]

Luc Ferry, in his anti-ecologist book Le Nouvel Ordre écologique [fr] published in 1992, particularly incriminated deep ecology as being an anti-humanist ideology bordering on Nazism. However, this reading appears superficial to the philosopher of ecology Fabrice Flipo, who, in 2014, poses the following question: "Is the deep ecology of Næss this threatening fundamentalism about which Ferry warned us, here are nearly 20 years?" It shows that Luc Ferry expressed himself on deep ecology by a priori and prejudice, without knowing the content. His conclusion is that the risks of ecological fundamentalism pointed out by Ferry may exist but that they are not carried by Næss, nor by the deep ecology.[28]

Eurocentric bias

[edit]

Guha and Martinez-Allier critique the four defining characteristics of deep ecology. First, because deep ecologists believe that environmental movements must shift from an anthropocentric to an ecocentric approach, they fail to recognize the two most fundamental ecological crises facing the world: overconsumption in the global north and increasing militarization. Second, deep ecology's emphasis on wilderness provides impetus for the imperialist yearning of the West. Third, deep ecology appropriates Eastern traditions, characterizes Eastern spiritual beliefs as monolithic, and denies agency to Eastern peoples. And fourth, because deep ecology equates environmental protection with wilderness preservation its radical elements are confined within the American wilderness preservationist movement.[29]

While deep ecologists accept that overconsumption and militarization are major issues, they point out that the impulse to save wilderness is intuitive and has no connection with imperialism. This claim by Guha and Martinez-Allier, in particular, closely resembles statements made, for instance, by Brazilian president Jair Bolsonaro declaring Brazil's right to cut down the Amazon Rainforest. 'The Amazon belongs to Brazil and European countries can mind their own business because they have already destroyed their own environment.' The inference is clearly that, since European countries have already destroyed their environment, Brazil also has the right to do so: deep ecological values should not apply to them, as they have not yet had their 'turn' at maximum economic growth.[30]

With regard to 'appropriating spiritual beliefs' Arne Naess pointed out that the essence of deep ecology is the belief that 'all living creatures have their own intrinsic value, a value irrespective of the use they might have for mankind.'[10] Naess stated that supporters of the deep ecology movement came from various different religious and spiritual traditions, and were united in this one belief, albeit basing it on various different values.[31]

Knowledge of nonhuman interests

[edit]

Animal rights activists state that for an entity to require intrinsic rights, it must have interests.[32] Deep ecologists are criticised for insisting they can somehow understand the thoughts and interests of non-humans such as plants or protists, which they claim thus proves that non-human lifeforms have intelligence. For example, a single-celled bacteria might move towards a certain chemical stimulation, although such movement might be rationally explained, a deep ecologist might say that this was all invalid because according to his better understanding of the situation that the intention formulated by this particular bacteria was informed by its deep desire to succeed in life. One criticism of this belief is that the interests that a deep ecologist attributes to non-human organisms such as survival, reproduction, growth, and prosperity are really human interests. Deep ecologists refute this criticism by pointing out first that 'survival' 'reproduction' 'growth' and 'prosperity'(flourishing) are accepted attributes of all living organisms: 'to succeed in life', depending on how one defines 'success' could certainly be construed as the aim of all life. In addition, the plethora of recent work on mimesis. Thomas Nagel suggests, "[B]lind people are able to detect objects near them by a form of a sonar, using vocal clicks or taps of a cane. Perhaps if one knew what that was like, one could by extension imagine roughly what it was like to possess the much more refined sonar of a bat."[33] Others such as David Abram have pointed out that consciousness is not specific to humans, but a property of the totality of the universe of which humans are a manifestation.[34]

Deepness

[edit]

When Arne Næss coined the term deep ecology, he compared it favourably with shallow ecology which he criticized for its utilitarian and anthropocentric attitude to nature and for its materialist and consumer-oriented outlook,[35] describing its "central objective" as "the health and affluence of people in the developed countries."[3] William D. Grey believes that developing a non-anthropocentric set of values is "a hopeless quest". He seeks an improved "shallow" view.[36] Deep ecologists point out, however, that "shallow ecology" (resource management conservation) is counter-productive, since it serves mainly to support capitalism, the means through which industrial civilization destroys the biosphere. The eco-centric view thus only becomes 'hopeless' within the structures and ideology of civilization. Outside it, however, a non-anthropocentric world view has characterised most 'primal' cultures since time immemorial, and, in fact, obtained in many indigenous groups until the industrial revolution and after.[37] Some cultures still hold this view today. As such, the eco-centric narrative is in not alien to humans, and may be seen as the normative ethos in human evolution.[38] Grey's view represents the reformist discourse that deep ecology has rejected from the beginning.[39]

