User:Jimmy is Jimmy/Berlin Crisis of 1958–1959
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Berlin Crisis of 1958-1959
[edit]Background
[edit]Emigration through East Berlin
[edit]this section already exists and seems fine to me.
West German rearmament (start of my planned contribution)
[edit]1955 saw the United States welcome West Germany into its alliance, NATO.[1] United States leadership thought that German reunification was important to secure, and they thought rearming West Germany could give them the leverage needed to achieve that goal.[2] The United States and West Germany were alone in this goal however, as The United Kingdom and France did not support the reunification by this time.[3] The United States also wanted Germany to stay aligned with the Western Powers, even if it should just be Western Germany in that case.[4] The United States and other Western Powers first agreed to let West Germany conventionally rearm, but West German leadership would complain about "discrimination" when denied nuclear weapons as part of the rearmament.[5] West Germany would demand tactical nuclear weapons or a general disarmament throughout much of 1956 and 1957.[5] Eisenhower proposed in 1957 that West Germany would get nuclear capable launchers, and the United States would have control over the warheads themselves.[6] In 1958 Adenauer would begin work to arm West Germany with its own nuclear weapons in 1958.[7]
Preventing West Germany from joining NATO had been an important goal for Soviet leadership, and their failure to do so forced a change in strategy.[1] They made an alliance with the Eastern Bloc countries, The Warsaw Pact, and engaged in extended diplomacy with Adenauer.[1] West Germany possibly getting nuclear weapons of its own, and uncertainty in the future of West German politics, led Soviet leaders to move away from supporting reunification.[3] Khrushchev instead moved towards a two states solution, recognizing West Germany and giving East Germany more autonomy.[8] He had hoped to gain more direct influence over West Germany, while being able to maintain assistance sent into Eastern Germany.[8]
1958 Berlin ultimatum (everything in italics already exists on the page)
[edit]Khrushchev sought to find a lasting solution to the problem of a divided Germany and of the enclave of West Berlin deep within East German territory. In November 1958, calling West Berlin a "malignant tumor", he gave the United States, United Kingdom and France six months to conclude a peace treaty with both German states and the Soviet Union. If one was not signed, Khrushchev stated, the Soviet Union would conclude a peace treaty with East Germany. This would leave East Germany, which was not a party to treaties giving the Western Powers access to Berlin, in control of the routes to the city.[9] This ultimatum caused dissent among the Western Allies, who were reluctant to go to war over the issue.[10] Khrushchev, however, repeatedly extended the deadline. He had hoped to strengthen East Germany with the ultimatums.[11] Khrushchev thought if he could get West Berlin made into a free city, and if the Western Powers would recognize East Germany, that he could curb the East German emigration crisis.[11]
From the NATO perspective West Berlin—deep in Communist territory—had no military value. However it was the preeminent symbol of resistance to Soviet takeover of Europe. Eisenhower commented that Berlin was an "instance in which our political posture requires us to assume military postures that are wholly illogical.”[12] British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited Moscow for extended discussions with Khrushchev in February 1959. The meetings were mostly cordial; the ultimatum was dropped.[13] The Western Powers did not agree much on what they should do about the ultimatums. The French took a tougher stance, ready to call the bluff of the Soviet Union.[14] Eisenhower initially took a similar hard line position, but soon realized that negotiations could be made without seeming weak.[15] The UK took a weaker position, even after the February meetings, which Macmillan himself was embarrassed by, they still wanted to negotiate to maintain the status quo.[16] The West German position was against any talks that involved East Germany, and that reunification could only be gained by free elections.[17]
Notes
[edit]- ^ a b c Harrison, Hope M. (2003). Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961. Princeton University Press. p. 54. ISBN 978-0-691-12428-5.
- ^ Trachtenberg, Marc (1991). History and Strategy. Princeton University Press. pp. 173–174. ISBN 978-0-691-21798-7.
- ^ a b Trachtenberg, Marc (1991). History and Strategy. Princeton University Press. pp. 178–179. ISBN 978-0-691-02343-4.
- ^ Trachtenberg, Marc (1991). History and Strategy. Princeton University Press. p. 176. ISBN 978-0-691-02343-4.
- ^ a b Trachtenberg, Marc (1991). History and Strategy. Princeton University Press. pp. 181–184. ISBN 978-0-691-21798-7.
- ^ Trachtenberg, Marc (1991). History and Strategy. Princeton University Press. p. 184. ISBN 978-0-691-02343-4.
- ^ Trachtenberg, Marc (1991). History and Strategy. Princeton University Press. p. 191. ISBN 978-0-691-02343-4.
- ^ a b Harrison, Hope M. (2003). Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961. Princeton University Press. pp. 54–55. ISBN 978-0-691-12428-5.
- ^ Tompson 1995, p. 195
- ^ Tompson 1995, p. 196
- ^ a b Harrison, Hope M. (2003). Driving the Soviets up the Wall: Soviet-East German Relations, 1953-1961. Princeton University Press. p. 114. ISBN 978-0-691-12428-5.
- ^ Large, 2000, p 438–39.
- ^ Curtis Keeble, Britain and the Soviet Union, 1917–89 pp 258–60.
- ^ Trachtenberg, Marc (1991). History and Strategy. Princeton University Press. p. 198. ISBN 978-0-691-02343-4.
- ^ Trachtenberg, Marc (1991). History and Strategy. Princeton University Press. pp. 194–195. ISBN 978-0-691-02343-4.
- ^ Trachtenberg, Marc (1991). History and Strategy. Princeton University Press. pp. 198–200. ISBN 978-0-691-02343-4.
- ^ Trachtenberg, Marc (1991). History and Strategy. Princeton University Press. p. 197. ISBN 978-0-691-02343-4.