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Fallacy Files

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Nikzor

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IEP

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Baron

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Table

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Bias Normative model Explanation
I. ATTENTION
I. A. Availability, attention to here and now, easy, and compatible
errors in syllogisms logic limited search
four-card problem logic limited search
anchoring and underadjustment right answer to the question asked underadjustment
"availability in causes of death" right answer availability heuristic
"fault tree effect" probability additivity availability heuristic
asymmetric dominance independence of irrelevant alternatives neglect of difficult judgment
evaluability effect {see Choice#Evaluability_in_economics} invariance principle neglect of difficult judgment
dynamic inconsistency consistent discounting attention to short-term {temporal myopia? temporal discounting?}
"preference reversal for gambles" invariance principle response mode compatibility
identifiable victim effect utilitarianism proportionality heuristic*
planning fallacy regression to the mean individuating information
I. B. Heuristics based on imperfect correlations
gambler's fallacy independence of events representativeness heuristic
hindsight bias right answer availability heuristic
outcome bias right answer availability heuristic
information bias (psychology) value of information information heuristic
congruence bias value of information congruence heuristic
status-quo bias invariance principle status-quo heuristic
ambiguity effect EU theory (sure-thing principle) missing information heuristic
omission bias EU theory or utilitarianism do-no-harm heuristic
"punishment without deterrence" utilitarianism reciprocity heuristic
naturalness bias utility theory "naturalness heuristic"
proportionality bias EU theory (linear in p) proportionality heuristic
zero-risk bias EU theory proportionality heuristic
"extra cost effect" utility theory (only future consequences matter) confusion of marginal and total cost
sunk cost effect utility theory (future) no-waste heuristic
ex-ante equality utilitarianism equality heuristic
voter's illusion cause-effect cause-correlation confusion
diversification bias utility theory adaptation heuristic
I. C. Focus on one attribute with unawareness of others
neglect of priors (prior probability) {base rate neglect?[1]} Bayes's theorem representativeness heuristic
"nonregressiveness in prediction" (regression fallacy) regression to the mean representativeness heuristic
conjunction effect logic and probability representativeness heuristic
illusion of control contingency attention to outcome
prominence effect invariance (principle?) importance heuristic
neglect of ranges multiattribute utility theory importance heuristic
single mindedness multiattribute utility theory limited attention
failure to integrate utility maximization social isolation
fixed-pie assumption {negotiation} multiattribute utility theory failure to see tradeoffs
parochialism effect {parochialism} utilitarianism self-interest illusion
II. MOTIVATED BIAS - MYSIDE BIAS AND WISHFUL THINKING
inappropriate extreme confidence calibration myside bias in search
regression to the mean
wishful thinking independence of belief and value effect of desire on belief
selective exposure fairness toward evidence selective exposure
biased assimilation {Assimilation effect? Confirmation_bias#Biased_interpretation?} neutral evidence principle biased assimilation
polarization effect neutral evidence principle biased assimilation
belief overkill {(redirects)} uncorrelated beliefs myside bias
illusory correlation true correlation biased assimilation
primacy effect order principle biased assimilation
distortion of fairness by self-interest universalizability of morality wishful thinking
morality as self-interest illusion self-other distinction belief overkill
III. PSYCHOPHYSICAL DISTORTIONS
certainty effect EU theory (linear probability) diminishing sensitivity
overweighting low probabilities EU theory (linear probability) diminishing sensitivity
declining marginal disutility increasing marginal disutility (=declining marginal utility) diminishing sensitivity
framing effect for gains and losses invariance principle diminishing sensitivity
dynamic inconsistency** consistent discounting diminishing sensitivity to time

Other

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Extensionality, invariance

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  • The principle that mere re-description should not affect our decisions, normatively, is called “extensionality” (Arrow, 1982) or “invariance” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1984).
  • [...] the extensional notion that the probability of an event equals the sum of the probabilities of the different ways in which the event can occur. [2]