Misanthropy

[edit]

Social ecologist Murray Bookchin interpreted deep ecology as being misanthropic, due in part to the characterization of humanity by David Foreman, of the environmental advocacy group Earth First!, as a "pathological infestation on the Earth". Bookchin mentions that some, like Foreman, defend misanthropic measures such as organising the rapid genocide of most of humanity.[40] In response, deep ecologists have argued that Foreman's statement clashes with the core narrative of deep ecology, the first tenet of which stresses the intrinsic value of both nonhuman and human life. Arne Naess suggested a slow decrease in human population over an extended period, not genocide.[41]

Bookchin's second major criticism is that deep ecology fails to link environmental crises with authoritarianism and hierarchy. He suggests that deep ecologists fail to recognise the potential for humans to solve environmental issues.[40] In response, deep ecologists have argued that industrial civilization, with its class hierarchy, is the sole source of the ecological crisis.[42] The eco-centric worldview precludes any acceptance of social class or authority based on social status.[3] Deep ecologists believe that since ecological problems are created by industrial civilization the only solution is the deconstruction of the culture itself.[43]

Sciencism

[edit]

Daniel Botkin concludes that although deep ecology challenges the assumptions of western philosophy, and should be taken seriously, it derives from a misunderstanding of scientific information and conclusions based on this misunderstanding, which are in turn used as justification for its ideology. It begins with an ideology and is political and social in focus. Botkin has also criticized Næss's assertion that all species are morally equal and his disparaging description of pioneering species.[44] Deep ecologists counter this criticism by asserting that a concern with political and social values is primary, since the destruction of natural diversity stems directly from the social structure of civilization, and cannot be halted by reforms within the system. They also cite the work of environmentalists and activists such as Rachel Carson, Aldo Leopold, John Livingston, and others as being influential, and are occasionally critical of the way the science of ecology has been misused.[3]

Utopianism

[edit]

Eco-critic Jonathan Bate has called deep ecologists 'utopians', pointing out that 'utopia' actually means 'nowhere' and quoting Rousseau's claim that "the state of nature no longer exists and perhaps never did and probably never will." Bate asks how a planet crowded with cities

could possibly be returned to the state of nature? And ...who would want to return it there? ... Life in the state of nature, Thomas Hobbes reminded readers of Leviathan in 1650, is solitary, poor, ignorant, brutish and short. It may be necessary to critique the values of the Enlightenment, but to reject enlightenment altogether would be to reject justice, political liberty and altruism.[45]

Bates' criticism rests partly on the idea that industrial civilization and the technics it depends on are themselves 'natural' because they are made by humans. Deep ecologists have indicated that the concept of technics being 'natural' and therefore 'morally neutral' is a delusion of industrial civilization: there can be nothing 'neutral' about nuclear weapons, for instance, whose sole purpose is large scale destruction. Historian Lewis Mumford,[46] divides technology into 'democratic' and 'authoritarian' technics ('technics' includes both technical and cultural aspects of technology). While 'democratic' technics, available to small communities, may be neutral, 'authoritarian' technics, available only to large-scale, hierarchical, authoritarian, societies, are not. Such technics are not only unsustainable, but 'are driving planetary murder'. They need urgently to be abandoned, as supported by point #6 of the deep ecology platform.[47]

With reference to the degree to which landscapes are natural, Peter Wohlleben draws a temporal line (roughly equivalent to the development of Mumford's 'authoritarian' technics) at the agricultural revolution, about 8000 BC, when "selective farming practices began to change species."[48] This is also the time when the landscape began to be intentionally transformed into an ecosystem completely devoted to meeting human needs.[48]

Concerning Hobbes's pronouncement on 'the state of nature', deep ecologists and others have commented that it is false and was made simply to legitimize the idea of a putative 'social contract' by which some humans are subordinate to others. There is no evidence that members of primal societies, employing 'democratic technics', lived shorter lives than those in civilization (at least before the 20th century); their lives were the opposite of solitary, since they lived in close-knit communities, and while 'poverty' is a social relation non-existent in sharing cultures, 'ignorant' and 'brutish' both equate to the term 'savage' used by colonials of primal peoples, referring to the absence of authoritarian technics in their cultures. Justice, political liberty and altruism are characteristic of egalitarian primal societies rather than civilization, which is defined by class hierarchies and is therefore by definition unjust, immoral, and lacking in altruism.

[edit]

Arne Naess stated that the main philosophical influence on his life and work was Spinoza. 'When I was seventeen I read Spinoza's 'Ethics' he said, '... I was inspired by [his] view of human nature or essence: our nature or essence is such that we are pleased at other's pleasure and feel sad about other's sadness. Kindness and love activate our nature; best of all, they activate all aspects of ourselves.'[49]

Peter Singer critiques anthropocentrism and advocates for animals to be given rights. However, Singer has disagreed with deep ecology's belief in the intrinsic value of nature separate from questions of suffering.[50] Zimmerman groups deep ecology with feminism and civil rights movements.[51] Nelson contrasts it with ecofeminism.[52] The links with animal rights are perhaps the strongest, as "proponents of such ideas argue that 'all life has intrinsic value'".[53]

David Foreman, the co-founder of the radical direct-action movement Earth First!, has said he is an advocate for deep ecology.[54][55] At one point Arne Næss also engaged in direct action when he chained himself to rocks in front of Mardalsfossen, a waterfall in a Norwegian fjord, in a successful protest against the building of a dam.[56]

Some have linked the movement to green anarchism as evidenced in a compilation of essays titled Deep Ecology & Anarchism.[57]

The object-oriented ontologist Timothy Morton has explored similar ideas in the books Ecology without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics (2009) and Dark Ecology: For a Logic of Future Coexistence (2016).[58][59]

Notable advocates of deep ecology

[edit]

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b Smith, Mick (2014). "Deep Ecology: What is Said and (to be) Done?". The Trumpeter. 30 (2): 141–156. ProQuest 1958537477.
  2. ^ Barry, John; Frankland, E. Gene (2002). International Encyclopedia of Environmental Politics. Routledge. p. 161. ISBN 9780415202855 – via Google Books.
  3. ^ a b c d e f Næss, Arne (January 1973). "The shallow and the deep, long‐range ecology movement. A summary". Inquiry. 16 (1–4): 95–100. doi:10.1080/00201747308601682. S2CID 52207763.
  4. ^ Boeckel, Jan van (June 1995). "Interview with Norwegian eco-philosopher Arne Naess" (PDF). www.rerunproducties.nl.
  5. ^ a b Sessions, George (2014). "Deep Ecology, New Conservation, and the Anthropocene Worldview". The Trumpeter. 30 (2): 106–114. ProQuest 1958534297.
  6. ^ Arne, Naess; Rothenberg, David (1993). Is it Painful to Think?. University of Minnesota Press. pp. 131–132.
  7. ^ a b Drengson, Alan; Devall, Bill; Schroll, Mark A. (2011). "The Deep Ecology Movement: Origins, Development, and Future Prospects (Toward a Transpersonal Ecosophy)". International Journal of Transpersonal Studies. 30 (1–2): 101–117. doi:10.24972/ijts.2011.30.1-2.101.
  8. ^ a b Harding, Stephan. Deep Ecology in the Holistic Science Programme. Schumacher College.
  9. ^ Margulis, Lynn (2006). "Foreword". In Harding, Stephan (ed.). Animate Earth: Science, Intuition, And Gaia. Chelsea Green. ISBN 978-1933392295.
  10. ^ a b Næss 2008, p. 6.
  11. ^ a b Sessions, George, ed. (1995). Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century. Shambala Publications. ISBN 9781570620492.
  12. ^ Bodian, Stephan (1982). "Simple in Means, Rich in Ends - A Conversation with Arne Naess" (PDF).
  13. ^ Devall & Sessions 1985, p. 70. sfn error: multiple targets (4×): CITEREFDevallSessions1985 (help)
  14. ^ a b Næss 1989, pp. 166, 187. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFNæss1989 (help)
  15. ^ Taylor, B.; Zimmerman, M. (2005). "Deep Ecology". In Taylor, B. (ed.). Encyclopedia of Religion and Nature. Vol. 1. London: Continuum International. pp. 456–60.
  16. ^ Fox, Warwick. The Intuition of Deep Ecology., quoted in Devall, Bill; Sessions, George (1985). Deep Ecology. Gibbs M. Smith. p. 90. ISBN 978-0-87905-247-8.
  17. ^ Bohm, David (1980). Wholeness and The Implicate Order. p. 37. ISBN 9780710003669.
  18. ^ Devall, Bill; Sessions, George (1985). Deep Ecology. Gibbs M. Smith. p. 85. ISBN 978-0-87905-247-8. "We are only fellow-voyagers with other creatures in the odyssey of evolution," states Aldo Leopold.
  19. ^ McLaughlin, Andrew (1995). Sessions, George (ed.). The Heart of Deep Ecology. Shambala Publications. p. 87. ISBN 9781570620492. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
  20. ^ "There are no shortcuts to direct organic experiencing." Morris Berman, quoted in Devall, Bill; Sessions, George (1985). Deep Ecology. Gibbs M. Smith. p. 89. ISBN 978-0-87905-247-8.
  21. ^ Næss, Arne (1977). "Spinoza and ecology". Philosophia. 7: 45–54. doi:10.1007/BF02379991. S2CID 143850683.
  22. ^ de Jonge, Eccy (28 April 2004). Spinoza and Deep Ecology: Challenging Traditional Approaches to Environmentalism (Ashgate New Critical Thinking in Philosophy). Routledge. ISBN 978-0754633273.
  23. ^ MacDonald, Brenden James (14 May 2012). "Spinoza, Deep Ecology, and Human Diversity -- Schizophrenics and Others Who Could Heal the Earth If Society Realized Eco-Literacy". The Trumpeter. 28 (1): 89–101. ProQuest 1959176673.
  24. ^ "Top 25 Quotes by Fritjof Capra (Of 60)". A-Z Quotes.
  25. ^ a b Næss 2008, p. 8.
  26. ^ a b Næss 1989, p. ?. sfn error: multiple targets (2×): CITEREFNæss1989 (help)
  27. ^ Dalsuet, Anne (2010). Philosophie et écologie [Philosophy and ecology] (in French). Gallimard.
  28. ^ Flipo, Fabrice (2014). Nature et politique. Contribution à une anthropologie de la modernité et de la globalisation [Nature and politics. Contribution to an anthropology of modernity and globalization] (in French). Amsterdam: Amsterdam éditions. ISBN 9782354801342.
  29. ^ Guha, Ramachandra; Alier, Joan Martínez (1997). "Radical American Environmentalism and Wilderness Preservation: A Third World Critique". Varieties of Environmentalism: Essays North and South. pp. 92–108.
  30. ^ "Bolsonaro declares 'the Amazon is ours' and calls deforestation data 'lies'". The Guardian. 19 July 2019.
  31. ^ ibid
  32. ^ Feinberg, Joel. "The Rights of Animals and Future Generations". Retrieved 25 April 2006.
  33. ^ Nagel, Thomas (1997). "What is it like to be a bat?". Philosophical Review: 172.
  34. ^ Abram, David. The Spell of the Sensuous. p. 262.
  35. ^ Devall, Bill; Sessions, George. Deep Ecology: Environmentalism as if all beings mattered. Archived from the original on 24 June 2017. Retrieved 25 April 2006.
  36. ^ Grey, William (1993). "Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology". Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 71 (4): 463–75. doi:10.1080/00048409312345442. Archived from the original on 14 April 2001. Retrieved 6 August 2021.{{cite journal}}: CS1 maint: unfit URL (link)
  37. ^ Abram, David (1997). The Spell of the Sensuous: Perception and Language in a More-Than-Human World. Vintage Books. ISBN 978-0679776390.
  38. ^ Devall & Sessions 1985, p. 97. sfn error: multiple targets (4×): CITEREFDevallSessions1985 (help)
  39. ^ Devall & Sessions 1985, p. 52. sfn error: multiple targets (4×): CITEREFDevallSessions1985 (help)
  40. ^ a b Bookchin, Murray (1987). "Social Ecology versus Deep Ecology: A Challenge for the Ecology Movement". Green Perspectives/Anarchy Archives – via dwardmac.pitzer.edu.
  41. ^ Sessions, George, ed. (1995). Deep Ecology for the 21st Century. p. 88. ISBN 9781570620492.
  42. ^ Jensen 2006, p. 18.
  43. ^ Jensen 2006.
  44. ^ Botkin, Daniel B. (2000). No Man's Garden: Thoreau and a New Vision for Civilization and Nature. Shearwater Books. pp. 42 42, 39. ISBN 978-1-55963-465-6.
  45. ^ Bate, Jonathan (2000). The Song of the Earth. p. 37.
  46. ^ Mumford, Lewis (1966). The Myth of the Machine — Technics & Human Development.
  47. ^ Jensen, Derrick; McBay, Aric (2011). Technics (excerpt from chapter "Technotopia: Industry"). Derrick Jensen. p. 234. ISBN 9781583229897. Retrieved 5 August 2021 – via derrickjensen.org. {{cite book}}: |work= ignored (help)
  48. ^ a b Wohlleben, Peter (2019). The Secret Wisdom of Nature: Trees, Animals and the Extraordinary Balance of All Living Things. Translated by Billinghurst, Jane. David Suzuki Institute, Greystone Books. ISBN 9781771643887.
  49. ^ Næss 2008, p. 9.
  50. ^ Kendall, Gillian (May 2011). "The Greater Good: Peter Singer On How To Live An Ethical Life". Sun Magazine, the Sun Interview. No. 425. Retrieved 2 December 2011.
  51. ^ AtKisson, Alan (Summer 1989). "Introduction To Deep Ecology, an interview with Michael E. Zimmerman". Global Climate Change (22). Context Institute: 24. Archived from the original on 23 January 2012. Retrieved 5 August 2021 – via Context.org.
  52. ^ Nelson, C. (August 2021). Ecofeminism vs. Deep Ecology. Dialogue, San Antonio, Texas: Dept. of Philosophy, Saint Mary's University.
  53. ^ Wall, Derek (1994). Green History. Routledge. ISBN 978-0-415-07925-9.
  54. ^ Levine, David, ed. (1991). Defending the Earth: a dialogue between Murray Bookchin and Dave Foreman.
  55. ^ Bookchin, Murray; Purchase, Graham; Morris, Brian; Aitchtey, Rodney; Hart, Robert; Wilbert, Chris (1993). Deep Ecology and Anarchism. Freedom Press. ISBN 978-0-900384-67-7.
  56. ^ Seed, J.; Macy, J.; Flemming, P.; Næss, A. (1988). Thinking like a mountain: towards a council of all beings. Heretic Books. ISBN 0-946097-26-7.
  57. ^ Deep Ecology & Anarchism. Freedom Press. 1993.
  58. ^ Morton, Timothy (2009). Ecology without Nature: Rethinking Environmental Aesthetics. Harvard University Press. ISBN 9780674266162.
  59. ^ Morton, Timothy (2016). Dark Ecology: For a Logic of Future Coexistence. Columbia University Press. ISBN 9780231541367.

Bibliography

[edit]

Additional sources

[edit]
  • Bender, F. L. (2003). The Culture of Extinction: Toward a Philosophy of Deep Ecology. Amherst, New York: Humanity Books.
  • Katz, E.; Light, A. (2000). Beneath the Surface: Critical Essays in the Philosophy of Deep Ecology. et al. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
  • LaChapelle, D. (1992). Sacred Land, Sacred Sex: Rapture of the Deep. Durango: Kivakí Press.
  • Passmore, J. (1974). Man's Responsibility for Nature. London: Duckworth.
  • Clark, John P. (2014). "What Is Living In Deep Ecology?". Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy. 30 (2): 157–183.
  • Hawkins, Ronnie (2014). "Why Deep Ecology Had To Die". Trumpeter: Journal of Ecosophy. 30 (2): 206–273.
  • Drengson, Alan. "The Deep Ecology Movement." The Green Majority, CIUT 89.5 FM, University of Toronto, 6 June 2008.

Further reading

[edit]
  • Gecevska, Valentina; Donev, Vancho; Polenakovik, Radmil (2016). "A Review Of Environmental Tools Towards Sustainable Development". Annals of the Faculty of Engineering Hunedoara - International Journal of Engineering. 14 (1): 147–152.
  • Glasser, Harold, ed. (2005). The Selected Works of Arne Næss. Vol. 1–10. Springer. ISBN 1-4020-3727-9.. (review)
  • Holy-Luczaj, Magdalena (2015). "Heidegger's Support For Deep Ecology Reexamined Once Again". Ethics & the Environment. 20 (1): 45–66. doi:10.2979/ethicsenviro.20.1.45. S2CID 141921083.
  • Keulartz, Jozef 1998. Struggle for nature : a critique of radical ecology, London [etc.] : Routledge.
  • Linkola, Pentti 2011. Can Life Prevail? UK: Arktos Media, 2nd Revised ed. ISBN 1907166637
  • Marc R., Fellenz. "9. Ecophilosophy: Deep Ecology And Ecofeminism." The Moral Menagerie : Philosophy and Animal Rights. 158. Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 2007.
  • Orton, David (9 January 2000). "Deep Ecology and Animal Rights: A Discussion Paper". The Green Web.
  • Sylvan, Richard (1985a). "A Critique of Deep Ecology, Part I". Radical Philosophy. 40: 2–12.
  • Sylvan, Richard (1985b). "A Critique of Deep Ecology, Part II". Radical Philosophy. 41: 1–22.
  • Tobias, Michael, ed. (1988) [1984]. Deep Ecology. Avant Books. ISBN 0-932238-13-0.

In Marxian economics and preceding theories,[1] the problem of primitive accumulation (also called previous accumulation, original accumulation) of capital concerns the origin of capital, and therefore of how class distinctions between possessors and non-possessors came to be.

Adam Smith's account of primitive-original accumulation depicted a peaceful process, in which some workers laboured more diligently than others and gradually built up wealth, eventually leaving the less diligent workers to accept living wages for their labour.[2] Karl Marx rejected such accounts as 'insipid childishness' for their omission of the role of violence, war, enslavement, and conquest in the historical accumulation of land and wealth.[3] Marxist scholar David Harvey explains Marx's primitive accumulation as a process which principally "entailed taking land, say, enclosing it, and expelling a resident population to create a landless proletariat, and then releasing the land into the privatized mainstream of capital accumulation".[4]

Naming and translations

[edit]

The concept was initially referred to in various different ways, and the expression of an "accumulation" at the origin of capitalism began to appear with Adam Smith.[5] Smith, writing The Wealth of Nations in his native English, spoke of a "previous" accumulation;[6] Karl Marx, writing Das Kapital in German, reprised Smith's expression, by translating it to German as ursprünglich ("original, initial"); Marx's translators, in turn, rendered it into English as primitive.[1] James Steuart, with his 1767 work, is considered by some scholars as the greatest classical theorist of primitive accumulation.[7]

Myths of political economy

[edit]

In disinterring the origins of capital, Marx felt the need to dispel what he felt were religious myths and fairy-tales about the origins of capitalism. Marx wrote:

This primitive accumulation plays in political economy about the same part as original sin in theology. Adam bit the apple, and thereupon sin fell on the human race. Its origin is supposed to be explained when it is told as an anecdote of the past. In times long gone-by there were two sorts of people; one, the diligent, intelligent, and, above all, frugal elite; the other, lazy rascals, spending their substance, and more, in riotous living. (...) Thus it came to pass that the former sort accumulated wealth, and the latter sort had at last nothing to sell except their own skins. And from this original sin dates the poverty of the great majority that, despite all its labour, has up to now nothing to sell but itself, and the wealth of the few that increases constantly although they have long ceased to work. Such childishness is every day preached to us in the defence of property.

— Capital, Volume I, chapter 26[8]

What must be explained is how the capitalist relations of production are historically established; in other words, how it comes about that means of production become privately owned and traded, and how capitalists can find workers on the labour market ready and willing to work for them, because they have no other means of livelihood (also referred to as the "reserve army of labour".)

[edit]

At the same time as local obstacles to investment in manufactures are being overcome, and a unified national market is developing with a nationalist ideology, Marx sees a strong impulse to business development coming from world trade:

The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of black-skins, signaled the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. These idyllic proceedings are the chief moments of primitive accumulation. On their heels treads the commercial war of the European nations, with the globe for a theatre. It begins with the revolt of the Netherlands from Spain, assumes giant dimensions in England's Anti-Jacobin War, and is still going on in the opium wars against China, &c.
The different moments of primitive accumulation distribute themselves now, more or less in chronological order, particularly over Spain, Portugal, Holland, France, and England. In England at the end of the 17th century, they arrive at a systematical combination, embracing the colonies, the national debt, the modern mode of taxation, and the protectionist system. These methods depend in part on brute force, e.g., the colonial system. But, they all employ the power of the state, the concentrated and organized force of society, to hasten, hot-house fashion, the process of transformation of the feudal mode of production into the capitalist mode, and to shorten the transition. Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new one. It is itself an economic power.

— Capital, Volume I, chapter 31, emphasis added.[9]

Privatization

[edit]

According to Marx, the purpose of primitive accumulation is to privatize the means of production, so that the exploiting owner class can profit from the surplus labour of those who, lacking other means, must work for them.

Marx says that primitive accumulation means the expropriation of the direct producers and, more specifically, "the dissolution of private property based on the labour of its owner... Self-earned private property, that is based, so to speak, on the fusing together of the isolated, independent labouring-individual with the conditions of his labour, is supplanted by capitalistic private property, which rests on the exploitation of the nominally free labour of others, i.e., wage labour (emphasis added).[10]

Social relations of capitalism

[edit]

In the last chapter of Capital, Volume I, Marx described the social conditions he thought necessary for capitalism with a comment about Edward Gibbon Wakefield's theory of colonization:

Wakefield discovered that in the Colonies, property in money, means of subsistence, machines, and other means of production, does not as yet stamp a man as a capitalist if there be wanting the correlative – the wage-worker, the other man who is compelled to sell himself of his own free-will. He discovered that capital is not a thing, but a social relation between persons, established by the instrumentality of things. Mr. Peel, he moans, took with him from England to Swan River, West Australia, means of subsistence and of production to the amount of £50,000. Mr. Peel had the foresight to bring with him, besides, 3,000 persons of the working-class, men, women, and children. Once arrived at his destination, 'Mr. Peel was left without a servant to make his bed or fetch him water from the river.' Unhappy Mr. Peel, who provided for everything except the export of English modes of production to Swan River![11]

This is indicative of Marx's more general fascination with settler colonialism, and his interest in how "free" lands—or, more accurately, lands seized from indigenous people—could disrupt capitalist social relations.[citation needed]

Ongoing primitive accumulation

[edit]

"Orthodox" Marxists[who?] see primitive accumulation as a process beginning in the late Middle Ages and finishing with the rise of capitalist industry, situated entirely within the transition from the feudal mode of production to the capitalist mode of production. However, this can be seen as a misrepresentation of both Marx's ideas and historical reality, since feudal-type economies persist in various parts of the world, even in the 21st century.[This paragraph needs citation(s)]

Marx's description of primitive accumulation may also be seen as a special case of the general principle of capitalist market expansion. In part, trade grows incrementally, but often the establishment of capitalist relations of production involves force and violence. Transforming property relations means that assets previously owned by some people are no longer owned by them, but by other people, and making people part with their assets in this way involves coercion. This is an ongoing process of expropriation, proletarianization and urbanization.

In his preface to Das Kapital Vol. 1, Marx compares the situations of England and Germany and points out that less developed countries also face a process of primitive accumulation. Marx comments that "if, however, the German reader shrugs his shoulders at the condition of the English industrial and agricultural labourers, or in optimist fashion comforts himself with the thought that in Germany things are not nearly so bad, I must plainly tell him, "De te fabula narratur! (the tale is told of you!)".

Marx was referring here to the expansion of the capitalist mode of production (not the expansion of world trade), through expropriation processes. He continues, "Intrinsically, it is not a question of the higher or lower degree of development of the social antagonism that results from the natural laws of capitalist production. It is a question of these laws themselves, of these tendencies working with iron necessity towards inevitable results. The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future."[This paragraph needs citation(s)]

David Harvey's theory of accumulation by dispossession

[edit]

David Harvey expands the concept of "primitive accumulation" to create a new concept, "accumulation by dispossession", in his 2003 book, The New Imperialism. Like Mandel, Harvey claims that the word "primitive" leads to a misunderstanding of the history of capitalism: that the original, "primitive" phase of capitalism is somehow a transitory phase that need not be repeated once commenced. Instead, Harvey maintains that primitive accumulation ("accumulation by dispossession") is a continuing process within the process of capital accumulation on a world scale. Because the central Marxian notion of crisis via "over-accumulation" is assumed to be a constant factor in the process of capital accumulation, the process of "accumulation by dispossession" acts as a possible safety valve that may temporarily ease the crisis. This is achieved by simply lowering the prices of consumer commodities (thus pushing up the propensity for general consumption), which in turn is made possible by the considerable reduction in the price of production inputs. Should the magnitude of the reduction in the price of inputs outweigh the reduction in the price of consumer goods, it can be said that the rate of profit will, for the time being, increase. Thus:

Access to cheaper inputs is, therefore, just as important as access to widening markets in keeping profitable opportunities open. The implication is that non-capitalist territories should be forced open not only to trade (which could be helpful) but also to permit capital to invest in profitable ventures using cheaper labour power, raw materials, low-cost land, and the like. The general thrust of any capitalist logic of power is not that territories should be held back from capitalist development, but that they should be continuously opened up.

— David Harvey, The New Imperialism, p. 139.

Harvey's theoretical extension encompasses more recent economic dimensions such as intellectual property rights, privatization, and predation and exploitation of nature and folklore.

Privatization of public services puts enormous profit in capitalists' hands. If it belonged to the public sector, this profit would not exist. In this sense, profit is created by the dispossession of peoples or nations. Destructive industrial use of the environment is similar because the environment "naturally" belongs to everyone, or to no one; factually, it "belongs" to whoever lives there.

Multinational pharmaceutical companies collect information about how herbs or other natural medicines are used among natives in less-developed countries, do some research and development to find the materials that make those natural medicines effective, and patent the findings. By doing so, multinational pharmaceutical companies can now sell the medicine to the natives, who are the original source of the knowledge that made the production of medicine possible. That is, dispossession of folklore (knowledge, wisdom, and practice) through intellectual property rights.

David Harvey also argues that accumulation by dispossession is a temporary or partial solution to over-accumulation. Because accumulation by dispossession makes raw materials cheaper, the profit rate can at least temporarily go up.

Harvey's interpretation has been criticized by Tom Brass,[12] who disputes the view that what is described as present-day primitive accumulation, or accumulation by dispossession, entails proletarianization. Because the latter is equated by Harvey with the separation of the direct producer (mostly smallholders) from the means of production (land), Harvey assumes this results in the formation of a free workforce. By contrast, Brass points out that in many instances, the process of depeasantization leads to workers who are unfree because they are unable personally to commodify or recommodify their labour, by selling it to the highest bidder.

Schumpeter's critique of Marx's theory

[edit]

The economist Joseph Schumpeter disagreed with the Marxian explanation of the origin of capital, because Schumpeter did not believe in exploitation. In liberal economic theory, the market returns to all people the exact value they have provided it; capitalists are just people who are very adept at saving and whose contributions are especially magnificent, and they do not take anything away from other people or the environment.[citation needed] Liberals believe that capitalism has no internal flaws or contradictions; only external threats.[citation needed] To liberals, the idea of the necessity of violent primitive accumulation to capital is particularly incendiary. Schumpeter wrote rather testily:

[The problem of Original Accumulation] presented itself first to those authors, chiefly to Marx and the Marxists, who held an exploitation theory of interest and had, therefore, to face the question of how exploiters secured control of an initial stock of 'capital' (however defined) with which to exploit – a question which that theory per se is incapable of answering, and which may obviously be answered in a manner highly uncongenial to the idea of exploitation.

— Joseph Schumpeter, Business Cycles, Vol. 1, New York; McGraw-Hill, 1939, p. 229.

Schumpeter argued that imperialism was not a necessary jump-start for capitalism, nor is it needed to bolster capitalism, because imperialism pre-dated capitalism. Schumpeter believed that, whatever the empirical evidence, capitalist world trade could in principle expand peacefully. Where imperialism occurs, Schumpeter asserted, it has nothing to do with the intrinsic nature of capitalism itself, or of capitalist market expansion. The distinction between Schumpeter and Marx here is subtle. Marx claimed that capitalism requires violence and imperialism—first, to kick-start capitalism with a pile of booty and to dispossess a population to induce them to enter into capitalist relations as workers, and then to surmount the otherwise-fatal contradictions generated within capitalist relations over time. Schumpeter's view was that imperialism is an atavistic impulse pursued by a state, independent of the interests of the economic ruling class.

Imperialism is the object-less disposition of a state to expansion by force without assigned limits... Modern Imperialism is one of the heirlooms of the absolute monarchical state. The "inner logic" of capitalism would have never evolved it. Its sources come from the policy of the princes and the customs of a pre-capitalist milieu. But even export monopoly is not imperialism and it would never have developed to imperialism in the hands of the pacific bourgeoisie. This happened only because the war machine, its social atmosphere, and the martial will were inherited and because a martially oriented class (i.e., the nobility) maintained itself in a ruling position with which of all the varied interests of the bourgeoisie the martial ones could ally themselves. This alliance keeps alive fighting instincts and ideas of domination. It led to social relations which perhaps ultimately are to be explained by relations of production but not by the productive relations of capitalism alone.

— Joseph A. Schumpeter, The Sociology of Imperialism (1918).

See also

[edit]

References

[edit]
  1. ^ a b Perelman 2000, p. 25.
  2. ^ Harvey, David (September 2008). Class 12, Chapters 26–33, The Secret of Primitive Accumulation. Reading Marx’s Capital. Event occurs at 20:00–22:00.
  3. ^ Karl Marx, Capital, vol I Ch. 26
  4. ^ Harvey, David (2005). "4 Accumulation by Dispossession". The New Imperialism. Oxford University Press. p. 149. ISBN 0-19-926431-7 – via Google Books.
  5. ^ Smith, Adam (1776). "Introduction". The Wealth of Nations. Vol. Book II: On the Nature, Accumulation, and Employment of Stock. ... the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of things, be previous to the division of labour...
  6. ^ Marx, Karl. "Chapter Twenty-Six: The Secret of Primitive Accumulation". Capital. Vol. I – via Marxists Internet Archive. The whole movement, therefore, seems to turn in a vicious circle, out of which we can only get by supposing a primitive accumulation (previous accumulation of Adam Smith) preceding capitalistic accumulation; an accumulation not the result of the capitalistic mode of production, but its starting point. [referring to Adam Smith's Wealth, Bk II introduction,] This accumulation must, evidently, be previous to his applying his industry for so long a time to such a peculiar business.
  7. ^ Perelman 2000, p. 170.
  8. ^ Marx, Karl. "Chapter Twenty-Six: The Secret of Primitive Accumulation". Capital. Vol. I – via Marxists Internet Archive.
  9. ^ Marx, Karl. "Chapter Thirty-One: Genesis of the Industrial Capitalist". Capital. Vol. I – via Marxists Internet Archive.
  10. ^ Marx, Karl. "Chapter Thirty-Two: Historical Tendency of Capitalist Accumulation". Capital. Vol. I – via Marxists Internet Archive.
  11. ^ Marx, Karl. "Chapter Thirty-Three: The Modern Theory of Colonisation". Capital. Vol. I – via Marxists Internet Archive.
  12. ^ Brass, Tom (2011). "Unfree labour as primitive accumulation? Capital & Class". Capital & Class. 35 (1): 23–38. doi:10.1177/0309816810392969. S2CID 154410909.

Bibliography

[edit]


Further reading

[edit]
[edit]